## 1. Find all irreducible polynomials:

(a) of degree 4 over GF(2),

From the textbook: "A polynomial f(x) over a field F is called irreducible if and only if f(x) cannot be expressed as a product of two polynomials both over F, and both of degree lower than that of f(x)."

We can determine whether the polynomials are irreducible by performing the test  $A(x) \mod m(x) = 0$ ? If it is equal to 0, then it is not an irreducible polynomial. If this is not the case, we can test various other irreducible polynomials m(x) of lower degree to further determine whether or not A(x) is reducible. If none of them successfully reduce A(x), we know that A(x) is an irreducible polynomial.

We can test with x, x + 1,  $x^2 + x + 1$ ,  $x^3 + x + 1$ ,  $x^3 + x^2 + 1$ 

Below is a list of all monic polynomials of degree 4, along with their respective binary representations for simpler calculation.

Binary Binary		
POLVNOMIAL		
Rep.		
$x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x$ 11111		
+ 1		
$x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x$ 11110		
$x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$ 11101		
$x^4 + x^3 + x^2$ 11100		
$x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ 11011		
$x^4 + x^3 + x$ 11010		
$x^4 + x^3 + 1$ 11001		
$x^4 + x^3$ 11000		
$x^4 + x^2 + x + 1$ 10111		
$x^4 + x^2 + x$ 10110		
$x^4 + x^2 + 1$ 10101	10101	
$x^4 + x^2$ 10100		
$x^4 + x + 1$ 10011		
$x^4 + x$ 10010		
$x^4 + 1$ 10001		
x <sup>4</sup> 10000		

Example test:

11111

<u>11</u>000

00111

00110

00001

```
Not divisible by x+1, now test with x:
11111
10000
01111
01000
00111
00100
00011
00010
00001
Again, we find that the result is not 0, thus x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 is our first irreducible
polynomial.
If we test x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x, however, we can easily see that it is divisible by x:
10000
01110
01000
00110
00100
00010
00010
00000
I found the following to be another irreducible polynomial by simple inspection: x^4 + x + 1
To verify:
10011
11000
01011
01100
00111
00110
00001
And if we perform the modulus operation using x:
10011
10000
00011
00010
00001
Finally, I found one more irreducible polynomial for this case: x^4 + x^3 + 1 (11001)
11001
10000
01001
01000
```

00001

And by using x+1,

11001

11000

00001

So, I found the following three irreducible polynomials, which were not reducible under (00010, 00011, 00111, 01011, 01101)<sub>2</sub> polynomials:  $x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ ,  $x^4 + x + 1$ , and  $x^4 + x^3 + 1$ 

$$x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$$
,  $x^4 + x + 1$ , and  $x^4 + x^3 + 1$ 

b) of degree 2 over GF(3).

Below is a list of all monic polynomials of degree 2 over GF(3):

Polynomial	Ternary Rep. 122 121	
$x^2 + 2x + 2$		
$x^2 + 2x + 1$		
$x^2 + 2x$	120	
$x^2 + x + 2$	x + 1 111	
$x^2 + x + 1$		
$x^2 + x$		
$x^{2} + 2$	102	
$x^2 + 1$	101	
$\mathbf{x}^2$	100	

Testing  $x^2 + 2x + 2$ :

122

100

022

<u>010</u> 012

122

110

012

011

001

We find that  $x^2 + 2x + 2$  is an irreducible polynomial.

Testing  $x^2 + 2x + 1$ :

121

<u>100</u>

```
021
010
011
010
001
121
110
011
011
000
x^2 + 2x + 1 is a reducible polynomial.
Testing 120:
120
100
020
010
000
Clearly, this is x^2 + 2x is also a reducible polynomial.
Along with x^2 + 2x + 2, I found two other irreducible polynomials: x^2 + 1 and x^2 + x + 2.
Example:
112
110
002
112
100
012
010
002
2.
(a) One attack I was able to find was here:
http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2004/PKC/3421/3421.pdf, where the greatest field size to
be successfully attacked was of GF(2^{63}), although another claims that the best is over GF(2^{503})!
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2194
(b) Although some rather large attacks have been mounted successfully (the largest public one
being of GF(2^{97}), it is generally considered secure in the range from GF(2^{32}) to GF(2^{128}),
depending upon what purpose and how important the protection is.
```

http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/staff/bios/aoprea/publications/GF.pdf

speed. For example, the algorithm presented here;

(c) Yes, as it is becoming increasingly important to perform these operations quickly in a cryptographic perspective, there are many new and upcoming algorithms to improve upon the

http://www.princeton.edu/~rblee/ELE572Papers/Fall04Readings/NingYin-FiniteFieldMul.pdf.

which claims to offer a more efficient solution to software implementations of finite field multiplication.

3.

We generate the alog and log tables by taking a generator for this case to produce the values: Taking 2 or  $(10)_2$  and squaring mod P(x), we find the following values:

10 mod 11001 = 00010  $10*10 \mod 11001 =$ 00100  $10*100 \mod 11001 = 01000$  $10*1000 \mod 11001 = 01001$  $10*1001 \mod 11001 = 01011$  $10*1011 \mod 11001 = 011111$  $10*1111 \mod 11001 = 00111$  $10*111 \mod 11001 = 01110$  $10*1110 \mod 11001 = 00101$  $10*101 \mod 11001 = 01010$  $10*1010 \mod 11001 = 01101$  $10*1101 \mod 11001 = 00011$ 10\*11 mod 11001 = 00110  $10*110 \mod 11001 = 01100$  $10*1100 \mod 11001 = 00001$ 

Thus, the tables are as follows:

k	alog(k)	
1	10	
10	100	
11	1000	
100	1001	
101	1011	
110	1111	
111	111	
1000	1110	
1001	101	
1010	1010	
1011	1101	
1100	11	
1101	110	
1110	1100	
1111	1	

k	log(k)	
1	1111	

10	1		
11	1100		
100	10		
101	1001		
110	1101		
111	111		
1000	11		
1001	100		
1010	1010		
1011	101		
1100	1110		
1101	1011		
1110	1000		
1111	110		

```
(a) A * 7 = 10*7 = 1010 * 0111
= alog[log[1010] + log[0111] \mod 10000]
= alog[1010 + 111 mod 10000]
= alog[10001 \mod 10000] = alog[1] = 10 = 2
(b) 5*F = 5*15 = 0101 * 1111
= alog[log[0101] + log[1111] \mod 10000] = alog[1001 + 110 \mod 10000] = alog[1111] = 1
(c) B^{-1} = 11^{-1} =
We calculate this first by determining the inverse of B:
x*B^{-1} \bmod n = 1
a\log[\log[1011] + \log[x] \mod 10000] = 1 \rightarrow B^{-1} = 1010, so to verify, 1010*1011 \rightarrow
alog[log[1010] + log[1011] \mod 10000] \rightarrow alog[1010 + 101 \mod 10000] = 1
(d) C * D^{-1} = 12 * 13^{-1}
alog[log[1101] + log[x] \mod 10000] = 1
1011 + \log[x] \mod 10000 = 1111
log[x] mod 10000 = 100
x = 100, so \rightarrow D^{-1} = 100 \rightarrow alog[log[1100] + log[100] mod 10000] \rightarrow
alog[1110 + 10 \mod 10000] = 10
(a) de Fermat Little Algorithm:
To determine the inverse of A(x), we use A^{(2^n)-2} \mod P(x).
Thus, with m = 4, we need to calculate A(x)^{14}.
A(x) = x + 1
A(x)^2 = x^2 + 1
Then multiplying by A(x) again, we obtain
A(x)^3 = x^3 + x^2 + x + 1
A(x)^6 = x^3 + x, which we square to obtain
A(x)^{12} = x^3
Then with A(x)^{12} * A(x)^2, we obtain A(x)^{14} = x^3 + x^2 + x.
```

To verify that this is indeed the inverse of A(x), we test it:

$$1110 * 0011 = 10010$$

10010

10011

00001

Thus, the inverse is  $x^3 + x^2 + x$ 

(b) Extended Euclidean Algorithm for Polynomials:

i	qi	ri	хi
-2	-	10011	0
-1	1110	11	1
0	11	1	1110
1	-	0	

Where we can see that  $1110 = x^3 + x^2 + x$ , which is the same result as obtained using Fermat's Little Theorem.

```
5.
a.
i qi ri x^7 + x + 1 0
-1 x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x x + 1
0 - x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x

('Result: ', x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x)

b.

i qi ri x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x)

b.

i qi ri x^5 + 2*x + 1 0
-1 2*x^3 + 2*x 2*x^2 + 1 1 x^3 + x


('Result: ', x^3 + x)

Sage:


Denote CECAS Label.
```

```
\begin{split} P. <& x> = GF(3^5, z')[] \\ def \ Problem5(Px, Ax): \\ (A1, A2, A3) &= (1, 0, Px); \\ (B1, B2, B3) &= (0, 1, Ax); \\ print'i', ' qi ri xi'; \\ i &= -2; \\ print \ i, ' ', '-', ' ', A3, ' ', A2; \\ i &= i+1; \\ qi &= A3.quo\_rem(B3)[0]; \\ print \ i, ' ', qi, ' ', B3, ' ', B2; \\ Qtemp &= 0; \end{split}
```

```
while(True):
       i = i + 1;
       if(0 == B3.degree()):
          return('Result: ', B2/B3);
       Qi = A3.quo\_rem(B3)[0];
       (T1, T2, T3) = (A1 - qi*B1, A2-qi*B2, A3 - qi*B3);
       if(Qtemp == 0):
         print i, '
                                     ', T2;
       if(Qtemp != 0):
                       ',Qtemp, '
                                          ', T2;
          print i, '
       Qtemp = qi;
       (A1, A2, A3) = (B1, B2, B3);
       (B1, B2, B3) = (T1, T2, T3);
#Followed by the line below in a different code line to test:
Problem5(x^7+x+1, x+1)
```



7. (a) We have 
$$C(x) = A(x)B(x) \mod P(x)$$
  
 $c_1x + c_0 = (a_1x + a_0)(b_1x + b_0) \mod x^2 + p_1x + p_0 =$   
 $a_1b_1x^2 + a_0b_1x + b_0a_1x + a_0b_0 \mod x^2 + p_1x + p_0 =$ 



8.

We use multiplication clocked at 50MHz.

With this clock frequency, we have a  $1/(50*10^6) = 20$  ns clock period.

To perform the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, we assume each side simultaneously generates their public key, sends the key to each other, and then determines a shared secret key from this. In order to generate their public key using their private key in  $GF(2^{593})$ , this will take on average  $(2*2^{296})$  clock cycles, which would require  $(2*2^{296})*20$ ns =  $4.9*10^{77}$  seconds or 1.36 hours, which seems extremely large.