

Event-Driven Network Programming

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Nate Foster²



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
¹  University of Colorado Boulder

²  Cornell University

June 16th, 2016
(PLDI 2016)




Network Programming




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Network Programming




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
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
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- *Network configurations*—static network forwarding behavior
- There are many languages for this (NetKAT [POPL'14], etc.)
- SDN devices are becoming more programmable: mutable state, responding to events, etc.
- Writing programs for these *dynamic* networks is difficult: handling shared state in a distributed system, etc.


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
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
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
- We want to provide a useful form of consistency while ensuring that *all programs are efficiently implementable*

When Should we Respond to Events?

- In dynamic programs, a *packet event* **e** can trigger an update


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- “Uncoordinated” updates cause problems in this example
- We need stronger guarantees about *when* configurations change with respect to events
- *Don't respond to an event too late (and don't respond too early)!*

How Can we Handle Conflicting Events?

- Consider a firewall that authorizes **only the first-contacted** external host


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
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- *This program cannot be implemented efficiently!*

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- We provide a *locality condition* that guarantees efficient implementability

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Programming with Events

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- We extend NetKAT to allow specifying *multiple* network configurations, and the event-driven updates between them


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$$\begin{array}{ll} f & \in \text{Field} & (\text{header-field name}) \\ n & \in \mathbb{N} & (\text{numeric value}) \\ a, b ::= \mathbf{true} \mid \mathbf{false} \mid f = n \mid \mathbf{state}(n) = n \mid a \vee b \mid a \wedge b \mid \neg a & (\text{test}) \\ p, q ::= a \mid f \leftarrow n \mid p + q \mid p ; q \mid p^* \mid (n:n) \rightarrow (n:n) & (\text{command}) \\ & \mid \mathbf{state}(n) \leftarrow n \end{array}$$


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


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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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


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 - Problem: different switches could have different views of which events have occurred (conflicts!)

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
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

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

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



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



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



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- **Locality condition:** we require incompatible events to occur at the same switch

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Lemma

In general, can't correctly implement an NES that does not satisfy the locality condition, unless availability can be sacrificed


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Theorem (Correctness)

Implementing an event-driven program in this way guarantees:

- *event-triggered consistent update*
- *event structure consistency*

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
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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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
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
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
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Stateful Firewall—Topology




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

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
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
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
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Learning Switch—Topology



Incorrect behavior



Correct behavior

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