

Audit Report Sportsverse

August 2022

SHA256

9c8ca6ae92b5281bcf5239893fcde599f22635178210d51c5d6d084f7b139589

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Contract Review

Contract Name	BallInu
Testing Deploy	https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xEc558b38F3B 7d5aad0D6E51a545728C4D7678CFe#code
Symbol	\$\$SV
Decimals	18
Total Supply	1,000,000,000
Domain	https://sportsverse.me

Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contract.sol	9c8ca6ae92b5281bcf5239893fcde599f22635178210d 51c5d6d084f7b139589

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	3rd August 2022
Corrected	





The burn method is publicly available without allowance. As a result, any user has the authority to arbitrarily burn the tokens from any address.



Contract Analysis

CriticalMediumMinorPass

Severity	Code	Description
•	ST	Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions
•	OCTD	Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address
•	OTUT	Owner Transfer User's Tokens
•	ELFM	Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%)
•	ULTW	Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent
•	MT	Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens
•	ВТ	Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet
•	ВС	Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling



ST - Stop Transactions

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L621

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop transactions for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the sellmarketingAndMaintananceFee ,sellAutoBurnAndBuyBackFee to the maximum amount and turn the contract into a honeypot.

```
if(recipient == uniswapV2Pair){

transferAmount = collectSellFee(sender,amount);

_balances[sender] -= amount;
_balances[recipient] += transferAmount;

emit Transfer(sender, recipient, transferAmount);

return;
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for not allowing setting the sellmarketingAndMaintananceFee ,sellAutoBurnAndBuyBackFee to a reasonable amount. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be more than a fixed percentage of the total supply.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.



ELFM - Exceed Limit Fees Manipulation

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L727,731

Description

The contract owner has the authority to increase over the allowed limit of 25%. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the setTaxFeePercent function with a high percentage value.

```
function setBuyFee(uint256 _ReferralProgramFee) external onlyOwner {
   buyReferralProgramFee=_ReferralProgramFee;
}

function setSellFee(uint256 _marketingAndMaintananceFee, uint256
_AutoBurnAndBuyBackFee) external onlyOwner {
   sellmarketingAndMaintananceFee=_marketingAndMaintananceFee;
   sellAutoBurnAndBuyBackFee=_AutoBurnAndBuyBackFee;
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum acceptable value.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.



BT - Burn Tokens

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L704

Description

Any user can burn any user's tokens. The user may take advantage of it by calling the burn function. As a result the targeted contract address will lose the corresponding tokens.

```
function Burn(address account, uint256 amount) public {
    _burn(_from, _amount);
}
```

Recommendation

An allowance mechanism should be introduced in order to prevent users from arbitrary burn tokens.



Contract Diagnostics

CriticalMediumMinor

Severity	Code	Description
•	CO	Code Optimization
•	CR	Code Repetition
•	L01	Public Function could be Declared External
•	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant
•	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions
•	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic
•	L09	Dead Code Elimination



CR - Code Repetition

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L611,655,670

Description

There are code segments that are repetitive in the contract. Those segments increase the code size of the contract unnecessarily.

The _transfer method can be optimized. The following code segment is repetitive.

```
_balances[sender] -= amount;
_balances[recipient] += transferAmount;
emit Transfer(sender, recipient, transferAmount);
return;
```

This code segment is repetitive on collectBuyFee, collectSellFee methods.

```
uint256 _referralProgram = amount.mul(buyReferralProgramFee).div(10**(_feeDecimal + 2));
transferAmount=transferAmount.sub(_referralProgram);
_balances[ReferralAndFundsWallet] += _referralProgram;
emit Transfer(account, ReferralAndFundsWallet , _referralProgram);
```

Recommendation

Create an internal function that contains the code segment and remove it from all the sections.



L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L499,458,492,291,511,704,530,466,589,548,306,296,570,317,519,3 10,302

Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

getUnlockTime
lock
allowance
unlock
increaseAllowance
transferOwnership
getTime
transferFrom
decreaseAllowance
...

Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract.



L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L416

Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

_feeDecimal

Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.



L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L704,720,412,727,399,398,416,336,731

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
_referralAndFundsWallet
_marketingAndMaintananceFee
_AutoBurnAndBuyBackFee
WETH
_feeDecimal
_maxAmount
_autoBurnAndBuyBackWallet
_maxWallet
_ReferralProgramFee
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions.



L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L731,727

Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
buyReferralProgramFee = _ReferralProgramFee
sellmarketingAndMaintananceFee = _marketingAndMaintananceFee
```

Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.



L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L160

Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

ceil

Recommendation

Remove unused functions.



Contract Functions

Contract	Туре	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
0 (14 11				
SafeMath	Library			
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	ceil	Internal		
ERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	1	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
IERC20Metad ata	Interface	IERC20		
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
Context	Implementation			
-	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
	3			




Ownable	Implementation	Context		
	<constructor></constructor>	Public	1	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	1	onlyOwner
	getUnlockTime	Public		-
	getTime	Public		-
	lock	Public	1	onlyOwner
	unlock	Public	1	-
IUniswapV2Fa ctory	Interface			
	createPair	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Pa ir	Interface			
	sync	External	1	-
IUniswapV2Ro uter01	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
IUniswapV2Ro uter02	Interface	IUniswapV2 Router01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeO nTransferTokens	External	1	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupporting FeeOnTransferTokens	External	√	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupporti ngFeeOnTransferTokens	External	√	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupporting FeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-



Ballinu	Implementation	Ownable, IERC20, IERC20Met adata		
	<constructor></constructor>	Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	collectBuyFee	Private	√	
	collectSellFee	Private	1	
	_approve	Internal	1	
	Burn	Public	1	-
	_burn	Internal	✓	
	setWallets	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setBuyFee	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setSellFee	External	1	onlyOwner
	<receive ether=""></receive>	External	Payable	-



Contract Flow





Domain Info

Domain Name	sportsverse.me
Registry Domain ID	D425500000339768159-AGRS
Creation Date	2022-07-28T20:47:56Z
Updated Date	2022-07-28T20:47:59Z
Registry Expiry Date	2023-07-28T20:47:56Z
Registrar WHOIS Server	whois.namecheap.com
Registrar URL	www.namecheap.com
Registrar	NameCheap, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID	1068

The domain was created 12 months before the creation of the audit.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.



Summary

The contract is not functional since the burn method is open to any user without allowance.

Other than that, there are some functions that can be abused by the owner like stopping transactions, manipulating fees. The contract can be converted into a honeypot and prevent users from selling if the owner abuses the admin functions.



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About Cyberscope

Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provide all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

https://www.cyberscope.io