knowing mind. The two operations are different. Because the two do not take place at the same time, mind is not self-luminous.

To call the mind self-luminous is to call it a knower, which would ascribe it a form of 'I am the knower', while 'cognisance of another' means being known as object. The commentator has thus shown the fallacy of the believers in the doctrine of universal momentariness (a sect of Buddhists). It is not possible to know both the subject and the object at the same time. In their opinion the mental act, the subject, and the object of this act are not different entities. But it is not proper to say that the object is known while the self is known, or that the self is known while the object is known. Moreover, in the doctrine of universal momentariness mind being momentary and inclusive of the knower, the knowing act and the object, there is no chance or possibility of knowing oneself as 'I am the knower', and a knowable as a distinct entity.

Therefore the mind is not self-luminous as it is not the simultaneous illuminer of itself as the knower and the object; but it is a knowable, which reduces it to an object and is cognised as such. As the nature of the cognitive principle is known by a process of reflection it is a particular operation, and not automatic; so it is not absolute consciousness or self-luminous. If an automatic self-luminous entity is admitted, then it would be admitting an immutable principle of consciousness. What is the result of an operation, cannot be self-evident consciousness.

The argument in this Sūtra is that if the mind which is not self-illuminating, is called self-luminous, it will be both the knower and the knowable and it would imply cognisance of two things at the same time. But as that does not happen, the mind is not self-luminous.

भाष्यम्—स्थानमितः स्वरसनिषद्धं चित्तं चित्तान्तरेण समनन्तरेण ग्रह्मत इति—

चित्तान्तरदृश्ये बुडिबुडे रितप्रसङ्गः स्मृतिसङ्गरय ॥ २१ ॥ यथ चित्तं चेचित्तान्तरेण ग्रहेत्रत बुडिबुडिः केन ग्रह्मते, साप्यन्यया