

Globalisation of bordering processes

The role of the influential external actors on bordering processes in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict



From: <https://cartoonmovement.com/cartoon/peace-cake>

Course: Geopolitics of Bordering
MAN-MSG053

Qyra Hendriks - s4792939
Jeroen de Jong - s1087766
Yoram Kremers - s1086456
Sietse Veerman - s1064499

Word count: 3000

Introduction

Mere days after the annexation of Crimea, Angela Merkel stated that the conflict in Ukraine was “a conflict about sphere of influence” (Ferguson & Hast, 2018). Merkel continues on stating that these sorts of claims are of the 19th and 20th centuries. She, therefore, points to the return of spheres of influence, and thus claims for bordering. In this light, this essay is positioned to research such externalisation of the border. The case we will use to zoom in on is the one of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Our essay zooms in on one specific set of processes revolving around the internationalisation of border conflicts. This internationalisation can easily be spotted in the later-mentioned cease-fire agreement of 2020 which was not only signed by governmental representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia but also by the Russian president (Welt & Bowen, 2021). Other big external actors also have a vested interest in steering the bordering conflict. In our essay, we will highlight two of them. Russia, and the European Union (EU). The EU has an interest in the conflict through its so-called ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) (Klever, 2013). We will elaborate on their role in relation to the various and ongoing bordering processes, and who these two actors attempt to shape, steer and manipulate. The central question in this essay, therefore, is; “What is the role of Russia and the European Union in the bordering processes of the violent conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Artsakh (NKR)?”. The main argument in our essay is that the bordering dispute in Nagorno-Karabakh shows that these disputes are never mere local territorial feuds, but are the reflection of global power imbalances in which local actors lose their agency to external superpowers such as the EU and Russia.

To structure our argument we will first briefly give an overview of the border conflict. Secondly, the notion of bordering practices with a specific focus on the geopolitical element of these practices will be explained. Then, applying these theoretical perspectives, our focus will zoom in on both the role of the EU and the role of Russia regarding the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. This essay will conclude with highlighting some alternative imaginations of the border and also provide thoughts on the future of this bordering dispute.

Background of the conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region in the South Caucasus that has been the centre of an ongoing conflict for decades. The region is predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians (Welt & Bowen, 2021). Despite this, the claim of this 4,400 km² territory remains disputed. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Artsakh claims to be autonomous and declared its independence in 1991 (*About Artsakh Republic*, n.d.). However, the region is internationally recognised as belonging to Azerbaijan (UN Press, 2008).

The ongoing violent claims of the territory trace back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Ashur et al., 2021). In 1988 the violent territorial combat over the region began after both Armenia and Azerbaijan were on the run-up towards independence from the Soviet Union. After thousands of deaths and over half a million Armenians and Azerbaijanis fleeing, the first cease-fire agreement was signed in 1994 (Klever, 2013). Nevertheless, ever since this agreement, intervals of violent eruptions have occurred. On November 9, 2020, the last cease-fire agreement was signed after a six-week war with over 6,000 combat- and 150 civilian deaths (Welt & Bowen, 2021). This agreement forced Armenia to give back all the occupied territories to Azerbaijan (How, 2020). The ongoing reconstruction of the borders of this region can be linked to bordering practices, which will be elaborated on further.

The practice of bordering

Seeing a border as a finished entity gets in the way of understanding it, argue many scholars (Brambilla, 2015; dell’Agnese & Amilhat Szary, 2015; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002). This has given rise to the idea of ‘bordering’ to reflect this idea. Using the verb instead of the noun makes the

case for seeing the border as a never-finished process. Bordering, the approach of making borders, shows that borders are not fixed in time and space, but are constantly “created, shifted and deconstructed” (Rumford, 2006, p. 164). Bordering practices categorise and classify spaces as belonging to a certain state (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002). Territory that one has demarcated as belonging to one, can shift over time as belonging to another. It is, therefore, undetermined to whom a certain territory belongs in the future (Laine, 2017; Rumford, 2006). The constant demarcation of space happens in a selective and targeted manner (Rumford, 2006).

The ongoing redrawing of borders reflects the political and social context related to the territory. In addition, bordering practices also inherently reflect notions of power. Therefore, borders are constantly reinvented products of what Laine & Scott (2018, p. 253) call “competing projects of establishing power over territories and groups of people”. Consequently, borders and bordering practices should be understood as socio-political power balances (Laine, 2017). The question then is: who has the power to border? In fact, there is a wide range of actors that hold this power. As the knocking down of the Berlin Wall evidently demonstrates, even ‘regular’ citizens have the power to border, de-border and re-border (Rumford, 2006). However, in a state-centric world – where the notion of sovereignty is understood as a vital principle – it is the nation-state itself that is the most powerful actor when it comes to bordering practices (Paasi, 2003). The case of Nagorno-Karabakh is no exception. In essence, it is a bordering dispute between the states of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The geopolitical nature of bordering

Yet, the fact that nation-states are the most powerful actor in bordering processes does not mean that bordering disputes like the case of the South-Caucasus are immune to external influences. After all, we live in a globalising world – which undeniably affects the nature of bordering practices (Paasi, 2003). Bordering practices have become more and more internationalised. And as aforementioned, bordering practices always reflect the notion of power, contemporary borders should therefore be understood as products of geopolitical power (Paasi, 2003). During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States clearly played the dominant role in geopolitical bordering practices (Laine et al., 2018). Although the geopolitical landscape has clearly changed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there still exist great power imbalances in the matter of bordering practices. As Paasi (2003, p. 10) puts it: “States are, in sum, not equal in their sovereignty and their boundaries have very different meanings and functions”.

For that matter, bordering practices are an essential part of the construction of new “spheres of influence” of the contemporary great powers. According to Etzioni (2017, p. 117), spheres of influence are “international formations that contain one nation (the influencer) that commands superior”. The concept is often linked to times of colonialism and the Cold War. However, many scholars argue they are not foregone phenomena (Allison, 2020). The construction of a sphere of influences has various dimensions, but one of the most important reasonings behind it is that it helps a state mitigate the sense of external threat (Etzioni, 2017). In critical border studies, this practice is often referred to as the ‘externalisation of borders’ (Carrera, 2009). Prominent examples of this border externalisation are visa policies and ‘refugee deals’ (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015).

However, given the fact that bordering is about much more than drawing lines in the sand, the concept of externalisation encompasses much more than border control alone. Instead, we believe that – in correspondence with the notion of bordering – it should be understood as a multidimensional phenomenon that transcends mere security matters and involves economic, political and even socio-cultural practices as well. In that sense, all foreign policy – no matter the actor, no matter the form – concerns a certain degree of externalisation. Bilateral trade deals, for example, are a form of externalising one’s economic borders. Therefore, we argue that creating a sphere of influence and externalising one’s borders are not necessarily detrimental practices. However, we do believe that the

geopolitical power structures within these bordering practices should be recognised. Therefore, bordering disputes – like in Nagorno-Karabakh – should never be viewed as mere local territorial feuds. Instead, they should be interpreted critically through a global lens, paying attention to the multi-dimensional geopolitical powerplays that lie underneath.

The peacekeeper's transgressional interest: Russia

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a fitting example of such geopolitical influences in a local conflict. The first of these actors that we will explore, Russia, historically had a great influence on the region and the demarcation process of the borders that have never been accepted, and are, on the contrary, even adding to the lasting conflict situations throughout the recent history of the Armenian and Azerbaijan relatively young nations.

Russia's seemingly natural interference stems from a shared national history with the region, as it had previously been part of the Soviet Union. During the USSR, both Armenia and Azerbaijan were a Soviet Socialist Republic until 1991. Russia took on the role of mediator in the peace talks already in the same year as their independence in the Zheleznovodsk Communiqué, as a response to quickly emerged strife. After four years of hostilities, with Russia in a dual role as mediator and active interventionist participant, despite Azerbaijan blaming Russia for partiality, the war was stopped after the Bishkek Protocol (Carney, 1992). Russia's brokered peace resulted in the earlier mentioned mass exodus of both Azerbaijanis and Armenians from the Armenian and Azerbaijan lands respectively, bolstering further segregation.

In 1997 Russia signed a treaty of friendship with Armenia, including cooperation and mutual assistance, defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of both countries (Tamrazian, 1997). After the first conflict, the geopolitical relations of Russia became more impactful on their policy-making, alongside national influences, and the emergence of a new semi-authoritarian leader: Vladimir Putin (Bakare, 2021). Russia's global relations with the US at this time were perceived as cooperative, however, Brugato's Appendix: List of Aggressive Events (2008, p. 31-38) shows that through the actions Putin takes, his policy is clearly one seeking division from, and competition with liberalism. Brugato's thesis is that the increase in Russian aggression in these seven years is in large part due to the risen oil price, boosting the growth of Russia's GDP by 6-7% yearly. This strategy by Russia can also be understood from the national influence of fascism (Dunlop, 2004). Dunlop criticises Dugin's 1997 book 'Foundations of Geopolitics' on its fascist rhetoric. One of Dugin's main ideas was to use annexations and alliances to create a Eurasian Empire to overcome 'Atlanticism', in opposition to the domination of liberal values. It was thus also important for Russia to remain present in the NKR conflicts: by assisting in the border conflict of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Russia was able to exert its influence on the strategically significant region.

A decade later, Russia's self-interest became more apparent. Companjen (2010, p. 13) described Russia's importance in this phase of the conflict, stating that "Russia has an important role in the negotiations, but is also trying to control them for its own interests". Gafarli (2016) noticed Russia taking "complete control" over negotiations. Götz & MacFarlane's (2019) work adds insight into Russia's increased imperialistic meddling in geopolitical disputes. Russia's economic stake in the region became palpably discernible in its engagement in the 2015 Eurasian Economic Union with Armenia.

After the 2016 clashes, Russia invested in their political relations with both sides of the conflict, striking deals with both countries on a railway line and gas supply, though they also keep up their weapon supply to both sides (Farchy, 2016). Farchy reiterates the words of the US ambassador in Armenia, who observed that Putin has filled a vacuum that the U.S. had left by not intervening. Furthermore, Russia has asserted its influence through the OSCE Minsk Group, using the platform to

rival Turkey. In the 2020 clashes, Russia's opposition to Turkey became even more apparent (Bremmer, 2020). Though Russia did not intervene when targets within Armenia were struck (Agayev, 2020), despite their military treaty with Armenia.

In the most recent conflicts of 2021 and 2022, Russia has remained participative through the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia acted as a mediator in demarcating borders (Mejlumyan, 2021). In its peacekeeping efforts, Russia has launched investigations into the actions of both sides and engaged in peace talks regularly. Despite these efforts, the conflict kept reigniting.

Russia's most recent absence attests to its previous influence: "Russia [...] isn't punishing Azerbaijan for cease-fire violations — and the country is taking advantage of the situation" (Gavin, 2022). Russia's influence, through geopolitical rivalry as well as regional presence, mediating, and even active intervention on the bordering of the NKR cannot be cold-shouldered.

The normative role of the EU: A challenge to Russia?

The European Union, in the same vein as Russia, has interests in this region. These interests culminated in the creation of the Eastern Partnership commonly called the EaP (European Commission, 2022). While the framework of the EaP has many facets, it is built around joint projects concerning the fostering of "stability, security and prosperity" (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2021, p. 156). The countries part of the EaP have always seen the EaP as a way to counterbalance the role of Russia in the region, and thus are to some degree open to cooperation with the EU (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2021).

In this section, we would like to specifically focus on the security aspect of the EaP. The region has many (frozen) conflicts, and this, therefore, is an important area. The 'how' for conflict prevention and resolution seems to reside in the promotion of political reforms and economic development, through norm-setting. Yet, these policies have led to little or no results (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2018, 2021; Dimitrovova, 2012). This is also precisely one of the main critiques of the EaP. The EU is criticised for its inaction in conflict resolution. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for example highlights very clearly how actors have been severely disappointed by the role and influence of the EaP.

The reasoning for this is two-folded. Firstly, the EU is, by all actors, considered to have little influence in the region and instead points to Russia as the influential player in the region (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2018, p. 59). And secondly because the role of the EU as 'neutral actors' is not seen as credible. Instead, Azerbaijan for example has become highly sceptical of the EU's double standards in conflicts: "[The] EU strongly supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine Moldova and Georgia, but remains silent on Azerbaijan" (idem, p. 58).

Yet, this does not mean the countries do not want the EU to be involved. Both parties are not happy with the role Russia is playing either. Many correspondents of interviews conducted by Delcour & Wolczuk (2018, p. 53) state that "Russia has an interest in maintaining the status quo" because it indeed preserves its leverage over both countries. Armenian governmental officials' interviews were also optimistic of a greater role for the EU in the conflict resolution process (idem, p. 55). This leads to conclude that the only reason the EaP does not do more for conflict resolution is either an unwillingness or an inability to seriously challenge Russia's hard sphere of influence in the region.

However, it seems like there might be a change upcoming in this. The ongoing war in Ukraine has been a wake-up call for the EU to seriously reconsider its security policies as part of the EaP (Gavin, 2022). Examples of this are the recently agreed peace mission and the attempts by the EU to become a serious peace broker (Mejlumyan et al., 2022; Bayramli, 2022). It marks a new chapter in the EaP where the approach shifts from soft power influence & persuasion to a serious challenge of Russia's sphere of influence in the region through what domestic actors have except from the EU: presence on the ground (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2018).

What the EU's role, the perception of its role and the expectations of the actors in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict show is precisely the idea that border processes not only happen at the border but happen everywhere. It also highlights very clearly the influence of big external players like the EU and Russia, but also others like Turkey, the US and Iran for example. In this sense, it is indeed very much the case that local states in a sense need bigger actors in their quest for the ability to border and that the border is under constant renegotiation.

Conclusion

Indeed, the bordering processes for Nagorno Karabakh are not finished, nor will they be in the future. The border is in this sense not fixed in time nor space but is constantly being (re-)constructed by a whole range of processes. What we show in this essay is that these processes happen not only at the border but, through globalisation, happen everywhere: both near and far. With this in mind, we have zoomed in on two actors: the EU and Russia, and have shown how their actions significantly impact the local bordering dispute.

Russia has, through its interventionist, mediator, and peacekeeper roles as well as its bilateral trade deal involvements, shown a motivated participant in the conflict throughout the years. Many argue that this is indeed done on purpose to keep its 'sphere of influence' alive. The EU on the other hand has been considered to have little influence through norm-setting and economic agendas. The result however has been that the countries considered the EU weak and reluctant to partner up with them. Yet, despite this, the expectations and wishes of local actors towards the EU clearly also influenced decisions and actions on the ground.

The bordering conflict in the NKR region has a lot more meaning than a 'simple' feud for the line in the sand. The conflict represents many livelihoods of the people living in the region. It is also about power dynamics of global actors both near and far. In this way, it also represents a tool for the mighty powerful external actors to externalise their border and claim this region in their sphere of influence. It is, in this sense, a playground where big external actors come to battle to be declared the right and power to steer bordering processes.

Future conceptions of this region can instead of seeing the border as reasons for conflict also embrace the bordered life. We suggest a reconceptualization of the border as a positive notion wherein differences are embraced rather than rejected. The borderscape approach provides a more inclusive outlook in which the agency of citizens and local institutions is taken into account (Brambilla & Jones, 2019). The struggles around the Nagorno-Karabakh region can then be used to create collective political and cultural opportunities in which the region shifts from a space of conflict to a space of hope (Van Houtum, 2021).

Bibliography

- About Artsakh Republic*. (n.d.). <http://gov.nkr.am/>. Retrieved 29 September 2022, from <http://gov.nkr.am/>
- Agayev, Z. (2020). *Azerbaijan Attack on Armenia Raises Stakes in Karabakh Conflict*. Bloomberg. Retrieved 2 October, 2022, from [Azerbaijan Attack on Armenia Raises Stakes in Karabakh Conflict - Bloomberg](#)
- Allison, G. (2021, October 19). The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe With Other Great Powers. *Foreign Affairs*.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence>
- Ashur, S., Gaviria, I., Sheng, J., Yapar, H. (2021). *Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Geopolitical Analysis* (Doctoral dissertation, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
- Bakare, N. (2021). *Contextualizing Russia and South Asia relations through Putin's Look East policy*. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 56(3), 676–692
<https://doi-org.ru.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0021909620939113>
- Bayramli, N. (2022). *Azerbaijan, Armenia Take Next Step Toward Peace Agreement, Recognizing Each Other's Territorial Integrity*
<https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan-armenia-take-next-step-toward-peace-agreement-recognizing-each-others-territorial-integrity-2022-10-7-0/>
- Brambilla, C. (2015). Exploring the Critical Potential of the Borderscapes Concept. *Geopolitics*, 20(1), 14–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2014.884561>
- Brambilla, C. & Jones, R. (2019). Rethinking borders, violence, and conflict: From sovereign power to borderscapes as sites of struggles. *Society and space*.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775819856352>
- Bremmer, I. (2020). *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Fighting Could Spiral Into A Larger Regional Conflict*. Time. Retrieved 2 October 2022, from [Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict May Spiral Into Wider Region | Time](#)
- Brugato, T. (2008). *Drunk on oil: Russian Foreign Policy 2000-2007*. Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, 21(2). <https://doi.org/10.5070/B3212007661>
- Carney, James (1992). *Former Soviet Union Carnage in Karabakh*. Time. Retrieved 2 October 2022, from [Former Soviet Union Carnage in Karabakh - TIME](#)
- Carrera, Sergio and Hernández i Sagrera, Raúl, The Externalisation of the EU's Labour Immigration Policy: Towards Mobility or Insecurity Partnerships? (October 23, 2009). CEPS Working Document No. 321, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1513247>
- Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S., & Pickles, J. (2015). Riding Routes and Itinerant Borders: Autonomy of Migration and Border Externalization. *Antipode*, 47(4), 894–914.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12148>
- Companjen, F. J. (2010). *Nagorno Karabakh embedded in geo-politics*. *Atlantisch Perspektief*, 34(4), 9–14.
- Deen, B., Zweers, W., & van Loon, I. (2021). The Eastern Partnership: Three dilemmas in a time of troubles. In *Clingendael*. The Clingendael Institute. Retrieved 28 September 2022, from <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/eastern-partnership-three-dilemmas-time-troubles>
- Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2018). Well-Meaning but Ineffective? Perceptions of the EU's Role as a Security Actor in the South Caucasus. *EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW*, 20.
- Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2021). Mind the gap: Role expectations and perceived performance of the EU in the South Caucasus. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 62(2), 156–177.

- <https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2020.1779103>
- dell'Agnese, E., & Amilhat Szary, A.-L. (2015). Borderscapes: From Border Landscapes to Border Aesthetics. *Geopolitics*, 20(1), 4–13. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2015.1014284>
- Dimitrova, B. (2012). Imperial re-bordering of Europe: The case of the European Neighbourhood Policy. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(2), 249–267. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.678298>
- Dunlop, John (2004). *Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics*. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (George Washington University). 12 (1): 41.
- Etzioni, A. (2015). Spheres of Influence: A Reconceptualization. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 39(2), 117–132. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45290158>
- European Commission. (2022). *European neighbourhood policy*. Retrieved 27 September 2022, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/european-neighbourhood-policy_en
- Farchy, J. (2016). *Russia senses opportunity in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict*. Financial Times. Retrieved 1 October 2022, from [Russia senses opportunity in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict | Financial Times \(ft.com\)](https://www.ft.com/content/10000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000)
- Ferguson, I., & Hast, S. (2018). Introduction: The Return of Spheres of Influence? *Geopolitics* 23(2), 277–284. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2018.1461335>
- Gafarli, O. (2016). *Secrets of the Four-Day Karabakh War*. The National Interest. Retrieved 2 October 2022, from [Secrets of the Four-Day Karabakh War | The National Interest](https://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/secrets-of-the-four-day-karabakh-war-14444)
- Gavin, G. (2022). *The EU is stepping into Russia's shoes in Nagorno-Karabakh*. [Www.Euractiv.Com](https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/the-eu-is-stepping-into-russias-shoes-in-nagorno-karabakh/). <https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/the-eu-is-stepping-into-russias-shoes-in-nagorno-karabakh/>
- Gavin, G. (2022). *With Russia distracted, clashes rock Nagorno-Karabakh*. Politico. Retrieved 5 October 2022, from <https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-distracted-ukraine-clash-rock-nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan/>
- Götz Elias, & MacFarlane, N. (2019). *Russia's role in world politics: power, ideas, and domestic influences*. *International Politics*, 56(6), 713–725. <https://doi-org.ru.idm.oclc.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0162-0>
- How, M. (2020). *Nagorno-Karabakh Ceasefire Agreement – Outlook*. Retrieved October 2, 2022, from <https://ve-insight.com/geopolitics/nagorno-karabakh-ceasefire-agreement-outlook/>
- Klever, E. (2013). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: An overview of the current situation. *European Movement International*, 2.
- Laine, J. P. (2017). Understanding borders under contemporary globalisation. *Annales Scientia Politica*, 6(2), 6–18.
- Laine, J. P., Liikanen, I., & Scott, J. W. (2018). Introduction: Post-Cold War borders and borderscapes. In *Post-Cold War Borders* (1st ed., pp. 1–12). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429491177>
- Laine, J. P., & Scott, J. W. (2018). Conclusions: On borderscapes of post-Cold War borders. In *Post-Cold War Borders* (1st ed., pp. 246–256). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429491177>
- Mejlumyan, A. (2021). *Armenia close to new agreement with Azerbaijan*. Eurasianet. Retrieved 2 October 2022, from [Armenia close to new agreement with Azerbaijan | Eurasianet](https://eurasianet.org/armenia-close-to-new-agreement-with-azerbaijan)
- Mejlumyan, ani, Kucera, J., & Isayev, H. (2022). *Armenia, Azerbaijan agree to EU*

mission on border | *Eurasianet*.

<https://eurasianet.org/armenia-azerbaijan-agree-to-eu-mission-on-border>

Paasi, A. (2003). Boundaries in a globalizing world. In A. Paasi Boundaries in a globalizing world (pp. 462-472). SAGE Publications Ltd, <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781848608252>

Rumford, C. (2006). Theorizing Borders. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9(2), 155–169. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431006063330>

Tamrazian, H. (1997). *Armenia/Russia: Landmark Treaty Includes Provision For Mutual Defense*. RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. Retrieved 31 September 2022, from [Armenia/Russia: Landmark Treaty Includes Provision For Mutual Defense \(rferl.org\)](https://www.rferl.org/content/Armenia-Russia-Landmark-Treaty-Includes-Provision-For-Mutual-Defense/2781261.html)

Van Houtum, H., & Van Naerssen, T. (2002). Bordering, Ordering and Othering. *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie*, 93(2), 125–136. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9663.00189>

Van Houtum, H. (2021). Beyond Borderism: Overcoming discriminative B/ordering and Othering, *TESG*. doi: oi/10.1111/tesg.1247

Welt, C., & Bowen, A. S. (2021). Azerbaijan and Armenia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC.

Zacha, O. (2018). EU Policy Gaps Towards the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict: Action Long Overdue. *STRATPOL Policy Paper*, 1–20. <https://stratpol.sk/three-new-policy-papers-on-gaps-in-eu-policy-towards-the-black-sea-and-south-caucasus/>