

that only existent entities like *dvyanuka* etc. have the relationship in the form of *samavāya* with their own causes.

*Vedāntin*: No, for it is not admitted (by them) that anything has existence before the (*samavāya*) relationship (occurs). It is surely not held by the *Vaiśeṣikas* that a pot etc. have any existence before the potter, (his) stick, wheel, etc. start functioning. Nor do they admit that clay itself takes the shape of a pot etc. As a result, it has to be admitted (by them) as the last alternative that non-existence itself has some relationship!

*Vaiśeṣika*: Well, it is not contradictory even for a non-existent thing to have the relationship in the form of inherence.

*Vedāntin*: No, because this is not seen in the case of a son of a barren woman etc. If the antecedent non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*) of the pot etc. alone comes into a relationship with its own (material) cause, but not so the non-existence of the son of a barren woman etc. though as non-existence both are the same, then the distinction between the (two) non-existences has to be explained. Through such descriptions (of *abhāva*, non-existence) as non-existence of one, non-existence of two, non-existence of all, antecedent non-existence, non-existence after destruction, mutual non-existence and absolute non-existence, nobody can show any distinction (as regards non-existence itself)! There being no distinction, (therefore, to say that:) ‘it is only the “antecedent non-existence” of the pot which takes the form of the pot through the (action of) the potter and others, and comes into a relationship with the existing pot-halves which are its own (material) causes and becomes fit for all empirical processes (236); but the “non-existence after destruction” of that very pot does not do so, though it, too, is non-existence. Hence, the “non-existence after destruction”, etc. (237) are not fit for any empirical processes, whereas only the “antecedent non-existence” of things called *dvyanuka* etc. is fit for such empirical processes as origination etc.’—all this is incongruous, since as non-existence it is indistinguishable, as are ‘absolute non-existence’ and ‘non-existence after destruction’.