
CPIF Contract Methodology

In this type of contract, the customer establishes both a lower (RIEmin) and an upper limit (RIEmax) for the project's total cost. At RIEmin, the contractor earns the maximum fee, while at RIEmax, the contractor receives the minimum fee. Any savings or overruns within this range are shared between both parties. This range is known as the Range of Incentive Effectiveness (RIE). Based on the contractor's actual expenses upon completion of the project, four possible scenarios can occur. To understand these scenarios more clearly, let's consider the following example:



Scenario 1 (Region 1): If AC<TC & AC<Cost_{min}

In this scenario, the customer informs the contractor that if they complete the project within this range, they will receive all the savings from the difference between the minimum cost (Costmin) and the actual cost (AC), with a savings ratio (SR) of 0/100. In other words, the contractor gets the maximum fee.

In our current example and using Eq.1:

And using the above formulas: Cost (min) = \$800 & Cost(max) = \$1100

a. AC= \$700
$$\rightarrow$$
 AC< TC and AC< Cost_{min}

Eq.1: Seller's share= (1000-800)*0.4 + (800-700)= 180

2- Actual Profit/ Fee (AF): AF= Fee(max) Eq.2

In our current example:

- a. AF=Fee(max)=\$180
- 3- Actual Price (APR) APR= AC+AF Eq.3

In our current example: AF= Fee(max)

a. APR= 700 + 180 = \$880

Scenario 2 (Region 2): If AC<TC & AC=Cost_{min} or AC> Cost_{min}

1- Seller's share of saving= (TC-AC) *SSR (in region 2) Eq.4

In our current example and using Eq.4:

- b. $AC = \$800 \rightarrow AC = Cost_{min} \rightarrow Seller's share = (1000-800) *0.4 = \80
- c. AC= \$900 \rightarrow AC> Cost_{min} \rightarrow Seller's share= (1000-900) *0.4 = \$40
- d. AC= $\$1000 \rightarrow$ AC> Cost_{min} and AC=TC \rightarrow Seller's share= (1000-1000) *0.4 = \$0
- 2- Actual Profit/Fee (AF): AF= TF+ Seller's share of saving Eq.5
- b. AF= 100+80= \$180
- c. AF= 100+40= \$140
- d. AF = 100 + 0 = \$100 = TF
- 3- Actual Price (APR): Eq.3
- b. APR= 800+ 180= \$980
- c. APR= 900+ 140= \$1040
- d. APR= 1000+100= \$1100 = Target Price

Scenario 3 (Region 2): If AC>TC & AC < Cost_{max} or AC= Cost_{max}

- 1- Seller's share of overrun= (TC-AC)*SSR(in region 2) Eq.4
- e. AC= \$1050 \rightarrow AC>TC and AC< Cost_{max} \rightarrow Seller's share= (1000-1050)*0.4= \$20
- f. AC= \$1100 \rightarrow AC>TC and AC= Cost_{max} \rightarrow Seller's share= (1000-1100)*0.4= \$40
- 2- AF=TF+Eq.4 Eq.6
- e. AF= 100 + (-20)= \$80
- f. $AF = 100 + (-40) = $60 = Fee_{min}$
- 3- APR **Eq.3**
- e. APR= 1050+ 80 = \$1130
- f. APR= 1100+60 = \$1160

Scenario 4 (Region 3): If AC>TC & AC >Cost_{max}

Note that the <u>seller's share of overrun</u> is calculated by: (**TC-Cost**_{max})***SSR Eq.7 or seller's** share at $Cost_{max}$:

because in this region the SR= 100/0. So, the contractor will not pay any extra share beyond $Cost_{max}$. The customer will reimburse this much to the contractor.

- 1- Seller's share of overrun= Eq.7
- g. AC= \$1150 \rightarrow AC>TC and AC> Cost_{max} \rightarrow Seller's share= (1000-800)*0.4= \$40= f
- h. AC= \$1200 \rightarrow AC>TC and AC> Cost_{max} \rightarrow Seller's share= (1000-800)*0.4= \$40= f
- 2- AF= Feemin Eq.8
- g. AF= \$60
- h. AF= \$60
- 3- APR = AC+ Fee_{min} Eq.9
- g. APR= 1150+60= \$1210
- h. APR= 1200+60= \$1260

| | Actual cost | Cost variance | Seller's share | Actual Fee | Actual price |
|----------|-------------------|---------------|----------------|------------|--------------|
| COST MIN | 700 | 300 | 180 | 180 | 880 |
| | 750 | 250 | 130 | 180 | 930 |
| | <mark>800</mark> | 200 | 80 | 180 | 980 |
| | 850 | 150 | 60 | 160 | 1010 |
| | 900 | 100 | | | |
| | 950 | 50 | | | |
| TC | <mark>1000</mark> | 0 | 0 | 100 | 1100 |
| COST MAX | 1050 | -50 | -20 | 80 | 1130 |
| | <mark>1100</mark> | -100 | -40 | 60 | 1160 |
| | 1150 | -150 | -40 | 60 | 1200 |
| | 1200 | -200 | -40 | 60 | 1260 |