

Audit Report Wednesday NFT

February 2023

Type BEP20

Network BSC

Address 0x9f55c34dc4b00659d70bea02769bae51b0c341fc

Audited by © cyberscope



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Review

| Contract Name | ADDAMS |
|------------------|--|
| Compiler Version | v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2 |
| Optimization | 99999 runs |
| Explorer | https://bscscan.com/address/0x9f55c34dc4b00659d70bea02769bae51b0c341fc |
| Address | 0x9f55c34dc4b00659d70bea02769bae51b0c341fc |
| Network | BSC |
| Symbol | ADDAMS |
| Decimals | 18 |
| Total Supply | 1,000,000,000 |

Audit Updates

| Initial Audit | 26 Feb 2023 https://github.com/cyberscope-io/audits/tree/main/addams/v1/audit.pdf |
|-------------------|---|
| Corrected Phase 2 | 28 Feb 2023 |



Source Files

| Filename | SHA256 |
|---|--|
| @openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.s ol | 86908de632a9fbffc04a94fa27bd320c304 a47072a85de02293e08f1724934fb |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/access/IAccessControl.sol | d03c1257f2094da6c86efa7aa09c1c07eb d33dd31046480c5097bc2542140e45 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extension s/IERC20Metadata.sol | af5c8a77965cc82c33b7ff844deb982616 6689e55dc037a7f2f790d057811990 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.so | 94f23e4af51a18c2269b355b8c7cf4db80 03d075c9c541019eb8dcf4122864d5 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol | 1458c260d010a08e4c20a4a517882259a 23a4baa0b5bd9add9fb6d6a1549814a |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC1 65.sol | 8806a632d7b656cadb8133ff8f2acae440 5b3a64d8709d93b0fa6a216a8a6154 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC 165.sol | 701e025d13ec6be09ae892eb029cd83b3 064325801d73654847a5fb11c58b1e5 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol | 8059d642ec219d0b9b62fbc7691207952 9cf494cac988abe5e371f1168b29b0f |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol | 0dc33698a1661b22981abad8e5c6f5ebc a0dfe5ec14916369a2935d888ff257a |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol | f81f11dca62dcd3e0895e680559676f4ba 4f2e12a36bb0291d7ecbb6b983141f |
| @uniswap/v2-core/contracts/interfaces/IUniswap V2Factory.sol | 51d056199e3f5e41cb1a9f11ce581aa3e1 90cc982db5771ffeef8d8d1f962a0d |
| @uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router01.sol | 0439ffe0fd4a5e1f4e22d71ddbda76d63d 61679947d158cba4ee0a1da60cf663 |
| @uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol | a2900701961cb0b6152fc073856b97256 4f7c798797a4a044e83d2ab8f0e8d38 |



| contracts/ADDAMS.sol | 0ec6b49b156004e64bb78f00db6fe572c aa4bafcc97fbd1c9b523d76f8de2b65 |
|--|--|
| contracts/interfaces/IDistribution.sol | 9fba229a13ad042492df1d2d065146a1e 26d9719bb6f7b89b758b61d12ac15a9 |



Analysis

CriticalMediumMinor / InformativePass

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|------------------------------------|--------|
| • | ST | Stops Transactions | Passed |
| • | OCTD | Transfers Contract's Tokens | Passed |
| • | OTUT | Transfers User's Tokens | Passed |
| • | ELFM | Exceeds Fees Limit | Passed |
| • | ULTW | Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet | Passed |
| • | MT | Mints Tokens | Passed |
| • | ВТ | Burns Tokens | Passed |
| • | ВС | Blacklists Addresses | Passed |



Diagnostics

CriticalMediumMinor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|--|------------|
| • | PULT | Potential Unreachable Locked Tokens | Unresolved |
| • | PVC | Price Volatility Concern | Unresolved |
| • | MVN | Misleading Variables Naming | Unresolved |
| • | CR | Code Repetition | Unresolved |
| • | RSML | Redundant SafeMath Library | Unresolved |
| • | IDI | Immutable Declaration Improvement | Unresolved |
| • | L04 | Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | Unresolved |
| • | L09 | Dead Code Elimination | Unresolved |
| • | L13 | Divide before Multiply Operation | Unresolved |
| • | L19 | Stable Compiler Version | Unresolved |
| • | L20 | Succeeded Transfer Check | Unresolved |



PULT - Potential Unreachable Locked Tokens

| Criticality | Medium |
|-------------|------------|
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract owner has the ability to reset the liquidityFeeAmount and swapFeeAmount amounts. This amount is the tokens that have been accumulated to the contract from the corresponding fees. If these counters reset, then the swap will not take into account these tokens. As a result, they will remain in the contract forever since there is no way to withdraw them.

```
function resetLiquidityFee() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    liquidityFeeAmount = 0;

    emit LiquidityFeeReseted();
}

...

function resetSwapFee() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    swapFeeAmount = 0;

    emit SwapFeeReseted();
}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to carefully check the business logic of the contract. The contract should not allow having accumulated unreachable tokens.



PVC - Price Volatility Concern

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L301 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract accumulates tokens from the taxes to swap them for ETH. The variable feeLimit sets a threshold where the contract will trigger the swap functionality. If the variable is set to a big number, then the contract may swap a huge amount of tokens for ETH.

It is important to note that the price of the token representing it, can be highly volatile. This means that the value of a price volatility swap involving Ether could fluctuate significantly at the triggered point, potentially leading to significant price volatility for the parties involved.

```
function setLimit(uint256 _feeLimit) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    feeLimit = _feeLimit;

    emit FeeLimitUpdated();
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could ensure that it will not sell more than a reasonable amount of tokens in a single transaction. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be less than a fixed percentage of the total supply. Hence, the contract will guarantee that it cannot accumulate a huge amount of tokens in order to sell them.



MVN - Misleading Variables Naming

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L427 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Variables can have misleading names if their names do not accurately reflect the value they contain or the purpose they serve. The contract uses some variable names that are too generic or do not clearly convey the information stored in the variable. Misleading variable names can lead to confusion, making the code more difficult to read and understand.

The contract utilizes a burnFeeBuyRate, burnFeeSellRate, and burnFeeTransferRate that intuitively means that this fee is burned. On the contrary, this fee may be transferred to addresses. As a result, it is working as a normal tax and not as a burn tac.

```
if (burnFeeRes > 0) {
    if (burnFeeReceivers.length > 0) {
        for (uint256 i = 0; i < burnFeeReceivers.length; i++) {
            _transferAmount(_from, burnFeeReceivers[i], _calcFee(burnFeeRes, burnFeeReceiversRate[i]));
        }
    } else {
        _transferAmount(_from, deadAddress, burnFeeRes);
    }
}</pre>
```

Recommendation

It's always a good practice for the contract to contain variable names that are specific and descriptive. The team is advised to keep in mind the readability of the code.



CR - Code Repetition

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract contains repetitive code segments. There are potential issues that can arise when using code segments in Solidity. Some of them can lead to issues like gas efficiency, complexity, readability, security, and maintainability of the source code. It is generally a good idea to try to minimize code repetition where possible.

```
function updateBurnFeeReceivers(address[] calldata _burnFeeReceivers,
uint256[] calldata _burnFeeReceiversRate)

function updateLiquidityFeeReceivers(address[] calldata
_liquidityFeeReceivers, uint256[] calldata _liquidityFeeReceiversRate)

function updateSwapFeeReceivers(address[] calldata _swapFeeReceivers,
uint256[] calldata _swapFeeReceiversRate)
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places, which can make the contract easier to read and maintain. The authors could try to reuse code wherever possible, as this can help to reduce the complexity and size of the contract. For instance, the contract could reuse the common code segments in an internal function in order to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places.



RSML - Redundant SafeMath Library

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|----------------------|
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

SafeMath is a popular Solidity library that provides a set of functions for performing common arithmetic operations in a way that is resistant to integer overflows and underflows.

Starting with Solidity versions that are greater than or equal to 0.8.0, the arithmetic operations revert on underflow and overflow. As a result, the native functionality of the Solidity operations replaces the SafeMath library. Hence, the usage of the SafeMath library adds complexity, overhead and increases unnecessarily the gas consumption.

```
library SafeMath {...}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to remove the SafeMath library. Since the version of the contract is greater than 0.8.0 then the pure Solidity arithmetic operations produce the same result.

If the previous functionality is required, then the contract could exploit the unchecked $\{\ldots\}$ statement.

Read more about the breaking change on https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.16/080-breaking-changes.html#solidity-v0-8-0-breaking-changes.



IDI - Immutable Declaration Improvement

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|-------------------------------|
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L108,109 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract is using variables that initialize them only in the constructor. The other functions are not mutating the variables. These variables are not defined as immutable.

name symbo

Recommendation

By declaring a variable as immutable, the Solidity compiler is able to make certain optimizations. This can reduce the amount of storage and computation required by the contract, and make it more gas-efficient.



L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---|
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L24,129,133,138,142,147,157,162,170,187,196,203,209,21 5,222,242,250,265,275,285,301,307,327,353,379 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

- 1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
- 2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
- Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
- 4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
- 5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
- 6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
- 7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.



Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention.



L09 - Dead Code Elimination

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L546 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

In Solidity, dead code is code that is written in the contract, but is never executed or reached during normal contract execution. Dead code can occur for a variety of reasons, such as:

- Conditional statements that are always false.
- Functions that are never called.
- Unreachable code (e.g., code that follows a return statement).

Dead code can make a contract more difficult to understand and maintain, and can also increase the size of the contract and the cost of deploying and interacting with it.

```
function _burn(address _account, uint256 _amount) internal {
    require(_account != address(0), "ERC20: burn from the zero address");
    require(_account != deadAddress, "ERC20: burn from the dead address");
    require(balances[_account] >= _amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds
balance");

    _transferAmount(_account, deadAddress, _amount);
}
```

Recommendation

To avoid creating dead code, it's important to carefully consider the logic and flow of the contract and to remove any code that is not needed or that is never executed. This can help improve the clarity and efficiency of the contract.



L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|-------------------------------|
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L455,482 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
uint256 liquidityFeeHalf = liquidityFeeAmount.div(2)
uint256 liquidityFeeToken1Amount = _calcFee(token1Balance,
liquidityFeeHalf.mul(10000).div(amountToSwap))
```

Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.



L19 - Stable Compiler Version

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|-------------------------|
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L2 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The ^ symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.2;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.



L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L198 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
IERC20(_address).transfer(msg.sender, _amount)
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the Openzeppelin library.



Functions Analysis


| Contract | Туре | Bases | | |
|----------|------------------------|--|------------|-----------|
| | Function Name | Visibility | Mutability | Modifiers |
| | | | | |
| ADDAMS | Implementation | IERC20Met adata, AccessCont rol | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | balanceOf | Public | | - |
| | transfer | External | 1 | - |
| | allowance | Public | | - |
| | approve | External | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | increaseAllowance | External | 1 | - |
| | decreaseAllowance | External | ✓ | - |
| | updateRouterAndPair | Public | 1 | onlyRole |
| | setLpToken | External | 1 | onlyRole |
| | recoverTokens | External | 1 | onlyRole |
| | setExcludedFromFee | Public | 1 | onlyRole |
| | setExcludedFromSwap | Public | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setRewardSwapReceivers | External | 1 | onlyRole |
| | setRewardSellRate | External | 1 | onlyRole |
| | setRewardBuyRate | External | 1 | onlyRole |
| | resetRewardsAmount | External | 1 | onlyRole |
| | updateBuyRates | External | 1 | onlyRole |
| | updateSellRates | External | 1 | onlyRole |
| | updateTransferRates | External | 1 | onlyRole |
| | resetCounter | External | 1 | onlyRole |



| setLimit | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|-------------|
| updateBurnFeeReceivers | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| updateLiquidityFeeReceivers | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| resetLiquidityFee | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| updateSwapFeeReceivers | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| resetSwapFee | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| setEnabledSwapForSell | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| _transfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| _takeFees | Internal | ✓ | |
| _transferAmount | Internal | ✓ | |
| _mint | Internal | ✓ | |
| _burn | Internal | ✓ | |
| _approve | Internal | ✓ | |
| _calcFee | Internal | | |
| _isSell | Internal | | |
| _isBuy | Internal | | |
| _swapTokensForToken1 | Internal | ✓ | lockTheSwap |
| _addLiquidity | Internal | ✓ | lockTheSwap |
| | | | |




Inheritance Graph





Flow Graph





Summary

ADDAMS contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns, and potential improvements. ADDAMS is an interesting project that has a friendly and growing community. The Smart Contract analysis reported no compiler errors or critical issues. The contract Owner can access some admin functions that can not be used in a malicious way to disturb the users' transactions. There is also a limit of max 9% fees.



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Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



The Cyberscope team

https://www.cyberscope.io