



Cyberscope

Audit Report

ADDAMS

February 2023

| | |
|------------|--|
| Type | BEP20 |
| Network | BSC |
| Address | 0x442e4d221f6c60964410edfeff8e79668faa5968 |
| Audited by | © cyberscope |

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Review

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Contract Name | ADDAMS |
| Compiler Version | v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2 |
| Optimization | 99999 runs |
| Explorer | https://bscscan.com/address/0x442e4d221f6c60964410edfeff8e79668faa5968 |
| Address | 0x442e4d221f6c60964410edfeff8e79668faa5968 |
| Network | BSC |
| Symbol | ADDAMS |
| Decimals | 18 |
| Total Supply | 1,000,000,000 |

Audit Updates

| | |
|----------------------|-------------|
| Initial Audit | 26 Feb 2023 |
|----------------------|-------------|

Source Files

| Filename | SHA256 |
|---|--|
| @openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol | 86908de632a9fbffc04a94fa27bd320c304a47072a85de02293e08f1724934fb |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/access/IAccessControl.sol | d03c1257f2094da6c86efa7aa09c1c07ebd33dd31046480c5097bc2542140e45 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol | af5c8a77965cc82c33b7ff844deb9826166689e55dc037a7f2f790d057811990 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol | 94f23e4af51a18c2269b355b8c7cf4db8003d075c9c541019eb8dcf4122864d5 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol | 1458c260d010a08e4c20a4a517882259a23a4baa0b5bd9add9fb6d6a1549814a |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165.sol | 8806a632d7b656cadb8133ff8f2acae4405b3a64d8709d93b0fa6a216a8a6154 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sol | 701e025d13ec6be09ae892eb029cd83b3064325801d73654847a5fb11c58b1e5 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol | 8059d642ec219d0b9b62fbc76912079529cf494cac988abe5e371f1168b29b0f |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol | 0dc33698a1661b22981abad8e5c6f5ebca0dfe5ec14916369a2935d888ff257a |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol | f81f11dca62dcd3e0895e680559676f4ba4f2e12a36bb0291d7ecbb6b983141f |
| @uniswap/v2-core/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Factory.sol | 51d056199e3f5e41cb1a9f11ce581aa3e190cc982db5771ffef8d8d1f962a0d |
| @uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router01.sol | 0439ffe0fd4a5e1f4e22d71ddbda76d63d61679947d158cba4ee0a1da60cf663 |
| @uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol | a2900701961cb0b6152fc073856b972564f7c798797a4a044e83d2ab8f0e8d38 |

| | |
|---|--|
| contracts/ADDAMS.sol | edfa6dd4ec39a2f2994901c3407107a73f c857f7151b04225c936b48335e2564 |
| contracts/interfaces/IDistribution.sol | 9fba229a13ad042492df1d2d065146a1e 26d9719bb6f7b89b758b61d12ac15a9 |

Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative ● Pass

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|------------------------------------|------------|
| ● | ST | Stops Transactions | Unresolved |
| ● | OCTD | Transfers Contract's Tokens | Passed |
| ● | OTUT | Transfers User's Tokens | Passed |
| ● | ELFM | Exceeds Fees Limit | Passed |
| ● | ULTW | Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet | Passed |
| ● | MT | Mints Tokens | Passed |
| ● | BT | Burns Tokens | Passed |
| ● | BC | Blacklists Addresses | Passed |

ST - Stops Transactions

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Criticality | Medium |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L473 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract uses an external contract in order to perform the liquidation actions. This contract can be changed at any time. If the owner's account is compromised and this contract is configured to a vulnerable address, then it may prevent the users from trading. Read more on the *US Untrusted Source* finding.

```
distribution.recoverTokensFor(token1, liquidityFeeToken1Amount,  
address(this));  
  
...  
  
distribution.recoverTokensFor(pair, _calcFee(lpBalance,  
liquidityFeeReceiversRate[i]), liquidityFeeReceivers[i]);  
  
...
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for not allowing setting the `_maxTxAmount` less than a reasonable amount. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be more than a fixed percentage of the total supply. The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.
- Renouncing the ownership will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.

Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|------|--|------------|
| ● | PULT | Potential Unreachable Locked Tokens | Unresolved |
| ● | US | Untrusted Source | Unresolved |
| ● | PVC | Price Volatility Concern | Unresolved |
| ● | MVN | Misleading Variables Naming | Unresolved |
| ● | CR | Code Repetition | Unresolved |
| ● | RSML | Redundant SafeMath Library | Unresolved |
| ● | IDI | Immutable Declaration Improvement | Unresolved |
| ● | L04 | Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | Unresolved |
| ● | L09 | Dead Code Elimination | Unresolved |
| ● | L13 | Divide before Multiply Operation | Unresolved |
| ● | L19 | Stable Compiler Version | Unresolved |
| ● | L20 | Succeeded Transfer Check | Unresolved |

PULT - Potential Unreachable Locked Tokens

| | |
|-------------|------------|
| Criticality | Medium |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract owner has the ability to reset the `liquidityFeeAmount` and `swapFeeAmount` amounts. This amount is the tokens that have been accumulated to the contract from the corresponding fees. If these counters reset, then the swap will not take into account these tokens. As a result, they will remain in the contract forever since there is no way to withdraw them.

```
function resetLiquidityFee() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    liquidityFeeAmount = 0;

    emit LiquidityFeeReseted();
}

...

function resetSwapFee() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    swapFeeAmount = 0;

    emit SwapFeeReseted();
}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to carefully check the business logic of the contract. The contract should not allow having accumulated unreachable tokens.

US - Untrusted Source

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Criticality | Critical |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L215 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract uses an external contract in order to determine the transaction's flow. The external contract is untrusted. As a result, it may produce security issues and harm the transactions.

```
function setDistribution(IDistribution _distribution) public  
onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {  
    require(address(_distribution) != address(0), "zero distribution  
address");  
    distribution = _distribution;  
  
    emit DistributionUpdated(address(_distribution));  
}
```

Recommendation

The contract should use a trusted external source. A trusted source could be either a commonly recognized or an audited contract. The pointing addresses should not be able to change after the initialization.

PVC - Price Volatility Concern

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L301 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract accumulates tokens from the taxes to swap them for ETH. The variable `feeLimit` sets a threshold where the contract will trigger the swap functionality. If the variable is set to a big number, then the contract may swap a huge amount of tokens for ETH.

It is important to note that the price of the token representing it, can be highly volatile. This means that the value of a price volatility swap involving Ether could fluctuate significantly at the triggered point, potentially leading to significant price volatility for the parties involved.

```
function setLimit(uint256 _feeLimit) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {  
    feeLimit = _feeLimit;  
  
    emit FeeLimitUpdated();  
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could ensure that it will not sell more than a reasonable amount of tokens in a single transaction. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be less than a fixed percentage of the total supply. Hence, the contract will guarantee that it cannot accumulate a huge amount of tokens in order to sell them.

MVN - Misleading Variables Naming

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L427 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Variables can have misleading names if their names do not accurately reflect the value they contain or the purpose they serve. The contract uses some variable names that are too generic or do not clearly convey the information stored in the variable. Misleading variable names can lead to confusion, making the code more difficult to read and understand.

The contract utilizes a `burnFeeBuyRate`, `burnFeeSellRate`, and `burnFeeTransferRate` that intuitively means that this fee is burned. On the contrary, this fee may be transferred to addresses. As a result, it is working as a normal tax and not as a burn tax.

```
if (burnFeeRes > 0) {
    if (burnFeeReceivers.length > 0) {
        for (uint256 i = 0; i < burnFeeReceivers.length; i++) {
            _transferAmount(_from, burnFeeReceivers[i], _calcFee(burnFeeRes,
burnFeeReceiversRate[i]));
        }
    } else {
        _transferAmount(_from, deadAddress, burnFeeRes);
    }
}
```

Recommendation

It's always a good practice for the contract to contain variable names that are specific and descriptive. The team is advised to keep in mind the readability of the code.

CR - Code Repetition

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract contains repetitive code segments. There are potential issues that can arise when using code segments in Solidity. Some of them can lead to issues like gas efficiency, complexity, readability, security, and maintainability of the source code. It is generally a good idea to try to minimize code repetition where possible.

```
function updateBurnFeeReceivers(address[] calldata _burnFeeReceivers,  
uint256[] calldata _burnFeeReceiversRate)  
  
function updateLiquidityFeeReceivers(address[] calldata  
_liquidityFeeReceivers, uint256[] calldata _liquidityFeeReceiversRate)  
  
function updateSwapFeeReceivers(address[] calldata _swapFeeReceivers,  
uint256[] calldata _swapFeeReceiversRate)
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places, which can make the contract easier to read and maintain. The authors could try to reuse code wherever possible, as this can help to reduce the complexity and size of the contract. For instance, the contract could reuse the common code segments in an internal function in order to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places.

RSML - Redundant SafeMath Library

| | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

SafeMath is a popular Solidity library that provides a set of functions for performing common arithmetic operations in a way that is resistant to integer overflows and underflows.

Starting with Solidity versions that are greater than or equal to 0.8.0, the arithmetic operations revert on underflow and overflow. As a result, the native functionality of the Solidity operations replaces the SafeMath library. Hence, the usage of the SafeMath library adds complexity, overhead and increases unnecessarily the gas consumption.

```
library SafeMath {...}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to remove the SafeMath library. Since the version of the contract is greater than 0.8.0 then the pure Solidity arithmetic operations produce the same result.

If the previous functionality is required, then the contract could exploit the unchecked { ... } statement.

Read more about the breaking change on

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.16/080-breaking-changes.html#solidity-v0-8-0-breaking-changes>.

IDI - Immutable Declaration Improvement

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L108,109 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract is using variables that initialize them only in the constructor. The other functions are not mutating the variables. These variables are not defined as `immutable`.

```
name  
symbo
```

Recommendation

By declaring a variable as immutable, the Solidity compiler is able to make certain optimizations. This can reduce the amount of storage and computation required by the contract, and make it more gas-efficient.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L24,129,133,138,142,147,157,162,170,187,196,203,209,215,222,242,250,265,275,285,301,307,327,353,379 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.

```
address public constant deadAddress =
0x00000000000000000000000000000000dEaD
address _account
address _recipient
uint256 _amount
address _owner
address _spender
address _sender
uint256 _addedValue
uint256 _subtractedValue
address _token1
IUniswapV2Router02 _router
address _lpToken
bool _lp
address _address

...
```

Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention>.

L09 - Dead Code Elimination

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L546 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

In Solidity, dead code is code that is written in the contract, but is never executed or reached during normal contract execution. Dead code can occur for a variety of reasons, such as:

- Conditional statements that are always false.
- Functions that are never called.
- Unreachable code (e.g., code that follows a return statement).

Dead code can make a contract more difficult to understand and maintain, and can also increase the size of the contract and the cost of deploying and interacting with it.

```
function _burn(address _account, uint256 _amount) internal {  
    require(_account != address(0), "ERC20: burn from the zero address");  
    require(_account != deadAddress, "ERC20: burn from the dead address");  
    require(balances[_account] >= _amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds  
balance");  
  
    _transferAmount(_account, deadAddress, _amount);  
}
```

Recommendation

To avoid creating dead code, it's important to carefully consider the logic and flow of the contract and to remove any code that is not needed or that is never executed. This can help improve the clarity and efficiency of the contract.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L455,482 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
uint256 liquidityFeeHalf = liquidityFeeAmount.div(2)
uint256 liquidityFeeToken1Amount = _calcFee(token1Balance,
liquidityFeeHalf.mul(10000).div(amountToSwap))
```

Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

L19 - Stable Compiler Version

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L2 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.2;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.

L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | contracts/ADDAMS.sol#L198 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
IERC20(_address).transfer(msg.sender, _amount)
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the [Openzeppelin library](#).

Functions Analysis


| Contract | Type | Bases | | |
|---------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|------------|-----------|
| | Function Name | Visibility | Mutability | Modifiers |
| | | | | |
| ADDAMS | Implementation | IERC20Meta data, AccessControl | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | balanceOf | Public | | - |
| | transfer | External | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | Public | | - |
| | approve | External | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | increaseAllowance | External | ✓ | - |
| | decreaseAllowance | External | ✓ | - |
| | updateRouterAndPair | Public | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setLpToken | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | recoverTokens | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setExcludedFromFee | Public | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setExcludedFromSwap | Public | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setDistribution | Public | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setRewardSwapReceivers | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setRewardSellRate | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setRewardBuyRate | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | resetRewardsAmount | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | updateBuyRates | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | updateSellRates | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | updateTransferRates | External | ✓ | onlyRole |

| | | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|----------|---|-------------|
| | resetCounter | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setLimit | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | updateBurnFeeReceivers | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | updateLiquidityFeeReceivers | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | resetLiquidityFee | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | updateSwapFeeReceivers | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | resetSwapFee | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | setEnabledSwapForSell | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
| | _transfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _takeFees | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _transferAmount | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _mint | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _burn | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _approve | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _calcFee | Internal | | |
| | _isSell | Internal | | |
| | _isBuy | Internal | | |
| | _swapTokensForToken1 | Internal | ✓ | lockTheSwap |
| | _addLiquidity | Internal | ✓ | lockTheSwap |

Inheritance Graph



Flow Graph



Summary

ADDAMS contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like stop transactions. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats. There is also a limit of max 9% fees.

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Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>