

# Audit Report Upfront Protocol

May 2023

Network BSC

Address 0xf84Fd783E7C38A3C99030535919fB89350387502

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# **Review**

Contract Name	UPFRONT
Compiler Version	v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404
Optimization	200 runs
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/address/0xf84fd783e7c38a3c9903053591 9fb89350387502
Address	0xf84fd783e7c38a3c99030535919fb89350387502
Network	BSC
Symbol	UP
Decimals	18
Total Supply	1.000.000.000

# **Audit Updates**

Initial Audit	15 May 2023
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## **Source Files**

Filename	SHA256
UPFRONT.sol	4c9844563d49c3165d9b32b3e12dcf0a1a451a148aed06cbcef91ee232 498657



# **Findings Breakdown**



Severity	Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
<ul><li>Critical</li></ul>	0	0	0	0
<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	0	0	0	0
Minor / Informative	10	0	0	0



# **Analysis**

CriticalMediumMinor / InformativePass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	ST	Stops Transactions	Unresolved
•	OCTD	Transfers Contract's Tokens	Passed
•	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
•	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
•	ULTW	Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet	Passed
•	MT	Mints Tokens	Passed
•	ВТ	Burns Tokens	Passed
•	ВС	Blacklists Addresses	Passed



## **ST - Stops Transactions**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L816
Status	Unresolved

#### Description

The contract stops the transactions for all users excluding the addresses that are excluded from fees. The contract will not be able to stop the transactions once the tradingEnabled variable is enabled by the contract owner. The variable can be switched once.

```
if(!_isExcludedFromFees[from] && !_isExcludedFromFees[to]) {
    require(tradingEnabled, "Trading not yet enabled");
}
```

#### Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.



# **Diagnostics**

CriticalMediumMinor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	DDP	Decimal Division Precision	Unresolved
•	PTRP	Potential Transfer Revert Propagation	Unresolved
•	PVC	Price Volatility Concern	Unresolved
•	IDI	Immutable Declaration Improvement	Unresolved
•	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
•	L09	Dead Code Elimination	Unresolved
•	L14	Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope	Unresolved
•	L17	Usage of Solidity Assembly	Unresolved
•	L20	Succeeded Transfer Check	Unresolved



#### **DDP - Decimal Division Precision**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L926,927
Status	Unresolved

#### Description

Division of decimal (fixed point) numbers can result in rounding errors due to the way that division is implemented in Solidity. Thus, it may produce issues with precise calculations with decimal numbers.

Solidity represents decimal numbers as integers, with the decimal point implied by the number of decimal places specified in the type (e.g. decimal with 18 decimal places). When a division is performed with decimal numbers, the result is also represented as an integer, with the decimal point implied by the number of decimal places in the type. This can lead to rounding errors, as the result may not be able to be accurately represented as an integer with the specified number of decimal places.

Hence, the splitted shares will not have the exact precision and some funds may not be calculated as expected.

The variable contractTokenBalance will not be splitted as expected.

```
if (liquidityShare > 0) {
    uint256 liquidityTokens = contractTokenBalance *
liquidityShare / totalFee;
    swapAndLiquify(liquidityTokens);
}

if (marketingShare > 0) {
    uint256 marketingTokens = contractTokenBalance *
marketingShare / totalFee;
    swapAndSendFund(marketingTokens);
}
```



The variable newBalance will not be splitted as expected.

```
uint256 newBalance = address(this).balance - initialBalance;
uint256 mktPart = (newBalance*60)/100;
uint256 treasuryPart = (newBalance*40)/100;
```

## Recommendation

The contract could calculate the subtraction of the divided funds in the last calculation in order to avoid the division rounding issue.



## **PTRP - Potential Transfer Revert Propagation**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L930,931
Status	Unresolved

## Description

The contract sends funds to a marketingWallet and treasuryFundWallet as part of the transfer flow. This address can either be a wallet address or a contract. If the address belongs to a contract then it may revert from incoming payment. As a result, the error will propagate to the token's contract and revert the transfer.

```
payable (marketingWallet) .sendValue (mktPart);
payable (treasuryFundWallet) .sendValue (treasuryPart);
```

#### Recommendation

The contract should tolerate the potential revert from the underlying contracts when the interaction is part of the main transfer flow. This could be achieved by not allowing set contract addresses or by sending the funds in a non-revertable way.



## **PVC - Price Volatility Concern**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L826
Status	Unresolved

#### Description

The contract accumulates tokens from the taxes to swap them for ETH. The variable swapTokensAtAmount sets a threshold where the contract will trigger the swap functionality. If the variable is set to a big number, then the contract will swap a huge amount of tokens for ETH.

It is important to note that the price of the token representing it, can be highly volatile. This means that the value of a price volatility swap involving Ether could fluctuate significantly at the triggered point, potentially leading to significant price volatility for the parties involved.

```
function _transfer(address from,address to,uint256 amount)
internal override {
    ...
    bool canSwap = contractTokenBalance >= swapTokensAtAmount;
```

#### Recommendation

The contract could ensure that it will not sell more than a reasonable amount of tokens in a single transaction. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be less than a fixed percentage of the total supply. Hence, the contract will guarantee that it cannot accumulate a huge amount of tokens in order to sell them.



## **IDI - Immutable Declaration Improvement**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L710,711,725
Status	Unresolved

## Description

The contract is using variables that initialize them only in the constructor. The other functions are not mutating the variables. These variables are not defined as <code>immutable</code>.

uniswapV2Router uniswapV2Pair treasuryFundWallet

#### Recommendation

By declaring a variable as immutable, the Solidity compiler is able to make certain optimizations. This can reduce the amount of storage and computation required by the contract, and make it more gas-efficient.



#### **L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L39,40,57,777,767,777,787,793,800
Status	Unresolved

#### Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

- 1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
- 2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
- 3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX\_VALUE, ERROR\_CODE).
- 4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
- 5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
- 6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
- 7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.

```
function DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() external view returns (bytes32);
function PERMIT_TYPEHASH() external pure returns (bytes32);
function MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY() external pure returns (uint);
function WETH() external pure returns (address);
uint256 _liquidityFeeOnBuy
uint256 _marketingFeeOnBuy
uint256 _liquidityFeeOnSell
uint256 _marketingFeeOnSell
uint256 _walletToWalletTransferFee
address _marketingWallet
address _treasuryFundWallet
```



#### Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention.



#### L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L259,308,318,337,351,368,378,393,403,418,442,454,628
Status	Unresolved

#### Description

In Solidity, dead code is code that is written in the contract, but is never executed or reached during normal contract execution. Dead code can occur for a variety of reasons, such as:

- Conditional statements that are always false.
- Functions that are never called.
- Unreachable code (e.g., code that follows a return statement).

Dead code can make a contract more difficult to understand and maintain, and can also increase the size of the contract and the cost of deploying and interacting with it.

#### Recommendation



To avoid creating dead code, it's important to carefully consider the logic and flow of the contract and to remove any code that is not needed or that is never executed. This can help improve the clarity and efficiency of the contract.



## L14 - Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L699
Status	Unresolved

## Description

Using an uninitialized local variable can lead to unpredictable behavior and potentially cause errors in the contract. It's important to always initialize local variables with appropriate values before using them.

address router

#### Recommendation

By initializing local variables before using them, the contract ensures that the functions behave as expected and avoid potential issues.



## L17 - Usage of Solidity Assembly

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L459
Status	Unresolved

## Description

Using assembly can be useful for optimizing code, but it can also be error-prone. It's important to carefully test and debug assembly code to ensure that it is correct and does not contain any errors.

Some common types of errors that can occur when using assembly in Solidity include Syntax, Type, Out-of-bounds, Stack, and Revert.

```
assembly {
    let returndata_size := mload(returndata)
    revert(add(32, returndata), returndata_size)
}
```

#### Recommendation

It is recommended to use assembly sparingly and only when necessary, as it can be difficult to read and understand compared to Solidity code.



#### **L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	UPFRONT.sol#L753
Status	Unresolved

## Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
ERC20token.transfer(msg.sender, balance)
```

#### Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the Openzeppelin library.



# **Functions Analysis**

Contract	Туре	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
IUniswapV2Fac tory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	1	-



	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	1	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	mint	External	✓	-
	burn	External	✓	-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	<b>✓</b>	-
	sync	External	<b>✓</b>	-
	initialize	External	<b>✓</b>	-
IUniswapV2Rou ter01	Interface			
	factory	External		-



	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
IUniswapV2Rou ter02	Interface	IUniswapV2 Router01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTr ansferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	1	-



	swapExactTokensForTokensSupporting FeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFee OnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFee OnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	1	-
IERC20Metadat	Interface	IERC20		
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
Address	Library			
	isContract	Internal		
	sendValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	



	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	functionDelegateCall	Internal	✓	
	functionDelegateCall	Internal	✓	
	verifyCallResultFromTarget	Internal		
	verifyCallResult	Internal		
	_revert	Private		
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
		Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	1	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Meta data		
		Public	✓	-




	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	_mint	Internal	✓	
	_burn	Internal	✓	
	_approve	Internal	✓	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	1	
	_afterTokenTransfer	Internal	1	
UPFRONT	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
		Public	✓	ERC20
		External	Payable	-
	enableTrading	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	claimStuckTokens	External	✓	onlyOwner



excludeFromFees	External	✓	onlyOwner
isExcludedFromFees	Public		-
updateBuyFees	External	1	onlyOwner
updateSellFees	External	1	onlyOwner
updateWalletToWalletTransferFee	External	✓	onlyOwner
changeMarketingWallet	External	1	onlyOwner
changeTreasuryFundWallet	External	1	onlyOwner
_transfer	Internal	1	
setSwapTokensAtAmount	External	✓	onlyOwner
swapAndLiquify	Private	✓	
swapAndSendFund	Private	1	




# **Inheritance Graph**





# Flow Graph





# **Summary**

Upfront Protocol contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns, and potential improvements. There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like stopping transactions. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. There is also a limit of max 10% fee.



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