



Cyberscope

# Audit Report

## **Futuball**

November 2022

Type       BEP20

Network     BSC

Address     0xBB4BbeEa97Ec14406Fb75aa43AaB02D7ef6b35b4

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## Contract Review

<b>Contract Name</b>	FutuballToken
<b>Compiler Version</b>	v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2
<b>Optimization</b>	1 runs
<b>Explorer</b>	<a href="https://bscscan.com/token/0xBB4BbeEa97Ec14406Fb75aa43AaB02D7ef6b35b4">https://bscscan.com/token/0xBB4BbeEa97Ec14406Fb75aa43AaB02D7ef6b35b4</a>
<b>Symbol</b>	FB
<b>Decimals</b>	18
<b>Total Supply</b>	100,000,000
<b>Domain</b>	futuball.io

## Source Files

<b>Filename</b>	<b>SHA256</b>
<b>contract.sol</b>	d7a9f1edd9b1a9349cd9a28dd7b35df278e9c4b07c1164f174337d675ddf56e3

## Audit Updates

<b>Initial Audit</b>	5th November 2022
<b>Corrected</b>	

# Contract Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative ● Pass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	ST	Stops Transactions	Unresolved
●	OCTD	Transfers Contract's Tokens	Passed
●	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
●	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Unresolved
●	ULTW	Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet	Passed
●	MT	Mints Tokens	Passed
●	BT	Burns Tokens	Passed
●	BC	Blacklists Addresses	Passed

## ST - Stops Transactions

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L955,926
Status	Unresolved

### Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop the sales for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the `buyTaxFee` to a high value. As a result, the contract may operate as a honeypot.

```
if(sender == pairAddress) {  
    taxFee = amount.mul(buyTaxFee).div(10000);  
}
```

The contract owner has the authority to stop the transactions for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the `antiBotAmount` to zero.

```
if (!(addLPAddress[sender] || addLPAddress[recipient]))  
    { require(amount <= antiBotAmount, "antiBot"); }
```

### Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for not allowing setting the 'antiBotAmount' less than a reasonable amount. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be more than a fixed percentage of the total supply.

Read more about the [fees manipulation](#).

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user

from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

## ELFM - Exceeds Fees Limit

<b>Criticality</b>	critical
<b>Location</b>	contract.sol#L731
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

The contract owner has the authority to increase over the allowed limit of 25%. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `setTax` function with a high percentage value.

```
function setTax(uint256 _sellTaxFee, uint256 _buyTaxFee) public onlyOwner{  
    sellTaxFee = _sellTaxFee;  
    buyTaxFee = _buyTaxFee;  
}
```

### Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum acceptable value.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.



# Contract Diagnostics

● Critical   ● Medium   ● Minor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	TSD	Total Supply Diversion	Unresolved
●	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant	Unresolved
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
●	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic	Unresolved

## TSD - Total Supply Diversion

<b>Criticality</b>	critical
<b>Location</b>	contract.sol#L976
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

The taxed amount is added to the contract's address but it is not subtracted from the recipient's amount. As a result, the sum of balances is diverted from the total supply and the contract's balance is violated.

```
taxFee = amount.mul(buyTaxFee).div(10000);  
...  
_balances[address(this)] = _balances[address(this)].add(taxFee);  
...  
_balances[recipient] = _balances[recipient].add(amount);
```

### Recommendation

The sum of balances should always be equal with the total supply.

## L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

<b>Criticality</b>	minor / informative
<b>Location</b>	contract.sol#L650,651,652
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

```
_name  
_symbol  
_initSupply
```

### Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.

## L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

<b>Criticality</b>	minor / informative
<b>Location</b>	contract.sol#L708,731,696,434,727,670
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow `_` at the beginning of the mixed\_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
_amount  
_buyTaxFee  
_sellTaxFee  
_duration  
_address  
WETH  
_taxAddress  
_router
```

### Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions>.

## L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

<b>Criticality</b>	minor / informative
<b>Location</b>	contract.sol#L708,731
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
antiBotAmount = _amount  
sellTaxFee = _sellTaxFee
```

### Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.

# Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
<b>IERC20</b>	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
<b>IERC20Metadata</b>	Interface	IERC20		
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
<b>Context</b>	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
<b>SafeMath</b>	Library			
	tryAdd	Internal		
	trySub	Internal		
	tryMul	Internal		
	tryDiv	Internal		
	tryMod	Internal		
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		


	sub	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
<b>Ownable</b>	Implementation	Context		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_setOwner	Private	✓	
<b>IPancakeFactory</b>	Interface			
	createPair	External	✓	-
<b>IPancakeRouter</b>	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-

	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
<b>IPancakePair</b>	Interface			
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
<b>FutuballToken</b>	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata, Ownable		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	setAddLPAddress	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	isAntiBotEnded	Public		-
	setAntiBotAmount	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	applyFee	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	excludeFromFee	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	includeInFee	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	setTaxAddress	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	setTax	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	isExcludedFromFee	Public		-
	amountForEth	Public		-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-



	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	_mint	Internal	✓	
	_approve	Internal	✓	

# Contract Flow



## Domain Info

<b>Domain Name</b>	futuball.io
<b>Registry Domain ID</b>	4e2a25d6eadd46f29da4688e7ba1dd52-DONUTS
<b>Creation Date</b>	2022-09-19T15:30:04Z
<b>Updated Date</b>	2022-09-24T15:30:18Z
<b>Registry Expiry Date</b>	2023-09-19T15:30:04Z
<b>Registrar WHOIS Server</b>	whois.namecheap.com
<b>Registrar URL</b>	<a href="https://www.namecheap.com/">https://www.namecheap.com/</a>
<b>Registrar</b>	NameCheap, Inc.
<b>Registrar IANA ID</b>	1068

The domain was created about 2 months before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 11 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.

## Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like stopping transactions and manipulating fees. The contract can be converted into a honeypot and prevent users from selling if the owner abuses the admin functions. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against some of the potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate some of the contract threats.

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Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

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Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provide all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>