

Political Zionism

Though he was an assimilated Jew, Herzl had great convictions and concerns about Jewish issues. He developed grandiose plans to liberate the Jewish people (all Jews convert to Catholicism etc.) During the Dreyfuss affair period, there was an enormous amount of violence against the Jews in France (which resulted in 0 deaths). Herzl covered the Dreyfuss case. As Dreyfuss was stripped of his rank Herzl was inspired to found the movement of Zionism.

Who were the early Zionists? At Basel in 1897 there were cadres of Western European secular Jews. There were also, however, Eastern European Jews, running the gamut from orthodox to secularist. All these disparate groups let Herzl run the show. Perhaps this is attributable to Herzl's charisma. His ignorance of authentic Judaism may have helped him deal with his orthodox constituents. Had he been more religious, his movement might have been construed as an attempt to reformulate religious ideology. Another attraction that Herzl had was his promise of results. As a well-connected religious outsider he could solve more problems and offer more than a shtetl rabbi. Thus he attracted many followers from all walks of Judaism.

Herzl eschewed the idea of cultural Zionism. He didn't want a new Jew or a new Judaism. He focused instead on the political machinery of a state. Instead of the practical issues of buying and building he wanted a political Zionism. His state was predicated on the idea of "if you build it they will come". Setting up the apparatus of politics would attract Jews to the nascent state. The state would be the solution to *tzarat yehudit* and would precede immigration and the building of the land. Anti-Semitism would be solved by political Zionism.

The Ottoman Empire was viewed at this time as a vulnerable state. Herzl tried to gain contact (unsuccessfully) with the Ottoman Sultan. At the same time he cultivated contacts with the English. He also met with the Kaiser and the Russian police minister trying to sell his idea to them.

In reality, however, Herzl was playing a shell game. He had to convince the gentiles of his power among the Jews and his ability to buy the land and move them there. He had to convince the Jews that he was making headway. Neither idea was true, yet Herzl played the game well.

Eventually in 1902 there is a crisis in the Zionist movement. Herzl, at forty only 4 years from death, comes to the Congress with a proposal. He suggested settling the Jews in Tanzania. Asking the Congress for a vote on the issue, Herzl created a schism. Cultural Zionists were repulsed by the idea of leaving Jewish culture for the Tanzanian nationalist province. While the issue died soon afterwards, the Uganda controversy ignited the divisive factionalism which would plague Zionism in the future.

Around this time the *Mizrahi* was formed. The leader of the group was Rabbi Reines, who was a great talmid chacham. In the Uganda debate the *Mizrahi* supported Herzl and the African solution. The reason for this is unclear. The simplest hypothesis is that Reines was a political Zionist who cared about *tzraat hayehudim* more than anything else.

Rav Kook disagreed with the attitude of the *Mizrahi* in this regard. He felt that religion and Zionism were an inseparable force. The pigeonholing and compartmentalizing of each component were abhorrent and un-Jewish to him. While we don't know what Rav Kook's position on Uganda, his position on cultural Zionism was clear as day.

Herzl had cobbled together Zionism with his political shell game. The entire enterprise seemed based on his political efforts. After Herzl died Zionism began to stall. While the institutions remained, the movement was becoming ossified and irrelevant. All this changed drastically with the Balfour Declaration. The declaration was born out of the desire of the British to throw a bone to the worldwide Jewish establishment (which at the time favored Germany). When the declaration came out, the Zionists seemed ascendant and triumphant. This revitalization of the Zionist movement was a drastic one, and the anti-Zionists resigned themselves to their loss.

The Jewish responses to the Declaration were threefold in nature (leaving aside, for the moment Religious Zionism).

- 1) Purely political Zionism (Herzlian) (ex. Jabotinsky)
- 2) Purely cultural Zionism
- 3) Practical Zionism (building the land etc.)

Oftentimes, the practical Zionists tended to be Socialists. They began to establish different organizations which would define the future of the Zionist enterprise. For example, the *Histadrut* labor union and *Kupat Cholim* health insurance were started by these practical Zionists. In addition to this, the Practical Zionists began the establishment of Jewish self-defense. Thus the future of Israeli governmental infrastructure was slowly being shaped by the Socialists.

The political Zionists eschewed such projects. Jabotinsky wanted a state, first and foremost. Except in self-defense matters, the Revisionists left the building of infrastructure to others.

Numerically, the Revisionists were a significant minority in Palestine. Yet, it is evident that the majority of Jews fell into a catchall category of general Zionists. Except in "red" Haifa, most municipalities tended towards the moderate.

All this changed in 1933 with the rise of significant anti-Semitism. At this point there was a heated schism. The foreign minister, Orlov, was involved in a negotiation with the Nazi government. A moderate socialist, he was making an attempt to get Jews out of Germany and into Palestine. Upon his return from Germany to Palestine he was shot while taking a walk on the beach. The murder was blamed by the Laborite establishment on the Revisionists, who had attacked the negotiations in the first place. This shrewd move sealed the political fate of Israel for years to come, polarizing the image of the Revisionists as murderers and extremists. In light of history, it seems that the convicted murderer, Stavsky, was framed for murder. At this point, Rav Kook sprung into action, insisting that a Jew could not have murdered the foreign minister. Eventually, Stavsky was acquitted on a technicality. However, the establishment still won the PR victory of framing the right wing.

Zionist Culture

The early Zionists were highly detached from Jewish culture. Nordau, for example, carried on a correspondence with a heavily anti-Semitic Russian noblewoman. However, as time went on, there developed a Zionist culture. The paragon of this culture was *Ahad Haam*.

A fine Hebrew stylist and editor of a journal, he wielded great influence over Zionist culture. *Ahad Haam* was influenced heavily by different intellectual fads. For example, he latched on to evolutionary ideology (social Darwinism). This led him to believe that either Jews were biologically superior or that Jews were biologically and ontologically Jewish. This ethical conflict constantly tore at *Ahad Haam*. He blurred the distinctions between the two positions, eschewing the tough philosophical choice. His writings are a constant blur. *Ahad Haam's* major thrust was *tzzarat hayahdut*. However, he remained somewhat loyal to Jewish traditions. His interest wasn't in destroying Judaism as a traditional rubric. Putting his enlightenment objections at the back-burner, he was interested in *klal yisrael*. For example, *Ahad Haam* believed in the salvic efficiency of Shabbat, and held tradition in high regard (despite his disregard for the God aspect).

Ahad Haam was an ardent Zionist, in a cultural sense; however, he was scathingly critical of much of the Zionist establishment. He was very much opposed, for example to Herzl. What was the basis of this opposition? Firstly, he saw the horrors and the failure of the first *yishuv*. He also opposed Zionist efforts to build a Zionist political entity, calling them futile. His concerns were not anti-Semitism; rather, he was concerned with Jewish culture. He believed, for example, that Palestine should be a major center for Jewish culture. He viewed Palestine as the home of the vanguard and elite of culture. The new Jewish culture would spring forth from Zion and Jerusalem (this position in contrast to some more extreme *haskala* elements who were against *yishuv haaretz*).

Ahad Haam though an atheist, was critical of Reform and other such movements. He believed that reform ideology did not naturally spring from Jewish culture. Religiously, *Ahad Haam* believed in unconscious evolution. Thus, sitting down and deliberately changing Judaism was wrong, but organic change was right and inevitable. For example, he writes about *ayin tachat ayin* which he claimed was subconsciously changed to a sanction for litigation. This was organic and natural change in the mores of Judaism. There was no symposium or conference, the definition shifted with changing cultural times.

Ahad Haam's conception of Jewish values was of a religion, based, not on love, but on justice. Extolling Moshe (who may or may not have existed) as the paragon of justice, he contrasted Judaism with Christianity. Christianity, the religion of love extols the weakness of dying for others. Judaism says that one's life comes first. Legislation is, to *Haam*, superior to love. Judaism, to him, was superior to Christianity.

Needless, to say, the Orthodox with whom *Ahad Haam* wanted to cooperate were outraged. They saw a radical revision of Judaism implicit in his work. *Haam* was puzzled by this; after all he was against reform!

Ahad Haam heavily influenced almost all secular Zionists. Bialik, for example, devoted time to publishing *Sefer HaAggadot*, a collection of disembodied *Midrashei Chazal*, secularized, sans religion. Thus, the student of *Haam* distilled the culture out of

Judaism. Bialik also wrote an essay on the importance of *Halacha* and *Aggada*, telling the Jewish people of the importance of apparently trivial *Halacha*. He claimed that the new Jewish culture had embraced *Aggada* and eschewed *Halacha*. He imagined a fictional Talmudic tractate, with a new Zionist *Halacha*. Zionist culture should be grounded in the ideals and practicality of a new *Halachic* system. This was the influence of *Haam*.

Among others, Kurzweil, the literature professor at Bar Ilan criticized the influence of *Haam* claiming that his system trivialized Judaism into a societal trend. No longer was deep religious experience possible, all was trivialized and subsumed into nondescript *yiddishe* cultural protoplasm. A life lacking in depth and meaning is no problem, in the new Jewish cultural paradigm. *Haam's* Judaism was a disembodied soul.

Other cultural Zionists, such as Brenner and Berdechshky took the cultural aspect of the new Jew even farther than *Ahad Haam*. They assumed that, jumping off from authentic Jewish sources, one could build a free culture. With the basis of Jewish culture one could then assimilate foreign ideas into the worldview. Thus, starting with knowledge of Judaism, one could then deny God and build a “Jewish” thought system based on this mixture. Brenner went so far to claim that a Jew could be religiously Christian, denying the essential nature of the Jewish religion in Jewish culture. In fact, subsequent to these thinkers, those inspired by them claimed the new Jew not to be a Jew, but a Canaanite.

Kaplan and Reconstruction

Kaplan was already unorthodox in his youth. However, he went to Europe and obtain orthodox *semikah*. This allowed him to take up a number of orthodox pulpits. In the 1920s he was a Rabbi in an orthodox synagogue and a teacher at JTS. Eventually he was kicked out of the orthodox shul, and at this point he began his own splinter. Despite teaching at JTS he began the Reconstructionist movement. In 1945 he was put in *cherem* by the *Agudas HaRabbonim* when he published his siddur, which was filled with changes. In fact, Rabbi Saul Lieberman would not sit within 4 *amot* of Kaplan, due to the *cherem*. Kaplan's magnum opus was *Judaism as a Civilization*.

The basic tenet of Kaplan theosophy was a desire to bring Judaism into conformity with a modern outlook. This entails getting rid of the traditional concept of God, and the idea of the chosenness of Israel. Kaplan's view of religion was one of an otherworldly system. Religion, as he saw it, was based on a premise of a supernatural world. This, to him, was unbelievable. In this sense, Kaplan took a very superficial view of religion, automatically equating it with the irrational.

According to Kaplan, traditional religion was impractical. After all, what use did outmoded beliefs have in the modern world? Kaplan argued from the then-popular ideas of Practicalism, to form his new Judaism. The value of an idea was measured by how and whether it worked. Orthodoxy was patently unworkable in the new world.

Kaplan was an ardent Zionist. He argued for a national Jewish rubric in Palestine. He felt that Jewish nationalism was healthy, because it added pragmatic reason to people's lives. Israel, he felt, would be a substitute for outmoded religion. Zionism, within a secular framework, could add meaning and supplant religion.

Reconstruction was very different from Reform in many respects. Kaplan felt that reform separated religion from real life. He felt that Judaism should remain pertinent to people's lives. Thus, Kaplan eschewed Reform attempts to destroy *kiddushin*, claiming that it was heretical to say that Judaism had nothing to say about something as important as family life. Although he didn't believe in God, like *Ahad Haam* Kaplan felt that Jewish culture should pervade one's life. Compartmentalization is untenable to Kaplan.

Practically, Reconstruction is closer to Orthodoxy than Reform. However, in doctrine, Kaplan and tradition were polar opposites. Without believing in God, Kaplan advocated the keeping of many traditional observances. Kaplan, in fact, put on *tefillin* every day.

Kaplan, although he advocated an orthopraxy similar to *Ahad Haam*, had certain distinct traits. Kaplan deemphasized the collectivism of *Ahad Haam* and focused more on individual interests. While, compared to the Rav, for example, Kaplan still had a collectivist impulse; he was not into the all-consuming collective, as *Ahad Haam* was.

Buber

Buber had no parents. When he was three years old his mother disappeared, for no apparent reason. In the meantime, he was raised by his farmer grandparents, his father being too inept to raise him. It is biographically significant that he grew up on a farm, as he was exposed to nature and animals. He claimed that in his adolescence he suffered from radical philosophical doubts. There are those who would claim that Buber's later philosophy reflected these early doubts (Mendes-Flohr). By the time Buber was 20, he was active in the Zionist movement, and he remained a Zionist all his life. His intellectual upbringing was not particularly Jewish. He wrote his doctorate on Christian mysticism, and was not particularly concerned with Jewish issues. Later he became a very popular Jewish speaker, and he issued his edition of *Hasidic Tales*. He reworked the stories into his own image of the Hasidic mindset. Taking advantage of the popular bias towards mysticism, which was ingrained in the zeitgeist, his book became very popular. After this early success, Buber adopted a pseudo-Hasidic ideal as part of his philosophical viewpoint.

One unique facet that Buber exposed in Hasidut, perhaps inaccurately, was the idea of a sociable mysticism. Buber seemed to emphasize the idea that Hasidim was a mysticism firmly rooted in community. This idea, of a mysticism untainted by rampant asceticism, appealed to Buber tremendously. However, in many ways Buber overemphasized this "spin" on Hasidut. After all, much of the mystical trend in Hasidut was rooted firmly in old school asceticism. The Hasidim could roll in the snow with the best of them.

Buber, in later life was embarrassed to have been pro-war in the beginning of WW1. While Buber eventually became vocally anti-war, he retroactively filtered his earlier writings. Thus, it always seemed that he was a non-jingoist, antiwar activist, all along.

Buber's philosophy, by the time it matured into *I and Thou* had stepped away from the mystical currents he had earlier embraced. While some mysticism was still

evident, the focus was on an ethical system, not an ecstatic hermeneutics. Buber posited two types of relationship paradigms. The first was I and it, the second I and thou. The difference between the two was whether one made accommodations (responded at a personal level) to the other. Thus a person in front of you in line, to whom there was no such connection, would be an *it*. A person we try to help would be a *thou*.

Within this philosophy there is a crucial obfuscation. Buber blurs the line. He does not distinguish between any type of response to any type of demand. To contrast Buber with Kant, Buber describes the thou relationship as a phenomenon, rather than, like Kant, as a moral imperative.

The thou relationship that Buber describes is a fleeting minority of all relationships. Thus, most relationships will focus on it. The vast majority of people do not respond to the vast majority of people's needs. Indeed, one of Buber's examples of the thou relationship was his love affair with a certain horse in his youth. As he became aware of the uniqueness of this relationship, he became increasingly intent and cerebral about it. The relationship lost its special transcendence (and the horse felt it too). This fragility proscribes the basing of any ethic on the bedrock of the I and thou.

It is very hard for the I thou relationship between man and God to materialize. Firstly, and obviously, the reciprocal nature of the relationship is missing. This is an obvious fundament of I and thou. Also, the potential for self-deception in such a relationship is apparent and dangerous. After all, we know not what God likes and dislikes. It is easy to claim that God approves of our actions, be they lecherous or murderous. The *haskama* of God is easy to invent. Another glitch in this relationship is the exclusivity of the I thou relationship. It seems that a relationship with God would impinge on relationships with people. Buber circumvents the problem by calling God "the eternal center". This makes God the inclusive center of all given relationships. Thus by relating to a human we relate to God.

On a day to day level, most relationships do not reflect an I thou paradigm. Thus a need for a formal moral and ethical framework divorced from the I and thou stricture. Buber responds to this need by holding up the I thou as an ideal. Going through the motions of an I thou relationship can approximate the moral superiority and advantages of this relationship.

Franz Rosenzweig

Rosenzweig grew up in a totally assimilated Jewish home. He went to University, majoring in pre-Med, but ended up in history and philosophy. Eventually he wrote his doctorate on Hegel, which was an important work, in and of itself. In his college years, his friends decided to convert to Christianity. He was seriously considering this idea. As he came closer to conversion, he saw that a serious Christian viewpoint requires a concession to the Jewish roots of the church. A true Christian must grapple with Judaism. On Yom Kippur, Rosenzweig stumbled into a *shul* (not a Hasidic *shtiebel*, but a Modern Orthodox *shul*) here he made a decision to embrace Judaism. Later, he served on the Eastern front, which made him more cognizant of a more genuine and old-fashioned Judaism.

Later on in life, he founded a *Lehrhaus*, an adult education center in Frankfurt. He wanted to set up a *chavrusa*-type framework, where text knowledge would be emphasized. In this respect, he was far ahead of his time. The *Lehrhaus* became a center for Jewish intellectuals, housing luminaries like Buber and Scholem. This was his niche, as he had found a place where he was comfortable. As this was going on he moved towards a more observant lifestyle. However, in 1922 and 1923, he became ill with Lou Gehrig's disease. By the time he stabilized, he was immobilized in a wheelchair, unable to move his arms, and without control of his head. He was unable to speak, rather, he communicated by pointing at a typewriter keyboard. All in all, he was in terrible shape. Heroically, he still wrote several books during this period, putting out more work than most university professor would have in a comparable period. During this period, his observance of Judaism increased. He died at the age of 43 in 1929.

Rosenzweig's magnum opus is The Star of Redemption, this is a difficult and complex work. The book is directed against the notion that there is one principle which underlies reality. According to him, the world is based on the interaction of God, man and world. The attempts to oversimplify this are a fundamental falsehood. Hegel, for example, saw the world from the perspective of reason (man). Rosenzweig insists on seeing the world in its complexity. His thesis is that all prior philosophy had its beginning in the fear of death. Every philosopher, he posited, tried to latch on to some given concept, which would transcend death. The key, he said, was to face death, and not try to avoid it. He admired a small group of philosophers who embraced this world and did not try to avoid the grave. Thus he admired Nietzsche and Schopenhauer as new thinkers, forerunners of his thought.

One exceptional facet of Rosenzweig's framework is the building of Christian concepts into his Jewish philosophy. He goes out of his way to explain why Christianity is a necessary component of the divine plan. For Rosenzweig, the attraction of Christianity stemmed from the historical pertinence of Christianity. Judaism could be seen as obsolescent, outside the pale of history. Christianity was the most happening religion. The reason that Rosenzweig never converted was because his concept of the purpose of Judaism was as a vehicle to reflect the ideal. Christianity, to Rosenzweig, was an expedient to the ideal, a path to the ideal, not the ideal itself. Thus, eschatologically, Judaism never needs to be pertinent. The purpose of Christianity is to reach out to the wider world and bring it closer to the truth.

Rosenzweig had a sometime relationship with tradition. For example, he was not prepared to reject bible criticism. Yet, he did not engage in textual emendation of the bible (in his Tanach translation). Perhaps his position was that there was a historical connection of the Jewish people to the Torah that is in our hands, indicative of the Jewish relationship to God. As he put it, "for me 'r' is not the redactor, but 'rabbeinu'". This is very much a view parallel to that of the current conservative movement. The Torah is not entirely divine, but it was sanctified by the Jewish people. The Torah is thus a sacred document because it is indicative of the relationship between God and the Jewish people, the details, however, are less important. Thus, Rosenzweig believes that *mitzvos* are not a unilateral legislation, but a set of suggestions.

Hazon Ish

The Hazon Ish moved to Israel in the 1930s after the failure of his wife's business in Europe. During the war, the question of the International Dateline established him as a preeminent *posek* worldwide. One could posit that the focus of the Hazon Ish's *psak* was apolitical. He seemed to eschew the often politically volatile distinctions between Jew and Jew. Thus, the biggest accusation against religious Zionism would not be the movement's political ideology, but its relative lack of religious zeal.

Karelitz had a unique *derech halimud*. He eschewed the "Brisker" methodology for a less "yeshivish" stance. Hazon Ish seemed to contend that such a method was detached from the real world of learning. The artifice of the Brisker chiddush was anathema to Karelitz.

The Hazon Ish's thought in *Emuna uBeatachon* begins with a radical reformulation of the relationship between *emuna* and *beatachon*. Hazon Ish essentially redefines the two as one central concept of acknowledging the control of God. Thus, he destroys the idea that *beatachon* is some sort of reciprocal relationship with God. Thus Karelitz developed a sort of litvish theosophy, which could ignore God's beneficent and reciprocal nature in favor of terrestrial obligations.

Another issue raised by Karelitz is that of mussar. Hazon Ish was very much against the extremist position of such mussar-fundamentalists as the Novardok school. In the place of such a system, which insists on overbearing moralist "objectivity", Karelitz posits a halachically-centered ethic. Any moral quandary can be resolved, simply by opening a Gemara. Peuedopshychoanalysis was a misguided approach to the value ethic, according to Karelitz. Possibly, this approach was informed by his bias towards Halacha. Just as Karelitz felt that the more modern elements were lacking, not in their politics, but in their observance and assiduousness in learning, so too he felt that the mussar faction was lacking. Halacha, according to him, was the be-all and end-all of Judaism. Hazon Ish developed a system of *dikduk hadin*, where accuracy in *psak* Halacha is the ideal.

Rav Kook

Rav Kook had an interest in Eretz Yisrael at an early stage in his life. At the age of 40 he was elected the Rav of Yafo and its surroundings. This made him the most prominent Rav in contact with the newer elements of the yishuv. This experience crystallized much of his thought about the role of nonreligious Jewry in the Zionist idea. Kook was stuck in Switzerland and England for the duration of the Great War. After the war, the Zionists established the institution of *Rabbanut HaReishit* for Ashkenazi Jewry in the Yishuv. At this point the *Rabbanut HaReishit* was a sort of mixed position, encompassing the Rabbanut of Jerusalem as well as the chief Rabbanut.

Rav Kook strived towards a rapprochement between the religious and secular camps. In his moderate *psak Halacha* and his eloquent writing Rav Kook catalyzed a certain respect for the Haredi sector among the less religious. Yet, his moderation in Halacha and his *haskafa* he earned opprobrium from the religious right. For example, he

embraced the idea of physical education. Yet, he was respected by the elite of the right wing, inasmuch as he was a great Rav.

One basic idea that Rav Kook espoused was the overarching value of unity. Rav Kook gave this concept a mystical flavor, positing a Godly connection between different things. Thus, one might say that every idea has a certain spark of truth, reflecting this supernal connection. One could almost say that any heretical philosopher is not heretical in what he says, as much as he is heretical in his omission of certain complementary truths. For example, Rav Kook could even embrace some of Schopenhauer's profound negativity, saying that it stemmed from an omission of some complimentary truth, but that it contained a kernel of some Godly authenticity. Rav Kook took this idea even farther, adding, not only a value to every idea, but saying that every idea has a historical milieu in which it is functional. Thus, all ideas germinate in a historical continuum.

There is a deep and unique facet in the thought of Kook which seems to posit strongly that the idea of Torah is that of the collective consciousness of the Jewish people. Torah is not foisted on the Jew from without, but it is ingrained in his psyche. Thus, the Torah would tell us the true and deeper interest of the Jewish people. The Rav, for example, might disagree with this, emphasizing the idea of the Godly command.

Another difference between the Rav and Rav Kook would be the idea of appearance vs. reality. For the more mystical Rav Kook, appearances do not count nearly as much as what is behind them. For example, one might condescendingly posit that secularists really (in their heart of hearts) have a desire for a Torah-lifestyle. This has been a very contentious sticking point in the philosophy of Rav Kook. Oftentimes, the students of Rav Kook have accused others of a greater desire for religious nationalism than they themselves have evinced. The Rav would call a spade a spade and concede to the appearances.

The Rav: Ish HaHalacha

One of the basic building blocks of the Rav's philosophical framework is the idea of Halacha. The Rav is unique in this respect, as he unified the world of the Rosh haYeshiva with the world of the philosopher. Moreover, for Soloveitchik, the process of learning the Torah was a uniquely significant act. In this regard, he was a Brisker chauvinist, his reference points being from that methodology.

The Rav was originally a student of Hermann Cohen, and he was somewhat influenced by Cohen's ideas, even in his conception of Halachic concepts. Thus the Rav incorporated a certain neo-Kantian tradition into his work.

Another major philosophical influence on the Rav was the notion of the study of ideal types. For this, the Rav went back to the work of Springer, who innovated the notion, that in analyzing an idea, one develops a certain abstraction, and then releases (as it were) this ideal type into the world. Thus, Soloveitchik invented the ideal types of the "cognitive man" and the "religious man", who are somewhat synthesized in the overarching "Halachic man". The point of these types is not a phenomenological description of a specific person. Rather, it is to explore the very nature of the category. The ideal cognitive man would be a scientist. Likewise, the religious man is characterized by a deep yearning for another world.

The risk of talking about ideal types is their compatibility with the real world. One must be aware of the interplay between ideal types and their applicability in the concrete real world.

Notwithstanding this, the Rav had a deep and abiding sense of individualism. Each person would represent a unique voice in a polyphonic symphony. This idea doesn't jibe so well with that of ideal types.

The category of the Halachic man is a new and unique category, according to Soloveitchik. He lies somewhere in between the cognitive man and the religious man. In a deeper sense, one could posit that the Halachic man eschews the specificity of the scientist, and the spontaneity of the religious man for a more balanced perspective.

To a large extent, in this essay, the Rav underlines similarities between the Halachic man and the cognitive man. The cognitive man seems somewhat closer to the truth of Halachic man. The Rav does have a disclaimer, stating that the religious man is riven by a conflict, which is necessary and cathartic. This would be a distinct advantage to the religious man. This conflict also limns much of the life of the Halachic Man, as he shares this element with the religious man.

The second section of Halachic Man is about the creativity of the Halachic man. This section is anomalous in several regards. The small size of this chapter immediately sticks out, to even the casual reader. Also, there seem to be a number of tangents involved here. One thing that the Rav talks about, is the confluence of prophecy and creativity. The connection of this to the Halachic man seems very tenuous. One way to interpret these interjections is to posit a palpable principle of *imatio dei*. Creativity, to Soloveitchik, is important because God is a creator, and man must emulate God. This idea forms the seed of the religious component of the psyche of the Halachic man. What makes the Halachic man a particularly spiritual personality is that his actions stem not from a simple devotion to obeying God, but from a central idea of being like God.

Levinas and the Readings

Levinas and Heidegger were both students of Husserl (who was actually Jewish). Levinas was a great Jewish philosopher. Heidegger was a Nazi. Levinas lived most of his life as a Jewish functionary. During the war he was a German POW, and he did not have to suffer the ravages of the holocaust. Later in his life, influenced by Chouchani, he took a more Jewish view of life. Indeed, he wrote his Talmudic Lectures, later in life. These lectures utilize the Aggada to develop important philosophical points. He had two major "pure" philosophy works: Otherwise than Being, Totality and Infinity. In the 1960s, he became one of the biggest French philosophers, both because of his work's prominence, and because of the fact that Derrida, who he influenced, became very popular.

One aspect of Levinas' philosophy was a focus on phenomenology. Husserl and those who came after him focused on the experience of perception, and the effects of the pretension and the "sediment" of residual experience. For someone like Heidegger, the central question of history would be why there is something rather than nothing. This is the question of "being". Thus, the tragedy of history would be the tragedy of the loss of

the consciousness of “being”. This fall away from being occurs when people begin to think about other things (such as technology). There is a certain mystical attachment to the concept of “being”, for Heidegger.