

Audit Report **ObeseFans Calories**

April 2023

SHA256

2f3a940b2aeeb3d828af9e62604f65f7eb44444ac4acacb8612a0d7f1243d836

Audited by © cyberscope



Table of Contents

Table of Contents	1
Review	3
Audit Updates	3
Source Files	3
Findings Breakdown	4
Analysis	5
OCTD - Transfers Contract's Tokens	6
Description	6
Recommendation	6
ULTW - Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet	7
Description	7
Recommendation	7
BT - Burns Tokens	8
Description	8
Recommendation	9
Diagnostics	10
AFI - Accumulated Fees Inconsistency	11
Description	11
Recommendation	11
RSML - Redundant SafeMath Library	12
Description	12
Recommendation	12
L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant	13
Description	13
Recommendation	13
L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	14
Description	14
Recommendation	15
L05 - Unused State Variable	16
Description	16
Recommendation	16
L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic	17
Description	17
Recommendation	17
L08 - Tautology or Contradiction	18
Description	18
Recommendation	18
L09 - Dead Code Elimination	19
Description	19



Recommendation	19
L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation	21
Description	21
Recommendation	21
L15 - Local Scope Variable Shadowing	22
Description	22
Recommendation	22
L16 - Validate Variable Setters	23
Description	23
Recommendation	23
L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check	24
Description	24
Recommendation	24
Functions Analysis	25
Inheritance Graph	33
Flow Graph	34
Summary	35
Disclaimer	36
About Cyberscope	37



Review

Contract Name	Calories
Testing Deploy	https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x4ca6812c88db2c319c2 0bfabc0cfa53f7cd5921f
Symbol	\$CLRS
Decimals	18
Total Supply	10.000.000.000

Audit Updates

Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contracts/CLRS.sol	2f3a940b2aeeb3d828af9e62604f65f7eb44444ac4acacb8612a0d7f1243 d836



Findings Breakdown



Severity	Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
Critical	2	0	0	0
Medium	0	0	0	0
Minor / Informative	13	0	0	0



Analysis

CriticalMediumMinor / InformativePass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	ST	Stops Transactions	Passed
•	OCTD	Transfers Contract's Tokens	Unresolved
•	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
•	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
•	ULTW	Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet	Unresolved
•	MT	Mints Tokens	Passed
•	ВТ	Burns Tokens	Unresolved
•	ВС	Blacklists Addresses	Passed



OCTD - Transfers Contract's Tokens

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L1123
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract owner has the authority to claim all the balance of the contract. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the rescueAnyBEP20Tokens function.

```
function rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address _tokenAddr, address _to, uint
_amount) public onlyOwner {
   IERC20(_tokenAddr).transfer(_to, _amount);
}
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.
- Renouncing the ownership will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.



ULTW - Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract owner has the authority to transfer funds without limit to the team wallet.

These funds have been accumulated from fees collected from the contract. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the rescueBNB methods.

```
function rescueBNB(uint256 weiAmount) external onlyOwner{
  require(address(this).balance >= weiAmount, "insufficient BNB
balance");
  payable(msg.sender).transfer(weiAmount);
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum amount of funds that can be swapped, since a huge amount may volatile the token's price. The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.
- Renouncing the ownership will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.



BT - Burns Tokens

Criticality	Critical
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L1330
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract automatically burns up to 10% of the liquidity pair token balance every 10 minutes at most. If a large amount of liquidity is removed from the pool through burning, it can cause a decrease in the liquidity of the pool, which can, in turn, result in increased volatility and price fluctuations of the tokens in the pair.

```
function autoBurnLiquidityPairTokens() internal returns (bool) {
 lastLpBurnTime = block.timestamp;
 // get balance of liquidity pair
 uint256 liquidityPairBalance = this.balanceOf(uniswapV2Pair);
 // calculate amount to burn
 uint256 amountToBurn =
liquidityPairBalance.mul (percentForLPBurn) .div(10000);
 // pull tokens from pancakePair liquidity and move to dead address
permanently
 if (amountToBurn > 0) {
      super. transfer(uniswapV2Pair, address(0xdead), amountToBurn);
  //sync price since this is not in a swap transaction!
 IUniswapV2Pair pair = IUniswapV2Pair(uniswapV2Pair);
 pair.sync();
 emit AutoNukeLP();
 return true;
```



Recommendation

It is recommended to review and adjust the parameters of the auto-liquidity burn mechanism to ensure that it operates optimally. Specifically, the period of time and percentage burned should be reasonable and appropriate for the specific use case. This will help to prevent any potential issues and ensure that the mechanism functions as intended.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.
- Renouncing the ownership will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.



Diagnostics

CriticalMediumMinor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	AFI	Accumulated Fees Inconsistency	Unresolved
•	RSML	Redundant SafeMath Library	Unresolved
•	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant	Unresolved
•	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
•	L05	Unused State Variable	Unresolved
•	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic	Unresolved
•	L08	Tautology or Contradiction	Unresolved
•	L09	Dead Code Elimination	Unresolved
•	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation	Unresolved
•	L15	Local Scope Variable Shadowing	Unresolved
•	L16	Validate Variable Setters	Unresolved
•	L20	Succeeded Transfer Check	Unresolved



AFI - Accumulated Fees Inconsistency

Criticality	Critical
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L1279
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract has a rescueAnyBEP20Tokens function that withdraws tokens from the contract. However, the contract does not update the variable that tracks the accumulated fees when the withdrawal occurs. This can result in incorrect fee calculations and cause the swap function to revert.

```
function swapBack() private {
    uint256 contractBalance = balanceOf(address(this));
    uint256 totalTokensToSwap = tokensForLiquidity + tokensForMarketing
+ tokensForDev + tokensForCharity;
    ...
}
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to update the variables that tracks the accumulated fees every time a token withdrawal occurs.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.
- Renouncing the ownership will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.



RSML - Redundant SafeMath Library

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol
Status	Unresolved

Description

SafeMath is a popular Solidity library that provides a set of functions for performing common arithmetic operations in a way that is resistant to integer overflows and underflows.

Starting with Solidity versions that are greater than or equal to 0.8.0, the arithmetic operations revert on underflow and overflow. As a result, the native functionality of the Solidity operations replaces the SafeMath library. Hence, the usage of the SafeMath library adds complexity, overhead and increases the gas consumption unnecessarily.

```
library SafeMath {...}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to remove the SafeMath library. Since the version of the contract is greater than 0.8.0 then the pure Solidity arithmetic operations produce the same result.

If the previous functionality is required, then the contract could exploit the unchecked { ... } statement.

Read more about the breaking change on https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.16/080-breaking-changes.html#solidity-v0-8-0-breaking-changes.



L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L893,894
Status	Unresolved

Description

State variables can be declared as constant using the constant keyword. This means that the value of the state variable cannot be changed after it has been set. Additionally, the constant variables decrease gas consumption of the corresponding transaction.

```
uint256 public manualBurnFrequency = 30 minutes
uint256 public lastManualLpBurnTime
```

Recommendation

Constant state variables can be useful when the contract wants to ensure that the value of a state variable cannot be changed by any function in the contract. This can be useful for storing values that are important to the contract's behavior, such as the contract's address or the maximum number of times a certain function can be called. The team is advised to add the constant keyword to state variables that never change.



L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L47,48,65,738,876,925,937,939,941,1063,1072,1123,1322
Status	Unresolved

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

- 1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
- 2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
- 3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
- 4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
- 5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
- 6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
- 7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.



```
function DOMAIN SEPARATOR() external view returns (bytes32);
function PERMIT TYPEHASH() external pure returns (bytes32);
function MINIMUM LIQUIDITY() external pure returns (uint);
function WETH() external pure returns (address);
address public constant deadAddress = address(0xdead)
mapping (address => bool) public
isExcludedMaxTransactionAmount
event marketingWalletUpdated(address indexed newWallet, address
indexed oldWallet);
event devWalletUpdated(address indexed newWallet, address
indexed oldWallet);
event charityWalletUpdated(address indexed newWallet, address
indexed oldWallet);
uint256 liquidityFee
uint256 devFee
uint256 buyCharityFee
uint256 marketingFee
uint256 sellCharityFee
. . .
```

Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention.



L05 - Unused State Variable

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L669
Status	Unresolved

Description

An unused state variable is a state variable that is declared in the contract, but is never used in any of the contract's functions. This can happen if the state variable was originally intended to be used, but was later removed or never used.

Unused state variables can create clutter in the contract and make it more difficult to understand and maintain. They can also increase the size of the contract and the cost of deploying and interacting with it.

```
int256 private constant MAX_INT256 = ~(int256(1) << 255)</pre>
```

Recommendation

To avoid creating unused state variables, it's important to carefully consider the state variables that are needed for the contract's functionality, and to remove any that are no longer needed. This can help improve the clarity and efficiency of the contract.



L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L1040,1046,1051,1064,1073,1325
Status	Unresolved

Description

Events are a way to record and log information about changes or actions that occur within a contract. They are often used to notify external parties or clients about events that have occurred within the contract, such as the transfer of tokens or the completion of a task.

It's important to carefully design and implement the events in a contract, and to ensure that all required events are included. It's also a good idea to test the contract to ensure that all events are being properly triggered and logged.

```
swapTokensAtAmount = newAmount
maxTransactionAmount = newNum * (10**18)
maxWallet = newNum * (10**18)
buyMarketingFee = _marketingFee
sellMarketingFee = _marketingFee
lpBurnFrequency = _frequencyInSeconds
```

Recommendation

By including all required events in the contract and thoroughly testing the contract's functionality, the contract ensures that it performs as intended and does not have any missing events that could cause issues with its arithmetic.



L08 - Tautology or Contradiction

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L1324
Status	Unresolved

Description

A tautology is a logical statement that is always true, regardless of the values of its variables. A contradiction is a logical statement that is always false, regardless of the values of its variables.

Using tautologies or contradictions can lead to unintended behavior and can make the code harder to understand and maintain. It is generally considered good practice to avoid tautologies and contradictions in the code.

```
require(_percent <= 1000 && _percent >= 0, "Must set auto LP
burn percent between 0% and 10%")
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to carefully consider the logical conditions is using in the code and ensure that it is well-defined and make sense in the context of the smart contract.



L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L414,715,721,728
Status	Unresolved

Description

In Solidity, dead code is code that is written in the contract, but is never executed or reached during normal contract execution. Dead code can occur for a variety of reasons, such as:

- Conditional statements that are always false.
- Functions that are never called.
- Unreachable code (e.g., code that follows a return statement).

Dead code can make a contract more difficult to understand and maintain, and can also increase the size of the contract and the cost of deploying and interacting with it.

```
function _burn(address account, uint256 amount) internal
virtual {
         require(account != address(0), "ERC20: burn from the
         zero address");

         _beforeTokenTransfer(account, address(0), amount);

         _balances[account] = _balances[account].sub(amount,

"ERC20: burn amount exceeds balance");
         _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(amount);
         emit Transfer(account, address(0), amount);
}

function abs(int256 a) internal pure returns (int256) {
         require(a != MIN_INT256);
         return a < 0 ? -a : a;
}
...</pre>
```

Recommendation



To avoid creating dead code, it's important to carefully consider the logic and flow of the contract and to remove any code that is not needed or that is never executed. This can help improve the clarity and efficiency of the contract.



L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L1215,1216,1217,1218,1219,1223,1224,1225,1226,1 227
Status	Unresolved

Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
tokensForMarketing += fees * sellMarketingFee / sellTotalFees
fees = amount.mul(buyTotalFees).div(100)
```

Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.



L15 - Local Scope Variable Shadowing

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L974
Status	Unresolved

Description

Local scope variable shadowing occurs when a local variable with the same name as a variable in an outer scope is declared within a function or code block. When this happens, the local variable "shadows" the outer variable, meaning that it takes precedence over the outer variable within the scope in which it is declared.

```
uint256 totalSupply = 1 * 1e10 * 1e18
```

Recommendation

It's important to be aware of shadowing when working with local variables, as it can lead to confusion and unintended consequences if not used correctly. It's generally a good idea to choose unique names for local variables to avoid shadowing outer variables and causing confusion.



L16 - Validate Variable Setters

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L1100,1105
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract performs operations on variables that have been configured on user-supplied input. These variables are missing of proper check for the case where a value is zero. This can lead to problems when the contract is executed, as certain actions may not be properly handled when the value is zero.

```
marketingWallet = newMarketingWallet
devWallet = newWallet
```

Recommendation

By adding the proper check, the contract will not allow the variables to be configured with zero value. This will ensure that the contract can handle all possible input values and avoid unexpected behavior or errors. Hence, it can help to prevent the contract from being exploited or operating unexpectedly.



L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/CLRS.sol#L1124
Status	Unresolved

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
IERC20(_tokenAddr).transfer(_to, _amount)
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the Openzeppelin library.



Functions Analysis

Contract	Туре	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	1	-
	transfer	External	1	-
	transferFrom	External	1	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-



	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	mint	External	✓	-
	burn	External	✓	-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Fac tory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-



	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
IERC20Metadat	Interface	IERC20		
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Meta data		
		Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-



	transfer	Public	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	_mint	Internal	✓	
	_burn	Internal	✓	
	_approve	Internal	✓	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
SafeMath	Library			
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		



		Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
SafeMathInt	Library			
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	add	Internal		
	abs	Internal		
	toUint256Safe	Internal		
SafeMathUint	Library			
	toInt256Safe	Internal		
IUniswapV2Rou ter01	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-



	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	1	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
IUniswapV2Rou ter02	Interface	IUniswapV2 Router01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTr ansferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	1	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupporting FeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFee OnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFee OnTransferTokens	External	1	-
Calories	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		




	Public	√	ERC20
	External	Payable	-
enableTrading	External	1	onlyOwner
removeLimits	External	1	onlyOwner
disableTransferDelay	External	1	onlyOwner
updateSwapTokensAtAmount	External	✓	onlyOwner
updateMaxTxnAmount	External	1	onlyOwner
updateMaxWalletAmount	External	✓	onlyOwner
excludeFromMaxTransaction	Public	√	onlyOwner
updateSwapEnabled	External	✓	onlyOwner
updateBuyFees	External	✓	onlyOwner
updateSellFees	External	✓	onlyOwner
excludeFromFees	Public	✓	onlyOwner
setAutomatedMarketMakerPair	Public	✓	onlyOwner
_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair	Private	1	
updateMarketingWallet	External	1	onlyOwner
updateDevWallet	External	✓	onlyOwner
updateCharityWallet	External	✓	onlyOwner
isExcludedFromFees	Public		-
rescueBNB	External	✓	onlyOwner
rescueAnyBEP20Tokens	Public	✓	onlyOwner
_transfer	Internal	✓	
swapTokensForEth	Private	✓	



addLiquidity	Private	1	
swapBack	Private	1	
setAutoLPBurnSettings	External	1	onlyOwner
autoBurnLiquidityPairTokens	Internal	1	




Inheritance Graph





Flow Graph





Summary

ObeseFans Calories contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns, and potential improvements. There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like draining the contract's tokens and transferring funds to the team's wallet. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats. There is also a limit of max 20% fee.



Disclaimer

The information provided in this report does not constitute investment, financial or trading advice and you should not treat any of the document's content as such. This report may not be transmitted, disclosed, referred to or relied upon by any person for any purposes nor may copies be delivered to any other person other than the Company without Cyberscope's prior written consent. This report is not nor should be considered an "endorsement" or "disapproval" of any particular project or team. This report is not nor should be regarded as an indication of the economics or value of any "product" or "asset" created by any team or project that contracts Cyberscope to perform a security assessment. This document does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the technology analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the technologies proprietors' business, business model or legal compliance. This report should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. This report represents an extensive assessment process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology.

Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk Cyberscope's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security Cyberscope's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze. The assessment services provided by Cyberscope are subject to dependencies and are under continuing development. You agree that your access and/or use including but not limited to any services reports and materials will be at your sole risk on an as-is where-is and as-available basis Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies and carry with them high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives false negatives and other unpredictable results. The services may access and depend upon multiple layers of third parties.



About Cyberscope

Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.

