

(Brahman is *anādi*, beginningless, and is) *matparam*, that of which I am the supreme (*para*) power called Vāsudeva. Truly, the redundancy could be avoided in this way if that meaning were possible. But that meaning is not possible, because what is intended is to make Brahman known only through a negation of all attributes by saying, 'It is called neither being nor non-being.' It is contradictory to show a possession of a distinctive power and to negate attributes. Therefore, although *matup* and a *bahuvrīhi* compound convey the same meaning of 'possession', its (*matup*'s) use is for completing the verse. (98)

Having aroused an interest through inducement by saying, 'The Knowable which has Immortality as its result is being spoken of by Me,' the Bhagavān says: *Tat*, that Knowable; *ucyate*, is called; *na sat*, neither being; nor is it called *asat*, non-being.

*Objection:* After strongly girding up the loins and declaring with a loud voice, 'I shall speak of the Knowable,' is it not incongruous to say, 'That is called neither being nor non-being'?

*Reply:* No. What has been said is surely consistent.

*Objection:* How?

*Reply:* For in all the Upanisads, the Knowable, that is Brahman, has been indicated only by negation of all attributes—'Not this, not this' (Br. 4.4.22), 'Not gross, not subtle' (op. cit. 3.3.8), etc.; but not as 'That is this', for It is beyond speech.

*Objection:* Is it not that a thing which cannot be expressed by the word 'being' does not exist? Likewise, if the Knowable cannot be expressed by the word 'being', It does not exist. And it is contradictory to say, 'It is the Knowable', and 'It cannot be expressed by the word "being".'

*Counter-objection:* As to that, not that It does not exist, because It is not the object of the idea, 'It is non-being.'

*Objection:* Do not all cognitions verily involve the idea of being or non-being? This being so, the Knowable should either be an object