

Smart Contract Security Audit Report

[2021]



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1 Executive Summary

On 2021.05.31, the SlowMist security team received the Mars team's security audit application for Mars Ecosystem, developed the audit plan according to the agreement of both parties and the characteristics of the project, and finally issued the security audit report.

The SlowMist security team adopts the strategy of "white box lead, black, grey box assists" to conduct a complete security test on the project in the way closest to the real attack.

The test method information:

Test method	Description
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.
White box testing	Based on the open source code, non-open source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant impact on the security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the critical vulnerabilities.
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project party should evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to reproduce in engineering.



Level	Description	
Suggestion	There are better practices for coding or architecture.	

2 Audit Methodology

The security audit process of SlowMist security team for smart contract includes two steps:

Smart contract codes are scanned/tested for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities using automated analysis tools.

Manual audit of the codes for security issues. The contracts are manually analyzed to look for any potential problems.

Following is the list of commonly known vulnerabilities that was considered during the audit of the smart contract:

- Reentrancy Vulnerability
- Replay Vulnerability
- Reordering Vulnerability
- Short Address Vulnerability
- Denial of Service Vulnerability
- Transaction Ordering Dependence Vulnerability
- Race Conditions Vulnerability
- Authority Control Vulnerability
- Integer Overflow and Underflow Vulnerability
- TimeStamp Dependence Vulnerability
- Uninitialized Storage Pointers Vulnerability
- Arithmetic Accuracy Deviation Vulnerability
- tx.origin Authentication Vulnerability



- "False top-up" Vulnerability
- Variable Coverage Vulnerability
- Gas Optimization Audit
- Malicious Event Log Audit
- Redundant Fallback Function Audit
- Unsafe External Call Audit
- Explicit Visibility of Functions State Variables Aduit
- Design Logic Audit
- Scoping and Declarations Audit

3 Project Overview

3.1 Project Introduction

Project: Mars Ecosystem,

Type: DeFi

Module: Bondingcurve + core + genesis + oracle + pcv + refs + redemption

Code lines: 2206

Complexity: Medium

Workload: 11 working days, smart contract security audit standards, related instructions and certificate query:

https://www.slowmist.com/service-smart-contract-security-audit.html

Source code:

https://github.com/MarsEcosystem/mars-swap

Initial audit commit: 313bf2b4ad943f7c9216aa7c33abfb33cda88551

Last audit commit: c0dad9789a9713ccdf6abfe56d4bddc344616746



3.2 Vulnerability Information

The following is the status of the vulnerabilities found in this audit:

NO	Title	Category	Level	Status
N1	initialize function doesn't check the role that may be called by others perviously	Authority Control Vulnerability	Low	Fixed
N2	purchase/deposit functions has payable maybe lock user's assets	Unsafe External Call Audit	Suggestion	Fixed
N3	redeem may be called by others	Authority Control Vulnerability	Suggestion	Ignored
N4	Suggest that add call authority check to the launch function	Authority Control Vulnerability	Suggestion	Fixed
N5	PCVController role has too much authority that can withdraw assets from the contracts	Authority Control Vulnerability	Medium	Fixed
N6	getUSDMAmountGover nance loop maybe call DoS	Others	Suggestion	Ignored

4 Code Overview

4.1 Contracts Description

The main network address of the contract is as follows:

Module Address



Module	Address
Core	0x00789Cfb69499c65ac9A3a68fb4917c9b4FcA2a7
XMS	0x7859B01BbF675d67Da8cD128a50D155cd881B576
IMO	0x243DDd2E42CEb93349E726e2367EDeC6339aba75
MarsSwapFactory	0x6f12482D9869303B998C54D91bCD8bCcba81f3bE
MarsSwapRouter	0xb68825C810E67D4e444ad5B9DeB55BA56A66e72D
MarsStake	0x3b550BBFaC32Ec434F858a8135fa17C40636583B
AirDrop	0x01D152fF991E76b6cb310387c07cAfdFda790a25
Governor (timelock)	0xC35a8BdBB93abFAb362aF6dC3383cD2c6aEA6cBc

4.2 Visibility Description

The SlowMist Security team analyzed the visibility of major contracts during the audit, the result as follows:

BondingLCurve			
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
constructor	internal	can modify state	<u>-</u>
setIncentiveAmount	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
setMaxBasisPointsFromPe gLP	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
setAllocation	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
setOracle	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
allocate	external	can modify state	postGenesis,whenNotPaused,validP riceRange



BondingLCurve			
getCurrentPrice	public	-	-
getAmountOut	public	-	-
getTotalPCVHeld	public	-	-
_purchase	internal	can modify state	-
_incentivize	internal	can modify state	-
_isValidPriceRange	internal	-	-
_ignoreUSDMSupplyCap	internal	-	-

BUSDBondingLCurve			
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
constructor	public	can modify state	-
initialize	external	can modify state	initializer
setOracle	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
getCurrentPrice	public	-	-
getAmountOut	public	-	-
getAmountIn	public	-	-
setFee	public	can modify state	onlyGovernor
purchase	external	payable	postGenesis,whenNotPaused,ensure
getTotalPCVHeld	public	-	-
_allocateSingle	internal	can modify state	-



BUSDBondingLCurve			
_isValidPriceRange	internal	-	-
_ignoreUSDMSupplyCap	internal	-	<u>-</u>
setChainlink	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor

BNBBondingLCurve				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
initialize	external	can modify state	initializer	
getCurrentPrice	public	-	-	
getAmountOut	public	-	-	
getAmountIn	public	-	-	
setFee	public	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
purchase	external	payable	postGenesis,whenNotPaused,ensure	
getTotalPCVHeld	public	-	-	
_allocateSingle	internal	can modify state	-	
_isValidPriceRange	internal	-	-	
_ignoreUSDMSupplyCap	internal	-	-	
setChainlink	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	

Permissions			
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers



	Permissions			
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
createRole	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
grantMinter	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
grantBurner	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
grantPCVController	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
grantGovernor	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
grantGuardian	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
revokeMinter	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
revokeBurner	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
revokePCVController	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
revokeGovernor	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
revokeGuardian	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
revokeOverride	external	can modify state	onlyGuardian	
isMinter	external	-	-	
isBurner	external	-	-	
isPCVController	external	-	-	
isGovernor	public	THE WAY	-	
isGuardian	public	-	-	
_setupGovernor	internal	can modify state	-	
_setupMinter	internal	can modify state	-	



Permissions				
_setupBurner	internal	can modify state	-	

Core				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
init	external	can modify state	initializer	
setXMSSupportRatio	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
setUSDM	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
setXMS	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
setGenesisGroup	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
allocateXMS	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
allocateToken	public	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
approveXMS	public	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
approveToken	public	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
completeGenesisGroup	external	can modify state	-	
getApprovedPairsLength	public	-	-	
getApprovedContractsLength	public	-	-	
setApprovedPairAndContract	public	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
removeApprovedPairAndContract	public	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
_setXMSSupportRatio	internal	can modify state	-	
_setUSDM	internal	can modify state	-	



	Core		
_setXMS	internal	can modify state	-

IDO				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
deploy	external	can modify state	onlyGenesisGroup	
removeLiquidity	external	can modify state	onlyGuardianOrGovernor	

BUSDGenesisGroup				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
initGenesis	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
purchase	external	payable	duringTime	
redeem	external	can modify state	-	
launch	external	can modify state	nonContract,afterTime	
emergencyExit	external	can modify state	-	
getAmountsToRedeem	public	-	postGenesis	
getAmountOut	public	-	-	
_burnFrom	internal	can modify state	-	
_usdmXMSExchangeRate	internal	-	-	
_getEffectiveMGEN	internal	-	-	



BUSDGenesisGroup			
setChainlink	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor

CombinationOracle				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	internal	can modify state	-	
initialize	external	can modify state	initializer	
isStale	public	-	-	
canUpdate	public	-	-	
update	external	can modify state	-	
consult	public	-	-	
setRouter	public	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
getRouter	public	-	-	
_initialize	internal	can modify state	-	
_canUpdate	internal	-	-	
_isStale	internal	-	-	
_update	internal	can modify state	-	
_consult	internal	-	-	

	BNBLastP	riceOracle	
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
constructor	public	can modify state	-



	BNBLastP	riceOracle	
getLatestPrice	public	-	-

	BUSDLastPriceOracle				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers		
constructor	public	can modify state	-		
getLatestPrice	public	-	-		

OracleIncentives				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
updateXMSForUSDMMROracle	public	can modify state	whenNotPaused	
updateXMSForUSDMSupplyCapOracle	public	can modify state	whenNotPaused	
_incentivize	internal	can modify state	-	
setIncentiveAmount	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	

SwapMiningOracle SwapMiningOracle			
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
constructor	public	can modify state	-
getPairsLength	external	-	-
setFactory	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
setPeriod	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor



	SwapMiningOracle SwapMiningOracle			
addPair	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
removePair	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
update	external	can modify state	-	
consult	external	-	-	

MarsSwapPairCombOracle				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
setFactory	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
setPeriod	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
setConsultLeniency	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
setAllowStaleConsults	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
_initialize	internal	can modify state	-	
_canUpdate	internal	-	-	
_isStale	internal	-	-	
_update	internal	can modify state	-	
_consult	internal	-	-	

	PCVController					
Function Name	Function Name Visibility Mutability Modifiers					
constructor	internal	can modify state	-			



PCVController			
forceWithdraw	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
setPCVDeposit	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
_withdraw	internal	can modify state	-

BUSDUniswapPCVController				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
depositLpMining	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
harvest	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
withdrawLpMining	external	can modify state	onlyGuardianOrGovernor	
removeLiquidity	external	can modify state	onlyGuardianOrGovernor	
_removeLiquidity	internal	can modify state	-	
_harvest	internal	can modify state	-	
_depositLpMining	internal	can modify state	-	
_withdrawLpMining	internal	can modify state	-	
setLpMiningMaster	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	

	PCVVenusDeposit PCVVenusDeposit				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers		
constructor	internal	can modify state	-		
withdraw	external	can modify state	onlyPCVController		



PCVVenus Deposit PCVVenus Deposit			
leaveSupply	external	can modify state	onlyPCVController
harvest	external	can modify state	onlyPCVController
_supply	internal	can modify state	-
_leaveSupply	internal	can modify state	-
_harvest	internal	can modify state	-
_transferWithdrawn	internal	can modify state	-

BNBVenusPCVDeposit				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
receive	external	payable	-	
deposit	external	payable	postGenesis,whenNotPaused	
_supply	internal	can modify state	-	
_leaveSupply	internal	can modify state	-	
_harvest	internal	can modify state	-	
_transferWithdrawn	internal	can modify state	-	

PCVSplitter PCVSplitter			
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
constructor	internal	can modify state	-
checkAllocation	public	-	-



PCVSplitter			
getAllocation	public	-	-
_allocateSingle	internal	can modify state	-
_setAllocation	internal	can modify state	-
_allocate	internal	can modify state	-

PCVUniswapDeposit PCVUniswapDeposit				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	internal	can modify state	-	
withdraw	external	can modify state	onlyPCVController	
removeLiquidity	external	can modify state	onlyPCVController	
harvest	external	can modify state	onlyPCVController	
depositLpMining	external	can modify state	onlyPCVController	
withdrawLpMining	external	can modify state	onlyPCVController	
_addLiquidity	internal	can modify state	-	
_removeLiquidity	internal	can modify state	-	
_harvest	internal	can modify state	-	
_depositLpMining	internal	can modify state	-	
_withdrawLpMining	internal	can modify state	-	
_getLpMiningPid	internal	-	-	
_transferWithdrawn	internal	can modify state	-	



PCVUniswapDeposit PCVUniswapDeposit					
setLpMiningMaster	setLpMiningMaster external can modify state onlyPCVController				

BUSDUniswapPCVDeposit				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
deposit	external	payable	postGenesis,whenNotPaused	
_getAmountUSDMToDeposit	internal	Carrier Carrier	-	
_addLiquidity	internal	can modify state	-	
_removeLiquidity	internal	can modify state	-	
_harvest	internal	can modify state	-	
_depositLpMining	internal	can modify state	-	
_withdrawLpMining	internal	can modify state	-	
_transferWithdrawn	internal	can modify state	-	
_getLpMiningPid	internal	-	-	
setChainlink	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	

RedemptionUnit				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	internal	can modify state	-	
fee	external	-	-	
feePrecision	external	-	-	



RedemptionUnit				
_purchase	internal	can modify state	-	
purchase	external	payable	postGenesis,whenNotPaused,ensure	

XMSRedemptionUnit				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	public	can modify state	-	
getCurrentPrice	public	-	-	
getAmountOut	public	-	-	
getAmountIn	public	-	-	
_purchase	internal	can modify state	-	
getTotalAssetHeld	public	-	-	
setFee	public	can modify state	onlyGovernor	

	UniAndOracleRef				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers		
constructor	internal	can modify state	-		
setPair	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor		
setRouter	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor		
setFactory	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor		
token	public	-	-		
getReserves	public		-		



UniAndOracleRef				
liquidityOwned	public	-	-	
_approveToken	internal	can modify state	-	
_setupPair	internal	can modify state	-	
_setupRouter	internal	can modify state	-	
_setupFactory	internal	can modify state	-	
_isPair	internal	-	-	
_getUniswapPrice	internal	-	-	

CoreRef				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	internal	can modify state	-	
setCore	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
pause	public	can modify state	onlyGuardianOrGovernor	
unpause	public	can modify state	onlyGuardianOrGovernor	
core	public	-111115	-	
usdm	public		-	
xms	public	-	-	
usdmBalance	public	-	-	
xmsBalance	public	-	-	
getUSDMAmountGovernance	public	-	-	



CoreRef				
_burnUSDMHeld	internal	can modify state	-	
_mintUSDM	internal	can modify state	-	

	OracleRef		
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
constructor	internal	can modify state	-
setXMSForUSDMMROracle	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
setXMSForUSDMSupplyCapOracle	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor
invert	public	······································	-
getXMSPrice	public	-	-
getUSDMSupplyCap	public	-	-
_setXMSForUSDMMROracle	internal	can modify state	-
_setXMSForUSDMSupplyCapOracle	internal	can modify state	-

UniRef				
Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers	
constructor	internal	can modify state	-	
setPair	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
setRouter	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
setFactory	external	can modify state	onlyGovernor	
token	public	-	-	



UniRef				
getReserves	public	-	-	
liquidityOwned	public	-	-	
_approveToken	internal	can modify state	-	
_setupPair	internal	can modify state	-	
_setupRouter	internal	can modify state	-	
_setupFactory	internal	can modify state	-	
_isPair	internal	-	-	
_getUniswapPrice	internal	-	-	

4.3 Vulnerability Summary

[N1] [Low] initialize function doesn't check the role that may be called by others perviously

Category: Authority Control Vulnerability

Content

contracts/bondingcurve/BNBBondingLCurve.sol#53-59,

```
function initialize(address _wbnb, address _chainlink)
    external
    initializer
{
    wbnb = IERC20(_wbnb);
    chainlink = IChainlinkLastPriceOracle(_chainlink);
}
```

contracts/bondingcurve/BUSDBondingLCurve.sol#55-61,

```
function initialize(address _busd, address _chainlink)
    external
```



```
initializer
{
  busd = IERC20(_busd);
  chainlink = IChainlinkLastPriceOracle(_chainlink);
}
```

This function only has one initializer modifier, but the initializer only check whether the contract was intialized, so it can be called by others.

the same points:

contracts/core/Core.sol#40-42,

```
function init() external override initializer {
    _setupGovernor(msg.sender);
}
```

contracts/oracle/CombinationOracle.sol#40-45,

```
function initialize(address _oracle, address[] memory _path)
    external
    initializer
{
    setRouter(_oracle, _path);
}
```

Solution

add onlyOwner / onlyGovernor check

Status

Fixed

[N2] [Suggestion] purchase/deposit functions has payable maybe lock user's assets

Category: Unsafe External Call Audit

Content

contracts/genesis/BUSDGenesisGroup.sol#76-87,



```
payable
  override
  duringTime
{
    require(value != 0, "BUSDGenesisGroup::purchase: No value sent");
    busd.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), value);
    _mint(to, value);
    emit Purchase(to, value);
}
```

Has payable but never use it.

contracts/pcv/BNBVenusPCVDeposit.sol#39,

```
receive() external payable {}
```

contracts/pcv/BUSDUniswapPCVDeposit.sol#40-54,

```
function deposit(uint256 busdAmount)
    external
    payable
    override
    postGenesis
    whenNotPaused
{
    busdAmount = busd.balanceOf(address(this)); // Include any BUSD dust from prior
LP
    _addLiquidity(busdAmount);
    _burnUSDMHeld(); // Burn any USDM dust from LP
```



```
emit Deposit(msg.sender, busdAmount);
}
```

Solution

remove payable.

Status

Fixed:

[N3] [Suggestion] redeem may be called by others

Category: Authority Control Vulnerability

Content

contracts/genesis/BUSDGenesisGroup.sol#91-132,

```
function redeem(address to) external override {
    (uint256 usdmAmount, uint256 genesisXMS, uint256 busdAmount) =
        getAmountsToRedeem(to);
   require(
        block.number > launchBlock,
        "BUSDGenesisGroup::redeem: No redeeming in launch block"
   );
    // Burn MGEN
   uint256 amountIn = balanceOf(to);
   _burnFrom(to, amountIn);
   // Send USDM and XMS and BUSD
   if (usdmAmount != 0) {
        usdm().transfer(to, usdmAmount);
    }
    if (genesisXMS != 0) {
        uint256 genesis20Percent = genesisXMS.mul(2).div(10);
        xms().transfer(to, genesis20Percent);
        address tokenTimelockDelegator =
            address(
                new StraightTokenTimelockDelegator(
                    address(xms()),
                    to,
```



```
3600 * 24 * 30 * 12
                )
            );
        tokenTimelockDelegators[to] = tokenTimelockDelegator;
        xms().transfer(
            tokenTimelockDelegator,
            genesisXMS.sub(genesis20Percent)
        );
        ILinearTokenTimelock(tokenTimelockDelegator).initialize(
            launchTimestamp
        );
    }
    if (busdAmount != 0) {
        busd.transfer(to, busdAmount);
    }
    emit Redeem(to, amountIn, usdmAmount, genesisXMS);
}
```

The redeem function is that redeem the assets of to address, it can by called by others, maybe it's not 'to' address's desire.

Solution

Check if the sender is 'to' address

Status

Ignored; This mechanism has already been tested by other well-known protocols.

[N4] [Suggestion] Suggest that add call authority check to the launch function

Category: Authority Control Vulnerability

Content

contracts/genesis/BUSDGenesisGroup.sol#135-180,

```
function launch() external override nonContract afterTime {
    // Complete Genesis
    core().completeGenesisGroup();
    launchBlock = block.number;
    launchTimestamp = block.timestamp;
```



```
(totalEffectiveMGEN, supersuper) = _getEffectiveMGEN(totalSupply());

uint256 endOfTime = uint256(-1);

// Bonding curve purchase and PCV allocation
bondingCurve.purchase(address(this), totalEffectiveMGEN, 0, endOfTime);
bondingCurve.allocate();

ido.deploy(_usdmXMSExchangeRate());

// solhint-disable-next-line not-rely-on-time
emit Launch(block.timestamp);
}
```

It can be called by others, may exhibit unexpected behavior, especially the launch function has ido.deploy operation.

Solution

Add call authority check.

Status

Fixed;

[N5] [Medium] PCVController role has too much authority that can withdraw assets from the contracts

Category: Authority Control Vulnerability

Content

contracts/pcv/PCVVenusDeposit.sol#27-34,

```
function withdraw(address to, uint256 amountUnderlying)
    external
    override
    onlyPCVController
{
    _transferWithdrawn(to, amountUnderlying);
    emit Withdrawal(msg.sender, to, amountUnderlying);
}
```

contracts/pcv/BNBVenusPCVDeposit.sol#87-90,



```
function _transferWithdrawn(address to, uint256 amount) internal override {
    (bool success, ) = to.call{value: amount}("");
    require(success, "BNBVenusPCVDeposit::_transferWithdrawn: Transfer failed");
}
```

There is onlyPCVController check, but the role has too much authority that can withdraw assets from the contracts especially when the private key was stolen.

Solution

Move the authority to the governor, add timelock.

Status

Fixed; PCVController is default empty, onlyGovernor can change it, and onlyGovernor is a Timelock contract now.

[N6] [Suggestion] getUSDMAmountGovernance loop maybe call DoS

Category: Others

Content

contracts/refs/CoreRef.sol#157-176,

```
function getUSDMAmountGovernance()
   public
   view
    override
   returns (uint256 usdmAmount)
{
    address pair;
    address _contract;
    for (uint256 i; i < core().getApprovedPairsLength(); i++) {</pre>
        pair = core().approvedPairs(i);
        for (uint256 j; j < core().getApprovedContractsLength(pair); j++) {</pre>
            _contract = core().approvedContracts(pair, j);
            usdmAmount += core()
                 .usdm()
                 .balanceOf(pair)
                 .mul(IERC20(pair).balanceOf( contract))
                 .div(IERC20(pair).totalSupply());
        }
```



}

The function calls external contracts in the loop, maybe failed when core().getApprovedPairsLength() is too long.

Solution

Control getApprovedPairsLength() is in the range, or execute in batches.

Status

Ignored; The types of USDM LP tokens that are managed by the protocol are limited, currently there are only two liquidity pairs — XMS/USDM and BUSD/USDM.

5 Audit Result

Audit Number	Audit Team	Audit Date	Audit Result
0X002106110004	SlowMist Security Team	2021.05.31 - 2021.06.14	Passed

Summary conclusion: The SlowMist security team use a manual and SlowMist team's analysis tool to audit the project, during the audit work we found 1 medium risk, 1 low risk, 4 suggestion vulnerabilities. And 2 suggestion vulnerabilities were ignored; All other findings were fixed.



6 Statement

SlowMist issues this report with reference to the facts that have occurred or existed before the issuance of this report, and only assumes corresponding responsibility based on these.

For the facts that occurred or existed after the issuance, SlowMist is not able to judge the security status of this project, and is not responsible for them. The security audit analysis and other contents of this report are based on the documents and materials provided to SlowMist by the information provider till the date of the insurance report (referred to as "provided information"). SlowMist assumes: The information provided is not missing, tampered with, deleted or concealed. If the information provided is missing, tampered with, deleted, concealed, or inconsistent with the actual situation, the SlowMist shall not be liable for any loss or adverse effect resulting therefrom. SlowMist only conducts the agreed security audit on the security situation of the project and issues this report. SlowMist is not responsible for the background and other conditions of the project.



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Github

https://github.com/slowmist