



# DISCRETE MATHEMATICS FOR COMPUTER SCIENCE

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# The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- **Theorem** (*The Chinese Remainder Theorem*) Let  $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n$  be pairwise relatively prime positive integers greater than 1 and  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n$  arbitrary integers. Then the system

$$x \equiv a_1 \pmod{m_1}$$

$$x \equiv a_2 \pmod{m_2}$$

...

$$x \equiv a_n \pmod{m_n}$$


has a unique solution modulo  $m = m_1 m_2 \cdots m_n$ .

# The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- **Proof** Let  $M_k = m/m_k$  for  $k = 1, 2, \dots, n$  and  $m = m_1 m_2 \cdots m_n$ . Since  $\gcd(m_k, M_k) = 1$ , there is an integer  $y_k$ , an inverse of  $M_k$  modulo  $m_k$  such that  $M_k y_k \equiv 1 \pmod{m_k}$ . Let


$$x = a_1 M_1 y_1 + a_2 M_2 y_2 + \cdots + a_n M_n y_n.$$

It is checked that  $x$  is a solution to the  $n$  congruences.



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
$$x \equiv 2 \pmod{7}$$

$$x \equiv 8 \pmod{15}$$

$$x \equiv 2 \pmod{21}$$


# Modular Arithmetic in CS

- Modular arithmetic and congruencies are used in CS:
  - ◊ Pseudorandom number generators
  - ◊ Hash functions
  - ◊ Cryptography



# Hash Functions


- A *hash function* is an algorithm that maps data of arbitrary length to data of a fixed length. The values returned by a hash function are called *hash values* or *hash codes*.



# Hash Functions


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**Example:**



# Hash Functions

- **Problem:** Given a large collection of records, how can we store and find a record quickly?



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**Solution:** Use a hash function, calculate the location of the record based on the record's ID.

**Example:** A common hash function is

- $h(k) = k \bmod n$ ,

where  $n$  is the number of available storage locations.


|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

ID: 21       $\xrightarrow{21 \bmod 9} = 3$

ID: 35       $\xrightarrow{35 \bmod 9} = 8$

# Hash Functions

- Two records mapped to the same location



# Hash Functions

- Solution 1: move to the next available location


try

$$h_0(k) = k \bmod n$$

$$h_1(k) = (k+1) \bmod n$$


...

$$h_m(k) = (k+m) \bmod n$$




# Hash Functions

- **Solution 2:** remember the exact location in a secondary structure that is searched sequentially



# Applications of Number Theory in Cryptography

- Introduction
- Symmetric cryptography
- Asymmetric cryptography
- RSA Cryptosystem
- DLP and El Gamal cryptography
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
- Cryptocurrency, e.g., bitcoin



# Fermat's Little Theorem

- **Theorem (Fermat's little theorem)** : Let  $p$  be a prime, and let  $x$  be an integer such that  $x \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ . Then

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
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$$\{1, 2, \dots, p-1\} = \{x, 2x, \dots, x(p-1) \pmod{p}\}$$

# Euler's Theorem

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
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
- Let  $a \in \mathbb{Z}$  and  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ . If  $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ , the least  $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$  such that  $a^\ell \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$  is called the *order of a modulo n*, denoted by  $\text{ord}_n(a)$ .



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**Example**  $n = 7$ , then

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
**Q** : How to prove this theorem?

Using Euler's theorem and  $\phi(n) = q \cdot \text{ord}_n(a) + r$



# Primitive Roots

- A *primitive root* modulo a prime  $p$  is an integer  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  such that every nonzero element of  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  is a power of  $r$ .



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
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**Q** : proof? The number of primitive roots? \*



# Classical One-Key Ciphers


- A 5-tuple  $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, E_k, D_k)$ , where
  - ▶  $\mathcal{M}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{K}$  denote the plaintext space, ciphertext space, and key space.
  - ▶ Any  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  could be the encryption and decryption key;
  - ▶  $E_k$  and  $D_k$  are encryption and decryption transformatons with  $D_k(E_k(m)) = m$  for each  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ .

# Classical One-Key Ciphers

- Give a cipher  $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, E_k, D_k)$ :
  - ▶ **Encryption:**  $c = E_k(m)$ , where  $E_k$  is usually applied to blocks of the plaintext  $m$ .
  - ▶ **Decryption:**  $m = D_k(c)$ , where  $D_k$  is usually applied to blocks of the ciphertext  $c$ .



# Symmetric Cryptography




# Attacks on Classical Cryptography

- **Ciphertext-only attack**

determine the decryption transformation  $D_k$ , or  $k$ , or  $m$  from the ciphertext  $c$ .

- **Known-plaintext attack**

determine the decryption transformation  $D_k$ , or  $k$ , from a ciphertext-plaintext pair  $(c, m)$ .



# Simple Substitution Ciphers

- Let  $f$  be a 1-to-1 function from  $A$  to  $B$ . It is a 5-tuple  $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, E_k, D_k)$ , where

- $\mathcal{M} = A^*$  and  $\mathcal{C} = B^*$

- $\mathcal{K}$  is the set of all possible  $f$

- $k = f \in \mathcal{K}$  is the encryption and decryption key


- For a message  $m = m_0 m_1 m_2 \dots$ ,

$$c = E_k(m) = f(m_0) f(m_1) f(m_2) \dots$$

- For a ciphertext  $c = c_0 c_1 c_2 \dots$ ,

$$m = D_k(c) = f^{-1}(c_0) f^{-1}(c_1) f^{-1}(c_2) \dots$$

# Simple Substitution Ciphers: Examples



|   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a | . | b | . | c | . |
| d | . | e | . | f | . |
| g | . | h | . | i | . |

|   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| k | . | l | . | m | . |
| n | . | o | . | p | . |
| q | . | r | . | s | . |

|   |  |   |  |   |  |
|---|--|---|--|---|--|
| t |  | u |  | v |  |
| w |  | x |  | y |  |
| z |  | j |  |   |  |

# Simple Substitution Ciphers: Caesar Cipher

|     |     |     |          |     |     |
|-----|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|
| $a$ | $b$ | $c$ | $\cdots$ | $y$ | $z$ |
| 0   | 1   | 2   | $\cdots$ | 24  | 25  |

$$f(x) = (x + 3) \bmod 26$$



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VENI, VIDI, VICI

YHQL YLGL YLFL



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**Affine cipher:** Take any  $(k_0, k_1)$  with  $\gcd(k_0, 26) = 1$  and  $0 \leq k_0 \leq 25$ , define the 1-to-1 mapping  $f$  by

$$f(a) = (ak_0 + k_1) \bmod 26.$$

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**Q :** Why  $\gcd(k_0, 26) = 1$  ?

# Simple Substitution Ciphers: Examples

**Cryptanalysis:** Suppose that we know two pairs of plaintext-ciphertext characters  $(m_1, c_1)$  and  $(m_2, c_2)$ , i.e.,

$$c_1 = (m_1 k_0 + k_1) \bmod 26$$

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**Q :** When the set of two equations above has a **unique** solution  $(k_0, k_1)$ ?



# Other Symmetric Ciphers

DES


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
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## “Confusion” & “Diffusion”

Claude E. Shannon, "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems", Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 28-4, pages 656-715, 1949.



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




图 1 AES 加密/解密框图



# Public-Key Cryptosystems

W. Diffie, M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography”,  
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 22-6, pages  
644-654, 1976.




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
Four properties:

1.  $D(E(M)) = M$
2. Both  $E$  and  $D$  are easy to compute
3. It is computationally infeasible to derive  $D$  from  $E$
4.  $E(D(M)) = M$




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


# Asymmetric Cryptography



# Public-Key Cryptosystems


R. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman, "A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems", Communications of the ACM, vol. 21-2, pages 120-126, 1978.



# RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem

Pick two **large** primes,  $p$  and  $q$ . Let  $n = pq$ , then  $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ . Encryption and decryption keys  $e$  and  $d$  are selected such that

- $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$
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$$C = M^e \bmod n \text{ (RSA encryption)}$$

$$M = C^d \bmod n \text{ (RSA decryption)}$$

- **Theorem 12** (Correctness) : Let  $p$  and  $q$  be two odd primes, and define  $n = pq$ . Let  $e$  be relatively prime to  $\phi(n)$  and let  $d$  be the multiplicative inverse of  $e$  modulo  $\phi(n)$ . For each integer  $x$  such that  $0 < x < n$ ,

$$x^{ed} \equiv x \pmod{n}.$$

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
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
$$x^{ed} \equiv x \pmod{n}.$$

**Q** : How to prove this?



# RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem: Example

| Parameters: | $p$ | $q$ | $n$ | $\phi(n)$ | $e$ | $d$ |
|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----------|-----|-----|
|             | 5   | 11  | 55  | 40        | 7   | 23  |




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
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**Public key:** (7, 55)

**Private key:** 23

**Encryption:**  $M = 28, C = M^7 \bmod 55 = 52$

**Decryption:**  $M = C^{23} \bmod 55 = 28$




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**Q :** Why?

# The Security of the RSA

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Trying all possible private keys.

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
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
**Attack:** Determine  $d$  directly.

**Comment:** It is believed that determining  $\phi(n)$  is equivalent to factoring  $n$ . Meanwhile, determining  $d$  given  $e$  and  $n$ , appears to be at least as time-consuming as the integer factoring problem.



# The Security of the RSA

In practice, RSA keys are typically 1024 to 2048 bits long.




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**Q :** Consider the RSA system, where  $n = pq$  is the modulus. Let  $(e, d)$  be a key pair for the RSA. Define

$$\lambda(n) = \text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1)$$


and compute  $d' = e^{-1} \bmod \lambda(n)$ . Will decryption using  $d'$  instead of  $d$  still work?

# Using RSA for Digital Signature

$S = M^d \bmod n$  (RSA **signature**)

$M = S^e \bmod n$  (RSA **verification**)


Why?



# The Discrete Logarithm

- The **discrete logarithm** of an integer  $y$  to the base  $b$  is an integer  $x$ , such that

$$b^x \equiv y \pmod{n}.$$




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
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
Given  $n$ ,  $b$  and  $y$ , find  $x$ .

This is very hard!!!



# El Gamal Encryption

- **Setup** Let  $p$  be a prime, and  $g$  be a generator of  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . The **private key**  $x$  is an integer with  $1 < x < p - 2$ . Let  $y = g^x \bmod p$ . The **public key** for *El Gamal encryption* is  $(p, g, y)$ .



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**El Gamal Encryption:** Pick a random integer  $k$  from  $\mathbb{Z}_{p-1}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} a &= g^k \bmod p \\ b &= My^k \bmod p \end{aligned}$$

The ciphertext  $C$  consists of the pair  $(a, b)$ .


**El Gamal Decryption:**

$$M = b(a^x)^{-1} \bmod p$$

# Using El Gamal for Digital Signature

$a = g^k \pmod{p}$   
 $b = k^{-1}(M - xa) \pmod{p-1}$   
(El Gamal **signature**)

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
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**Q** : How to verify it?

## An Example


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
- ▶ **(Public key)**  $k_e = (p, g, y) = (2579, 2, 949)$
- ▶ **(Private key)**  $k_d = x = 765$

**Encryption:** Let  $M = 1299$  and choose a random  $k = 853$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}(a, b) &= (g^k \bmod p, My^k \bmod p) \\ &= (2^{853} \bmod 2579, 1299 \cdot 949^{853} \bmod 2579) \\ &= (435, 2396).\end{aligned}$$

**Decryption:**

$$M = b(a^x)^{-1} \bmod p = 2396 \times (435^{765})^{-1} \bmod 2579 = 1299.$$



# Security of the El Gamal Cryptosystem

**Question 1:** Is it feasible to derive  $x$  from  $(p, g, y)$ ?

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
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**Question 2:** Given a ciphertext  $(a, b)$ , is it feasible to derive the plaintext  $M$ ?

**Attack 1:** Use  $M = by^{-k}$ . However,  $k$  is **randomly** picked.

**Attack 2:** Use  $M = b(a^x)^{-1} \bmod p$ , but  $x$  is **secret**.



# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol

User A

Generate random  
 $X_A < p$   
calculate  
 $Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \text{ mod } p$

Calculate  
 $k = (Y_B)^{X_A} \text{ mod } p$

$Y_A$   
→  
←  
 $Y_B$

User B


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Calculate  
 $k = (Y_A)^{X_B} \text{ mod } p$

# Announcements

## ■ Homework assignment 3

- ◊ P245 Ex. 37, 38, 39, P255 Ex. 2, 26, P272 Ex. 11\*, 12, P273 Ex. 42, P274 Ex. 50, 55, P284 Ex. 7\*, P285 Ex. 22, P286 Ex. 39, P305 Ex. 23, 28, 30
- ◊ Due on *Nov. 7th, 2017 at the beginning of class*
- ◊ Please try you best to slove problems marked with \*
- ◊ Please write your homeowrk **neatly**, as a courtesy to graders.



# Next Lecture

- induction, ...

