



Cyberscope

Audit Report

World Bet Token

August 2022

SHA256 a75b655075a4622b850ba9d4648ff1d545348bf2f0f392681682253d6208715d

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Contract Review

Contract Name	WorldBetToken
Testing Deploy	https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x1867118e465BAE5840Ca67A093B770D08aA79DA0
Symbol	WBT
Decimals	18
Total Supply	100,000,000
Domain	https://worldbet.club

Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contract.sol	a75b655075a4622b850ba9d4648ff1d545348bf2f0f392681682253d6208715d

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	3rd August 2022
Corrected	

Contract Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor ● Pass

Severity	Code	Description
●	ST	Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions
●	OCTD	Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address
●	OTUT	Owner Transfer User's Tokens
●	ELFM	Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%)
●	ULTW	Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent
●	MT	Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens
●	BT	Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet
●	BC	Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling

ELFM - Exceed Limit Fees Manipulation

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L704

Description

The contract owner has the authority to increase over the allowed limit of 25%. The owner may take advantage of it by setting `antiBotEnable`. As a result for the next 10 minutes the `_totalFee` is set to 85%.

```
function takeFee(
    address sender,
    address recipient,
    uint256 gonAmount
) internal returns (uint256) {
    uint256 _totalFee = totalFee;
    uint256 activeTime = lastAntiTime + antiTime;

    if (recipient == pair) {
        _totalFee = totalFee.add(sellFee);
    }

    if(antiBotEnable && block.timestamp < activeTime){
        _totalFee = 85;
    }
}
```

Recommendation

The contract owner should not have permission to re-enable anti bot functionality after the trade opens.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

ULTW - Unlimited Liquidity to Team Wallet

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L817

Description

The contract owner has the authority to transfer funds without limit to the team wallet. These funds have been accumulated from fees collected from the contract. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `withdrawAllToTreasury` method.

```
function withdrawAllToTreasury() external swapping onlyOwner {
    uint256 amountToSwap = _gonBalances[address(this)].div(
        _gonsPerFragment
    );
    require(
        amountToSwap > 0,
        "There is no token deposited in token contract"
    );
    address[] memory path = new address[](2);
    path[0] = address(this);
    path[1] = router.WETH();
    router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(
        amountToSwap,
        0,
        path,
        treasuryReceiver,
        block.timestamp
    );
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum amount of funds that can be swapped. Since a huge amount may volatile the token's price.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Contract Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor

Severity	Code	Description
●	STC	Succeeded Transfer Check
●	L01	Public Function could be Declared External
●	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions
●	L05	Unused State Variable
●	L09	Dead Code Elimination
●	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation

STC - Succeeded Transfer Check

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L760,765

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
(bool success, ) = payable(treasuryReceiver).call{
    value: amountETHToTreasuryAndReward.mul(treasuryFee).div(_currentFee),
    gas: 30000
}("");

(success, ) = payable(rewardReceiver).call{
    value: amountETHToTreasuryAndReward.mul(rewardFee).div(
        _currentFee
    ),
    gas: 30000
}("");
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful.

L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L491,487,483,523,510,528

Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

```
transferOwnership  
owner  
renounceOwnership  
name  
symbol  
decimals
```

Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract.

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L563,573,564,566,562,565

Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

```
liquidityFee  
treasuryFee  
sellFee  
burnFee  
antiTime  
rewardFee
```

Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L600,972,544,945,599,968,274,545,543,911,598,38,272,964,931,305,548,932,570,939

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow `_` at the beginning of the `mixed_case` match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
_antiBotEnable  
feeDenominator  
_rewardReceiver  
_isFeeExempt  
MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY  
_treasuryReceiver  
_addr  
DOMAIN_SEPARATOR  
WETH  
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions>.

L05 - Unused State Variable

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L596,350

Description

There are segments that contain unused state variables.

```
MAX_INT256  
MAX_SUPPLY
```

Recommendation

Remove unused state variables.

L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L378

Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

```
abs
```

Recommendation

Remove unused functions.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L954

Description

Performing divisions before multiplications may cause lose of prediction.

```
liquidityBalance = _gonBalances[pair].div(_gonsPerFragment)
```

Recommendation

The multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
IPancakeSwap Factory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
IPancakeSwap Router	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-

	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
IPancakeSwapPair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-

	mint	External	✓	-
	burn	External	✓	-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
SafeMathInt	Library			
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	add	Internal		
	abs	Internal		
SafeMath	Library			
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
ERC20Detailed	Implementation	IERC20		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-

	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
Ownable	Implementation			
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	isOwner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_transferOwnership	Internal	✓	
WorldBetToken	Implementation	ERC20Detailed, Ownable		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	ERC20Detailed Ownable
	transfer	External	✓	validRecipient
	transferFrom	External	✓	validRecipient
	_basicTransfer	Internal	✓	
	_transferFrom	Internal	✓	
	takeFee	Internal	✓	
	swapBack	Internal	✓	swapping
	addLiquidity	Internal	✓	swapping
	withdrawAllToTreasury	External	✓	swapping onlyOwner
	shouldTakeFee	Internal		
	shouldSwapBack	Internal		
	shouldAddLiquidity	Internal		
	allowance	External		-
	decreaseAllowance	External	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	External	✓	-
	approve	External	✓	-
	checkFeeExempt	External		-
	getCirculatingSupply	Public		-
	isNotInSwap	External		-
	manualSync	External	✓	-

	setFeeReceivers	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setAntiBot	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setAutoAddLiquidity	External	✓	onlyOwner
	getLiquidityBacking	External		-
	setWhitelist	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setPairAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setLP	External	✓	onlyOwner
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	<Receive Ether>	External	Payable	-

Contract Flow



Domain Info

Domain Name	worldbet.club
Registry Domain ID	DFC42EC8E80884B30898C5E6B85B46FAF-GDREG
Creation Date	2022-07-29T03:57:21Z
Updated Date	2022-08-03T03:57:21Z
Registry Expiry Date	2023-07-29T03:57:21Z
Registrar WHOIS Server	whois.namecheap.com
Registrar URL	http://www.namecheap.com
Registrar	NameCheap, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID	1068

The domain has been created in 12 months before the creation of the audit.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.

Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like manipulating fees and transferring funds to the team's wallet. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

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Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provide all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>