

LUCID: Learning-Enabled Uncertainty-Aware Certification of Stochastic Dynamical Systems (Extended Version)

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Abstract

Ensuring the safety of AI-enabled systems, particularly in high-stakes domains such as autonomous driving and healthcare, has become increasingly critical. Traditional formal verification tools fall short when faced with systems that embed both opaque, black-box AI components and complex stochastic dynamics. To address these challenges, we introduce LUCID (Learning-enabled Uncertainty-aware Certification of stochastic Dynamical systems), a verification engine for certifying safety of black-box stochastic dynamical systems from a finite dataset of random state transitions. As such, LUCID is the first known tool capable of establishing quantified safety guarantees for such systems. Thanks to its modular architecture and extensive documentation, LUCID is designed for easy extensibility.

LUCID employs a data-driven methodology rooted in control barrier certificates, which are learned directly from system transition data, to ensure formal safety guarantees. We use conditional mean embeddings to embed data into a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS), where an RKHS ambiguity set is constructed that can be inflated to robustify the result to out-of-distribution behavior.

A key innovation within LUCID is its use of a finite Fourier kernel expansion to reformulate a semi-infinite non-convex optimization problem into a tractable linear program. The resulting spectral barrier allows us to leverage the fast Fourier transform to generate the relaxed problem efficiently, offering a scalable yet distributionally robust framework for verifying safety. LUCID thus offers a robust and efficient verification framework, able to handle the complexities of modern black-box systems while providing formal guarantees of safety. These unique capabilities are demonstrated on challenging benchmarks.

Source Code — <https://github.com/TendTo/lucid>

Documentation — <https://tendto.github.io/lucid/>

1 Introduction

Embodied forms of AI are on the rise, including applications such as autonomous vehicles, robotics, personalized healthcare, and smart infrastructure. Their core functionality is built around the advances of deep learning, enabling systems to understand and reason in complex and human-like

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ways to produce a desired behavior. Whilst the black-box nature of AI components has been a crucial contributor to the widespread success of deep learning, in response to a rapidly evolving legal scrutinization (Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius 2021), the resulting lack of traceability and certifiability has put a premature halt to its deployment in safety-critical applications.

As deep learning agents are left to choose their actions autonomously in closed-loop interaction with the physical world, they are confronted with a world riddled with randomness and uncertainty. Efforts to establishing trust in their safe operation have been largely focused on developing tools to verify the input–output behavior of Neural Networks (NNs) embedded in the systems (Liu et al. 2021). Unfortunately, there do not exist any tools that could take these results and certify the safety of the entire system, as uncertainty-aware models of closed-loop systems are rarely available and simulators are often too complicated and opaque to perform verification directly (Wongpiromsarn et al. 2023). This motivates a holistic black-box treatment (Corso et al. 2021), where safety guarantees are to be established from behavioral data and in account of the unknown laws of randomness themselves.

There exist no tools capable of quantifying safety guarantees for complex stochastic closed-loop systems from data. For the setting where a model of the closed-loop system is available, NPINTERVAL by Harapanahalli, Jafarpour, and Coogan (2023) verifies safety of nonlinear systems with non-deterministic disturbance based on existing NN verification tools. See the references therein and the annual friendly competition by Abate et al. (2024) for adjacent work. Few data-driven approaches for stochastic systems exist. OMNISAFE is a comprehensive platform for the development of safe Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms (Ji et al. 2024). However, safe RL does generally only *encourage* safer behavior, without providing any rigorous or quantified guarantees on the probability of the absence of unsafe behavior. As a popular working principle for certifying safety, *Control Barrier Certificates* (CBCs) (Prajna 2006) are at the basis of tools such as TRUST (Gardner et al. 2025), which supports only polynomial dynamics, and FOS-SIL (Edwards, Peruffo, and Abate 2024), which is model-based, and both being restricted to deterministic systems.

To close this gap (see Table 1), we introduce LUCID,

Tool	Supported Features					
	Guarantees	Data Driven	Stochastic Dyn.	Non-Poly. Dyn.	Stat. Correct.	Closed Loop
LUCID (this work)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
TRUST (2025)	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓ ¹	✓
FOSSIL (2024)	✓	✗	✗	✓	NA	✓
OMNISAFE (2024)	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
NPINTERVAL (2023)	✓	✗	✓/✗ ²	✓	NA	✓

Table 1: Qualitative comparison with existing tools based on their supported features: quantified safety guarantees, data driven, stochastic dynamics, non-polynomial dynamics, statistical correctness guarantees of the learned model (only applicable if data driven), and support for closed-loop systems.

the first verification engine for black-box stochastic dynamical systems with quantified guarantees. At its core, LUCID learns CBCs for unknown systems based solely on data, by constructing an uncertainty-aware estimator of the expected system behavior based on *Conditional Mean Embeddings* (CMEs) (Muandet et al. 2017). Crucially, the underlying learning framework establishes quantified safety probabilities with distributionally robust guarantees for arbitrary smooth dynamics, thus relaxing the need for restrictive structural assumptions common to related approaches. For instance, Schön, Zhong, and Soudjani (2024) learn CBCs for systems with polynomial dynamics and Chen et al. (2025) assume systems with known deterministic component.

Alternative approaches often leave the statistical correctness with respect to the underlying data-generating process unaddressed: Kazemi and Soudjani (2020) use model-free reinforcement learning, relying on known Lipschitz constants; Lew and Pavone (2021) compute reachable sets for stochastic systems using a sampling-based scheme, which yields only asymptotic guarantees; and Salamat et al. (2024) use a scenario-based method, based on Lipschitz constants and exponentially large datasets. For data-driven safety verification of stochastic systems via conformal prediction (Lindemann et al. 2024), no tools are available.

We summarize the main contributions of this work:

- We introduce LUCID, a novel verification engine that learns control barrier certificates from data using kernel-based CMEs. LUCID uses a tractable reformulation of the problem via a finite Fourier expansion, enabling efficient barrier synthesis based on a linear program.
- A robust and extensible software implementation, with both C++ and Python interfaces, supporting configuration via YAML, JSON, or Python scripts, and offering both a *Command Line Interface* (CLI) and a *Graphical*




Figure 1: Evolution of the closed-loop system.

User Interface (GUI).

- Numerical evaluation on a suite of benchmarks, demonstrating LUCID’s unique capabilities, robustness, and practical utility.

Organization The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical foundations of LUCID, including the safety of black-box dynamical systems, control barrier certificates, conditional mean embeddings, and derivation of the relaxed linear program. Section 3 describes the architecture and functionalities of LUCID alongside a running example, presenting LUCID’s components and how they interact. Section 4 evaluates LUCID on a suite of benchmarks. Finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion and future extensions.

2 Theoretical Working Principles

2.1 Safety of Black-Box Dynamical Systems

System Description Many AI-driven systems exhibit complex, nonlinear, and stochastic behavior that can be modeled as discrete-time stochastic processes with Markovian dynamics:

$$\mathcal{S}: \quad x_{t+1} = f(x_t, a_t, w_t), \quad w_t \sim p_w, \quad (1)$$

where $f: \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{A} \times \mathbb{W} \rightarrow \mathbb{X}$ is a continuous vector field describing the evolution of the system state $x_t \in \mathbb{X} \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ over time $t \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$, driven by control actions $a_t \in \mathbb{A} \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ and process noise $w_t \in \mathbb{W} \subset \mathbb{R}^l$. The noise is assumed to be drawn from a stochastic distribution p_w in an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) manner. This general formulation subsumes a wide range of systems, including discrete-time Markov Decision Processes (MDPs).

Black-Box Policies Here, the focus is on systems \mathcal{S} driven by black-box control policies of the form $\pi: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$, i.e., at every time step $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ a continuous action $a_t \in \mathbb{A}$ is selected based on the current state x_t . Such policies could be, for example, neural networks trained via RL, or any other black-box function generating actions in \mathbb{R}^m (see Figure 1). The resulting closed-loop system is denoted as \mathcal{S}^π .

Dataset Due to their complexity and opacity, such systems must often be treated as black boxes in their entirety, assuming only access to a finite amount, N , of system observations

$$\mathcal{D}_N: \quad \{(x^i, a^i, x_+^i)\}_{i=1}^N, \quad (2)$$

where every sampled transition from $x^i \in \mathbb{X}$ to a successor $x_+^i \in \mathbb{X}$ is generated as a realization

$$(x^i, a^i, x_+^i) \sim \int \delta_{f(x^i, a^i, w)}(dx_+^i) p_w(dw) \mathcal{U}_{\mathbb{X}}(dx^i) \mathcal{U}_{\mathbb{A}}(da^i),$$

with $\mathcal{U}_{\mathbb{X}}$ and $\mathcal{U}_{\mathbb{A}}$ uniform distributions on \mathbb{X} and \mathbb{A} , respectively, and δ indicating the Dirac delta distribution capturing the system dynamics.

¹Assuming the data satisfies persistence of excitation.

²Accepts non-deterministic bounded disturbances.

Assuming i.i.d. data of the form (2) and full observability offers statistical guarantees on the consistency of the data-driven CME constructed in Section 2.3. We point to literature addressing dependent data, assuming either ergodicity, burn-in time, or reduced sample effectiveness w.r.t. the mixing time (Zhang et al. 2024; Ziemann et al. 2023).




Figure 2: Sequence of steps LUCID goes through to generate a barrier certificate.

Safety Problem A question that often arises when designing a policy π for a system \mathcal{S} , especially in engineering contexts, is if the closed-loop system \mathcal{S}^π elicits safe behavior. That is, when starting from a domain $\mathbb{X}_0 \subset \mathbb{X}$ under a policy π , the system \mathcal{S}^π shall avoid unsafe regions $\mathbb{X}_U \subset \mathbb{X}$ (such as obstacles) for at least some predefined time horizon $T \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\}$.

Certifying safety of a discrete-time stochastic system over an uncountable state space does not generally admit an analytical solution and is extremely challenging, especially for complex dynamics (Abate et al. 2008). Furthermore, for unbounded stochasticity $w_t \sim p_w$, there is generally no yes/no answer to safety, but a safety probability $P_{\text{safe}}(\mathcal{S}^\pi) \in [0, 1]$. Note that given a policy π , for every initial state $x_0 \in \mathbb{X}_0$ there is an associated safety probability. Our goal is to estimate a *lower bound* on the infimum of such probabilities across all initial states in \mathbb{X}_0 .

Problem Statement Assuming access to a finite dataset \mathcal{D}_N from the black-box system \mathcal{S} in (1), quantify a certifiable lower bound on the probability of the black-box system \mathcal{S}^π being safe with respect to a safety specification given by $(\mathbb{X}_0, \mathbb{X}_U, T)$.

Available sampling-based methods such as Monte Carlo simulation are unfit to solve this problem, as they compute guarantees for fixed initial conditions $x_0 \in \mathbb{X}_0$. LUCID pro-

vides a solution for continuous sets \mathbb{X}_0 by automating the steps in Figure 2, outlined in the next sections.

2.2 Control Barrier Certificates

CBCs³ leverage the concept of set invariance to arrive at an abstraction-free numerical solution to finding a lower bound on $P_{\text{safe}}(\mathcal{S}^\pi)$. This has made them popular tools for safety verification and controller synthesis (Prajna 2006).

A non-negative function $B: \mathbb{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ is a CBC of a system \mathcal{S} with reference to an unsafe set \mathbb{X}_U if it satisfies

- (a) $\forall x_0 \in \mathbb{X}_0: B(x_0) \leq \eta$;
 - (b) $\forall x_U \in \mathbb{X}_U: B(x_U) \geq 1$; and
 - (c) $\forall x \in \mathbb{X}, \exists a \in A: \mathbb{E}[B(X_+)|X = x, A = a] - B(x) \leq c$;
- for some constants $1 > \eta \geq 0$ and $c \geq 0$. Here, upper case X_+ , X , and A denote the random variables underlying concrete realizations (x_t, a_t, x_{t+1}) elicited by \mathcal{S} . Intuitively, if one can find a CBC for a system \mathcal{S} , then, a lower bound on the probability of \mathcal{S} being safe can be quantified based on the distance between the two level sets 1 and η (Kushner 1967):

$$P_{\text{safe}}(\mathcal{S}^\pi) \geq 1 - (\eta + cT), \quad (3)$$

where T is the desired time horizon.

Whilst (3) can provide a robust assessment of a system's safety, in practice, the bound can be overly conservative and thus several improved variants of the original barrier constraints exist (e.g., Anand et al. 2022). As these conditions in essence all rely on the computation of a stochastic constraint with respect to the expected behavior of the system, they are basically interchangeable.

Although there exist model-based efficient solutions to this problem for linear and control affine systems, this is generally a semi-infinite problem, demanding a data-driven solution. Furthermore, for the data-driven case, establishing constraint (c) rigorously without relying on impractical assumptions is extremely challenging.

2.3 Data-Driven Dynamics Estimation via Conditional Mean Embeddings

To reason about the expected value of a random variable, embedding the variable into a (higher dimensional) space and forming a data-driven estimate is a well-established concept in machine learning (Schölkopf and Smola 2002; Steinwart and Christmann 2008). Following the same reasoning, the *kernel mean embedding* represents the embedding of a probability measure into an RKHS via a feature map ϕ associated with a positive definite kernel k (Smola et al. 2007; Muandet et al. 2017). For conditional probability distributions a similar concept exists: CMEs can be used to model the expected value of any RKHS function $g: \mathbb{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ under a stochastic process such as \mathcal{S} (Park and Muandet 2020; Muandet et al. 2017). For the Gaussian kernel,

$$k(x, x') := \sigma_f^2 \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}(x - x')^\top \Sigma (x - x')\right), \quad (4)$$

where $\Sigma := \text{diag}(\sigma_l)^{-2}$, with hyperparameters $\sigma_f, \sigma_l \in \mathbb{R}$, the associated RKHS encompasses all smooth functions g .

³CBCs and discrete-time *Control Barrier Functions* (CBFs) (Cosner et al. 2024) are equivalent.

A data-driven estimate can then be obtained in closed form from a finite amount of data \mathcal{D}_N :

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[f(X_+)] &| X = x, A = a \approx \\ k_{XA}^N(x, a)^\top [K_{XA}^N + N\lambda I_N]^{-1} f(X_+^N), \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

with column vector $k_{XA}^N(x, a) := [k((x^i, a^i), (x, a))]_{i=1}^N$, Gram matrix $K_{XA}^N := [k((x^i, a^i), (x^j, a^j))]_{i,j=1}^N$, regularization factor $\lambda \geq 0$, identity matrix I_N , and $f(X_+^N) := [f(x_+^i)]_{i=1}^N$. The empirical estimator in (5) converges in expectation to the true CME for $N \rightarrow \infty$ and $\lambda \rightarrow 0$ (Park and Muandet 2020).

It is common practice to robustify empirical estimates such as (5) to out-of-sample behavior by constructing an RKHS ambiguity set centered at the empirical CME. The result is a distributionally robust estimator with an adjustable robustness radius. The details are omitted here for brevity, but the interested reader is referred to the works by Kuhn, Shafiee, and Wiesemann (2025) and Li et al. (2022).

2.4 Data-Driven Spectral Barriers

Based on the data-driven estimator in (5), the problem of computing CBCs using data can be formulated as a nonconvex semi-infinite program, which for general classes of systems and barriers is extremely difficult to solve. To arrive at a tractable solution, LUCID conducts two additional steps:

1. Spectral Abstraction Inspired by the popular random Fourier features approach by Rahimi and Recht (2007), the Gaussian kernel (4) admits a Fourier expansion

$$k(x, x') \equiv \sigma_f^2 \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \mathcal{N}(d\omega | 0, \Sigma) e^{i\omega^\top (P(x) - P(x'))}, \quad (6)$$

with the zero-mean Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{N}(d\omega | 0, \Sigma)$ with covariance Σ , the imaginary unit $i := \sqrt{-1}$, and where the affine transform $x \mapsto P(x)$ maps the domain \mathbb{X} into the unit hypercube $[0, 1]^n$. Partitioning the space of spatial frequencies $\omega \in \mathbb{R}^n$ into a set of discrete frequency bands (see Figure 3) yields a spectral abstraction of the associated RKHS, i.e., characterizing learnable functions \mathbf{B} in the form of Fourier series. By truncating the series to a finite number, M , of fixed frequency bands $\omega_j \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $j \in \{0, \dots, M\}$, the resulting barriers are of the form

$$\mathbf{B}(x) = \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^M \alpha_i \cos(\omega_i^\top P(x)) + \beta_i \sin(\omega_i^\top P(x)).$$

Notably, \mathbf{B} admits the linear form $\mathbf{B}(x) = \phi_M(x)^\top b$, with a truncated Fourier feature map $\phi_M: \mathbb{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{2M+1}$, parametrized by learnable spectral amplitudes

$$b = \left[\frac{\alpha_0}{\sigma_f^2 \mathbf{w}_0^2} \quad \frac{\alpha_1}{2\sigma_f^2 \mathbf{w}_1^2} \quad \frac{\beta_1}{2\sigma_f^2 \mathbf{w}_1^2} \quad \cdots \quad \frac{\alpha_M}{2\sigma_f^2 \mathbf{w}_M^2} \quad \frac{\beta_M}{2\sigma_f^2 \mathbf{w}_M^2} \right]^\top \in \mathbb{R}^{2M+1},$$

where the weights $\mathbf{w}_0, \dots, \mathbf{w}_M \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ associated with each frequency band are determined efficiently from the kernel's Gaussian spectral measure via the multivariate CDF (see Figure 4). The CME-based estimator (5) is approximated in the same finite basis via $H \in \mathbb{R}^{(2M+1) \times (2M+1)}$ such that

$$k_{XA}^N(x, a)^\top [K_{XA}^N + N\lambda I_N]^{-1} \Phi_{M,+}^N \approx \varphi_M(x, a)^\top H,$$




Figure 3: Spectral barrier certificate $\mathbf{B}(x) = \phi_M(x)^\top b$.




Figure 4: Abstraction of a 1-dim. Gaussian spectral measure of the Gaussian kernel, shown in (6).

where $\Phi_{M,+}^N := [\phi_M(x_+^i)^\top]_{i=1}^N$, $\varphi_M(x, a): \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{2M+1}$ a feature map augmenting $\phi_M(x)$, and with an approximation error decreasing exponentially with M (Rahimi and Recht 2007). This reduces the barrier synthesis problem to a semi-infinite linear program, with barrier conditions linear in b :

- (a) $\forall x_0 \in \mathbb{X}_0: \phi_M(x_0)^\top b \leq \eta$;
- (b) $\forall x_U \in \mathbb{X}_U: \phi_M(x_U)^\top b \geq 1$; and
- (c) $\forall x \in \mathbb{X}, \exists a \in \mathbb{A}: \varphi_M(x, a)^\top (Hb - b) \leq c$.

For the case where a is provided by a given fixed policy π , $\varphi_M(x, a)$ reduces to $\phi_M(x)$.

2. Finite-Constraint Relaxation To obtain a program with *finitely* many constraints, trigonometric bounding results (Pfister and Bresler 2018; Schön, Zhong, and Soudjani 2025) are used to obtain a relaxed linear program by sampling spatial lattices on \mathbb{X} , \mathbb{X}_0 , and \mathbb{X}_U . For example, to enforce barrier constraint (a) in Section 2.2, it suffices to construct a lattice $\{x_0^i\}_{i=1}^{N_0} \subset \mathbb{X}_0$ and impose the constraints $b^\top \phi_M(x_0^i) \leq \eta - \epsilon$ for $i = 1, \dots, N_0$, where $\epsilon > 0$ is a computed coefficient. Selecting lattices with a sampling density meeting the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem with respect to the highest frequency ω_M appearing in the barrier and truncated estimator, the relaxation retains all guarantees. As a result, the semi-infinite problem is relaxed to a finitely-constrained Linear Program (LP), provided in full in the appendix. Recall that given an appropriate robustness radius, the barriers produced by LUCID based on data \mathcal{D}_N are

statistically correct with respect to the unknown true system \mathcal{S} , and a lower bound for the safety probability is computed according to (3).

3 Tool Structure and Functionalities

LUCID implements the previously outlined functionality, written in C++ and designed to be used as a library or standalone executable. The choice of a low level language gives us plenty of freedom and fine-grained control over the execution of the software. We expose a set of interfaces allowing users to highly customize the verification process. A high-level visualization of LUCID’s architecture is illustrated in Figure 5, while a more technical description can be found in the online documentation at

<https://tendto.github.io/lucid/>.

We also provide a Python wrapper, called PYLUCID, to facilitate the integration of the tool into existing workflows and effortlessly leverage well-established libraries such as NumPy (Harris et al. 2020) and SciPy (Virtanen et al. 2020). Moreover, PYLUCID can be extensively configured in a variety of ways (e.g., Python scripts, YAML files, GUI), making it the recommended way to operate LUCID. For the rest of the paper, we will thus focus on PYLUCID when describing the user interfaces. Further information about PYLUCID are deferred to the appendix.

Configuration To certify safety of a system, LUCID accepts a configuration comprising data from the system and the safety specification (see Figure 5). We suggest defining it as a `.yaml` or equivalent `.json` file. If more flexibility is needed, a Python script generating a configuration can be used instead. Regardless of their format, configuration files can be loaded with the command `pylucid <config file>` to start the tool’s verification pipeline. The same configuration can also be passed directly as command line arguments. PYLUCID also provides a browser-based GUI to aid in the configuration and execution of the tool.

In its current form, LUCID implements all the functionality needed to certify safety of a closed-loop system with a given control policy π . Thus the action a in the previous section is replaced with the policy $\pi(x)$. Future releases will expand this core functionality to safe controller synthesis as well. Due to its modular architecture, LUCID can be easily extended in multiple directions, as outlined in Section 5.

3.1 Configuring and Running the Tool

LUCID is built with a modular architecture, where each component is responsible for a specific task in the certification process. Since the components extend from a common interface, they can be easily replaced or extended. An overview of the core components and how they interact is shown in Figure 5. Classes and interfaces available in PYLUCID are written in monospace font.

To make the explanation more intuitive, we will use a one-dimensional linear system as a running example:

$$\mathcal{S}: \quad x_{t+1} = 0.5x_t + w_t, \quad w_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\cdot | 0, 0.01), \quad (7)$$

with state space $\mathbb{X} = [-1, 1]$, initial set $\mathbb{X}_0 = [-0.5, 0.5]$, and unsafe regions $\mathbb{X}_U = [-1, -0.9] \cup [0.9, 1]$. While going




Figure 5: General architecture of LUCID, highlighting its core components and their connections.

over each component of LUCID, we will show how they can be configured within a `.yaml` configuration file to capture the system (7) and its safety specification.

Dataset Due to its data-driven nature, all that LUCID needs to operate is a set of sampled transitions \mathcal{D}_N from the system, as shown in (2), and the safety specification itself. The samples can be specified directly in the configuration file, divided into x^1, \dots, x^N and x_+, \dots, x_+^N :

```
x_samples: [[5.930e-01], ..., [-1.937e-01]]
xp_samples: [[3.015e-01], ..., [-1.018e-01]]
```

Alternatively, the samples can be either generated by the Python configuration script or stored in a separate file.

① Safety Specification LUCID understands sets $\mathbb{X}, \mathbb{X}_0, \mathbb{X}_U$ specified as `RectSet`, `SphereSet`, or `Multiset` objects (collections of sets from the first two categories). They can be included in the configuration as shown below:

```
X_bounds: "RectSet([-1, [1])"
X_init: "RectSet([-0.5, [0.5])"
X_unsafe: ["RectSet([-1, [-0.9])",
           "RectSet([0.9, [1])"]
```

② Estimator The core of LUCID is its Estimator, namely the `KernelRidgeRegressor`, which uses the `GaussianKernel` to learn the underlying system dynamics by estimating the CME from the samples. Its predictions of the expected next state x_+ are used to determine the constraints for the CBC LP. The setup is configured as follows:

```
kernel: "GaussianKernel"
estimator: "KernelRidgeRegressor"
```

③ Tuner Being parameter-free approaches, kernel methods do not require the expensive learning processes of other machine learning methods, such as neural networks. However, they still depend on a number of hyperparameters, such as the kernel bandwidth σ_f , the lengthscale σ_l , and the regularization constant λ (see (4)–(5)). Changes in their val-

ues can have significant impact on the Estimator’s efficiency and accuracy. The process of finding good values for these hyperparameters is known as *hyperparameter tuning*, with the optimal parameters being problem dependent. LUCID provides a set of utilities, which specialize the Tuner interface, to aid in this task:

- MedianHeuristicTuner uses the *median heuristic* (Garreau, Jitkrittum, and Kanagawa 2018) to produce rule-of-thumb-type estimates for the hyperparameters σ_f and σ_l of, e.g., the Gaussian kernel (4), via closed-form expressions. It can be useful as a starting point for subsequent improvements.
- LbfgsTuner finds the hyperparameters that maximize the *log marginal likelihood* (Rasmussen and Williams 2006), defined as

$$\begin{aligned} \log p(X_N^+ | X_N, \theta) &= -\frac{1}{2} X_N^{+\top} (K_X^N + N\lambda I_N)^{-1} X_N^+ \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{2} \log |K_X^N + N\lambda I_N| - \frac{N}{2} \log(2\pi), \end{aligned}$$

where $\theta := (\sigma_f, \sigma_l, \lambda)$ is the hyperparameterization being optimized. We use the L-BFGS or L-BFGS-B quasi-Newton optimization algorithms (Fletcher 2000), implemented in the LBFGS++ library.

- GridSearchTuner implements the grid search method, exploring the space of possible hyperparameter values to maximize the Estimator’s R^2 score,

$$R^2 = 1 - \left(\sum_{i=1}^M (y_i - \hat{y}_i)^2 / \sum_{i=1}^M (y_i - \bar{y})^2 \right),$$

with \hat{y}_i and $\bar{y} := (\sum_{i=1}^N y_i)/N$ being the i^{th} predicted and mean observed outputs, respectively.

Tuners open a wide range of possibilities to the user. We recommend using them within a Python script generating a configuration to automate the tuning process before finalizing the Estimator’s hyperparameter values:

```
def scenario_config(c: Configuration):
    t = LbfgsTuner(lb=[1e-5], ub=[1e5])
    c.estimator = KernelRidgeRegressor()
    c.estimator.fit(c.x_samples, c.
    xp_samples, tuner=t)
    return c
```

In this example, we set the hyperparameters explicitly:

```
sigma_1: 0.0446
lambda: 1.0e-5
set_scaling: 0.04
```

The parameter `set_scaling` can be used to lower the constraint-tightening ϵ (see Section 2.4.2.) by increasing the size of the sets $\mathbb{X}, \mathbb{X}_0, \mathbb{X}_U$; here, for example, by 4%.

④ Feature Map We exploit the spectral kernel expansion in (6) to construct an explicit approximated feature map, composed of trigonometric functions with increasing frequencies (see Figure 3). The underlying kernel expansion, visualized in Figure 4, can be controlled to trade-off efficiency and accuracy/conservativeness. After selecting its hyperparameters (σ_f, σ_l) , the feature map can be used to




Figure 6: Barrier certificate for the running example. The value of the barrier B is plotted against the state space \mathbb{X} . The green line represents the barrier value. The initial and unsafe sets are highlighted in blue and red, respectively.

map any point from \mathbb{X} to the RKHS associated with the kernel. To this end, LUCID partitions the kernel’s spectral measure: `LinearTruncatedFourierFeatureMap` defines equally spaced frequency bands on the interval $[-3\sigma_l, 3\sigma_l]$, capturing 99.73% of the spectral measure. This partitioning is shown in Figure 4. Users may define custom feature maps to produce other partitions.

In our example, we truncate the Fourier expansion to 6 frequency bands, including the constant term, and use 300 lattice points to build the constraints for the optimization.

```
num_frequencies: 6
lattice_resolution: 300
feature_sigma_1: 0.0925
```

⑤ Solver From the components discussed above, LUCID generates and solves a finite-constraint LP as outlined in Section 2.4. If successful, LUCID returns a CBC, a quantified lower bound on the true safety probability $P_{\text{safe}}(\mathcal{S}^T)$, as well as the corresponding constants η and c .

Generating the LP, specifically choosing an appropriate lattice density, involves trading off efficiency versus conservativeness, with any sampling density beyond the Nyquist frequency yielding a valid relaxation. In the benchmarks in Section 4 we showcase the relation numerically. For solving the LP, LUCID can interface with different linear optimizers: GUROBI, ALGLIB, or HIGHS. Here, we use GUROBI:

```
optimiser: "GurobiOptimiser"
```

Running the Tool We have configured all the components needed to run LUCID. Putting it all together in a single configuration file, we can run the tool with the command `pylucid config.yaml --plot`. LUCID will parse the configuration, synthesize a barrier certificate, and plot the result. For the running example, we obtain the barrier certificate shown in Figure 6 for a time horizon of $T = 15$, certifying safety of the system in (7) with a probability of at least 93.07% ($\eta = 0.006, c = 0.004$).

Validation (optional) Albeit barriers generated by LUCID are by design formally sound with respect to the data-driven estimator, if the latent system dynamics are known, LUCID provides the option to formally verify the correctness of the resulting barrier using the DREAL SMT solver (Gao, Kong, and Clarke 2013). Since we know the expected behavior of

the system \mathcal{S} from (7), we confirm that \mathcal{B} is indeed a valid CBC by adding the following lines:

```
system_dynamics: ["x1 / 2"]
verify: true
```

4 Experimental Evaluation

To ascertain the performance of LUCID, we conduct a series of experiments on a Windows 10 machine with an AMD Ryzen 9 5950X 16-Core Processor @ 3.40 GHz, NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3090 GPU, and 64 GB of RAM. All runs had the random seed set to 42 to ensure reproducibility.

We adapt the Barr_2 and Barr_3 benchmarks from Abate et al. (2021). Both are two-dimensional highly nonlinear systems to which we add stochastic noise $w_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\cdot | 0, 0.01I_2)$. Given $N = 1000$ samples, initial set \mathbb{X}_0 , and unsafe set \mathbb{X}_U , we synthesize a barrier \mathcal{B} that guarantees trajectories starting in \mathbb{X}_0 do not enter \mathbb{X}_U within $T = 5$ time steps. Note that here we only certify safety w.r.t. the empirical distribution, i.e., the CME constructed from the observed data. The synthesized barriers are shown in Figures 7–8. We also consider a new benchmark Over , where an autonomous vehicle controlled by a NN is overtaking another vehicle. The dynamics of the ego vehicle are given by Dubin’s car model with an added noise vector w where each component is drawn from a zero-mean Gaussian with standard deviation 0.01, 0.01, and 0.001 respectively. The steering wheel angle is supplied by the NN controller and we travel at a fixed velocity.

Table 2 summarizes the results of all the experiments presented. As a point-wise baseline, we estimate the safety probability at selected initial states via Monte Carlo simulation, yielding approximately 95–100% safety in the reported benchmarks. Note that these estimates do not extend to set-wise guarantees. Further details on the experiments can be found in the appendix.




Figure 7: CBC synthesized for the Barr_2 benchmark.




Figure 8: CBC synthesized for the Barr_3 benchmark.

	T	#Freq.	Lattice Size	Runtime [mm:ss]	Safety Prob.
Linear	15	6	300 ¹	00:01	93.07%
Barr_2	5	7	330 ²	04:38	63.17%
Barr_3	5	7	330 ²	03:20	51.63%
Over	5	5	70 ³	93:56	53.66%

Table 2: Computational benchmarks: The lattice size indicates the number of points of the lattice in each dimension. T is the time horizon associated with the lower bound on the safety probability, displayed in the last column.

5 Conclusion and Future Extensions

This paper introduces LUCID, a novel tool capable of quantifying safety guarantees for black-box systems with complex stochastic dynamics and deep learning components in the loop. As such, LUCID fills a gap currently unaddressed by preexisting tools. To achieve this, LUCID leverages Conditional Mean Embeddings (CME) to learn control barrier certificates from data and recasts the problem into a tractable linear form via a spectral abstraction.

LUCID is built for extensibility. In its current form, it assumes access to full state measurements (see (2)), as is the case when working with simulated systems, and focuses on verification, i.e., when a policy is given. Extending LUCID to partially observed settings and safe controller synthesis is on our agenda and builds on top of the results presented in this paper. LUCID derives barriers based on the empirical CME, which can be robustified against out-of-sample system behavior by tightening the barrier constraint (c) (see Sections 2.3–2.4). The scalability of LUCID can be improved by performing sparse CME computations or specializing the estimator’s Kernel to embed prior knowledge about the system dynamics.

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A Linear Program

The finitely-constrained LP discussed in Section 2.4 is presented. For this, the lattices $\Theta_{\tilde{N}} := \{x^1, \dots, x^{\tilde{N}}\} \subset \tilde{\mathbb{X}}$, $\{x^1, \dots, x^N\} \subset \mathbb{X}$, $\{x_0^1, \dots, x_0^{N_0}\} \subset \mathbb{X}_0$, and $\{x_U^1, \dots, x_U^{N_U}\} \subset \mathbb{X}_U$ of cardinality $\tilde{N}, N, N_0, N_U \in \mathbb{N}$, respectively, are formed. For given values of $\bar{\mathbf{B}}$ and robustness radius $\varepsilon \geq 0$, the following LP is obtained:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \min_{\substack{b, c, \eta \\ \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X}_0}, \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X}_u}, \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\Delta}^{\mathbb{X}}, \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}}} \\ \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_0}, \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_u}, \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X} \setminus \tilde{\mathbb{X}}}, \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\Delta}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}}}} \quad \eta + cT, \\
& \text{subject to} \quad \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X}_0} \leq \phi_M(x_0^{(i)})^\top b \leq \hat{\eta}, \quad i = 1, \dots, \hat{N}_0, \\
& \quad \hat{\gamma} \leq \phi_M(x_u^{(i)})^\top b \leq \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X}_u}, \quad i = 1, \dots, \hat{N}_u, \\
& \quad \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\Delta}^{\mathbb{X}} \leq \phi_M(x^{(i)})^\top (Hb - b) \leq \hat{\Delta}, \quad i = 1, \dots, \hat{N}, \\
& \quad \hat{\xi} \leq \phi_M(x^{(i)})^\top b \leq \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, \hat{N}, \\
& \quad \phi_M(x^{(i)})^\top b \leq \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_0}, \quad i = 1, \dots, \tilde{N} - \hat{N}_0, \\
& \quad \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_u} \leq \phi_M(x^{(i)})^\top b, \quad i = 1, \dots, \tilde{N} - \hat{N}_u, \\
& \quad \check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X} \setminus \tilde{\mathbb{X}}} \leq \phi_M(x^{(i)})^\top b, \quad i = 1, \dots, \tilde{N} - \hat{N}, \\
& \quad \phi_M(x^{(i)})^\top (Hb - b) \leq \hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\Delta}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, \tilde{N} - \hat{N}, \\
& \quad c \geq 0, \quad 1 > \eta \geq 0, \quad b \in \mathbb{R}^{2M+1},
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

with $\kappa \geq \sigma_f$, $\bar{\mathbf{B}} \geq \|b\|_2$, and constraint-tightening coefficients

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{\eta} &:= \frac{2\eta + (C_{\tilde{N}} - 1)\check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X}_0} - 2A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_0}\hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_0}}{C_{\tilde{N}} - 2A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_0} + 1}, & \hat{\gamma} &:= \frac{2 + (C_{\tilde{N}} - 1)\hat{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X}_u} - 2A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_u}\check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_u}}{C_{\tilde{N}} - 2A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_u} + 1}, \\
\hat{\Delta} &:= \frac{2(c - \varepsilon\bar{\mathbf{B}}\kappa) + (C_{\tilde{N}} - 1)\check{\mathbf{B}}_{\Delta}^{\mathbb{X}} - 2A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}}\check{\mathbf{B}}_{\Delta}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}}}{C_{\tilde{N}} - 2A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}} + 1}, & \hat{\xi} &:= \frac{(C_{\tilde{N}} - 1)\check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\mathbb{X}} - 2A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}}\check{\mathbf{B}}_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}}}{C_{\tilde{N}} - 2A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}} + 1}.
\end{aligned}$$

Here, the coefficients $C_{\tilde{N}}, A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}}, A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_0}$, and $A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_u}$ are obtained as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
C_{\tilde{N}} &:= \left(1 - \frac{2f_{\max}}{\tilde{Q}}\right)^{-\frac{n}{2}}, \\
A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{S}} &:= \frac{1}{\tilde{N}} \sum_{\bar{x} \in \Theta_{\tilde{N}} \setminus \mathbb{S}} D_{f_{\max}, \tilde{Q} - f_{\max}}^n(x - \bar{x}), \quad \mathbb{S} \in \{\mathbb{X}, \mathbb{X}_0, \mathbb{X}_U\},
\end{aligned}$$

with $\tilde{N} = \tilde{Q}^n$, $f_{\max} \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$ the maximum degree of the Fourier barrier \mathbf{B} , and $D_{a,b}^n: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ the Vallée-Poussin kernel

$$D_{a,b}^n(z) := \frac{1}{(b-a)^n} \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{\sin(\frac{b+a}{2}z_i) \sin(\frac{b-a}{2}z_i)}{\sin^2(\frac{z_i}{2})}.$$

In practice, the coefficients $A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}}, A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_0}, A_{\tilde{N}}^{\tilde{\mathbb{X}} \setminus \mathbb{X}_u}$ are computed numerically for enlarged versions of the sets $\mathbb{X}, \mathbb{X}_0, \mathbb{X}_U$ (see `set_scaling` in Section 3.1, ③) via particle swarm optimization. See Schön, Zhong, and Soudjani (2025) for more details.

B Tool Technical Details

B.1 Installation

The recommended way to install PYLUCID is via the `pip` package manager, using one of the pre-built wheels, thus avoiding the time-consuming process of compiling the software from source. Assuming `Python>=3.8` is already present on the system, PYLUCID can be installed with a single command:

```
pip install "pylucid[gui]" --index-url https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/71977529/packages/
    pypi/simple
```

PYLUCID comes with several optional dependencies that enhance its functionality. These can be installed by specifying the corresponding flag in square brackets after the package name.

- The `gui` flag adds the PYLUCID GUI.
- The `verification` flag adds the DREAL SMT solver, allowing for formal verification of the barriers, provided the system dynamics are known. Note that DREAL can only be installed on Linux and non-ARM macOS.
- The `gurobi` flag adds the GUROBI solver interface. Note that a valid license is required to use the GUROBI solver.

If no pre-compiled wheel is available for the desired platform, PYLUCID can be installed from source by running the following commands:

```
git clone https://github.com/TendTo/lucid.git
cd lucid
pip install ".[gui]"
```

Building LUCID from source requires Python ≥ 3.8 and Bazel ≥ 8.0 to be installed on the system. For more details on the installation process, please refer to the online documentation at https://tendto.github.io/lucid/md_docs_2Pylucid.html.

B.2 Containerized Installation

We also provide a pre-built Docker image running PYLUCID in a containerized environment with all dependencies included. To run the image with the desired configuration, run:

```
docker run --name lucid -it --rm \
-v /path/to/conf.py:/config \
ghcr.io/tendto/lucid:latest /config/conf.py
```

Alternatively, the container can also run the GUI by changing the command to

```
docker run --name lucid -it --rm \
-p 3661:3661 --entrypoint pylucid-gui \
ghcr.io/tendto/lucid:latest
```

The GUI will be accessible at <http://localhost:3661>. Note that, in all cases, to use the GUROBI solver, a GUROBI Web License Service (WLS) license¹ will have to be mounted in the container.

B.3 Configuration Formats

PYLUCID configuration can be stored in a `.yaml` file (recommended), `.json` file, generated via a Python script producing a `Configuration` object, or provided directly via command line arguments. Moreover, system transition data can be either embedded directly in the configuration file or provided separately in the form of `.csv`, `.mat`, `.npy`, or `.npz` files. For example, the following configurations are equivalent:

¹See <https://www.gurobi.com/features/web-license-service/>

```

seed: 42
X_bounds: "RectSet([-1], [1])"
X_init: "RectSet([-0.5], [0.5])"
X_unsafe:
  - "RectSet([-1], [-0.9])"
  - "RectSet([0.9], [1])"
x_samples: [[1.0], [-1.0]]
xp_samples: [[0.5], [-0.5]]
lambda: 1.0e-5
time_horizon: 15
sigma_f: 18.0
sigma_l: 0.034
num_frequencies: 5
lattice_resolution: 700

```

Listing 1: YAML configuration.

```
{
  "seed": 42,
  "X_bounds": "RectSet([-1], [1])",
  "X_init": "RectSet([-0.5], [0.5])",
  "X_unsafe": [
    "RectSet([-1], [-0.9])",
    "RectSet([0.9], [1])"
  ],
  "x_samples": [[1], [-1]],
  "xp_samples": [[0.5], [-0.5]],
  "lambda": 0.00001,
  "time_horizon": 15,
  "sigma_f": 18,
  "sigma_l": 0.034,
  "num_frequencies": 5,
  "lattice_resolution": 700
}
```

Listing 2: JSON configuration.

```

from pylucid import *
import numpy as np

def scenario_config() -> Configuration:
    c = Configuration(seed=42, lambda_=1e-5)
    c.X_bounds = RectSet([(−1, 1)])
    c.X_init = RectSet([(−0.5, 0.5)])
    c.X_unsafe = MultiSet(
        RectSet([(−1, −0.9)]),
        RectSet([(0.9, 1)]),
    )
    c.x_samples = np.array([[1.0], [-1.0]])
    c.xp_samples = np.array([[0.5], [-0.5]])
    c.time_horizon = 15
    c.sigma_f = 18.0
    c.sigma_l = 0.034
    c.num_frequencies = 5
    c.lattice_resolution = 700
    return c

```

Listing 3: Python configuration.

```

pylucid \
--seed 42 \
--X_bounds "RectSet([-1], [1])" \
--X_init "RectSet([-0.5], [0.5])" \
--X_unsafe "MultiSet([RectSet([-1], \
[-0.9]), \
RectSet([0.9], [1])])" \
--lambda "1.0e-5" \
--time_horizon 15 \
--sigma_f 18.0 \
--sigma_l 0.034 \
--num_frequencies 5 \
--lattice_resolution 700 \
-i x_samples.csv \
-o xp_samples.csv

```

Listing 4: Command line configuration assuming that the transition samples have been stored as .csv files.

B.4 Graphical User Interface

PYLUCID provides a GUI to guide the user in the creation of the scenario configuration and presenting the results in an intuitive format. Running `pylucid-gui` will open a browser tab with the interface shown in Figure 9, while a local server will listen for requests coming from the GUI, computing and returning the results. Following the same enumeration as the arrows in the figure, we provide a list of the main components and features of the GUI:

1. It is easy to import or export configurations in JSON format. In the *Import* menu, the user can paste the configuration or load it from a file. The experiments discussed in this paper are also available and can be selected from a dropdown list. The *Export* menu can be used to copy the current configuration to the clipboard or download it locally.
2. The dimension n of the system is specified. Here, $n = 1$.
3. The user can provide transition samples directly by copy-pasting them into the text fields in the Data tab. Alternatively, if a model describing the system's expected behavior is available, the user can specify it in the Model tab. Lucid will then automatically generate a set of transitions from the model to be used in the computation of the barrier function. Note that this model-based generation is mainly intended for reference and convenience.
4. The x^1, \dots, x^N samples are specified in CSV format. They can be edited manually or loaded from a file.
5. The x_+^1, \dots, x_+^N samples are specified analogously.
6. The state space \mathbb{X} is defined by a `RectSet`. Here, $\mathbb{X} = [-1, 1]$.
7. The initial set \mathbb{X}_0 is defined from one of the available type options. More sets can be added via the + button. Here, $\mathbb{X}_0 = [-0.5, 0.5]$.
8. The unsafe set \mathbb{X}_U is defined analogously. Here, $\mathbb{X}_U = [-1, -0.9] \cup [0.9, 1]$.




Figure 9: PYLUCID's GUI as presented in the browser. The left half of the page allows the user to provide the transition samples and the safety specification to verify. The right half of the page shows the results produced by LUCID, including a plot of the computed barrier function and detailed logs.

9. The *Preview* button visualizes the expected stochastic behavior of the black-box system, predicted from the transition samples or alternatively as specified in the *Model* tab, alongside the bounding boxes of the state space \mathbb{X} , the initial set \mathbb{X}_0 , and the unsafe set \mathbb{X}_U .
10. The *Submit* button starts the computation of the barrier function with the current configuration.
11. The plot of the transition function or the computed barrier function.
12. The numerical results of the computation, including the lower bound on the safety probability, values of η and c , and the computation time. If a model of the expected system behavior is provided, it is also possible to formally verify the computed barrier function via DREAL.
13. The logs provide information on the progress of the computation, updated in real-time. The verbosity of the logs can be adjusted in the *Advanced* options.
14. The main GUI displays the most important configuration options. More advanced options can be accessed via the *Advanced* button. This includes the kernel hyperparameters, time horizon, number of frequencies and lattice size, LP solver selection, etc.

C Benchmarks

We provide a more detailed description of the benchmarks presented in Section 4, including the corresponding configuration files and an extended list of experiments. All benchmarks were run on a Windows 10 machine with an AMD Ryzen 9 5950X 16-Core Processor @ 3.40 GHz, NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3090 GPU, and 64 GB of RAM. To ensure reproducibility, all runs had the random seed set to 42. We ascertained that the variance of the safety probability is low across different seeds, and can be reduced further by increasing the number of samples used to fit the Estimator. The scripts for running the benchmarks and tuning the hyperparameters are available in the `benchmarks/integration/` folder of the repository. Note that `Python>=3.9` is required to run the scripts, as some dependencies used to track the benchmarks' metrics across multiple runs are not compatible with `Python 3.8`. The hyperparameter tuning of the Estimator was performed with the `LbfgsTuner`, bounding the value of σ_l between $[10^{-5}, 10^5]$, and refined with the `GridSearchTuner`. For additional flexibility, we use individual lengthscales σ_l and σ_{l_f} for the input kernel and output kernel, respectively. We use $N = 1000$ sample transitions and the `GUROBI` solver for all experiments; Other optimizers, such as `ALGLIB` or `HIGHS`, can be used instead, but may yield different results, especially in terms of performance.

C.1 Linear

We consider a black-box system with the following dynamics:

$$x_{t+1} = 0.5x_t + w_t,$$

where $w_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\cdot | 0, 0.01I_1)$. The data sampled from this black-box system is used as input for LUCID. Given $\mathbb{X} = [-1, 1]$, $\mathbb{X}_0 = [-0.5, 0.5]$, and $\mathbb{X}_U = [-1, -0.9] \cup [0.9, 1]$, we want to ensure that the system, starting in \mathbb{X}_0 , does not enter the unsafe regions \mathbb{X}_U within $T = 15$ time steps. We set the kernel hyperparameters to $\sigma_f = 1$ and $\lambda = 0.00001$. The complete configuration for the linear example benchmark is shown in Listing 5, with a satisfying barrier plotted in Figure 6.

```
b_norm: 2.0
estimator: KernelRidgeRegressor
feature_map: LinearTruncatedFourierFeatureMap
feature_sigma_l: 0.0925
gamma: 1.0
kernel: GaussianKernel
lambda: 1.0e-5
lattice_resolution: 300
noise_scale: 0.01
num_frequencies: 6
num_samples: 1000
optimiser: GurobiOptimiser
plot: true
seed: 42
set_scaling: 0.040000000000000001
sigma_f: 1.0
sigma_l: 0.04465750366442458
system_dynamics: [x1 / 2]
time_horizon: 15
verbose: 3
X_bounds:
  - RectSet:
    - [-1, 1]
```

#Freq.	Lattice Size	σ_{l_f}	σ_l	Set Scaling	η	c	Runtime [mm:ss]	Safety Prob.
6	300	[0.09]	[0.044]	4%	0.01	0.00	0:01	93.07%
7	400	[0.09]	[0.197]	3%	0.02	0.00	0:01	92.99%
6	400	[0.09]	[0.131]	4%	0.02	0.00	0:01	91.61%
5	400	[0.13]	[0.035]	5%	0.04	0.00	0:01	89.13%
6	300	[0.13]	[0.345]	3%	0.05	0.00	0:01	88.69%
8	400	[0.09]	[0.167]	3%	0.02	0.01	0:01	85.85%
7	400	[0.09]	[0.123]	4%	0.02	0.01	0:01	84.94%
6	400	[0.09]	[0.024]	5%	0.02	0.01	0:01	83.91%
8	300	[0.09]	[0.027]	3%	0.05	0.01	0:01	79.36%
4	400	[0.18]	[0.081]	6%	0.12	0.01	0:01	74.87%

Table 3: Linear results, sorted by the last column. For each combination of number of frequencies, M , and lattice size (i.e., number of lattice points per dimension), we report the values of the σ_l used in the estimator and the feature map, how much sets were scaled w.r.t the periodic space, η , c , the runtime, and the achieved lower bound on the safety probability.

```
X_init:
  - RectSet:
    - [-0.5, 0.5]
X_unsafe:
  - RectSet:
    - [-1, -0.9]
  - RectSet:
    - [0.9, 1]
```

Listing 5: Configuration for the linear example.

C.2 Barrier 2

We consider a black-box system with the following nonlinear dynamics:

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_{1,t+1} \\ x_{2,t+1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_{1,t} \\ x_{2,t} \end{bmatrix} + 0.1 \begin{bmatrix} x_{2,t} - 1 + e^{-x_{1,t}} \\ -\sin^2(x_{1,t}) \end{bmatrix} + w_t,$$

where $w_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\cdot | 0, 0.01I_2)$. The data sampled from this black-box system is used as input for LUCID. Given

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{X} &= [-2, 2] \times [-2, 2], \\ \mathbb{X}_0 &= \{[x_1, x_2] : (x_1 + 0.5)^2 + (x_2 - 0.5)^2 \leq 0.4\}, \\ \mathbb{X}_U &= \{[x_1, x_2] : (x_1 - 0.7)^2 + (x_2 + 0.7)^2 \leq 0.3\}, \end{aligned}$$

we want to ensure that the system, starting in \mathbb{X}_0 , does not enter the unsafe regions \mathbb{X}_U within $T = 5$ time steps. The system dynamics and safety specification are visualized in Figure 10. The kernel hyperparameters are set to $\sigma_f = 1$ and $\lambda = 10^{-6}$. The complete configuration for the Barr₂ benchmark is shown in Listing 6, with a satisfying barrier is plotted in Figure 7. A list of experiments using different combinations of frequencies and σ_l values, showing their impact on performance and final result, is presented in Table 4.

```
b_norm: 16.0
estimator: KernelRidgeRegressor
feature_map: LinearTruncatedFourierFeatureMap
feature_sigma_l: [0.1600000000000003, 0.1167777777777779]
gamma: 1.0
kernel: GaussianKernel
lambda: 1.0e-06
lattice_resolution: 330
noise_scale: 0.01
num_frequencies: 7
num_samples: 1000
optimiser: GurobiOptimiser
plot: true
seed: 42
```

```

set_scaling: 0.05
sigma_f: 1.0
sigma_l: [0.40501051998808607, 0.3580734352248586]
system_dynamics:
  - "x1 + 0.1 * (x2 - 1 + exp(-x1)) "
  - "x2 + 0.1 * -(sin(x1)^2) "
time_horizon: 5
verbose: 3
X_bounds:
  - RectSet:
    - [-2, 2]
    - [-2, 2]
X_init:
  - SphereSet:
    center: [-0.5, 0.5]
    radius: 0.4
X_unsafe:
  - SphereSet:
    center: [0.7, -0.7]
    radius: 0.3

```

Listing 6: Configuration for Barr_2 .




Figure 10: Visualization of the stochastic system behavior (based on 10 random transitions from an 100×100 grid of initial states) and safety specification for the Barr_2 benchmark.

C.3 Barrier 3

We consider a black-box system that has the following dynamics:

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_{1,t+1} \\ x_{2,t+1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_{1,t} \\ x_{2,t} \end{bmatrix} + 0.1 \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{3}x_{1,t}^3 - x_{1,t} - x_{2,t} \\ x_{2,t} \end{bmatrix} + w_t,$$

#Freq.	Lattice Size	σ_{l_f}	σ_l	Set Scaling	η	c	Runtime [mm:ss]	Safety Prob.
7	330	[0.16, 0.12]	[0.41, 0.36]	5%	0.18	0.04	4:38	63.17%
7	330	[0.12, 0.15]	[0.45, 0.34]	5%	0.16	0.05	3:21	59.17%
7	330	[0.16, 0.13]	[0.52, 0.44]	5%	0.19	0.05	4:18	58.38%
7	330	[0.20, 0.10]	[0.60, 0.32]	5%	0.20	0.05	4:00	54.82%
7	330	[0.20, 0.12]	[0.68, 0.41]	5%	0.22	0.05	4:13	54.11%
7	330	[0.16, 0.15]	[0.30, 0.42]	5%	0.20	0.05	4:07	53.88%
7	330	[0.24, 0.10]	[0.72, 0.21]	5%	0.23	0.05	4:21	53.46%
6	330	[0.40, 0.07]	[0.75, 0.21]	5%	0.25	0.04	2:28	53.13%
6	330	[0.20, 0.13]	[0.68, 0.26]	5%	0.21	0.05	1:39	52.36%
7	330	[0.24, 0.08]	[0.44, 0.25]	5%	0.22	0.05	4:28	52.31%
7	330	[0.24, 0.15]	[0.72, 0.35]	4%	0.26	0.05	6:27	50.38%
6	330	[0.36, 0.08]	[0.62, 0.25]	5%	0.25	0.05	2:40	49.13%
7	330	[0.20, 0.13]	[0.58, 0.31]	5%	0.24	0.05	4:41	48.91%
6	330	[0.24, 0.15]	[0.66, 0.36]	5%	0.27	0.05	2:03	48.54%
6	330	[0.24, 0.12]	[0.81, 0.33]	5%	0.24	0.06	1:57	47.84%
7	330	[0.20, 0.15]	[0.63, 0.38]	5%	0.27	0.05	4:24	47.64%
6	330	[0.32, 0.12]	[0.65, 0.34]	5%	0.27	0.05	2:19	46.55%
6	330	[0.40, 0.08]	[0.55, 0.29]	5%	0.26	0.06	2:25	46.46%
6	330	[0.28, 0.12]	[0.77, 0.30]	5%	0.28	0.05	1:59	46.22%
6	330	[0.28, 0.13]	[0.73, 0.31]	5%	0.30	0.05	1:43	44.72%
6	330	[0.32, 0.13]	[0.84, 0.47]	5%	0.30	0.05	2:14	44.69%

Table 4: Barr_2 results, sorted by the last column. For each combination of number of frequencies, M , and lattice size (i.e., number of lattice points per dimension), we report the values of c , λ , the runtime, and the achieved lower bound on the safety probability.

where $w_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\cdot | 0, 0.01I_2)$. The data sampled from this black-box system is used as input for LUCID. Given

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{X} &= [-3, 2.5] \times [-2, 1] \\ \mathbb{X}_0 &= [1, 2] \times [-0.7, 0.3] \cup [-1.8, -1.4] \times [-0.1, 0.1] \\ &\quad \cup [-1.4, -1.2] \times [-0.5, 0.1] \\ \mathbb{X}_U &= [0.4, 0.6] \times [0.2, 0.6] \cup [0.6, 0.7] \times [0.2, 0.4],\end{aligned}$$

we want to ensure that the system, starting in \mathbb{X}_0 , does not enter the unsafe regions \mathbb{X}_U within $T = 5$ time steps. The system dynamics and safety specification can be visualized in Figure 11. The kernel hyperparameters were set to $\sigma_f = 1$ and $\lambda = 10^{-8}$. The complete configuration for the Barr_3 benchmark is shown in Listing 7, while the barrier function is plotted in Figure 8. A list of experiments using different combinations of frequencies and σ_l values, showing their impact on performance and final result, is presented in Table 5.

```
b_norm: 7.0
estimator: KernelRidgeRegressor
feature_map: LinearTruncatedFourierFeatureMap
feature_sigma_l: [0.05, 0.15]
gamma: 1.0
kernel: GaussianKernel
lambda: 1.e-8
lattice_resolution: 330
noise_scale: 0.01
num_frequencies: 7
num_samples: 1000
optimiser: GurobiOptimiser
plot: true
seed: 42
set_scaling: 0.025
sigma_f: 1.0
sigma_l: [0.320588187057447, 0.15721319058133434]
system_dynamics:
- x1 + 0.1 * x2
```

```

- x2 + 0.1 * (-x1 - x2 + 1 / 3 * x1 ^ 3)
time_horizon: 5
verbose: 3
X_bounds: RectSet([-3, -2], [2.5, 1])
X_init:
- RectSet([1, -0.7], [2, 0.3])
- RectSet([-1.8, -0.1], [-1.4, 0.1])
- RectSet([-1.4, -0.5], [-1.2, 0.1])
X_unsafe:
- RectSet([0.4, 0.2], [0.6, 0.6])
- RectSet([0.6, 0.2], [0.7, 0.4])

```

Listing 7: Configuration for Barr_3 .




Figure 11: Visualization of the stochastic system behavior (based on 10 random transitions from an 100×100 grid of initial states) and safety specification for the Barr_3 benchmark.

C.4 Overtaking

We consider a scenario where an autonomous vehicle controlled by a NN is overtaking another vehicle. The dynamics of the ego vehicle are given by Dubin's car model with additive noise $w = [w_t^1 \ w_t^2 \ w_t^3]^\top$ where each component w_t^i is drawn from a zero-mean Gaussian with standard deviation 0.01, 0.01, and 0.001, respectively. The steering wheel angle is supplied by the NN controller and we travel at a fixed velocity. Given $N = 1000$ sample transitions and the sets

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{X} &= [1, 90] \times [-7, 19] \times [-\pi, \pi], & \mathbb{X}_0 &= [1, 3] \times [-1, 1] \times [-0.5, 0.5], & \mathbb{X}_U &= [1, 90] \times [-7, -6] \times [-\pi, \pi] \\ &&&\cup [1, 90] \times [18, 19] \times [-\pi, \pi] \\ &&&\cup [40, 45] \times [-6, 6] \times [-\pi, \pi], \end{aligned}$$

we want to ensure that the system, starting in \mathbb{X}_0 , does not enter the unsafe regions \mathbb{X}_U within $T = 5$ time steps. The sampled transitions and safety specification are visualized in Figure 12. The kernel hyperparameters are set to $\sigma_f = 7$, and $\lambda = 10^{-5}$. The complete configuration for the Over benchmark is shown in Listing 8. A list of experiments using different combinations of frequencies, lattice sizes and σ_l values, showing their impact on performance and final result, is presented in Table 6.

```

b_norm: 5.0
estimator: KernelRidgeRegressor
feature_map: LinearTruncatedFourierFeatureMap
feature_sigma_1: [0.525, 0.05, 0.525]
gamma: 1.0
kernel: GaussianKernel
lambda: 1.0e-05
lattice_resolution: 70

```

```

num_frequencies: 5
optimiser: GurobiOptimiser
plot: true
seed: 42
set_scaling: 0.03
sigma_f: 7.0
sigma_l: [0.05414576430336046, 0.09360528166417184, 5.078332038463804]
time_horizon: 5
verbose: 4
X_bounds:
- RectSet: [[1, 90], [-7, 19], [-3.14159265358979, 3.14159265358979]]
X_init:
- RectSet: [[1, 3], [-1, 1], [-0.5, 0.5]]
X_unsafe:
- RectSet: [[1, 90], [-7, -6], [-3.14159265358979, 3.14159265358979]]
- RectSet: [[1, 90], [18, 19], [-3.14159265358979, 3.14159265358979]]
- RectSet: [[40, 45], [-6, 6], [-3.14159265358979, 3.14159265358979]]
x_samples:
- [..., ..., ...]
- ...
- [..., ..., ...]
xp_samples:
- [..., ..., ...]
- ...
- [..., ..., ...]

```

Listing 8: Configuration for Over. The transition samples were generated by a separate script and appended to the configuration, abbreviated here for conciseness.




Figure 12: Visualization of $N = 200$ sample transitions and safety specification for the Over benchmark.

#Freq.	Lattice Size	σ_{l_f}	σ_l	Set Scaling	η	c	Runtime [mm:ss]	Safety Prob.
7	330	[0.05, 0.15]	[0.32, 0.16]	2%	0.29	0.04	3:20	51.63%
7	330	[0.05, 0.20]	[0.29, 0.57]	2%	0.29	0.04	3:29	50.92%
7	330	[0.05, 0.25]	[0.30, 0.23]	2%	0.29	0.04	3:52	50.91%
7	330	[0.05, 0.25]	[0.19, 0.71]	2%	0.29	0.04	3:16	50.50%
7	330	[0.05, 0.20]	[0.26, 0.81]	2%	0.29	0.04	3:24	49.63%
7	330	[0.05, 0.15]	[0.15, 0.62]	2%	0.28	0.04	2:43	49.15%
7	330	[0.05, 0.30]	[0.20, 0.77]	2%	0.30	0.04	3:20	48.91%
7	330	[0.05, 0.25]	[0.19, 0.21]	2%	0.30	0.04	3:13	48.72%
7	330	[0.05, 0.30]	[0.36, 1.27]	2%	0.30	0.04	3:40	47.94%
7	330	[0.05, 0.30]	[0.20, 0.83]	2%	0.30	0.04	3:23	47.47%
7	330	[0.05, 0.35]	[0.29, 0.39]	2%	0.31	0.04	3:30	47.46%
7	330	[0.05, 0.40]	[0.24, 1.25]	2%	0.30	0.05	3:23	45.74%
7	330	[0.05, 0.20]	[0.26, 0.70]	2%	0.32	0.04	2:46	45.40%
7	330	[0.05, 0.35]	[0.19, 0.94]	2%	0.32	0.05	3:47	45.10%
7	330	[0.05, 0.15]	[0.21, 0.38]	2%	0.32	0.05	2:45	44.36%
7	330	[0.05, 0.40]	[0.22, 0.97]	2%	0.33	0.05	3:17	44.14%
7	330	[0.05, 0.35]	[0.10, 1.10]	2%	0.31	0.05	2:55	43.64%
7	330	[0.05, 0.40]	[0.22, 0.92]	2%	0.33	0.05	2:18	42.42%
7	330	[0.05, 0.45]	[0.18, 0.81]	2%	0.34	0.05	0:48	41.21%
8	330	[0.05, 0.10]	[0.20, 0.36]	2%	0.30	0.06	5:21	41.03%
8	330	[0.05, 0.15]	[0.18, 0.38]	2%	0.32	0.05	2:52	40.99%
8	330	[0.05, 0.10]	[0.27, 0.44]	2%	0.32	0.05	4:20	40.25%
7	330	[0.05, 0.45]	[0.07, 1.38]	2%	0.32	0.06	1:04	39.90%
8	330	[0.05, 0.15]	[0.29, 0.14]	2%	0.34	0.05	2:30	39.42%
7	330	[0.05, 0.45]	[0.24, 0.28]	2%	0.35	0.05	2:57	38.76%
7	330	[0.05, 0.10]	[0.33, 0.29]	2%	0.36	0.05	2:28	38.73%
8	330	[0.05, 0.20]	[0.31, 0.49]	2%	0.34	0.06	2:08	38.52%
7	330	[0.05, 0.10]	[0.36, 0.27]	2%	0.38	0.05	2:35	38.39%
8	330	[0.05, 0.10]	[0.21, 0.19]	2%	0.33	0.06	5:09	38.07%
6	330	[0.05, 0.20]	[0.16, 0.53]	2%	0.26	0.07	1:35	37.66%
7	330	[0.05, 0.50]	[0.17, 0.70]	2%	0.35	0.06	0:56	36.97%
8	330	[0.05, 0.20]	[0.22, 0.69]	2%	0.34	0.06	2:51	36.87%
8	330	[0.05, 0.25]	[0.26, 0.44]	2%	0.33	0.06	2:30	36.64%
7	330	[0.05, 0.55]	[0.25, 0.93]	2%	0.35	0.06	1:02	36.49%
7	330	[0.05, 0.10]	[0.08, 0.31]	2%	0.38	0.05	2:27	36.43%
8	330	[0.05, 0.15]	[0.22, 0.26]	2%	0.35	0.06	2:03	35.55%
7	330	[0.05, 0.50]	[0.18, 0.78]	2%	0.36	0.06	1:18	35.19%
7	330	[0.05, 0.55]	[0.19, 1.07]	2%	0.36	0.06	1:19	34.39%
8	330	[0.05, 0.25]	[0.18, 0.69]	2%	0.34	0.06	2:46	33.75%
6	330	[0.05, 0.30]	[0.19, 0.67]	2%	0.34	0.07	1:57	30.01%
6	330	[0.05, 0.30]	[0.19, 0.81]	2%	0.34	0.08	1:32	27.17%

Table 5: Barr_3 results, sorted by the last column. For each combination of number of frequencies M and lattice size (i.e., number of lattice points per dimension), we report the values of c , λ , the runtime, and the achieved lower bound on the safety probability.

#Freq.	Lattice Size	σ_{l_f}	σ_l	Set Scaling	η	c	Runtime [mm:ss]	Safety Prob.
5	70	[0.53, 0.05, 0.53]	[0.05, 0.09, 5.08]	3%	0.46	0.00	93:56	53.66%
5	70	[0.53, 0.05, 1.00]	[0.08, 0.37, 0.29]	5%	0.48	0.00	94:03	52.25%
5	70	[0.53, 0.05, 1.00]	[0.11, 0.02, 0.43]	3%	0.50	0.00	75:01	50.20%
5	70	[0.53, 0.05, 0.53]	[1.70, 0.01, 0.71]	4%	0.57	0.00	96:02	43.15%
5	70	[0.53, 0.05, 0.53]	[17.70, 0.09, 0.01]	5%	0.57	0.00	103:49	42.58%
5	80	[0.53, 0.05, 0.53]	[0.00, 7227, 1.02]	2%	0.61	0.00	111:55	38.81%
5	70	[0.53, 0.05, 0.05]	[3.24, 0.07, 0.02]	4%	0.77	0.00	37:30	22.63%
5	70	[0.53, 0.05, 0.05]	[3.24, 0.06, 0.07]	3%	0.78	0.00	44:36	22.08%
5	70	[0.53, 0.05, 1.00]	[2.05, 0.32, 0.03]	4%	0.83	0.00	67:05	17.28%
5	70	[0.53, 0.05, 0.05]	[12583, 0.00, 0.08]	5%	0.90	0.00	59:29	10.19%

Table 6: Over results, sorted by the last column. For each combination of number of frequencies M and lattice size (i.e., number of lattice points per dimension), we report the values of c , λ , the runtime, and the achieved lower bound on the safety probability.