



# Cyberscope

## Audit Report

# **AI MASA**

July 2023

Network     BSC Testnet

Address     0x8073D97B896299188681999E05DdF046fEF73fc8

Audited by   © cyberscope

# Analysis

● Critical   ● Medium   ● Minor / Informative   ● Pass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	ST	Stops Transactions	Unresolved
●	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
●	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
●	MT	Mints Tokens	Unresolved
●	BT	Burns Tokens	Passed
●	BC	Blacklists Addresses	Passed

# Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	PFM	Potential Functions Misuse	Unresolved
●	L19	Stable Compiler Version	Unresolved

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## Review

Contract Name	MASA
Compiler Version	v0.8.16+commit.07a7930e
Optimization	800 runs
Explorer	<a href="https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x8073d97b896299188681999e05ddf046fef73fc8">https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x8073d97b896299188681999e05ddf046fef73fc8</a>
Address	0x8073d97b896299188681999e05ddf046fef73fc8
Network	BSC_TESTNET
Decimals	18

## Audit Updates

Initial Audit	19 Jul 2023
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
## Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contracts/MASA.sol	84a78f52b4ae4382120f93ca3e65628d4ce62fa1f64efcfa33fb898e267fa335
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/StringsUpgradeable.sol	68f5690fc266a6b48386c28cbfd72ec67c24b05a51ce26d24103577c15f61401
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/StorageSlotUpgradeable.sol	05b696b46ca1be28e19dfba65ea71c3b3615bd39d19bfd8212864a16c54870fd

<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/CountersUpgradeable.sol</b>	5c1ac829a429b0c2ca9b4c9ed8b78d4123 20e9175e45f088c4e9056ef95fbf21
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ContextUpgradeable.sol</b>	5fb301961e45cb482fe4e05646d2f529aa4 49fe0e90c6671475d6a32356fa2d4
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol</b>	1d7d481b79fd54d957c9a0696f6227f7799 fec01d8ba41f5c130a7cc6b4eddc9
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/math/SafeCastUpgradeable.sol</b>	647d03e70d45c15cd9aa3afc3b32de945e c024a022614e263f33bb35c557ac94
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/math/MathUpgradeable.sol</b>	158a0316fa289fad12c2ca764449e43e672 4fb79c58fc438508d116f9af46b39
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/cryptography/EIP712Upgradeable.sol</b>	91e9d20515fa1516a9e9dd754b8a3ced55 52f955b039dbe69d08c566fbd2e024
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/cryptography/ECDSAUpgradeable.sol</b>	2aee2a508bebf8e55bf78814d9d66a7a21c 35c171e4010dfc3888c031f193628
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/IERC20Upgradeable.sol</b>	4e09a7479aa3e7c313f8fc141c4c8fc04e0 abfeb8754615ef7d78ec94c298b07
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/ERC20Upgradeable.sol</b>	7307fb68607d3c93995797209010e5048c 9cc1777f3b97dc7940f41a7327d080
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-IERC20PermitUpgradeable.sol</b>	b97515a88e75c313eacf0a27c9439ef371d 86d4c2730d3b13076640942f813df
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20PermitUpgradeable.sol</b>	6d6ffe69a38a39c69acde1dd5edb74f80cff 046c4a66d1cd816b98ca741c9a43
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20MetadataUpgradeable.sol</b>	68bcca423fc72ec9625e219c9e36306c72 6a347e43f3711467c579bd3f6500c8
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20VotesUpgradeable.sol</b>	88763a9a0b498ca738c9a1c0c33a56464e 0e8a2ad466426fe10b01cd9e01e2ae

<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20BurnableUpgradeable.sol</b>	ca660e828b0c4be205a9f56f3b87b91c1fa67cfd0f6e9dbd431faea7a6280d36
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/PausableUpgradeable.sol</b>	c05b019a0b3bee8f3fac2da7c929f7d665b97d6d046aa35126615fff11205119
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol</b>	7517b26ac0cee066447b94cbf7df8ad5ce91cc6ddf0fd1e3425fe978889f5eb0
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol</b>	98ce2984e449716f24043a8c11bbe969a6d34878b1d522b92c88d62708ba3376
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/beacon/IBeaconUpgradeable.sol</b>	e0ac7115916f0dce0a8e80769694736f3e674bdc5b2e5853964c82004b1e1cc5
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/ERC1967/ERC1967UpgradeUpgradeable.sol</b>	f6c1a8b4512e9cc0168278c2a634b184fd86b1e39c7c283bcf34fb154236fc5d
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/interfaces/draft-IERC1822Upgradeable.sol</b>	a94576fd98585c07b2a9725f7c89c910a3a1909a03f49ec2df465327c6a0ffc3
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/governance/utils/IVotesUpgradeable.sol</b>	400936c02700eb4147c65a91a15fb6f90d074d7519f8ebce49dce78a2c917186
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol</b>	da66c17044345dc892d85bd7ddc9745d25df0b3dacfba8f84eb87c60d6e40fe3

## Findings Breakdown



● Critical	1
● Medium	0
● Minor / Informative	3

Severity	Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
● Critical	1	0	0	0
● Medium	0	0	0	0
● Minor / Informative	3	0	0	0



## ST - Stops Transactions

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/MASA.sol#L39
Status	Unresolved

### Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop the transactions for all users including the owner, by calling the `pause` method.

```
function pause() public onlyOwner {  
    _pause();  
}
```

### Recommendation

It is recommended to consider removing the `pause` functionality from the contract entirely, especially if there are no other intended purposes or justifiable use cases for it. Also the team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.
- Renouncing the ownership will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.

## MT - Mints Tokens

Criticality	Critical
Location	contracts/MASA.sol#L47
Status	Unresolved

### Description

The contract owner has the authority to mint tokens. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `mint` function. As a result, the contract tokens will be highly inflated.

```
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public onlyOwner {  
    _mint(to, amount);  
}
```

### Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. Some suggestions are:

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-sign wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.
- Renouncing the ownership will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.

## PFM - Potential Functions Misuse

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/UUPSUpgradeable.sol#L72,85
Status	Unresolved

### Description

The contract contains the `upgradeTo` and `upgradeToAndCall` functions that facilitate the upgradeability of the proxy's implementation. While these functions are essential for maintaining and improving the contract over time, there exists a potential risk. If these functions misused, they could redirect the proxy to point to a malicious or unintended implementation. Such a scenario could compromise the contract's intended behavior, potentially leading to loss of funds, unauthorized access, or unintended functionalities.

```
function upgradeTo(address newImplementation) external
virtual onlyProxy {
    _authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation);
    _upgradeToAndCallUUPS(newImplementation, new bytes(0),
false);
}

function upgradeToAndCall(address newImplementation, bytes
memory data) external payable virtual onlyProxy {
    _authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation);
    _upgradeToAndCallUUPS(newImplementation, data, true);
}
```

### Recommendation

It is recommended to implement robust access controls and governance mechanisms around the `upgradeTo` and `upgradeToAndCall` functions. Only trusted entities, such as contract administrators or a multi-signature wallet, should have the authority to invoke these functions.

## L19 - Stable Compiler Version

<b>Criticality</b>	Minor / Informative
<b>Location</b>	contracts/MASA.sol#L2
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.9;
```


### Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.


## Functions Analysis

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
MASA	Implementation	Initializable, ERC20Upgradable, ERC20BurnableUpgradable, PausableUpgradable, OwnableUpgradable, ERC20PermitUpgradable, ERC20VotesUpgradable, , UUPSUpgradable		
		Public	✓	-
	initialize	Public	✓	initializer
	pause	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	unpause	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	mint	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	whenNotPaused
	_authorizeUpgrade	Internal	✓	onlyOwner
	_afterTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
	_mint	Internal	✓	
	_burn	Internal	✓	

# Inheritance Graph



## Flow Graph



## Summary

AI MASA contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like stop transactions and mint tokens. If the contract owner abuses the mint functionality, then the contract will be highly inflated. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

### Initial Audit, 19 Jul 2023

At the time of the audit report, the contract with address

0x8073D97B896299188681999E05DdF046fEF73fc8 is pointed by the following proxy

address: 0x21BAEAE318F0B2B4D6FaAEc38bd3E5572905aAC6.



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Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. Cyberscope's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. Cyberscope's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze. The assessment services provided by Cyberscope are subject to dependencies and are under continuing development. You agree that your access and/or use including but not limited to any services reports and materials will be at your sole risk on an as-is where-is and as-available basis. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies and carry with them high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives, false negatives and other unpredictable results. The services may access and depend upon multiple layers of third parties.

## About Cyberscope

Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



**The Cyberscope team**

<https://www.cyberscope.io>