

# **Lecture 1: Introduction**

## Decision making methodologies

- Machine Learning
- Artificial Intelligence
- Optimization
- Optimum Control
- Planning
- Markov Decision Process
- Influential Diagram
- Decision Tree
- Dynamic Control
- **Game Theory**
- Search
- Stochastic Programming
- Dynamic programming
- Reinforcement Learning
- Bandit problem

*Engineering is all about decision makings*



What are **the differences** in these decision-making strategies

What are **the common aspects** in these decision-making strategies?

## Why do we have to learn many decision making methodologies?

engineers' creativity depends on the diversity of tools that he or she has



- Diversify tools for decision making
- Understand the usages of your tools
- Sharpen your tools
- Organize your tools

Be ready for solving any problem that might appear in the future!

## Core idea

What type of decision making framework will be used?


- Single stage or multi stages
- Single decision maker or many decision makers
- Model based or model-free

## “Decision makings under uncertainties”


How to model uncertainties?

- **Epistemic Uncertainty** (systemic uncertainty) :  
Uncertainty arising through lack of knowledge
  - Model uncertainty
  - State uncertainty
- **Aleatoric uncertainty** (statistical uncertainty):  
Uncertainty arising through an underlying stochastic system


## Classified decision making methods




## Classified decision making methods




## Classified decision making methods



## Classified decision making methods



# Problem solving




Data can help to model a target problem more realistically and derive more accurate solution!

## **Key elements of this course**



# Data analytics

- Bayesian Statistics
  - Machine learning
  - Artificial intelligence



## Modeling

- Optimization
  - Markov Decision Process
  - Game Theory



## Decision Making


- Mathematical Programming
  - Dynamic Programming
  - Reinforcement Learning

## Course objectives

**Upon successful completion of the course, you are able to**

- *understand* various mathematical models describing decision making problems.
- *formulate* real-world decision making problems in a mathematical form.
- *implement* key algorithms and approaches to solving various decision making problems.
- *Interpret* the results of decision-making problems.


# Prisoner's Dilemma



	C	D
C	-1, -1	-4, 0
D	0, -4	-3, -3

# Course schedule


1. Static Games of Complete Information
2. Dynamic Games of Complete Information
3. Static Game of Incomplete Information
4. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information



- **Incomplete Information**: Players do not have complete information about the game being played (regarding payoffs)
- **Imperfect Information**: Players do not perfectly observe the actions of other players or forget their own actions (regarding actions)
- **We will study, how each of these four classes of games can be mathematically described**

# Course schedule

1. Static Games of Complete Information
2. Dynamic Games of Complete Information
3. Static Game of Incomplete Information
4. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
5. Learning in Repeated Game
6. Learning Stochastic Games
7. Optimal Control and Differential Game (if time allows)



## Course schedule

1. Static Games of Complete Information
2. Dynamic Games of Complete Information
3. Static Game of Incomplete Information
4. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
5. Learning in Repeated Game
6. Learning Stochastic Games
7. Optimal Control and Differential Game (if time allows)



**HUMAN**

**Restart Game**

Play at least twenty rounds to share your score.

WINS	TIES	WINS
0	1	3
	Round 4	
	Round 3	
	Round 2	
	Round 1	


**VETERAN COMPUTER**

Play at least five rounds to see what the computer is thinking.



[http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/science/rock-paper-scissors.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/science/rock-paper-scissors.html?_r=0)






## Course grades



## Course project

- The objective of the project is to encourage students to define their own problems of interests and formulate them in a formal mathematical way. The topic should be related to the general theme of the course. As part of the project you should:
  - formulate a target problem
  - apply a decision making methodology to solve the formulated problem
  - analyze and interpret the results obtained
  - present the result and derived insights to other people

## Text books



**Why game theory is useful?**

## What is game theory?

Definitions of game theory found in literature....

- Game theory is described as “the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers.”
- Game theory is the study of the behavior of decision makers whose decisions affect each other
- Provides the languages and framework for the discussion of problems in economics, social science, evolutionary biology, etc.
- Mathematical study of interaction between rational, self-interested agents

## What is game theory?

- **Cooperative/coalitional games**
  - The basic modeling unit is the group
- **Non-cooperative games**
  - The basic modeling unit is the individual (including his beliefs, preferences, and possible actions)
  - while it's most interested in situations where agents' interests conflict, it's not restricted to these settings
  - the individuals pursue their own interests


## From optimality to equilibrium

	1 payoff	$n$ payoffs
1 player	<b>Optimization (Optimality)</b>	Multi-objective optimization
$n$ players	Team theory	<b>Game theory (Equilibrium)</b>

- In optimization problems, a solution can be determined by a single player
  - **Optimality condition** can be used
- In game theory, a set of strategies can be determined simultaneously by multiple players
  - Optimal condition with respect to a single player does not work (other players affect each agent's payoff)
  - Instead, **equilibrium concept** can be used

## Motivation

- In many business situation, strategic player has to determine his strategy without knowledge of what the rival is doing at the same time
  - Product design
  - Pricing and marketing some new product
  - Mergers and acquisitions competition
  - Auctions



## Motivation

- For international relations and politics, there are also many conflicts that can be modeled by game theory
  - Voting
  - International organizations
  - Custom duty on imported goods
  - OPEC
  - Territory conflicts
  - Religion



# Motivation


- In **Biology**, game theory has been used to describe
  - Evolution of species
  - Behaviors of animals

Leadership in fish affected by previous experiences and linked to personality

Leadership behaviour is affected by social experiences from previous partners and depends on an individual's personality, as shown by our latest study with three-spined stickleback fish, now published in [Behavioral Ecology](#).



<http://jollejolles.com/leadership-in-fish-linked-to-personality-and-previous-social-experience/>



- orange color: very aggressive and defend large territories;
- blue color: less aggressive defense smaller territories;
- yellow color: not aggressive, opportunistic mating behavior.

<https://evolhappens.wordpress.com/2013/05/07/survival-of-the-sexiest-male-competition/>

## Motivation

- In everyday life, we are also using game theory

- Rock paper scissor game
- Team project
- Getting a good GPA in a class
- Applying for graduate schools and labs
- Sports




## Motivation

- In everyday life, we are also using game theory
  - Rock paper scissor game
  - Team project
  - Getting a good GPA in a class
  - Applying for graduate schools and labs
  - Sports



## Motivation


- In engineering, the concept of game theory is being widely used to model the interaction among sub-systems that are designed to achieve global objectives
  - Drone formation
  - Driverless cars
  - Smart grid operation
  - Distributed water channel
  - Machine learning
  - Communication



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFi5SkhUjR8&feature=youtu.be>

## Motivation

- In engineering, the concept of game theory is being widely used to model the interaction among sub-systems that are designed to achieve global objectives
  - Drone formation
  - Driverless cars
  - Smart grid operation
  - Distributed water channel
  - Machine learning
  - Communication




Community	Coordination chain	Value	division
$C_1 = \{1\}$	[1]	20	[20]
$C_2 = \{2\}$	[2]	10	[10]
$C_3 = \{3\}$	[3]	30	[30]
$C_4 = \{1, 2\}$	[1, 2]	34	[23, 11]
$C_5 = \{2, 3\}$	[3, 2]	44	[32, 12]
$C_6 = \{1, 2\}$	[2, 1]	44	[31, 13]
$C_7 = \{3, 1\}$	[1, 3]	49	[20, 29]
$C_8 = \{1, 2, 3\}$	[1, 2, 3]	46	[6, 9, 31]

# Inside the 20-Year Quest to Build Computers That Play Poker

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence research raise questions about the threat that bots pose to the online gambling industry.

by Joshua Brustein

2017년 1월 31일 오후 7:00 GMT+9



<https://www.engadget.com/2017/02/10/libratus-ai-poker-winner/>

# Can game theory help solve the problem of climate change?

Applying the mathematical principle of studying models of conflict and cooperation between groups could help us rein in global warming



*i* A mother and her children wear masks for protection as smoke billows from a coal-fired power plant in Shanxi, China. Photograph: Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

### Game Theory reveals the Future of Deep Learning



Credit: <https://unsplash.com/search/game?photo=B4op5oZ4x5Q>

3 different ways game theory plays in Deep Learning.

- (1) As a means of describing and analyzing new DL architectures.
- (2) As a way to construct a learning strategy and
- (3) A way to predict behavior of human participants.

# Fake news on Facebook is no game, but it can explain game theory

December 02, 2016 | By Clare Milliken



Economist Jeff Ely says game theory can help explain the fake news phenomenon.

## Trending

**Myopia cell discovered in retina**

February 6, 2017 – *Health*

**Northwestern Athletics unveils Trienens Performance Center**

February 7, 2017 – *University*

**Change in astronaut's gut bacteria attributed to spaceflight**


February 3, 2017 – *Science & Tech*

[ALL STORIES >](#)

- Player 1: person or group fabricating news stories
- Player 2: the reader who encounters stories and isn't immediately able to discern whether a story is fake or not
- Player 3: Mark Zuckerberg


## Will filtering fake news help stop spreads of fake news?

## Scope of this course




- **Incomplete Information:** Players do not have complete information about the game being played (regarding payoffs)
- **Imperfect Information:** Players do not perfectly observe the actions of other players or forget their own actions (regarding actions)
- **We will study, how each of these four classes of games can be mathematically described**

## Scope of this course




- Corresponding to these four games, we will discuss **four notions of equilibrium**
- We will also study how these four classes of games used to model various problems


## Scope of this course



## Scope of this course




## Scope of this course




Part 3


## Scope of this course



## Scope of this course



## Scope of this course



**Learning in stochastic game**  
(Multiagent reinforcement learning)

- Transition is unknown
- Opponent's strategies are unknown
- Payoff structures are unknown

**Part 6**


## Fun game: Traveler's dilemma



- A and B find that the airline has damaged the identical antiques that each had purchased
- An airline manager says that he is happy to compensate them but is handicapped by being clueless about the value of these strange objects.
- An airline manager asks each of them to write down the price of the antique as any dollar integer between 2 and 100 without conferring together.
  - ✓ If  $A = B$ , both will get the same money
  - ✓ If  $A > B$ , A will get  $A - 2$  (penalty for cheating) and B will get  $B + 2$  (bonus for being diligent)
  - ✓ If  $A < B$ , A will get  $A + 2$  (bonus for being diligent) and B will get  $B - 2$  (penalty for cheating)

**Play this game with a person sitting next to you**

## Fun game: Traveler's dilemma




		PETE'S CHOICE (dollars)							
		2	3	4	...	98	99	100	
LUCY'S CHOICE (dollars)		2	2 2	4 0	4 0	...	4 0	4 0	4 0
2	3	0 4	3 3	5 1	...	5 1	5 1	5 1	
3	4	0 4	1 5	4 4	...	6 2	6 2	6 2	
4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
...	98	0 4	1 5	2 6	...	98 98	100 96	100 96	
98	99	0 4	1 5	2 6	...	96 100	99 99	101 97	
99	100	0 4	1 5	2 6	...	96 100	97 101	100 100	


- The equilibrium reaches by two rational decision maker is (\$2, \$2)
- The example shows **the paradoxes of rationality** that plague game theory

## Fun game: Traveler's dilemma

How actually people play this game? (180-300) and a penalty and bonus are \$5 each



## Example: Structural control using game theory



State dynamics

$$\dot{x} = Ax + B_1u_1 + B_2u_2 + B_3u_3 + Eg$$

Accumulated cost for each controller

$$J_1 = \int_0^{\infty} \{x^T Q_1 x + u_1^T R_{11} u_1 + u_2^T R_{12} u_2 + u_3^T R_{13} u_3\} dt$$

$$J_2 = \int_0^{\infty} \{x^T Q_3 x + u_1^T R_{21} u_1 + u_2^T R_{32} u_2 + u_3^T R_{23} u_3\} dt$$

$$J_3 = \int_0^{\infty} \{x^T Q_3 x + u_1^T R_{31} u_1 + u_2^T R_{32} u_2 + u_3^T R_{33} u_3\} dt$$

## Example: Structural control using game theory

### Nash control

$$J_1(F_1, F_2, F_3, x_0) = \int_0^\infty \{x^T(Q_1 + F_1^T R_{11} F_1 + F_2^T R_{12} F_2 + F_3^T R_{13} F_3)x\} dt$$

$$J_2(F_1, F_2, F_3, x_0) = \int_0^\infty \{x^T(Q_2 + F_1^T R_{21} F_1 + F_2^T R_{22} F_2 + F_3^T R_{23} F_3)x\} dt$$

$$J_3(F_1, F_2, F_3, x_0) = \int_0^\infty \{x^T(Q_3 + F_1^T R_{31} F_1 + F_2^T R_{32} F_2 + F_3^T R_{33} F_3)x\} dt$$

$$J_1(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*, x_0) \leq J_1(F_1, F_2^*, F_3^*, x_0)$$

$$J_2(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*, x_0) \leq J_2(F_1^*, F_2, F_3^*, x_0)$$

$$J_3(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*, x_0) \leq J_3(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3, x_0)$$


### Minmax control

$$J_c(u, g, x_0) = \int_0^\infty \{x^T Q x + u^T R u - g^T V g\} dt$$

$$J_g(u, g, x_0) = -J_c(u, g, x_0) = \int_0^\infty \{-x^T Q x - u^T R u + g^T V g\} dt$$

$$F^* = \min_{F \in \mathcal{F}} \sup_{g \in L_2^q(0, \infty)} J_c(F, g, x_0) = \int_0^\infty \{x^T(Q + F^T R F)x - g^T V g\} dt$$

## Example: Structural control using game theory



(a) Story displacement

## Example: Data-driven wind farm power maximization

Size of wind farm ↑

Wind farm power production efficiency ↓

wind turbines : companies

: assets

wind farm : market

: stock market

wind: resource


: money

Power: revenue


: payoff

Photo courtesy of Vattenfall.




# Example: Data-driven wind farm power maximization




<www.windpowr.org>




<www.windpowr.org>



Flow visualization of wake deflection. Conducted at the Royal Institute of Technology at 1987, Dahlberg (2003)




## Example: Data-driven wind farm power maximization



Greedy strategy:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \underset{x_i}{\text{maximize}} P_i(x; U, \theta)$$

•sensors



Cooperative strategy:

$$\underset{x}{\text{maximize}} \sum_{i=1}^N P_i(x; U, \theta)$$

$P_i(x; U, \theta)$  :Power of wind turbine  $i$

$x = (x_1, \dots, x_N)$  : Control inputs for  $N$  wind turbines

## Example: Data-driven wind farm power maximization


$(U, \theta)$  : Fixed wind condition (Fixed context)

**Input (control actions)**

$$\boldsymbol{x}^1 = (x_1^1, \dots, x_N^1)$$

$$\boldsymbol{x}^2 = (x_1^2, \dots, x_N^2)$$

$\vdots$



**Output (power measurements)**

$$y^1 = \sum_{i=1}^N P_i(\boldsymbol{x}^1; \theta, U) + \epsilon^1$$

$$y^2 = \sum_{i=1}^N P_i(\boldsymbol{x}^2; \theta, U) + \epsilon^2$$

$\vdots$


( $y$  = total wind farm power)

subject to  $\boldsymbol{x}^l \leq \boldsymbol{x} \leq \boldsymbol{x}^u$

$$\underset{\boldsymbol{x}}{\text{maximize}} \ f(\boldsymbol{x}; \mathcal{U}, \theta) = \sum_{i=1}^N P_i(\boldsymbol{x}; \theta, U)$$

Without knowing  $f(\boldsymbol{x}; \mathcal{U}, \theta)$


## Example: Data-driven wind farm power maximization



Greedy control (initial)







Cooperative control (after convergence)



# Smart Grid + AI


## Multi-Agent Stochastic Game




## ESS User vs ESS User


Grid Operator:  
$$P(t) = k_t(L(t))^2$$

Price structure  
is fixed



<Non-Cooperative Game among  $N$  ESS users>





<Sequential Game Modeled by Stackelberg Game>