

# **Presearch Code Audit**

By

**DLT Labs** 



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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. DOCUMENT PURPOSE

**DLT Labs** conducted the review of the smart contracts that makes up the **Presearch Token Sale** service. The findings of the review are presented in this document.

#### 1.2. REVIEW GOALS & FOCUS

#### **Sound Architecture**

This review includes both objective findings from the contract code as well as subjective assessments of the overall architecture and design choices. Given the subjective nature of certain findings, comments from the Presearch development team have been included in the report as appropriate.

#### **Smart Contract Best Practices**

This review will evaluate whether the codebase follows the current established best practices for smart contract development.

#### **Code Correctness**

This review will evaluate whether the code works as expected.

#### **Code Quality**

This review will evaluate whether the code has been written in a way that ensures readability and maintainability.

#### Security

This review will look for exploitable security vulnerabilities.

## 1.3. TERMINOLOGY

This review uses the following severity terms which indicates the magnitude of an issue:

#### Minor

Minor issues are generally subjective in nature, or potentially deal with topics like "best practices" or "readability". Minor issues in general will not indicate an actual problem or bug in code.

The maintainers should use their own judgment as to whether addressing these issues improves the quality of codebase.

## Major



Major issues will be things like bugs or security vulnerabilities. These issues may not be directly exploitable such as requiring a specific condition to arise to be exploited.

Left unaddressed these issues are highly likely to cause problems with the operation of the contract or lead to a situation which allows the system to be exploited in some way.

#### Critical

Critical issues are directly exploitable bugs or security vulnerabilities. Left unaddressed these issues are highly likely or guaranteed to cause major problems or potentially a full failure in the operations of the contract.



# 2. SOURCE CODE

## 2.1. SOURCE CODE

The source code under review was shared over the email on following dates:

- 1<sup>st</sup> Version 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2017
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Version 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2017
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Version 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017
- 4<sup>th</sup> Version 11<sup>th</sup> October 20177

#### 2.2. CONTRACTS

The code audit carried out was limited to the smart contract(s) shared over the email. There was only one smart contract **preToken.sol** which was reviewed.

## 3. DISCLAIMER

The audit makes no statements or warrantees about utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, regulatory regime for the business model, or any other statements about fitness of the contracts to purpose, or their bug free status.



## 4. FINDINGS

This section contains detailed issues and analysis on basis of white paper shared on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2017.

#### 4.1. CRITICAL ISSUES

**Issue#** 001

Code commit#: 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2017

Description:

The first version of the code was not getting compiled.

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by adding following lines in code which were missing in the previous version:

//crowdsaleAddress

address public crowdsaleAddress;

**Issue#** 002

Code commit#: 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2017

Description:

In function **setCrowdsaleAddress**, an incorrect variable was used to check address null condition. Variable **crowdsaleAddress** was used instead of **newCrowdsaleAddress** while checking the address null condition. The function **setCrowdsaleAddress** will always throw error as **crowdsaleAddress** was not initialized.

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by using the correct variable name. Also **crowdsaleAddress** was initialized to **msg.sender** in the contract constructor call, this sets the **crowdsaleAddress** to the address of the person who deploys the contract.

**Issue**# 003

Code commit#: 3rd October 2017

Description:

In function *mint* and *burn* logic to calculate *totalSuppy* was not written in the optimal way and it could be optimized to save gas cost.

It was written as totalSupply = totalSupply += \_amount and totalSupply = totalSupply -= \_amount respectively in *mint* and *burn*. This could be optimized as totalSupply += \_amount and totalSupply -= \_amount respectively. This optimization will save around



5000 gas in both functions. Use of SafeMath library was also recommended for calculations.

## Action:

Team Presearch fixed the issue by using the recommended optimized statement and also included the SafeMath library. The above-mentioned code was modified to:

Mint: totalSupply = totalSupply.add(\_amount);

Burn: totalSupply = totalSupply.sub(\_amount);



#### 4.2. MAJOR ISSUES

**Issue#** 004

Code commit#:3rd October 2017

Description:

Following variables remained constant throughout the life cycle of contract:

- maxSupply
- initialSupply
- unlockDate
- name
- symbol
- decimals
- version

So, all the above variables should have been declared as constant since their values are supposed to remain constant throughout. Making the variables constant also reduces the gas cost.

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by defining all above variables as a public constant.

## **Issue**# 005

Code commit#:3rd October 2017

## Description:

In functions *transfer* and *transferFrom,* there was no **Zero-Address check** validation on input parameters \_*to* and \_*from*.

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by adding the **Zero-Address** *check* on both parameters *to* and *from*.

#### **Issue**# 006

Code commit#:3<sup>rd</sup> October 2017

#### Description:

In function *approve*, there was no **Zero-Address check** validation on input parameter \_spender.

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by adding the **Zero-Address** *check* on *\_spender* parameter.



**Issue**# 007

Code commit#:3<sup>rd</sup> October 2017

Description:

According to white paper, value of token *name* and *symbol* should have been set to "*Presearch*" and "*PRE*" respectively but it was found that in smart contract value of *name* and *symbol* was specified as "*pstTest*" and "*PST*" respectively.

## Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by placing correct values as mentioned in the white paper.



#### 4.3. MINOR ISSUES

**Issue#** 008

Code commit#:3<sup>rd</sup> October 2017

## Description:

During audit following functions were identified as publicly visible functions which were not explicitly specified as public:

- preToken()
- balanceOf ()
- transfer()
- transferFrom()
- approve()
- allowance()
- transferOwnership()
- mint()
- burn()
- setCrowdsaleAddress()

It was recommended to specify public visibility explicitly for functions that needs to be publicly visible.

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the issue by specifying the visibility of all above functions as *public*.

#### **Issue#** 009

Code commit#:11<sup>th</sup> October 2017

#### Description:

According to latest standard, it is recommended to define functions which can read the state of blockchain but cannot write in it as **view** instead of constant. So we recommend to use **view** instead of constant in following functions:

- allowance()
- balanceOf()

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by changing all above functions from *constant* to *view*.



#### **Issue#** 010

Code commit#:3<sup>rd</sup> October 2017

## **Description**:

According to latest standard, it is recommended to define functions which can neither read the state of blockchain nor write in it as *pure* instead of constant. So we recommend to use *pure* instead of constant in following functions:

- mul()
- div()
- sub()
- add()

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by changing all above functions from *constant* to *pure*.

#### Issue# 011

Code commit#:3rd October 2017

## **Description**:

Data type of *decimal* was defined *uint256* but according to standard recommendation it should have been *uint8* 

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by changing the data type of **decimal** from uint256 to **uint8**.

#### **Issue**# 012

Code commit#:11<sup>th</sup> October 2017

#### Description:

An old solidity version (0.4.11) was used so it was recommended to update solidity version to **0.4.17** 

#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by upgrading solidity version to **0.4.17** 

#### **Issue**# 013

Code commit#:11<sup>th</sup> October 2017

### Description:



#### Action:

Team Presearch fixed the above issue by specifying the *maxSuppy* and **initialSupply** value in scientific notation.

#### **Issue#** 014

Code commit#:11<sup>th</sup> October 2017

#### Description:

In function *updateUnlockDate*, there is no check for *\_newDate* > the start time of token sale which allows someone to update unlock date any time prior to starting time of token sale.

#### Action:

Team Presearch decided to not add the check, as it is by design that there is no official start time/date.

#### **Issue#** 015

Code commit#:11<sup>th</sup> October 2017

## Description:

In function *updateUnlockDate*, we were checking *require* (\_newDate <= 1512018000); which means it will always compare with "November  $30^{th}$ ,  $2017\ 00:00:00\ AM\ EST$ ". Consider a scenario when someone changed the unlock date to "November  $15^{th}$ , 2017" so he would also be able to change it back to a later date (between "November  $15^{th}$ , 2017" and "November  $30^{th}$ , 2017") which contradicts with the comment mentioned above the same function.

#### Action:

Team Presearch decided to not add the check, as it is by design.



## **5. GENERAL COMMENTS**

#### 5.1. STANDARD ERC-20 TOKEN

PRE token is implemented by following ERC-20 compliant standard token standards. Thus, following the latest approved coding standard on Ethereum token. Link of approved EIP - https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20-token-standard.md

## **5.2.** Use of Assert and Require

Proper error handling and validation of input parameters have been done extensively throughout the code by using assert and require. The code base does not use the old way of "If .. throw" pattern. It has made use of new guard functions assert() and require().

#### 5.3. SHORT-ADDRESS ATTACK

Checks have been kept in place to handle the short-address. It has been handled by creating a modifier **onlyPayloadSize** and modifier is used at required places.

```
//Prevent short address attack
modifier onlyPayloadSize(uint size) {
   assert(msg.data.length == size + 4);
   _;
}
```

#### 5.4. ZERO-ADDRESS CHECK

Zero-Address check is present to prevent inadvertent transfer of Ether or Token to a 0x0 address. Checks like below are added

## require(newCrowdsaleAddress != address(0));

The above check using require and address cast is the clean and elegant way of doing Zero-Address check.