(1) It has been explained before that Viveka-khyāti or Discriminative discernment is a characteristic of the Buddhi or Intellect, i.e. it is a kind of knowledge. That is the final Sāttwika form of Buddhi. When the Rajas and Tamas dross of Intellect are overcome, then only this Discriminative discernment arises. Puruṣa, however, is different even from this highly sentient intellect in a state of discriminative discernment, because after all Buddhi is mutable etc. (See II-20).

To consider such Buddhi and Purusa as identical, i.e. to have the conception of both in the same form or units of knowledge, is known as Bhoga or experience (of pleasure and pain). As knowledge, experience is a form of fluctuation of Buddhi. And because it is a fluctuation of the Intellect it is a knowable. And being a knowable, experience is another's object, i.e. it serves as a knowable of the other, viz. the Seer, as it is an object made known by the Seer. A knowable serves as an object of another, while Purusa owns the object. This has been explained in Sūtra II-20. The owner is one who has property of his own, i.e. a proprietor. According to context that proprietor is either the self-established Purusa or the Buddhi abounding with the conception of Purusa. Here Buddhi having the knowledge about Puruşa is referred to as the object on which Samyama has to be practised. connection the commentator has stated that the Intellect, when it assumes the look of Purusa, which is only the conventional receiver and which is pure 'I'-sense, is the object of Samyama. In other words, what is thought of as Puruşa in ordinary use, is not the real Purusa but has only the look of Purusa and it is nothing but intellect shaped by the pure 'I'-feeling. By Samyama on this form of knowledge of Purusa, a knowledge regarding the real Puruşa is acquired. On this, the question might be askedis the Purusa the object of the knowledge of Intellect? No, that is not so; that is why the commentator has said-a knowledge relating to the Puruşa is acquired, i.e. Intellect does not reveal the Puruşa who is self-expressive. Intellect or 'l', therefore, thinks 'I am self-expressive'. That is Puruşa-like Intellect. knowledge as derived from the Sastras, or from inference, however, is not pure knowledge of the Purusa. After the mind has been realised through Samadhi, then to understand that Purusa is distinct from mind, is pure knowledge of Purusa.