

## EXISTENTIAL DIALECTICS OF THROWNNESS AND NOTHINGNESS IN HEIDEGGERIAN PHILOSOPHY

DANIEL OJOTULE OFFOR

danielojotule81@gmail.com

Department of Clinical Psychology, University of South Wales, United Kingdom

### Abstract

The research work aims to expose Heidegger's idea of nothingness which is not only a response to Hegelianism, but also a background upon which the doctrine of both phenomenology and existentialism rests. The work employed a methodological approach which is strictly expository and critical in the sense that it takes off on a note of general prologue. The study argues that Heidegger's position is ultimately self-defeating. If, as he maintains, Dasein always exists within its own world, is inescapably entangled in that world, and can only interpret itself through the terms of that world, then writing about Dasein for others to read becomes paradoxical. In such a view, any attempt to communicate Dasein's understanding beyond its own world would appear unnecessary or even impossible.

The study found out that, Heidegger maintains that *thrownness* is a mode of existence in which the human being simply *is*, without having chosen the conditions of its emergence. However, this stance does not exempt him from critical engagement with his own claims on atheism, Christian philosophy, or his non-ontological positions regarding theism and atheism. His account risks becoming reductionistic and overly mechanistic, as it frames the 'birth' of Dasein merely as a Being thrust into existence, without fully addressing the existential and metaphysical implications of such a condition. In reality, Heidegger succeeds only in raising the question of Being and directing attention toward it, yet ultimately leaves the question unresolved. His extensive reflections on *thrownness* and *Nothingness* culminate in a philosophical position that appears detached from practical and ethical concerns, rendering his ontology vulnerable to critiques of abstraction and moral indifference."

The study reveals that Heidegger's method is characterised by a sustained emphasis on inclusiveness, as evidenced by his consistent treatment of complementary concepts. He never discusses concealment without invoking unconcealment, nor truth without untruth and error, just as he holds Being (Nothingness) in tension with beings (what-is), particularly in relation to Dasein. This persistent interplay of oppositional yet interdependent notions distinguish Heidegger's thought and underscore his commitment to articulating a unified philosophical vision.

**Keywords:** Dasein's basic state, Existentiality, Thrownness, Nothingness, Heideggerian philosophy

## INTRODUCTION

The philosopher, Aristotle, stated in his metaphysics with the classical assertion that “All men by nature desire to know.” Knowledge is man’s delight, since it is connected with his quest for survival. It is a fact that man knows and desires to know more: but this desire to know over the years have landed some Philosophers at different position via- Idealism, Rationalism, Psychologism, Materialism, Realism and Existentialism especially when it comes to the basic issue of self-knowledge not strictly in the Socrates sense of “man know thyself...” But inclusively when it pertains to knowledge of man in its entirety, his origin, existence, goal, destiny purpose and how best could man live as men. what makes a man, why and how is man constituted? However, man by his very rational nature is a metaphysical Being. But pure and rational metaphysics was only under way when man started to shade off mythology for the sake of rationalization. Little wonder then metaphysics is traceable to the Greek Pre-Socratics that first raised the question of being from one perspective or the other.

Heidegger emerged in the metaphysical scene with his central question: ‘why are

there ‘Essents’ rather than ‘Nothing’? His overriding intention was to work out the question of the meaning of Being. But this ambition is not something easy to achieve. Heidegger undertook a bold philosophical enterprise that belongs to the mainstream of western history. To achieve this ambition, he supplanted the whole twenty-five centuries of metaphysical tradition. He deplores the state of philosophical bankruptcy that haunts the modern man which ensured from the forgetfulness of being. It has been ontic in its investigations of Being rather than ontological. The philosophic task of Heidegger then becomes, to drive philosophy back beyond the deviation of the west to the original pre-Socratic ontology. This return to the pre-Socratics requires a destruction of the traditional ontology. He said:

*If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments... dissolved.<sup>2</sup>*

This destruction must not be thought of as destroying. It is a dismantling that creates the opportunity for the radiation of Being.

*Destruction does not mean destroying*

*but dismantling. liquidity putting to one side the merely historical assertion of philosophy... To make ourselves free from what speaks to us in tradition as the Being of being.<sup>3</sup>*

With the destruction of traditional ontology. Heidegger introduces his fundamental ontology. The fundamental ontology is the existential analytic of the Dasein'. Since the idea of meaning and purpose of life and existence dawned on man, there has been perpetual quest for the answer to the question of "who man is." Answers to this fundamental question find no satisfaction in the face of contemporary challenges. The project to engage in ceaseless mission becomes pressing. Paradoxically, the more answers supplied to silence the question. the more questions that arise therefrom. Thus. it is a matter of philosophical consideration: as such philosophical eyes will look into it with a view to addressing the inherent mechanisms.

Our central aim in this research work is the exposition of Heidegger's idea of nothingness which is not only a response to Hegelianism, but also a background upon which the doctrine of both phenomenology and existentialism rests. We set to achieve a far-reaching expose of

Heidegger on the concept of Dasein (being), its self-existence, and its relationship with the other: this is expressed in his concepts of *thrownness* and *nothingness*, the two central tools forming the fulcrum of our discourse in the thesis. The immediate incubus that comes to mind borders on the question of relevance of the study. especially as it pertains to its effect on man's quest to comprehend his beingness. The work is set to help man not only ask more about the problem of how he came to be but also to seek meaning into how and why he should relate with others. This research work is limited within the frontiers of metaphysics and epistemology it is focused primarily to expose the entire hermeneutics of Heidegger's concept of being, and the various issues it generates. Heidegger's historical account of being in which case he adopts the existential analyticity method to drive home his points and positions. It exposes man to look beyond the convention and free himself from shackles of traditionalism. The work will also delve into areas that undergo the ontology of being, by which man understands his dialectical consciousness and movement.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The work employed a methodological approach is strictly expository and critical in the sense that it takes off on a note of general prologue which will immerse us into the task proper and this will mechanically be followed by the entire structure of the central locus of the project. The work is partitioned into tetrapartite divisions with a reasonable consummation in its conclusion.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **Dasein's basic state**

Being-in-the-World in general is the basic state of Dasein. This compound expression "Being-in-the world" indicates in the very way we have coined it. That it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole. Meanwhile. Being-in-the- world cannot be broken up into Contents which may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having several constitutive items in its structure. Indeed, the phenomenal datum which our expression indicates is one which may in fact be looked at in three ways, if we study it. Keeping the whole phenomenon firmly in mind beforehand, the following items may be brought out for emphasis -. The World; we shall herein inquire into the

ontological structure of the 'world' and defining the ideas of worldhood', Secondary, that entity which in every case has Being-in-the World as the way in which it is, shall be inquired about, So, we intend to bring to light such inquiries or an inquiry as for when one asks the question who is this being? As indicated earlier, by a phenomenological demonstration in the 'mode of Dasein's average everydayness. Thirdly, we shall be concerning ourselves with Being-in (In-Sein) as such, and briefly set forth the ontological constitution of inbeing (inbeing) itself.

It is worth mentioning that emphasis on any one of these constitutive items signifies that the others are emphasized along with it. This is inevitably proper to the whole phenomenon because, it is far from the obvious in our analysis to say that Being-in-the-world is not the basic, the fundamental and constitutive elements of the on-going existential analysis of Dasein. By way of orientation, let us now go further to expose these phenomena for special analysis briefly.<sup>2</sup>

### **The World**

In Greek conception, "World" is what is referred to as "Cosmos" in the sense used

by Parmenides, Melissus, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras and the others. It indicates the 'State' the 'How' in which being is "in the whole", "World" is that whereto Dasein transcends so as to be what it is. When it is stated in the essays that man is placed amidst a multitude of other beings in the whole or that man 'lets' things be as they are, the fundamental characterization that Dasein is Being-in-the world; is at the background and it should be born in mind that this proposition is essentially different from any statement that something is 'Ready-at-hand' (Vorhanden) for example a tree, a star is in the world. Meanwhile, Heidegger used the term 'world' to designate "the ontico-existential concept of the *world-hood*<sup>3</sup>. This worldhood of the world is an ontological relation of the world to Being through Dasein. That is, the 'World' essentially refers to Dasein and that Dasein factually lives in it as such. It is the horizon within which being can be encountered can have meaning and purpose, This analysis of the 'Worldliness' of the 'world'. It is noteworthy to observe that Heidegger emphasizes the point that Descartes whose Conception of 'RES EXTENSA' had omitted to consider the 'world' in

itself but was simply concerned with the study of physical and mental things rather than stabilizing the 'world' at the background. Continuing in his analysis, Heidegger comes to define the worldhood of the world as; the being of the ontic condition of the possibility of the discoverability of any beings encountered in the world<sup>4</sup>. The two different kinds of being - 'Zuhandenheit' and 'Vorhandenheit' will both belong to the phenomenon of the 'world'

### **"Being - in"**

Being-in-the world is analyzed as a unitary phenomenon. The being in this connection is of a nature entirely different from the 'in' applied to any phenomenon that is 'vorhanden' if a thing is said to be in something else. This relationship is 'Spatial'. If a being of the kind of Dasein is said to be 'in' something, the relationship is not meant primarily to be 'Spatial' but it means to dwell, to sojourn, to stay in the sense of the Latin word — HABITARE. For instance: A match is in a box in the plain spatial sense. But in the case of Dasein. It remains if a man is in his home, or in his office or not primarily spatial. The analysis of 'Being-in' is to clarify what is meant by the 'Da' the 'there' of 'man' (Dasein). What in

Heidegger's terms is its existentialistic constitution. Thus, it follows that when Emeka for instance, is said to be in his office or home or in love, the relationship meant herein is never spatial primarily but rather as Heidegger would contend, the 'in' plays an existential role: by so doing, it indicates an existential relationship between the Dasein, and the world. Thus, one fundamental trait of Dasein, which is expressly discussed as central in the analysis of 'Being'- in' is its 'ERSCHLOSSENHEIT' that is the 'Disclosed'. Discovered', unveiled state of Dasein.

This is vividly portrayed in the well — known metaphor of the 'LUMEN NATURALE'. In man with the essential 'ERSCHLOSSENHEIT' of Dasein in one with that of the existence of the world. Heidegger points that:

*This metaphor illustrates the way in which the 'Da' of Dasein actually is. Dasein is 'Enlightened or illuminated' not by another kind of being, but it itself is what sheds light. And only to an 'Enlightened' being (for which the shedding of light is existentialistically constitutive) is what is VORHANDEN accessible in light and concealed in darkness<sup>5</sup>*

It is not out of place to bear in mind, this phenomenon of the *ERSCHLOSSENHEIT* of Dasein when various modes of Being - in' are considered. Some examples of such modes include *BEFINDLICHEIT*: - which indicates the way in which a man (Dasein) is placed' in life and in the world'. However. The *BEFINDLICHEIT* and its self- revelation through moods is analyzed in three main respects via:

- i. The 'WIIEREFROM' and the WHERETO' of Dasein. Though remains veiled (covered/undisclosed) the fact that 'it is' THROWNNESS' (*GEWORFENHEIT*) of Dasein into its THER.E' and that is left to its own devices and responsibility (UEBERANTWORTUNG) IS disclosed to it undisguisedly. Thus, this mood in its deeper meaning brings the Dasein face to face with the THAT the fact of the 'THERE'.
- ii. Consequently, the mood has already disclosed the Being-in-the-world as a whole and makes it possible that the Dasein directs itself towards and concerns itself with some things, persons, and itself in the world as such.
- iii. The Dasein which is circumspect can be

affected, impressed and also threatened, in its 'there' by the things and the persons.

- iv. The second of these "Existentialia" of Being-in' co-original with the first, and it is understanding (*VERSTEHEN*). It sheds light on the 'There' of Dasein in a way fundamentally different from that of the *GESTIMMTE BEFINIDLICHKEIT*.

This taken in Its deepest meaning and in Heidegger's view is: the understanding' discloses to the Dasein for the sake of what it exists. *THE WORUNWILEE*<sup>6</sup> Existence here understood in the modern sense: things and persons and the whole of one's Being -in-the-world gain their significance' *BEDEUTSAMKEIT*. From the dominant purpose of aim, for the sake of which man understands himself to exist.

The third of the existentialia of Being-in' co-original with *GESTIMMTE BEFINIDLICHKEIT* and *VERSTEHEN* is *REDE* - meaning speech. 'Speaking is the signifying articulation *ARTIKULATION GLIEDERUNG* of' the Being-in-the-world' in the way in which it is understood. The understanding arising from human Dasein in the 'there' in which it is placed, expresses itself as

'speech' and the totality of the 'significances' articulated by 'understanding' and interpretations comes to 'word' nonetheless, it could be recalled that 'listening' *HOREN* which relates itself to this changing multiplicity. Our investigation takes its orientation from Being-in-the—world as the basic state of Dasein by which every mode of its being gets co-determined. The 'who' of Dasein could be seen from Dasein 'Everydayness'. In Dasein's encounter with other, it is pertinent at this juncture to highlight that Dasein is the 'Being' of which I am', 'you are', and 'we are' is basically in the world. So, in exposing the 'who' (Dasein) that encounters others. The 'others' meant herein is not in the sense of everyone else but me or those over against whom the 'I' stands out. The 'too' in this sense will mean a sameness of Being as concerned to Being-in-the-world.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the 'too' is to be understood existentially and not categorically. By reason of this encounter with 'others' as a being-S-the-world, the world is always the one I share with others. Heidegger contends thus;

*The world of Dasein is a WITH -WORLD (MITTELT). Being-in is Being-with others. Their Being-in themselves within-*

*the-the is Dasein with (MITDASEIN)*<sup>7</sup>

The 'others' are encountered environmentally. Dasein and silence (*SCHWIEGEN*) belongs as potentialities essential together with speech in human communication.

### **The Self (The 'Who' That is disclosed as a being-in-the-world)**

Our analysis so far is to focus the whole phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. Although its constitutive intrinsic elements have not all stood out with some distinctness:

However, by directing our research towards the phenomenon which is to provide us with an answer to the question of the 'WHO' that is disclosed as a Being-in-the-world. We shall like Heidegger, be led to certain structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world; Being-with and Dasein with (MIT'-, SEIN MITDASEIN).

In this kind of being is grounded the 'WHO' Which is typically the mode of everyday Being- one's self (SELBSTEIN). The 'self or the 'who' that is disclosed as a being in the world is expressed by Steiner G. as,

Dasein is to be there, (Dasein) and •there is the world. the concrete. literal. actual. daily world. To be human is to be immersed, implanted, and rooted in the earth. in the quotidian matter and matter of factness of the world. Thus, a particular Dasein in its everydayness is disburdened by the •they' and as well gets accommodates within the 'they'. The 'they' which supplies the answer to the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein is the 'NOBODY' to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-other (Every one is the other. and no one is in himself – *UNTEREINANDERSEIN*). Since the world is constitutively and structurally basic to the being of man in this sense. we shall now proceed to articulate briefly an ontological description of the Worldhood of the world: pointing out its significance and involvement in the light of Martin Heidegger<sup>8</sup>

### **The Worldhood of the World**

Being-in-the-world shall first be made visible with regard to that item its structure which is the 'world' itself. Obviously, our expository analysis aims at establishing in the thought of Martin Heidegger that; Being-in-the-world (IN – DER - WELT



- SEIN) is fundamental to the existential analysis of Dasein. Hence such question as. is the world' perhaps a characteristic of Dasein Being? Does every Dasein proximally have its world? In an attempt to answer these questions considerably Heidegger employed the term 'The worldhood of the world'- which in view has neither the common world nor the subjective world, but the worldhood of the world as such. How? (By what avenue do we meet this phenomenon) Heidegger in his famous work 'Being and Time' explains:

*Worldhood' is an ontological concept, and stand for the structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world. But we know Being-in-the-world as a way in which Dasein's character is defined existentially--- Ontologically. World is not a way of characterizing those which Dasein essentially is not: It is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself<sup>9</sup>*

The above explanation does not rule out the possibility' that when investigate the phenomenon of 'world' we must do so by the avenue of entities within-the-world and the Being which they possess. In the course of our considerations herein. the 'World' (as a term) and our frequent use of the term have apparently indicated its

several usages. By unravelling these we can get an indication of the different kinds of phenomenon that are signified and of the way in which they are interconnected. In the first place, 'world' is used as an ontical concept and in this sense signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world.

Secondly, "world" functions as an ontological term and signifies the Being of those entities which we have just mentioned. And indeed 'world' can become a term for any realm which encompasses a multiplicity of entities for instance - when one talks of the world of mathematicians, world in this context signifies the realm of possible objects of mathematics. Thirdly, 'world' can be understood in another ontological sense - as that wherein a factual Dasein as such can be said to live or dwell in. World in this context has herein a pre-ontological existential signification. However, there is here again another ontical sense of world — it may stand for the public (we - world) or one's own closest. (Domestic environment) Fourthly, 'world' designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood. Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural that any

special 'worlds(s)' may have at the time; but it inclusively embraces in itself the appriori character of worldhood in general.

The derivative from 'worldly' would then imply or apply' terminologically to a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein, never to a kind which belongs to entities present-at-hand "in" the world. In anything ready – to – hand, the world is always there. So that whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically. The character of Being which belongs to ready to hand is just such as involvement. Ontically, letting something be involved signified that Within our factual concern we let something ready-to-hand Be so - and - so as it is already and in order that be such.<sup>10</sup>

Nonetheless, from the Heideggerian perspective an analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities within-the-world will however demonstrate that the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is ground in the world's disclosedness. But disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is the 'there'. This disclosedness as it is, is constituted by state-of -mind, understanding and discourse and it

equiprimordially pertains to the world, to Being-in and to the self. As a step further, we discuss some of the characteristic features of Dasein as basically A Being – in – the - world. Such features are facility (THROWNNESS), Existentiality (The possibility of self-projection), fallenness which arises out of man's finitude and nothingness from within.

### **Existential dialectics of thrownness and nothingness and the future of man**

The Future of man and the emptiness that surrounds him is the reality that would continue to live with him for the rest of his existence on earth. And, although different from those who holds one certain believe about eternity with God. It is quite understanding too that life after now is like 'nothingness' in the future of man. here, existentially becomes a basic feature characteristic of man, that gives man the possibility to make himself what he wants to be. The possibility to effect a change in the world that he dwells.

The concept of nothingness is widely used in modern expression. Communication and in philosophy. Nothingness is a negative pronoun. It is not anything. Before I Heidegger, it was used by the scholastics in their philosophical and theological teaching about God and the

doctrine of creation of nothing. from the Christianity point of view. The origin of negation or the question could be well I understood from a 'dialectical or phenomenological concept of nothingness. Nothingness is not. Nothingness is made be, Nothingness does not annihilate itself; Nothingness is annihilated. Nothingness has a metaphysical significance' because it is not only a metaphysical pronouncement on principles, but a problem to be resolved. For a distinct grasp nothingness could be used in two senses. It could be nothing as designating a pronoun or noun as a name of something or no-thing as designating an absence.

Heidegger thus appropriated the noun in his bid to awaken the metaphysical consciousness saying; *why are there essence* rather than nothing? That is to say, on what ground from what source does an essent derive is being? Is it from something or Nothing? From this ontological consideration, nothingness would appear so vague as a counter conception of something That is. In this sense it presents itself as a future negation of the "thereness" of the being Dasein, hence it has dread as one of the basic moods of disclosing its potential actuality

made Heidegger to conceive nothingness through physical phenomenon. but existential real and compelling, in the existential facticity and thrownness of the Dasein: thus, Heidegger sustains that;

*Nothingness is encountered in the state of dread. not as something isolated. apart from the things in the world. but as one with them.<sup>1</sup>*

Therefore, even though the term seems to be an abstract conceptualization of "Negation of being" Heidegger sees it as a mood of expression that does not exist in isolation, but phenomenologically implied in the ontological futuristic mood of essents. As the no-longer there of being, it is considered as an "absence" before and after itself, A concretizing absence things to slide and sink away and the vital control over things strangely loosens and weakens. <sup>2</sup> Heidegger's contention is that nothing and its expression by man is the indispensable pre-requisite for the things in the world to come into their own and to be known and treated for what they are. Nothingness helps man to transcend all the things. It belongs to being, the essence and ground of what is.

The presence of Nothingness as the no-longer-there-of-Being is the absence of

‘truth’ ‘Alethia’, or ‘disclosure’. It is the reality of death, an essential composition of man. The second is the state-of-nothingness, as the basis of essent, of the many things that are, the underlying reality, substance or physics. This understanding is reflected in what Leonard de Vinci says. According to him:

Nothingness has no middle, and its boundaries are nothingness. “Among the great things which are to be found among us, the Being of Nothingness is the greatest.”<sup>3</sup>

This nothingness in this sense cannot be equated with absolute nothingness. It is not absurd nothing or a reduction to nothing. Nothingness in modern expression, communication and philosophy could designate a logical meaning, in the sense of not giving a proper logical analysis of a proposition. Nothingness is also ontological in the manner of designating negative or privation as used by St. Augustine.

### **Nothingness as an existentially futuristic projection**

Nothingness as an existentially futuristic projection is not a physical entity of Dasein. But it is present as a constitutive structure of a being towards death. But as

something futuristic, it qualifies Dasein’s mood as a projection into the future. For Heidegger we die every day, it is a metaphysical and biological process because the human cells die daily. This implies implicitly that death is really happening every day. Dying is a process that ends in nothingness or death. Death actually does not define man for the future alone; it is only one dimension of the multidimensional ecstasies of Dasein’s past and present. It is historical, a chain of events, not temporary.

Nothingness is not synonymous to death rather to dying. This is what Heidegger called *thanatology*. He does not mean death per se, but a process. We are living Daseins because we can die. Death now becomes the turning away from oneself and the withdrawal from one’s authentic potentialities. With the possibility of death, the temporality of fear, as an authentic state-of-mind as a moment of vision brings out nothingness which is a reflection of the authentic state of mind of conscious call of conscience to the historicity of Being. So then nothingness, death or dying are equiprimodality or coprimordial dimension of being ‘Dasein’. Nothingness is the no-longer-Being there of Dasein. It’s being towards

the future is annihilated when what is still outstanding in it has been liquidated. In such a case, it can never again be experienced as an entity. When Dasein reaches its wholeness in Future as “death,” it simultaneously loses the Being of its ‘there’. by its transition to no-longer. Dasein in this way a termination of Dasein becomes objectively accessible. According to Heidegger.

*The fact that death has been thus objectively given must make possible an ontological delimitation of Dasein's totality.*<sup>4</sup>

By that assertion, it means going-out-of-the-world and losing one's Being-in-the-world and no-more of a corporeal thing which we encounter. The ending which we have in view (which is futuristic) when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end (Zu-Ende sein), but a Being-towards-the-end (sein zum Ende) of this entity. Thus, Heidegger defines death as this: Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. “As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.”<sup>5</sup> To make a subtle distinction [from other possible interpretations] of this phenomenon, he added:

*Death in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life, life must be*

*understood as a kind of Being-in-the-world. Only if this kind of Being is oriented in a privative way to Dasein.*<sup>7</sup>

By this existential analysis, Heidegger, disassociates fear, sorrow and loss from death because death reveals itself as that possibility which one owns most, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped. On the other hand, in the ontological analysis of Being-towards the end, there is no anticipation of one's taking away one's existential stand towards death. If ‘death’ is defined as the end of Dasein, that is to say of Being in the world, this does imply any essential division whether, after death still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein lives on, or even outlasts itself and is immortal. What might be discussed under the topic of a metaphysics of death lies outside the domain of an existential analysis of death. Question 01 how and when death came into the world, what meaning it can have and is to have as an evil and affliction in the aggregate of entities.<sup>6</sup>

Factually, Dasein as Nothingness, as an existential projection in the future, maintains itself proximally and for the most part in an inauthentic Being-towards death. Authentic Being-towards death, cannot evade its own-most non-

relational possibility, or cover up this possibility by this fleeing from. or give a new explanation for it to accord with the common sense of the they". As a Being towards a future possibility, indeed towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself. It may signify something possible of what is present at hand. attainable. controllable, practicable and the like. Hence to preserve the existential possibility. projecting Dasein in the future, its possibility is a faculty of Dasein. that must be understood as a possibility and cultivated as a possibility. The facticity of Dasein's being consists in the fact of his being "thrown" into existence. (Thrownness-Geworfenheit), by the fact of "thrownness" or being "thrown into the world, but be it as it may. he simply finds himself thrown into existence. in circumstance that are not his own making. However, it is pertinent to note that (facticity of Dasein) the fact of man being thrown or "human thrownness is implicitly a limitation on man."<sup>7</sup>

As a being in-the-world, the way in which Dasein is "place" in life and in the world (BEFINDLICHKEIT) and a close look at its self-revelation through "moods", factually considered, one will discover that it has import of the "wherefrom" and

possibly the "whereto" of Dasein. Similarly, to be "thrown-into" existence (thrownness) is to be thrown into somewhere and in Heidegger's understanding. Dasein is thrown into the world. to be there for his realization. As such the world constitutes the "thereness" upon which or wherein Dasein is thrown into the dwell-in. Thus, in being there. Dasein is left to his own services and responsibilities, face to face with the fact of "there that he is thrown-into"<sup>8</sup>

Nonetheless, facticity means that human being is already in the world. the world into which beyond his will or willing, he has been cast or thrown into. The "world" as referred to herein is not the world of indefinite extended cosmos of Astrophysics or Cartesian-Rex Extensa but rather. it is in the sense of which one speaks of a common sphere of activity; like the world of sports for example. It is the perspective through which one's physical, geographical and historical environment becomes one's very own. Such a Sense as "I am always already in a world- in the sense in which my world is my world. it could no more be a world without me than I could be myself without it" This means that one is cast into a world of one's making although it

is left for one to appropriate and contingency as a being-in-the-world. Heidegger contends that man's limitation revealed by the facticity of his being thrown-into existence implies that man's past is beyond his control, it is unalterably what it is and there is nothing man can do to change it.

### **Existentiality**

This is the second basic features that characterize man, it is the man's possibility to make himself what he wants to be. The possibility (potentiality) to effect a change in the world that man dwells-in as such. The possibility to project oneself into the future and live towards this self-projection. It could be said to be an act of appropriating, the act of making my world mine. through self-transcendence. Existentiality refer not to existence in the sense in which sticks, stones, tables, books, etc are but to personal existence the designation of which it has become through Kierkegaard a quasi-technical term. Dasien's existentiality implies that man exists in anticipation or as an anticipated possibility of its own. So that, it is not out of place to say that Dasien exists in a kind of advancement of himself and grasps his

situations in anticipation of his own possibilities in becoming what he may (self- projection). This being the case, Dasien's existentiality points to the fact that Dasien (Man) is not a "ready-made being", fixed once and all. but in Heideggerian sense- we say that "Man is he is not yet'. Little wonder why man's dynamism eludes stability, determines self-project, Omoregbe. J. commenting on this issue observed that "the being of man reveals itself as a possibility to become what it is not yet.... thus man is a being who is more than he actually is at any given moment. Yet such projection of itself will never outrun the boundaries of the world it has been given or factically thrown-into (As the there-being). Consequent,<sup>10</sup> It is projection 'in- and 'of' and 'with' the world. Existentially is the anticipation of Dasein (Man -the there being) by itself and 'there with' of its world. As such, the understand of the world in Heideggerian sense depict that the world and to Dasein are inseparable existential.

Thus, while man's facticity points to his limitation and represent the future (futuristically man is a bundle of). subsequently, existentiality with its special references to the potentiality of

being, understand and project or a sit sometimes termed with a slight different emphasis with its special reference to the fact that Dasein is- that it is thrown into three (world) and is in the movement of the 'thrown- and the which though it is a movement into is manifest in some respect in every Dasein, from this exposition. three important facts must be pointed out:

*Dasein is a kind of being which in its being is concerned about its own or as it may be phrased – is for the sake of its own being Commented on this, Werner brook observed that:*

It (Dasein) is free its own inner most potentially of being of thus for the potentialities of authenticity and Unauthenticity. This relatedness to its own potentiality of being means ontologically that Dasein is in its being, always, already in advance. This idea of being in advance of itself is not to be taken as on isolation tendency an of a subject without the world for it characterizes only one aspect of being in-the-world. It is thrown into a world and left there to its own devices and responsibilities. (Dasein is always already in the world, being in advancement of itself. Dasein always engaged and spend itself in the world of

its care. It is actively concerned with being that are which means that it belongs to Dasein to civilizes the world through understanding and care. Dasein is thus structurally: already being in the world, in advance of itself as the being concerned with being encountered in the world.

### **Fallenness**

Fallenness into the world means an absorption in being with on another in so far as the world is the basic state of Dasein 's being-in falling. Dasein falls to in authenticity (in authenticity on the part of Dasein is a kind of absorption wherein the tendency of being- lost in the publish of the "they" is typified by Dasien but to have fallen does not mean anything like but amounts... The kind of which is completely fascinated by the world and by the of others in "they". Heidegger holds that we must not take fallenness of Dasien as a kind of "fall" from a purer and higher primal status: for not only do we lack any experience of this ontically but ontologically, we lack any possibilities or clues for interpreting it. Continuing he maintained that: falling is a definitive existential characteristic of Dasien itself. It makes no assertion about Dasien has something present-at-hand or about present-at-hand relations to entities from



which Dasien is descended or with which Dasien has subsequently wound up in in some sort of commercium.

It will be a misconception of ontological-existential or ontologico-existential structure of falling. if we were to ascribe to it the sense of bad and deplorable ontical property of which perhaps more advance stages of culture and attitude be able to rid themselves. It is not out of place in our exposition of characterization of Dasien constitutive structural mode as basically a being-in-the- world is documented in the phenomenon of falling. Given all these, a detailed analysis of this will lead one to discover that in undergoing this phenomenon. (and in considering all the intricacies involved). Man (Dasien) is involved in a kind of movement-falling or man is tempted to lead an inauthentic which is a downward plunge. Thus, Heidegger writes “Dasien plunges out itself into itself into the groundless and nullity of inauthentic clay bill this plunge remains hidden from Dasien by the way things have been publicly interpreted, so much so, indeed that it gets interpreted as a way of “ascending and living concrete”<sup>11</sup>

In being – the - world, falling is not

only tempting and tranquillizing, it is time alienating. This alienation closes off from its authenticity and possibly tend to force Dasien into its inauthenticity with the downward plunge into and within the groundlessness of the inauthentic being of the "they" which has in effect a kind of force (motion) that constantly draw the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities. Thus, one is dangerously led into the tranquillized supposition that it possesses everything or that everything is within its reach.

Fallenness is the aspect of man's being with a tendency to let himself go, the tendency to allow himself to become an object in the world, thereby depersonalizing himself. Infact, it is that tendentious alienation of one's true-self to inauthenticity, to become engulfed in the daily routine of mechanical or conventional life thoughtlessness. This dimension of man's being refers to the present-state of mind (present state of life or mode of life). It is worthy of note that Dasien (Man) while still in this inauthenticity (Authentic Existence) by the "call of consciousness". While fallenness is to present, factivity is to past and existentiality refers to the future and these three basic ontological structures of

man's being refers to the basic dimension of time.

### **Evaluation**

In his books *The God Who is There* (a very appropriate title in connection with a discussion of Heidegger) and *Escape From Reason*, Francis Schaeffer details the change that has taken place in man's concept of truth. He calls this change the line of despair. Above the line of despair men operated with the belief that they could, through the use of reason work out the answers to knowledge, meaning and value in life. Below the line, men have given up all hope of achieving a rational unified answer to knowledge and life. The situation modern man finds himself in can be somewhat humorously summed up in the following song from *Monty Python's The Meaning life*:

This non-rational approach to finding meaning is seen quite clearly in Heidegger's rejection of propositional statements of truth, the use of logic, and the subject-object distinction in favor of subjective experience to determine the meaning of being.

Furthermore, at an even more fundamental level it must be pointed out that Heidegger's system of thought is

therefore logically self-contradictory. For, as John Warwick Montgomery has pointed out: Like logic itself, both the subject-object distinction and propositional thinking must be presupposed in all sensible investigations. Why? Because to argue against their necessity is to employ them already! When one asserts: "Personal encounters, not propositions, yield truth," one is in fact stating a proposition (though a meaningless one). This points the way to another criticism of Heidegger, which is stated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his article on "Existentialism"<sup>12</sup> in Paul Edwards' *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*:

*When existentialists come to construct their own systems. the most obvious criticism they are subject to is that they are insensitive to the syntactic and semantic properties of the language they employ. So, Kierkegaard spoke of a dread of nothing in particular as though this implied that dread had an object whose name was "Nothing". So, Heidegger hypostatizes Being and Nothing as substantial entities.*

This problem is prevalent throughout Heidegger's works. Not only does Heidegger redefine many terms from

their common understanding in order to prove whatever point he is trying to make (the example above of "truth" as unconcealedness is but one instance) he constantly creates terms (often hyphenated) and then speaks of them as if they were things. In the citations I used above I tried to pick the clearest ones I could find to present his position. Otherwise, you wouldn't have understood him at all. and it's not because you're stupid. Here is a typical example: But in general, the "whither". to which the totality of places for a context of equipment gets allotted, is the underlying condition which makes possible the belonging-somewhere of an equipmental totality as something that can be placed. Not only is this incomprehensible, it is according Analytic philosophy meaningless. According to Analytic philosophy, in order for a proposition to have meaning, it must fit into one of two categories. It must be either a) analytic (i.e., its truth must be able to be determined by an analysis of its meaning) such as the statements of logic, pure mathematics and tautologies. or b) synthetic (i.e., its truth or falsehood is capable of being shown by a comparison with facts in the world). In other words,

they must be subject to verifiability tests, or at least falsifiability (Karl Popper).

If a proposition doesn't fit into one of these two categories. it is formally meaningless. As John Warwick Montgomery has written: And what is the result when existentialist Affirmations are subjected to verifiability tests? An excellent illustration has been provided in Rudolf Carnap's examination of the following typical argument in Heidegger's *Was Ist Metaphysics?* What is to be investigated is being only and - *nothing* else; being alone and further-*nothing*; solely being, and beyond being-*nothing*. *What about this Nothing...? Does the Nothing exist only because the Not, i.e., the Negation, exists? Or is it the other way around? Does the Negation and the Not exist only because the exists...? We assert: the Nothing is prior to the Not and the Negation. ... Where do seek the Nothing? How do we find the Nothing?... We know the Nothing....Anxiety reveals the Nothing. That for which and because of which we are anxious, was "really" – nothing. Indeed: The Nothing itself - as such was present. What about this Nothing? - The Nothing itself nothings.*

The argument, asserting the primacy of

existence (the "Nothing") over essence ("the Negation and the Not") and the necessity of embracing it through personal recognition of estrangement ("anxiety"), is shown by Carnap to consist of analytically meaningless "pseudo-statements," whose "non-sensicality is not obvious at first glance, because one is easily deceived by the analogy with...meaningful sentences." To assert that "the rain rains" is meaningful; but to argue that "the Nothing nothings" is something else again! This isn't profound. It's language gone on a

holiday!

Finally, as if all this weren't enough. Heidegger's position proves to be self-defeating. For, if it is true, as he states, that Dasein always exists in a world and is ensnared in this world, and this world is its own, and Dasein interprets itself in light of this world, then there is no point to his even writing about it for others to read. If I'm in my world, and you're in yours, and each of us interprets in terms of this world, everything is hopelessly subjective and communication itself is impossible.

## Conclusion

This essay exposes what it considers as Nothingness the onto-existential structure of Dasein. By giving its many applications and the metaphysical significance. Although nothingness is not a physical entity, it is a mood for Dasein as an existential projection to the future. The central question for metaphysics has always been the question of the origin of things that had pervaded the entire history of philosophy. Heidegger formulated this question thus “why are there essents, why is there anything at all. Rather than nothing?” This is a formulation that arose out of the narrow confines of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Hence, only valid about the origin of finite being. A formulation that excluded all about the infinite. At the onset of Heidegger’s enquiry, he recognized that the preceding metaphysical tradition had ceased to make Being the object of enquiry. All attention was centered on beings, thereby allowing Being to fall into oblivion. Indeed, no philosopher has aroused such diametrically opposed views about his status in the history of

thought as Heidegger

Many hold him to be not only the most eminent critic of metaphysics since Kant but also one of the small numbers of decisive western thinkers. It is worthy to point out that Hegel necessitated Heideggerian existentialism by his conclusion that existence is reconciled in consciousness (consciousness equals thought). Heideggerian regard as crucial the argument of his work, which, in essence hears on the single topic: what he calls the Being of beings. This points to the impact of his thought on, the existential Dialectics of thrownness and Nothingness on a diversity of disciplines and on modern attitudes, including Sartrean existentialism. linguistic the structuralist, and hermeneutic schools of textual interpretation. Theology, Hellenic studies, literary theory and literature itself.

However, having stated Heidegger’s thesis on thrownness as onto Existential structure of Dasein. Heidegger contends that thrownness as a mode of existence is as an entity which has to be as it is and it can be. Thus, we cannot exonerate him from

his critique and propositions on atheism, thesis and Christian philosophy, or on his no ontological positions on theism and atheism. This is a very reductionistic and mechanical explanation of the 'Birth' of Dasein as a Being thrown into existence. This question of thrown demonstrates his subjective and limited rationalization and understanding of creation by God. Because to the question who 'thrown' man and on what occasion and why? Was not answered by Heidegger, which shows an irresponsible silence on the question of God or his indifference.<sup>14</sup> Heidegger's choice of the 'Dasein' saw the unity between the object of thought, the process and the subject of philosophizing. Being is the object of thought is the thought is the process. But the object and process demand a being, an enquirer who is able to question his own being. Hence the choice of Dasein as a being-in-the-world. It would be improper then, to analyse Heidegger as being looked up within the influence of Cartesian consciousness.

Because while Descartes emphasized the subject and the object alone as the

sole basis of the certainty of enquiring of a being-in-the-world. Heidegger was taking the subject, the object and the process of unity. This is the epistemological novelty introduced by Heidegger. Heidegger is a mystical thinker. His Framework on nothingness is essential, "indispensable" for anyone who wishes to understand a great deal of recent continental work in philosophy and theology. But as presented, nothingness as Dasein mood of Being is futuristic, always present, but not as a physical entity. It looms large before or in the face of Dasein and in the effort to run away, Dasein falls into inauthenticity. To lose sight of Death, Dasein seeks pleasure in material things. Because the concept of nothingness or death is not a congenial or a pleasant discussion. Although they are terms used frequently with a clear and precise meaning.

Death is a dramatic event, which each one of us must confront on his own account. For this event there are no attorneys, no delegates and no representatives. In fact, it is inevitable, a tragic event. Seeing with

the above exposition Heidegger's fundamental ontology is an anthropology at the service of ontology, although a lot is to be admired in his choice of Dasein. Following his deconstruction, and language some critics consider Heidegger's obscure vocabulary as a cover-up for a basic traditional methodology. His "concatenation of neologism". His ubiquitous and pensive search for Sein and Dasein is in the logic, interpreted as nothing more than a disguised quest for a kind of belief in God.

Furthermore, as a consequence of Heidegger's shift in thought, starting almost as an existentialist, addressing the western philosophy of Being and ending almost as an eastern poet, there abounds inconsistency in his notion of and definition of Being. At the end, he was noted of establishing an empty and negative notion of transcendent existence. To be precise, the Being of Heidegger would be likened to the primary matter" of Aristotle. That which is a relative non-being, but the ground of every being. To be real, Heidegger was only able to raise the question of Being,

their pointing towards it, and eventually left it unanswered. His whole thesis on thrownness and Nothingness eventually landed Heidegger into a philosophy that is devoid of any practical and ethical values.

Heidegger had been admired for his courage in working against traditions, hence. F.H. Heinemann identified him as the personification of heroic defiance. He writes in defiance of the traditional ontology, terminology, logic and ethics. Another factor of admiration lies in the Heideggerian method, of inclusiveness. This inclusiveness pervades all through the thoughts of Heidegger, hence he never speaks of concealment without unconcealment; truth and untruth and error; Being (Nothingness) and beings (what - is) with special reference to Dasein. This made his thought a distinguished one in enunciating a unity of thought.

## References

<sup>2</sup>Heidegger, M., Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics by Charles Coulston Gillispie ed publisher New York

(Blomington. 1962), p.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>10</sup>Ibid, p. 92. <sup>1</sup>Ibid.p.1

<sup>3</sup>Heidegge, M: Being Anti Time  
(Translated by J. Manqtiarrje & Edward  
Robinso,, ;962) p. 79. Heidegger, M:  
Existence And Being (Gateway Edition,  
;988), p. 27.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, p. 97. <sup>4</sup>Ibid.p 281.

<sup>4</sup>Steiner G:'J/e/L/,,. (Glasgow- Williams  
CoHins & Sons Lid .,F;reig 97\$). p.7\$,  
Heidegger. M Be/ng And 7inw, Op. C  
it.. p.154.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid. p 155. <sup>5</sup>Ibid. p276 <sup>6</sup>Ibid. pl64.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid,p 289., <sup>7</sup>Ibid, p. 92. <sup>8</sup>Ibid, p. 93.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid, p. 164.

Francis Schaeffer. The Complele Works  
of Francis A. Schaeffer: A chirstain  
Worldwiew. Second Edition,Vol. I: The  
God Who is There (Westchester:  
Crossways Books. 1985). p. <sup>9</sup>

Gelven A, Commentary on Heidegger's  
Being and Time (New York: Harper and  
Row Publishers, 1970). p. 67

Heidegger . VI. Existence and Being  
(New York: []ove Publication, 1988  
p.50.

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger .M. Existence and being,

Op., p, 228.

Ibid, p 290 Ibid. p. 229.

Ibid., pp. 100-101 Ibid.,p.23

James Collins. The Existentislists: A  
Critical study (Chicago: Henry Regenery  
Company, 1952), p. 165

Solomon R.C, Op Cit., p. 193