

# Macroeconomics III

## Lecture 8: Incomplete Markets with Capital Accumulation

Tiago Cavalcanti

FGV/EESP  
São Paulo

# Road Map

S. Rao Aiyagari (1994, QJE) model: **Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving.**

# Introduction

- ▶ It was simultaneous and independent work of Hugget.
- ▶ The main difference is that in the [Aiyagari-world](#), households both underwrite debt contracts to each other, but also rent out resources to firms.
- ▶ Of course, this means that there can be positive savings in the economy which determines the capital stock.
- ▶ In addition, wages are not simple endowments, but paid by firms in a competitive market.

**Question studied by Aiyagari (1994):** Are precautionary savings important for aggregate saving/capital accumulation?

**Main conclusion:** *“... the contribution of uninsured idiosyncratic risk to aggregate saving is quite modest, at least for moderate and empirically plausible values of risk aversion, variability, and persistence in earnings.*

*The aggregate saving rate is higher by no more than three percentage points.”*

**But:** *“In contrast to representative agent models (see Cochrane [1989]), it turns out that access to asset markets is quite important in enabling consumers to smooth out earnings fluctuations.*

*The model is also consistent, at least qualitatively, with certain features of income and wealth distributions. The distributions are positively skewed (median < mean), the wealth distribution is much more dispersed than the income distribution, and inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is significantly higher for wealth than for income.”*

## Aiyagari (1994) Model: Firms

- ▶ Firms can hire workers on a labor sport market at wage rate  $w$ , and rent capital at rental rate  $\tilde{r}$ .
- ▶ Technology:  $Y = F(K, N) = K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha}$ , so we can work with a representative firm (capital depreciates at rate  $\delta$ ).
- ▶ The problem of the representative firm is:

$$\max_{K, N} \{K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha} - wN - \tilde{r}K\}, \text{ then}$$

$$w = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{K}{N} \right)^\alpha,$$

$$\tilde{r} = \alpha \left( \frac{K}{N} \right)^{\alpha-1}.$$

$$\text{Threfore: } w = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{\alpha}{\tilde{r}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

# Aiyagari (1994) Model: Households

Consider the following problem:

$$\max_{c_t, a_{t+1}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t),$$

subject to:

$$c_t + a_{t+1} = (1 + r_t)a_t + w_t z_t, \quad c \geq 0$$

$z_t \sim$  a Markov Process.

- ▶  $V(a, z) = \max_{a'} \{u(((1 + r)a + wz - a')) + \beta E[V(a', z')/z = \hat{z}]\}$ .  
For each  $i = 1, \dots, n$ :

$$V(a, z_i) = \max_{a'} \{u(((1 + r)a + wz_i - a')) + \beta \sum_{j=1}^n P_{ij} V(a', z_j)\}.$$

- ▶ Agent wants:  $a' = -\infty$ .

- **Natural borrowing limit (Aiyagari, 1994).** Agent is able to repay in its worst state.

$$a' \geq -\frac{w\underline{z}}{r} = \underline{a}.$$

**Derivation:**  $a_{t+1} + c_t \leq (1 + r_t)a_t + w_t z_t$ . Let  $z_t = \underline{z}$  and consider the stationary eq. with constant prices. If  $c_t = 0$ ,

$$a_{t+1} \leq (1 + r)a_t + w\underline{z}, \Rightarrow a_{t+2} \leq (1 + r)a_{t+1} + w\underline{z}$$

$$a_{t+2} \leq (1+r)^2 a_t + \sum_{j=0}^1 (1+r)^j w\underline{z}, \Rightarrow a_t \geq \frac{a_{t+2}}{(1+r)^2} - \sum_{i=1}^2 \frac{w\underline{z}}{(1+r)^i}.$$

$$\text{Repeating } T \text{ times: } a_t \geq \frac{a_{t+T}}{(1+r)^T} - \sum_{i=1}^T \frac{w\underline{z}}{(1+r)^i}, \forall t.$$

$$a_{t+1} \geq \frac{a_{t+1+T}}{(1+r)^T} - \sum_{i=1}^T \frac{w\underline{z}}{(1+r)^i}.$$

$$\text{Taking limits: } a' \geq -\frac{w\underline{z}}{r} = \underline{a}.$$

- **Endogenous borrowing limit (Kehoe and Levine, 1993).** Penalty for those who default on their obligations is the subsequent exclusion from capital and credit markets. Such that

$$\underline{V}(z) = u(\gamma w z) + \beta E[\underline{V}(z')/z = \hat{z}],$$

where  $\gamma \in (0, 1]$  corresponds to a pecuniary loss due to the default.

$$V(a, z) \geq \underline{V}(z).$$

$V(a, z)$  is increasing in  $a$  whereas  $\underline{V}(z)$  is independent of  $a$ , then the condition above defines  $\underline{a}^{EB}$ , such that

$$a' \geq \underline{a}^{EB}.$$



$$V(a, z_i) = \max_{\underline{a} \leq a' \leq \bar{a}} \{u(((1+r)a + wz_i - a') + \beta \sum_{j=1}^n P_{ij} V(a', z_j))\}.$$

- ▶ Arbitrage:  $\tilde{r} = r + \delta$ .
- ▶ Again, if  $\beta(1+r) \leq 1$ , we can find an  $\bar{a} < \infty$  such that  $a' \in [\underline{a}, \bar{a})$  and this problem is a **Contraction Mapping**.
- ▶ And for a given  $\tilde{r}$  (and therefore  $w$  and  $r$ ) the associated policy function is  $a' = g(a, z)$  (and  $c = g_c(a, z)$ ).

# Aiyagari (1994, QJE): Equilibrium

**DEFINITION:** A recursive stationary equilibrium is an interest rate,  $r$ , wage rate,  $w$ , a policy function,  $g(a, z)$ , and a stationary distribution  $\lambda(a, z)$ , such that:

1. Given  $r$  and  $w$ , The policy function  $g(a, z)$  solves  $V(a, z)$ ;
2. Given  $r$  and  $w$ , the representative firm maximizes profits:  
 $w = F_N(K, N)$  and  $r + \delta = F_K(K, N)$ .
3. Markets clear:


$$K' = \sum_{z,a} \lambda(a, z)a.$$

$$N = \pi'z.$$

4. The stationary distribution  $\lambda(a, z)$  is induced by  $(P, z)$  and  $g(a, z)$ :

$$\lambda(B) = \sum_{X=[a,\bar{a}] \times Z \in B} Q(X, B).$$

# Stationary Equilibrium



## Aiyagari (1994, QJE): Algorithm

1. Guess  $r \in (-\delta, \frac{1}{\beta} - 1)$ , get  $\tilde{r} = r + \delta$  and  $w = (1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\tilde{r}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$ ;
2. Given  $r$ , get  $K = \left(\frac{\alpha}{r+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \pi' z$ ;
3. Solve the households problem and get  $g(a, z)$ ;
4. Calculate the associated stationary distribution:  $\lambda(a, z)$ ;
5. Evaluate:  $e_K = K - \sum_{z,a} \lambda(a, z) a$ ;
6. If  $e_K > 0$ , update (bisection)  $r' > r$ ; if  $e_K < 0$ , update (bisection)  $r' < r$ . Go to step 1;
7. If  $|e_K| < \epsilon$ , stop.

# Aiyagari (1994) with Endogenous Labor Supply

- ▶ Continuum of agents  $[0, 1]$  with preferences:

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, 1 - l_t)$$

- ▶ Labor income at period  $t$  is

$$w_t l_t z_t,$$

Shock  $z_t$  follows a Markov Chain  $(Z, \Pi)$

$(Z = \{z_1 < z_2 < \dots < z_{n_z}\})$  and an element  $\pi_{i,j}$  of  $\Pi$  is  $Prob(z_{t+1} = z_j \mid z_t = z_i)$ .

- ▶ There is a representative firm which has access to the a CRS technology:

$$Y_t = F(K_t, L_t)$$

firms rents input in competitive markets and capital depreciates at rate  $\delta$ .

## Aiyagari (1994) with Endogenous Labor Supply

$$V(z_i, a) = \max_{c, l, a'} \left\{ u(c, l) + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{n_z} \pi_{i,j} V(z_j, a') \right\}$$

subject to

$$a' + c = a(1 + r) + wlz_i$$

$$l \in [0, 1]$$

$$c \geq 0$$

$$a' \geq \underline{a}$$

$r$  and  $w$  are taken as given

Get the optimal decision rules  $a'(z_i, a)$ ,  $c(z_i, a)$  and  $l(z_i, a)$ .

# Aiyagari (1994) with Endogenous Labor Supply

A recursive stationary equilibrium consists of:

- ▶ time invariant prices  $w$  and  $r$ ;
- ▶ a value function  $V(z_i, a)$  ;
- ▶ optimal decision rules  $a'(z_i, a)$  ,  $c(z_i, a)$  and  $l(z_i, a)$  ;
- ▶ an invariant distribution function  $\lambda(z_i, a)$
- ▶ a vector of aggregates:  $K, L$ ;

such that

# Aiyagari (1994) with Endogenous Labor Supply

1. **Consumer optimization:** given the prices  $r$  and  $w$ ,  $V(z_i, a)$  is a solution of the individual problem and  $a'(z_i, a)$ ,  $c(z_i, a)$  and  $l(z_i, a)$  are the associated optimal decision rules;
2. **Firm's optimization:** prices  $r$  and  $w$  satisfy:

$$\begin{aligned}r &= F_K(K, L) - \delta \\w &= F_L(K, L)\end{aligned}$$

3. **Consistency:**  $\Phi(z_i, a)$  is a stationary distribution consistent with the optimal decision rule  $a'(z_i, a)$  and the Markov chain  $(Z, \Pi)$ ;
4. **Aggregation:** The aggregate capital stock and labour supply are consistent with  $F(s_i, a)$  :

$$\begin{aligned}K &= \sum_{i=1}^{n_z} \int_A a d\lambda(z_i, a) \\L &= \sum_{i=1}^{n_z} \int_A l(z_i, a) z_i d\lambda(z_i, a)\end{aligned}$$



# Aiyagari (1994) with Endogenous Labor Supply

Households problem:

- ▶ If you choose VFI you need to implement VFI with 2 variable optimization.

- ▶ OR...assuming  $u(c, 1 - l) = \frac{(c^\gamma (1-l)^{1-\gamma})^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$

- ▶ Intra-temporal condition and budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned}wlz_i &= wz_i - \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}c, \\a' + c &= a(1+r) + wx_i,\end{aligned}$$

Imply that  $c = \frac{1}{\gamma}[(1+r)a + wz_i - a']$  and  $(1-l) = \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} \frac{c}{z_i w}$ . Or

$$l = \tilde{l}(z_i, a, a')$$

- ▶ if we plug back this into the original problem we can find the optimal  $a'$  in the same way as always and obtain:

$$a'(z_i, a)$$

# Aiyagari (1994) with Endogenous Labour Supply

The Value function becomes:

$$V(z_i, a) = \max_{a' \in [a_{\min}, \bar{a})} \left\{ u(a(1+r) + w\tilde{l}(z_i, a, a')z_i - a', 1 - \tilde{l}(z_i, a, a')) + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{n_z} \pi_{ij} V(z_j, a') \right\}.$$

We can solve it again for  $a'$  since the labour-leisure choice is an instantaneous decision and does not affect the future value directly.

- ▶ We can obtain:  $a'(z_i, a)$ ;
- ▶ then  $l = \tilde{l}(z_i, a, a') = \tilde{l}(z_i, a, a'(z_i, a)) = l(z_i, a)$
- ▶ then you can get:  $c = c(z_i, a)$
- ▶ Now you are ready to solve the problem

# Aiyagari (1994) with Endogenous Labour Supply

1. Guess  $r$
2. Compute the capital-labour ratio  $k$  from

$$r = F_K(k) - \delta$$

3. Compute  $w$  :

$$w = F_L(k)$$

4. Given  $r$  and  $w$  solve the consumer optimization problem finding  $a'(s_i, a)$ ,  $c(s_i, a)$  and  $l(s_i, a)$ .
5. Using  $a'(s_i, a)$  and  $\Pi$  find the stationary distribution of the assets:  $\lambda(s_i, a)$

## Aiyagari (1994) with Endogenous Labor Supply

6. Compute the aggregate capital supply  $K$  and the aggregate labour supply  $L$  :

$$K = \sum_{i=1}^{n_s} \int_A a d\lambda(s_i, a)$$

$$L = \sum_{i=1}^{n_s} \int_A l(s_i, a) s_i d\lambda(s_i, a)$$

7. the excess demand function can be defines as:

$$D(r) = k - \frac{K}{L}$$

find a fix point in  $D(r)$  such that  $D(r) = 0$  using a bisection method with bounds:

- 0.1 lower bound:  $r = -\delta$  (the return of capital after depreciation approaches  $-\delta$  as  $k$  goes to infinity)
- 0.2 upper bound:  $r < \frac{1}{\beta} - 1$  (for  $r = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1$  the household accumulates an infinite amount of asset then capital supply goes to infinity)

# Reading

- ▶ Aiyagari "Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Savings", QJE, 1994
- ▶ Heer and Maussner, Chapter 5;
- ▶ Hopenhayn, Prescott "Stochastic Monotonicity and Stationary Distributions for Dynamic Economies", Econometrica 1992
- ▶ Huggett "The Risk Free Rate in Heterogeneous-Agents, Incomplete Insurance Economies", JEDC 1993
- ▶ Miao, Chapter 17
- ▶ Rios-Rull "Computation of Equilibria in Heterogeneous-Agents Model" in Marimon and Scott eds, Computational Methods for the Study of Economic Dynamics, Chapter 11