

the Self which is the real subject of the notion of 'I'. For, actions done by the figurative lion or fire cannot be considered to have been accomplished by the real lion or fire. Nor is any action of the real lion and fire accomplished through the (figurative) cruelty or tawnyness; for, their purpose is fully served by being used for eulogy. And those who are praised know, 'I am not a lion; I am not fire; and neither is the work of a lion or fire mine.' So the more logical notion is, 'The action of the aggregate (of body etc.) do not belong to me who am the real Self', and not, 'I am the agent; it is my work.'

As for the assertion made by some that the Self acts through its own memory, desire and effort, which are the causes of activity—that is not so, for they are based on false knowledge. Memory, desire, effort, etc. indeed follow from the tendencies born from the experience of the desirable and the undesirable results of actions (—which actions themselves arise from the notions of the 'desirable' and the 'undesirable') caused by false knowledge. (266) Just as in this life virtue, vice and the experience of their results are caused by the identification (of the Self) with the aggregate of body etc. and attraction, repulsion, etc., so also was it in the previous birth, and even in the life preceding that. Thus it can be inferred that past and future mundane existence is without beginning and is a product of ignorance. And from this it becomes proved that the absolute cessation of mundane existence is caused by steadfastness in Knowledge, accompanied by renunciation of all rites and duties.

Besides, since self-identification with the body is nothing but ignorance, therefore, when the (ignorance) ceases, there remains no possibility of re-birth, and so, mundane existence becomes impossible. The identification of the Self with the aggregate of body etc. is nothing but ignorance, because in common life it is not seen that anybody who knows, 'I am different from cattle etc., and the cattle etc. are different from me', entertains the notion of 'I' with regard to them. However, mistaken perceiving a stump to be a man, one may out of indiscrimination entertain the idea of 'I' with regard to the aggregate of body etc.; not so when perceiving them as distinct. As for that notion of considering the son to be oneself—as