

Amending Constitutions in Dictatorships

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Introduction

Why do dictators make constitutional amendments?
Democracy vs. Dictatorship


- Existent literature ignores legal institutions in dictatorships
- Even for dictators, however, institutions work better than repressive tools

Hypotheses

- > Dictatorships with **multiparty systems** are more likely to make constitutional amendments than those with single party systems and no-party system.
- > Dictatorships with **legislatures** composed of multiple parties are more likely to constitutional amendments than those without any legislatures and those with a single party legislature.

Data

- Comparative Constitution Project(CCP)
- Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited Codebook (DD)
- 1946-2008 (135 countries, 4992 observations)
- unit of analysis: country-year




Measurement


- DV: Amendment(s) or not in the year of observation (0/1)
- IV: Party Institutionalization (0/1/2+parties)
Legislature Competition (0/1/2+ parties)
- Controls:
Logged Length of Constitution
Logged Age of Constitution
Number of Actors Needed to Propose/Approve Amendments

Logit Model Results

- Predicted Probabilities of constitutional amendment event



- Relative risks of constitutional amendment event for a pairwise comparison




0 Parties vs. 1 Party Legislature


1 Party vs. Multiple Parties Legislature

Multiple vs. 0 Party Legislature

Relative Risk of Amendments



Goodness of Fit



Conclusion

- > Main Findings:
 - 1) Dictators in multiple party systems are less likely to make constitutional amendments than those without any party or a single party system.
 - 2) **However**, once party competition is institutionalized within the legislature, dictators are more likely to make constitutional amendments.
- > Dictators are more concerned about elite-level rivals than regime outsiders.