



Cyberscope

Audit Report

Champion

July 2022

Type BEP20

Network BSC

Address 0xFd159d6bE08128D5a3776286e14c49703133B47f

Audited by © cyberscope

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Table of Contents | 1 |
| Contract Review | 3 |
| Source Files | 3 |
| Audit Updates | 3 |
| Contract Analysis | 4 |
| ST - Stop Transactions | 5 |
| Description | 5 |
| Recommendation | 5 |
| Update 11/07 | 6 |
| ELFM - Exceed Limit Fees Manipulation | 7 |
| Description | 7 |
| Recommendation | 7 |
| Update 11/07 | 7 |
| Contract Diagnostics | 8 |
| STC - Succeeded Transfer Check | 9 |
| Description | 9 |
| Recommendation | 9 |
| L01 - Public Function could be Declared External | 10 |
| Description | 10 |
| Recommendation | 10 |
| L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant | 11 |
| Description | 11 |
| Recommendation | 11 |
| L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | 12 |
| Description | 12 |
| Recommendation | 12 |

| | |
|---|-----------|
| L05 - Unused State Variable | 13 |
| Description | 13 |
| Recommendation | 13 |
| L06 - Missing Events Access Control | 14 |
| Description | 14 |
| Recommendation | 14 |
| L14 - Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope | 15 |
| Description | 15 |
| Recommendation | 15 |
| Contract Functions | 16 |
| Contract Flow | 18 |
| Domain Info | 19 |
| Summary | 20 |
| Update 11/07 | 20 |
| Disclaimer | 21 |
| About Cyberscope | 22 |

Contract Review

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Contract Name | CH |
| Compiler Version | v0.8.15+commit.e14f2714 |
| Optimization | 200 runs |
| Licence | MIT |
| Explorer | https://bscscan.com/token/0xFd159d6bE08128D5a3776286e14c49703133B47f |
| Symbol | CH |
| Decimals | 18 |
| Total Supply | 30,000,000 |
| Domain | championcoin.club |

Source Files

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| Filename | SHA256 |
| contract.sol | a51f04951793645c3f20791d2ebe4c1f37a86a17f8c756b8dc78ff0b686e91a7 |

Audit Updates

| | |
|----------------------|----------------|
| Initial Audit | 8th July 2022 |
| Corrected | 11th July 2022 |

Contract Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor ● Pass

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|---|---------------------|
| ● | ST | Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions | Ownership renounced |
| ● | OCTD | Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address | |
| ● | OTUT | Owner Transfer User's Tokens | |
| ● | ELFM | Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%) | Ownership renounced |
| ● | ULTW | Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent | |
| ● | MT | Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens | |
| ● | BT | Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet | |
| ● | BC | Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling | |

ST - Stop Transactions

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Criticality | critical |
| Location | contract.sol#L302,323 |
| Status | Ownership renounced |

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop the sales for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the variables that sum up the swapFee to zero. As a result, the swapFee will produce a zero division revert.

```
uint256 swapFee = _sellLPFee + _sellMarketingFee + _buyLPFee + _buyMarketingFee;  
uint256 lpFee = _buyLPFee + _sellLPFee;  
uint256 lpAmount = tokenAmount * lpFee / swapFee;
```

The contract owner may also take advantage of it by increasing the _sellLPFee to a high value. As a result, the sender's amount will not be sufficient and the transaction will revert.

```
if (isSell) {  
    swapFee = _sellLPFee + _sellMarketingFee;  
} else {  
    swapFee = _buyLPFee + _buyMarketingFee;  
}  
uint256 swapAmount = tAmount * swapFee / 100;
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for not allowing setting the _maxTxAmount less than a reasonable amount. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be more than a fixed percentage of the total supply.

Regarding the fees read more in the [fees manipulation section](#).

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Update 11/07

The contract has renounced the ownership, as a result the methods cannot be abused.

ELFM - Exceed Limit Fees Manipulation

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| Criticality | critical |
| Location | contract.sol#L383 |
| Status | Ownership renounced |

Description

The contract owner has the authority to increase over the allowed limit of 25%. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `setSellLPFee` function with a high percentage value.

```
function setSellLPFee(uint256 lpFee) external onlyOwner {  
    _sellLPFee = lpFee;  
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum acceptable value.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Update 11/07

The contract has renounced the ownership, as a result the methods cannot be abused.

Contract Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor

| Severity | Code | Description |
|----------|------|--|
| ● | STC | Succeeded Transfer Check |
| ● | L01 | Public Function could be Declared External |
| ● | L02 | State Variables could be Declared Constant |
| ● | L04 | Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions |
| ● | L05 | Unused State Variable |
| ● | L06 | Missing Events Access Control |
| ● | L14 | Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope |

STC - Succeeded Transfer Check

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------|
| Criticality | minor |
| Location | contract.sol#L339 |

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
if(marketingAmount>0){  
  
    BUSD.transferFrom(address(_tokenDistributor),marketingAddress,marketingAmount);  
}  
uint256 amountBUSDLiquidity = BUSDBalance - marketingAmount;  
BUSD.transferFrom(address(_tokenDistributor), address(this),  
amountBUSDLiquidity);
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful.

L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L76,85,90,197,205,210,214,219

Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

```
transferFrom
approve
allowance
transfer
totalSupply
transferOwnership
renounceOwnership
owner
```

Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract.

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L126,125,133

Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

```
sharetotal  
router  
BUSDaddress
```

Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L39,66,111,118,120,121,122,123,126,127,128,129,130

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
_swapPairList  
_mainPair  
_swapRouter  
BUSD  
BUSDaddress  
_sellMarketingFee  
_sellLPFee  
_buyMarketingFee  
_buyLPFee  
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions>.

L05 - Unused State Variable

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L133

Description

There are segments that contain unused state variables.

```
sharetotal
```

Recommendation

Remove unused state variables.

L06 - Missing Events Access Control

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L362

Description

Detected missing events for critical access control parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
fundAddress = addr
```

Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.

L14 - Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L242,241,297

Description

There are variables that are defined in the local scope and are not initialized.

```
feeAmount  
isSell  
takeFee
```

Recommendation


All the local scoped variables should be initialized.

Contract Functions

| Contract | Type | Bases | | |
|-------------------------|---|------------|------------|-----------|
| | Function Name | Visibility | Mutability | Modifiers |
| | | | | |
| IERC20 | Interface | | | |
| | decimals | External | | - |
| | symbol | External | | - |
| | name | External | | - |
| | totalSupply | External | | - |
| | balanceOf | External | | - |
| | transfer | External | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | External | | - |
| | approve | External | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| ISwapRouter | Interface | | | |
| | factory | External | | - |
| | WETH | External | | - |
| | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | addLiquidity | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| ISwapFactory | Interface | | | |
| | createPair | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| Ownable | Implementation | | | |
| | <Constructor> | Public | ✓ | - |
| | owner | Public | | - |
| | renounceOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | transferOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | | | | |
| TokenDistributor | Implementation | | | |

| | | | | |
|--------------|------------------------|--------------------|---------|-------------|
| | <Constructor> | Public | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| Token | Implementation | IERC20, Ownable | | |
| | <Constructor> | Public | ✓ | - |
| | symbol | External | | - |
| | name | External | | - |
| | decimals | External | | - |
| | totalSupply | Public | | - |
| | balanceOf | Public | | - |
| | transfer | Public | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | Public | | - |
| | approve | Public | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | Public | ✓ | - |
| | _approve | Private | ✓ | |
| | _transfer | Private | ✓ | |
| | _funTransfer | Private | ✓ | |
| | _tokenTransfer | Private | ✓ | |
| | swapTokenForFund | Private | ✓ | lockTheSwap |
| | _takeTransfer | Private | ✓ | |
| | setFundAddress | External | ✓ | onlyFunder |
| | changeBuyFees | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | changeFeesSell | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setSellLPFee | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | startAddLP | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | closeAddLP | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | startTrade | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | changeSwapBackSettings | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setFeeWhiteList | External | ✓ | onlyFunder |
| | setSwapPairList | External | ✓ | onlyFunder |
| | claimToken | External | ✓ | onlyFunder |
| | <Receive Ether> | External | Payable | - |
| | | | | |
| CH | Implementation | Token | | |
| | <Constructor> | Public | ✓ | Token |

Contract Flow



Domain Info

| | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Domain Name | championcoin.club |
| Registry Domain ID | D6C647AB0DE474FF082AFADCF2B243596-GDREG |
| Creation Date | 2022-06-23T13:16:24Z |
| Updated Date | 2022-06-28T13:16:25Z |
| Registry Expiry Date | 2023-06-23T13:16:24Z |
| Registrar WHOIS Server | whois.dnspod.cn |
| Registrar URL | www.dnspod.cn |
| Registrar | DNSPod, Inc. |
| Registrar IANA ID | 1697 |

The domain has been created in 12 months before the creation of the audit.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.

Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like stopping transactions and manipulating fees. The contract can be converted into a honeypot and prevent users from selling if the owner abuses the admin functions. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

Update 11/07

The contract has renounced the ownership, as a result the methods cannot be abused.

Disclaimer

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment.

Cyberscope team provides no guarantees against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from being scammed.

The Cyberscope team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools. Under no circumstances did Cyberscope receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website.

Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from scams. This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token.

The Cyberscope team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.

About Cyberscope

Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Cyberscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provide all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>