

Audit Report RFDAI

May 2023

Network BSC

Address 0x21f01BF3D1D5Eda97c140a6540159C909de81857

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Analysis

CriticalMediumMinor / InformativePass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	ST	Stops Transactions	Passed
•	OCTD	Transfers Contract's Tokens	Passed
•	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
•	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
•	ULTW	Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet	Passed
•	MT	Mints Tokens	Passed
•	ВТ	Burns Tokens	Passed
•	ВС	Blacklists Addresses	Passed



Diagnostics

Critical
 Medium
 Minor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	MAP	Misleading Admin Permission	Unresolved
•	CR	Code Repetition	Unresolved
•	MVN	Misleading Variables Naming	Unresolved
•	AFI	Accumulated Fees Inconsistency	Unresolved
•	RSW	Redundant Storage Writes	Unresolved
•	IDI	Immutable Declaration Improvement	Unresolved
•	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant	Unresolved
•	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
•	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation	Unresolved
•	L19	Stable Compiler Version	Unresolved
•	L20	Succeeded Transfer Check	Unresolved



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Review

Contract Name	RFDAI
Compiler Version	v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2
Optimization	99999 runs
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/address/0x21f01bf3d1d5eda97c140a6540 159c909de81857
Address	0x21f01bf3d1d5eda97c140a6540159c909de81857
Network	BSC
Symbol	RFDAI
Decimals	18
Total Supply	1,000,000,000,000

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	30 May 2023
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Source Files

Filename	SHA256
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.s	0ab66c9c0b45fca5efad935058e889bd5b b5599eb95b0d17ec924f64ebcaf38f
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/IAccessControl.s	d03c1257f2094da6c86efa7aa09c1c07ebd 33dd31046480c5097bc2542140e45
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions /IERC20Metadata.sol	af5c8a77965cc82c33b7ff844deb9826166 689e55dc037a7f2f790d057811990
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	94f23e4af51a18c2269b355b8c7cf4db800 3d075c9c541019eb8dcf4122864d5
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol	1458c260d010a08e4c20a4a517882259a2 3a4baa0b5bd9add9fb6d6a1549814a
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC1 65.sol	8806a632d7b656cadb8133ff8f2acae4405 b3a64d8709d93b0fa6a216a8a6154
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC 165.sol	701e025d13ec6be09ae892eb029cd83b30 64325801d73654847a5fb11c58b1e5
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol	8597c62818dcbc6cf85c21179b90b714fb 4f70a4347ca2eed23e88c87b08b8a1
@uniswap/v2-core/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV 2Factory.sol	51d056199e3f5e41cb1a9f11ce581aa3e19 0cc982db5771ffeef8d8d1f962a0d
@uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router01.sol	0439ffe0fd4a5e1f4e22d71ddbda76d63d6 1679947d158cba4ee0a1da60cf663
@uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol	a2900701961cb0b6152fc073856b972564f 7c798797a4a044e83d2ab8f0e8d38
contracts/interfaces/IRFDAIDistribution.sol	95ad667a4d1e9f400160d8c2718da86221 487d3db1a1637f112c99ba49d2a8f1



contracts/RFDAI.sol	ca88c6b753374d4594f633a72c4ca1d4df6 86485e648b65c97ae509188034ac4
contracts/RFDAIDistribution.sol	57141d12215d414737866cace27459d0e4 534d785d022131c2be7ac89dfce677



Findings Breakdown



Sev	verity	Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
•	Critical	0	0	0	0
	Medium	0	0	0	0
	Minor / Informative	11	0	0	0



MAP - Misleading Admin Permission

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAI.sol#L22,107
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract has a variable named owner that is initialized to zero address, creating ambiguity regarding the ownership structure. As a result, one might assume that the contract ownership is renounced. However, the contract uses an access control library that includes an admin role serving as the default owner.

This leads to confusion and misunderstanding about the actual owner of the contract.

```
address public owner = address(0);
_setupRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender);
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to remove the redundant owner variable and clearly document the usage of the access control library to define and manage ownership in the contract.

CR - Code Repetition

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAI.sol#L189,272,292,318
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract contains repetitive code segments. There are potential issues that can arise when using code segments in Solidity. Some of them can lead to issues like gas efficiency, complexity, readability, security, and maintainability of the source code. It is generally a good idea to try to minimize code repetition where possible.

```
require(_rewardSwapReceivers.length == _rewardSwapReceiversRate.length,
"size");

uint256 _totalRate = 0;
for (uint256 _i = 0; _i < _rewardSwapReceiversRate.length; _i++) {
    _totalRate += _rewardSwapReceiversRate[_i];
}
require(_totalRate == 10000, "rate");</pre>
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places, which can make the contract easier to read and maintain. The authors could try to reuse code wherever possible, as this can help reduce the complexity and size of the contract. For instance, the contract could reuse the common code segments in an internal function in order to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places.



MVN - Misleading Variables Naming

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAI.sol#L41,393
Status	Unresolved

Description

Variables can have misleading names if their names do not accurately reflect the value they contain or the purpose they serve. The contract uses some variable names that are too generic or do not clearly convey the information stored in the variable. Misleading variable names can lead to confusion, making the code more difficult to read and understand.

The contract incorporates the capability to distribute burn fees among multiple addresses. However, the burn mechanism facilitates the transfer of tokens to a dead address for the purpose of burning them.

```
uint256 public burnFeeBuyRate;
uint256 public burnFeeSellRate;
uint256 public burnFeeTransferRate;
address[] public burnFeeReceivers;
uint256[] public burnFeeReceiversRate;
...
for (uint256 _i = 0; _i < burnFeeReceivers.length; _i++) {
    _transferAmount(_from, burnFeeReceivers[_i], _calcFee(_burnFeeRes, burnFeeReceiversRate[_i]));
}</pre>
```

Recommendation

It's always a good practice for the contract to contain variable names that are specific and descriptive. The team is advised to keep in mind the readability of the code.



AFI - Accumulated Fees Inconsistency

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAI.sol#L222,311,337
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract resets the accumulated fees variables without performing a distribution of the accumulated rewards. This creates an inconsistency between the actual accumulated tokens from the fees, as the reset effectively clears the stored values without properly accounting for their distribution.

```
function resetRewardsAmount() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    rewardSellAmount = 0;
    rewardBuyAmount = 0;

    emit RewardsAmountReseted();
}
function resetLiquidityFee() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    liquidityFeeAmount = 0;

    emit LiquidityFeeReseted();
}
function resetSwapFee() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    swapFeeAmount = 0;

    emit SwapFeeReseted();
}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to perform proper distribution of the accumulated rewards before resetting the accumulated variables. This ensures that users receive their deserved rewards based on their interactions with the contract.

RSW - Redundant Storage Writes

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAI.sol#L177,183,537
Status	Unresolved

Description

There are code segments that could be optimized. A segment may be optimized so that it becomes a smaller size, consumes less memory, executes more rapidly, or performs fewer operations.

The contract modifies the state of certain variables even if their current state is the same as the one passed as an argument. As a result, the contract performs redundant storage writes.

```
excludedFromFee[_address] = _isExcludedFromFee;
excludedFromSwap[_address] = _isExcludedFromSwap;
token1 = _token1;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to take these segments into consideration and rewrite them so the runtime will be more performant. That way it will improve the efficiency and performance of the source code and reduce the cost of executing it.

IDI - Immutable Declaration Improvement

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAI.sol#L104,105,111
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract declares state variables that their value is initialized once in the constructor and are not modified afterwards. The <u>immutable</u> is a special declaration for this kind of state variables that saves gas when it is defined.

name symbol distribution

Recommendation

By declaring a variable as immutable, the Solidity compiler is able to make certain optimizations. This can reduce the amount of storage and computation required by the contract, and make it more gas-efficient.

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAI.sol#L22
Status	Unresolved

Description

State variables can be declared as constant using the constant keyword. This means that the value of the state variable cannot be changed after it has been set. Additionally, the constant variables decrease gas consumption of the corresponding transaction.

```
address public owner = address(0)
```

Recommendation

Constant state variables can be useful when the contract wants to ensure that the value of a state variable cannot be changed by any function in the contract. This can be useful for storing values that are important to the contract's behavior, such as the contract's address or the maximum number of times a certain function can be called. The team is advised to add the constant keyword to state variables that never change.



L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAIDistribution.sol#L14contracts/RFDAI.sol#L24,125,129,13 4,138,143,153,158,167,176,182,188,208,215,229,239,249,265,271,291,3 17,343
Status	Unresolved

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

- 1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
- 2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
- 3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
- 4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
- 5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
- 6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
- 7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.



Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAI.sol#L418,447
Status	Unresolved

Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
uint256 _liquidityFeeHalf = liquidityFeeAmount / 2
uint256 _liquidityFeeToken1Amount = _calcFee(_token1Balance,
    _liquidityFeeHalf * 10000 / _amountToSwap)
```

Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

L19 - Stable Compiler Version

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAIDistribution.sol#L2contracts/RFDAI.sol#L2contracts/interfaces/IRFDAIDistribution.sol#L2
Status	Unresolved

Description

The symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.2;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.

L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/RFDAIDistribution.sol#L15
Status	Unresolved

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
IERC20(_token).transfer(_to, _amount)
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the Openzeppelin library.




Functions Analysis

Contract	Туре	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
IRFDAIDistribut ion	Interface			
	recoverTokensFor	External	✓	-
RFDAI	Implementation	IERC20Meta data, AccessContr ol		
		Public	✓	-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	External	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	External	✓	-
	setLpToken	External	✓	onlyRole
	setExcludedFromFee	Public	✓	onlyRole
	setExcludedFromSwap	Public	✓	onlyRole
	setRewardSwapReceivers	External	✓	onlyRole
	setRewardSellRate	External	✓	onlyRole

setRewardBuyRate	External	√	onlyRole
resetRewardsAmount	External	✓	onlyRole
updateBuyRates	External	✓	onlyRole
updateSellRates	External	✓	onlyRole
updateTransferRates	External	✓	onlyRole
resetCounter	External	✓	onlyRole
setLimit	External	✓	onlyRole
updateBurnFeeReceivers	External	✓	onlyRole
updateLiquidityFeeReceivers	External	✓	onlyRole
resetLiquidityFee	External	✓	onlyRole
updateSwapFeeReceivers	External	✓	onlyRole
resetSwapFee	External	✓	onlyRole
setEnabledSwapForSell	External	✓	onlyRole
_transfer	Internal	✓	
_takeFees	Internal	✓	
_transferAmount	Internal	✓	
_mint	Internal	✓	
_approve	Internal	✓	
_setRouterAndPair	Internal	✓	
_calcFee	Internal		
_isSell	Internal		
_isBuy	Internal		
_swapTokensForToken1	Internal	1	lockTheSwap


	_addLiquidity	Internal	✓	lockTheSwap
RFDAIDistributi on	Implementation	IRFDAIDistri bution, AccessContr ol		
		Public	✓	-
	recoverTokensFor	External	✓	onlyRole

Inheritance Graph





Flow Graph



Summary

RFDAI contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. RFDAI is an interesting project that has a friendly and growing community. The Smart Contract analysis reported no compiler errors or critical issues. The contract Owner can access some admin functions that can not be used in a malicious way to disturb the users' transactions. There is also a limit of max 9% fees. Additionally, the contract has a fee limit mechanism. Lastly, it appears that the contract is falsely represented as being renounced, however, it has not undergone the renouncement process.

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