Incident Response and Review – Clinic

Identification and Investigation

Timeline based on Windows Event Logs:


Log	Time (EDT)	Event ID	Attack	Notes
3	08:10:23	4624	Successful logon	By JohnDoe into DESKTOP-
				1234567 from
				, logon type
				10 (RDP)
5	09:45:32	4719	Policy changed	On Domain Controller with
				Account Name: Administrator
10	10:32:17	4625	Failed logon	From ,
				logon type 3 (Network logon) on
				DESKTOP-1234567
11	10:32:19	4625	Failed logon	From :50791,
				logon type 3 (Network logon) on
				DESKTOP-1234567
12	10:32:21	4624	Successful logon	From :50793, on
				DESKTOP-1234567, using
				admin, logon type 3 (Network
				logon)
13	10:33:45	2004	Firewall rule change	Allow traffic using TCP on port
				445 (SMB), from
				to
1	12:01:15	1000	Application error	explorer.exe program crashed
6	13:23:15	2004	Firewall rule change	Allow traffic using TCP on port
				22 (SSH) from to
7	14:10:12	861	Some application is	By user JohnDoe on SERVER-
			tracking activity	12345 using UDP on port 53
			(eavesdropping)	(DNS)

2	15:23:52	823	MSSQLSERVER	Failed read/write into database
8	15:34:56	4625	Failed logon	On DESKTOP-1234567 from source IP, logon type 3 (Network logon)
9	16:45:32	5156	WFP permit connection	Unknown application, inbound traffic from to :80
4	17:34:56	529	Failed logon	With username, Admin on SERVER-12345, logon type 2 (interactive logon)

Date: 2023-09-20


Timezone: New York, EDT (GMT-4), based on clinic HQ location

Tools like Timeline Explorer helped clear the fog from the data set to make better deductions of what took place during the attack:




Log Analysis:

- Upon using the showmyip bulk IP lookup tool, the IPs geolocations are visualized on the world map to see where the requests are from:



- Using these locations, we can determine whether it is legitimate network requests or not
- Tool like Abuseipdb showed specific IPs which may have been used in prior attacks:



Affected systems, services:

- DESKTOP-1234567
- MSSQLSERVER database file, "mydatabase.mdf"
- Policy changed on DC-SERVER-01
- DNS tracking on SERVER-12345

Patterns/Anomalies:

- Lateral movement from using logon type: 3 (failed and successful attempts)
- Brute force attacks from logs 10, 11, 12
- Unauthorized access into DESKTOP-1234567 using RDP and log 12
- Privilege escalation

Questions for stakeholders:

- Is there a list of assets (inventory) that can be accessed to understand potential impact of system? I.e, where can lateral movement take the attacker.

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Response Containment and Eradication

<u>Short-term plan:</u> (Snapshot, Isolate comprised systems, uninstall malware, revert changes, traffic analysis)

Actions	Steps to take	
Snapshot	Take snapshot of current system to take	
	closer look at changes and unauthorized	
	access, modifications etc.	
Isolate systems	Isolate data and systems like DESKTOP-	
	1234567, SERVER-12345, DC-SERVER-	
	01, SQLSERVER-12345	
	Isolate the SQL database and use backup	
	until resolved	
Uninstall/remove unwanted software	Uninstall software unknown.exe and all	
	data related to it	
	Remove tracking application on SERVER-	
	12345	
Make changes	Revert changed policy on Domain	
	controller	
	Change JohnDoe account password and	
	access	
	Mandatory password reset on all accounts	
Traffic analysis	Block/filter traffic from identified malicious	
	IP addresses involved in the attack	

<u>Long-term plan:</u> (Further investigation, monitoring, improved access controls, user education)

Actions	Steps to take	
Further investigation	Identify how credentials were acquired by	
	JohnDoe (data leak?)	
	Identify how to prevent privilege escalation	
	to Admin account via User and Groups	
	Plan how to prevent lateral movement of	
	attackers once access is gained to network	
Monitoring	Continue monitoring network for malicious	
	activity	
Improved access controls	Firewall rules changed need to be reverted	
	Implement stringent intrusion detection	
	systems	
	Enable MFA for database access	
	Update all software on SERVERS and	
	apply necessary patches	
Education	User education and training to prevent	
	credential leak	

Overview:

- Inform authorities and patients on such a security gap
- Unauthorized access of network can mean PII data of patients has been compromised
- Ensure compliance with HIPAA, PCI DSS, GDPR (legal team)
- Prevent any more downtime of servers or database (which has patient records)
- Consider company branding and image (PR)

Cost-analysis:

- Tools
 - o IDS/IPS \$10,000 to \$50,000
- User education & training \$30 to \$100 per employee annually
- Business disruptions/downtime (SQL database, patient details) \$300,000+
- Penalties involved with compliance violations
- Cybersecurity insurance

Presentation to CTO:

Affected systems have been isolated to prevent spread of attack				
Eradicated malware and resolved vulnerabilities				
Policy changes are required				
Continue to monitor for further network security events				
Provide user education and training on security incidents				
Implement improved access controls				
Perform further investigation				
Get legal team involved for compliance and regulations (HIPAA, PII)				
Consider potential company branding as a result of security incident				
Decide on financial impact and decisions to be made				

Post Incident Review

Target audience:

- Upper management interested in financial impacts and business objectives
- Affected business units interested in how to prevent such security incidents
- Considering that the security gap caused violations of HIPAA and GDPR, legal team and PR will have to be involved in this meeting.

Timeline:

- Security incident occurred on 2023-09-20 from 8am to 6pm.
- Attacker gained access to network and activities were logged by security controls in place, including potential data exfiltration.
- Once alarms were raised from this security incident, the security team conducted initial investigations and containment of the attack on 2023-09-21.
- Affected systems and services (including patient records) were restored on 2023-09-22, and necessary access control measures deployed.

Impact to business:

- Loss of trust in customers (patients)
- Compliance violations and fees involved with that
- Downtime of affected systems and business lost as a result of that

Security Review:

What went right:

- Immediate detection and response to security incident
- Proper protocols and policies followed to respond and contain the attack and consequences

What could be better:

- More hands-on deck to respond to such incidents
- Implementation of SOAR and SIEM tools to detect and respond faster
- To prevent such re-occurrences improve overall security posture by reducing attack vectors and surfaces for potential vulnerabilities
- Move forward with more user training, employ concepts of defense-in-depth and least privilege.

Lessons learned:

- Security incidents can occur even when mitigative strategies and access management tools are in place, ie, ensure cyber hygiene at all times (do not let guard down)
- Incidents such as these can have impacts not just on affected systems but also the end user (patients and compliance)

The future:

- Hire external security consultation company to recommend potential security measures
- Consider cybersecurity insurance plan in place for security incidents
- In the event of security events to have business continuity and risk management plans