

Exploring Adversarial Examples for ~~Anomaly Detector~~ with ~~Neural Network~~ in Cyber-physical System

Anonymous Author(s)

ABSTRACT

The increasing threat of attacks faced by cyber-physical systems (CPS) in critical public infrastructures have motivated research into anomaly detectors, and nowadays, complicated neural network models has been proposed as solutions for safety critical systems. While several studies have suggested the efficacy of CPS anomaly detectors for catching a range of conventional attacks, limited studies have considered their effectiveness against adversarial attackers possessing knowledge of the model that the detector is based on. In this work, we specifically present an adversarial attack on a recurrent neural network (RNN) predictor that was trained to detect anomalies in a Secure Water Treatment system (SWaT), a real-world water treatment plant. Inspired by some white-box gradient-based approaches, we design adversarial attacks for RNN to produce noises (a.k.a. perturbations but following the rule checking mechanism) to avoid being detected by the system. We then propose a general method for recognising such noise as a defence to such attacks. Following this, we will demonstrate the effectiveness of such adversarial attacks and the corresponding defence for RNN predictor on the SWaT testing bed. Our study poses multiple threats in applying neural network anomaly detectors in CPS and possible defence to tackle them.

KEYWORDS

Neural network cyber physical systems water treatment plant adversarial attack LSTM

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1 INTRODUCTION

Cyber-physical systems (CPS), which deeply intertwine computational control software and physical processes, are ubiquitous in critical public infrastructures where they face a constant threat of attacks which may significantly influence people's everyday life [48]. This has spurred a great variety of research into attack detection mechanisms for CPS, including techniques based on monitoring invariant [37], fingerprinting [23], and anomaly detection [16]. Underpinning several of these approaches are state-of-the-art machine

learning algorithms, which have revolutionised the field by allowing these hugely complex systems to be modelled and reasoned about automatically and without the need for system-specific expertise.

Recently, neural networks have become a particularly popular choice of model, and their efficacy for detecting attacks in CPS has been widely reported [32, 36, 38, 46]. However, it has been shown in many other fields that neural networks are susceptible/vulnerable to *adversarial examples*, i.e. inputs that are similar to what would normally occur, but which are classified incorrectly to a target determined by the attacker [27]. Such attacks have been widely demonstrated in classification domains including images [40], audio [15], and malware [28]. This throws shadow on the reliability of neural network anomaly detectors in CPS as well.

At present, limited studies [20, 24, 34, 51] have considered adversarial examples for CPS attack detection mechanisms based on neural networks. This is despite the potentially significant consequences for real-world systems: while manipulating a CPS towards some unsafe state, an attacker would need only slightly perturb the actual sensor data to mask the attack and have the system's behaviour classified as "normal". It is thus important and urgent to understand how (and to what extent) can such adversarial attacks be brought about in a CPS in practice, and what can be done to defend against them.

In this work, we explore constructing adversarial examples for a recurrent neural network (RNN) that was trained to detect anomalies in a Water Distribution (WADI) test bed and a Secure Water Treatment system (SWaT), two real-world water distribution and purification plants. This is more challenging than traditional domains (like image and audio), partially because while we can modify the sensors in the continuous domain, the actuators can only take discrete values. We thus need to design perturbation in a CPS-specific way. Besides, CPS are often equipped with rule checking mechanisms to monitor abnormal changes of the environment, i.e., we are desired to produce noise¹ in the data that is undetected by both the RNN predictor and rule checking system. After successfully constructing adversarial examples, we take one step further and propose a simple method to recognize such adversarial examples with noise to defence against such adversarial attacks. We demonstrate the effectiveness of both the attack and defence on the testing beds.

Our Contributions. We thus make the following main contributions:

- We create a threat model for CPS adversarial attack/defence and propose a white-box gradient-based attack to construct adversarial examples in order to confuse the RNN predictor (following [24]) to have wrong decisions and meanwhile avoid the rule checking system if necessary.

¹We will use noise and perturbation interchangeably.

- Afterwards, we train a classifier from a set of normal/adversarial data and check if it is able to detect unseen adversarial examples as one of the defense.
- Finally, we validate our approach on a Water Distribution (WADI) test bed and a Secure Water Treatment system (SWaT) to show the effectiveness of our methods on CPS with RNN as anomaly detector.

Organisation. In Section 2, we will provide necessary background and present our threat model. In Section 3, we will introduce our experiment design and methodologies to construct adversarial examples. We will show our empirical study results on SWaT and WADI in Section 4. Finally, we review related works in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Structure of a CPS

Figure 1 provides an architectural overview of a typical cyber-physical system, which contains a physical part and a cyber part. The cyber part further consists of the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) [12] which implement a set of control logics according to the input sensors from the physical environment and a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. The physical environment periodically sends sensor data into the cyber part through a local network (Layer 0 Network). The PLCs then generate the control commands and send them back to adjust the physical environment. The SCADA system is built on top of PLCs (communicating using Layer 1 Network) to monitor and supervise the control process. To dynamically detect potential attacks at real time, CPS are often equipped with multiple *inner* mechanisms to guarantee that the system is in normal operation. Among them, rule checking [11] and anomaly detection [16] are widely adopted strategies which we focus on in this work. Notice that in theory rule checking and anomaly detection can be implemented in both the PLCs or the SCADA system.

2.2 SWaT and WADI

We carry out our study on a real-world modern Secure Water Treatment plant (SWaT) [3] and WADI [9]. SWaT is a 6-stage plant that takes raw water as input and produces 5 gallons/minute of treated water. The six sub-processes in the plant (one corresponding to each stage) include "stage 1: Supply and Storage", "stage 2: Pre- Treatment", "stage 3: Ultra-filtration and Backwash", "stage 4: De-Chlorination System", "stage 5: Reverse Osmosis" and "stage 6: Permeate Transfer, Cleaning and Back-wash". Each sub-process is controlled by different PLCs. WADI is a similar cyber-physical system but with a purpose of water distribution to serve customers 10 gallons of drinking water per minute. WADI has three stages where the first stage consists two water *tank* to store water from external source and pass the water to second stage *where provide customers* drinking water based on their demanding. Afterwards, the water goes to the third stage and *prepare to be* pumped back for reuse.

Sensors and actuators: In total, SWaT contains 68 sensors and actuators. Notice that among them some actuators serve as standbys and

are intended to be used only when the primary actuator fails, which we do not consider in this work. After filtering such actuators, there are in total 25 sensors and 26 actuators which we target in this study. Notice that sensors are of integer or float type while actuators can only take discrete values. WADI has similar data type but with 121 features including 51 actuators (20 valves and 31 pumps) and 70 sensors.

In the following, we use x to denote a system state (represented by sensor and actuator values) at a certain timestamp where $x = [x_a1, x_a2, x_a3...x_s1, x_s2, x_s3...]$, x_a represents actuator value and x_s represents sensor value. X is the set of all possible system states. Let S be a sequence of system states, we use $S[i]$ to denote the i -th state in the sequence, $S[i : j]$ to denote the sequence of system states from time i to j , and $S[i :]$ to denote the sequence of states from time i to the present.

We take *stage 1* (Supply and Storage) as an example. There are 2 sensors and 3 actuators in stage 1, i.e., sensor "FIT101" to measure the speed of flow transmission, sensor "LIT101" to measure the water level, actuator "MV101" as a motor valve and "P101", "P102" as two pumps. SWaT collects the values of sensors and actuators every second as data logs and *generate* a set of control commands. An example data log of stage 1 is given in Table 1.

Plant supervision and control: A Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation is located in the plant control room. A Human Machine Interface (HMI) is also located inside the plant room and can be used to view the process state and set parameters. Control code or anomaly detectors can be loaded into the PLC via the workstation. We can also acquire data logs (as well as network packet flows) from the historian at preset time intervals.

Communications: A multi-layer network enables communications across all components of SWaT and WADI. The ring network in each stage at Layer 0 enables PLCs to communicate with sensors and actuators. A star network at Layer 1 enables communications across PLCs, SCADA, HMI and the historian. Both wired and wireless options are available at Layer 1 and also for communications with the sensors at Layer 0. PLCs communicate with each other through the Layer 1 network, and with centralized Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system and Human-Machine Interface (HMI), through the Layer 2 network.

2.3 CPS attacks

Original attacks: Original attacks are applied by other attackers, where we used *as attack data* for experiments. The data set are labeled to indicate where and when *they* applied the data and lead to what results. In particular, *a total of 36 attacks* were conducted during *the four days* for SWaT system. The attacks in the dataset are generated following the attack model described in [2, 3]. All the attacks are carried out by spoofing the sensor values transmitted to the PLCs (*which is exactly the ability 4 in the threat model*). Some examples of attacks are given in Table 2.

Adversarial attacks: Adversarial attacks are applied by our work with a purpose to descent the accuracy of RNN predictor without




Figure 1: Overview of a cyber-physical system and cyber attacks.

Table 1: Example of log data

Timestamp	FIT101	LIT101	MV101	P101	P102	Normal/Attack
28/12/2015 10:00:00 AM	2.427057	522.8467	2	2	1	Normal
28/12/2015 10:00:01 AM	2.446274	522.886	2	2	1	Normal
28/12/2015 10:00:02 AM	2.489191	522.8467	2	2	1	Normal
28/12/2015 10:00:03 AM	2.53435	522.9645	2	2	1	Normal

Table 2: Example of attacks

Start Time	End Time	Attack Point	Start State	Attack
10:29:14	10:44:53	MV-101	MV-101 is closed	Open MV-101
10:51:08	10:58:30	P-102	P-101 is on where P-102 is off	Turn on P-102
11:22:00	11:28:22	LIT-101	Water level between L and H	Increase by 1 mm/s

being detected by the rule checking system or other anomaly detectors. Thus the adversarial attacked data and the original data should be "similar" enough to avoid being detected. As for CPS is complicated and there are different types of data (e.g. continuous and discrete data) in one data stream, we define the "similarity" of sensor values as sensor acceptable noises and for actuator values, we define it as "not being detected by defence system (e.g. rule checking system)".

Attack definition: Our adversarial attack may lead to an "actual attack" for the CPS system, and the system has its own way to define if it is an "actual attack" by monitoring if the sensor values are in normal/operational range. By studying the judging mechanism of the CPS, we model the mechanism as T to be our ground truth. Similar to the real system, the model judge the "attack" or "normal" status with a standard of "if an attack result exists". In details, if $T(S[i]) = \text{attack}$ means at time i , the data point $S[i]$ is classified as attack as it could lead to actual attack results for the system. Model T is designed to detect all possible attacks including tank overflow, tank underflow, water quality change, outflow stop, inflow stop, etc. These attack results can be indicated from sensor values, for example, $LIT101$ indicates the water level in the first stage, if $LIT101 > 1100mm$, it means an overflow and also a stop work of pump $P601$. In one sentence, if the sensor value has extended the

control points from white paper, it can be regarded as an "actual attack" or an "anomaly"

2.4 CPS anomaly detection

We introduce two frequently used anomaly detection approaches we target which are implemented in SWaT to monitor and detect unusual behaviors (or potential attacks) of the system.

2.4.1 Rule checking. The idea of rule checking is to implement a set of pre-defined rule that should never been violated into the PLCs. For instance, a sensor value should never exceed its operation range. Besides, there are some regulations that the system should follow under normal operation. We use R to denote the set of rule implemented in PLCs for checking. Once a rule $r \in R$ is violated, the system will raise an anomaly alarm to report that the system is in abnormal state. In total, we implemented 23 rule through the PLCs of SWaT. Some examples of implemented rule are shown in Table 3. Let us take rule 1 as an example. The rule specifies that under condition that sensor "LIT101" is equal or smaller than 500, the actuator "MV101" is supposed to be 2 after 12 seconds.

2.4.2 Learning-based approach. On the other hand, the idea of learning-based anomaly detectors is to model the normal behavior of the system from a piece of data historian S using a machine learning model (denoted by f). At run time, the system will look

Table 3: Example of rule

Num	Condition	Rule	Time
1	LIT101 \leq 500	MV101=2	12
2	LIT101 \leq 250	P101=1 AND P102=1	2
3	LIT301 \leq 800	P101=2 OR P102=2	12
4	AIT201 $>$ 260 and FIT201 $>$ 0.5	P201=1 AND P202=1	2

at the historian data (of a certain length), use f to predict the system state x' and compare it with the actual system state x . If the difference is beyond a threshold, the system is likely to be abnormal. In this work, we use RNN with LSTM architecture [31] as the prediction model and CUSUM algorithm (denoted by C) to calculate the differences between the actual value and the predicted value following the methodology from [24]. In the following sections, when we mention the anomaly detector, it means the learning-based approach, and we will use rule checker to imply the rule checking mechanism.

2.5 Threat model

As shown in Figure 1, our threat model assumes a white-box setting where an attacker has the following abilities:

- the attacker is aware of the underlying rule for rule checking but no access for rule contents;
- (white box) the attacker has full access to the RNN-based anomaly detector;
- the attacker is able to compromise the data transmitted from the physical part to the PLCs.

Under such a threat model, we aim to answer the following questions: 1) how should the attacker compromise the original data and construct the adversarial examples to fool the anomaly detector? 2) how should the attacker compromise the original data to fool the rule checking system and the anomaly detector? 3) how can we design a defence against such adversarial examples?

3 EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The experiment is designed to descent the performance of the anomaly detector. For a basic set up of CPSs, data from sensors and actuators will go directly to RNN predictor for attack detection, we when apply a thread model with gradient-based adversarial attack to deceive the anomaly detector directly. While for many CPSs, a rule checking system as we introduced in 2.4 is implemented to check if data obey the rule. For those systems, we use generative algorithm to overcome the rule checking system if the adversarial attack is detected by the rule checking system and eventually lead to that RNN predictor give a wrong prediction. Figure 2 provide an overview of the thread model and algorithm 1 show the logic to generate the adversarial examples.

3.1 Dataset

Our study is based on the SWaT dataset [36], which is a publicly available dataset [35] and has been used in multiple projects [24, 50]. The dataset records the system state of 26 sensor values and 25 actuators (in total 51 features) every second for a period of time.




Figure 2: An Illustration of Data Flow for Adversarial Attack Scenario

Algorithm 1: Overall Algorithm

Input: Data S_i ; RNN predictor model f ; rule Checker R ; noise level δ

Output: adversarial examples

- 1 Get gradient direction from f of loss r.p.t inputs data S_i ;
- 2 Apply the noise δ to S_i along or opposite the sign of gradients to get S'_i ;
- 3 **if** S'_i cannot pass rule checker **then**
- 4 | $S''_i = \text{GA}(S'_i[i])$;
- 5 **else**
- 6 | $S''_i = S'_i$;
- 7 **end**
- 8 **return** S''_i

The sensor values are integer or float while the actuator values are discrete with 0, 1 or 2 to indicate if the actuator is opening/closing or closed or open. The dataset consists of two types of data:

- **Normal data:** The normal dataset S_n is collected for 7-days (a total of xxx records) when the system is under normal operation. The data is used to train the LSTM anomaly detector.

- *Attack data*: The attack dataset S_a is collected for 4-days (a total of 449909 records) by 36 attacks with labels (normal or attack). The data is used as testing data for the trained anomaly detector.

3.2 RNN predictor

We train a RNN in LSTM architecture from normal data as the prediction model. The trained model is a many-to-one prediction model $f : S \rightarrow X$ which takes a certain sequence (parameterized by window size) of data historian as input and make the prediction of the output of the coming timestamp. For example, a window size of 10 represents a sequential input of the past 10 timestamps.

Once we obtain the predicted output at each timestamp, we then adopt the CUSUM algorithm [14] to decide whether the system is in abnormal state as follows. The difference d at timestamp i (denoted as $d[i]$) is calculated from the predicted value $x'[i]$ by the RNN model and the actual value $x[i]$, the difference d will then be added cumulatively with an allowable slack c . We calculate the CUSUM for each sensor with both positive and negative value by following formula:

$$\begin{aligned} SH[i] &= \max(0, SH[i-1] + d[i] - c) \\ SL[i] &= \min(0, SL[i-1] + d[i] + c) \\ d[i] &= X'[i] - x[i], \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where SH represents the set of high cumulative sum and SL represents the low cumulative sum, d is the difference between the predicted value x and actual value x' , and c is the allowable slack which is defined as 0.05 multiplied by the standard deviation of S . Besides, two thresholds, i.e., a Upper Control Limit (UCL) and a Lower Control Limit (LCL) for SH and SL to compare with respectively are required to check whether the system is in abnormal state. Normally, UCL and LCL are defined according to the experiment validation of the training data. Table 4 shows the UCL and LCL from stage 1 as an example.

3.3 Adversarial Attacks

Our next step is to construct adversarial examples which aim to fool the anomaly detectors equipped in the system. We consider two cases. Firstly, we construct adversarial examples only to fool the RNN predictor. Secondly, we take a step further to fool both the RNN predictor and the rule checking system, which is more challenging. In both cases, we assume a white-box attack that the attacker could access the trained RNN model (and its parameters) and the attacker is able to compromise the data transmitted to the PLCs. The goal of the attacker is thus finding a minimum perturbation δ on the original input \mathbf{x} such that the detector will make a different decision from the original one. Formally, given the input x at each timestamp and the RNN detector f , the objective of an attacker is to:

$$\begin{aligned} \min \delta \\ \text{s.t., } f(\mathbf{x}) \neq f(\mathbf{x} + \delta) \text{ and } \|\delta\| \leq \tau \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

, where τ is a small value which restricts the manipulation range of \mathbf{x} according to a certain norm $\|\cdot\|$ (to measure the distance of the modification). The success of such an attack will fool the detector in two folds. In the case that the detector detects an actual anomaly, the adversarial attack will be able to bypass the detector and put

the system in danger (without noticing that the system is in the abnormal state). In the case that the detector detects an actual normal status, the adversarial attack will deceive the detector to raise false alarms. We remark that how to construct adversarial examples using Eq. 2 has been extensively investigated in multiple domains [26, 33, 42, 49]. In the following, we introduce in details how we solve the problem in our setting.

3.3.1 Adversarial Attacks on RNN predictor. In the primary setting, we only aim to construct adversarial examples for the RNN detector. Notice that the detector uses CUSUM to check the difference between the predicted output and the actual output. Thus, we need to minimize the difference between the predicted value and targeted value in order to fool the CUSUM checker. On the other hand, we may need to minimize the loss of actual value and the targeted by RNN. Consider the RNN predict sequential data, the equation (2) is not suitable here as the output for this equation is for classification. Thus the equation should be modified with a adversarial target output y^* which is to be matched as close as possible with $f(x')$ where x' is the adversarial example, thus the equation could be modified as:

$$\begin{aligned} \min \delta \\ \text{s.t., } \|f(\mathbf{x} + \delta) - y^*\| \leq \Delta \text{ and } \|\delta\| \leq \tau \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where y^* is the desired output of the model, Δ is the acceptable difference between the desired model output and adversarial output.

The key problem is to calculate the perturbation δ . For this, we borrow the idea of the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) method in image domain, which perturbs the input *towards* the gradient direction to *maximize* the change in the model prediction[27]. Consequently, if the perturbation is added *opposite* the direction of the Gradients, the change of the model prediction is *minimized*. FGSM constructs adversarial examples by adding noises along the sign of gradient of the loss function w.r.t. the input. Conceptually, the perturbation can be formalized as:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}' &= \mathbf{x} \pm \delta \\ \delta &= \epsilon \cdot \text{sgn}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} l(\mathbf{x}, y')) \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where \mathbf{x}' is the calculated adversarial examples, ϵ is a constant representing the magnitude of the perturbation and l is the loss function. In our work, we choose Mean Square Error (MSE) as the loss function, which is the most commonly used for regression tasks. In our case, due to the target of "let the anomaly detection make wrong decisions", we have that if the actual status of the data point is "normal" ($S_a = \text{"normal"}$), we need to increase the loss with adding δ and if the actual status is "attack" ($S_a = \text{"attack"}$), we need to decrease the loss by minus δ . Besides, notice that in Eq. 4 ϵ is a constant. This is not suitable for CPS data set with a combination of different data types. To solve the two problems, we propose an adapted version of the Eq.4 in practice:

$$\mathbf{x}' = \begin{cases} \mathbf{x} + \delta, & \text{if } S_a = \text{"normal"} \\ \mathbf{x} - \delta, & \text{if } S_a = \text{"attack"} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

$$\delta = \text{sgn}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} l(\mathbf{x}, y')) \cdot \tilde{\epsilon},$$

Table 4: Upper and Lower control limit

Senor	Upper Control Limit	Lower Control Limit
FIT101	2	-1.5
LIT101	50	-2

where $\vec{\epsilon}$ is a diagonal matrix, and the value of each element from $\vec{\epsilon}$ is defined according to the data type of each feature which represents the magnitude of the perturbation for each feature. The smaller the $\vec{\epsilon}$ is, the less is the perturbation.

We distinguish three different types of feature, i.e., actuators, valves and pumps and add different perturbation on them. For sensors, we add a perturbation λ , which represents the percentage of the perturbation w.r.t. the original value. There are two types of actuators, valves and pumps. For valves, there are three values: 0 for opening/closing, 0.5 for close and 1 for open. For pumps, there are two values with 0 for close, and 1 for open. In order to follow the character of discrete values for actuators, we will define the ϵ of valves as 0.5 and the ϵ of pumps is defined as 1. In summary, the value of the diagonal matrix $\vec{\epsilon}$ can be defined as:

$$\vec{\epsilon}_{jj} = \begin{cases} \lambda, & \text{if } \vec{F}[j] \in \vec{U}, \text{ where } \vec{U} \subset \vec{F} \\ 0.5, & \text{if } \vec{F}[j] \in \vec{V}_m, \text{ where } \vec{V}_m \subset \vec{F} \\ 1, & \text{if } \vec{F}[j] \in \vec{V}_p, \text{ where } \vec{V}_p \subset \vec{F} \end{cases}$$

where \vec{F} is the set of all features, \vec{U} is the set of sensors, \vec{V}_m is the set of all valves, and \vec{V}_p is the set of pumps. For example, if we only consider data from stage 1, $\vec{\epsilon} =$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0.01 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0.01 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.5 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

To make sure the modified data are following the formats of data set, we clip the adversarial examples to 0 to 1 as it supposed to be. In specific, for a pump value, if the sign of the gradient at $V_p[i, j]$ is positive, $V_p'[i, j] = S[i, j] + 1$. where $V_p'[i, j]$ is the adversarial example of $S[i, j]$. However, we will get $V_p'[i, j] = 2$ which is not acceptable if $V_p[i, j] = 1$. Thus clipping is necessary. In physical world, $V_p[i, j] = 0$ means the pump is closed and after adversarial attack, it change to 1, means it is open after the attack.

We thus construct adversarial examples for the RNN detector by adding noise in the above way and algorithm 2

3.3.2 Adversarial attacks considering rule checking. The rule checking mechanism is widely used to detect anomaly of CPS by many works [11, 12, 18, 43]. An example rule from SWaT system could be that when the value of "LIT101" is smaller than 500, the value of "MV101" should always equal to 2 after 12 seconds, otherwise an alarm will arise to indicate anomalies. In this setting, we aim to construct adversarial examples to bypass both the RNN detector and the rule checking system.

As the rule checking system makes decisions depending on the actuators status, we propose to use genetic algorithm(GA)[25] to help us generate the ideal combination of actuator status. Due to the difficulty of different range for sensors, pumps and valves, we

Algorithm 2: Adversarial examples

Input: Data S_i ; RNN predictor model f
Output: adversarial examples

```

1  $\delta \leftarrow \text{sgn}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} l(\mathbf{x}, y')) \cdot \vec{\epsilon}$ ;
2 if  $S_i$  is normal data then
3    $S'_i = S_i + \delta$ ;
4 else
5    $S'_i = S_i - \delta$ ;
6 end
7 if  $S'_i$  cannot pass rule checker then
8    $S''_i = \text{GA}(S'_i)$ ;
9 else
10   $S''_i = S'_i$ ;
11 end
12 return  $S''_i$ 
```

develop the genetic algorithm to generate values according to data types. The algorithm 3 give an overview of how genetic algorithm works in this project.

Algorithm 3: GA

Input: Data $S'[i]$; fitness function G ; population size n ; mutation probability p_m ; rule Checker R
Output: adversarial examples

```

1 Generate initial population  $P$ ;
2 Compute fitness  $g$  for each candidate from  $P$ ;
3 repeat
4   Select parents from  $P$  with a probability of fitness distribution;
5   Apply crossover and mutation with  $p_m$  to get new candidates;
6   Select individuals from old and new candidates based on their fitness to participate in new  $P$ ;
7    $S''[i] \leftarrow$  fittest candidate from  $P$ ;
8 until  $R(S''[i]) = \text{True}$  or iteration = max iteration;
9 return  $S''[i]$ 
```

Inside the algorithms, R is a set of rule implemented in the system (for SWaT, there are in total 23 rule to monitor the system status.). Firstly, a set of random data points generated with population size n . Those data points should have the same data format with attack data set S , such as 26 sensor values with range from 0-1, 9 valve values from [0, 0.5, 1], and 16 pump values from [0, 1]. Afterwards, we calculate the fitness number with $g = c1 * (1/c2)$, where 1) $c1 = 1$ if $R(x) = \text{True}$, which means the data point x has passed rule checker, and $c1 = 0$ otherwise which indicating it is impossible to be chosen;

2) c_2 is the vector magnitude of the difference between the candidate and its original value. The lower c_2 is, the fewer modification on original data, which has a higher possibility to be chosen. Then we start to look at the repeating part, where the new population generated. Each candidate is assigned a probability according to the roulette wheel selection [25], which means probability of each candidate being selected as parent is $g_i / \sum_{j=1}^n g_j$. From the selected parents, the generation is sampled with crossover and mutation, in details, a random point is chosen to divide the vector and swap the sub-vector with each other. Afterwards, we randomly mutate a point with fix mutation probability p_m . Next, the fitness score is calculated for all candidates and top n fittest candidates form the new population. The fittest candidate value pass to $S''[i]$. This iteration continues until $S''[i]$ pass rule checker or timeout. Then we get the new adversarial example $S''[i]$.

Our experiment shows that this way works for passing most rules. We apply our methodology to construct adversarial examples in this setting and found that 461 out of 449909 data points have been caught by the rule checking system. After removing the noises accordingly, we obtain the results shown in the last row of Table 5. From the results we can see that we still achieve similar reduction in the performance of the anomaly detector as explained in the above section.

3.4 Defence model

Our next question is whether it is possible to detect the constructed examples efficiently as a defence. Our attempt is to create a binary classifier of different model types (e.g., d-NN and random forest) trained from a set of original data points and an equal number of adversarial examples. We then use the trained classifier to test whether the classifier can detect adversarial examples constructed from other data points. We will focus on the defence neural network (d-NN) performance and use the random forest as a comparison.

4 EVALUATION ON PHYSICAL SYSTEM

We evaluated our experiment to the full data set of real world cyber-physical systems, SWaT system that we have introduced in Section 2 background. The experiments are done on a purpose to answer our research questions raised in section 2.5.

4.1 Experiment setting

We conducted our experiments on a GPU laptop with 1 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8750H CPU at 2.20GHz, 16GB system memory and GPU of NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1050 Ti with Max-Q Design. The information of parameters we used for the experiment and specifications for RNN predictor and d-NN defence are summarised in Table ?? and Table ??.

The threshold selection for CUSUM is according to the validation of the attack data. We compared the cusum value for each sensor with attack labels, and set the threshold as the lowest peak of the CUSUM value that indicates an attack, so each sensor is possible to indicate 0 attacks or more than 1 attacks. Fig 3 presents a cusum value example for sensor "LIT101", the top graph is the negative cusum value SL of "LIT101". The bottom picture is the actual label of data, 1 means under attack and 0 means normal status. By comparing the two graph, almost each peak value from the SL indicated an




Figure 3: A CUSUM value example for sensor LIT101

attack, we choose the lowest peak value as the threshold and here it's indicated by the red dot line with value of -2 . All thresholds are calculated with this methods.

The above CUSUM-RNN model proposed by J.Goh [24] is also evaluated on SWaT system, however only on stage 1 (Supply and Storage). We expand the model with all stages of the system to make sure our adversarial attack works on the completed system.

4.2 Research questions

We have three research questions to evaluate our experiments with SWaT and WADI system.

RQ1: how should the attacker compromise the original data and construct the adversarial examples to fool the anomaly detector?

On SWaT system, the adversarial attack has been applied following the Eq.5. To balance the modification and effectiveness of the model, we design three experiments find the optimized solution. Experiment 1 and 2 is to apply the noise to sensor data only with $\lambda = 0.01$ and $\lambda = 0.1$ to check the influence for different noises. Experiment 3 and 4 is based on experiment 1 and 2, but we also change the actuator values along the sign of calculated gradient. In details, $\vec{\epsilon}$ is defined with 26 elements with $\lambda = 0.01$ for sensor value for experiment 3 and $\lambda = 0.1$ for sensor value for experiment 4, with 6 elements with 0.5 for actuator valves and 19 elements with 1 for actuator pumps value with locations responding to each feature, and the same logic has been applied to WADI system.

During the experiments, firstly, the RNN predictors for the two systems has been created, all data are collected with a frequency of 1Hz, so we select 10 seconds as the window size for WADI due to the slowly change of real systems. However, SWaT system has rule checking mechanism which check the data status with a delay more than 10s sometimes, so we choose the maximum delay of 12s from the rule checking mechanism as the window size of the SWaT system to make sure the window size can at least catch one attack. We compare the results of ground truth model $T(S)$ with the results from learning-based anomaly detector $C(f(S))$ to calculate the original anomaly detector accuracy of data S , and the difference between $T(S')$ and $C(f(S'))$ to get accuracy of data S' .

As the definition of the attacks, as defined in section 2.3 is dynamic with changes of input data, so for every prediction of f , we have to generate the status labels as the ground truth, Figure 4 shows an overview of how results generated. Vertically, Data S is the original attack data, Data S' is noised data after gradient-based




Figure 4: An overview of input vs output

attack by model N, and S'' is GA selected data to pass rule checker R. Horizontally, from each data set (s, s' and S''), we will calculate Y_T as the ground truth to compare with the anomaly detector results Y_C and get outputs. The *Output* inside figure refer to a lists of standards such as precision, recall f1, etc.

We can see the results Table 5 for SWaT and Table 6 for WADI, where the precision, f1 and accuracy has been apparently reduced after the adversarial attack. Results of experiments 1 and 2 are given from the second and third rows of the Table 5, if we only add noises on sensor values, the more noises we added, the lower accuracy of the anomaly detector. However, there is a possibility that the noises are added in an extreme condition so that the noised data has exceed the threshold and lead to an "actual attack", in this condition, the data will be classified as attack by the ground truth model T. The slightly higher results of precision, recall and f1 for 10% noises than 1% indicates that the higher noises leads to more "actual attacks" defined by model T. The fourth and fifth row provide the results that we apply the noises to sensor and change actuator values at the same time. The accuracy has been reduced more than if we apply noises to sensor only, and the false positive values of 0.78 implies that many attacks has been failed to be detected by the anomaly detector. As for row 2,4 and row 3,5, we can see if we apply the same noise range for sensor value, a manipulation of actuators could provide an extra decrease of model accuracy.

We did the same experiment on WADI, and get the results as shown by Table 6. WADI is a bit different as we do not have its control points information to determine the ground truth, thus we calculate the operation range under normal conditions with a small tolerance to set the ground truth model T. As it has more features (121) than SWaT (51), the complexity is more apparent and behavior is more unpredictable.

RQ2: how should the attacker compromise the original data to fool the rule checking system and the anomaly detector?

Rule checking system is commonly used in industrial CPS as a basic defence mechanism, as WADI has not established an rule checking system, so our second experiment will only be applied to SWaT test bed. The rule checking mechanism is settles to monitor

the condition and invariant in SWAT system, it will check in total 20 actuators status according to the 11 sensor values for SWaT system. Aware of the rule checking mechanism relies on the change of actuators, we design the experiment 5 to use GA to generate actuator data to check if this is sufficient to pass the rule checker. We assume that the attacker does not have the access to the content of the rule, but knows whether the data could pass the rule checker or not. The rules include the relationship between the sensor and actuator values, so we divided an data point x into $x_a = [x_a1, x_a2...]$ and $x_s = [x_s1, x_s2...]$, and use GA to generate possible x_a and keep x_s to combine back to calculate fitness score. As our goal is to generate adversarial attack rather than "actual attacks", so we only care those rule checked attacks that are caused by adversarial attacks (i.e. applying noises), so we won't use GA to replace those attacks that being detected before and after attacks.

The results for experiment 5 can be found from the last row of Table 5. The accuracy has been slightly increased indicating that using GA for actuator value selection may sacrifice the drop of accuracy which is reasonable, as GA generated values do not change following the sign of gradients. While the overall performance is almost the same comparing with the experiment 4 results (row 5 from Table 5), so GA could be used for overcoming the rule checker without reduce the anomaly detector performance.

RQ3: how can we design a defence against such adversarial examples?

The adversarial examples have more noises comparing to original data, so we design a defence neural network (d-NN) to distinguish if the data are adversarial examples or original data from the system. The d-NN performs as a basic binary classifier. We train the model with half original data and half adversarial examples as training data and the rest half as testing data. The d-NN model is designed with three layers and 100 units for each layer, and we choose *binary cross entropy* as our loss function. We also use a 10 estimators random forest for comparison.

The results can be found from Table 7, both d-NN and random forest model works well on detecting the noises, which indicates the original data has a certain pattern that the noises we added, though small but are easy to change the pattern. Moreover, comparing to change sensor value only, changing all data would be 100% detected by the defence models. As for changing sensor value only, the larger value we modified, the easier to be detected.

4.3 Evaluation constrains

There are some limitations for the evaluation and application validity. First, though the two CPS systems are real and operational, they are still testing bed and note industrialized. Secondly, the data are collected and labeled due to manual work, there are some data points are not accurate and may increase the bias of the results. Finally, we only considered the recorded attacks to train and calculated ground truth, so the methods may not work well for non-recorded attacks. Similarly, the defence method (i.e. d-NN) has to be trained for each kind of adversarial examples (10% noises and 1% noises), and it does not work for un-known adversarial examples (e.g. 5% noises).

Table 5: Before and after adding noises of anomaly detector for SWaT

	precision	recall	f1	accuracy	False positive	False negative
Original Anomaly Detector	0.96	0.86	0.91	89.40%	0.05	0.14
Noises to sensor (1%)	0.62	0.53	0.57	52.38%	0.48	0.47
Noises to sensor (10%)	0.65	0.58	0.61	48.78%	0.72	0.42
Noises to all data (1%)	0.52	0.50	0.51	51.85%	0.46	0.50
Noises to all data (10%)	0.12	0.84	0.21	28.84%	0.78	0.16
Noises to all data + GA for actuator	0.14	0.76	0.24	39.56%	0.62	0.34

Table 6: Before and after adding noises of anomaly detector for WADI

	precision	recall	f1	accuracy	False positive	False negative
Original Anomaly Detector	0.32	0.16	0.22	93.29%	0.02	0.84
Noises to sensor (1%)	0.42	0.65	0.51	51.70%	0.56	0.35
Noises to sensor (10%)	0.42	0.65	0.51	51.70%	0.56	0.35
Noises to all data (1%)	0.42	0.65	0.51	51.70%	0.56	0.35
Noises to all data (10%)	0.42	0.65	0.51	51.70%	0.56	0.35

Table 7: Defence for adversarial attacks on SWaT

	D-NN			RF		
	precision	recall	f1	precision	recall	f1
Noises to sensor (1%)	0.98	0.99	0.99	1	0.99	0.99
Noises to sensor (10%)	0.99	0.99	0.99	1	1	1
Noises to all data (1%)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Noises to all data (10%)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Noises to all data + GA for actuator	1	1	1	1	1	1

5 RELATED WORK

This work focus on adversarial attacks on LSTM-RNN which is implemented as a part of anomaly detector in a cyber-physical system. In this section, we will discuss some researches with relevant themes such as adversarial attacks and some relevant works done on SWaT/WADI systems.

Anomaly detection on CPS: A number of researches has explored the anomaly detection on CPS, these approaches [7, 13, 21, 29, 30, 34, 39, 41, 44, 45, 47] unusual monitor the changes or suspicious patterns from the logs of a CPS. Y.Harada et al [29] has proposed a statistical way to monitor the outliers from logs. This statistical methods can include machine leaning or deep learning methods. J.Inoue et al [34] has provide an unsupervised machine learning methods to detect anomalies and M. Kravchik et al [39] proposed to use convolutional neural network to detec cyber attacks in control systems.

SWaT system as a typical cyber-physical system has been widely explore by researches, and there are many works including anomaly detection done on the public data set [35, 36]. These works includes unsupervised learning methods [24, 34, 39], which includes deep learning methods, and supervised leaning methods [17, 19], who injected simulated faults to get attack data. Ahmed et al. [8, 10] has worked on fingerprinting the noises patterns to detect anomalies while Adepu and Mathur [1, 4–6] has manually derived the invariants or what we call "rules" by monitoring the normal operation

of the system. C. Feng [22] also tried to get invariants but using a systematic way to learn the invariants.

Adversarial attacks:

6 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we introduce a case study of adversarial attack for real world cyber-physical systems, and we create possible defences for adversarial attack. Firstly, we propose a adversarial attacks for anomaly detector with LSTM-RNN as predictor in a cyber-physical system, we applied noises with different ranges and compare their impacts. Then we consider the condition with rule checking mechanism and provide a solution to overcome the checker, which is by using GA. Finally, we explore if there is any possible methods to detected the adversarial examples and tried d-NN and random forest for the experiments. Afterwards, we evaluate our methods on two testing beds, SWaT and WADI and get results to show that the thread model has effectively drop the performance of the pre-implemented anomaly detectors, and even though we consider the rule checking mechanism to weaken the assumptions of attackers, we can still achieve a similar results with our improved adversarial attack methods.

For future works, we will consider weaken the attacker model with black box adversarial attack, and we will explore other methods to overcome the rule checker such as SMT solver. The evaluation

should be done with the actual system and real time attack application. Moreover, we will investigate possible solutions for adversarial example detection.

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