



Cyberscope

Audit Report

Circle Launchpad Locker

January 2022

Github <https://github.com/monkey-shanti/Circle-Launchpad>

Commit [915604357d2528c77dbdb6672471c2bcc9b8bb2a](#)

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Contract Review

Repository	https://github.com/monkey-shanti/Circle-Launchpad
Commit	915604357d2528c77dbdb6672471c2bcc9b8bb2a

Contract Name	CircleLocker
Testing Deploy	https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x56D7A9Ddd18d0990650387775fc4a5E8f075F3aa

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	20 Dec 2022 https://github.com/cyberscope-io/audits/blob/main/circleLaunchpad/v1/locker.pdf
Corrected Phase 2	02 Jan 2023

Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contracts/launchpad/interfaces/IUniswapV2Pair.sol	797d818f0b1ce3bccbddec7c5158babae5d4082d7feab73dc92fed7d661dc926
contracts/launchpad/interfaces/PoolLibrary.sol	bea8cc1b2ccf49e29be71baa6e9e105a67c56a3094cefbdb271b5104c7026aa23
contracts/launchpad/libraries/LibEnsureSafeTransfer.sol	03f9e4a97f22127d967d3064a874192bc5ff6c69f8eaf5a4c16c9d58bdb4d661
contracts/Locker.sol	6f055219de0df3aca937f5140dd19f82dfbefb8a457a9b1f734084ac18a90d5e

Introduction

The Locker contract implements a locker mechanism.

Roles

The contract has three roles.

Owner Role

The owner role has the authority to WithdrawBNB.

Locker Owner Role

- editLockDescription
- editLock
- withdrawableTokens
- unlock
- transferLockOwnership

User Role

The users have the authority to

- multipleVestingLock
- vestingLock
- lock

Contract Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	LTM	LP Token Mocking	Unresolved
●	LLS	Locker Logic Simplification	Unresolved
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
●	L05	Unused State Variable	Unresolved
●	L08	Tautology or Contradiction	Unresolved
●	L12	Using Variables before Declaration	Unresolved
●	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation	Unresolved
●	L14	Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope	Unresolved
●	L19	Stable Compiler Version	Unresolved

LTM - LP Token Mocking

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	Locker.sol#L908
Status	Unresolved

Description

The user can create a contract that implements the `factory()`, `getPair()`, and `token0()`, `token1()` method in order to mock the LP token validator. As a result, the user will be able to lock an LP Token that essentially is not an LP token.

```
function _isValidLpToken(address token, address factory)
private
view
returns (bool)
{
    IUniswapV2Pair pair = IUniswapV2Pair(token);
    address factoryPair = IUniswapV2Factory(factory).getPair(
        pair.token0(),
        pair.token1()
    );
}
```


LLS - Locker Logic Simplification

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	Locker.sol#L24
Status	Unresolved

Description

The normal and vesting lock could be the same since the normal lock is equal to the vesting lock with 100% return in the first circle.

```
Normal lock == Vesting with:  
tgeBps = 10_000  
tgeDate = lock date  
cycleBps = lock start date  
cycle = 1
```

Recommendation

The contract could merge and simplify the logic of the vesting and normal token lock.

```
struct Lock {  
    uint256 id;  
    address token;  
    address owner;  
    uint256 amount;  
    uint256 lockDate;  
    uint256 tgeDate; // TGE date for vesting locks, unlock date for  
normal locks  
    uint256 tgeBps; // In bips. Is 0 for normal locks  
    uint256 cycle; // Is 0 for normal locks  
    uint256 cycleBps; // In bips. Is 0 for normal locks  
    uint256 unlockedAmount;  
    string description;  
    bool isVesting;  
}
```

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/Locker.sol#L858
Status	Unresolved

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.

```
uint256 _amount  
address payable _receiver
```

Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention>.

L05 - Unused State Variable

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/Locker.sol#L85
Status	Unresolved

Description

An unused state variable is a state variable that is declared in the contract, but is never used in any of the contract's functions. This can happen if the state variable was originally intended to be used, but was later removed or never used.

Unused state variables can create clutter in the contract and make it more difficult to understand and maintain. They can also increase the size of the contract and the cost of deploying and interacting with it.

```
uint256 private constant ID_PADDING = 1_000_000
```

Recommendation

To avoid creating unused state variables, it's important to carefully consider the state variables that are needed for the contract's functionality, and to remove any that are no longer needed. This can help improve the clarity and efficiency of the contract.

L08 - Tautology or Contradiction

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/Locker.sol#L183
Status	Unresolved

Description

A tautology is a logical statement that is always true, regardless of the values of its variables. A contradiction is a logical statement that is always false, regardless of the values of its variables.

Using tautologies or contradictions can lead to unintended behavior and can make the code harder to understand and maintain. It is generally considered good practice to avoid tautologies and contradictions in the code.

```
require(tgeBps >= 0, "Invalid bips for TGE")
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to carefully consider the logical conditions is using in the code and ensure that it is well-defined and make sense in the context of the smart contract.

L12 - Using Variables before Declaration

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/Locker.sol#L832
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract is using a variable before the declaration. This is usually happening either if it has not been declared yet or if the variable has been declared in a different scope. It is not a good practice to use a local variable before it has been declared.

```
address factory
```

Recommendation

By declaring local variables before using them, contract ensures that it operates correctly. It's important to be aware of this rule when working with local variables, as using a variable before it has been declared can lead to unexpected behavior and can be difficult to debug.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/Locker.sol#L541
Status	Unresolved

Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
uint256 currentTotal = (((block.timestamp - userLock.tgeDate) /  
userLock.cycle) * cycleReleaseAmount) + tgeReleaseAmount
```

Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

L14 - Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/Locker.sol#L832
Status	Unresolved

Description

Using an uninitialized local variable can lead to unpredictable behavior and potentially cause errors in the contract. It's important to always initialize local variables with appropriate values before using them.

```
address factory
```

Recommendation

By initializing local variables before using them, the contract ensures that the functions behave as expected and avoid potential issues.

L19 - Stable Compiler Version

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/launchpad/libraries/LibEnsureSafeTransfer.sol#L1
Status	Unresolved

Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.

Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
IERC20Permit Upgradeable	Interface			
	permit	External	✓	-
	nonces	External		-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
IERC20Upgradeable	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
SafeERC20Upgradeable	Library			
	safeTransfer	Internal	✓	
	safeTransferFrom	Internal	✓	
	safeApprove	Internal	✓	
	safeIncreaseAllowance	Internal	✓	
	safeDecreaseAllowance	Internal	✓	
	safePermit	Internal	✓	
	_callOptionalReturn	Private	✓	

AddressUpgradable	Library			
	isContract	Internal		
	sendValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	verifyCallResult	Internal		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
		Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	_checkOwner	Internal		
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_transferOwnership	Internal	✓	
ReentrancyGuard	Implementation			
		Public	✓	-
IERC20Permit	Interface			
	permit	External	✓	-
	nonces	External		-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-

	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
SafeERC20	Library			
	safeTransfer	Internal	✓	
	safeTransferFrom	Internal	✓	
	safeApprove	Internal	✓	
	safeIncreaseAllowance	Internal	✓	
	safeDecreaseAllowance	Internal	✓	
	safePermit	Internal	✓	
	_callOptionalReturn	Private	✓	
Address	Library			
	isContract	Internal		
	sendValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	functionDelegateCall	Internal	✓	
	functionDelegateCall	Internal	✓	
	verifyCallResult	Internal		
Context	Implementation			

	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
Math	Library			
	max	Internal		
	min	Internal		
	average	Internal		
	ceilDiv	Internal		
	mulDiv	Internal		
	mulDiv	Internal		
	sqrt	Internal		
	sqrt	Internal		
SafeMath	Library			
	tryAdd	Internal		
	trySub	Internal		
	tryMul	Internal		
	tryDiv	Internal		
	tryMod	Internal		
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
EnumerableSet	Library			

	_add	Private	✓	
	_remove	Private	✓	
	_contains	Private		
	_length	Private		
	_at	Private		
	_values	Private		
	add	Internal	✓	
	remove	Internal	✓	
	contains	Internal		
	length	Internal		
	at	Internal		
	values	Internal		
	add	Internal	✓	
	remove	Internal	✓	
	contains	Internal		
	length	Internal		
	at	Internal		
	values	Internal		
	add	Internal	✓	
	remove	Internal	✓	
	contains	Internal		
	length	Internal		
	at	Internal		
	values	Internal		
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-

	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	mint	External	✓	-
	burn	External	✓	-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Router01	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-

	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
IUniswapV2Router02	Interface	IUniswapV2Router01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Factory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-

	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
PoolLibrary	Library			
	withdrawableVestingTokens	Internal		
	getContributionAmount	Internal		
	convertCurrencyToToken	Internal		
	addLiquidity	Internal	✓	
	calculateFeeAndLiquidity	Internal		
LibEnsureSafe Transfer	Library			
	safeTransferFromEnsureExactAmount	Internal	✓	validAddress validAddress validAddress validAmount
	transferEnsureExactAmount	Internal	✓	validAddress validAddress validAmount
	transferNativeOrToken	Internal	✓	
	transferNative	Internal	✓	validAddress validAmount
ICircleLocker	Interface			
	lock	External	✓	-
	vestingLock	External	✓	-
	multipleVestingLock	External	✓	-
	unlock	External	✓	-
	editLock	External	✓	-

CircleLocker	Implementation	ICircleLocker, Ownable, Utility		
	lock	External	✓	-
	vestingLock	External	✓	-
	multipleVestingLock	External	✓	-
	_multipleVestingLock	Internal	✓	
	_createLock	Internal	✓	
	_lockToken	Private	✓	
	_registerLock	Private	✓	
	unlock	External	✓	validLock
	_normalUnlock	Internal	✓	
	_vestingUnlock	Internal	✓	
	withdrawableTokens	External		-
	_withdrawableTokens	Internal		
	editLock	External	✓	validLock
	editLockDescription	External	✓	validLock
	transferLockOwnership	Public	✓	validLock
	renounceLockOwnership	External	✓	-
	getTotalLockCount	External		-
	getLockAt	External		-
	getLockById	Public		-
	allLpTokenLockedCount	Public		-
	allNormalTokenLockedCount	Public		-
	getCumulativeLpTokenLockInfoAt	External		-
	getCumulativeNormalTokenLockInfoAt	External		-
	getCumulativeLpTokenLockInfo	External		-
	getCumulativeNormalTokenLockInfo	External		-
	totalTokenLockedCount	External		-

	IpLockCountForUser	Public		-
	IpLocksForUser	External		-
	IpLockForUserAtIndex	External		-
	normalLockCountForUser	Public		-
	normalLocksForUser	External		-
	normalLockForUserAtIndex	External		-
	totalLockCountForUser	External		-
	totalLockCountForToken	External		-
	getLocksForToken	Public		-
	_getActualIndex	Internal		
	_parseFactoryAddress	Internal		
	_isValidLpToken	Private		
	withdrawBNB	Public	✓	onlyOwner validAddress validAmount
Utility	Implementation			

Contract Flow

Inheritance Graph



Summary

The Locker contract implements a locker mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns, and potential improvements.

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Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>