Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model

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What is the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model?

- A.k.a. the neo-classical growth model, a model of long run economic growth.
- Developed by Frank Ramsey (1929) and later extended by David Cass (1969) and Tjalling Koopmans (1969).
- The workhorse model of modern macroeconomics.

Why is the RCK model useful?

- More reasonable explanation on the household's decision on saving/consumption à la Fisher. [The Solow model has an ad-hoc constant saving rate.]
- The model is also a basis for real business cycle (RBC) models of short-run fluctuations, which will be later in the class.

Recap: Solow model

In Solow model, we have

$$y_t = A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta},$$

$$s_t = i_t = k_t - (1 - \delta)k_{t-1},$$

$$s_t = \sigma y_t,$$

where k_t is the capital stock at the *end* of date t.

- We will relax the assumption of the constant saving rate.
- [Show the circulation diagram]

Firm

 The representative firm can access to the Cobb-Douglas production function technology:

$$y_t = A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta}.$$

• As a result of profit maximization,

$$r_t = \theta y_t / k_{t-1},$$

and

$$\pi_t = y_t - r_t k_{t-1} = (1 - \theta) y_t.$$

Household

Household's saving is equal to investment on capital:

$$s_t = i_t = k_t - (1 - \delta)k_{t-1}.$$

• Household owns capital and firm, and decide how much to save and consume:

$$c_t + s_t = r_t k_{t-1} + \pi_t = y_t.$$

• In Solow model, $s_t=\sigma y_t$ and hence $c_t=(1-\sigma)y_t$. Here, decision on consumption and saving is endogenous.

Euler equation

 Household choose consumption so as to satisfy the following the Euler equation:

$$MU_t = \beta MU_{t+1} \left(1 + r_{t+1} - \delta \right),\,$$

where β is discount factor and MU_t is the marginal utility from consumption in period t.

 The LHS is the benefit from one unit of consumption today. The RHS is the benefit from one unit of saving today and consuming the return on saving tomorrow.

Marginal utility

- Marginal utility is the benefit from one unit of consumption.
- To link consumption to utility, we need a utility function of the household.
 For example,

$$U_t = \log c_t$$
.

Then we have

$$MU_t = 1/c_t$$
.

Equilibrium

• Now we have the following equilibrium conditions:

$$y_{t} = A_{t}k_{t-1}^{\theta},$$

$$c_{t} + k_{t} - (1 - \delta)k_{t-1} = y_{t},$$

$$1 = \beta \frac{c_{t}}{c_{t+1}} (1 + r_{t+1} - \delta),$$

$$r_{t} = \theta y_{t}/k_{t-1}.$$

• There are four unknowns and four equations, so we can solve the model.

The two key equations

• The equilibrium conditions are summarized as

$$\begin{split} \frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} &= \beta \left(1 + \theta A_{t+1} k_t^{\theta - 1} - \delta \right), \\ k_t - k_{t-1} &= A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta} - \delta k_{t-1} - c_t. \end{split}$$

The steady state

In the steady state,

$$1 = \beta \left(1 + \alpha A k^{\alpha - 1} - \delta \right),$$

$$0 = A k^{\alpha} - \delta k - c,$$

hold.

• The steady-state conditions can be solved for

$$\bar{k} = \left(\frac{\alpha\beta A}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)}\right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}},$$
$$\bar{c} = A(\bar{k})^{\alpha} - \delta\bar{k}.$$

These equations are drawn on the (k, c) plane.



The transition dynamics

Let


$$g_{ct} \equiv c_t/c_{t-1} - 1 = \beta \left(1 + \alpha A_t k_{t-1}^{\alpha - 1} - \delta \right) - 1,$$

$$\tilde{g}_{kt} \equiv k_t - k_{t-1} = A k_{t-1}^{\alpha} - \delta k_{t-1} - c_t.$$

- If $g_{ct} > 0$, $c_t > c_{t-1}$ holds; $k_{t-1} < \bar{k}$ implies $g_c > 0$.
- If $\tilde{g}_{kt} > 0$, $k_t > k_{t-1}$ holds; $c_t < Ak_{t-1}^{\alpha} \delta k_{t-1}$ implies $\tilde{g}_k > 0$.
- ullet c_t is called jump variables, whereas k_{t-1} is state variable.

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The Phase diagram



Two ways to solve the RCK model

- A Robinson Crusoe (Social Planner) economy.
- A Competitive economy.
- When the allocations and prices in these economies coincide each other? The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics.

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A Robinson Crusoe economy

- Consider an economy with only one individual.
- The individual wants to maximize a lifetime utility of the form

$$\begin{split} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log c_t \\ \text{subject to} \\ k_t &= (1-\delta)k_{t-1} + i_t, \\ y_t &= A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta} \geq c_t + i_t. \end{split}$$

where c_t is consumption, k_t is capital, i_t is investment and y_t is output. Parameters are given as $\beta \in (0,1]$ is discount factor, $\delta \in (0,1]$ is depreciation rate, and θ is capital share.

Lagrangean

We set up the Lagrangean as

$$L_0 \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \log c_t - \lambda_t \left(c_t + k_t - (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} - A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta} \right) \right\}.$$

 λ_t is called the Lagrange multiplier, which measures the marginal utility of consumption.

Taking the derivatives of the Lagrangean and set them to zero

$$\begin{aligned} \partial c_t : \quad & \lambda_t = 1/c_t, \\ \partial k_t : \quad & \lambda_t = \beta \lambda_{t+1} \left(1 + \theta A_{t+1} k_t^{\theta} - \delta \right), \\ \partial \lambda_t : \quad & c_t + k_t - (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} - A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta} = 0. \end{aligned}$$

These are the necessary conditions for the equilibrium.



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The two key equations

The equilibrium conditions are summarized as

$$1 = \beta \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}} \left(1 + \theta A_{t+1} k_t^{\theta - 1} - \delta \right),$$

$$c_t + k_t - (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} = A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta}.$$

Transversality condition

• The transversality condition is

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \beta^t M U_t k_t = 0,$$

where k_t is the remaining resources and MU_t converts the value of k_t to the unit in terms of utility.

 The condition says that the planner must use all the resources and/or have no marginal benefit from consumption.

A competitive economy

- In a competitive economy, there are consumers who provide labor to the market and firms who hire the labor at wage w_t and rent capital at rate r_t .
- All individuals are the same. We consider the "representative" agent's problem.

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Firms

• The representative firm can access to the Cobb-Douglas production function technology:

$$y_t = A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta}.$$

• As a result of profit maximization,

$$r_t = \theta y_t / k_{t-1},$$

and

$$\pi_t = y_t - r_t k_{t-1} = (1 - \theta) y_t.$$



Households

• An individual $i \in [0,1]$ maximizes:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t^i)$$

subject to

$$c_t^i + k_t^i - (1 - \delta)k_{t-1}^i = r_t k_t^i + \pi_t^i,$$

Lagrangean

• We set up the Lagrangean as

$$L_0^i \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \log c_t^i - \lambda_t \left(c_t^i + k_t^i - (1 - \delta) k_{t-1}^i - r_t k_{t-1}^i - \pi_t^i \right) \right\}.$$

Taking the derivatives of the Lagrangean and set them to zero,

$$\begin{split} &\partial c_t^i: \quad \lambda_t = 1/c_t^i, \\ &\partial k_t^i: \quad \lambda_t = \beta \lambda_{t+1} \left(1 + r_{t+1} - \delta\right), \\ &\partial \lambda_t: \quad c_t^i + k_t^i - (1 - \delta)k_{t-1}^i - r_t k_{t-1}^i - \pi_t^i = 0. \end{split}$$

The two key equations for households

• The optimality conditions for households are summarized as

$$\begin{split} \frac{c_{t+1}^i}{c_t^i} &= \beta \left(1 + r_{t+1} - \delta\right), \\ c_t^i + k_t^i &= (1 - \delta)k_{t-1}^i + r_t k_{t-1}^i + \pi_t^i. \end{split}$$

Aggregation

The aggregation rules are

$$c_{t} = \int_{0}^{1} c_{t}^{i} di, \quad k_{t} = \int_{0}^{1} k_{t}^{i} di,$$
$$y_{t} = \int_{0}^{1} y_{t}^{i} di, \quad \pi_{t} = \int_{0}^{1} \pi_{t}^{i} di,$$

• Note that $\pi_t + r_t k_{t-1} = y_t$. Then we have

$$1 = \beta \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}} \left(1 + \theta A_{t+1} k_t^{\theta - 1} - \delta \right),$$

$$c_t + k_t - (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} = A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta}.$$



Second welfare theorem

• The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics: If household preferences and firm production sets are convex, there is a complete set of markets with publicly known prices, and every agent acts as a price taker, then any Pareto optimal outcome can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium if appropriate lump-sum transfers of wealth are arranged.

Second welfare theorem, cont'd

- The first fundamental theorem: Any Competitive Equilibrium allocation (C.E.) is necessarily Pareto Optimum allocation (P.O.).
- The second fundamental theorem: Any P.O. can be achieved as a C.E. with a lump-sum transfer.
- If the second welfare theorem holds, we only need to look at P.O. instead of C.E.
- Counter-example: An economy with distortionary tax.

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Appendix

- An economy with variable labor
- Incorporating trend
- 3 Notes on Newton's method and deterministic simulation

An economy with variable labor

• The social planner wants to maximize a lifetime utility

$$\begin{split} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log c_t + v(h_t) \\ \text{subject to} \\ k_t &= (1-\delta)k_{t-1} + i_t, \\ y_t &= A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta} h_t^{1-\theta} \geq c_t + i_t. \end{split}$$

where c_t is consumption, k_t is capital, i_t is investment, y_t is output and h_t is hours worked. Parameters are given as $\beta \in (0,1)$ is discount factor, $\delta \in (0,1]$ is depreciation rate, and θ is capital share.

Labor disutility

- $v(h_t)$ is called labor disutility: $h_t \in (0,1)$ and $v(h_t)$ is a concave function such that $v(h_t) \to -\infty$ as $h_t \to 1$.
- There are two forms of labor disutility.
 - Divisible labor: $v(h_t) = B \log(1 h_t)$: Everyone works for h_t hours.
 - Indivisible labor: $v(h_t) = -Bh_t$: Only a fraction of *individuals* works for h_0 hours.

Indivisibility and lottery

- Labor is indivisible: Individuals can either work full time, denoted by h_0 , or not at all.
- We require individuals to choose lotteries α_t :

$$\log c_t + A\alpha_t \log(1 - h_0)$$

Note $\log(1) = 0$. Total hours worked (per capita) is $h_t = \alpha_t h_0$.



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Indivisibility and lottery, cont'd

- It can be viewed as linear disutility from the point of view of "representative" household.
- By substituting out α_t , we have

$$A\alpha_t \log(1 - h_0) = A \log(1 - h_0)/h_0 h_t,$$

= $-Bh_t$

where $B = -A \log(1 - h_0)/h_0 > 0$.

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Lagrangean

We set up the Lagrangean as

$$L_0 \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \log c_t + v(h_t) - \lambda_t \left(c_t + k_t - (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} - A_t k_{t-1}^{\alpha} h_t^{1-\alpha} \right) \right\}.$$

 λ_t is the Lagrange multiplier.

Taking the derivatives of the Lagrangean and set them to zero,

$$\begin{split} & \partial c_t : \quad \lambda_t = 1/c_t, \\ & \partial h_t : \quad \lambda_t (1-\alpha) A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta} h_t^{-\theta} = -v'(h_t), \\ & \partial k_t : \quad \lambda_t = \beta \lambda_{t+1} \left(1 + \theta A_{t+1} k_t^{\theta-1} h_t^{1-\theta} - \delta \right), \\ & \partial \lambda_t : \quad c_t + k_t - (1-\delta) k_{t-1} - A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta} h_t^{1-\theta} = 0. \end{split}$$

Equilibrium conditions

• The equilibrium conditions are

$$\begin{split} y_t &= A_t k_{t-1}^{\theta} h_t^{1-\theta}, \\ 1 &= \beta \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}} \left(1 + \theta \frac{y_{t+1}}{k_t} - \delta \right), \\ c_t &+ k_t - (1-\delta) k_{t-1} - y_t = 0, \end{split}$$

and

$$(1-\theta)\frac{y_t}{h_t} = \begin{cases} \frac{Bc_t}{1-h_t}, & \text{(divisible labor)} \\ Bc_t. & \text{(indivisible labor)} \end{cases}$$

• There are 4 variables $\{c_t, k_t, y_t, h_t\}$ and 4 equations, so we can solve the model.

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The steady state

• The steady state conditions are

$$\begin{split} y &= k^{\theta} h^{1-\theta}, \\ 1 &= \beta \left(1 + \theta y/k - \delta \right), \\ 0 &= y - \delta k - c, \end{split}$$

and

$$(1-\theta) rac{y}{h} = egin{cases} rac{Bc}{1-h}, & ext{(divisible labor)} \\ Bc. & ext{(indivisible labor)} \end{cases}$$

• Dynare solves for the steady state values numerically with an educated initial guess. The steady state values are also analytically obtained.

Appendix

- An economy with variable labor
- Incorporating trend
- 3 Notes on Newton's method and deterministic simulation

Incorporating trend

• Consider the dividible labor economy. Let $Z_t\equiv A_t^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$ and $\gamma\equiv Z_{t+1}/Z_t$. The production function becomes

$$y_t = k_{t-1}^{\theta} (Z_t h_t)^{1-\theta}.$$

This is called the Harrod-neutral production function.

 \bullet In the steady state, y and k exponentially grows at the rate $\gamma.$



Detrending

The equilibrium conditions in the dividible labor economy are

$$y_{t} = k_{t-1}^{\theta} (Z_{t} h_{t})^{1-\theta},$$

$$(1-\theta) \frac{y_{t}}{h_{t}} = \frac{Bc_{t}}{1-h_{t}},$$

$$1 = \beta \frac{c_{t}}{c_{t+1}} \left(1 + \theta \frac{y_{t+1}}{k_{t}} - \delta \right),$$

$$c_{t} + k_{t} - (1-\delta)k_{t-1} - y_{t} = 0.$$

• y_t , c_t and k_{t-1} grows at γ , whereas the model variables have to be stationary.



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Detrending, cont'd

• Define $\tilde{y}_t \equiv y_t/Z_t$, $\tilde{c}_t \equiv c_t/Z_t$ and $\tilde{k}_{t-1} \equiv k_{t-1}/Z_t$. Substituting them into the equilibrium conditions,

$$\begin{split} \tilde{y}_t &= \tilde{k}^{\theta}_{t-1} h^{1-\theta}_t, \\ (1-\theta) \frac{\tilde{y}_t}{h_t} &= \frac{B\tilde{c}_t}{1-h_t}, \\ 1 &= (\beta/\gamma) \frac{\tilde{c}_t}{\tilde{c}_{t+1}} \left(1 + \theta \frac{\tilde{y}_{t+1}}{\tilde{k}_t} - \delta\right), \\ \tilde{c}_t &+ \gamma \tilde{k}_t - (1-\delta) \tilde{k}_{t-1} - \tilde{y}_t = 0. \end{split}$$

The steady state

• The steady state conditions are

$$\begin{split} \tilde{y} &= \tilde{k}^{\theta} h^{1-\theta}, \\ (1-\theta)(\tilde{y}/h) &= B\tilde{c}/(1-h), \\ 1 &= \tilde{\beta} \left(1+\theta \tilde{y}/\tilde{k}-\delta\right), \\ 0 &= \tilde{y} - (\gamma-1+\delta)\tilde{k} - \tilde{c}, \end{split}$$

where $\tilde{\beta} = \beta/\gamma$.

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The steady state, cont'd

• Let h = 1/3, then we have

$$\begin{split} \tilde{y}/\tilde{k} &= \theta^{-1}(\tilde{\beta}^{-1} - 1 + \delta), \\ \tilde{c}/\tilde{k} &= \tilde{y}/\tilde{k} - (\gamma - 1 + \delta), \\ \tilde{k} &= \left(\frac{\theta h^{1-\theta}}{\tilde{\beta}^{-1} - 1 + \delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \\ B &= (1 - \alpha)(\tilde{y}/\tilde{c})(1 - h)/h. \end{split}$$

 $\tilde{y}=(\tilde{y}/\tilde{k})\tilde{k}$ and $\tilde{c}=(\tilde{c}/\tilde{k})\tilde{k}$ are also obtained. Note that B is a normalization parameter.

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Appendix

- An economy with variable labor
- Incorporating trend
- Notes on Newton's method and deterministic simulation

Newton-Raphson method

- We solve an equation f(x) = 0 for x.
- First-order Taylor expansion around $x^{(0)}$: $f(x) \approx f(x^{(0)}) + f'(x^{(0)})(x x^{(0)}) = 0$.
- The Newton-Raphson method updates $x^{(k)}$ for k = 1, 2, ...

$$x^{(k)} = x^{(k-1)} - f'(x^{(k-1)})^{-1} f(x^{(k-1)}),$$

$$\text{until } \left\| x^{(k)} - x^{(k-1)} \right\| \leq \epsilon.$$

• Example: $f(x) = 4x^3 - 3$, which has a real root of $.75^{1/3}$.



Newton-Raphson method: The case of 2 variables

• We solve a system of equations

$$f_1(x_1, x_2) = 0, \quad f_2(x_1, x_2) = 0.$$

• First-order Taylor expansion:

$$f_1(x_1, x_2) \approx f_1(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)}) + D_1 f_1(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)})(x_1 - x_1^{(0)}) + D_2 f_1(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)})(x_2 - x_2^{(0)}), f_2(x_1, x_2) \approx f_2(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)}) + D_1 f_2(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)})(x_1 - x_1^{(0)}) + D_2 f_2(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)})(x_2 - x_2^{(0)}).$$

It can be written as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} f_1(x_1, x_2) \\ f_2(x_1, x_2) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} f_1(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)}) \\ f_2(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)}) \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} D_1 f_1(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)}) & D_2 f_1(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)}) \\ D_1 f_2(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)}) & D_2 f_2(x_1^{(0)}, x_2^{(0)}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 - x_1^{(0)} \\ x_2 - x_2^{(0)} \end{bmatrix}.$$

Newton-Raphson method: The case of 2 variables

Or,

$$\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}) \approx \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}) + \nabla \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}^{(0)})(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}^{(0)}) = 0.$$

where $\mathbf{x} = [x_1, x_2]'$ and

$$\nabla \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}) = \begin{bmatrix} D_1 f_1(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}) & D_2 f_1(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}) \\ D_1 f_2(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}) & D_2 f_2(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}) \end{bmatrix}$$

is an (2×2) matrix called Jacobian.

Newton-Raphson method: The case of 2 variables

ullet The Newton-Raphson method updates $\mathbf{x}^{(k)}$

$$\mathbf{x}^{(k+1)} = \mathbf{x}^{(k)} - [\nabla \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}^{(k)})]^{-1} \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}^{(k)}),$$
 until $\|\mathbf{x}^{(k+1)} - \mathbf{x}^{(k)}\| \le \epsilon$.

ullet It is easily extended to the N-variable case.



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Deterministic simulations

- Dynare can be used for deterministic simulations with the assumption of perfect foresight.
- ullet The numerical problem consists of solving a nonlinear system of simultaneous equations in n endogenous variables in T periods.
- ullet To solve the system of nT equations, Dynare uses a Newton-type method, which is based on the Fair-Taylor (1983) algorithm.
 - My explanation is based on Hollinger (1996).

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A nonlinear system

A nonlinear dynamic system is of a general form

$$f_{i,t}(\mathbf{y}_{t-1},\mathbf{y}_t,\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) = 0,$$

for i=1,...,n where $\mathbf{y}_t=[y_{1,t},\cdots,y_{n,t}]'$.

• For example, the basic RCK model is expressed as

$$f_{1,t}(\mathbf{y}_{t-1}, \mathbf{y}_t, \mathbf{y}_{t+1}) = \beta \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}} \left(1 + \alpha A_{t+1} k_t^{\alpha - 1} - \delta \right) - 1 = 0,$$

$$f_{2,t}(\mathbf{y}_{t-1}, \mathbf{y}_t, \mathbf{y}_{t+1}) = A_t k_{t-1}^{\alpha} + (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} - k_t - c_t = 0,$$

where $\mathbf{y}_t = [k_t, c_t]'$.



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A nonlinear system, cont'd

• The system is expressed compactly as a $(n \times 1)$ vector of equations:

$$\mathbf{f}_t(\mathbf{y}_{t-1},\mathbf{y}_t,\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) = \begin{bmatrix} f_{1,t}(\mathbf{y}_{t-1},\mathbf{y}_t,\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) \\ \vdots \\ f_{n,t}(\mathbf{y}_{t-1},\mathbf{y}_t,\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0},$$

where $\mathbf{f}_t = [f_{1,t}, \cdots, f_{n,t}]'$.

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Solving the nonlinear system

- We solve $\mathbf{f}_t(\mathbf{y}_{t-1},\mathbf{y}_t,\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) = \mathbf{0}$ simultaneously for t=1,...,T.
- $\mathbf{y}_{t-1} = \mathbf{y}_0$ is predetermined at t = 1. Also, $\mathbf{y}_{t+1} = \mathbf{y}_{T+1}$ is predetermined at t = T (the boundary conditions).

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Solving the nonlinear system, cont'd

We stack the system for T periods as

$$F(Z) = \left[egin{array}{c} \mathbf{f}_1(\mathbf{y}_0, \mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_2) \\ dots \\ \mathbf{f}_t(\mathbf{y}_{t-1}, \mathbf{y}_t, \mathbf{y}_{t+1}) \\ dots \\ \mathbf{f}_T(\mathbf{y}_{T-1}, \mathbf{y}_T, \mathbf{y}_{T+1}) \end{array}
ight] = \mathbf{0},$$

where $F = [\mathbf{f}_1', \cdots, \mathbf{f}_t', \cdots, \mathbf{f}_n']'$ and $Z = [\mathbf{y}_0', \mathbf{y}_1', \cdots, \mathbf{y}_T', \mathbf{y}_{T+1}']'$. There is a $(nT \times 1)$ vector of equations.

ullet We solve F(Z)=0 by the Newton-Raphson method for nT variables

$$[\mathbf{y}_1',\cdots,\mathbf{y}_T']',$$

given \mathbf{y}_0' and \mathbf{y}_{T+1}' .



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Assignment #2 (revised on 1 Mar; 11 Mar.)

 Consider the basic RCK model with a distortionary tax on capital income after depreciation. The representative household maximizes the lifetime utility subject to:

$$c_t + k_t \le (1 - \delta)k_{t-1} + r_t k_{t-1} - \tau(r_t - \delta)k_{t-1} + \pi_t + \tau_t,$$

where $\pi_t > 0$ is the firms profit and τ_t is the transfer from the government. Note that the household takes both π_t and τ_t as given.

- ① The government budget constraint is given by $\tau(r_t \delta)k_{t-1} = \tau_t$. Derive the resource constraint for the social planner's economy. [Hint: Use the firm's FOC and the balanced government budget in the competitive economy.]
- Solve for the equilibrium conditions in both the social planner's economy and the competitive economy.
- § Let $\beta=.96,~\delta=.1,~\alpha=.36.$ and $\tau=.2.$ Compute the initial dynamics with $k_0=0.1$ in both economies.



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