

Identity

Assessment results

The results presented below are based on the security principles detailed in the [Configuring Microsoft Entra for increased security guide](#).

Search

Risk:

High

Medium

Low

Status:

Passed

Failed

Planned

Skipped

Filter by SFI Pillar:

Showing 97 of 130 tests

Accelerate response and remediation

Monitor and detect cyberthreats

Protect engineering systems

Protect identities and secrets

Protect networks

Protect tenants and isolate production systems

Protect tenants and production systems

Name ↑↓	Risk ↑↓	Status ↑↓
Admin consent workflow is enabled	↑ High	Failed
Enterprise applications with high privilege Microsoft Graph API permissions have owners	↑ High	Failed
User consent settings are restricted	↑ High	Failed
Limit the maximum number of devices per user to 10	↑ High	Failed
Security key attestation is enforced	↑ High	Failed
Restrict non-administrator users from recovering the BitLocker keys for their owned devices	↑ High	Failed
Permissions to create new tenants are limited to the Tenant Creator role	↑ High	Failed

Local Admin Password Solution is deployed	↑ High	Failed
Reduce the user-visible password surface area	↑ High	Failed
Tenant restrictions v2 policy is configured	↑ High	Failed
Manage the local administrators on Microsoft Entra joined devices	↑ High	Failed
Migrate from legacy MFA and SSPR policies	↑ High	Failed
Passkey authentication method enabled	↑ High	Failed
Outbound cross-tenant access settings are configured	↑ High	Failed
Block administrators from using SSPR	↑ High	Failed
Security key authentication method enabled	↑ High	Failed
High Global Administrator to privileged user ratio	↑ High	Failed
SMS and Voice Call authentication methods are disabled	↑ High	Passed
Privileged accounts have phishing-resistant methods registered	↑ High	Passed
Entra Connect Sync is configured with Service Principal Credentials	↑ High	Passed
Use cloud authentication	↑ High	Passed
Workload Identities are not assigned privileged roles	↑ High	Passed

App instance property lock is configured for all multitenant applications	↑ High	Passed
Inactive applications don't have highly privileged built-in roles	↑ High	Passed
App registrations use safe redirect URIs	↑ High	Passed
Global Administrators don't have standing access to Azure subscriptions	↑ High	Passed
Applications don't have client secrets configured	↑ High	Passed
Service principals use safe redirect URIs	↑ High	Passed
Microsoft services applications don't have credentials configured	↑ High	Passed
Application certificates must be rotated on a regular basis	↑ High	Passed
Password protection for on-premises is enabled	↑ High	Passed
Privileged accounts are cloud native identities	↑ High	Passed
High priority Microsoft Entra recommendations are addressed	↑ High	Passed
Guests are not assigned high privileged directory roles	↑ High	Passed
App registrations must not have dangling or abandoned domain redirect URIs	↑ High	Passed
Authentication transfer is blocked	↑ High	Skipped
All privileged role assignments are activated just in time and not permanently active	↑ High	Skipped

User sign-in activity uses token protection	↑ High	Skipped
All risky workload identity sign-ins are triaged	↑ High	Skipped
All Microsoft Entra privileged role assignments are managed with PIM	↑ High	Skipped
Emergency access accounts are configured appropriately	↑ High	Skipped
Restrict high risk sign-ins	↑ High	Skipped
Privileged Microsoft Entra built-in roles are targeted with Conditional Access policies to enforce phishing-resistant methods	↑ High	Skipped
Restrict device code flow	↑ High	Skipped
Restrict access to high risk users	↑ High	Skipped
Secure the MFA registration (My Security Info) page	↑ High	Skipped
Require multifactor authentication for device join and device registration using user action	↑ High	Skipped
Conditional Access policies for workload identities based on known networks are configured	↑ High	Skipped
Conditional Access policies for Privileged Access Workstations are configured	↑ High	Skipped
All risky workload identities are triaged	↑ High	Skipped
All sign-in activity comes from managed devices	↑ High	Skipped

Diagnostic settings are configured for all Microsoft Entra logs	↑ High	Skipped
Maximum number of Global Administrators doesn't exceed five users	↓ Low	Passed
Activation alert for all privileged role assignments	↓ Low	Skipped
Activation alert for Global Administrator role assignment	↓ Low	Skipped
Enable protected actions to secure Conditional Access policy creation and changes	↓ Low	Skipped
Workload Identities are configured with risk-based policies	→ Medium	Failed
Microsoft Authenticator app shows sign-in context	→ Medium	Failed
Block legacy Azure AD PowerShell module	→ Medium	Failed
All Microsoft Entra recommendations are addressed	→ Medium	Failed
Guests have restricted access to directory objects	→ Medium	Failed
Resource-specific consent is restricted	→ Medium	Failed
Smart lockout threshold set to 10 or less	→ Medium	Failed
Guest access is limited to approved tenants	→ Medium	Failed
Restrict Temporary Access Pass to Single Use	→ Medium	Failed
Enforce standards for app secrets and certificates	→ Medium	Failed
Add organizational terms to the banned password list	→ Medium	Failed

Microsoft Authenticator app report suspicious activity setting is enabled	→ Medium	Failed
Guest access is limited to approved tenants	→ Medium	Failed
Inactive applications don't have highly privileged Microsoft Graph API permissions	→ Medium	Failed
Guests can't invite other guests	→ Medium	Failed
Creating new applications and service principals is restricted to privileged users	→ Medium	Failed
Enterprise applications must require explicit assignment or scoped provisioning	→ Medium	Passed
Password expiration is disabled	→ Medium	Passed
Enterprise applications have owners	→ Medium	Passed
All guests have a sponsor	→ Medium	Passed
Guests do not own apps in the tenant	→ Medium	Passed
Applications are configured for automatic user provisioning	→ Medium	Passed
Guests don't have long lived sign-in sessions	→ Medium	Passed
No usage of ADAL in the tenant	→ Medium	Passed
Guest self-service sign-up via user flow is disabled	→ Medium	Passed
Service principals don't have certificates or credentials associated with them	→ Medium	Passed

Applications don't have certificates with expiration longer than 180 days	→ Medium	Passed
Smart lockout duration is set to a minimum of 60	→ Medium	Passed
Token protection policies are configured	→ Medium	Skipped
All entitlement management packages that apply to guests have expirations or access reviews configured in their assignment policies	→ Medium	Skipped
Named locations are configured	→ Medium	Skipped
Inactive guest identities are disabled or removed from the tenant	→ Medium	Skipped
All entitlement management policies that apply to External users require approval	→ Medium	Skipped
All entitlement management policies have an expiration date	→ Medium	Skipped
All entitlement management assignment policies that apply to external users require connected organizations	→ Medium	Skipped
Temporary access pass is enabled	→ Medium	Skipped
All groups in Conditional Access policies belong to a restricted management administrative unit	→ Medium	Skipped
Privileged users have short-lived sign-in sessions	→ Medium	Skipped
Users have strong authentication methods configured	→ Medium	Skipped
Block legacy authentication policy is configured	→ Medium	Skipped

All user sign in activity uses phishing-resistant authentication methods

→ Medium

Skipped



Zero Trust Assessment

An automated assessment tool that evaluates your Microsoft tenant's zero trust security posture.

Resources

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[Zero Trust Workshop](#)

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