

PLA-LiDAR : Physical Laser Attacks against LiDAR-based 3D Object Detection in Autonomous Vehicle

Zizhi Jin¹, Xiaoyu Ji¹, Yushi Cheng^{1,2}, Bo Yang¹, Chen Yan¹, Wenyan Xu¹

¹Zhejiang University, ²Tsinghua University,



智能系统安全实验室
UBIQUITOUS SYSTEM SECURITY LAB.



浙江大学
ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY



清华大学
Tsinghua University

LiDAR

- ❑ LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is widely used for perception.
- ❑ Correct LiDAR perception provides the foundation for safety in self driving.



Self-driving Car



CVIS




Robots




Drones

Source: www.velodynelidar.com





How Does LiDAR work?




💡 LiDAR generates point cloud by **laser ranging** and **laser beam steering**.

Laser Ranging




- Direction (θ, φ)
- Distance
 $d = 0.5 * t * c$


Laser Beam Steering



How Does LiDAR-based Perception work?




Security of LiDAR-based Perception



Is it possible to fool 3D object detection using **lasers** in the **physical world**?



PLA-LiDAR can achieve physical laser attacks!



Contributions of PLA-LiDAR:


1. **Enhanced** Point Manipulation Capability
2. **Physical-world** Laser Attacks against 3D Object Detection

Threat Model and Attack Goal




Challenges of Physical Laser Attack

1. Interference of surrounding environment



2. Scanning and rotating in high speed!

Scanning a single cycle in $\sim 2.3\mu s$



Rotating in 300~1200 RPM

3. “Curse of Light Speed”

small time error * **light speed** = **large** distance error


e.g. $1ns * 3 * 10^8 m/s = 30cm$

C1: How to make the attack signal be considered as a valid echo?

C2: How to have a fine control of the injected point clouds?

C1: What is valid echo?


Return Mode:



Strongest — the strongest echo. ✓

Last — the last (temporally) detected echo.

Dual — both the strongest and last echo.



Vulnerability: Echo can be forged.


Insights:

- A **high-power** fake echo can be recognized as a valid echo.
- The real echo will be **ignored**.


Preliminary: Point Injection Experiment

Critical Laser Parameters :


Parameters	Requirements
Wavelength	Appropriate: Same as LiDAR laser
Power	High: The higher the better
Frequency	Precise: According to LiDAR scanning sequence




(a) Original




(b) Scatter



(c) Wave



(d) Broken Wall



(e) Wall

>4000 points
(30° hori. angle)

SOTA:
Cao. CCS'19.
200 points
(8° hori. angle)

C2. Have a fine control of the point clouds: PLA-LiDAR



Step1. Point Cloud Design

- *Design the point cloud to either hide or create objects.*
- **Requirement:** **Injectable** point cloud.

Step2. Laser Signal Design

- *Convert the point cloud into laser signals*
- **Requirement:** Fully **the 3D information** of the point cloud.

Step3. Points Injection


- *Inject the signals into the lidar to generate desired point cloud.*
- **Requirement:** **Precise synchronization.**

Step1: Injectable Point Cloud Design

Physical Constraints :

- a. Every generated point can only locate on one of the LiDAR's laser rays;
- b. Each laser ray can generate at most one point.

1. Record-based



Pros: 1) Black box.  2) Naturally satisfy the physical constraint. ✓

2. Optimization-based



Question formulation:

$$\min_{P'} \mathcal{L}(P)$$

$$\text{s.t. } (R'_i, \alpha'_i, \omega'_i) \in \text{Loc}^{\text{exp}}, i \in [1, n]$$


$$|\alpha'_i - \alpha'_j| + |\omega'_i - \omega'_j| \neq 0, i, j \in [1, n]$$

—————→ Satisfy constrain a.

—————→ Satisfy constrain b.


**Constrained
Search Space.**

Step2: Laser Signal Design.





Point to Pulse Mapping

3D information
to
Temporal information



Step3: Points Injection with Precise Synchronization.




The measurement method of t_{device}

Empirically, time error should be within **3 nanosecond**.

The delay should be set: $t_{delay} = t_{align} - ToF_1 - ToF_2 - t_{device}$
 where $t_{align} = N * T_{full} - T_{sfc}$

PLA-LiDAR: System Design.




Physical-World Attacks

Ground Truth




Benign point cloud

Point Cloud under attack




Detection under attack







Naïve Hiding






Record-based Creating



Optimization Hiding




Optimization Creating



Evaluation


Physical-world attack Evaluation

- Four Attacks
- Two LiDARs: VLP-16, RS-16



- Three Models: Second, Pointpillar, Apollo

Physical Attack Setup



Physical-World Attacks

• Overall Performance

Detector	LiDAR Model	Attack Types			
		Nai-Hide	Rec-Create	Opt-Hide	Opt-Create
SECOND	VLP-16	100%	98%	38%	72%
	RS-16	100%	86%	33%	61%
PoinPillar	VLP-16	100%	64%	79%	15%
	RS-16	100%	51%	68%	12%
Apollo	VLP-16	100%	98%	77%	37%
	RS-16	100%	89%	73%	21%

90.5%

48.8%


VLP-16: 73.2%

RS-16: 66.2%


Observations:

1. VLP-16 (73.2%) is more vulnerable than RS-16 (66.2%).
 - Period randomization can mitigate our attacks.
2. Naive attack (90.5%) is better than optimization-based attack (48.8%).
 - Optimization attack has a higher requirement on timing.

Feasibility Study on Moving Vehicle



(a) A receiver and a laser transmitter on the car roof.



(b) The attack equipment in the car trunk.



Setup of moving experiment .




(c) The victim car (Apollo KiT) with a VLP-16.

- Improvement to conquer Jitter when moving
 - A large-diameter telescope ($\Phi = 50 \text{ mm}$) to expand the receiver's receiving area
 - Large spot diameter (8 cm), and use a high-power laser diode ($P_{\text{peak}} = 300 \text{ W}$)
- Attack success rate:
 - Hiding Attacks **94.1%** (16/17 trials)
 - Creating Attacks **78.9%** ASR (15/19 trials)

Feasibility Study on Moving Vehicle - Demo



Hiding Attacks



Creating Attacks

Potential Mitigation



1. LiDAR Improvement

- Pulse Encoding
- Pulse Randomizing and Scanning Period Randomizing

2. Security Redundancy

- Multi-LiDAR Fusion
- Multi-Sensor Fusion

Summary



- **Proposed the PLA-LiDAR attack**
 - 20 times more points than prior works.
 - 4 types of attacks.
- **Extensive physical experiments**
 - 2 LiDARs + 3 Detection Models
 - Stationary + Moving
- **Show the physical threats of lasers against LiDAR-based object detection!**

PLA-LiDAR : Physical Laser Attacks against LiDAR-based 3D Object Detection in Autonomous Vehicle



Demo Website:

<https://sites.google.com/view/physical-lidar-attack>


Corresponding Authors:

xji@zju.edu.cn, wylu@zju.edu.cn




USSLAB Website: www.ussslab.org


How Does Mechanical LiDAR work?



Laser Ranging




Electrical signal




- Direction (θ, φ)
- Distance
 $d = 0.5 * t * c$


Laser Beam Steering: Vertical Scanning + Horizontal Rotation




Vertical Scanning Sequence



How Does LiDAR-based Perception work?



One Point:
Laser Ranging





Electrical signal




- Direction (θ , φ)
- Distance
- $d = 0.5 * t * c$

Point Array:
Vertical Steering




Point Cloud:
Vertical & Horizontal Steering




300 ~ 1200 RPM
(Rotating per Minute)

Dive into Mechanical LiDAR - Return Mode


Return Mode: Strongest or Last or Dual



Return Mode	Valid Echo	Point Number
Strongest (Default)	Echo ₁	1
Last	Echo ₂	1
Dual	Echo ₁ & Echo ₂	2



Return Mode	Valid Echo
Strongest	Fake Echo
Last	Fake Echo
Dual	Echo ₁ & Fake Echo



Return Mode	Valid Echo
Strongest	Fake Echo
Last	Echo ₁ / Fake Echo (saturation)
Dual	Echo ₁ & Fake Echo