

Audit Report

MosesCoin

June 2023

Network ETH

Address 0x93de4630120a31588012aC0BC122e0Bd1BeD6198

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Analysis

CriticalMediumMinor / InformativePass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	ST	Stops Transactions	Passed
•	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
•	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
•	MT	Mints Tokens	Unresolved
•	ВТ	Burns Tokens	Passed
•	ВС	Blacklists Addresses	Passed



Diagnostics

CriticalMediumMinor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	FRA	Fixed Router Address	Unresolved
•	MEM	Misleading Error Messages	Unresolved
•	IDI	Immutable Declaration Improvement	Unresolved
•	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant	Unresolved
•	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
•	L11	Unnecessary Boolean equality	Unresolved
•	L19	Stable Compiler Version	Unresolved
•	L20	Succeeded Transfer Check	Unresolved



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Review

Contract Name	MosesCoin
Compiler Version	v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2
Optimization	200 runs
Explorer	https://etherscan.io/address/0x93de4630120a31588012ac0bc1 22e0bd1bed6198
Address	0x93de4630120a31588012ac0bc122e0bd1bed6198
Network	ETH
Symbol	Moses
Decimals	18
Total Supply	1,000,000,000

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	13 Jun 2023
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Source Files

Filename	SHA256
MosesCoin.sol	84c135ca1cada66a77f22e8694a92348f65116afc66dab1de27abc2a5fe d7497



Findings Breakdown



Severity		Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
•	Critical	1	0	0	0
•	Medium	0	0	0	0
	Minor / Informative	8	0	0	0



MT - Mints Tokens

Criticality	Critical
Location	MosesCoin.sol#L617
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract owner has the authority to mint tokens. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the mint function. As a result, the contract tokens will be highly inflated.

```
function mint(uint256 value) external onlyOwner() {
   _mint(msg.sender, value);
}
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.
- Renouncing the ownership will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.



FRA - Fixed Router Address

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MosesCoin.sol#L491
Status	Unresolved

Description

The uniswapV2Pair address is assigned once and it can not be changed. It is a common practice in decentralized exchanges to create new swap versions. A contract that cannot change the swap address may not be able to catch up to the upgrade. As a result, the contract will not be able to migrate to a new liquidity pool pair or decentralized exchange.

Recommendation

The team is advised to add the ability to change the uniswapV2Pair address in order to cover potential liquidity pool migrations. It would be better to support multiple pair addresses so the token will be able to have the same behavior in all the decentralized liquidity pairs.



MEM - Misleading Error Messages

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MosesCoin.sol#L517
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract is using misleading error messages. These error messages do not accurately reflect the problem, making it difficult to identify and fix the issue.

The use of the term "native tokens" in the error message is misleading. The intent behind the message is to indicate that the owner of the contract should not be able to claim tokens associated with the contract itself, rather than referring to tokens native to the blockchain.

```
require(token != address(this), "Owner cannot claim native
tokens");
```

Recommendation

The team is suggested to modify the error message and remove the term <code>native</code>. This modification will help users understand that the prohibition pertains to tokens specifically linked to the contract, rather than implying a restriction on native tokens.



IDI - Immutable Declaration Improvement

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MosesCoin.sol#L494,495,506
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract declares state variables that their value is initialized once in the constructor and are not modified afterwards. The <u>immutable</u> is a special declaration for this kind of state variables that saves gas when it is defined.

uniswapV2Router uniswapV2Pair burnAmount

Recommendation

By declaring a variable as immutable, the Solidity compiler is able to make certain optimizations. This can reduce the amount of storage and computation required by the contract, and make it more gas-efficient.



L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MosesCoin.sol#L464,465,468
Status	Unresolved

Description

State variables can be declared as constant using the constant keyword. This means that the value of the state variable cannot be changed after it has been set. Additionally, the constant variables decrease gas consumption of the corresponding transaction.

Recommendation

Constant state variables can be useful when the contract wants to ensure that the value of a state variable cannot be changed by any function in the contract. This can be useful for storing values that are important to the contract's behavior, such as the contract's address or the maximum number of times a certain function can be called. The team is advised to add the constant keyword to state variables that never change.



L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MosesCoin.sol#L77,78,93,110,263,267,464,546,555
Status	Unresolved

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

- 1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
- 2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
- 3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
- 4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
- 5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
- 6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
- 7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.



Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention.



L11 - Unnecessary Boolean equality

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MosesCoin.sol#L572,607
Status	Unresolved

Description

Boolean equality is unnecessary when comparing two boolean values. This is because a boolean value is either true or false, and there is no need to compare two values that are already known to be either true or false.

it's important to be aware of the types of variables and expressions that are being used in the contract's code, as this can affect the contract's behavior and performance. The comparison to boolean constants is redundant. Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false.

```
lockBurner == true
require(lockBurner == false)
```

Recommendation

Using the boolean value itself is clearer and more concise, and it is generally considered good practice to avoid unnecessary boolean equalities in Solidity code.



L19 - Stable Compiler Version

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MosesCoin.sol#L3
Status	Unresolved

Description

The _______ symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.4;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.



L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MosesCoin.sol#L524
Status	Unresolved

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
ERC20token.transfer(msg.sender, balance)
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the Openzeppelin library.



Functions Analysis

Contract	Туре	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
		Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_transferOwnership	Internal	✓	
IUniswapV2Fac tory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-



	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-



	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Rou ter01	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-



	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
IUniswapV2Rou ter02	Interface	IUniswapV2 Router01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTr ansferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	1	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupporting FeeOnTransferTokens	External	1	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFee OnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFee OnTransferTokens	External	1	-
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
IERC20Metadat a	Interface	IERC20		
	name	External		-




	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Meta data		
		Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	1	-
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	_mint	Internal	✓	
	_burn	Internal	✓	
	_approve	Internal	✓	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
	_afterTokenTransfer	Internal	1	



MosesCoin	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
		Public	1	ERC20
		External	Payable	-
	claimStuckTokens	External	1	onlyOwner
	excludeFromFees	External	1	onlyOwner
	includeInFees	External	1	onlyOwner
	isExcludedFromFees	Public		-
	updateBuyFees	External	1	onlyOwner
	updateSellFees	External	1	onlyOwner
	_transfer	Internal	1	
	setBurner	External	1	onlyOwner
	burn	External	1	onlyOwner
	mint	External	1	onlyOwner
	burnAfterSixMonths	External	1	onlyBurner




Inheritance Graph





Flow Graph





Summary

MosesCoin contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like mint tokens. if the contract owner abuses the mint functionality, then the contract will be highly inflated. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats. There is also a limit of max 10% fees.



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Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.

