

On the Equilibrium of Query Reformulation and Document Retrieval

Authors:

Shihao Zou (UCL), Guanyu Tao (UCL), Jun Wang (UCL), Weinan Zhang (SJTU), Dell Zhang (UoL)

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Self-introduction — Shihao Zou

- BSc in Beijing Institute of Technology in 2017.06
- Master of Research in University College London, 2017.09 now
- I am going to pursue PhD in University of Alberta, Canada in Jan 2019
- Research interest: machine learning in data mining topics, reinforcement learning

Introduction



Two challenges in information retrieval:



- how to formulate optimal queries to best represent the user's information needs
- relevance estimation for the document given the information need representation
- Query reformulation (relevance feedback)

Retrieval model

Equilibrium theory of information retrieval:

 a strategic game, simultaneously playing between the query reformulation and the retrieval model

Introduction



Intuition:

- The query reformulation would refine the query that is the best response to the relevance estimation given by retrieval model
- The retrieval model would also need to produce the document relevant estimation that is the **best response** toward the formulated query
- Two components shall cooperate to achieve the best response to each other. (an equilibrium state)

Definition: IR Strategic Game



An IR Strategic Game is a tuple (P, S, U), where :

- $P = \{Q, M\}$ is the set of two players: query formulator Q and retrieval model M.
- $S = S_Q \times S_M$ are finite sets of strategies available to player Q and M.
- $s_q \in S_Q$ denotes whether the term is included in the query or not.
- $s_m \in S_M$ denotes relevance estimation by retrieval model.
- An equilibrium state: both players have no incentive to change their strategies s_m^* and s_q^* , so that

$$u_{Q}(s_{q}^{*}, s_{m}^{*}) \ge u_{Q}(s_{q}, s_{m}^{*}), u_{M}(s_{q}^{*}, s_{m}^{*}) \ge u_{M}(s_{q}^{*}, s_{m})$$

IR Game with Relevance Feedback



Common utility:
$$u(\mathbf{s}_q, \mathbf{s}_m) = \frac{1}{|D_r|} \sum_{\mathbf{d}_i \in D_r} \log p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_i, \mathbf{q}; \theta) - \frac{1}{|D_n|} \sum_{\mathbf{d}_i \in D_n} \log p(r = 0|\mathbf{d}_i, \mathbf{q}; \theta),$$

Toy example: Table 1: An IR game example (relevance feedback).

	d_1	\mathbf{d}_2
t_1	1	0
t_2	0	1
r	1	0

$$s_{m_1} = s_{m_2} = \{1, 0.2\}$$
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(a) Corpus

(b) Utilities of Strategies

$$p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_i, \mathbf{q}; \theta) = \operatorname{sigmoid}(\theta_1 \mathbf{q}_1 \mathbf{d}_{i1} + \theta_2 \mathbf{q}_2 \mathbf{d}_{i2})$$

$$p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_1, \mathbf{q}; \theta) = \operatorname{sigmoid}(1 \times 1 \times 1 + 0.2 \times 0 \times 0) = 0.7311$$

$$p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_2, \mathbf{q}; \theta) = \operatorname{sigmoid}(1 \times 1 \times 0 + 0.2 \times 0 \times 1) = 0.5$$

$$u(\mathbf{s}_a, \mathbf{s}_m) = \log p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_1, \mathbf{q}; \theta) + \log p(r = 0|\mathbf{d}_2, \mathbf{q}; \theta) = -1.0064.$$

IR Game with Pseudo Relevance Feedback



Utility for retrieval model:

$$u_{M}(\mathbf{s}_{q}, \mathbf{s}_{m}) = \frac{1}{|D_{r}|} \sum_{\mathbf{d}_{i} \in D_{r}} \log p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_{i}, \mathbf{q}; \theta) - \frac{1}{|D_{n}|} \sum_{\mathbf{d}_{i} \in D_{n}} \log p(r = 0|\mathbf{d}_{i}, \mathbf{q}; \theta).$$

Utility for query reformulation (top-k):

$$u_Q(\mathbf{s}_q,\mathbf{s}_m) = \frac{1}{|D_k|} \sum_{\mathbf{d}_i \in D_k} \log p(r=1|\mathbf{d}_i,\mathbf{q};\theta) - \\ \frac{1}{N-|D_k|} \sum_{\mathbf{d}_i \notin D_k} \log p(r=0|\mathbf{d}_i,\mathbf{q};\theta),$$

IR Game with Pseudo Relevance Feedback



Toy example for pseudo relevance feedback:

Table 2: An IR game example (pseudo relevance feedback).

	\mathbf{d}_1	\mathbf{d}_2
t_1	1	0
<i>t</i> ₂	0	1
r	1	0

	$s_{m_1} = \{1, 0.2\}$	$s_{m_2} = \{0.2, 1\}$
$\mathbf{s}_{q_1} = \{1, 0\}$	(-1.0064, -1.0064)	(-1.2913, -1.2913)
$\mathbf{s}_{q_2} = \{0, 1\}$	(-1.2913, -1.4913)	(-1.0064, -2.0064)

(a) Corpus

(b) Utilities of Strategies (u_O, u_M)

$$p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_1, \mathbf{q}; \theta) = \text{sigmoid}(1 \times 0 \times 1 + 0.2 \times 1 \times 0) = 0.5$$

 $p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_2, \mathbf{q}; \theta) = \text{sigmoid}(1 \times 0 \times 0 + 0.2 \times 1 \times 1) = 0.5498$
 $u_Q(\mathbf{s}_{q_2}, \mathbf{s}_{m_1}) = \log p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_2, \mathbf{q}; \theta) + \log p(r = 0|\mathbf{d}_1, \mathbf{q}; \theta) = -1.2913$
 $u_M(\mathbf{s}_{q_2}, \mathbf{s}_{m_1}) = \log p(r = 1|\mathbf{d}_1, \mathbf{q}; \theta) + \log p(r = 0|\mathbf{d}_2, \mathbf{q}; \theta) = -1.4913$

Experiment: text retrieval



Five training schemes:

- Case 1: No iteration (Naïve)
- Case 2: Update once (Rocchio)
- Case 3: Query Iteration (Conv-Q)

$$\theta_{i} = \operatorname{sigmoid}(\mathbf{q}^{\top} \mathbf{d}_{i}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\mathbf{q}^{\top} \mathbf{d}_{i}}}$$
$$\frac{\partial u_{Q}(\mathbf{s}_{q}, \mathbf{s}_{m})}{\partial \mathbf{q}} = \frac{1}{|D_{r}|} \sum_{d_{i} \in D_{r}} (1 - \theta_{i}) \mathbf{d}_{i} - \frac{1}{|D_{n}|} \sum_{d_{i} \in D_{n}} \theta_{i} \mathbf{d}_{i}$$

Case 4: Retrieval Model Iteration (Conv-M)

$$\theta_i = \operatorname{sigmoid} \left(\sum_{k=1}^K w_k \cdot (\mathbf{d}_i^k)^\top \mathbf{q}^k \right) \qquad \text{Logistic regression of } \mathbf{K} \text{ weight schemes}$$

$$\frac{\partial u_M(\mathbf{s}_q, \mathbf{s}_m)}{\partial w_k} = \frac{1}{|D_r|} \sum_{\mathbf{d}: \in D} (1 - \theta_i) \cdot (\mathbf{d}_i^k)^\top \mathbf{q}^k - \frac{1}{|D_n|} \sum_{\mathbf{d}: \in D} \theta_i \cdot (\mathbf{d}_i^k)^\top \mathbf{q}^k$$

Case 5: Equilibrium of the Query and Retrieval Model (Equil-Q&M)

Experiment: text retrieval



Dataset: TREC disks 4 & 5

Utility after each iteration in training stage:




Figure 1: Utility in both cases of relevance feedback Observations:

 Iterations on Q&M in both RF and PRF help improve the ranking performance (utility) in training stage

Text retrieval (RF)



Algorithm	NDCG@10	NDCG@30	MRR
Naive (VSM)	0.395±0.37	0.412±0.32	0.352±0.38
Naive (TFIDF)	0.511±0.37	0.528 ± 0.33	0.478 ± 0.41
Naive (BM25)	0.504±0.37	0.517±0.32	0.459 ± 0.40
Rocchio (VSM)	0.407±0.37	0.422±0.32	0.367±0.39
Rocchio (TFIDF)	0.519±0.38	0.536 ± 0.33	0.487 ± 0.41
Rocchio (BM25)	0.518±0.37	0.531±0.32	0.474 ± 0.40
Conv-Q (VSM)	0.527±0.34	0.554±0.29	0.475±0.39
Conv-Q (TFIDF)	0.568±0.35	0.571±0.30	0.530 ± 0.40
Conv-Q (BM25)	0.563±0.35	0.573 ± 0.30	0.522 ± 0.40
Conv-M	0.463±0.38	0.482±0.34	0.431±0.41
Equil-Q&M	0.583±0.34	0.601*±0.29	0.537*±0.39
Algorithm	P@10	P@30	MAP
Naive (VSM)	0.152±0.18	0.134±0.15	0.184±0.16
Naive (TFIDF)	0.221±0.22	0.179±0.18	0.263 ± 0.23
Naive (BM25)	0.217±0.22	0.178±0.17	0.262 ± 0.23
Rocchio (VSM)	0.162±0.18	0.139±0.15	0.193±0.17
Rocchio (TFIDF)	0.225±0.22	0.186 ± 0.18	0.276 ± 0.24
Rocchio (BM25)	0.221±0.21	0.183 ± 0.17	0.272 ± 0.24
Conv-Q (VSM)	0.245±0.23	0.212±0.18	0.288±0.22
Conv-Q (TFIDF)	0.264±0.24	0.220 ± 0.20	0.317±0.25
Conv-Q (BM25)	0.265±0.24	0.214 ± 0.20	0.319±0.25
Conv-M	0.190±0.20	0.160±0.16	0.238±0.21
Equil-Q&M	0.278*±0.24	0.233±0.19	0.331*±0.25
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Datasets

TREC disks 4 & 5

Task

- Text retrieval ranking
- Key observations
 - Conv-Q shows better performance than Naïve and Rocchio, esp. Conv-Q(TFIDF)
 - Conv-M fails to perform well on test set although well on training set
 - The best Equil-Q&M indicates the effectiveness of coordinating Q and M

Text retrieval (PRF)



Algorithm	NDCG@10	NDCG@30	MRR
Naive (VSM)	0.323±0.38	0.378±0.29	0.287±0.36
Naive (TFIDF)	0.463±0.36	0.493 ± 0.30	0.413±0.38
Naive (BM25)	0.439±0.35	0.474±0.28	0.375±0.36
Rocchio (VSM)	0.323±0.36	0.378±0.30	0.285±0.36
Rocchio (TFIDF)	0.460±0.36	0.493 ± 0.30	0.410 ± 0.38
Rocchio (BM25)	0.444±0.35	0.477±0.29	0.386 ± 0.37
Conv-Q (VSM)	0.245±0.34	0.308±0.29	0.228±0.33
Conv-Q (TFIDF)	0.428±0.37	0.465 ± 0.32	0.370 ± 0.38
Conv-Q (BM25)	0.400±0.36	0.456 ± 0.30	0.349 ± 0.36
Conv-M	0.415±0.37	0.447±0.31	0.367±0.39
Equil-Q&M	0.469*±0.37	0.499±0.31	0.397±0.38
Algorithm	P@10	P@30	MAP
Naive (VSM)	0.112±0.14	0.100±0.12	0.158±0.15
Naive (TFIDF)	0.200±0.21	0.142 ± 0.14	0.239 ± 0.22
Naive (BM25)	0.187±0.20	0.137 ± 0.13	0.226 ± 0.21
Rocchio (VSM)	0.108±0.14	0.100±0.12	0.157±0.16
Rocchio (TFIDF)	0.207±0.22	0.145 ± 0.14	0.244±0.23
Rocchio (BM25)	0.193±0.20	0.141 ± 0.14	0.233 ± 0.22
Rocchio (BM25) Conv-Q (VSM)	0.193±0.20 0.095±0.15	0.141±0.14 0.090±0.12	0.233±0.22 0.138±0.15
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Conv-Q (VSM)	0.095±0.15	0.090±0.12	0.138±0.15
Conv-Q (VSM) Conv-Q (TFIDF)	0.095±0.15 0.211±0.23	0.090±0.12 0.150±0.16	0.138±0.15 0.253±0.24

- Datasets
 - TREC disks 4 & 5
- Task
 - Text retrieval ranking
 - Key observations
 - Conv-Q shows worse performance than Naïve and Rocchio (One cannot fully rely on the top-k retrieved docs from the model to update the query)
 - The best Equil-Q&M indicates the coordination of Q and M help overcome the issue of bad query representation

Experiment: User-based item recommendation



• Revise a linear retrieval model as $\theta_i = p(r = 1 | \mathbf{d}_i, \mathbf{q}_u) = \operatorname{sigmoid}(\mathbf{q}_u^\top \mathbf{W} \mathbf{d}_i)$ \mathbf{q}_u : target user's profile, \mathbf{d}_i : memory user's profile.

Results:

Algorithm	NDCG@10	NDCG@30	MRR
Rocchio	0.194±0.31	0.220±0.28	0.167±0.28
Conv-Q	0.201±0.31	0.234 ± 0.28	0.172 ± 0.29
Conv-M	0.199±0.32	0.223±0.29	0.170 ± 0.30
Equil-Q&M	0.204*±0.31	0.237±0.28	0.174*±0.29
Algorithm	P@10	P@30	MAP
Rocchio	0.111±0.20	0.039±0.07	0.021±0.03
Conv-Q	0.113±0.19	0.043 ± 0.07	0.024 ± 0.03
Conv-M	0.111±0.21	0.040 ± 0.07	0.022 ± 0.03
Equil-Q&M	0.116±0.19	0.045*±0.07	0.025 ± 0.03

- Datasets
 - Movielens(100k)
- Task
 - Item recommendation
- Key observations
 - Conv-Q and Conv-M outperform Rocchio
 - Equil-Q&M slightly exceeds the other three cases.

Summary of this work:



- We study the interactions between query reformulation and retrieval model relevance estimation in a game theoretical framework.
- The performance of an equilibrium solution from relevance feedback consistently outperforms other separate cases.
- Larger dataset is required to investigate more interesting things in the equilibrium solution.
- We shall perform a deeper inquiry of the utility design in the proposed normal-form IR game.



Thank you for listening.

Questions?