



Cyberscope

Audit Report

Cactus Reward Token

February 2023

| | |
|------------|--|
| Type | BEP20 |
| Network | BSC |
| Address | 0x28CF95076Cc52cfB6339dadFF8150Db1A5958E55 |
| Audited by | © cyberscope |

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Review

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Contract Name | CactusRewardToken |
| Compiler Version | v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2 |
| Optimization | 200 runs |
| Explorer | https://bscscan.com/address/0x28cf95076cc52cfb6339dadff8150db1a5958e55 |
| Address | 0x28cf95076cc52cfb6339dadff8150db1a5958e55 |
| Network | BSC |
| Symbol | CRT |
| Decimals | 18 |
| Total Supply | 104.824 |

Audit Updates

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| Initial Audit | 15 Feb 2023 https://github.com/cyberscope-io/audits/tree/main/4-crt/v1/audit.pdf |
| Corrected Phase 2 | 22 Feb 2023 |

Source Files

| Filename | SHA256 |
|---|--|
| @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol | 9353af89436556f7ba8abb3f37a6677249aa4df6024fbfaa94f79ab2f44f3231 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol | af5c8a77965cc82c33b7ff844deb9826166689e55dc037a7f2f790d057811990 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol | 94f23e4af51a18c2269b355b8c7cf4db8003d075c9c541019eb8dcf4122864d5 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol | 1e0922f6c0bf6b1b8b4d480dcabb691b1359195a297bde6dc5172e79f3a1f826 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol | 1458c260d010a08e4c20a4a517882259a23a4baa0b5bd9add9fb6d6a1549814a |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol | 0dc33698a1661b22981abad8e5c6f5ebca0dfe5ec14916369a2935d888ff257a |
| contracts/CactusRewardToken.sol | 6c213a9dcba7a062c112c2f0ad54336fe534544b557d8ddb277e01ccc8e2027f |

Roles

The contract roles consist of Owner and Operator role.

The `Owner` has the authority to mint tokens.

The `Operator` has the authority to

- Change payable address.
- Grant or revoke the Operator role.
- Change uniswap pair address.

Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative ● Pass

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|------------------------------------|------------|
| ● | ST | Stops Transactions | Passed |
| ● | OCTD | Transfers Contract's Tokens | Passed |
| ● | OTUT | Transfers User's Tokens | Passed |
| ● | ELFM | Exceeds Fees Limit | Passed |
| ● | ULTW | Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet | Passed |
| ● | MT | Mints Tokens | Unresolved |
| ● | BT | Burns Tokens | Passed |
| ● | BC | Blacklists Addresses | Passed |

MT - Mints Tokens

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| Criticality | Critical |
| Location | contracts/CactusRewardToken.sol#L62,99 |
| Status | Acknowledged |

Description

The contract's owner is a Staking contract, which means the ownership cannot be transferred and has the authority to mint tokens. The Staking contract mints tokens to the `CactusRewardToken` when a user claims the staking reward and the reward amount is greater than the token's contract balance. The max reward amount that can be claimed by a user is equal to 45.6% of the token's total supply. This is possible if a user stakes the maximum stake amount and waits for almost a year to claim the reward.

Additionally, the users have the authority to mint tokens by calling the function `claim`. As a result, the contract tokens will be highly inflated.

```
function claim() public payable returns (bool) {
    require(
        msg.value >= _airdropEth,
        "0.0176 BNB (~$5) is the minimum required to claim CRT"
    );
    require(
        msg.value <= _maxAirdropEth,
        "3.52 BNB (~$1000) is the maximum to claim CRT"
    );
    uint256 amountToMint = msg.value.div(_airdropBaseEth).mul(
        _airdropSingleToken
    );
    require(
        mintableAirdropTokens >= amountToMint,
        "There are no more tokens to claim"
    );
    if (participants[msg.sender] == address(0)) {
        numParticipants = numParticipants.add(1);
        participants[msg.sender] = msg.sender;
    }
    mintableAirdropTokens = mintableAirdropTokens.sub(amountToMint);
    fundRaised = fundRaised.add(msg.value);
    _mint(msg.sender, amountToMint);
    payable(payableAddress).transfer(msg.value);

    return true;
}

function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner {
    _mintTokens(to, amount);
}
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Team Update

The team responded with the following statement:

“The Mint function of the CRT token is controlled by the staking contract. And not by any individual owner or operator. The staking contract is designed to only mint new tokens when the CRT tokens in its reward pool have been exhausted. The staking contract is the owner of the CRT token.

The operator has no function over the contract when it comes to minting function. Therefore the concern for inflation in the tokens cannot come to be. Since the staking contract is the only owner with access to mint tokens, it only does it on a measured basis.”

Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|--|------------|
| ● | L02 | State Variables could be Declared Constant | Unresolved |
| ● | L04 | Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | Unresolved |
| ● | L07 | Missing Events Arithmetic | Unresolved |
| ● | L13 | Divide before Multiply Operation | Unresolved |
| ● | L16 | Validate Variable Setters | Unresolved |
| ● | L19 | Stable Compiler Version | Unresolved |

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

| | |
|-------------|---|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/CactusRewardToken.sol#L18,19,20,21,22,23,30,31,32 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

State variables can be declared as constant using the constant keyword. This means that the value of the state variable cannot be changed after it has been set. Additionally, the constant variables decrease gas consumption of the corresponding transaction.

[illegible]

Recommendation

Constant state variables can be useful when the contract wants to ensure that the value of a state variable cannot be changed by any function in the contract. This can be useful for storing values that are important to the contract's behavior, such as the contract's address or the maximum number of times a certain function can be called. The team is advised to add the `constant` keyword to state variables that never change.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/CactusRewardToken.sol#L103,107,114 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.

```
address _payableAddress
address _uniswapV2PairAddress
address _operator
bool _status
```

Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention>.

L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/CactusRewardToken.sol#L82 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Events are a way to record and log information about changes or actions that occur within a contract. They are often used to notify external parties or clients about events that have occurred within the contract, such as the transfer of tokens or the completion of a task.

It's important to carefully design and implement the events in a contract, and to ensure that all required events are included. It's also a good idea to test the contract to ensure that all events are being properly triggered and logged.

```
mintableAirdropTokens = mintableAirdropTokens.sub(amountToMint)
```

Recommendation

By including all required events in the contract and thoroughly testing the contract's functionality, the contract ensures that it performs as intended and does not have any missing events that could cause issues with its arithmetic.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/CactusRewardToken.sol#L71 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of precision.

```
uint256 amountToMint = msg.value.div(_airdropBaseEth).mul(  
    _airdropSingleToken  
)
```

Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

L16 - Validate Variable Setters

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/CactusRewardToken.sol#L47,104 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract performs operations on variables that have been configured on user-supplied input. These variables are missing of proper check for the case where a value is zero. This can lead to problems when the contract is executed, as certain actions may not be properly handled when the value is zero.

```
payableAddress = _payableAddress
```

Recommendation

By adding the proper check, the contract will not allow the variables to be configured with zero value. This will ensure that the contract can handle all possible input values and avoid unexpected behavior or errors. Hence, it can help to prevent the contract from being exploited or operating unexpectedly.

L19 - Stable Compiler Version

| | |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/CactusRewardToken.sol#L2 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.

Functions Analysis


| Contract | Type | Bases | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| | Function Name | Visibility | Mutability | Modifiers |
| | | | | |
| Ownable | Implementation | Context | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | owner | Public | | - |
| | _checkOwner | Internal | | |
| | renounceOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | transferOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | _transferOwnership | Internal | ✓ | |
| | | | | |
| IERC20Metadata | Interface | IERC20 | | |
| | name | External | | - |
| | symbol | External | | - |
| | decimals | External | | - |
| | | | | |
| IERC20 | Interface | | | |
| | totalSupply | External | | - |
| | balanceOf | External | | - |
| | transfer | External | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | External | | - |
| | approve | External | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| Address | Library | | | |
| | isContract | Internal | | |

| | | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------------|----------|---|--|
| | sendValue | Internal | ✓ | |
| | functionCall | Internal | ✓ | |
| | functionCall | Internal | ✓ | |
| | functionCallWithValue | Internal | ✓ | |
| | functionCallWithValue | Internal | ✓ | |
| | functionStaticCall | Internal | | |
| | functionStaticCall | Internal | | |
| | functionDelegateCall | Internal | ✓ | |
| | functionDelegateCall | Internal | ✓ | |
| | verifyCallResult | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| Context | Implementation | | | |
| | _msgSender | Internal | | |
| | _msgData | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| SafeMath | Library | | | |
| | tryAdd | Internal | | |
| | trySub | Internal | | |
| | tryMul | Internal | | |
| | tryDiv | Internal | | |
| | tryMod | Internal | | |
| | add | Internal | | |
| | sub | Internal | | |
| | mul | Internal | | |
| | div | Internal | | |
| | mod | Internal | | |
| | sub | Internal | | |
| | div | Internal | | |
| | mod | Internal | | |


| | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|--|---------|--------------|
| CactusReward Token | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata, Ownable | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | claimedTokens | Public | | - |
| | claim | Public | Payable | - |
| | _mintTokens | Internal | ✓ | |
| | mint | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | changePayableAddress | Public | ✓ | onlyOperator |
| | changeUniswapV2Pair | Public | ✓ | onlyOperator |
| | updateOperator | External | ✓ | onlyOperator |
| | name | Public | | - |
| | symbol | Public | | - |
| | decimals | Public | | - |
| | totalSupply | Public | | - |
| | balanceOf | Public | | - |
| | transfer | Public | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | Public | | - |
| | approve | Public | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | Public | ✓ | - |
| | increaseAllowance | Public | ✓ | - |
| | decreaseAllowance | Public | ✓ | - |
| | _callTransfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _transfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _mint | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _burn | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _approve | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _spendAllowance | Internal | ✓ | |

| | | | | |
|--|----------------------|----------|---|--|
| | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _afterTokenTransfer | Internal | ✓ | |

Inheritance Graph



Flow Graph



Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like mint tokens. If the contract owner abuses the mint functionality, then the contract will be highly inflated. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats. There is also a max of 3% fee.

Regarding the mint functionality, the team responded with the following statement:

“The Mint function of the CRT token is controlled by the staking contract. And not by any individual owner or operator. The staking contract is designed to only mint new tokens when the CRT tokens in its reward pool have been exhausted. The staking contract is the owner of the CRT token.”

The operator has no function over the contract when it comes to minting function. Therefore the concern for inflation in the tokens cannot come to be. Since the staking contract is the only owner with access to mint tokens, it only does it on a measured basis.”

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Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>