

hwJ.

1. \rightarrow GLM = unknown concentration P_0 of infectious microbe.

\rightarrow progressively dilute original solution

\rightarrow after each dilution, pour (small volume) V into plate.

\rightarrow plate $\begin{cases} \rightarrow \text{zero microbe} \rightarrow \text{sterile} \\ \rightarrow \text{any microbe} \rightarrow \text{infected.} \end{cases}$

\rightarrow observing = whether infection. & P_0

$\rightarrow P_t$ = concentration at dilution t

$$\rightarrow P_t = \frac{P_0}{2^t}$$

$\rightarrow Y_t$ = observed sterile plate $\in \{0, 1\}$

\rightarrow relate P_0 & t & Y_t

a. $\rightarrow \mu(t) := \mathbb{E}[Y_t] = \text{chance of infected plate}$

\rightarrow plausible output dist for Y_t , using $\mu(t)$.

\Rightarrow since Y_t can either be 0 or 1

$\Rightarrow Y_t$ is a discrete binary dist

\Rightarrow possible dist = bernoulli dist

\Rightarrow thus, $Y_t \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\mu(t))$

b. \rightarrow at dilution t , pour volum v .

$$\rightarrow \mathbb{E}[\# \text{microbe}] = P_t * V.$$

\rightarrow actual # microbes at $t \sim \text{Poisson}(P_t * V)$.

$$\rightarrow \text{expression} = M(t) := \mathbb{E}[Y_t]$$

$\Rightarrow M(t) = P(\text{plate is infected at dilution } t)$

$= 1 - P(\text{there are 0 microbes on plate at dilution } t)$.

$$= 1 - P(0 \sim \text{Poisson}(P_t * V))$$

$$= 1 - e^{-vP_t} \frac{(vP_t)^0}{0!}$$

$$= 1 - e^{-vP_t}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{since } P_t = \frac{P_0}{2^t}$$

$$\Rightarrow M(t) = 1 - e^{-v * \left(\frac{P_0}{2^t}\right)}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{thus, } M(t) = 1 - e^{-v * \left(\frac{P_0}{2^t}\right)}.$$

C. \rightarrow link func $g(M(t)) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t$

\rightarrow constant β_0 & β_1 .

$$\Rightarrow M(t) = 1 - e^{-v * \left(\frac{P_0}{2^t}\right)}$$

\Rightarrow since the only part that contain t is the second part

$$\Rightarrow \text{let } g(x) = 1 - x$$

$$\Rightarrow g(M(t)) = 1 - \left(1 - e^{-v * \left(\frac{P_0}{2^t}\right)}\right)$$

$$= e^{-v * \left(\frac{P_0}{2^t}\right)}$$

\Rightarrow if we take \ln for this $g(x) = g_2(x)$

$$\Rightarrow \ln[g(\mu(t))] = \log\left[e^{-v * \left(\frac{P_0}{2^t}\right)}\right]$$

$$= -v * \left(\frac{P_0}{2^t}\right)$$

\Rightarrow we then take \log_2 for $g_2(x)$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow \log_2(g_2(x)) &= \log_2\left[-v * P_0 * 2^{-t}\right] \\ &= \log_2[-v * P_0] - \log_2[2^t] \\ &= \log_2[-v * P_0] - t \end{aligned}$$

\Rightarrow then $B_0 = \log_2[-v * P_0]$ and $B_1 = -1$

$$\Rightarrow \log_2[\ln(1 - \mu(t))] = \log_2[-v * P_0] - t$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{thus, } g(x) = \log_2[\ln(1 - x)]$$

$$\text{so } g(\mu(t)) = \log_2[\ln(1 - \mu(t))]$$

$$\text{and } B_0 = \log_2[-v * P_0] = \text{constant}$$

$$\text{and } B_1 = -1 = \text{constant.}$$

d. \rightarrow estimation for P_0

$$\Rightarrow Y_t = \text{Bernoulli}(\mu(t))$$

$$\Rightarrow \mu(t) = 1 - e^{-v * \left(\frac{P_0}{2^t}\right)}$$

$$\Rightarrow g(\mu(t)) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t$$

$$\Rightarrow \beta_0 = \log_2 [-v * P_0] \quad \& \quad \beta_1 = -1$$

$$\Rightarrow 2^{\beta_0} = -v * P_0$$

$$\Rightarrow P_0 = 2^{\beta_0} / (-v)$$

\Rightarrow thus, if we know P_0 , estimate for

$$P_0 = 2^{\beta_0} / (-v)$$

2. \rightarrow finite markov decision process

\rightarrow each state = 4 action N, S, E, W.

\rightarrow each action reward = 0.

\rightarrow off-grid: $R = -1$ & $A \rightarrow A' = R = +10$

$\rightarrow B \rightarrow B' = +5$

$\rightarrow \gamma = 0.9$ = discounted rewards

a. \rightarrow center $V(S) = 0.7$ & bellman equation.

$$\Rightarrow V(S) = \max_a Q(S, a)$$

$$\begin{aligned}\Rightarrow Q(S, a) &= \sum_{S'} P(S'|S, a) * (R(S', a, S) + \gamma V(S')) \\ &= \sum_{S'} P(S'|S, a) * (R(S', a, S) + \gamma \max_{a'} Q(S', a')).\end{aligned}$$

s'

\Rightarrow since each state have 4 possible actions equally

$\Rightarrow R(s', a, s) = 0$ for all movement around the center

$$\Rightarrow V(\text{center}) = \max_a \sum_{s'} 1 * (0 + 0.9 V(s'))$$

$\Rightarrow P(s'|s, a) = \text{deterministically } 1/4.$

\Rightarrow deviate the optimal policy, in this we need the value

func that have equal prob to go to all adjacent state

$$\Rightarrow V(\text{center}) = \sum_a P(a|s) \sum_{s'} P(s'|s, a) * (R(s', a, s) + \gamma V(s')).$$

$$\Rightarrow V(\text{center}) = \frac{1}{4} * (0 + 0.9(2.3)) + \frac{1}{4} * (0 + 0.9(0.7))$$

$$+ \frac{1}{4} (0 + 0.9(0.4)) + \frac{1}{4} * (0 + 0.9(-0.4))$$

$$= 0.675$$

≈ 0.7 (rounding up to 1 decimal point).

\Rightarrow thus, the center state does have a value +0.7 under this policy.

b. \rightarrow adding constant c to all rewards

\rightarrow result \uparrow in V_c to all states

\rightarrow prove diff in state value = same

$\rightarrow V_c$ in terms of c and γ

$$\Rightarrow V^\pi(s) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k R(s_t, a_t) | S_0 = s \right]$$

$\Rightarrow R(S_t, A_t)$ = each reward at time t.

\Rightarrow let $R_i = R(S_i, A_i)$ & $i \in T$.

$$\Rightarrow V^\pi(S) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k R_{k+1} \mid S_0 = S \right]$$

\Rightarrow by adding a constant C to all reward.

$$\Rightarrow \text{new } V'_\pi(S) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k (R_{k+1} + C) \mid S_0 = S \right].$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\gamma^k R_{k+1} + \gamma^k C) \mid S_0 = S \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k R_{k+1} + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} C \gamma^k \mid S_0 = S \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k R_{k+1} + C \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k \mid S_0 = S \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k R_{k+1} \mid S_0 = S \right] + \mathbb{E} \left[C \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k \mid S_0 = S \right]$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{new } V'_\pi(S) = V_\text{old}^\pi(S) + C * \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k \right]$$

\Rightarrow since $\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k \right]$ is independent of S

\Rightarrow all state's new $V'_\pi(S)$ is increase by the same constant

$$\Rightarrow \text{let } V_c = V'_\pi(S) - V_\text{old}^\pi(S)$$

$$= C * \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k \right] \text{ & } k = \text{all positive int}$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k \right] = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k = \text{geometric series} \text{ & } \gamma < 1$$

$\Rightarrow V_c = C * \text{geometric series that converge}$

$$= \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k * C$$

$$\approx \left[\frac{1}{1-\gamma} \right] * c$$

$$= \frac{c}{1-\gamma}$$

\Rightarrow thus, adding a constant c does not affect the relative

values of state under that policy, and

$$V_c = \frac{c}{1-\gamma}$$

c.

\Rightarrow the expected return $V^\pi(s) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k R_{k+1} | S_0 = s \right]$

\Rightarrow we can tell from the graph that A' have a negative value

while B' have a positive value

\Rightarrow this means that to get to A' state, the penalty for running into edge is larger than possibly reach state A then to A' .

\Rightarrow vice, versa, since state B' have a positive value, the penalty for running into edge is smaller than possibly reach state B then to B' .

\Rightarrow we know that once we get to state A , we have to get to A' .

bc the A' have a negative value, we can tell that it's more likely

to go into the penalty state (running to the edge of the grid),
thus, the expected return A smaller than the immediate reward.

\Rightarrow we can analyze the same thing for B, once we get to state B

we have to get to B', bc the B' have a negative value, we can

tell that it's less likely to go into the penalty state

thus, the expected return B larger than the immediate reward.

3. \rightarrow robot A: starting position K. & $K \in \{1, 4\}$.

\rightarrow from K, to $K_1 = \begin{cases} \xrightarrow{\text{shoot}(S)} & \text{shoot} \\ \xrightarrow{\text{dribble}(D)} & \end{cases}$ & $P_A = \text{shoot}$.

\rightarrow if $S \xrightarrow{\text{score}(G)} G$ & $D \xrightarrow{\text{miss}(M)} M$. $\xrightarrow{\text{advance}} P_{t+1}$

\rightarrow terminate states = G & M.

\rightarrow transitional model $(y) = P(\text{dribble} \& \text{advance})$.

\rightarrow discount $\gamma = 1$

$\rightarrow P(G|K, S) = \frac{k}{6} \quad \& \quad P(M|K, S) = 1 - \frac{k}{6}$

$\rightarrow P(K+1|K, D) = y \quad \& \quad P(M|K, D) = y$.

$\rightarrow R(K, S, G) = 1$.

a. \rightarrow always shoot $V^\pi(1)$.

$\Rightarrow V^\pi(S) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k R(S_t, a_t) | S_0 = S \right] \quad \& \quad V(\text{terminal state}) = 0$

$\Rightarrow V^\pi(1) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k R(S_t, S) | S_0 = 1 \right] = \sum_{P'} P(P'|1) * (R(1, S, S') + \gamma V(P'))$

$$= \mathbb{E}[R(1, S)]$$

$$= P(G|1, S) * 1 + P(M|1, S) * 0$$

$$= \frac{1}{6} * 1 + \frac{5}{6} * 0 = \frac{1}{6}.$$

$$\Rightarrow V^\pi(1) = \frac{1}{6}$$

\Rightarrow thus, $V^\pi(1)$ for the policy π that shoot is $\frac{1}{6}$.

b. $\rightarrow Q^*(s, a) = \text{value of a } q\text{-state } (s, a)$.

\rightarrow expected utility = starting with action a at state s & optimally acting after.

$\rightarrow Q^*(3, D) \& y$.

$$\begin{aligned}\Rightarrow Q^*(s, D) &= \sum_{s'} P(s'|s, a) * (R(s', a, s) + \gamma V(s')) \\ &= \sum_{s'} P(s'|s, a) * (R(s', a, s) + \gamma \max_{a'} Q(s', a')).\end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow Q^*(3, D) = \sum_{P'} P(P'|3, D) * (R(P', D, 3) + \gamma V(P'))$$

$\Rightarrow P'$ can either be \xrightarrow{M} advance to $K=4$

$$\Rightarrow ① P' = \text{miss}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = P(M|3, D) * (R(M, D, 3) + \gamma V(M))$$

$$= (1-y) * (0+0) = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow ② P' = \text{advance to } K=4$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = P(\text{advance}|3, D) * (R(K=4, D, 3) + \gamma V(K=4))$$

$$= y * [0 + V(k=4)]$$

$$\Rightarrow V(k=4) = \max_a Q(4, a)$$

$$= \max_a \sum_{p'} P(p'|4, a) * (R(p', a, 4) + \gamma V(p'))$$

\Rightarrow at $K=4$, action = S & $p' = \begin{matrix} G \\ \rightarrow M \end{matrix}$

$$\Rightarrow V(k=4) = \sum_{p'} P(p'|4, S) * [R(p', S, 4) + \gamma V(p')]$$

$$= P(G|4, S) * [R(G, S, 4) + V(G)] + P(M|4, S) * [R(M, S, 4) + V(M)]$$

$$= \frac{4}{6} * (1+0) + (1 - \frac{4}{6}) * (0+0)$$

$$= \frac{4}{6}$$

$$\Rightarrow Q^*(3, D) = [value = miss] + [value = pass]$$

$$= [value = miss] + [value = V(k=4)]$$

$$= [value = miss] + y * [V(k=4)]$$

$$= 0 + \frac{4}{6}y = \frac{2}{3}y$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{thus, } Q^*(3, D) = \frac{2}{3}y.$$

C. $\rightarrow V_t^*(s) = \text{value of a state at iteration } t.$

\rightarrow expected utility starting s & acting optimally.

$\rightarrow y = \frac{3}{4}$ & first two ($t=1, 2$) value iteration.

$\rightarrow t=0 = \text{value 0 in every state } V_0^*(1) = \dots = V_0^*(4) = 0.$

$$\rightarrow V_{t+1}^*(s) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{s'} P(s'|s,a) (R(s,a,s') + V_t^*(s')).$$

$$\Rightarrow V_0^*(1) = V_0^*(2) = V_0^*(3) = V_0^*(4) = G = M = 0.$$

$$\Rightarrow V_{0+1}^*(1) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{p'} P(p'|1,a) (R(1,a,p') + 0).$$

$$\Rightarrow \textcircled{1} a=S \& p' \xrightarrow{M} G$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = \frac{1}{6}$$

$$\Rightarrow \textcircled{2} a=D \& p' \xrightarrow{M} k=2$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = \frac{1}{4}*0 + \frac{3}{4}*0 = 0$$

value [S] > value [D]

$$\Rightarrow V_1^*(1) = \frac{1}{6}$$

\Rightarrow since all $V_0^*(k)=0$, all the rest $V_i^*(k)$ will choose shoot

$$\Rightarrow V_i^*(k) = P(G|k,S)$$

$$\Rightarrow V_i^*(1) = \frac{1}{6} \& V_i^*(2) = \frac{2}{6} \& V_i^*(3) = \frac{3}{6} \& V_i^* = \frac{4}{6}$$

$$\Rightarrow V_{i+1}^*(1) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{p'} P(p'|1,a) (R(1,a,p') - V_i^*(p')).$$

$$\Rightarrow \textcircled{1} a=S \& p' \xrightarrow{M} G$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = \frac{5}{6}*(0+0) + \frac{1}{6}*(1+0) = \frac{1}{6}$$

value [S] < value [D]

$$\Rightarrow \textcircled{2} a=D \& p' \xrightarrow{M} k=2$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = \frac{1}{4}(0-0) + \frac{3}{4}(0+\frac{2}{6}) = \frac{1}{4}$$

$$\Rightarrow V_2^*(1) = \frac{1}{4} \& \text{action} = D$$

$$\Rightarrow V_{t+1}^*(2) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{P'} P(P'|2, a) (R(2, a, P') - V_t^*(P')).$$

$$\Rightarrow \textcircled{1} a=S \& P' \xrightarrow{M} G$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = \frac{4}{6} * (0+0) + \frac{2}{6} * (1+0) = \frac{1}{3}$$

$$\Rightarrow \textcircled{2} a=D \& P' \xrightarrow{M} K=3$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = \frac{1}{4}(0-0) + \frac{3}{4}(0+\frac{3}{6}) = \frac{3}{8}$$

$$\Rightarrow V_2^*(2) = \frac{3}{8} \& \text{action}=D$$

$$\Rightarrow V_{t+1}^*(3) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{P'} P(P'|3, a) (R(3, a, P') - V_t^*(P')).$$

$$\Rightarrow \textcircled{1} a=S \& P' \xrightarrow{M} G$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = \frac{3}{6} * (0+0) + \frac{3}{6} * (1+0) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Rightarrow \textcircled{2} a=D \& P' \xrightarrow{M} K=4$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = \frac{1}{4}(0-0) + \frac{3}{4}(0+\frac{4}{6}) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Rightarrow V_2^*(3) = \frac{1}{2} \& \text{action}=D \text{ or } S.$$

$$\Rightarrow V_{t+1}^*(4) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{P'} P(P'|4, a) (R(4, a, P') - V_t^*(P')).$$

$$\Rightarrow \textcircled{1} a=S \& P' \xrightarrow{M} G$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{value} = \frac{2}{6} * (0+0) + \frac{4}{6} * (1+0) = \frac{2}{3}$$

$$\Rightarrow V_2^*(4) = \frac{2}{3} \& \text{action}=S$$

\Rightarrow thus, value iteration for $t=1, 2, 3$

$\frac{k}{t}$	$k=1$	$k=2$	$k=3$	$k=4$
$t=0$	$V_0^*(1)=0$	$V_0^*(2)=0$	$V_0^*(3)=0$	$V_0^*(4)=0$
$t=1$	$V_1^*(1)=\frac{1}{6}$	$V_1^*(2)=\frac{2}{6}$	$V_1^*(3)=\frac{3}{6}$	$V_1^*(4)=\frac{4}{6}$
$t=2$	$V_2^*(1)=\frac{1}{4}$	$V_2^*(2)=\frac{3}{8}$	$V_2^*(3)=\frac{1}{2}$	$V_2^*(4)=\frac{2}{3}$

d. \rightarrow range y & $Q^*(3, S) \geq Q^*(3, D)$.

$$\Rightarrow Q^*(3, D) = \frac{2}{3}y. \quad \leftarrow \text{part b.}$$

$$\Rightarrow Q^*(3, S) = \sum_{P'} P(P' | 3, S) * (R(P', S, 3) + \gamma V(P'))$$

$\Rightarrow P'$ can either be \xrightarrow{M}

$$\Rightarrow Q^*(3, S) = \frac{3}{6} * (0+0) + \frac{3}{6} * (1+0) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Rightarrow Q^*(3, D) = \frac{2}{3}y \quad \& \quad Q^*(3, S) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \geq \frac{2}{3}y$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{2}{3}y \leq \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Rightarrow y \leq \frac{3}{4} \quad \& \quad y \geq 0$$

\Rightarrow thus, for $Q^*(3, S) \geq Q^*(3, D)$, $0 \leq y \leq \frac{3}{4}$.

4. \rightarrow FDA = new drug = bioequivalent to current drug.

→ bioequivalent = effect not substantially diff.

→ drug effect = # hormone in blood after drug.

→ O = old drug, N = new drug & P = placebo.

→ bioequivalent $|θ| \leq 0.2$ & $θ = \frac{\mathbb{E}[N-O]}{\mathbb{E}[O-P]}$.

→ θ from dataset & bootstrap confidence interval.

a. → data for #8 subjects.

→ estimate $\hat{\theta}$ of θ.

$$\Rightarrow \theta = \frac{\mathbb{E}[N-O]}{\mathbb{E}[O-P]}$$

$$= \frac{\mathbb{E}[N] - \mathbb{E}[O]}{\mathbb{E}[O] - \mathbb{E}[P]}$$

$$\Rightarrow \theta = \mathbb{E}[\hat{\theta}]$$

b. → (i) func bootstrap_bioequivalence (N, O, P, B)

→ N, O, P = n length array

→ B = # bootstrap replica

→ return = length B array with $\hat{\theta}$ replica

→ (ii) bootstrap_bioequivalence (N, O, P, 1000)

→ plot hist & x,y axis label

(iii) 95% confidence interval for θ

→ np. percentile.

c. → 95% interval within FDA requirement.

Untitled

April 20, 2020

```
[33]: import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import numpy as np
import pandas as pd
import seaborn as sns
import scipy.stats
import numpy.random as rnd
%matplotlib inline
```

```
[34]: dataframe = pd.read_csv("bioequivalence.csv")
dataframe
```

```
[34]:   Patient  New Drug  Old Drug  Placebo
0          0     16449    17649     9243
1          1     14614    12013     9671
2          2     17274    19979    11792
3          3     23798    21816    13357
4          4     12560    13850     9055
5          5     10157     9806     6290
6          6     16570    17208    12412
7          7     26325    29044    18806
```

```
[35]: #np.asarray(dataframe["Old Drug"])
O_expect = np.mean(np.asarray(dataframe["Old Drug"]))
N_expect = np.mean(np.asarray(dataframe["New Drug"]))
P_expect = np.mean(np.asarray(dataframe["Placebo"]))
theta_hat = (N_expect - O_expect) / (O_expect - P_expect)
theta_hat
```

```
[35]: -0.07130609590256017
```

theta_hat is -0.07130609590256017

```
[36]: O_data = np.asarray(dataframe["Old Drug"])
N_data = np.asarray(dataframe["New Drug"])
P_data = np.asarray(dataframe["Placebo"])
```

```
[37]: def bootstrap_bioequivalence(N,O,P,B):
    indices = np.arange(0,8)
    pop_para = []
    for i in np.arange(0,B):
        bootstrap_indice = rnd.choice(indices,B)
```

```

bootstrap_0 = np.mean([0[i] for i in bootstrap_indice])
bootstrap_N = np.mean([N[i] for i in bootstrap_indice])
bootstrap_P = np.mean([P[i] for i in bootstrap_indice])
bootstrap_theta = (bootstrap_N - bootstrap_0) / (bootstrap_0 - bootstrap_P)
pop_para.append(bootstrap_theta)

return pop_para

```

[]: repeat_10000 = bootstrap_bioequivalence(N_data,0_data,P_data,10000)

[]: plt.hist(repeat_10000)
plt.xlabel("theta_hat")
plt.ylabel("frequency (amount)")
plt.title("bootstrap theta_hat distribution")

[]: lower_bound = np.percentile(repeat_10000,2.5)
upper_bound = np.percentile(repeat_10000,97.5)
print("the 95% confidence interval for theta is: ",lower_bound, "< theta <", upper_bound)
print("the 95% confidence interval for theta is: [",lower_bound,",", upper_bound,"] ")

Base on part B, we can conclude that the new drug and old drug are bioequivalent, at the 95% confidence interval level. The 95% confidence interval level fall within the FDA requirement for bioequivalent. The bioequivalence is define as $|theta| \leq 0.2$, which mean $-0.2 \leq theta \leq 0.2$. And from part B, we can conclude that the 95% confidence interval for this new drug is $-0.076690 \leq theta \leq -0.0066$. Thus, every value in that interval satisfy the definition so the entire 95% confidence interval satisfy the definition. We can then conclude that the new drug and old drug are bioequivalent at the 95% confidence interval level.

[]: