



Cyberscope

Audit Report

Pepe McGregor

Aug 2023

Network BSC

Address 0xa59925867f610cd4eaa8997f3d5deafa0f4ad387

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Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative ● Pass

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|-------------------------|------------|
| ● | ST | Stops Transactions | Unresolved |
| ● | OTUT | Transfers User's Tokens | Passed |
| ● | ELFM | Exceeds Fees Limit | Passed |
| ● | MT | Mints Tokens | Passed |
| ● | BT | Burns Tokens | Passed |
| ● | BC | Blacklists Addresses | Passed |

Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|--------------------------------------------|------------|
| ● | FSA | Fixed Swap Address | Unresolved |
| ● | PVC | Price Volatility Concern | Unresolved |
| ● | PTRP | Potential Transfer Revert Propagation | Unresolved |
| ● | IDI | Immutable Declaration Improvement | Unresolved |
| ● | L02 | State Variables could be Declared Constant | Unresolved |
| ● | L04 | Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | Unresolved |
| ● | L09 | Dead Code Elimination | Unresolved |
| ● | L14 | Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope | Unresolved |
| ● | L20 | Succeeded Transfer Check | Unresolved |

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Review

| | |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Contract Name | PepeMcGregor |
| Compiler Version | v0.8.17+commit.8df45f5f |
| Optimization | 200 runs |
| Explorer | https://bscscan.com/address/0xa59925867f610cd4eaa8997f3d5deafa0f4ad387 |
| Address | 0xa59925867f610cd4eaa8997f3d5deafa0f4ad387 |
| Network | BSC |
| Symbol | MCGREGOR |
| Decimals | 18 |
| Total Supply | 1,000,000,000 |


Audit Updates

| | |
|-------------------|-------------|
| Initial Audit | 10 Aug 2023 |
| Corrected Phase 2 | 13 Aug 2023 |

Source Files

| | |
|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Filename | SHA256 |
| PepeMcGregor.sol | 5ff5c9619fe11fc2ef164937308e1d0edc402cef89ec3af0a6e239b2ff96ca68 |

Findings Breakdown



| | |
|---------------------|---|
| Critical | 1 |
| Medium | 0 |
| Minor / Informative | 9 |

| Severity | Unresolved | Acknowledged | Resolved | Other |
|---------------------|------------|--------------|----------|-------|
| Critical | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Minor / Informative | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

ST - Stops Transactions

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------------|
| Criticality | Critical |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L559 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The transactions are initially disabled for all users excluding the authorized addresses. The owner can enable the transactions for all users. Once the transactions are enable the owner will not be able to disable them again.

```
require(tradingEnabled || !_isExcludedFromFees[from] ||  
_isExcludedFromFees[to], "Trading not yet enabled!");
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.

FSA - Fixed Swap Address

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L476 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The swap address is assigned once and it can not be changed. It is a common practice in decentralized exchanges to create new swap versions. A contract that cannot change the swap address may not be able to catch up to the upgrade. As a result, the contract will not be able to migrate to a new liquidity pool pair or decentralized exchange.

```
IUniswapV2Router02 _uniswapV2Router = IUniswapV2Router02(router);
address _uniswapV2Pair =
    IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory())
        .createPair(address(this), _uniswapV2Router.WETH());

uniswapV2Router = _uniswapV2Router;
uniswapV2Pair = _uniswapV2Pair;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to add the ability to change the pair and router address in order to cover potential liquidity pool migrations. It would be better to support multiple pair addresses so the token will be able to have the same behavior in all the decentralized liquidity pairs.

PVC - Price Volatility Concern

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L608 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract accumulates tokens from the taxes to swap them for ETH. The variable `swapTokensAtAmount` sets a threshold where the contract will trigger the swap functionality. If the variable is set to a big number, then the contract will swap a huge amount of tokens for ETH.

It is important to note that the price of the token representing it, can be highly volatile. This means that the value of a price volatility swap involving Ether could fluctuate significantly at the triggered point, potentially leading to significant price volatility for the parties involved.

```
function setSwapTokensAtAmount(uint256 newAmount) external
onlyOwner{
    require(newAmount > totalSupply() / 1_000_000,
"SwapTokensAtAmount must be greater than 0.0001% of total
supply");
    swapTokensAtAmount = newAmount;

    emit SwapTokensAtAmountUpdated(swapTokensAtAmount);
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could ensure that it will not sell more than a reasonable amount of tokens in a single transaction. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be less than a fixed percentage of the total supply. Hence, the contract will guarantee that it cannot accumulate a huge amount of tokens in order to sell them.

PTRP - Potential Transfer Revert Propagation

| | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L631 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract sends funds to a `marketingWallet` as part of the transfer flow. This address can either be a wallet address or a contract. If the address belongs to a contract then it may revert from incoming payment. As a result, the error will propagate to the token's contract and revert the transfer.

```
payable(marketingWallet).sendValue(newBalance);
```

Recommendation

The contract should tolerate the potential revert from the underlying contracts when the interaction is part of the main transfer flow. This could be achieved by not allowing set contract addresses or by sending the funds in a non-revertable way.

IDI - Immutable Declaration Improvement

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L480,481 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract declares state variables that their value is initialized once in the constructor and are not modified afterwards. The `immutable` is a special declaration for this kind of state variables that saves gas when it is defined.

```
uniswapV2Router
uniswapV2Pair
```

Recommendation

By declaring a variable as immutable, the Solidity compiler is able to make certain optimizations. This can reduce the amount of storage and computation required by the contract, and make it more gas-efficient.

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

| | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L444 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

State variables can be declared as constant using the constant keyword. This means that the value of the state variable cannot be changed after it has been set. Additionally, the constant variables decrease gas consumption of the corresponding transaction.

```
string public creator
```

Recommendation

Constant state variables can be useful when the contract wants to ensure that the value of a state variable cannot be changed by any function in the contract. This can be useful for storing values that are important to the contract's behavior, such as the contract's address or the maximum number of times a certain function can be called. The team is advised to add the constant keyword to state variables that never change.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L33,34,51,71,540,603 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.

```
function DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() external view returns (bytes32);
function PERMIT_TYPEHASH() external pure returns (bytes32);
function MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY() external pure returns (uint);
function WETH() external pure returns (address);
address _marketingWallet
bool _enabled
```

Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention>.

L09 - Dead Code Elimination

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L394 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

In Solidity, dead code is code that is written in the contract, but is never executed or reached during normal contract execution. Dead code can occur for a variety of reasons, such as:

- Conditional statements that are always false.
- Functions that are never called.
- Unreachable code (e.g., code that follows a return statement).

Dead code can make a contract more difficult to understand and maintain, and can also increase the size of the contract and the cost of deploying and interacting with it.

```
function _burn(address account, uint256 amount) internal
virtual {
    require(account != address(0), "ERC20: burn from the
zero address");

    _beforeTokenTransfer(account, address(0), amount);

    uint256 accountBalance = _balances[account];
    ...
}
_totalSupply -= amount;

emit Transfer(account, address(0), amount);

_afterTokenTransfer(account, address(0), amount);
}
```


Recommendation

To avoid creating dead code, it's important to carefully consider the logic and flow of the contract and to remove any code that is not needed or that is never executed. This can help improve the clarity and efficiency of the contract.

L14 - Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope

| | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L465 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Using an uninitialized local variable can lead to unpredictable behavior and potentially cause errors in the contract. It's important to always initialize local variables with appropriate values before using them.

```
address router
```

Recommendation

By initializing local variables before using them, the contract ensures that the functions behave as expected and avoid potential issues.

L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

| | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/JasonInu.sol#L516 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
ERC20token.transfer(msg.sender, balance)
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the [Openzeppelin library](#).

Functions Analysis

| Contract | Type | Bases | | |
|--------------------------|----------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| | Function Name | Visibility | Mutability | Modifiers |
| | | | | |
| IUniswapV2Factory | Interface | | | |
| | feeTo | External | | - |
| | feeToSetter | External | | - |
| | getPair | External | | - |
| | allPairs | External | | - |
| | allPairsLength | External | | - |
| | createPair | External | ✓ | - |
| | setFeeTo | External | ✓ | - |
| | setFeeToSetter | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| IUniswapV2Pair | Interface | | | |
| | name | External | | - |
| | symbol | External | | - |
| | decimals | External | | - |
| | totalSupply | External | | - |
| | balanceOf | External | | - |
| | allowance | External | | - |
| | approve | External | ✓ | - |
| | transfer | External | ✓ | - |

| | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------|---|---|
| | transferFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | DOMAIN_SEPARATOR | External | | - |
| | PERMIT_TYPEHASH | External | | - |
| | nonces | External | | - |
| | permit | External | ✓ | - |
| | MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY | External | | - |
| | factory | External | | - |
| | token0 | External | | - |
| | token1 | External | | - |
| | getReserves | External | | - |
| | price0CumulativeLast | External | | - |
| | price1CumulativeLast | External | | - |
| | kLast | External | | - |
| | mint | External | ✓ | - |
| | burn | External | ✓ | - |
| | swap | External | ✓ | - |
| | skim | External | ✓ | - |
| | sync | External | ✓ | - |
| | initialize | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| IUniswapV2Router01 | Interface | | | |
| | factory | External | | - |
| | WETH | External | | - |


| | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------|---|
| | addLiquidity | External | ✓ | - |
| | addLiquidityETH | External | Payable | - |
| | removeLiquidity | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityETH | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactTokensForTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapTokensForExactTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactETHForTokens | External | Payable | - |
| | swapTokensForExactETH | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactTokensForETH | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapETHForExactTokens | External | Payable | - |
| | quote | External | | - |
| | getAmountOut | External | | - |
| | getAmountIn | External | | - |
| | getAmountsOut | External | | - |
| | getAmountsIn | External | | - |
| | | | | |
| IUniswapV2Router02 | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 | | |
| | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------|---------|---|
| | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | Payable | - |
| | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| IERC20 | Interface | | | |
| | totalSupply | External | | - |
| | balanceOf | External | | - |
| | transfer | External | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | External | | - |
| | approve | External | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| IERC20Metadata | Interface | IERC20 | | |
| | name | External | | - |
| | symbol | External | | - |
| | decimals | External | | - |
| | | | | |
| Address | Library | | | |
| | sendValue | Internal | ✓ | |
| | | | | |
| Context | Implementation | | | |
| | _msgSender | Internal | | |
| | _msgData | Internal | | |
| | | | | |


| Ownable | Implementation | Context | | |
|---------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------|---|-----------|
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | owner | Public | | - |
| | renounceOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | transferOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | | | | |
| ERC20 | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Meta data | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | name | Public | | - |
| | symbol | Public | | - |
| | decimals | Public | | - |
| | totalSupply | Public | | - |
| | balanceOf | Public | | - |
| | transfer | Public | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | Public | | - |
| | approve | Public | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | Public | ✓ | - |
| | increaseAllowance | Public | ✓ | - |
| | decreaseAllowance | Public | ✓ | - |
| | _transfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _mint | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _burn | Internal | ✓ | |

| | | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------|---------|-----------|
| | _approve | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _afterTokenTransfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | | | | |
| JasonInu | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | ERC20 |
| | | External | Payable | - |
| | claimStuckTokens | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | excludeFromFees | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | isExcludedFromFees | Public | | - |
| | setMarketingFees | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | changeMarketingWallet | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | enableTrading | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | _transfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | setSwapEnabled | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setSwapTokensAtAmount | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | swapAndSendMarketing | Private | ✓ | |

Inheritance Graph



Flow Graph



Summary

MCGREGOR contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like stop transactions. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract will eliminate all the contract threats. There is also a limit of max 10% fees on both buy and sell transactions.

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Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



The Cyberscope team

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