



Cyberscope

Audit Report

WEMOV

August 2022

Type BEP20

Network BSC

Address 0xc473DfaE668e1d9C21aBdCF1eCfb3d7b5Afc868F

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Contract Review

Contract Name	WeMov
Compiler Version	v0.8.9+commit.e5eed63a
Optimization	200 runs
Licence	MIT
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/token/0xc473DfaE668e1d9C21aBdCF1eCfb3d7b5Afc868F
Symbol	WM
Decimals	18
Total Supply	500,000,000
Domain	

Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contract.sol	b4200e6d9bad061fc1dcfab639c1d5bfb7738bc86bc8a1d434690e1542a3127b

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	21st August 2022 https://github.com/cyberscope-io/audits/blob/main/wm/audit.pdf
Corrected	23rd August 2022

Contract Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor ● Pass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	ST	Stops Transactions	Passed
●	OCTD	Transfers Contract's Tokens	Passed
●	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
●	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
●	ULTW	Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet	Unresolved
●	MT	Mints Tokens	Passed
●	BT	Burns Tokens	Passed
●	BC	Blacklists Addresses	Passed

ULTW - Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L972
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract owner has the authority to transfer funds without limit to the team wallet. These funds have been accumulated from fees collected from the contract. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `recoverETH` method.

```
function recoverETH() external onlyOwner {  
    payable(msg.sender).transfer(address(this).balance);  
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum amount of funds that can be swapped. Since a huge amount may volatile the token's price.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Contract Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	STC	Succeeded Transfer Check	Unresolved
●	FSA	Fixed Swap Address	Unresolved
●	CR	Code Repetition	Unresolved
●	L01	Public Function could be Declared External	Unresolved
●	L03	Redundant Statements	Unresolved
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
●	L05	Unused State Variable	Unresolved
●	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic	Unresolved
●	L09	Dead Code Elimination	Unresolved
●	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation	Unresolved
●	L15	Local Scope Variable Shadowing	Unresolved

STC - Succeeded Transfer Check

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L1131,1138
Status	Unresolved

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
(bool success,) = address(_taxWallet.marketing).call{value: ethForMarketing}("");  
(success,) = address(_taxWallet.treasury).call{value: address(this).balance}("");
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful.

FSA - Fixed Swap Address

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L905
Status	Unresolved

Description

The swap address is assigned once in the constructor and it can not be changed. The decentralized swaps sometimes create a new swap version or abandon the current. A contract that cannot change the swap address may not be able to catch-up the upgrade.

```
constructor() ERC20("WEMOV", "WM") {  
    IUniswapV2Router02 _uniswapV2Router =  
    IUniswapV2Router02(0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E);  
    excludeFromMaxTransaction(address(_uniswapV2Router), true);  
    uniswapV2Router = _uniswapV2Router;  
  
    uniswapV2Pair =  
    IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory()).createPair(address(this),  
    _uniswapV2Router.WETH());
```

Recommendation

It could be better to allow the swap address mutation in case of future swap updates.

CR - Code Repetition

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L989, 998, 1007
Status	Unresolved

Description

There are code segments that are repetitive in the contract. Those segments increase the code size of the contract unnecessarily.

```
excludeFromFees(_taxWallet.marketing, false);  
excludeFromMaxTransaction(_taxWallet.marketing, false);  
  
excludeFromFees(_taxWallet.marketing, true);  
excludeFromMaxTransaction(_taxWallet.marketing, true);
```

Recommendation

Create an internal function that contains the code segment and remove it from all the sections.

L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L203,211,228,254,262,273,291,313,332,612,631,640,976,1014
Status	Unresolved

Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

```
name
symbol
decimals
transfer
allowance
approve
transferFrom
increaseAllowance
decreaseAllowance
...
```

Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract.

L03 - Redundant Statements

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L4
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract contains statements that are not used and have no effect. As a result, those segments increase the code size of the contract unnecessarily.

Context

Recommendation

Remove the redundant statements in order to decrease the code size.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L30,31,48,717,959,855,868,884
Status	Unresolved

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
DOMAIN_SEPARATOR  
PERMIT_TYPEHASH  
MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY  
WETH  
_marketingFee  
_liquidityFee  
_treasuryFee  
deadAddress  
_taxWallet  
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions>.

L05 - Unused State Variable

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L649
Status	Unresolved

Description

There are segments that contain unused state variables.

```
MAX_INT256
```

Recommendation

Remove unused state variables.

L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L944,959
Status	Unresolved

Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
swapTokensAtAmount = newAmount  
marketingFee = _marketingFee
```

Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.

L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L396,695,701,708
Status	Unresolved

Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

```
_burn  
abs  
toUint256Safe  
toInt256Safe
```

Recommendation

Remove unused functions.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L1018
Status	Unresolved

Description

Performing divisions before multiplications may cause lose of prediction.

```
fees = amount.mul(totalFees).div(100)
```

Recommendation

The multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

L15 - Local Scope Variable Shadowing

Criticality	minor / informative
Location	contract.sol#L914
Status	Unresolved

Description

There are variables that are defined in the local scope containing the same name from an upper scope.

```
totalSupply
```

Recommendation

The local variables should have different names from the upper scoped variables.

Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	mint	External	✓	-
	burn	External	✓	-


	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Factory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
IERC20Metadata	Interface	IERC20		
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-

	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	_mint	Internal	✓	
	_burn	Internal	✓	
	_approve	Internal	✓	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
SafeMath	Library			
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
SafeMathInt	Library			
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	sub	Internal		

	add	Internal		
	abs	Internal		
	toUint256Safe	Internal		
SafeMathUint	Library			
	toInt256Safe	Internal		
IUniswapV2Router01	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
IUniswapV2Router02	Interface	IUniswapV2 Router01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-

	swapExactETHForTokensSupporting FeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupporting FeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
WeMov	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	ERC20
	<Receive Ether>	External	Payable	-
	updateSwapTokensAtAmount	External	✓	onlyOwner
	excludeFromMaxTransaction	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	updateSwapEnabled	External	✓	onlyOwner
	updateFees	External	✓	onlyOwner
	excludeFromFees	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	recoverETH	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setAutomatedMarketMakerPair	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_setPair	Private	✓	
	updateMarketingWallet	External	✓	onlyOwner
	updateTreasuryWallet	External	✓	onlyOwner
	updateLiquidityWallet	External	✓	onlyOwner
	isExcludedFromFees	Public		-
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	swapTokensForEth	Private	✓	
	addLiquidity	Private	✓	
	swapBack	Private	✓	

Contract Flow



Domain Info

Domain Name	wemov.io
Registry Domain ID	5c0ac6451e9a4e0b913593323ce20b92-DONUTS
Creation Date	2022-08-01T16:55:07Z
Updated Date	2022-08-06T16:55:22Z
Registry Expiry Date	2023-08-01T16:55:07Z
Registrar WHOIS Server	http://www.hostinger.com
Registrar URL	http://www.hostinger.com
Registrar	Hostinger, UAB
Registrar IANA ID	1636

The domain was created 20 days before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 12 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.

Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like transferring funds to the team's wallet. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats. There is also a limit of max 5% fees.

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About Cyberscope

Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provide all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>