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EUROPE AND RUSSIA

Nationalism and Transnationalism

During the time of the Mediterranean civilizations some two thousand years ago, Europe was at the margins of the civilized world, However, in the past several centuries it has dominated the global order. European nations reached out to the world seeking resources and trade, and they ended up conquering vast spans of territory. When they receded from their colonial territories, they left behind Europe's distinctive contribution to global politics, the concept of the nation-state. It is something of a paradox, then, that in the current global age Europe is forming a new transnational political and economic structure, the European Union.

Everyone knows where Europe is, though exactly where it begins and ends is another matter. This is because Europe is not a separate entity but is, in fact, the westernmost portion of the Eurasian continental mass. It is usually defined as the nations north of the Caucasus mountains, west of the Ural mountains, and north of the Mediterranean, Black, and Caspian seas. The island nations of Cyprus and Malta in the Mediterranean are also considered part of Europe, as are the Northern Atlantic Ocean island nations of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Iceland (though they are not regarded as part of "continental" Europe). Russia is also part of Europe, even though most of Russia's land mass extends eastward to the Pacific Ocean; even so, whatever is within the boundaries of the nation of Russia is usually considered European for cultural and political reasons. Turkey lies on the southern border of Europe. Most of the inhabitants of its largest city, Istanbul, live on the European side of the Bosporus—the waterway that connects the Mediterranean and Black seas—yet its longstanding interest in joining the European

Union has often been rebuffed on the grounds that it is not really European. What many Europeans may have in mind, however, is not geography, but culture; the Muslim faith that predominates in Turkey sets it apart from most other European countries, except for Albania and Kosovo.

It is a bit odd that some Europeans would regard the Christian religion as something that is distinctively European, since today the majority of the world's Christians live in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Historically, Christianity—like Islam—was a Middle Eastern religion. Ultimately, Christianity became European, and the story of how that happened is an interesting case in cultural globalization.

Christianity emerged as a sect of Judaism and then became part of the religions of the Mediterranean world, a region that encompassed Southern Europe, Northern Africa and much of the Middle East. After the Roman Emperor Constantine converted to Christianity in 312 CE, it soon became the major religion of the Roman Empire. But the areas of Northern Europe, such as France, Germany, Britain, and the Scandinavian countries were far from Roman civilization, and it took centuries before they were Christianized. The religion of pre-Christian Europe was centered around fertility cults, rites related to the equinoxes and the changing seasons, holy men, and goddesses. As Christianity moved into these European cultural areas, it adopted many of the features of European religion. The holidays of Christmas and Easter were linked to seasonal festival days, Christian saints became as prominent as pagan European holy men, and the cult of the Virgin Mary seemed to replicate the goddess veneration of an earlier tradition. What Christianity brought to the European cultural tradition was religious organization, the transnational power of the church, and—in the Roman Catholic tradition—a central headquarters in the Vatican.

The global impact of Europe was not just cultural, however; it also changed the world's economic and political landscape. Beginning with Christopher Columbus and his famous journey to the Americas in 1492, European explorers have searched for new trade routes over the seas, in the process discovering new territories. Eventually these territories were conquered and settled by Europeans—especially Spanish, British, Portuguese, Dutch, and French—in a network of colonies spread throughout the world and encompassing much of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas. The impact of this centuries-long period of domination is incalculable. Brazil would be unthinkable without the Portuguese language; Mexico would be hard to imagine without its Spanish culture; and in India, political and educational institutions are still modeled after those of the British.

Perhaps the quintessential European gift to the world was the idea of the nation-state and the democratic values associated with it. The ideology of rationalism and nationalism that emerged from the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment was spread throughout the world. By the middle of the twentieth century, virtually every inch of global territory was a part of, or was claimed by, a nation-state. Nationalism was one of the most influential ideologies of the twentieth century. Another was communism, the state socialism promoted by the great European social thinker, Karl Marx, and

adopted by Russia, China, and many Eastern European countries. Though many people in the Eastern European and Central Asian countries that fell under Soviet domination regarded their plight as a form of Russian colonialism, they were at least officially united by a common socialist ideology. Their communism was an inheritor of European Enlightenment ideals, where the notion of democracy was applied to economic institutions. Thus, the great conflict of the latter half of the twentieth century, the Cold War, was a contest between two European ideologies.

In the twenty-first century, Europe occupies a more modest role in the global order, but its role is still an influential one. The European attempt at regional consolidation in the form of the European Union is a model of transnational organization that is closely watched by other parts of the world. The way that Europe deals with multiculturalism is also an important bellwether of how the global community will deal with an increasingly diverse population throughout the world. In an era of easy mobility, where everyone can—and does—live everywhere is a challenge to the old European notion of a nationalism based on a common, homogeneous, ancestral culture. As Europe explores ways of assimilating a diversity of populations into its national and regional identities, it will be offering examples—both good and bad—to the rest of the world.

The selections in this section begin with a consideration of the European contributions to globalization, especially in the nineteenth century, by the American historian Peter Stearns. Stearns taught at Carnegie Mellon University for some years and later became a provost at George Mason University. He helped to develop the field of world history. In this excerpt, he describes the effects of European aspects of industrialization and modern political ideas on global culture. This selection is followed by one that specifically explores an influential and transformative European notion, the idea of the nation, to which the European political culture gave birth. The author of this excerpt, Eric Hobsbawm, is one of the great economic historians of the twentieth century. Hobsbawm was British, born in Egypt and raised for a time in Austria before his Jewish family fled Hitler's Nazi regime and came to England, where Hobsbawm eventually became a student and then professor at Cambridge University.

The next selection is from an essay by Seyla Benhabib, a political philosopher who teaches at Yale; she was born in Turkey and achieved acclaim in the United States for her contributions to critical theory and feminist theory. In this selection, she observes that the European Enlightenment notion of national citizenship is challenged in an era of globalization and that a middle path needs to be found between the extremes of open borders and rigid notions of national membership. The Soviet empire during the Cold War is the subject of the next selection. It was written by Odd Arne Westad, a Norwegian historian specializing in the history of China and of the Cold War, who received his graduate training at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, and is now a professor of international history at the London School of Economics and Politics (familiarly known as LSE). In this selection, Westad argues that Soviet communism was at heart an attempt to create a Russian version of modernity.

The last selection is by the great German social and political philosopher Jürgen Habermas. He writes in the tradition of Max Weber, one of the founders of the modern field of sociology, in emphasizing rational communication as a prerequisite to citizenship in what he describes as the "public sphere." In this excerpt, Habermas responds to one of the most critical issues in contemporary Europe, the flood of new immigrants from Eastern Europe to Western Europe and from North Africa and the Middle East to Germany, France, and other European nations. Habermas argues that there should be soft boundaries between nations and a continuity of a sense of citizenship between national identities and the attitude of being world citizens in a global society.

THE 1850S AS TURNING POINT: THE BIRTH OF GLOBALIZATION?

Peter Stearns

A growing group of historians specifically interested in globalization place the effective origins of the phenomenon in the middle of the 19th century. They differ from the larger cluster of world historians who add features to already-sanctioned dates like 1000 or 1500 to provide a larger historical perspective (though of course they would not deny the importance of preparatory developments prior to 1850). They certainly quarrel, if implicitly, with the advocates of 1750. But they also part ways with the "new global history" approach, which is so fascinated with the radical departures, the historical disconnects, of the past fifty years.

Thomas Zeiler puts the case this way. Admittedly, recent changes, particularly in technology, have accelerated globalization's pace beyond anything visible 150 years ago. But in terms of basic changes in transportation, new business networks and economic relationships, the real movement to globalization began earlier. The movement was "nascent and incomplete," and it was "interrupted by events of the twentieth century": "but movement existed, nonetheless." Zeiler sees changes taking shape before World War I as the "early era of globalization." It was fueled not only by new steamships but also the two great world canals, which sped commerce around the globe; and also by real breakthroughs in communications, with telegraph lines between the United States and Latin America and Europe, and British cables lines to Asia, allowing faster commercial interactions than ever before but also unprecedented exchanges of news. Great world's fairs, beginning in London in 1851, highlighted Western manufacturing, to be sure, but with growing attention to economic and cultural patterns in other parts of the world. "Global connections shrunk the world itself"—precisely the claim made about globalization more recently. It was also in this "early era" that not only the United States but also Japan made basic adjustments to globalization that have, with a few disruptions, defined basic orientations ever since. Japanese historians readily see this period, and not the more recent one, as the point at when Japan made its really fundamental global commitments, and the same could be said about North America. Global worries about

Asian competition—defined in the words of the German emperor shortly after 1900 as a new "yellow peril"—and the first stirrings of concerns about cultural and economic "Americanization" accompanied these changes.

This chapter will amplify these claims, and add others, noting changes in patterns of immigration, the onset of new kinds of global connection in popular culture, and a really new era in political globalization with the emergence of capacities to define global standards in a number of areas—beyond anti-slavery—and the formation of international conventions on a host of crucial topics.

We will also, of course, deal with limitations in globalization's "early era"—because the global processes common today were not fully sketched. Even in advance, however, we must take up a still more fundamental question: if a really good case can be made for 1850 as globalization's inception, why has this date never been widely used in world history before?

Both European and world historians have conventionally seized on a period 1750 or 1789 to 1914 as an almost self-evident chronological unit in the human experience, with 1850s and early globalization buried within this larger scheme. The great British historian Eric Hobsbawm dubbed the period the "long 19th century," and virtually every survey history, whether Western or global in focus, has followed suit. Again, there's a bit of dispute about when to begin the "long" century. The date 1750 or so captures the early stages of British and then European industrialization, undeniably (if not then, at least ultimately) a major change in human history. As we have seen, a few voices for a first globalization phase have chimed in with a similar periodization. The date 1789 highlights the revolutionary era, launched a bit earlier but gaining new urgency with the great French rising of that year. And of course, regardless of specific inception, the two developments can be put together, with a long 19th century focused ultimately on the twin phenomena of economic upheaval—industrialization—and political and social challenge through the revolutionary ideas and precedents. Interweaving with both developments, though particularly with industrialization, the long 19th century also saw the further blossoming of Western imperialism, with Africa, Oceania and new parts of southeast Asia offering new jewels to European imperial crowns.

Ending in 1914 seems even more obvious: World War I was a huge event, disrupting lives and social processes around the world, though particularly of course in Europe itself. The generation that experienced that war understandably believed that it was a true watershed, the "Great War," and even later groups of historians picked up the same basic assessment. The brutality of the war, though foreshadowed by earlier conflicts like the American Civil War, was a marker in and of itself. More recent historians have also seen the war as the beginning of the end of European imperial dominance, thanks to the weakening of the major European powers and the unintended encouragement given to nationalist movements elsewhere, from Japan through India and Turkey to Africa.

The overall result is a really powerful set of historical assumptions, into which the idea of an intervening globalization process can fit only with difficulty. It is possible,

of course, to envisage a scheme that would continue to argue for the long 19th century as a basic period, but with a new surge toward globalization coming in the middle. Given the importance that globalization has assumed today, and the fact that many people were claiming new and wide-ranging global connections even by 1900, this compromise seems dubious. In fact, aspects of the argument for a break around 1850 really assume that some of the features normally assigned to the late 18th century—particularly, the earliest stages of European industrialization—really gained full global importance only after mid-century, which makes the latter date preferable in indicating a real break in trends. Though British industrial competition had impact in places like Latin America and India earlier, mainly by driving down levels of traditional manual production especially in textiles, it was really only by the 1850s that a truly global dimension emerged, embracing for example China and Japan as well as south Asia. The age of revolutions angle is trickier, for it did move out earlier from origins in North America and western Europe, to impact Haiti and Latin America in the revolutions and independence movements between the 1790s and 1820s, and through nationalism affected southeastern Europe as well. But here, too, a fuller global roll-out of revolutionary principles, often highlighting nationalism, also awaited the later 19th century.

World War I takes on a partial new role in a globalization-based periodization as well. It did encourage some powerful countercurrents to globalization, in the form of nationalist and regional reactions seeking to limit globalization's impact and develop alternative economic structures. The war's importance is in this sense confirmed, partly on rather familiar grounds. Globalization hit a really rough patch between the 1920s and 1945. But obviously the results were not permanent, and a resumption of the trajectory took shape (at least in some crucial respects) from 1945 onward. World War I is a break, then, but it did not usher in a durable new structure, at least in global mechanisms.

Fortunately, the focus on globalization does not require a full consideration of all aspects of world history chronology. It suggests the possibility, however, of beginning to rethink conventional structures, to argue for a longer early modern period—1450–1850—based on the inclusion of the Americas, a new level of global exchange, and some shifts in global power relationships including a greater role for the West. The last century of this span, after 1750, with accelerated world trade, fuller inclusion of the Pacific regions, and some other changes, expanded several key themes of the period in ways that would provide transitions to the sharper departures of the 1850s and ensuing decades. Then, with the 1850s, came the real advent of modern globalization, with an important but not permanent disruption following World War I, and then a resumption with added acceleration from the later 1940s to the present. Again, this chapter does not depend on recasting world history so completely, but if globalization is the key change in modern world history (which is at least a defendable proposition) and if the modern form of globalization began in the 1850s, the new framework can certainly be suggested.

THE NATION AS NOVELTY

Eric Hobsbawm

Given the historical novelty of the modern concept of "the nation," the best way to understand its nature, I suggest, is to follow those who began systematically to operate with this concept in their political and social discourse during the Age of Revolution, and especially, under the name of "the principle of nationality" from about 1830 onwards. This excursus into *Begriffsgeschichte* is not easy, partly because, as we shall see, contemporaries were too unselfconscious about their use of such words, and partly because the same word simultaneously meant, or could mean, very different things.

The primary meaning of "nation," and the one most frequently ventilated in the literature, was political. It equated "the people" and the state in the manner of the American and French Revolutions, an equation which is familiar in such phrases as "the nation-state," the "United Nations," or the rhetoric of late-twentieth-century presidents. Early political discourse in the USA preferred to speak of "the people," "the union," "the confederation," "our common land," "the public," "public welfare" or "the community" in order to avoid the centralizing and unitary implications of the term "nation" against the rights of the federated states. For it was, or certainly soon became, part of the concept of the nation in the era of the Revolutions that it should be, in the French phrase, "one and indivisible." The "nation" so considered, was the body of citizens whose collective sovereignty constituted them a state which was their political expression. For, whatever else a nation was, the element of citizenship and mass participation or choice was never absent from it. John Stuart Mill did not merely define the nation by its possession of national sentiment. He also added that the members of a nationality "desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively." We observe without surprise that Mill discusses the idea of nationality not in a separate publication as such, but, characteristically—and briefly—in the context of his little treatise on Representative Government, or democracy.

The equation nation = state = people, and especially sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation to territory, since structure and definition of states were now essentially territorial. It also implied a multiplicity of nation-states so constituted, and this was indeed a necessary consequence of popular self-determination. As the French Declaration of Rights of 1795 put it:

> Each people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who compose it and the extent of the territory it occupies. This sovereignty is inalienable.

But it said little about what constituted a "people." In particular there was no logical connection between the body of citizens of a territorial state on one hand, and the identification of a "nation" on ethnic, linguistic or other grounds or of other characteristics which allowed collective recognition of group membership. Indeed, it has been argued that the

French Revolution "was completely foreign to the principle or feeling of nationality; it was even hostile to it" for this reason. . . .

Indeed, if "the nation" had anything in common from the popular-revolutionary point of view, it was not, in any fundamental sense, ethnicity, language and the like, though these could be indications of collective belonging also. As Pierre Vilar has pointed out, what characterized the nation–people as seen from below was precisely that it represented the common interest against particular interests, the common good against privilege, as indeed is suggested by the term Americans used before 1800 to indicate nationhood while avoiding the word itself. Ethnic group differences were from this revolutionary-democratic point of view as secondary as they later seemed to socialists. Patently what distinguished the American colonists from King George and his supporters was neither language nor ethnicity, and conversely, the French Republic saw no difficulty in electing the Anglo-American Thomas Paine to its National Convention.

We cannot therefore read into the revolutionary "nation" anything like the later nationalist programme of establishing nation-states for bodies defined in terms of the criteria so hotly debated by the nineteenth-century theorists, such as ethnicity, common language, religion, territory and common historical memories (to cite John Stuart Mill yet again). As we have seen, except for a territory whose extent was undefined (and perhaps skin colour) none of these united the new American nation. Moreover, as the "grande nation" of the French extended its frontiers in the course of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars to areas which were French by none of the later criteria of national belonging, it was clear that none of them were the basis of its constitution. . . .

To understand the "nation" of the classical liberal era it is thus essential to bear in mind that "nation-building," however central to nineteenth-century history, applied only to some nations. And indeed the demand to apply the "principle of nationality" was not universal either. Both as an international problem and as a domestic political problem it affected only a limited number of peoples or regions, even within multilingual and multiethnic states such as the Habsburg empire, where it clearly dominated politics already. It would not be too much to say that, after 1871—always excepting the slowly disintegrating Ottoman empire—few people expected any further substantial changes in the map of Europe, and recognized few national problems likely to bring them about, other than the perennial Polish question. And, indeed, outside the Balkans, the only change in the European map between the creation of the German empire and World War I was the separation of Norway from Sweden. What is more, after the national alarums and excursions of the years from 1848 to 1867, it was not too much to suppose that even in Austria–Hungary tempers would cool. That, at all events, is what the officials of the Habsburg empire expected when (rather reluctantly) they decided to accept a resolution of the International Statistical Congress at St Petersburg in 1873 to include a question about language in future censuses, but proposed to postpone its application until after 1880 to allow time for opinion to grow less agitated. They could not have been more spectacularly mistaken in their prognosis.

It also follows that, by and large, in this period nations and nationalism were not major domestic problems for political entities which had reached the status of "nation-states," however nationally heterogeneous they were by modern standards, though they were acutely troublesome to non-national empires which were not (anachronistically) classifiable as "multinational." None of the European states west of the Rhine as yet faced serious complications on this score, except Britain from that permanent anomaly, the Irish. This is not to suggest that politicians were unaware of Catalans or Basques, Bretons or Flemings, Scots and Welsh, but they were mainly seen as adding to or subtracting from the strength of some statewide political force. The Scots and the Welsh functioned as reinforcements to liberalism, the Bretons and Flemings to traditionalist Catholicism. Of course the political systems of nation-states still benefited from the absence of electoral democracy, which was to undermine the liberal theory and practice of the nation, as it was to undermine so much else in nineteenth-century liberalism.

That is perhaps why the serious theoretical literature about nationalism in the liberal era is small and has a somewhat casual air. Observers like Mill and Renan were relaxed enough about the elements which made up "national sentiment"—ethnicity—in spite of the Victorians' passionate preoccupation with "race"—language, religion, territory, history, culture and the rest—because politically it did not much matter, as yet, whether one or the other among these was regarded as more important than the rest. But from the 1880s on the debate about "the national question" becomes serious and intensive, especially among the socialists, because the political appeal of national slogans to masses of potential or actual voters or supporters of mass political movements was now a matter of real practical concern. And the debate on such questions as the theoretical criteria of nationhood became passionate, because any particular answer was now believed to imply a particular form of political strategy, struggle and programme. This was a matter of importance not only for governments confronted with various kinds of national agitation or demand, but for political parties seeking to mobilize constituencies on the basis of national, non-national or alternative national appeals. For socialists in central and eastern Europe it made a great deal of difference on what theoretical basis the nation and its future were defined. Marx and Engels, like Mill and Renan, had regarded such questions as marginal. In the Second International [an organization of socialist and labor parties formed in Paris in 1889] such debates were central, and a constellation of eminent figures, or figures with an eminent future, contributed important writings to them: Kautsky, Luxemburg, Bauer, Lenin and Stalin. But if such questions concerned Marxist theorists, it was also a matter of acute practical importance to, say, Croats and Serbs, Macedonians and Bulgarians, whether the nationality of Southern Slavs was defined in one way or another.

The "principle of nationality" which diplomats debated and which changed the map of Europe in the period from 1830 to 1878 was thus different from the political phenomenon of nationalism which became increasingly central in the era of European democratization and mass politics. In the days of Mazzini it did not matter that, for

the great bulk of Italians, the Risorgimento did not exist so that, as Massimo d'Azeglio admitted in the famous phrase: "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians." It did not even matter to those who considered "the Polish Question" that probably most Polish-speaking peasants (not to mention the third of the population of the old pre-1772 Rzecspopolita who spoke other idioms) did not yet feel themselves to be nationalist Poles; as the eventual liberator of Poland, Colonal Pilsudski recognized in *his* phrase: "It is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state." But after 1880 it increasingly did matter how ordinary common men and women felt about nationality. It is therefore important to consider the feelings and attitudes among pre-industrial people of this kind, on which the novel appeal of political nationalism could build.

CITIZENS, RESIDENTS, AND ALIENS IN A CHANGING WORLD: POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL ERA

Seyla Benhabib

Our contemporary condition is marked by the emergence of new forms of identity/difference politics around the globe. As globalization proceeds at a dizzying rate, as a material global civilization encompasses the earth from Hong Kong to Lima, from Pretoria to Helsinki, worldwide integration in economics, technology, communication, armament, and tourism is accompanied by the collective and cultural disintegration of older political entities, in particular of the nation-state. India and Turkey, which are among the oldest democracies of the Third World, are in the throes of struggles that call into question the very project of a secular, representative democracy. Need one mention in this context ethnic wars, cleansings, and massacres in the former Yugoslavia, the Russian destruction of Chechnya, the simmering nationality conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Macedonia and Greece, the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism, and the continuing tribal massacres in the central African states of Rwanda, Uganda, and the Congo? Displaying a social dynamic that we have hardly begun to understand, global integration is proceeding alongside sociocultural disintegration and the resurgence of ethnic, nationalist, religious, and linguistic separatisms.

With globalization and fragmentation proceeding apace, human rights and sovereignty claims come into increasing conflict with each other. On the one hand, a worldwide consciousness about universal principles of human rights is growing; on the other hand, particularistic identities of nationality, ethnicity, religion, race, and language in virtue of which one is said to belong to a sovereign people are asserted with increasing ferocity. Globalization, far from creating a "cosmopolitical order," a condition of perpetual peace among peoples governed by the principles of a republican constitution, has brought to a head conflicts between human rights and the claim to self-determination of sovereign collectivities. Because sovereignty means the right of a collectivity to define itself by asserting power over a bounded territory, declarations of sovereignty more

often than not create distinctions between "us" and "them," those who belong to the sovereign people and those who do not. Historically, there is no convergence between the identity of all those "others" over whom power is asserted because they happen to reside in a bounded state territory and the sovereign people in the name of whom such power is exercised. The distinction between citizens, on the one hand, and residents and foreigners, on the other, is central to the theory and practice of democracies. In this regard, Hannah Arendt's astute observations, although formulated in a different context and with respect to the difficulties of protecting human rights in the interwar period in Europe, are more perspicacious than ever: "From the beginning the paradox involved in the declaration of inalienable human rights was that it reckoned with an 'abstract' human being who seemed to exist nowhere. . . . The whole question of human rights, therefore, was quickly and inextricably blended with the question of national emancipation; only the emancipated sovereignty of the people, of one's own people, seemed to be able to insure them."

The citizenship and naturalization claims of foreigners, denizens, and residents within the borders of a polity, as well as the laws, norms, and rules governing such procedures, are pivotal social practices through which the normative perplexities of human rights and sovereignty can be most acutely observed. Sovereignty entails the right of a people to control its borders as well as to define the procedures for admitting "aliens" into its territory and society; yet, in a liberal-democratic polity, such sovereignty claims must always be constrained by human rights, which individuals are entitled to, not in virtue of being citizens or members of a polity, but insofar as they are human beings *simpliciter*. Universal human rights transcend the rights of citizens and extend to all persons considered as moral beings. What kinds of immigration, naturalization, and citizenship practices, then, would be compatible with the commitments of liberal democracies to human rights? Can claims to sovereign self-determination be reconciled with the just and fair treatment of aliens and others in our midst?

In debates around these issues, two approaches dominate: the radical universalist argument for open borders and the civic republican perspective of "thick conceptions of citizenship." Radical universalists argue that, from a moral point of view, national borders are arbitrary and that the only morally consistent universalist position would be one of open borders. Joseph Carens, for example, uses the device of the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" to think through principles of justice from the standpoint of the refugee, the immigrant, the asylum seeker. Are the borders within which we happen to be born, and the documents to which we are entitled, any less arbitrary from a moral point of view than other characteristics such as skin color, gender, and genetic makeup? Carens's answer is "no." From a moral point of view, the borders that circumscribe our birth and the papers to which we are entitled are arbitrary because their distribution does not follow any clear criteria of moral worth, achievement, and compensation. Therefore, claims Carens, liberal democracies should practice policies that are as compatible as possible with the vision of a world without borders.

Opposed to Carens's radical universalism are a range of communitarian and civic-republican positions, articulating more or less "thick" conceptions of citizenship, community, and belonging. These theories of citizenship, though not precluding or prohibiting immigration, will want to articulate stricter criteria of incorporation and citizenship of foreigners than the universalists. Only those immigrants who come closest to the model of the republican citizen envisaged by these theories will be welcome; others will be spurned. Of course, given how contested such thick conceptions of citizenship inevitably are, communitarian theories can easily lend themselves to the justification of illiberal immigration policies and the restricting of the rights of immigrants and aliens.

This essay steers a middle course between the radical universalism of open borders politics, on the one hand, and sociologically antiquated conceptions of thick republican citizenship, on the other. Instead, stressing the constitutive tension between universalistic human rights claims and democratic sovereignty principles, it will analyze the contemporary practices of political incorporation into liberal democracies. The essay will focus on dilemmas of citizenship and political membership in contemporary Western Europe against the background of these larger theoretical concerns. Current developments in citizenship and incorporation practices within the member states of the European Union in particular are the primary focus. There are a number of compelling historical as well as philosophical reasons for choosing European citizenship and incorporation practices as the focal point for these concerns.

Insofar as they are liberal democracies, member states of the European Union cannot form a "fortress Europe." No liberal democracy can close its borders to refugees and asylum seekers, immigrants and foreign workers. The porousness of borders is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of liberal democracies. By the same token, no sovereign liberal democracy can lose its right to define immigration and incorporation policies.

I distinguish conditions of entry into a country (e.g., the permission to visit, work, study, and buy property) from conditions of *temporary residency,* and both in turn from *permanent residency* and *civil incorporation*, the final stage of which is naturalization and *political membership*. These are different stages of political incorporation, very often collapsed into one another in theoretical discussions, but analytically distinguishable. At each of these stages, the rights and claims of foreigners, residents, and aliens will be regulated by sovereign polities; but these regulations can be subject to scrutiny, debate, and contestation, as well as protest by those to whom they apply, their advocates, and national and international human-rights groups. No step of this process can be shielded from scrutiny by interested parties. Democratic sovereignty in immigration and incorporation policy is not an unlimited right. The right to self-assertion of a particular people must be examined and evaluated in the light of the commitment of this very same people to universal human rights. Developments of citizenship and immigration practices within contemporary Europe reflect some of the deepest perplexities faced by all nation-states in the era of globalization.

SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS IN THE GLOBAL COLD WAR

Odd Arne Westad

Like the United States, the Soviet state was founded on ideas and plans for the betterment of humanity, rather than on concepts of identity and nation. Both were envisaged by their founders to be grand experiments, on the success of which the future of humankind depended. As states, both were universalist in their approaches to the world and the majority of their leaders believed that friends or enemies on the international stage were defined by proximity or nonproximity to the specific ideological premises on which each of these Powers had been founded. During the Cold War both Soviet and American leaders came to define the potential for such proximity by any country's distance from the other superpower in its foreign policy and domestic political agenda.

In historical terms, much of the twentieth century can be seen as a continuous attempt by other states to socialize Russia and America into forms of international interaction based on principles of sovereignty. In these efforts there were some successes, but many failures. The successes have mainly been connected to crises within the international system that could directly threaten Moscow or Washington themselves. For the United States, as we have seen, the Great Depression, the Second World War, and the end of the Vietnam War all led to a greater degree of accommodation to the interests of other states. For Russia, the period between the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, the aftermath of the German attack in 1941, and the Gorbachev–Yeltsin era signaled such accommodation. But the periods in which both powers have been poised to intervene unilaterally *against* the gradually developing norms of international interaction have been much more prevalent. Given the form that American and—at least during its Soviet period—Russian policy took during the twentieth century, it is reasonable to assume that the two projects—one of state sovereignty and another of global ideological predominance—cannot be reconciled, even though both Cold War superpowers at least in form came to accept alliances and international organizations. . . .

While most of the interventionist impulses in Soviet foreign policy were unique to that specific form of a Russian state, the Communists when taking power in Russia of course became successors to an old expansionist empire, in much the same way as the American revolutionaries developed out of the British empire. In both cases the ideologies that justified intervention had developed from concerns that were formed in earlier centuries, under different regimes. For the Russian Communists, this meant that not only did they inherit a multicultural space in which Russian was spoken by less than half the population, but they also took over a state in which the tsars for at least two generations had attempted a policy of Russification and modernization of their non-Russian subjects. Many Russians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including some who became Communists, believed that their country had been endowed with a special destiny to clear the Asian wilderness and civilize the tribes of the East.

In the first decade of the twentieth century Vladimir Illich Ulianov—also known as Lenin—created a party that believed in a form of Marxist modernity that would drive away backwardness from European Russia and set the Asian peoples of the empire on the path to modern development. The Bolsheviks—later known as the All-Russia Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—placed the liberation of the productive potential of the people at the core of the political process. To Lenin, as a Marxist, that liberation meant their transformation from peasants to modern workers, but without the oppression that capitalist systems had inflicted on the industrial proletariat in other European countries. The small Russian proletariat could, the Bolsheviks believed, free itself from the capitalist stage of development if led by a revolutionary vanguard—the Communist Party. The party represented the proletariat and would direct Russia's historical development from a peasant society to a society of industrial workers.

While US and Soviet ideologies had much in common in terms of background and project, what separated them were their distinctive definitions of what modernity meant. While most Americans celebrated the market, the Soviet elites denied it. Even while realizing that the market was the mechanism on which most of the expansion of Europe had been based, Lenin's followers believed that it was in the process of being superseded by class-based collective action in favor of equality and justice. Modernity came in two stages: a capitalist form and a communal form, reflecting two revolutions—that of capital and productivity, and that of democratization and the social advancement of the underprivileged. Communism was the higher stage of modernity, and it had been given to Russian workers to lead the way toward it.

CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Jürgen Habermas

Hannah Arendt's analysis that stateless persons, refugees, and those deprived of rights would determine the mark of this century has turned out to be frighteningly correct. The displaced persons whom the Second World War had left in the midst of a Europe in ruins have been replaced by asylum seekers and immigrants flooding into a peaceful and wealthy Europe from the South and the East. The old refugee camps cannot accommodate the flood of new immigration. In coming years statisticians anticipate twenty to thirty million immigrants from Eastern Europe. This problem can be solved only by the joint action of the European states involved. This process would repeat a dialectic that has already taken place, on a smaller scale, during the process of German unification. The trans-national immigrants' movements function as sanctions which force Western Europe to act responsibly in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of state socialism. Europe must make a great effort to quickly improve conditions in the poorer areas of middle and Eastern Europe or it will be flooded by asylum seekers and immigrants.

The experts are debating the capacity of the economic system to absorb these people, but the readiness to politically integrate the asylum seekers depends more upon how citizens *perceive* the social and economic problems posed by immigration. Throughout Europe, right-wing xenophobic reaction against the "estrangement" (*überfremdung*) caused by foreigners has increased. The relatively deprived classes, whether they feel endangered by social decline or have already slipped into segmented marginal groups, identify quite openly with the ideologized supremacy of their own collectivity and reject everything foreign. This is the underside of a chauvinism of prosperity which is increasing everywhere. Thus the asylum problem as well brings to light the latent tension between citizenship and national identity.

One example is the nationalistic and anti-Polish sentiments in the new German state. The newly acquired status of German citizenship is bound together with the hope that the Republic's frontier of prosperity will be pushed toward the Oder and Neiβe. Their newly gained citizenship also gives many of them the ethnocentric satisfaction that they will no longer be treated as second-class Germans. They forget that citizenship rights guarantee liberty because they contain a core composed of universal human rights. Article Four of the Revolutionary Constitution of 1793, which defined the status of the citizen, gave to *every* adult foreigner who lived for one year in France not just the right to remain within the country but also the active rights of a citizen. . . .

These tendencies signify only that a concept of citizenship, the normative content of which has been dissociated from that of national identity, cannot allow arguments for restrictive and obstructionist asylum or immigration policies. It remains an open question whether the European Community today, in expectation of great and turbulent migrations, can and ought to adopt even such liberal foreigner and immigration policies as the Jacobins did in their time. Today the pertinent *moral-theoretical discussion* regarding the definition of "special duties" and special responsibilities is restricted to the social boundaries of a community. Thus the state too forms a concrete legal community which imposes special duties on its citizens. Asylum seekers and immigrants generally present the European states with the problem of whether special citizenship-related duties are to be privileged above those universal, trans-national duties which transcend state boundaries. . . .

Special duties are those which specific persons owe to others to whom they are obligated by virtue of being "connected" to them as dependents, thus as members of a family, as friends, as neighbors, and as co-members of a political community or nation. Parents have special obligations toward their children—and vice versa. Consulates in foreign countries have special obligations to those of their citizenry who need protection—these in turn are obligated to the institutions and laws of their own land. In this context, we think above all of positive duties, which remain undetermined, insofar as they demand acts of solidarity, engagement, and care in measures which cannot be accurately determined. Help cannot always be expected by everyone. Special duties are those which result from the relationship between the concrete community and a part of

its membership, and can be understood as social attributes and factual specifications of such intrinsically undetermined duties. . . .

A special duty toward these "others" does not result primarily from their membership in a concrete community. It results more from the abstract coordinating tendencies of *judicial* institutions, which specify, according to certain attributes, certain categories of persons or agents; this process, in turn, specifies and legally enforces those positive social and factual obligations which would have been undetermined otherwise. According to this interpretation, institutionally mediated responsibilities determine those specific obligations owed to certain others active in a moral division of labor. Within such a judicially regulated moral economy, the social boundaries of a legal community only have the function of regulating the distribution of responsibilities throughout the community. That does not mean that our responsibility ends at this boundary. More must be done by the national government so that the citizenry fulfills its duties toward its nonmembers—to the asylum seekers, for example. Still, with this argument the question, "What are these duties?" has not yet been answered.

The moral point of view commits us to assess this problem impartially, and thus not just from the one-sided perspective of those living in prosperous regions, but also from the perspective of the immigrants, those who search for grace. Let us say that they seek not only political asylum but a free and dignified human existence. . . . Legitimate restrictions of immigration rights would then be established by competing viewpoints, such as consideration to avoid the enormity of claims, social conflicts, and burdens that might seriously endanger the public order or the economic reproduction of society. The criteria of ethnic origin, language, and education—or an "acknowledgment of belonging to the cultural community" of the land of migration, in the case of those who have Germanic status—could not establish privileges in the process of immigration and naturalization. . . .

The modern state also presents a political way of life which cannot be exhausted through the abstract form of an institutionalization of legal principles. The way of life builds a political-cultural context in which basic universalistic constitutional principles must be implemented. Then and only then will a population, because it is *accustomed* to freedom, also secure and support free institutions. For that reason, Michael Walzer is of the opinion that the right of immigration is limited by the political right of a community to protect the integrity of its life form. According to him, the right of citizens to self-determination implies the right of self-assertion to each particular way of life. . . .

The requisite competence "to act as citizens of a special political community (this particular polity)" is to be understood in another sense completely—namely, the *universalistic* sense—as soon as the political community itself implements universalistic basic laws. The identity of a political community, which may not be touched by immigration, depends primarily upon the constitutional principles rooted in a political culture and not upon an ethical-cultural form of life as a whole. That is why it must be expected that the new citizens will readily engage in the political culture of their new home, without necessarily

giving up the cultural life specific to their country of origin. The *political acculturation* demanded of them does not include the entirety of their socialization. With immigration, new forms of life are imported which expand and multiply the perspective of all, and on the basis of which the common political constitution is always interpreted. . . . We can draw the following normative conclusion: The European states should agree upon a liberal immigration policy. They should not draw their wagons around themselves and their chauvinism of prosperity, hoping to ignore the pressures of those hoping to immigrate or seek asylum. The democratic right of self-determination includes, of course, the right to preserve one's own *political* culture, which includes the concrete context of citizen's rights, though it does not include the self-assertion of a privileged *cultural* life form. Only within the constitutional framework of a democratic legal system can different ways of life coexist equally. These must, however, overlap within a common political culture, which again implies an impulse to open these ways of life to others.

Only democratic citizenship can prepare the way for a condition of world citizenship which does not close itself off within particularistic biases, and which accepts a worldwide form of political communication. The Vietnam War, the revolutionary changes in Eastern and middle Europe, as well as the war in the Persian Gulf are the first *world political* events in a strict sense. Through the electronic mass media, these events were made instantaneous and ubiquitous. In the context of the French Revolution, Kant speculated on the role of the participating public. He identified a world public sphere, which today will become a political reality for the first time with the new relations of global communication. Even the superpowers must recognize worldwide protests. The obsolescence of the state of nature between bellicose states has begun, implying that states have lost some sovereignty. The arrival of world citizenship is no longer merely a phantom, though we are still far from achieving it. State citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum which already shows itself, at least, in outline form.

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