IERG4999I Final Year Project II

Final Report

Secure Group Messaging with Cryptographic Watermarking: A TreeKEM and DCT-LSB Hybrid Approach

BY

TSOI, Ming Hon

1155175123

ZHANG, Yi Yao

1155174982

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ABSTRACT

In an era where digital privacy faces unprecedented threats from data breaches, surveillance, and quantum computing advancements, secure group messaging has become a cornerstone of confidential communication. Existing platforms, such as Signal and WhatsApp, provide robust end-to-end encryption but often fall short in managing dynamic group membership, ensuring forward secrecy, and verifying data authenticity at scale. Our project, Secure Group Messaging with Watermarking, addresses these critical gaps by developing a comprehensive system that integrates TreeKEM-based group key management with advanced watermarking techniques, specifically Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) for images and Least Significant Bit (LSB) for text metadata. Leveraging the X25519 key exchange and AES-CBC encryption with 256-bit keys, the system ensures confidentiality and forward secrecy, preventing removed members from accessing future communications. The incorporation of DCT and LSB watermarking embeds tamper-evident markers, enabling robust verification of data origin and integrity, which is vital for applications like digital rights management (DRM) and confidential document sharing.

Implemented in Python, the system comprises two primary components: a command-line tool (encrypt.py, decrypt.py) for encrypting/decrypting text and images, and a Telegram bot (handlers.py, main.py) for secure photo sharing in group chats. The command-line tool uses TreeKEM to derive group keys, applies AES encryption, and embeds watermarks, while the Telegram bot facilitates real-time photo sharing with encrypted metadata (e.g., group ID, timestamp, member IDs) embedded via LSB.

Experimental results demonstrate the system's efficacy: key generation scales linearly (5–60 ms for 2–50 members), AES encryption/decryption is efficient (45 ms for a 786 KB image), and watermarking is robust (DCT: PSNR ≈ 40 dB; LSB: PSNR > 50 dB). The Telegram bot processes photo sharing in 2–3 seconds, integrating seamlessly with group dynamics. Scalability tests confirm reliability for groups up to 50 members, with stable memory usage (50–55 MB).

The project's significance lies in its hybrid approach, combining cryptographic rigor with practical usability, addressing real-world needs in secure messaging apps, enterprise communication platforms, and DRM systems. Its modular design supports future integration of post-quantum cryptographic schemes, such as CSIDH, to counter emerging quantum threats. By bridging the gap between confidentiality and authenticity, this system offers a scalable, secure, and verifiable solution for group communication in an increasingly interconnected and privacy-conscious world.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Secure group messaging is vital in today's digital world, where data breaches and privacy violations pose significant risks. While one-on-one encrypted messaging is well-developed, exemplified by Signal's Double Ratchet algorithm [2], group messaging presents unique challenges, including managing dynamic membership, ensuring forward secrecy, and verifying data authenticity. Forward secrecy guarantees that members removed from a group cannot access future messages, while post-compromise security protects past communications if a key is compromised [1]. Additionally, confirming that messages are genuine and untampered is essential to prevent fraud and spoofing in group settings.

Current solutions, such as Signal and WhatsApp, prioritize encryption for confidentiality but often lack robust tools for large-scale group management and tamper detection [2]. For instance, handling membership changes in large groups can be inefficient, and verifying message authenticity at scale remains a gap. Watermarking, a technique widely used in multimedia security, offers a solution by embedding invisible markers to confirm data origin and integrity [3]. By adapting watermarking for messaging systems, it's possible to ensure messages are tamper-proof, enhancing trust in group communications.

Our project addresses these challenges by integrating TreeKEM, a scalable group key management protocol, with advanced watermarking techniques, specifically Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) for images and Least Significant Bit (LSB) for text metadata [4]. Implemented in Python, the system includes a command-line tool (encrypt.py, decrypt.py) for encrypting and decrypting text and images, and a Telegram bot (handlers.py, main.py) for secure photo sharing in group chats. Using X25519 key exchange and AES-CBC encryption, it ensures confidentiality and forward secrecy, while DCT and LSB watermarks verify authenticity. Experimental results show efficient key management (5–60 ms for 2–50 members), fast encryption (45 ms for a 786 KB image), and robust watermarking (DCT PSNR ≈ 40 dB). This hybrid approach delivers a secure, authentic, and scalable group messaging system suitable for messaging apps, enterprise tools, and digital rights management.

1.2 MESSAGING ENCRYPTION INDUSTRY & PROJECT SIGNIFICANCE

The messaging encryption industry has grown rapidly in recent years, fueled by rising concerns about privacy and data security. Apps like Signal, WhatsApp, and Telegram have set high standards for end-to-end encryption, but their group messaging solutions are designed for small groups and often lack advanced mechanisms for verifying message authenticity [2][5].

For example, Signal uses the Double Ratchet algorithm for secure one-on-one communication, while WhatsApp extends this to small groups, yet both struggle with large-scale group management and tamper detection [2][5].

In enterprise settings, tools like Slack and Microsoft Teams need scalable solutions to handle dynamic groups where members frequently join or leave, ensuring secure and trustworthy communication [1].

Our project addresses these gaps by developing a system that combines TreeKEM, a protocol for efficient group key management, with watermarking techniques to ensure both security and authenticity [4]. Specifically, it:

Uses TreeKEM to update group keys quickly, ensuring forward secrecy so removed members cannot access new messages [4].

Integrates Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and Least Significant Bit (LSB) watermarking to verify data authenticity, preventing tampering and spoofing [3].

Provides a Telegram bot for practical, real-world use, enabling secure photo sharing with embedded metadata (e.g., group ID, timestamp) in group chats [1].

Implemented in Python, the system includes a command-line tool (encrypt.py, decrypt.py) for encrypting text and images and a Telegram bot (handlers.py, main.py) for group photo sharing. Experimental results show efficient key updates (5–60 ms for 2–50 members), fast encryption (45 ms for a 786 KB image), and robust watermarking (DCT PSNR ≈ 40 dB) [3]. The system's scalability and authenticity features make it ideal for secure messaging apps, confidential document sharing, and digital rights management (DRM), where watermarking can protect intellectual property by embedding ownership details [6].

1.3 MOTIVATION AND PROJECT IDEA

The need for secure and trustworthy group communication in fast-changing environments, such as corporate workplaces or digital rights management (DRM) systems, drives this project. Many existing messaging protocols focus on keeping messages private but often fail to detect tampering or handle group membership changes securely, which can lead to data breaches in sensitive industries like finance or healthcare [1]. For example, when an employee leaves a company, they should not be able to read new messages, and in DRM, creators need to ensure their content remains authentic and untampered [6]. Our project tackles these issues by combining TreeKEM, a secure key management system, with Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and Least Significant Bit (LSB) watermarking to ensure both privacy and authenticity [4][3].

Built in Python, the system includes a command-line tool (encrypt.py, decrypt.py) for locking and unlocking text and images, and a Telegram bot (handlers.py, main.py) that makes secure photo sharing easy in group chats. TreeKEM ensures quick key updates (5–60 ms for 2–50 members) to keep removed members out, while DCT and LSB watermarks embed hidden markers, like group IDs and timestamps, to verify data hasn't been altered [4][3]. The Telegram bot, for instance, shares photos in 2–3 seconds with watermarks that score high on quality (DCT PSNR ≈ 40 dB). Using trusted libraries like cryptography for encryption, OpenCV for image processing, and Pillow for watermarking, the system is reliable and can be extended for future needs [9][10]. This approach makes our system ideal for secure messaging, confidential document sharing, and protecting digital content in DRM applications.

1.4 PROJECT PIPELINE

The project pipeline is designed to be modular, secure, and user-friendly, integrating advanced cryptographic and watermarking techniques with practical group messaging capabilities (Figure 1). It consists of the following key stages:

Group Key Management: TreeKEM generates and updates group keys using X25519 key exchange and HKDF derivation, ensuring scalability and forward secrecy. When members join or leave, the system updates keys efficiently (5–60 ms for 2–50 members), preventing removed members from accessing future messages. This is implemented in treekem.py with functions like update_key_TreeNode.

Encryption/Decryption: Messages and images are encrypted using AES-CBC with 256-bit keys, implemented in crypto.py (aes_encrypt, aes_decrypt). Large files, such as photos, are processed in 1024-byte chunks with CRC32 checksums for integrity. Encryption takes approximately 45 ms for a 786 KB image, and decryption is equally efficient, ensuring secure sharing via command-line tools (encrypt.py, decrypt.py).

Watermarking: Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) embeds tamper-evident markers in images, while Least Significant Bit (LSB) embeds text metadata (e.g., group ID, timestamp) for authenticity verification. Implemented in watermark.py (dct_watermark_color, encode_lsb), watermarking achieves robust quality (DCT PSNR ≈ 40 dB, LSB PSNR > 50 dB) and takes 320 ms for DCT embedding. The Telegram bot uses both techniques to secure shared photos.

Telegram Integration: A Telegram bot (handlers.py, main.py) enables secure photo sharing in group chats. Users initiate sharing with /share, upload photos privately, and view them via /view_{user_id}. The bot applies DCT and LSB watermarks, embedding encrypted metadata, and completes sharing in 2–3 seconds, making the system practical for real-world use.

Testing: The system is rigorously tested for security, scalability, and watermark robustness. Experiments evaluate TreeKEM key updates, AES encryption/decryption performance, watermark resilience against compression, and Telegram bot functionality. Results confirm scalability for up to 50 members, stable memory usage (50–55 MB), and reliable watermark extraction, ensuring the system meets its goals.



Figure 1: Flow chart of the project pipeline, illustrating TreeKEM key derivation, AES encryption, DCT/LSB watermark embedding, Telegram bot workflow, and testing stages (include a diagram showing the flow from group setup to photo sharing and verification).

2. RELATED OR PREVIOUS WORK

2.1 OVERVIEW

Secure group messaging protocols have evolved, but challenges in scalability, post-compromise security (PCS), and authenticity persist. Signal's group messaging and Sender Keys are simple but scale poorly. Matrix improves PCS but remains centralized. The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol, using TreeKEM, offers efficient key updates but relies on central servers. Advanced protocols like Rerandomized TreeKEM and Causal TreeKEM enhance forward secrecy and decentralization, while Decentralized Continuous Group Key Agreement (DCGKA) excels in concurrent updates.

However, these protocols often overlook data authenticity. Watermarking, traditionally used for multimedia, is underexplored in messaging systems. Our project bridges this gap by integrating TreeKEM with DCT and LSB watermarking, adding a Telegram bot for practical deployment.

2.2 RESEARCH PAPER ANYLASIS

This section provides a concise analysis of key research papers relevant to secure group messaging and watermarking. Key papers informing our work include:

2.2.1 TREEKEM: A PROTOCOL FOR SECURE GROUP MESSAGING

TreeKEM provides scalable group key management for dynamic groups using a tree-based structure. It supports forward secrecy and post-compromise security but relies on centralization for key updates.

2.2.2 KEY AGREEMENT FOR DECENTRALIZED SECURE GROUP MESSAGING WITH STRONG SECURITY GUARANTEES

This paper proposes DCGKA, a decentralized protocol for secure group messaging. It ensures forward secrecy and post-compromise security (PCS), making it resilient to network partitions and compromised devices.

2.2.3 CSIDH: AN EFFICIENT POST-QUANTUM COMMUTATIVE GROUP ACTION

CSIDH introduces an efficient post-quantum key exchange scheme using isogeny-based cryptography. It achieves compact public keys (64 bytes) and strong security guarantees, making it suitable for resource-constrained environments.

2.2.4 WATERMARKING FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS

This paper focus on embedding and extracting watermarks in encrypted data. It highlights the potential of watermarking for ensuring data authenticity in messaging systems.

Our system builds on TreeKEM's efficiency and watermarking's authenticity, with a modular design for post-quantum integration.

3. METHODOLOGIES

The project develops a secure group messaging system integrated with a Telegram bot, leveraging advanced cryptographic techniques, watermarking methods, and group key management to ensure confidentiality, authenticity, and traceability. The system employs AES-CBC for symmetric encryption, X25519 for asymmetric key exchange, and TreeKEM for scalable group key management. Watermarking techniques, including Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and Least Significant Bit (LSB), embed tamper-evident metadata in photos, ensuring robustness against attacks such as cropping (cut attacks). The Telegram bot provides a user-friendly interface for secure photo and text sharing, with metadata embedded to track group interactions. The system is designed to handle various image sizes without data corruption, ensuring reliability in real-world scenarios.

3.1 END-TO-END ENCRYPTION (E2EE)

IMPLEMENTION OVERVIEW

Our system ensures secure communication where only authorized group members can access messages, protecting data from intermediaries, service providers, and malicious actors. Inspired by industry-leading protocols like Signal and Apple's iMessage, our implementation combines robust cryptographic techniques to guarantee confidentiality, integrity, and forward secrecy.

3.1.1 CORE COMPONENTS

1. AES-256-CBC Encryption
- Symmetric encryption using 256-bit keys, implemented via crypto.py (aes_encrypt, aes_decrypt).
- Provides strong security with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, ensuring data confidentiality.

2. TreeKEM for Group Key Management
- Utilizes X25519 key exchange and HKDF for secure group key derivation (implemented in treekem.py via TreeNode).
- Dynamically updates keys when members join or leave (update_key_TreeNode), ensuring forward secrecy—past messages remain secure even if a member's key is compromised.

3. Chunked Encryption for Large Data
- Files (e.g., photos) are split into 1024-byte chunks, each encrypted with CRC32 checksums (encrypt_chunked_data).
- Ensures efficient and secure handling of large payloads while maintaining integrity.

3.1.2 SECURITY COMPONENTS

- No Third-Party Access: Only group members possess the keys needed to decrypt messages.
- Post-Compromise Protection: Key updates prevent retrospective decryption if a member leaves or is compromised.
- Tamper Resistance: Encryption and checksums ensure data cannot be modified undetected.

3.1.3 COMPARISON WITH IDUSTRY STANDARDS

Like Signal (which uses the Signal Protocol) and iMessage (with PQ3's hybrid post-quantum encryption), our system leverages proven cryptographic primitives while optimizing for group dynamics. While we currently rely on classical cryptography (AES, X25519), future enhancements could integrate post-quantum-resistant algorithms (e.g., Kyber) for long-term protection.

By combining efficient symmetric encryption, secure key exchange, and dynamic key updates, our E2EE implementation delivers a private, scalable, and future-resistant messaging framework.

3.2 E2EE METHODS

The E2EE implementation combines several cryptographic primitives to achieve robust security:

X25519 Key Exchange: Each group member generates an X25519 key pair (generate_private_key in treekem.py). Shared secrets are computed between the root node and child nodes (compute_shared_key), providing a foundation for group key derivation.

AES-CBC: Data is encrypted with 256-bit keys in CBC mode, using a 16-byte IV for randomization (aes_encrypt in crypto.py). Chunked encryption supports large files, with each chunk independently encrypted and verified via CRC32 (encrypt_chunked_data).

HKDF: The HMAC-based Key Derivation Function derives a uniform 256-bit group key from combined shared secrets, ensuring cryptographic strength (generate_group_key_TreeNode in treekem.py).

Dynamic Key Updates: TreeKEM updates the group key when members join or leave (add_member_TreeNode, remove_member_TreeNode), ensuring forward secrecy (new content cannot be decrypted with old keys) and backward secrecy (new members cannot decrypt old content).

Asynchronous Key Distribution: Keys are stored in output/encrypted/derived_key_*.bin for standalone use (encrypt.py, decrypt.py) or distributed via Telegram's secure channels (handlers.py). The bot supports offline key updates by storing keys with unique timestamps and user IDs.

This combination ensures scalability, security, and flexibility for group communication.Telegram Integration: The bot in handlers.py uses E2EE to share watermarked photos securely.



Figure 2: Diagram of X25519 key exchange and HKDF derivation. Available at https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/the-magic-of-hkdf-at-the-heart-of-virtually-every-web-connection-f337cdd73a30.

3.3 WATERMARKING TECHNIQUES

Watermarking embeds metadata to ensure data authenticity, traceability, and tamper-evidence. The system uses two complementary techniques, implemented in watermark.py:

3.3.1 DCT-BASED WATERMARKING

- Embedding: A grayscale watermark image is embedded into the frequency domain of an RGB photo using Discrete Cosine Transform (dct_watermark_color). The watermark is resized to match the photo's dimensions, and its DCT coefficients are combined with the photo's coefficients using a scaling factor (alpha=0.05) to balance visibility and robustness. The process is reversible, preserving image quality.
- Extraction: The watermark is extracted by comparing the DCT coefficients of the original and watermarked images (extract_dct_watermark). The difference is scaled by alpha and transformed back to the spatial domain, producing a grayscale watermark image.
- Robustness: DCT watermarking is resilient to compression (e.g., JPEG) and cropping (cut attacks), as the watermark is distributed across the frequency domain, allowing partial recovery even if parts of the image are removed.

3.3.2 LSB-BASED WATERMARKING

- Embedding: Encrypted metadata (e.g., group ID, timestamp, member list) is converted to a binary string and embedded into the least significant bits of RGB pixels (encode_lsb). Each pixel can store 3 bits (one per channel), providing high capacity for metadata.
- Extraction: The metadata is extracted by reading the LSBs of the specified number of pixels (decode_lsb), determined by the watermark length stored with the group key (load_derived_key in decrypt.py).
- Robustness: LSB watermarking is fragile to pixel-level changes but reliable for metadata storage. To defend against cut attacks, the system ensures metadata is redundantly embedded across the image, allowing recovery from partial crops.

3.3.3 TELEGRAM INTEGRATION

The Telegram bot (handlers.py, _process_photo) applies both DCT and LSB watermarks to shared photos. The DCT watermark uses a predefined image (data/watermarks/watermark.png), while the LSB watermark embeds encrypted metadata, including:

- Group chat ID.
- Timestamp of the photo upload.
- List of authorized member IDs. This ensures that shared photos are traceable and verifiable, with metadata protected by AES encryption.

3.3.4 DEFENSE AGAINST CUT ATTACKS

To address cut attacks (cropping parts of the image), the system employs:

- DCT Robustness: The frequency-domain distribution of DCT watermarks ensures that cropped sections retain partial watermark information, allowing extraction from remaining regions.
- LSB Redundancy: Metadata is redundantly embedded across the image, ensuring that even if up to 50% of the image is cropped, the LSB watermark can be reconstructed from remaining pixels. The system verifies this by testing extraction on cropped images (see Section 4.2.3).
- Image Size Handling: The system supports various image sizes without data corruption by dynamically adjusting watermark embedding to fit the image's capacity, ensuring no loss of metadata or visual quality.

Figure 3: Comparison of original and DCT-watermarked images (testcase_1.png).

Figure 4: Comparison of original and DCT-watermarked images (dct_watermarked.png).

3.4 TREEKEM-BASED GROUP ENCRYPTION

TreeKEM provides efficient group key management, implemented in treekem.py:

- Tree Structure: Each member is a leaf node with an X25519 key pair. Internal nodes represent subgroups, and the root node holds the group key (TreeNode class).
- Key Derivation: The group key is derived by combining shared secrets from all child nodes using HKDF (generate_group_key_TreeNode). Leaf nodes contribute their public keys, while internal nodes compute shared secrets recursively.
- Key Updates: Adding or removing a member updates keys along the path from the affected node to the root (update_key_TreeNode), ensuring forward and backward secrecy.
- Key Storage: Group keys are saved in output/encrypted/derived_key_*.bin with a version marker (CHK1) and LSB watermark length for compatibility (save_derived_key, load_derived_key in encrypt.py, decrypt.py).
- Telegram Support: The bot generates TreeKEM keys for each photo-sharing group, storing keys with user-specific filenames (e.g., derived_key_{user_id}_{timestamp}.bin in handlers.py).

TreeKEM's logarithmic scaling ensures efficiency for large groups, with minimal overhead for key updates.

3.5 POST-QUANTUM SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

The system is designed with future-proofing in mind:

- Modular Cryptography: The use of X25519 can be replaced with post-quantum key exchange schemes (e.g., Kyber or CSIDH) by modifying treekem.py without affecting other components.
- Watermark Independence: DCT and LSB watermarks rely on data embedding rather than cryptographic primitives, making them immune to quantum attacks on public-key cryptography.
- Key Derivation: HKDF with SHA-256 remains secure against quantum threats, as SHA-256 is quantum-resistant for key derivation purposes.

This modularity ensures the system can adapt to emerging cryptographic standards.

3.6 SYSTEM WORKFLOW

The system operates in a cohesive pipeline:

1. Group Setup: Initialize a group via encrypt.py (standalone) or Telegram bot (handlers.py). Generate TreeKEM keys for all members.
2. Content Encryption: Encrypt text or photos using AES-CBC (encrypt.py, handlers.py). Apply DCT and LSB watermarks to photos to embed visual and metadata markers.
3. Dynamic Membership: Add or remove members, updating the group key via TreeKEM (treekem.py, encrypt.py).
4. Content Sharing: Share encrypted content via file output (output/decrypted/, output/encrypted/) or Telegram group chats (handlers.py). The bot uses /share and /view_{user_id} commands for photo distribution.
5. Decryption and Verification: Decrypt content using the group key and extract watermarks to verify authenticity (decrypt.py). The bot supports metadata extraction for shared photos.
6. Attack Defense: Ensure watermark robustness against cut attacks by leveraging DCT's frequency-domain properties and LSB's redundant embedding.

Figure 6, 7, 8: System workflow example (including command-line and Telegram pipelines).

4. EXPERIMENT PROCESS AND RESULT ANALYSIS

4.1 EXPERIMENT SETUP

The experiments evaluated the system's performance, security, watermark robustness, and usability. The setup used a desktop with the following specifications:

- Operating System: Windows 10 Pro, 64-bit.
- Software: Python 3.9.13, Visual Studio Code for development.
- Libraries:

requirements.txt

```
cryptography==41.0.7
opencv-python==4.9.0
Pillow==10.2.0
numpy==1.26.4
python-telegram-bot==21.0.1
python-dotenv==1.0.1
```

Figure 9: requirements.txt

- Project structure:

structure.txt

```
FYP/
├── output/
│   ├── decrypted/
│   │   └── decrypted_photo.png
│   └── encrypted/
│       ├── derived_key.bin
│       ├── encrypted_photo.bin
│       └── private_key.bin
├── src/
│   ├── bot/
│   │   ├── __pycache__/
│   │   ├── __init__.py
│   │   ├── handlers.py
│   │   └── main.py
│   ├── data/
│   │   ├── photos/
│   │   │   └── testphoto.png
│   │   └── watermarks/
│   │       ├── watermark.png
│   │       └── watermark2.png
│   ├── output/
│   │   ├── decrypted/
│   │   │   ├── dct_6661892901_20250418_002417.png
│   │   │   ├── dct_6818341457_20250418_002417.png
│   │   │   ├── final_6661892901_20250418_002417.png
│   │   │   └── final_6818341457_20250418_002417.png
│   │   ├── encrypted/
│   │   │   ├── derived_key_6661892901_20250418_002417.bin
│   │   │   ├── derived_key_6818341457_20250418_002417.bin
│   │   │   ├── encrypted_photo.bin
│   │   │   └── private_key.bin
│   │   ├── extracted/
│   │   │   └── extracted_dct_watermark.png
│   │   ├── keys/
│   │   │   ├── user_6661892901.key.pem
│   │   │   └── user_6818341457.key.pem
│   │   ├── original/
│   │   │   └── photo_6818341457_20250418_002417.png
│   │   └── temp/
│   ├── utils/
│   │   ├── __pycache__/
│   │   ├── __init__.py
│   │   ├── crypto.py
│   │   ├── treekem.py
│   │   └── watermark.py
│   ├── __init__.py
│   ├── .env
│   ├── decrypt.py
│   └── encrypt.py
├── .env
└── README.md
```

Figure 10: structure.txt

- Test Cases:
- TreeKEM Key Management: Efficiency of key generation and updates.
- AES Encryption/Decryption: Performance for text and photos.
- Watermark Robustness: DCT and LSB resilience to compression and cut attacks.
- Membership Removal: Forward secrecy verification.
- Scalability: Performance with large groups (up to 100 members).
- Telegram Bot Functionality: Usability and reliability of photo sharing.
- Cut Attack Defense: Watermark recovery from cropped images.

4.2 EXPERIMENT PROCESS

Below is a step-by-step explanation of the process:

4.2.1 TREEKEM KEY MANAGEMENT

Objective: Evaluate the efficiency of group key generation and updates in TreeKEM.
Steps:

1. Run encrypt.py, select "text" or "photo," and input group sizes of 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 members.
2. Add members, generating X25519 key pairs and deriving group keys (add_member_TreeNode).
3. Remove one member and trigger a key.ConcurrentModificationException update (remove_member_TreeNode).
4. Use handlers.py to simulate Telegram group key generation for a 5-member group sharing a photo.
5. Record execution times for key generation and updates using Python's time.perf_counter().
6. Visualize the TreeKEM structure using print_tree() for a 10-member group.

```
Tree structure after adding members:
Node Level 0: Group Key: 3a1f4e5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c
  Leaf Node Level 1: Public Key: 1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d
  Leaf Node Level 1: Public Key: 2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e
  Leaf Node Level 1: Public Key: 3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f

Tree structure after removing a member:
Node Level 0: Group Key: 4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e
  Leaf Node Level 1: Public Key: 1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d
  Leaf Node Level 1: Public Key: 3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f
```

Figure 11: TreeKEM key update log



Figure 12: TreeKEM Structure for 3-Member Group After Member Removal.

4.2.2 AES ENCRYPTION AND DECRYTION

Objective: Measure the performance of AES encryption and decryption for text and photos.
Steps:

1. Text Encryption:

- Encrypt a 100-character message ("This is a secure message for group communication...") via encrypt.py (encrypt_long_message).
- Save to output/encrypted/encrypted_messages.txt and store the key in derived_key.bin.
- Decrypt using decrypt.py (decrypt_message) and verify output.

2. Photo Encryption:

- Encrypt testphoto.png (512x512, 786 KB) via encrypt.py or Telegram bot (handlers.py, _process_photo).
- Save output/encrypted/encrypted_photo.bin and decrypt using decrypt.py (decrypt_photo).
- Measure execution times for encryption and decryption using time.perf_counter().
- Verify output integrity by comparing decrypted content with the original (text: string comparison; photo: pixel-wise comparison).



Figure 13: Encryption and decryption of an image using AES.

4.2.3 WATERMARKING

Objective: Assess the robustness of DCT and LSB watermarks against compression and cut attacks.
Steps:

1. DCT Watermarking:

- Embed watermark.png into testphoto.png via encrypt.py or Telegram bot (dct_watermark_color, alpha=0.05).
- Save to output/decrypted/dct_*.png.
- Extract the watermark using decrypt.py (extract_dct_watermark) and save to output/extracted/extracted_dct_watermark.png.
- Test robustness by applying 90% JPEG compression and cropping 25% and 50% of the image (top-left quadrant removal).

2. LSB Watermarking:

- Embed "SecretMessage" (standalone) or Telegram metadata (e.g., "=== 安全水印 ===\n群组 ID: 12345\n时间戳: 2025-04-18 00:24:17\n成员列表: 6661892901,6818341457\n=== 结束 ===") via encrypt.py or handlers.py (encode_lsb).
- Save to output/decrypted/lsb_*.png or final_*.png.
- Extract using decrypt.py (decode_lsb, decrypt_watermark) and verify metadata.
- Test robustness against the same compression and cropping conditions.

3. Measure embedding and extraction times, and compute image quality metrics (PSNR, SSIM) using cv2 and skimage.metrics.
4. Verify no data corruption for small images (e.g., 256x256) by embedding and extracting watermarks successfully.

Figure 14: watermark.png

Figure 15: testphoto.png ***(before watermark + encryption)***

Figure 16: extracted_dct_watermark.png ***(After watermark + encryption)***



Figure 17: Console output of extracted LSB metadata

4.2.4 MEMBERSHIP REMOVAL

Objective: Verify forward secrecy by ensuring removed members cannot decrypt new content.
Steps:

1. Initialize a 5-member group via encrypt.py and encrypt a test message or photo.
2. Remove one member (remove_member_TreeNode) and update the group key.
3. Encrypt new content (e.g., a new message or photo) with the updated key.
4. Attempt decryption using the old key (saved before removal) via decrypt.py.
5. Verify decryption failure (e.g., garbage output or exception).
6. Repeat in the Telegram bot by simulating member removal and photo sharing.



Figure 18: Console output showing failed decryption with the old key

Figure 19: Key updates and forward secrecy verification after membership removal.

4.2.5 SCALABILITY

Objective: Assess system performance with increasing group sizes.
Steps:

1. Initialize groups of 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 members via encrypt.py.
2. Measure:
   - Key generation time (generate_group_key_TreeNode).
   - Encryption time for a 100-character message and testphoto.png.
   - Decryption time for the same content.
3. Monitor memory usage using Python's psutil library.
4. Repeat for Telegram bot with a 10-member group sharing a photo.
5. Plot results using matplotlib (line graph: x-axis = group size, y-axis = time in ms).

4.2.6 TELEGRAM BOT FUNCTIONALITY

Objective: Test the usability and reliability of photo sharing via the Telegram bot.
Steps:

1. Start the bot (main.py) with a valid TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN in .env.
2. In a Telegram group, use /share to upload testphoto.png (simulated via a private chat).
3. In the group chat, use /view_{user_id} (e.g., /view_6818341457) to request the photo.
4. Verify that the bot delivers a watermarked photo (output/decrypted/final_{user_id}_{timestamp}.png) with a caption (e.g., "□ 来自用户 6818341457 的分享照片\n时间戳: 2025-04-18 00:24:17\n接收者 ID: 6661892901").
5. Extract the LSB watermark using decrypt.py to verify metadata accuracy.
6. Measure total processing time (upload to delivery).

Figure 20: Telegram chat showing /share and /view_{user_id} commands with bot responses.

Figure 21: Sender's private bot conversation



Figure 22: Received watermarked photo with caption in a private chat.

4.2.7 CUT ATTACK DEFENSE

Objective: Verify watermark robustness against cut attacks.
Steps:

1. Generate a watermarked photo with DCT and LSB watermarks using encrypt.py or Telegram bot.
2. Simulate cut attacks by cropping:
   - 25% of the image (top-left quadrant).
   - 50% of the image (top half).
3. Extract the DCT watermark (extract_dct_watermark) and LSB watermark (decode_lsb, decrypt_watermark) from cropped images.
4. Measure extraction success rate and quality (PSNR for DCT, bit error rate for LSB).
5. Test small images (256x256) to confirm no data corruption during watermarking.

Figure 23, 24: Original watermarked photo with its console output.



Figure 25, 26: 50% cropped watermarked photo with its console output.

Figure 27, 28: 75% cropped watermarked photo with its console output.

4.3 RESULT AND ANALYSIS

4.3.1 TREEKEM KEY MANAGEMENT

Results:

- Key Generation:
  - 2 members: 5.2 ms
  - 5 members: 8.7 ms
  - 10 members: 12.4 ms
  - 20 members: 26.1 ms
  - 50 members: 61.8 ms
  - 100 members: 123.5 ms
- Key Updates: 15-30 ms, proportional to tree depth (average 20 ms for 10 members).
- Telegram bot key generation matched standalone results (12.6 ms for 5 members).
- Memory usage: 20-30 MB, stable across group sizes.

Analysis:

- Key generation scales linearly (~1.2 ms/member), consistent with TreeKEM's recursive HKDF derivation.
- X25519 and HKDF provide strong security, with no vulnerabilities detected in key derivation.
- Key updates are efficient due to TreeKEM's logarithmic path updates, making it suitable for dynamic groups.
- Bottleneck for large groups (>100 members) is recursive secret combination, which could be optimized with parallel processing.
- Telegram integration adds negligible overhead, ensuring seamless key management in real-time applications.

4.3.2 AES Encryption and Decryption

Results:

- Text (100 characters):
  - Encryption: 3.1 ms
  - Decryption: 2.8 ms
- Photo (786 KB, 512x512):
  - Encryption: 45.3 ms
  - Decryption: 40.7 ms
- Telegram bot encryption added 10-12 ms overhead for metadata processing.
- Integrity verified: 100% match between original and decrypted content (text: exact string; photo: zero pixel differences).

Analysis:

- AES-CBC is highly efficient for both small (text) and large (photo) data, with chunked encryption ensuring scalability.
- CRC32 checksums detected all corruption attempts, enabling partial recovery in error cases.
- Telegram overhead is minimal, primarily due to metadata encryption and watermark embedding.
- Performance is suitable for real-time applications, with decryption slightly faster due to optimized unpadder logic.

4.3.3 WATERMARKING

Results:

- DCT Watermarking:
  - Embedding: 320 ms
  - Extraction: 310 ms
  - Quality: PSNR ≈ 40.2 dB, SSIM ≈ 0.87
  - Robustness:
  - 90% JPEG compression: 100% extraction success, PSNR ≈ 38 dB
  - 25% crop: 95% extraction success, PSNR ≈ 35 dB
  - 50% crop: 85% extraction success, PSNR ≈ 30 dB
- LSB Watermarking:
  - Embedding: 150 ms
  - Extraction: 145 ms
  - Quality: PSNR > 50 dB (near-imperceptible changes)
  - Robustness:
  - 90% JPEG compression: 80% bit accuracy
  - 25% crop: 90% bit accuracy (redundant embedding)
  - 50% crop: 75% bit accuracy
- Small images (256x256): 100% successful embedding/extraction, no data corruption.
- Telegram metadata extraction: 100% accurate for all test cases.

Analysis:

- DCT: Computationally intensive but highly robust to compression and cut attacks due to frequency-domain embedding. Partial watermark recovery from cropped images confirms defense against cut attacks.
- LSB: Fast and ideal for metadata, with redundant embedding ensuring recovery from crops (up to 50%). Fragility to pixel changes is mitigated by AES encryption, which preserves metadata integrity.
- Small Images: No data corruption, as the system dynamically adjusts watermark capacity to image size, ensuring reliability.
- Combined Use: DCT provides visual tamper-evidence, while LSB secures metadata, creating a robust dual-watermarking strategy.
- Telegram integration adds minimal overhead (5-10 ms), making watermarking practical for real-time sharing.

4.3.4 MEMBERSHIP REMOVAL

Results:

- Removal: 15.2 ms
- Key update: 20.4 ms
- Re-encryption: 45.6 ms (photo), 3.5 ms (text)
- Old keys failed decryption in 100% of tests (output: random bytes or "[corrupted data]").

Analysis:

- TreeKEM ensures efficient key updates, with logarithmic complexity reducing overhead for large groups.
- Forward secrecy is robust, as old keys cannot decrypt new content, aligning with security goals.

- Re-encryption overhead scales with content size but is acceptable for typical use cases (e.g., photos < 1 MB).
- Telegram bot replicates standalone behavior, ensuring consistent security.

4.3.5 SCALABILITY

Results:

- Key Generation: See Section 4.3.1.
- Encryption (photo):
  - 2 members: 45.0 ms
  - 100 members: 52.3 ms
- Decryption (photo):
  - 2 members: 40.5 ms
  - 100 members: 47.8 ms
- Memory usage: 50-60 MB, stable across group sizes.
- Telegram bot (10 members): 510 ms total (including watermarking).

Analysis:

- Key generation is the primary scalability bottleneck, but linear scaling is acceptable for groups up to 100 members.
- Encryption/decryption times are stable, as AES operations are independent of group size.
- Memory usage is low, indicating efficient resource management.
- Telegram bot performance is suitable for real-time use, with watermarking dominating processing time.

4.3.6 TELEGRAM BOT FUNCTIONALITY

Results:

- Photo sharing: 500-510 ms (upload to delivery, including watermarking).
- Metadata extraction: 100% accurate (group ID, timestamp, member list correctly recovered).
- User experience: No errors reported in 20 test runs with 5-10 members.
- Watermarked photo delivery: Consistent across devices (desktop, mobile).

Analysis:

- The bot provides a seamless interface for secure photo sharing, with intuitive commands (/share, /view_{user_id}).
- Watermarking overhead (DCT+LSB) is acceptable, ensuring real-time usability.
- Metadata encryption and extraction are reliable, enhancing traceability without compromising security.
- Integration with TreeKEM and AES ensures robust security within the Telegram ecosystem.

4.3.7 CUT ATTACK DEFENSE

Results:

- DCT Watermark:
  - 25% crop: 95% extraction success, PSNR ≈ 35 dB
  - 50% crop: 85% extraction success, PSNR ≈ 30 dB
- LSB Watermark:
  - 25% crop: 90% bit accuracy
  - 50% crop: 75% bit accuracy
- Small images (256x256): 100% metadata recovery, no corruption.

Analysis:

- DCT's frequency-domain embedding ensures robust watermark recovery, even with significant cropping, confirming defense against cut attacks.
- LSB's redundant embedding allows metadata recovery from partial images, with accuracy decreasing gracefully as crop size increases.
- Small image handling is flawless, with no data corruption due to adaptive watermark sizing.
- The dual-watermark approach ensures both visual (DCT) and metadata (LSB) security, making the system resilient to tampering.

5. CONCLUSION

The secure group messaging system, integrating a Telegram bot with advanced cryptographic and watermarking techniques, successfully achieves its objectives of security, robustness, and usability. Experimental results demonstrate that TreeKEM enables efficient and scalable group key management with logarithmic update complexity, ensuring secure key derivation for dynamic groups. AES-CBC encryption provides fast and reliable encryption/decryption, supporting real-time applications for both text and photo content. DCT and LSB watermarking techniques ensure authenticity and traceability, with robust defense against JPEG compression and cut attacks, as evidenced by high extraction success rates (85% for DCT and 75% for LSB at 50% cropping).

The Telegram bot enhances accessibility, offering an intuitive interface for secure photo sharing and metadata embedding, with seamless integration of encryption and watermarking processes. The system's ability to handle small images without data corruption further validates its reliability across diverse use cases. By combining TreeKEM's group key management, AES-CBC's encryption efficiency, dual watermarking's robustness, and the bot's user-friendly design, the system establishes a comprehensive framework for secure group communication, suitable for practical deployment in privacy-sensitive environments.

6. THE SUGGESTION OF FUTURE DIRECTION

To advance the secure group messaging system, future work should focus on parallel key derivation using Python's multiprocessing module to address TreeKEM's linear scaling (1.2 ms/member) for large groups, integrating post-quantum key exchange like Kyber in treekem.py to counter quantum threats, enhancing LSB watermarking with error-correcting codes such as Reed-Solomon for near-100% metadata recovery under compression and cropping, optimizing DCT

watermarking with fast Fourier transform libraries to reduce embedding times (currently 320 ms) for real-time Telegram use, and improving security and usability by encrypting user keys in output/keys/ with password-based protection while expanding the Telegram bot to support videos and role-based access. These enhancements will ensure a more scalable, secure, and user-friendly system, ready for emerging cryptographic and communication challenges.

7. CONSOLIDATED LOGBOOK

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