

### 4.3. Induction on well-founded relations

Def. schema: let  $C$  be a class and  $R$  be a relational class on  $C$ .

i)  $R$  is well-founded on  $C$  iff:

$$\forall X \subseteq C \left[ X \neq \emptyset \rightarrow \exists y \in X (\neg \exists z \in X (z R y)) \right]$$

ii)  $R$  is extensional on  $C$  iff

"the axiom of extensionality is true in  $(C, R)$ " i.e.


$$\forall x, y \in C \left[ \forall z \in C (z R x \leftrightarrow z R y) \rightarrow x = y \right]$$

iii)  $R$  is set-like on  $C$  iff

$\forall x \in C$ , the class  $\{y \in C : y R x\}$  is a set

Intuition:  $R$  is "small", the predecessor chain of an element is never too big to be a proper class.

Note: that this is a def schema i.e. one def for each pair of formula  $\varphi_C$  and  $\varphi_R$  corresponding to  $C$  and  $R$ .



set-like relational class  $R$  on  $C$

Def : (Generalization of transitive closure to the relational class context.)

schema

let  $R$  be set-like on  $C$ .

Since the  $R$ -predecessors of any element of  $C$  is a set, we can define by induction on  $n$ :


We set:  $\text{pred}(C, x, R) := \{y \in C : y R x\} \leftarrow \text{is a set!}$

by ind  
on  $n$

$$i) \begin{cases} \text{pred}^0(C, x, R) := \text{pred}(C, x, R) \\ \text{pred}^{n+1}(C, x, R) := \bigcup \{ \text{pred}(C, y, R) : y \in \text{pred}^n(C, x, R) \} \end{cases}$$

$$ii) \text{cl}(C, x, R) := \bigcup \{ \text{pred}^n(C, x, R) : n \in \omega \}$$

Intuitively,  $\text{cl}(C, x, R)$  contains the  $R$ -el of  $x$   
 + the  $R$ -el of  $R$ -el of  $x$   
 + the  $R$ -el of  $R$ -el of  $R$ -el of  $x$   
 + ...



$\text{pred}^0(C, x, R)$

$\text{pred}^1(C, x, R)$

$\vdots$



Thm 7 (ZF-P): If  $R$  is w-f and set-like on  $C$ , then every non-empty subclass  $X$  of  $C$  has an  $R$ -least element.

Proof: Claim: Suppose  $R$  set-like on  $C$ .  
Then for all  $x \in C$  and  $y \in d(C, x, R)$   
we have  $\text{pred}(C, y, R) \subseteq d(C, x, R)$

Proof:  $\nabla$  obvious from the picture


$y \in d(C, x, R)$   
 $\Rightarrow y \in \text{pred}^n(C, x, R)$  f.s.  $n \in \omega$

let  $z \in \text{pred}(C, y, R)$

$\Rightarrow z \in \bigcup \{ \text{pred}(C, y, R) : y \in \text{pred}^n(C, x, R) \}$

$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{pred}^{n+1}(C, x, R)$

$\Rightarrow z \in d(C, x, R)$   $\square$



let  $x \in X$ . If  $x$   $R$ -min in  $X$ , finished.

Otherwise,  $\exists y \in X (y R x) \Rightarrow X \cap d(C, x, R) \neq \emptyset$

$\Rightarrow (R \text{ is w-f}) \exists y' R\text{-min in } X \cap d(C, x, R)$

Thus  $y'$   $R$ -min in  $X$ .

since  $y$  belongs to both

Otherwise, let  $z \in X$  s.t.  $z R y'$ .  $\Rightarrow z \in \text{pred}(C, y', R)$  and  $y' \in d(C, x, R)$

$\Rightarrow$  (claim)  $z \in d(C, x, R)$ , contradicts

minimality of  $y'$  in  $X \cap d(C, x, R)$ .  $\square$

similar to Chap 2, Thm B.

As a corollary, we can do proofs by induction on well-founded set-like relational classes. 8'

Thm 8 (Proofs by induction) let  $R$  w-f and s-l on  $C$   
 i.e.  $\forall x \in C. [(\forall y (y \in C \wedge y R x \rightarrow \varphi(y)) \rightarrow \varphi(x)]$   
 Schema:  $\left[ \forall x \in C \left( \left( \forall y \in C (y R x \rightarrow \varphi(y)) \right) \rightarrow \varphi(x) \right) \right] \rightarrow \forall x \in C (\varphi(x))$   
 if  $\varphi(x)$  holds as soon as  $\varphi(y)$  holds for all  $R$ -pred  $y$  of  $x$  in  $C$ , then  $\forall x \in C \varphi(x)$  holds

If  $\varphi(x)$  is true as soon as  $\varphi(y)$  is true for all  $R$ -pred of  $x$ , then  $\varphi(x)$  is true for all  $x \in C$ .

Proof: A corollary of thm 7.

Same proof as thm 14, chap 3.

Thm 9 (defs by induction) schema

let  $R$  be w-f and s-l on  $C$ , and let

$F: C \times V \rightarrow V$  functional class.

Then there exists a unique  $G: C \rightarrow V$  funct. class s.t.

$$\forall x \in C \left[ G(x) = F(x, G \upharpoonright_{\text{pred}(C, x, R)}) \right]$$

Proof: Similar to thm 16, chap 2.

Note: we need  $R$  set-like in order for the expression

$G \upharpoonright_{\text{pred}(C, x, R)}$  to be meaningful (since  $\text{pred}(C, x, R)$  is a set).



#### 4.4. Moskowsky collapsing theorem.

Intro (oral)


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We prefer working with transitive relational classes, since they have many suitable properties: no circularities ( $x R y$  and  $y R x$ ), no self-precedencing ( $x R x$ ), ...

We prove that without loss of much generality, we can restrict our attention to transitive relational classes  $(C, R)$ .

This will be important when we will consider models of ZFC: we prefer transitive models, ...

To summarize, we can "transitivize" the relational classes that are not too pathological (set-like, well-founded, extensional). The function that performs this "transitivization" is the Moskowsky collapsing function, and the obtained transitive class is the Moskowsky collapse.





Thm 10 ( $\mathcal{ZF}^-$ ) Mostowsky collapsing theorem schema

let  $R$  be an extensional, well-founded, set-like relational class on a class  $C$ .

Then there exists a unique transitive class  $M \subseteq WF$  and a unique isom functional class  $F$  such that

$$F: C, R \rightarrow M, \in_M$$

(  $F$  isom means  $\forall x, y \in C, x R y \mapsto F(x) \in F(y)$  )

$M$  is the Mostowsky collapse of  $C, R$

$F$  is the Mostowsky collapsing function.

faire le dessin  
après énoncer  
le thm.

Proof:  $R$  w-f and s-l  $\stackrel{\text{thm 7}}{\Rightarrow}$  We can define by transfinite induction:  $F: C \rightarrow V$  as follows:

$$F(x) = \{ F(y) : y \in \text{pred}(C, x, R) \}$$

$$\text{i.e.} = \{ F(y) : y \in C \text{ and } y R x \}$$

And let  $M$  be the image of  $F$

i.e.  $\phi_M(x)$  iff  
 $\exists x' (\phi_C(x') \wedge$   
 $\{F(\langle x, x' \rangle)\})$

$M$  transitive: let  $y \in y' \in M$ .

$$y' \in M \Rightarrow \exists x' \in C \text{ s.t. } y' = F(x')$$

$$y \in y' = F(x') = \{ F(x) : x \in C \wedge x R x' \} \Rightarrow y = F(x) \text{ f.s. } x \in C$$

$$\text{i.e. } y \in F(C) = M$$

$M \subseteq WF$ : By transfinite induction, we prove  $y \in WF, \forall y \in M$ .

let  $F(x) \in M$  (all el. of  $M$  are of this form) and

$$\text{suppose } \forall y' \in M \left[ \underbrace{(\underbrace{y' \in F(x)}_{= F(x')})}_{\text{iff } y' = F(x') \text{ with } x' R x} \rightarrow (y' \in WF) \right]$$


$$\text{iff } \forall x' \in C \left[ (x' R x) \rightarrow (F(x') \in WF) \right]$$

i.e.  $\{F(x') : x' \in C \wedge x' R x\} \subseteq WF$ , hence  $\in WF$ . 101  
 $= F(x)$  by def

So  $\forall y \in M (y \in WF)$  i.e.  $M \subseteq WF$

F isom: By construction,  $F: C \rightarrow V$  is onto and  
 and  $\forall x, y \in C, F(y) \in F(x) \leftrightarrow y R x$

Suppose  $F$  not 1-1. (and remember that  $M \subseteq WF$ )  
 $\Rightarrow \exists a$  of min rank  $\in M$  and  $x \neq x'$  both  $\in C$  s.t.  
 $F(x) = F(x') = a$



If  $y R x$ , then  $F(y) \in F(x) = a = F(x')$

But  $F(y) \in F(x') \Rightarrow \exists y' R x'$  s.t.  $F(y') = F(y)$

Since  $F(y) \in a$ , the minimality of  $a$  ensures that only  $y$  has  $F(y)$  as image i.e.  $y' = y$ . direct, by  $\epsilon$ -min of  $a$

Hence,  $y R x \Rightarrow y = y' R x'$  i.e.  $\text{pred}(C, x, R) \subseteq \text{pred}(C, x', R)$

Symmetrically  $\text{pred}(C, x', R) \subseteq \text{pred}(C, x, R)$

Thus equality and by extensionality of  $R$   $x = x'$ , contradiction

Unicity of M: Suppose  $F'$  and  $M'$  also satisfy the Univ.

$F'$  isom means by def  $F'(y) \in F'(x) \leftrightarrow y R x, \forall x, y \in C$

i.e.  $F(x) = \{F'(y) : y \in C \wedge y R x\}$

The unicity of def by induction implies  $F' = F$ , thus  $M' = M$ . □



## Chapter 5: Relative Consistency

Given a theory  $T$  that we assume to be consistent (typically  $\mathcal{Z}$ ,  $\mathcal{ZF}^-$ ,  $\mathcal{ZF}^- + \text{Inf}$ ,  $\mathcal{ZF}$ ), we would like to know if the theory remains consistent if we add to it a novel axiom  $\varphi$ , i.e. we would like to prove results of the form:

$$\text{Cons}(T) \rightarrow \text{Cons}(T + \varphi)$$

Such kinds of result guarantee that assuming  $\varphi$  as a novel axiom is not problematic

Remark:  $\text{Cons}(T + \varphi)$  iff  $T \nVdash \neg \varphi$

$$(\Leftarrow): T \vdash \neg \varphi \Rightarrow T + \varphi \vdash \neg \varphi$$

$$\Rightarrow T + \varphi \vdash \neg \varphi \wedge \varphi$$

$$\Rightarrow \neg \text{Cons}(T + \varphi)$$

$$(\Rightarrow): \neg \text{Cons}(T + \varphi) \Rightarrow$$

$$\exists \psi \text{ s.t. } T + \varphi \vdash \psi \text{ and } T + \varphi \vdash \neg \psi$$

$$\Rightarrow T + \varphi \vdash \perp \Rightarrow T \vdash \neg \varphi$$

reductio ad  
absurdum

Thus, relative consistency results like

$$\text{Cons}(T) \rightarrow \text{Cons}(T + \varphi)$$

are equivalent to

$$\text{Cons}(T) \rightarrow T \nVdash \neg \varphi$$



The big advances in descriptive set theory<sup>1</sup>  
was to prove independence results i.e.

We say that  $\phi$  is independent from  $T$  iff

$$\text{Cons}(T) \rightarrow \text{Cons}(T + \phi) \quad \text{and}$$

$$\text{Cons}(T) \rightarrow \text{Cons}(T + \neg \phi)$$

$$\text{i.e. } \text{Cons}(T) \rightarrow (T \nVdash \neg \phi \text{ and } T \nVdash \phi)$$

We have the following important independence results:

$$\text{Cons}(\text{ZF}) \rightarrow \text{Cons}(\text{ZF} + \text{AC}) \quad (\text{Gödel's model})$$

$$\text{Cons}(\text{ZF}) \rightarrow \text{Cons}(\text{ZF} + \neg \text{AC}) \quad (\text{Forcing})$$

also

$$\text{Cons}(\text{ZF}) \rightarrow \text{Cons}(\text{ZF} + \text{CH}) \quad (\text{Gödel's model})$$

$$\text{Cons}(\text{ZF}) \rightarrow \text{Cons}(\text{ZF} + \neg \text{CH}) \quad (\text{Forcing})$$

Hence AC, CH, (GCH also) are independent of ZF.

In this chapter, we will prove easier relative consistency results about axioms of ZF, like

$$\text{Cons}(\text{ZF}^-) \rightarrow \underbrace{\text{Cons}(\text{ZF} - \text{Inf} + \neg \text{Inf})}_{\text{i.e. } \text{ZF} - \text{Inf} \nVdash \text{Inf}}$$

$$\text{Cons}(\text{ZF}^-) \rightarrow \underbrace{\text{Cons}(\text{ZF} - \text{Repl} + \neg \text{Repl})}_{\text{i.e. } \text{ZF} - \text{Repl} \nVdash \text{Repl}}$$

$$\text{Cons}(\text{ZF}^-) \leftrightarrow \text{Cons}(\text{ZF})$$

## 5.1. Relativization and Absoluteness


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In order to prove relative consistency results, we will, given a model  $U$  of  $ZF$ , build another model  $M$  inside  $U$  of  $ZF + \varphi$ .

This would imply  $\text{cons}(ZF) \rightarrow \text{cons}(ZF + \varphi)$

We need the tools of relativization and absoluteness.

We will "talk" semantically, but everything can be done syntactically.



Definition: Let  $M$  be any class and  $\varphi$  a formula.

The relativization of  $\varphi$  to  $M$ ,  $\varphi^M$ , is defined by induction on  $\varphi$  by:

- i)  $(x = y)^M$  is  $x = y$
- ii)  $(x \in y)^M$  is  $x \in y$
- iii)  $(\varphi \wedge \psi)^M$  is  $\varphi^M \wedge \psi^M$
- iv)  $(\neg \varphi)^M$  is  $\neg \varphi^M$
- v)  $(\exists x \varphi)^M$  is  $\exists x (x \in M \wedge \varphi^M)$

i.e.  $\exists x (M(x) \wedge \varphi^M)$ , where  $M(\cdot)$  is the formula defining the class  $M$



Definition: let  $M$  be any class

- a) " $\phi$  is true in  $M$ " (or " $M \models \phi$ ") means  $\phi^M$   
 b) for a theory  $S$ , " $S$  is true in  $M$ " or " $M$  is a model of  $S$ " (or " $M \models S$ ") means that each  $\phi$  in  $S$  is true in  $M$ .

Remark:  $\phi^M$  is just one sentence, whereas " $M \models S$ " means that each  $\phi$  in  $S$  can be proved from the axioms we are presently using (e.g. ZF), but cannot be expressed by a single formula (c.f. Kunen p. 134, 143-146 for more details). Thus, results involving such considerations are not technically provable from ZF or ZFC, this is a certain abuse of notation.

the following lemma will be useful

meta-result  
lemma 1

If we can prove from  $S$  that  $M$  is a non-void model of  $T$ , then  $\text{cons}(S) \rightarrow \text{cons}(T)$ .

let  $S$  and  $T$  be two theories, and let  $M$  be a class s.t.  $S \vdash (M \neq \emptyset \wedge "M \models T")$   
 Then  $\text{cons}(S) \rightarrow \text{cons}(T)$  
 $\Delta$  abuse of language since this is not one formula

Proof: Suppose  $S$  consistent and  $T$  not.

Then  $T \vdash \phi \wedge \neg \phi$  for some (any)  $\phi$ .

But the hyp  $S \vdash "M \models T"$

together with  $T \vdash \phi \wedge \neg \phi$  implies

$S \vdash \phi^M \wedge \neg \phi^M$  thus inconsistent, contradict.

Thus  $T$  consistent.

(See Kunen p. 141-142 for more formal.)

In this chapter,  $S$  will usually be ZF; and  $T$  be ZF, ZF-Inft+21 etc...

$\Delta$  we do not argue from ZF (but from nothing)

We like transitive classes because they have "good properties". We look at the validity of the axioms inside transitive classes.

Prop 2: (ZF) Let  $M$  be a transitive class

i) " $M \models$  Extensionality" (i.e. formally  $\text{Ext}^M$  holds)

ii) If  $M \subseteq WF$ , then " $M \models$  Foundation"

iii) " $M \models$  Pairing, Union, Power Set" iff

$$\forall a, b \in M \exists c \in M \left( \{a, b\} \subseteq c \right), \\ \left( \bigcup a \subseteq c \right), \text{ and } \left( \mathcal{P}(a) \cap M \subseteq c \right) \text{ resp.}$$

iv) " $M \models$  Comprehension" iff for every  $\varphi(x, y, \vec{z})$  one has

$$\forall y, \vec{z}' \in M \left( \{x \in y : \varphi^M(x, y, \vec{z}')\} \in M \right) \quad \text{free variables among } x, y, \vec{z}'$$

v) " $M \models$  Replacement" iff for every formula

not necessary to say

$\forall x \in A \cap M$  which would be the relativised version.

$\varphi(x, y, A, \vec{z}')$  and every  $A, \vec{z}' \in M$  satisfying  $\forall x \in A \exists! y \in M \varphi^M(x, y, A, \vec{z}')$ , then

$$\exists Y \in M \left( \{y : \exists x \in A \varphi^M(x, y, A, \vec{z}')\} \subseteq Y \right)$$

Proof: i) We have to prove that  $\text{Ext}^M$  holds.

$$\text{Ext}^M \text{ is } \forall x, y \in M \left[ \forall z \in M (z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y) \rightarrow x = y \right]$$

But for any  $x, y \in M$ ,  $M$  transitive implies

$$\forall z \in M (z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y) \xleftrightarrow{\text{trivial}} \forall z (z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y) \quad \text{by transitivity of } M$$

Thus  $\text{Ext}^M$  iff  $\forall x, y \in M \left[ \forall z (z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y) \rightarrow x = y \right]$  which is true by  $\text{Ext}$ .

Exercise  
just give hints



ii) Suppose  $M \subseteq WF$ . (Foundation) $^M$  is

$$\forall x \in M \left[ \exists y \in M (y \in x) \rightarrow \exists y \in M (y \in x \wedge \neg \exists z \in M (z \in x \wedge z \in y)) \right]$$

take  $y$  of minimal rank in  $x \cap M$ , then  $y$  satisfies  $\otimes$ .

iii) (Pairing) $^M$  is  $\forall a, b \in M \exists c \in M (a \in c \wedge b \in c)$   
 i.e.  $\forall a, b \in M \exists c \in M (\{a, b\} \subseteq c)$

doesn't use  
transitivity  
of  $M$

(Union) $^M$  is  $\forall F \in M \exists A \in M \forall Y \in M \forall x \in M$

$$(x \in Y \in F \rightarrow x \in A)$$

$$\iff \forall F \in M \exists A \in M \forall Y, x (x \in Y \in F \rightarrow x \in A)$$

$$\text{i.e. } \forall F \in M \exists A \in M (U F \subseteq A)$$

prove this one  
as example  
→

(Power Set) $^M$  is  $\forall x \in M \exists y \in M \forall z \in M ([z \subseteq x]^M \rightarrow z \in y)$

$$\iff \forall x \in M \exists y \in M \forall z \in M (z \subseteq x \rightarrow z \in y)$$

$$\iff \forall x \in M \exists y \in M \forall z [(z \in M \wedge z \subseteq x) \rightarrow z \in y]$$

$$\iff \forall x \in M \exists y [P(x) \cap M \subseteq y]$$

$$\forall t \in M (t \in z \rightarrow t \in x)$$

$$z \cap M \subseteq x$$

=  $z$  since  $M$  transitive  
(and  $z \in M$ )

$$\bullet u \in z \cap M \rightarrow u \in z$$

$$\bullet u \in z : \text{since } z \in M, u \in M \rightarrow u \in z \cap M$$

iv) (Comp) $^M$  is  $\forall y, \vec{z} \in M \exists Y \in M \forall x \in M (x \in Y \leftrightarrow x \in y \wedge \varphi^M)$

$$\text{trivial } \iff \text{by transitivity of } M$$

$$\forall x (x \in Y \leftrightarrow x \in y \wedge \varphi^M)$$

$$\iff \forall y, \vec{z} \in M (\{x \in y : \varphi^M\} \in M) \quad Y := \{x \in y : \varphi^M\}$$

v) similar: the transitivity of  $M$  ensures that elements of  $A$  are in  $M$  (i.e.  $x \in A \in M \rightarrow x \in M$ ).