# **Computational Advertising**

Greedy Algorithms
Competitive Algorithms
Picking the Best Ad
The Balance Algorithm

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Slides primarily taken from Anand Rajaraman



# Administrivia

Final Exam Last Lectures

#### **Final Exam**

- To be held in Dinkelspiel Auditorium, 8:30-11:30AM, Wednesday March 16.
  - Do not go to Nvidia Aud.
- Exam will cover entire course.
  - No programming.
  - No proofs, but you may need to prove something to yourself to be sure of getting the right answer.
  - Open book/notes.
  - Internet allowed, but not communication with others.

#### Words of Advice Re Final

- Although you can access any on-line source of information, e.g., the text or Wikipedia, you will find that there are a lot of questions to be answered in very little time.
- If you have to read a section of the book for every question, you will waste too much time.


#### Last Lectures

- March 3: Jeff finishes up Computational Advertising + comparison between MapReducelike systems and bulk-synchronous systems.
- March 8: Hima and Tim talk about submodular optimization.
- March 10: Caroline on multi-arm bandits + Jeff on the design of good MapReduce algorithms.

### Online Algorithms


- Classic model of (offline) algorithms:
  - You get to see the entire input, then compute some function of it.
- Online algorithm:
  - You get to see the input one piece at a time, and need to make irrevocable decisions along the way.
  - Similar to data stream models.

## **Example: Bipartite Matching**




- Two sets of nodes.
- Some edges between them.
- Maximize the number of nodes paired 1-1 by edges.

# Bipartite Matching — (2)



 $M = \{(1,a),(2,b),(3,d)\}$  is a *matching* of cardinality |M| = 3.

# Bipartite Matching – (3)



 $M = \{(1,c),(2,b),(3,d),(4,a)\}$  is a perfect matching (all nodes matched).


## **Matching Algorithm**

- Problem: Find a maximum-cardinality matching for a given bipartite graph.
  - A perfect one if it exists.
- There is a polynomial-time offline algorithm (Hopcroft and Karp 1973).
- But what if we don't have the entire graph initially?

### Online Matching

- Initially, we are given the set of men.
- In each round, one woman's set of choices is revealed.
- At that time, we have to decide either to:
  - Pair the woman with a man.
  - Don't pair the woman with any man.
- Example applications: assigning tasks to servers or Web requests to threads.

# Online Matching — (2)



- (1,a)
- (2,b)
- (3,d)

## **Greedy Algorithm**

- Pair the new woman with any eligible man.
  - If there is none, don't pair the woman.
- How good is the algorithm?

#### **Competitive Ratio**

 For input I, suppose greedy produces matching M<sub>greedy</sub> while an optimal matching is M<sub>opt</sub>.

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Competitive ratio = \min_{\text{all possible inputs } I} (|M_{\text{greedy}}|/|M_{\text{opt}}|).
```

# Greedy Has Competitive Ratio 1/2


- Let O be the optimal matching, and G the matches produced by a run of the greedy algorithm.
- Consider the sets of women:

A: Matched in G, not in O.

B: Matched in both.

C: Matched in O, not in G.

#### Proof of Competitive Ratio 1/2




During the greedy matching, every woman in C found her optimal match taken by another
 Woman.

things, you are greater than their

- Thus,  $|A| + |B| \ge |C|$ .
- Surely,  $|A| + |B| \ge |B|$ .
- Thus,  $|G| = |A| + |B| \ge (|B| + |C|)/2 = |O|/2$ .

average.

#### Worst-Case Scenario



### History of Web Advertising

- Banner ads (1995-2001).
  - Initial form of web advertising.
  - Popular websites charged X\$ for every 1000 "impressions" of ad.
    - Called "CPM" rate.
    - Modeled on TV, magazine ads.
  - Untargeted to demographically targeted.
  - Low clickthrough rates.
    - low ROI for advertisers.

#### Performance-Based Advertising

- Introduced by Overture around 2000.
  - Advertisers "bid" on search keywords.
  - When someone searches for that keyword, the highest bidder's ad is shown.
  - Advertiser is charged only if the ad is clicked on.
- Similar model adopted by Google with some changes around 2002.
  - Called "Adwords."

#### Web 2.0

- Performance-based advertising works!
  - Multi-billion-dollar industry.
- Interesting problems:
  - What ads to show for a search?
  - If I'm an advertiser, which search terms should I bid on and how much should I bid?

#### Adwords Problem

- A stream of queries arrives at the search engine
  - **q**1, q2,...
- Several advertisers bid on each query.
- When query q<sub>i</sub> arrives, search engine must pick a subset of advertisers whose ads are shown.
- Goal: maximize search engine's revenues.
- Clearly we need an online algorithm!
- Simplest online algorithm is Greedy.

### Complications – (1)

- Each ad has a different likelihood of being clicked.
- Example:
  - Advertiser 1 bids \$2, click probability = 0.1.
  - Advertiser 2 bids \$1, click probability = 0.5.
    - Click-through rate measured by historical performance.
- Simple solution:
  - Instead of raw bids, use the "expected revenue per click."

### The Adwords Innovation

| Advertiser | Bid    | CTR  | Bid * CTR   |
|------------|--------|------|-------------|
| Α          | \$1.00 | 1%   | 1 cent      |
| В          | \$0.75 | 2%   | 1.5 cents   |
| С          | \$0.50 | 2.5% | 1.125 cents |

### The Adwords Innovation

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| В          | \$0.75 | 2%   | 1.5 cents   |
| С          | \$0.50 | 2.5% | 1.125 cents |
| Α          | \$1.00 | 1%   | 1 cent      |

#### Complications – (2)

- Each advertiser has a limited budget
  - Search engine guarantees that the advertiser will not be charged more than their daily budget.

### Simplified Model (For Now)

- Assume all bids are 0 or 1.
- Each advertiser has the same budget B.
- One advertiser is chosen per query.
- Let's try the greedy algorithm:
  - Arbitrarily pick an eligible advertiser for each keyword.

#### **Bad Scenario For Greedy**

- Two advertisers A and B.
- A bids on query x, B bids on x and y.
- Both have budgets of \$4.
- Query stream: x x x x y y y y.
- Possible greedy choice: B B B B \_ \_ \_ \_ \_.
- Optimal: A A A A B B B B.
- Competitive ratio = 1/2.
  - This is actually the worst case.

#### Balance Algorithm [MSVV]

- [Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani].
- For each query, pick the advertiser with the largest unspent budget who bid on this query.
  - Break ties arbitrarily.


#### Example: Balance

- Two advertisers A and B.
- A bids on query x, B bids on x and y.
- Both have budgets of \$4.
- Query stream: x x x x y y y y.
- Balance choice: B A B A B B \_ \_.
- Optimal: A A A A B B B B.
- Competitive ratio = 3/4.

### **Analyzing Balance**


- Consider simple case: two advertisers, A<sub>1</sub> and A<sub>2</sub>, each with budget B > 1, an even number.
- We'll consider the case where the optimal solution exhausts both advertisers' budgets.
  - I.e., optimal revenue to search engine = 2B.
- Balance must exhaust at least one advertiser's budget.
  - If not, we can allocate more queries.
  - Assume Balance exhausts A<sub>2</sub>'s budget.

## **Analyzing Balance**



- Queries allocated to A<sub>1</sub> in optimal solution
- Queries allocated to A<sub>2</sub> in optimal solution


Note: only green queries can be assigned to neither. A blue query could have been assigned to A<sub>1</sub>.




**Balance allocation** 

We claim  $y \ge x$  (next slide). Balance revenue is minimum for x=y=B/2. Minimum Balance revenue = 3B/2. Competitive Ratio = 3/4.

# **Analyzing Balance: Two Cases**




- Case 1: At least half the blue queries are assigned to A<sub>1</sub> by Balance.
  - Then  $y \ge B/2$ , since the blues alone are  $\ge B/2$ .
- Case 2: Fewer than half the blue queries are assigned to A<sub>1</sub> by Balance.
  - Let q be the last blue query assigned by Balance to A<sub>2</sub>.




**Balance allocation** 

# Analyzing Balance – (3)



- Since  $A_1$  obviously bid on q, at that time, the budget of  $A_2$  must have been at least as great as that of  $A_1$ .
- Since more than half the blue queries are assigned to A<sub>2</sub>, at the time of q, A<sub>2</sub>'s remaining budget was at most B/2.
  - Therefore so was  $A_1$ 's, which implies  $x \le B/2$ , and therefore  $y \ge B/2$  and  $y \ge x$ .
- Thus Balance uses > 3B/2.



Balance allocation

#### General Result

- In the general case, competitive ratio of Balance is 1−1/e = approx. 0.63.
- Interestingly, no online algorithm has a better competitive ratio.
- Won't go through the details here, but let's see the worst case that gives this ratio.


#### **Worst Case for Balance**

- N advertisers, each with budget B >> N >> 1.
- N\*B queries appear in N rounds.
- Each round consists of a single query repeated B times.
- Round 1 queries: bidders A<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>2</sub>,..., A<sub>N</sub>.
- Round 2 queries: bidders A<sub>2</sub>, A<sub>3</sub>,..., A<sub>N</sub>,...
- Round i queries: bidders A<sub>i</sub>,..., A<sub>N</sub>,...
- Round N queries: only A<sub>N</sub> bids.
- Optimum allocation: round i queries to A<sub>i</sub>.
  - Optimum revenue N\*B.

#### Pattern to Remember

- After i rounds, the first i advertisers have dropped out of the bidding.
  - Why? All subsequent queries are ones they do not bid on.
- Thus, they never get any more queries, even though they have budget left.


#### **Balance Allocation**



After k rounds, sum of allocations to each of  $A_k, ..., A_N$  is  $S_k = S_{k+1} = ... = S_N = \sum_{1 \le i \le k} B/(N-i+1)$ .

If we find the smallest k such that  $S_k \ge B$ , then after k rounds we cannot allocate any queries to any advertiser.

#### **BALANCE** Analysis



#### **BALANCE** analysis

- Fact:  $H_n = \sum_{1 < i < n} 1/i \sim = \log_e(n)$  for large n.
  - Result due to Euler.

$$1/1$$
  $1/2$   $1/3$  ...  $1/(N-k+1)$  ...  $1/(N-1)$   $1/N$ 
 $log(N)$ 
 $S_k = 1$  implies  $H_{N-k} = log(N) - 1 = log(N/e)$ .

 $N-k = N/e$  (Why?  $log(N-k) = H_{N-k} = log(N/e)$ ).

 $k = N(1-1/e) \sim = 0.63N$ .

#### Balance analysis

- So after the first N(1-1/e) rounds, we cannot allocate a query to any advertiser.
- Revenue = BN(1-1/e).
- Competitive ratio = 1-1/e.

#### General Version of Problem

- Arbitrary bids, budgets.
- Balance can be terrible.
- Example: Consider two advertisers A<sub>1</sub> and A<sub>2</sub>,
   each bidding on query q.
  - $A_1$ :  $X_1 = 1$ ,  $b_1 = 110$ .
  - $A_2$ :  $X_2 = 10$ ,  $B_2 = 100$ .
- First 10 occurrences of q all go to A<sub>1</sub>, and A<sub>1</sub>
   then gets 10 q's for every one that A<sub>2</sub> gets.
  - What if there are only 10 occurrences of q?
    - Opt yields \$100; Balance yields \$10.

#### **Generalized Balance**

- Arbitrary bids; consider query q, bidder i.
  - Bid =  $x_i$ .
  - Budget = b<sub>i</sub>.
  - Amount spent so far = m<sub>i</sub>.
  - Fraction of budget remaining f<sub>i</sub> = 1-m<sub>i</sub>/b<sub>i</sub>.
- Define  $\psi_i(q) = x_i(1-e^{-f_i})$ .
- Allocate query q to bidder i with largest value of  $\psi_i(q)$ .
- Same competitive ratio (1-1/e).