Expectations, Deflation Traps and Macroeconomic Policy, 2009, Evans & Honkapohja

-Assumptions in the non-linear framework already are: point forecasts (distributions do not matter), representative agents and ricardian households (i.e. households understand government spending rule and incorporate that in their expectations.)
-monetary policy is transparent and clear–> that's why agents take it into account in their expectation formation rule.
-target steady-state is locally determinate, low inflation steady-state is locally indeterminate.

-textbfendogenous regime switches near the zlb -two steady-state in the standard framework, i.e. benhabib schmitt uribe results-
-discount factor shock which gives rise to movements in the equilibrium value of real interest rate
-the agent does not know the regimes; he contemplates about possible regimes. Hence this is a step between Bill's paper where they consider learning under regimes that are known; and our framework where the regime switches are completely unobserved and unknown.
-there is model averaging and switching too
Dordal i Carrera, 2016: they consider adverse shocks large enough to push the targeted equilibrium to a point where ZLB becomes binding. Lansing's paper here consider endogenous switches between the two steady-states; hence it is not only the shock process that generates the ZLB episode.

on the initialization, galimberti and jacqueson
examine the performance of common methods used in the literature. These are REE-based initializations, training-based, hand-picked and estimation-based. They find evidende in favour of training-based methods.

bullard and eusepi, E-stability and determinacy:
when are these two conditions equivalent?
Their main finding is determinacy does not in general imply E-stability, except for some special (albeit important) cases.

nonlinear advantures at the zlb:
-explicitly account for the nonlinearity due to zlb
-main takeaway and relevant part for our paper is that government spending multipliers are larger at the ZLB.

macroeconomic analysis without the rational expectations hypothesis woodford

review of adaptive and eductive learning concepts; the eductive learning concept he talks about a k-level approach, which is actually very close the notion of iterative E-stability that we use here. He also talks about Restricted Perceptions Equilibria, rule selection: once we deviate from REE, there are many many alternatives so how do we choose among all possible candidates? Empirical fit might be a criterion he says. Monetary policy should also be robust to all plausible alternatives considered. I.e. some sort of minimax approach where the welfare criterion is maximized with respect to the worst case scenario. This is not relevant for this paper, but certainly is for the upcoming projects.