



Cyberscope

Audit Report

Poker Vegas

November 2022

Type BEP20

Network BSC

Address 0xbd19D58ADaAC6121cDDb1414F733B135f1afA52c

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Contract Review

Contract Name	PokerVegas
Compiler Version	v0.8.15+commit.e14f2714
Optimization	200 runs
Licence	MIT
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/token/0xbd19D58ADaAC6121cDDb1414F733B135f1afA52c
Symbol	POKER
Decimals	18
Total Supply	80,000,000
Domain	https://www.pokervegas.app/

Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contract.sol	b17107f5e4a6221ec865e4751c33498a82f9edcbac019c275494af52a0846a1f

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	4th November 2022
Corrected	

Contract Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative ● Pass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	ST	Stops Transactions	Passed
●	OCTD	Transfers Contract's Tokens	Passed
●	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
●	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
●	ULTW	Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet	Unresolved
●	MT	Mints Tokens	Passed
●	BT	Burns Tokens	Passed
●	BC	Blacklists Addresses	Passed

ULTW - Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L512
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract owner has the authority to transfer funds without limit to the team wallet. These funds have been accumulated from fees collected from the contract. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `claimStuckTokens` method with the token argument set to zero address.

```
function claimStuckTokens(address token) external onlyOwner {
    require(token != address(this), "Owner cannot claim native tokens");
    if (token == address(0x0)) {
        payable(msg.sender).transfer(address(this).balance);
        return;
    }
    IERC20 ERC20token = IERC20(token);
    uint256 balance = ERC20token.balanceOf(address(this));
    ERC20token.transfer(msg.sender, balance);
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum amount of funds that can be swapped. Since a huge amount may volatile the token's price.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Contract Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	CO	Code Optimization	Unresolved
●	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant	Unresolved
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
●	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic	Unresolved
●	L09	Dead Code Elimination	Unresolved
●	L11	Unnecessary Boolean equality	Unresolved

CO - Code Optimization

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L445,575
Status	Unresolved

Description

There are code segments that could be optimized. A segment may be optimized so that it becomes a smaller size, consumes less memory, executes more rapidly, or performs fewer operations.

Since the `liquidityFee` variable can not be changed. The `liquidityTokens` will always be aggregated to zero. Hence, the function call `swapAndLiquify` is redundant.

```
uint256 liquidityFee = 0;

if( canSwap &&
    !swapping &&
    !automatedMarketMakerPairs[from]
) {
    swapping = true;

    uint256 liquidityTokens = (contractTokenBalance * liquidityFee) / totalFee;
    swapAndLiquify(liquidityTokens);
}
```

Recommendation

Rewrite some code segments so the runtime will be more performant.

The function `swapAndLiquify` and the variable `liquidityFee` could be removed from the contracts' implementation.

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L446,457,452,441,442,450,449,448,447
Status	Unresolved

Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

```
teamWallet1  
DEAD  
walletToWalletTransferWithoutFee  
liquidityFee  
marketingFee  
marketingWallet  
teamWallet4  
teamWallet3  
teamWallet2
```

Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L257,274,256,503,294,457
Status	Unresolved

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow `_` at the beginning of the `mixed_case` match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
PERMIT_TYPEHASH  
MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY  
DOMAIN_SEPARATOR  
_enable  
WETH  
DEAD
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions>.

L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L657
Status	Unresolved

Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
swapTokensAtAmount = newAmount
```

Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.

L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L186
Status	Unresolved

Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

```
_burn
```

Recommendation

Remove unused functions.

L11 - Unnecessary Boolean equality

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L534
Status	Unresolved

Description

The comparison to boolean constants is redundant. Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false.

```
require(bool,string)(_isExcludedFromFees[account] != true,Account is already excluded)
```

Recommendation

Remove the equality to the boolean constant.

Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
IERC20Metadata	Interface	IERC20		
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-

	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	_mint	Internal	✓	
	_burn	Internal	✓	
	_approve	Internal	✓	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
	_afterTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
IUniswapV2Factory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-

	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	mint	External	✓	-
	burn	External	✓	-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Router01	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-

	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
IUniswapV2Router02	Interface	IUniswapV2Router01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
IPinkAntiBot	Interface			
	setTokenOwner	External	✓	-
	onPreTransferCheck	External	✓	-
PokerVegas	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	ERC20
	<Receive Ether>	External	Payable	-
	setEnableAntiBot	External	✓	onlyOwner
	claimStuckTokens	External	✓	onlyOwner
	sendBNB	Internal	✓	
	_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair	Private	✓	
	excludeFromFees	External	✓	onlyOwner
	isExcludedFromFees	Public		-

	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	swapAndLiquify	Private	✓	
	swapAndSendMarketing	Private	✓	
	setSwapTokensAtAmount	External	✓	onlyOwner

Contract Flow



Domain Info

Domain Name	pokervegas.app
Registry Domain ID	4A30846E1-APP
Creation Date	2022-10-18T21:46:05Z
Updated Date	2022-10-23T21:46:05Z
Registry Expiry Date	2023-10-18T21:46:05Z
Registrar WHOIS Server	whois.registrar.eu
Registrar URL	http://www.openprovider.com
Registrar	Hosting Concepts B.V. dba Openprovider
Registrar IANA ID	1647

The domain was created 17 days before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 12 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.

Summary

The Smart Contract analysis reported one minor severity issue. The contract owner has the authority to transfer funds to the team's wallet. Other than that, the contract owner can access some admin functions that can not be used in a malicious way to disturb the users' transactions. There is also a fixed fee of 1% that liquidates to 5 wallets.

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Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provide all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>