

Audit Report Pirates Plunder

December 2022

Type BEP20

Network BSC

Address 0xDF7C19f2a7E107aE6578293Bebbe3681cdfd0F42

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Contract Review

| Contract Name | PIRATE |
|------------------|--|
| Compiler Version | v0.8.9+commit.e5eed63a |
| Optimization | 200 runs |
| Licence | Unlicense |
| Explorer | https://bscscan.com/token/0xDF7C19f2a7E107aE65782 93Bebbe3681cdfd0F42 |
| Symbol | PIRATE |
| Decimals | 18 |
| Total Supply | 777,777,777,777 |
| Domain | piratesplunder.io |

Source Files

| Filename | SHA256 |
|--------------|--|
| contract.sol | c3b0157ec8647aa78dc9d2728f60cf2c68ceb7610a221ea 3371755c6c45b6dcb |

Audit Updates

| Initial Audit | 6th December 2022 |
|---------------|-------------------|
| Corrected | |



Contract Analysis

CriticalMediumMinor / InformativePass

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|------------------------------------|------------|
| • | ST | Stops Transactions | Unresolved |
| • | OCTD | Transfers Contract's Tokens | Passed |
| • | OTUT | Transfers User's Tokens | Passed |
| • | ELFM | Exceeds Fees Limit | Passed |
| • | ULTW | Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet | Passed |
| • | MT | Mints Tokens | Passed |
| • | ВТ | Burns Tokens | Passed |
| • | ВС | Blacklists Addresses | Unresolved |



ST - Stops Transactions

| Criticality | critical |
|-------------|-------------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L1142,1173 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Users can be taxed up to 100% or prevented from sale if they sell during the first day of their purchase.

```
if (!isBuy && enableEarlySellTax) {
    if (_holderFirstBuyTimestamp[from] != 0 && (_holderFirstBuyTimestamp[from])
+ (24 hours) >= block.timestamp)) {
        sellLiquidityFee = earlySellLiquidityFee;
        sellMarketingFee = earlySellMarketingFee;
        sellDevFee = earlySellDevFee;
        sellTotalFees = sellMarketingFee + sellLiquidityFee + sellDevFee;
    } else {
        sellLiquidityFee = 2;
        sellMarketingFee = 0;
        sellDevFee = 3;
        sellTotalFees = sellMarketingFee + sellLiquidityFee + sellDevFee;
    }
}
```

The contract owner can limit the transactions to one per block. Once disabled, it cannot be reenabled.

```
require(_holderLastTransferTimestamp[tx.origin] < block.number, "_transfer::
Transfer Delay enabled. Only one purchase per block allowed.");</pre>
```



Recommendation

The contract should remove the last transfer check, as it may cause a transaction to fail. Additionally, the contract could embody a check for not allowing setting the early sell taxes more than the allowed limit of 25%.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.



BC - Blacklists Addresses

| Criticality | medium |
|-------------|--------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L1081 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop addresses from transactions. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the ManageBot function.

```
function ManageBot (address account, bool isBlacklisted) private onlyOwner {
    _blacklist[account] = isBlacklisted;
}
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.



Contract Diagnostics

CriticalMediumMinor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|--|------------|
| • | PTRP | Potential Transfer Revert Propagation | Unresolved |
| • | RSML | Redundant SafeMath Library | Unresolved |
| • | BLC | Business Logic Concern | Unresolved |
| • | L04 | Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | Unresolved |
| • | L05 | Unused State Variable | Unresolved |
| • | L07 | Missing Events Arithmetic | Unresolved |
| • | L09 | Dead Code Elimination | Unresolved |
| • | L13 | Divide before Multiply Operation | Unresolved |
| • | L15 | Local Scope Variable Shadowing | Unresolved |



PTRP - Potential Transfer Revert Propagation

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|-------------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L1318,1325 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract sends funds to a marketingWallet and a devWallet as part of the transfer flow. These addresses can either be a wallet address or a contract. If the address is a contract then it may revert from incoming payment. As a result, the error will propagate to the token's contract and revert the transfer.

```
(success,) = address(devWallet).call{value: ethForDev}("");
...
(success,) = address(marketingWallet).call{value: address(this).balance}("");
```

Recommendation

The contract should tolerate the potential revert from the underlying contracts when the interaction is part of the main transfer flow. This could be archived by not allowing set contract addresses or by sending the funds in a non-revertable way.



RSML - Redundant SafeMath Library

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L459 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The Solidity versions that are greater than or equal to 0.8.0 do not need the use of SafeMath Library. The usage of the SafeMath library produces unnecessary additional gas.

```
library SafeMath {
...
}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to remove the SafeMath library as it is safe to do math operations without it.



ROA - Redundant Owner Approval

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L1332 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Approving the owner is redundant.

```
_approve(owner(), owner(), totalSupply());
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to remove this check, as there is no reason to approve the owner.



L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|--|
| Location | contract.sol#L927,1065,1328,38,54,1081,37,929,1057,915,727 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
marketingWalletUpdated
_earlySellDevFee
_devFee
Send
PERMIT_TYPEHASH
MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY
_liquidityFee
ManageBot
_earlySellMarketingFee
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-conventions.



L05 - Unused State Variable

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L658 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

There are segments that contain unused state variables.

MAX_INT256

Recommendation

Remove unused state variables.



L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|--|
| Location | contract.sol#L1031,1038,1057,1065,1043 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
swapTokensAtAmount = newAmount
maxTransactionAmount = newNum * (10 ** 18)
buyMarketingFee = _marketingFee
sellMarketingFee = _marketingFee
maxWallet = newNum * (10 ** 18)
```

Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.



L09 - Dead Code Elimination

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|------------------------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L704,717,1081,403,710 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

abs toInt256Safe ManageBot _burn toUint256Safe

Recommendation

Remove unused functions.



L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L1114 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Performing divisions before multiplications may cause lose of prediction.

```
fees = amount.mul(buyTotalFees).div(100)
tokensForMarketing += fees * sellMarketingFee / sellTotalFees
fees = amount.mul(sellTotalFees).div(100)
tokensForDev += fees * sellDevFee / sellTotalFees
```

Recommendation

The multiplications should be prior to the divisions.



L15 - Local Scope Variable Shadowing

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L964 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The are variables that are defined in the local scope containing the same name from an upper scope.

totalSupply

Recommendation

The local variables should have different names from the upper scoped variables.



Contract Functions

| Contract | Туре | Bases | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| | Function Name | Visibility | Mutability | Modifiers |
| Context | Implementation | | | |
| Context | · · | Internal | | |
| | _msgSender | Internal | | |
| | _msgData | internal | | |
| IUniswapV2Pa ir | Interface | | | |
| | name | External | | - |
| | symbol | External | | - |
| | decimals | External | | - |
| | totalSupply | External | | - |
| | balanceOf | External | | - |
| | allowance | External | | - |
| | approve | External | ✓ | - |
| | transfer | External | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | External | 1 | - |
| | DOMAIN_SEPARATOR | External | | - |
| | PERMIT_TYPEHASH | External | | - |
| | nonces | External | | - |
| | permit | External | ✓ | - |
| | MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY | External | | - |
| | factory | External | | - |
| | token0 | External | | - |
| | token1 | External | | - |
| | getReserves | External | | - |
| | price0CumulativeLast | External | | - |
| | price1CumulativeLast | External | | - |
| | kLast | External | | - |
| | mint | External | 1 | - |
| | burn | External | 1 | - |



| | swap | External | √ | - |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|---|----------|---|
| | skim | External | √ | - |
| | sync | External | / | _ |
| | initialize | External | / | _ |
| | | | | |
| IUniswapV2Fa ctory | Interface | | | |
| | feeTo | External | | - |
| | feeToSetter | External | | - |
| | getPair | External | | - |
| | allPairs | External | | - |
| | allPairsLength | External | | - |
| | createPair | External | 1 | - |
| | setFeeTo | External | 1 | - |
| | setFeeToSetter | External | 1 | - |
| | | | | |
| IERC20 | Interface | | | |
| | totalSupply | External | | - |
| | balanceOf | External | | - |
| | transfer | External | 1 | - |
| | allowance | External | | - |
| | approve | External | 1 | - |
| | transferFrom | External | √ | - |
| | | | | |
| IERC20Metad ata | Interface | IERC20 | | |
| | name | External | | - |
| | symbol | External | | - |
| | decimals | External | | - |
| | | | | |
| ERC20 | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Met adata | | |
| | <constructor></constructor> | Public | ✓ | - |
| | name | Public | | - |
| | symbol | Public | | - |



| | decimals | Public | | - |
|-------------|-----------------------------|----------|---|-----------|
| | totalSupply | Public | | - |
| | balanceOf | Public | | - |
| | transfer | Public | 1 | - |
| | allowance | Public | | - |
| | approve | Public | 1 | - |
| | transferFrom | Public | 1 | - |
| | increaseAllowance | Public | 1 | - |
| | decreaseAllowance | Public | 1 | - |
| | _transfer | Internal | 1 | |
| | _mint | Internal | 1 | |
| | _burn | Internal | 1 | |
| | _approve | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | 1 | |
| | | | | |
| SafeMath | Library | | | |
| | add | Internal | | |
| | sub | Internal | | |
| | sub | Internal | | |
| | mul | Internal | | |
| | div | Internal | | |
| | div | Internal | | |
| | mod | Internal | | |
| | mod | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| Ownable | Implementation | Context | | |
| | <constructor></constructor> | Public | ✓ | - |
| | owner | Public | | - |
| | renounceOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | transferOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | | | | |
| SafeMathInt | Library | | | |
| | mul | Internal | | |
| | div | Internal | | |
| | sub | Internal | | |




| | add | Internal | | |
|------------------------|---|------------------------|----------|---|
| | abs | Internal | | |
| | toUint256Safe | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| SafeMathUint | Library | | | |
| | toInt256Safe | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| IUniswapV2Ro uter01 | Interface | | | |
| | factory | External | | - |
| | WETH | External | | - |
| | addLiquidity | External | ✓ | - |
| | addLiquidityETH | External | Payable | - |
| | removeLiquidity | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityETH | External | 1 | - |
| | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactTokensForTokens | External | 1 | - |
| | swapTokensForExactTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactETHForTokens | External | Payable | - |
| | swapTokensForExactETH | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactTokensForETH | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapETHForExactTokens | External | Payable | - |
| | quote | External | | - |
| | getAmountOut | External | | - |
| | getAmountIn | External | | - |
| | getAmountsOut | External | | - |
| | getAmountsIn | External | | - |
| | | | | |
| IUniswapV2Ro uter02 | Interface | IUniswapV2 Router01 | | |
| | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOn TransferTokens | External | √ | - |
| | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactTokensForTokensSupporti ngFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |



| | swapExactETHForTokensSupporting FeeOnTransferTokens | External | Payable | - |
|--------|--|-------------------|----------|-----------|
| | swapExactTokensForETHSupporting FeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| PIRATE | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable | | |
| | <constructor></constructor> | Public | / | ERC20 |
| | <receive ether=""></receive> | External | Payable | - |
| | enableTrading | External | √ ayabie | onlyOwner |
| | removeLimits | External | / | onlyOwner |
| | disableTransferDelay | External | 1 | onlyOwner |
| | setEarlySellTax | External | 1 | onlyOwner |
| | updateSwapTokensAtAmount | External | 1 | onlyOwner |
| | updateMaxTxnAmount | External | / | onlyOwner |
| | updateMaxWalletAmount | External | 1 | onlyOwner |
| | excludeFromMaxTransaction | Public | / | onlyOwner |
| | updateSwapEnabled | External | / | onlyOwner |
| | updateBuyFees | External | / | onlyOwner |
| | updateSellFees | External | 1 | onlyOwner |
| | excludeFromFees | Public | 1 | |
| | | Private | | onlyOwner |
| | ManageBot setAutomatedMarketMakerPair | Private | <i>√</i> | onlyOwner |
| | | Private | / | onlyOwner |
| | _setAutomatedMarketMakerPair | External | / | a.ml. (O |
| | updateMarketingWallet | | ✓ ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | updateDevWallet | External | √ | onlyOwner |
| | isExcludedFromFees | Public | | - |
| | _transfer | Internal | / | |
| | swapTokensForEth | Private | ✓ | |
| | addLiquidity | Private | ✓ | |
| | swapBack | Private | √ | |
| | Send | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |



Contract Flow





Domain Info

| Domain Name | piratesplunder.io |
|---------------------------|---|
| Registry Domain ID | 4128c384f67c4f9e9273b489714e4ac1-DONUTS |
| Creation Date | 2021-11-03T00:48:26Z |
| Updated Date | 2022-12-05T19:20:34Z |
| Registry Expiry Date | 2023-11-03T00:48:26Z |
| Registrar WHOIS Server | whois.namecheap.com |
| Registrar URL | https://www.namecheap.com/ |
| Registrar | NameCheap, Inc. |
| Registrar IANA ID | 1068 |

The domain was created about 1 year before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 11 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.



Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like stopping transactions and blacklisting addresses. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.



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Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



The Cyberscope team

https://www.cyberscope.io