

Audit Report payMe Vesting

October 2022

Github https://github.com/payMeQuiz/payMe-Project

Commit 6c603956be4963a53f2b78af0eaed73dba9bee9d

Audited by © cyberscope



Table of Contents

| Table of Contents | 1 |
|--|----|
| Contract Review | 3 |
| Audit Updates | 3 |
| Source Files | 4 |
| Introductions | 6 |
| Roles | 6 |
| Contract Diagnostics | 7 |
| VTAI - Vesting Total Amount Inconsistency | 8 |
| Description | 8 |
| Recommendation | 8 |
| VTI - Vesting Token Issues | 9 |
| Description | 9 |
| Recommendation | 10 |
| MC - Missing Check | 11 |
| Description | 11 |
| Recommendation | 11 |
| L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | 12 |
| Description | 12 |
| Recommendation | 12 |
| L05 - Unused State Variable | 13 |
| Description | 13 |
| Recommendation | 13 |
| L11 - Unnecessary Boolean equality | 14 |
| Description | 14 |
| Recommendation | 14 |
| L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation | 15 |



Contract Review

| Contract Name | PaymeTokenVesting |
|------------------|--|
| Compiler Version | v0.8.9+commit.e5eed63a |
| Github | https://github.com/payMeQuiz/payMe-Project |
| Commit | 6ae40ccfae93ee9b1b5fd8d90051790048d4279f |
| Testing Deploy | https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x2172122e8EAd8e8 5a2cdA49b0e91b5569Fc192A0 |
| Domain | https://payme.games |

Audit Updates

| Initial Audit | 17th October 2022 |
|---------------|-------------------|
| Corrected | |



Source Files

| Filename | SHA256 |
|---|--|
| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/access/Own ableUpgradeable .sol | da66c17044345dc892d85bd7ddc9745d25df0b3dacfba8f 84eb87c60d6e40fe3 |
| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/proxy/utils/l nitializable.sol | cd823c76cbf5f5b6ef1bda565d58be66c843c37707cd93e b8fb5425deebd6756 |
| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/security/Re entrancyGuardU pgradeable.sol | b6adbe9bc075b15cfb4b90f1ae020da4c78e3feada056a4 c75b875350285c915 |
| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/token/ERC2 0/extensions/draf t-IERC20PermitU pgradeable.sol | b97515a88e75c313eacf0a27c9439ef371d86d4c2730d3b 13076640942f813df |
| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/token/ERC2 0/IERC20Upgrad eable.sol | 4e09a7479aa3e7c313f8fc141c4c8fc04e0abfeb8754615e f7d78ec94c298b07 |
| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/token/ERC2 0/utils/SafeERC2 0Upgradeable.sol | b7410d275fc7d26e36b0851541d6ff290593ba72d64b5c9 06978124b123915c1 |



| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/utils/Addres sUpgradeable.sol | 35fb271561f3dc72e91b3a42c6e40c2bb2e788cd8ca5801 4ac43f6198b8d32ca |
|--|--|
| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/utils/Contex tUpgradeable.sol | 5fb301961e45cb482fe4e05646d2f529aa449fe0e90c6671 475d6a32356fa2d4 |
| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/utils/math/ MathUpgradeabl e.sol | 43127075ebfd67044ac7cbee0734c30911e435f58a42d8c f20a86d9fe963ae80 |
| @openzeppelin/c ontracts-upgrade able/utils/math/S afeMathUpgrade able.sol | 4039686a509394aed475619c4e0b3a2df1df34fe59e90b9 add8669de371eb731 |
| contracts/Payme TokenVesting.sol | 56c1b1a507294cdb229deab7b7646ada1ed2266a017eb b09bc21b82855fee681 |



Introductions

The PaymeTokenVesting contract implements a vesting contract as an upgradable proxy. The contract is responsible for creating and configuring vesting schedules for a beneficiary.

Each beneficiary can have multiple vesting schedules. In addition, the contract monitors the vesting schedules by keeping track of the beneficiaries and how many times its beneficiary has vested.

Roles

The contract has an owner role and a beneficiary role. The beneficiary is any user that vests on the contract. The owner has the authority to withdraw a specific amount from the contract if possible. Additionally, the owner and any user that is beneficiary have the authority:

- 1. Revoke all the vested amount if the vesting period is elapsed or the proportional amount in relation to the vested period.
- 2. Release tokens for TGE If the TGE opening time has elapsed.
- 3. Release a specific amount of vested tokens if it is possible.

Contract Diagnostics

CriticalMediumMinor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|--|------------|
| • | VTAI | Vesting Total Amount Inconsistency | Unresolved |
| • | VTI | Vesting Token Issues | Unresolved |
| • | CO | Code Optimization | Unresolved |
| • | MC | Missing Check | Unresolved |
| • | L04 | Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | Unresolved |
| • | L05 | Unused State Variable | Unresolved |
| • | L11 | Unnecessary Boolean equality | Unresolved |
| • | L13 | Divide before Multiply Operation | Unresolved |



VTAI - Vesting Total Amount Inconsistency

| Criticality | medium |
|-------------|-------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L271 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract is using a variable "vestingSchedulesTotalAmount" to aggregate the total vested amount. The variable is aggregating the total vested amount but it is not taking into account the TGE amount. When the TGE amount is claimed by the investors, it is creating an inconsistency between the actual total amount and the calculated vested ("vestingSchedulesTotalAmount") amount.

Recommendation

It is recommended to sum up all the potential releasable amounts in the total vesting amount.



VTI - Vesting Token Issues

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L271,415 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The vesting functionality may produce some vulnerabilities during the claiming period.

TGE vs Normal Claim

A user is able to claim the whole vested amount and then claim the TGE amount as well. The opposite cannot happen. If a user claims the TGE, then he will not be able to claim the vested amount.

Early TGE claim

If a user claims the TGE amount at the begging of the vesting period, then the '_computeReleasableAmount' method will revert. This will happen because the vestingSchedule.released will be greater than the releasable amount.

```
function releaseTokenForTGE(bytes32 vestingScheduleId) public nonReentrant
{
    //..
    vestingSchedule.released = vestingSchedule.released.add(TGEReleaseAmount);
    //..
}

function _computeReleasableAmount(VestingSchedule memory vestingSchedule) internal view
returns(uint256){
    //..
    vestedAmount = vestedAmount.sub(vestingSchedule.released);
    //..
}
```



Recommendation

The team is advised to carefully check if the implementation follows the expected business logic.



MC - Missing Check

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location | contract.sol#L1 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract is processing variables that have not been properly sanitized and checked that they form the proper shape. These variables may produce vulnerability issues. To be more specific, the variables TGEOpeningTime and TGEPercent are not properly sanitized.

```
function initialize(IERC20Upgradeable token_,uint256 TGEPercent_,uint256 TGEOpeningTime_)
public initializer {
    require(address(token_) != address(0));
    __Ownable_init_unchained();
    __ReentrancyGuard_init_unchained();

    _token = token_;

TGEOpeningTime = TGEOpeningTime_;
    TGEPercent = TGEPercent_;
}
```

Recommendation

The contract should properly check the variables according to the required specifications.

- TGEOpeningTime should be greater than the current timestamp.
- TGEPercent should be greater than zero and lower than 100 percent.



L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|---|
| Location | contracts/PaymeTokenVesting.sol#L108,173,47,203,130,57,59,48,205,199,202,2 06,204,201,200 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

TGEOpeningTime_
_crowdsales_address
TGEPercent
_slicePeriodSeconds
_beneficiary
TGETokenParticipates
crowdsales_address
TGEOpeningTime
_amount
...

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions.



L05 - Unused State Variable

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| Location | contracts/PaymeTokenVesting.sol#L18 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

There are segments that contain unused state variables.

PaymeTokenVesting

Recommendation

Remove unused state variables.



L11 - Unnecessary Boolean equality

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|--|
| Location | contracts/PaymeTokenVesting.sol#L415,244,70,78,271 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The comparison to boolean constants is redundant. Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false.

```
(currentTime < vestingSchedule.cliff) || vestingSchedule.revoked == true require(bool,string)(vestingSchedule.revocable == true,TokenVesting: vesting is not revocable) require(bool)(vestingSchedules[vestingScheduleld].initialized == true) require(bool,string)(vestingSchedule.releaseAtTGE == true,ReleaseTokenAtTGE: only investors can claim token at TGE) require(bool)(vestingSchedules[vestingScheduleld].revoked == false)
```

Recommendation

Remove the equality to the boolean constant.



L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

| Criticality | minor / informative |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|
| Location | contracts/PaymeTokenVesting.sol#L415 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Performing divisions before multiplications may cause lose of prediction.

vestedSlicePeriods = timeFromStart.div(secondsPerSlice)

Recommendation

The multiplications should be prior to the divisions.



Contract Functions

| Contract | Туре | Bases | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|------------|------------------|
| | Function Name | Visibility | Mutability | Modifiers |
| OwnableUpgr adeable | Implementation | Initializable, ContextUpg radeable | | |
| | Ownable_init | Internal | 1 | onlyInitializing |
| | Ownable_init_unchained | Internal | 1 | onlyInitializing |
| | owner | Public | | - |
| | _checkOwner | Internal | | |
| | renounceOwnership | Public | 1 | onlyOwner |
| | transferOwnership | Public | 1 | onlyOwner |
| | _transferOwnership | Internal | ✓ | |
| Initializable | Implementation | | | |
| | _disableInitializers | Internal | ✓ | |
| ReentrancyGu ardUpgradeab le | Implementation | Initializable | | |
| | ReentrancyGuard_init | Internal | ✓ | onlyInitializing |
| | ReentrancyGuard_init_unchained | Internal | ✓ | onlyInitializing |
| IERC20Permit Upgradeable | Interface | | | |
| | permit | External | 1 | - |
| | nonces | External | | - |
| | DOMAIN_SEPARATOR | External | | - |
| IERC20Upgrad | Interface | | | |
| | totalSupply | External | | - |
| | balanceOf | External | | - |



| | transfer | External | ✓ | - |
|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|----------|------------------|
| | allowance | External | | - |
| | approve | External | 1 | - |
| | transferFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| SafeERC20Up gradeable | Library | | | |
| | safeTransfer | Internal | 1 | |
| | safeTransferFrom | Internal | 1 | |
| | safeApprove | Internal | ✓ | |
| | safeIncreaseAllowance | Internal | ✓ | |
| | safeDecreaseAllowance | Internal | ✓ | |
| | safePermit | Internal | 1 | |
| | _callOptionalReturn | Private | ✓ | |
| | | | | |
| AddressUpgra deable | Library | | | |
| | isContract | Internal | | |
| | sendValue | Internal | ✓ | |
| | functionCall | Internal | ✓ | |
| | functionCall | Internal | ✓ | |
| | functionCallWithValue | Internal | 1 | |
| | functionCallWithValue | Internal | 1 | |
| | functionStaticCall | Internal | | |
| | functionStaticCall | Internal | | |
| | verifyCallResult | Internal | | |
| ContextUpgra deable | Implementation | Initializable | | |
| | Context_init | Internal | 1 | onlyInitializing |
| | Context_init_unchained | Internal | 1 | onlyInitializing |
| | _msgSender | Internal | | |
| | _msgData | Internal | | |
| MathUpgrade able | Library | | | |




| | max | Internal | | |
|-------------------------|--|---|---|-------------|
| | min | Internal | | |
| | average | Internal | | |
| | ceilDiv | Internal | | |
| | mulDiv | Internal | | |
| | mulDiv | Internal | | |
| | sqrt | Internal | | |
| | sqrt | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| SafeMathUpgr adeable | Library | | | |
| | tryAdd | Internal | | |
| | trySub | Internal | | |
| | tryMul | Internal | | |
| | tryDiv | Internal | | |
| | tryMod | Internal | | |
| | add | Internal | | |
| | sub | Internal | | |
| | mul | Internal | | |
| | div | Internal | | |
| | mod | Internal | | |
| | sub | Internal | | |
| | div | Internal | | |
| | mod | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| PaymeTokenV esting | Implementation | OwnableUp gradeable, Reentrancy GuardUpgra deable | | |
| | initialize | Public | ✓ | initializer |
| | getVestingSchedulesCountByBenefic iary | External | | - |
| | getVestingIdAtIndex | External | | - |
| | getVestingScheduleByAddressAndIn dex | External | | - |
| | getVestingSchedulesTotalAmount | External | | - |
| | setCrowdsaleAddress | External | 1 | - |



| getToken | External | | - |
|---|----------|----------|---|
| createVestingSchedule | Public | 1 | onlyCrowdsale OrOwner |
| revoke | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner onlyIfVestingS cheduleNotRe voked |
| withdraw | Public | ✓ | nonReentrant onlyOwner |
| releaseTokenForTGE | Public | ✓ | nonReentrant |
| release | Public | ✓ | nonReentrant onlylfVestingS cheduleNotRe voked |
| getVestingSchedulesCount | Public | | - |
| computeReleasableAmount | Public | | onlylfVestingS cheduleNotRe voked |
| getVestingSchedule | Public | | - |
| getWithdrawableAmount | Public | | - |
| computeNextVestingScheduleIdForH older | Public | | - |
| getLastVestingScheduleForHolder | Public | | - |
| computeVestingScheduleIdForAddre ssAndIndex | Public | | - |
| _computeReleasableAmount | Internal | | |
| getCurrentTime | Internal | | |



Contract Flow





Domain Info

| Domain Name | payme.games |
|---------------------------|---|
| Registry Domain ID | 29f4ee9286e043058b41ccc27375747f-DONUTS |
| Creation Date | 2021-01-06T13:00:37Z |
| Updated Date | 2022-08-05T11:31:27Z |
| Registry Expiry Date | 2023-01-06T13:00:37Z |
| Registrar WHOIS Server | whois.namecheap.com |
| Registrar URL | https://www.namecheap.com/ |
| Registrar | NameCheap, Inc. |
| Registrar IANA ID | 1068 |

The domain was created almost 2 years before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 3 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.



Summary

The PaymeTokenVesting contract is responsible for generating vesting schedules. This audit investigates security issues and mentions business logic concerns and potential improvements.



Disclaimer

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment.

Cyberscope team provides no guarantees against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from being scammed.

The Cyberscope team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools. Under no circumstances did Cyberscope receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website.

Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from scams. This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token.

The Cyberscope team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.



About Cyberscope

Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provide all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

https://www.cyberscope.io