

withdrawn from various objects and set on only one object. For this reason it is to be held that it is not occupied with one object only (B). Again, those who hold that the mind becomes one-pointed through the continuous flow of discrete but similar ideas would have to say that one-pointedness is a character of the flow of such ideas. But that also cannot be true, because in their own view the mind itself is momentary and how in that case can there be a flow (of one mind)? If, on the other hand, it is held that one-pointedness is the characteristic of each component of a continuous flow of ideas,—flow whether of similar ideas or dissimilar ideas—then each component idea will be individually one-pointed. If that happens there will be no such thing as a distracted mind. Hence, the mind has to be regarded as one, as being occupied with many objects and as being a substrate of all modifications. Further, if ideas which are unrelated, distinct and totally different are born (C) without a common substrate, then how can one idea remember something cognised by another? Also, how can the state which holds within it the impressions of past actions be different from the state which enjoys the fruits of action? Howsoever the matter might be explained, it would be no better than an exemplification of the maxim of Gomaya-Pāyasa (3).

Moreover, if each idea of the mind is considered to be uniquely different from every other idea, then that would mean the repudiation of the feeling of one's one self (D). How that would happen is being explained. In cognitions like the following, "The 'I' that saw is the 'I' which is touching it and the 'I' that touched is the 'I' that is seeing it",—although the sensations of touch and sight are different, the feeling of the 'I'