

ascertain that it is the voice of the crow. This complete knowledge is mental perception.

In the perception of mental objects, we get the adequate knowledge of cognition, *i.e.* by taking in the feeling existing in the senses we get a knowledge of it. The sensation of pleasure etc. is inchoate mental knowledge. The full knowledge thereof which follows is the adequate knowledge of a mental object. Like the action of external senses, the mind receives the impressions first; next when the mind-stuff is affected thereby, then mental perception takes place. Thus in all mental perceptions, reception comes first and then comes the full perception. Therefore, the sure awareness of a thing outside the senses is *Pramāna*. This definition is applicable to all direct perceptions.

(3) The feature and form of external objects are called their *Viśeṣa* (speciality). Every object has its peculiar properties of sound, touch, etc. different from those possessed by others; they are called their feature (*Mūrti*) while *Vyavadhī* is their special form. Take the case of a piece of brick. Its colour and shape cannot be exactly described by howsoever large a number of words we may use; but when we see it we can at once have the exact cognition. That is why direct apprehension mainly relates to *Viśeṣa*, *i.e.* form and feature. The word 'mainly' has been used to imply that some awareness of the general features is present therein, though knowledge of the special properties and features predominates. That which is present in many things is called *Sāmānya* or generality. Words like fire, water, etc. are used in a general sense. On account of nature and shape, fire may be many, but their general name is 'fire'. Existence is a common feature of all things. In direct apprehension knowledge of such general features is also present in a modified form. In the following instances of inference and verbal communication, however, the awareness is only of the general features, because they are established by words, signs, etc. It cannot be said that in the case of 'Chaitra (the name of a person) exists'—a case established by inference or verbal communication—we have an instance of the knowledge of a particular object; because if Chaitra had been seen before, the mention of the