

conclusion that can be arrived at is that complete renunciation (of duty) is surely meritorious!

*Counter-objection:* Truly so. But, may it not be that total relinquishment is itself an impossibility? Is a person ever-changeable like the *gunas* of the Sāṅkhyas, or is it that action itself is the agent, as it is in the case of the momentary five (231) forms of mundane consciousness propounded by the Buddhists? In either case there can be no complete renunciation of action.

Then there is also a third standpoint (as held by the Vaiśeṣikas): When a thing acts it is active, and inactive when that very thing does not act. If this be the case here, it is possible to entirely give up actions. But the speciality of the third point of view is that a thing is not ever-changing, nor is action itself the agent. What then? A non-existent action originates in an existing thing, and an existing action gets destroyed. The thing-in-itself continues to exist along with its power (to act), and that itself is the agent. This is what the followers of Kanāda say. (232) What is wrong with this point of view?

*Vedāntin:* The defect indeed lies in this that, this view is not in accord with the Bhagavān's view.

*Objection:* How is this known?

*Vedāntin:* Since the Bhagavān has said, 'Of the unreal there is no being...', etc. (2.16). The view of the followers of Kanāda is, indeed, this that the non-existent becomes existent, and the existent becomes non-existent.

*Objection:* What defect can there be if it be that this view, even though not the view of the Bhagavān, yet conforms to reason?

*Vedāntin:* The answer is: This is surely faulty since it contradicts all valid evidence.

*Objection:* How?

*Vedāntin:* As to this, if things like a *dvyanuka* (dyad of two *anus*, atoms) be absolutely non-existent before origination, and after origination continue for a little while, and again become absolutely