

myrobalan. Therefore the two fruits are separate in the sequential notion of the movements in time correlated to their distinct positions in space. The sequential notion of space correlated to another moment of time is the means of their distinction. From this (gross) illustration it is understood that although the species, symptom and position of two atoms might be the same, yet by discovering the correlation of every atomic position in space to a different moment of time, the sequential notion of such a position in space can be known to be different by a proficient yogin. Others (Vaiśeṣikas) say that it is the ultimate particulars which cause the notion of the distinction. In their opinion also, difference in position and symptom as well as difference in perceivability, in location (2) and in species, are responsible for distinctness. That change in moment is the ultimate difference and that is known only to yogins. That is why it has been said by Vārṣaganya—‘Since there is no diversity in characteristics, shape, position and species in the primal cause there is no distinction therein.’

(1) In gross outlook many things look alike, and we cannot notice their difference. Take two newly minted coins, placed one after the other. If they are changed in position we cannot say which is which, but if they are put under the microscope, we shall be able to discover some difference from which we shall be able to say which is first and which is second. Discriminative knowledge is like that. Subtlest difference is noticed by it. The change that takes place in a moment is the subtlest change; there is nothing subtler than that. Discriminative knowledge is the knowledge of that change.

Knowledge of difference arises in three ways—by distinction in species, by distinction in symptoms and by distinction in position. If there are two things in which such distinctions are not noticeable, then ordinarily their difference would not be known, but with discriminative knowledge that is known.