

## **Credit Risk Measurement and Management**

# FRM二级知识框架图



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## **Learning Structure**

### **Introduction of Credit Risk**

- 1. The Credit Decision
- 2. The Credit Analyst
- 3. Introduction of Credit Risk



**Credit Risk Measurement** ★★★

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## **Credit Risk Management**

### 管理工具★★

15 Credit Derivatives

**16 Structured Credit Risk and Securitization** 


17 The Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit

**18 Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO)** 

### **Risk Mitigation Techniques**

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### **Credit Risk Measurement**



**Portfolio** 

14. Portfolio Credit Risk

## Section 1~2

**The Credit Decision The Credit Analyst** 

## **Credit Risk & Credit Risk Evaluation**

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Credit Risk definition	Credit risk is the probability that a borrower will <b>not pay back</b> a loan in accordance with the terms of the credit agreement.
Credit Risk Evaluation	<ul> <li>The capacity and willingness of the obligor (borrower, counterparty, issuer, etc.)</li> <li>The external environment (operating conditions, country risk, business climate, etc.)</li> <li>The characteristics of the relevant credit instrument (product, facility, issue, debt security, loan, etc.)</li> <li>The quality and sufficiency of any credit risk mitigants (collateral, guarantees, credit enhancements, etc.)</li> </ul>

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## **Credit Analysis Comparison**

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	Consumers	Corporations	Financial Institutions	Sovereigns
Capacity	Wealth, salary, or incoming cash, expenses, assets, net cash	Liquidity, cash flow combined with earnings capacity and profitability	Similar to nonfinancial firms but bank specific.	Financial factors including the country's external debt load; tax receipts.
Willingness	Reputation of individual, payment history.	Quality of management, historical debt service.	Quality of management; qualitative analysis is even more important for financial films.	Credit analysis for sovereigns is often <i>more subjective</i> than for financial and nonfinancial firms.
Methods of evaluation	Credit scoring models	Detailed manual analysis including financial statement analysis, interviews with management.	Similar to nonfinancial firms.	Similar to financial and nonfinancial firms but with increased subjective analysis of the political environment.
Loan size/type	Large exposures: secured (e.g., mortgage). Smaller exposures: unsecured (e.g., credit card loans).	Typically larger exposures	Similar to nonfinancial firms (i.e., large).	Similar to financial and nonfinancial firms (i.e., large)

## **The Credit Analyst**

#### **Job Description**

- Consumer Credit Analyst
- Credit Modeling Analyst
- Corporate Credit Analyst
- Counterparty Credit Analyst
- Credit Analysts at Rating Agencies
- Sell-Side and Buy-Side Fixed Income Analysts
- Bank Examiners and Supervisors

#### **Functional Objective**

- Risk Management
- Investment Selection
- Rating Agency



#### **Type of Entity Analyzed**

- Corporate Credit Analyst
- Bank and Financial Institution Credit Analyst
- Sovereign/Municipal Credit Analyst

#### **Classification by Employer**

- Banks, Nonbank Financial Institutions, and Institutional Investors
- Rating Agencies
- Government Agencies
- Rating Advisor

**Introduction of Credit Risk** 

## **Credit Risky Securities**

### **Types of Credit Risk**

Corporate debt
Sovereign debt
Credit derivatives
Structured credit products



Senior debt

characteristics of both equity and debt securities

- Preferred stock
- Convertible bonds
- Payment in kind (PIK) bonds

### Credit Contract Frictions 名词掌握

- Asymmetric information refers to different parties to a transaction having different information sets.
- Principal-agent problems arise: the agent has better information than the principal.
- Risk shifting occurs when risks and rewards are transferred from one group of market participants to another
  group holding different positions in the firm's capital structure.
- Moral hazard arises when buying insurance or some protection that reduces the incentive of the insured party to avoid the insured event.
- Adverse selection occurs when parties to a transaction have asymmetric information.
- Externalities are costs or benefits that occur when one party's actions cause others to absorb the cost or benefit.
- *Collective action problems* (i.e., coordination failures) occur when a group of individuals were to benefit collectively if they all took a course of action, but would not benefit if an individual alone took the same course of action. Example: Prisoner's Dilemma

## **Default and Recovery** ★

### **Expected loss (EL)**

$$EL = PD \times LGD \times exposure$$

$$E[loss|default] = LGD = \frac{EL}{P[default]} = \frac{EL}{PD}$$

### Compare Risk-free bonds with Risky bond

The investor may *prefer the risky bond*:

### Credit Vs. Market Risk Events \*



Market risk	the risk of economic losses from <i>movements in market prices</i>
Credit risk	the risk of borrower <i>default</i> on contractual obligations, but also includes other risks including <i>credit downgrades</i> .
Mark-to-market risk	A change in the perception of credit quality, even if it does not result in credit migration, may cause spreads to increase and give rise to credit risk "the <i>ambiguity</i> in the distinction between credit and market risk."


**Credit VaR** 

## Credit VaR ★★★



### 名词掌握

Type of credit loss	Description	Formula
Expected credit loss (credit provision	Represent the average credit loss. Pricing of the portfolio covers expected loss.	$ECL_{i} = PD_{i} \times (1 - f_{i}) \times CE_{i}$ $ECL = \sum_{i=1}^{N} PD_{i} \times (1 - f_{i}) \times CE_{i}$
Worst credit loss	Represent the loss that will not be exceeded at some level of confidence.	$I - c = \int_{WCL}^{\infty} f(x) dx$
Unexpected credit loss	Deviation from the expected loss like VAR Economic capital covers the unexpected loss	UCL = CVAR = WCL - ECL



PZACAI	Market Risk	Credit Risk
Definition	compares a <i>future value</i> with a <i>current value</i>	compares two future values
Distributions	Symmetric	Skewed to the left
Time Horizon	Short Term (Days)	Long Term (Years)

### Risk Contribution ★★★



### Step 1: Expected loss and unexpected loss of individual asset

$$EL_{i} = AE_{i} \times LGD_{i} \times EDF_{i}$$

$$UL_{i} = AE_{i} \times \sqrt{EDF_{i} \times \sigma_{LGD_{i}}^{2} + LGD_{i}^{2} \times \sigma_{EDF_{i}}^{2}} \quad \text{where, } \sigma_{EDF_{i}}^{2} = EDF_{i} \times (1 - EDF_{i})$$

## Step 2: Expected loss and unexpected loss of N-asset portfolio

$$EL_{P} = \sum_{i} EL_{i} = \sum_{i} AE_{i} \times LGD_{i} \times EDF_{i}; \ UL_{P} = \sqrt{\sum_{i} \sum_{j} \rho_{ij} UL_{i} UL_{j}} \leq \sum_{i} UL_{i}$$
 For a two-asset portfolio,  $UL_{P} = \sqrt{UL_{1}^{2} + UL_{2}^{2} + 2\rho_{12} UL_{1} UL_{2}}$ 

### Step 3: The risk contribution (RC) of each asset

$$RC_{i} = UL_{i} \frac{\partial UL_{p}}{\partial UL_{i}} = \frac{UL_{i} \sum_{j} UL_{j} \rho_{ij}}{UL_{p}} \text{ and } \sum_{i} RC_{i} = UL_{p}$$

$$RC_{1} = UL_{1} \frac{\partial UL_{p}}{\partial UL_{1}} = \frac{UL_{1}^{2} + \rho_{12}UL_{1}UL_{2}}{UL_{p}} \text{ and } RC_{2} = UL_{2} \frac{\partial UL_{p}}{\partial UL_{2}} = \frac{UL_{2}^{2} + \rho_{12}UL_{1}UL_{2}}{UL_{p}}$$

**Binomial Trees of PD** 

	Binomial Trees of PD 🖈 🖈 🛨
Marginal default probability	the probability that a borrower will default in any given year.
Survival Rate	<ul> <li>a borrower will not default over a specified multi-year period.</li> <li>Survival Rate at end of two years: S<sub>2</sub>=(1-d<sub>1</sub>)(1-d<sub>2</sub>)</li> <li>Survival Rate at end of three years: S<sub>3</sub>=(1-d<sub>1</sub>)(1-d<sub>2</sub>)(1-d<sub>3</sub>)</li> </ul>
Cumulative default probability	a borrower will default <i>over a specified multi-year period</i> .  • Cumulative default probability at end of two years: $C_2 = 1 - S_2 = d_1 + (1 - d_1)d_2$ • Cumulative default probability at end of three years: $C_3 = 1 - S_3 = d_1 + (1 - d_1)d_2 + (1 - d_1)(1 - d_2)d_3$
Average survival rate and average default rate	$S_3 = \left(S^a\right)^3 \implies S^a - A S^a = 1 - d^a \implies d^a$

## **Change on probability of default** ★★★

- 对比
- For *investment-grade credits*, the increase of cumulative default probability is *more* than proportional with the horizon.
- For *speculative-grade credits*, the increase of cumulative default probability is *less* than proportional with the horizon.
- The marginal probability of default increases with maturity for initial high credit ratings, but decreases for initial low credit ratings. (Reasons: mean reversion effect)

**Credit Ratings** 

## **Credit Ratings and Agencies**

		Standard & Poor's/Fitch	Moody's
	Highest grade	AAA	Aaa
Investment	High grade	AA	Aa
grade	Upper medium grade	А	Α
	Medium grade	BBB	Ваа
	Lower medium grade	BB Z	Ва
	Speculative	LILL MB	В
Speculative	Poor standing	PZACCCC FMY	Саа
grade	Highly speculative	CC	Са
	Lowest quality, no interest	С	С
	In default	D	
	Modifiers: A+, A, A-, and A1, A2,	A+>A>A->BBB+>BBB	> <i>BBB</i> > <i>BB</i> +
	A1 > A2 > A3 > Baa1 > Baa2 > Baa3 > Ba1		

## Internal Credit Rating \*

### 名词掌握

### At-the-point approach (short horizon) & Through-the-cycle approach (long horizon)


- Through-the-cycle approaches: *high-rated firms may be underrated during growth* periods and overrated during the decline of a cycle.
- The use of at-the-point approaches may be procyclical. The changes in ratings and lending policies can lag the
  economic cycle.
- Through-the-cycle approach and at-the-point approach should not be mixed.

### **Credit Transition Matrices** ★★★

State		En	ding		Total
Starting	A	В	С	D	Prob.
A	0.97	0.03	0.00	0.00	1.00
В	0.02	0.93	0.02	0.03	1.00
C	0.01	0.12	0.64	0.23	1.00
D	0	0	0	1.00	1.00

- In the first year, the probability of default  $P(D_1/B_0) = 3\%$
- In the second year, the probability of default  $P(D_2/A_1)P(A_1) + P(D_2/B_1)P(B_1) + P(D_2/C_1)P(C_1) = 0.00 \times 0.02 + 0.03 \times 0.93 + 0.23 \times 0.02 = 3.25\%.$

### 计算



 $B \rightarrow D \ 0.03 = 0.0300 \ B \rightarrow A \rightarrow D \ 0.02^* \ 0.00 = 0.0000 \ B \rightarrow A \rightarrow A \rightarrow D \ 0.02^* \ 0.07^* \ 0.00 = 0.0000$ 

 $B \rightarrow B \rightarrow A \rightarrow D$  0.93\*0.02\*0.00=0.0000  $B \rightarrow B \rightarrow B \rightarrow D$  0.93\*0.93\*0.03=0.0259

 $B \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \ 0.93^* \ 0.02^* \ 0.23 = 0.0043$  $B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A \rightarrow D \ 0.02^* \ 0.00^* \ 0.00 = 0.0000$ 

B → C → B → D 0.02\*0.12\*0.03=0.0001

B→C→C→D 0.02\*0.64\*0.23=0.0029

 Default prob:
 0.0300
 0.0325
 0.0333

 Cumulative:
 0.0300
 0.0625
 0.0958

**Credit Scoring Models** 

## **Credit Scoring Models**

## Quantitative methodologies for credit analysis and scoring ★★★



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Type of credit scoring models	Feature Feature	Example
Fisher Linear discriminant analysis	<ul> <li>Parametric technique</li> <li>A process that segregates a larger group into homogeneous subgroups.</li> </ul>	z-score model
Parametric discrimination	<ul> <li>Parametric technique</li> <li>Use a score function to determine the members of the subgroups.</li> <li>Whether the value of the score falls above or below a certain threshold determines which subgroup the observation is placed in</li> </ul>	logit and probit model
K-nearest neighbor approach	<ul> <li>Non-parametric technique</li> <li>Use the properties of firms that have already fallen into the categories of interest (e.g., default or not default) and categorizes a new entrant by how closely it resembles the members already in each of the groups.</li> </ul>	
Support vector machines	<ul> <li>Parametric technique</li> <li>Use the characteristics of observations (firms) to create an equation that does the best job of dividing the larger group into two subgroups.</li> </ul>	Linear and nonlinear


### **Decision Rules in Credit Analysis** ★★

Туре	Feature Feature
Minimum error	<ul> <li>uses Bayes' theorem to determine a conditional probability</li> <li>p(C given default) x p(default) &gt; or &lt; p(C given not default) x p(not default)</li> </ul>
Minimum risk	• a class of rules that try to either <i>minimize the probability of misclassification</i> (incorrectly lending to risky firm) or minimize the loss associated with that error.
Neyman-Pearson	use the statistical concept of Type I and Type II errors.  • A Type I error is lending to a risky firm because it was incorrectly accepted as a non-risky firm.  • A Type II error is not lending to a non-risky firm because it incorrectly rejected as being risky. $\frac{p("conditions" \text{ given default})}{p("conditions" \text{ not given default})} > \text{threshold value}$
Minimax	• minimizing the maximum error or risk.

The *minimum error rule* makes a decision based on calculated *probabilities*.


The *other three* methods use *optimization* techniques

## The receiver operating characteristic (ROC)



- 1.  $Y = \frac{\text{number of defaults correctly predicted}}{\text{number of defaults}}$
- $2. X = \frac{\text{number of firms predicted to default and did not}}{\text{number of firms that did not default}}$

## The cumulative accuracy profile (CAP, GINI curve)



The accuracy ratio (AR) is defined as  $A_R/A_p + A_R$ , with a ratio close to 1 implying a more accurate model.

## **Retail Credit Risk Management**

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Retail Banking -

The retail banking industry revolves around receiving deposits from and lending money to *consumers and small businesses*.

#### **Retail Credit Risk vs. Corporate Credit Risk**

- Retail credit exposures are relatively small. A commercial credit portfolio often consists of large exposures.
- Due to the *diversification* of a retail credit portfolio, estimating the default percentage allows a bank to treat this loss as a cost of "doing business". A commercial credit portfolio is subjected to the risk that its *losses may exceed the expected threshold*.

### **Credit Risk Scoring Models**

Credit bureau scores	an applicant's FICO score
Pooled model	built by <i>outside parties</i> , is more costly than implementing a credit bureau score model; however, it offers the advantage of flexibility to tailor it to a specific industry.
Custom model	created by the lender itself using data specifically pulled from the lender's own credit application pool.


**Infer Credit Risk from Corporate Bond Prices** 

## **Infer Credit Risk from Corporate Bond Prices**





### **Risk-Neutral Probability of Default**



$$P = \frac{\$100}{(1 + \text{YTM})} = \left[\frac{\$100}{(1 + R_f)}\right] \times (1 - \pi) + \left[\frac{f \times \$100}{(1 + R_f)}\right] \times \pi$$


$$\Rightarrow \pi = \frac{1}{(1-f)} \left[ 1 - \frac{(1 + R_f)}{(1 + YTM)} \right]$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathsf{YTM} \approx \mathsf{R}_f + \pi \big( \mathsf{1-f} \big) \Rightarrow \mathsf{YTM-R}_f \approx \pi \big( \mathsf{1-f} \big)$$

$$\mathsf{Risk-free} \ \mathsf{yield} \qquad \mathsf{Recovery} \ \mathsf{rate}$$

$$\mathsf{Market-determined} \ \mathsf{yield} \qquad \mathsf{Risk-neutral} \ \mathsf{PD}$$

Objective probability of default



$$P^* = \frac{\$100}{(1 + YTM)} = \frac{\$100 \times (1 - \pi') + f \times \$100 \times \pi'}{(1 + R_f + Risk Premium)}$$

$$\Rightarrow YTM - R_f - RP \approx \pi (1 - f)$$

Where  $\pi'$  is the real-world PD and RP is the risk premium (liquidity premium and tax effects).

Spread Measure	<b>Definition</b>
Yield spread	YTM risky bond - YTM benchmark government bond
I-spead	YTM risky bond - linearly interpolated YTM on benchmark government bond or swap rate
Z-spread	Basis points added to each spot rate on a benchmark curve
Asset-swap spread	Spread on floating leg of asset swap on a bond
CDS spread	Market premium of CDS of issuer bond
Option adjusted spread(OAS)	Z-spread adjusted for optionality of embedded options
Discount margin	Fixed spread above current LIBOR needed to price bond correctly

### Influencing factors of Credit spread ★ 结论





- Credit spreads are *reduced* during times of *economic recovery*. This phenomenon is called flight to quality. Economy  $\uparrow \Rightarrow$  Buy risky bonds  $\uparrow \Rightarrow V_{Risky bond} \uparrow \Rightarrow Yield_{Risky bond} \downarrow \Rightarrow Credit spreads <math>\downarrow$
- The credit spread of *callable* bonds (redeemable bond) *widens* (narrows) as *volatility of interest rate increases* (decreases).

$$\sigma_{\text{interest}} \uparrow \Rightarrow V_{\textit{call}} \uparrow \Rightarrow V_{\text{Callable bond}} \downarrow \Rightarrow \text{Credit spread} \uparrow$$

The credit spread of puttable bonds narrows (widens) as volatility of interest rate increases (decreases).

### Spread '01 (DVCS) ★★ 名词掌握、结论

- The spread '01 is analogous to the DV01. It measures the price change implied by a one basis point change in the credit spread.
- The *smaller* the z-spread, the *larger the effect* on the bond price (i.e., the greater the credit spread sensitivity). The DVCS exhibits *convexity*.

### The Credit Spread Curve \*

- The first step to creating the curve is to plot the **most liquid credit spreads** observable in the market, generally **from CDS premiums or bond spreads**.
- Plotting the curve is further complicated by the choice of reference.
- An alternative method uses the credit spread around a *single, liquid observation* (e.g., credit spread with five years to maturity) to map the entire curve.


**Infer Credit Risk from Equity Prices** 

### Merton Model ★★★

- Value of *equity* = Call option on firm = value of firm's asset (V) value of risky debt
- Value of risky debt = Risk-free debt put option on firm

### **Equity: Call Option**

 Equity can be viewed as a call option on the firm value with strike price equal to the face value of debt.



$$\frac{\ln(V/Fe^{-r(T-t)})}{\sigma\sqrt{T-t}} + \frac{\sigma\sqrt{T-t}}{2} = d_1 \quad d_2 = d_1 - \sigma\sqrt{T-t}$$

N(-d<sub>2</sub>) is the risk-neutral probability of default.

### **Corporate debt**

 Long corporate bond = Long free-risk bond + Short put option on the firm value (or Short CDS)

Bond = 
$$Fe^{-r(T-t)}$$
-Put =  $VN(-d_1) + Fe^{-r(T-t)}N(d_2)$   
 $ECL_T = Put \times e^{r(T-t)} = -Ve^{r(T-t)}N(-d_1) + FN(-d_2)$ 

 A<sub>t</sub> = E<sub>t</sub> + D<sub>t</sub> = (European call with strike at F) + Fe<sup>-rT</sup> -(European put with strike at F)

### **Determining Firm Value and Volatility**

• 
$$\sigma_s *S = \Delta * \sigma_v *V$$

• The distribution of equity values is not constant (*volatility smirk*). The non-constant volatility of equity is a *violation of the Black-Scholes-Merton model*.

### **Credit spread**

credit spread=-
$$\left[\frac{1}{T-t}\right]*ln\left(\frac{D}{F}\right)$$
-R<sub>F</sub>

$$y_t-r=\frac{1}{T-t}log\left[\left(1-e^{-r(T-t)}\right)F+European put option with strike at F\right]-r$$

- As time increases there is greater probability that the value received will be less than par.
  - Studies have shown that as time to maturity increases, credit spreads tend to widen (i.e., increase).
  - For very risky debt, it may be the case that credit spreads narrow.
- As the *risk-free rate increases*, the expected value of the firm at maturity increases, which in turn *decreases the risk of default*.

### **Subordinate Debt in Merton Model**

- Subordinate debt can be valued in a portfolio as a *long position in a call option on the firm with an exercise* price equal to the face value of senior debt, F, and a short position on a call option on the firm with an exercise price equal to the total principal due on all debt, U + F.
- Subordinate debt values behave like *equity* when the *firm has low values*, as during periods of financial distress, and they behave like *senior debt* when the *firm is not in financial distress*.

#### **Calculate PD and LGD**

$$PD=N\left[\frac{\ln(F)-\ln(V)-(\mu)(T-t)+0.5\sigma^{2}(T-t)}{\sigma\sqrt{T-t}}\right] EL=F*PD-Ve^{\mu(T-t)}*N\left[\frac{\ln(F)-\ln(V)-(\mu)(T-t)+0.5\sigma^{2}(T-t)}{\sigma\sqrt{T-t}}\right]$$

$$expected \ LGD=\frac{\left[e^{r(T-t)}\left(European\ put\ option\ with\ strike\ at\ D\right)\right]}{\left[e^{r(T-t)}\left(European\ put\ option\ with\ strike\ at\ D\right)\right]}$$

### The Merton model rests on a number of assumptions:

- The market value of assets, A<sub>t</sub>, and expected return, μ, are related.
- The value of the firm is observable and follows a lognormal diffusion process (geometric Brownian motion).
- The *risk-free interest rate is constant* through time.
- Debt consists of a *single zero-coupon bond* with a nominal payment of maturing at time T. The model assumes that the firm *can default only on the maturity date* of the bond.
- Equity consists of common shares only.
- Debt-holders have limited liability and have no recourse to any other assets once equity is eliminated.
- Trading in markets occurs not only for the firm's equity and debt securities, but also for its assets.
- There are no cash flows prior to the maturity of the debt (including dividends).

#### The drawbacks of Merton Model

- The Merton model makes some *unrealistic assumptions*.
- It could result in *low default probability values and high recovery rates* for firms with high leverage. *Firms with high leverage in reality would typically have higher default probabilities* and lower recovery rates.

## The KMV Approach ★★★


### First step: calculate the distance to default (DD)

$$DD = \frac{expected \ asset \ return - default \ threshold}{\sigma_{expected \ asset \ returns}} = \frac{A \text{-}K}{\sigma_{A}}$$

### Determining the default point (i.e., default threshold) is:

- If the ratio of long-term-liabilities-to-short-term-liabilities is less than 1.5:
  - short-term liabilities + 0.5 × long-term liabilities
- If this ratio is greater than 1.5:

short-term liabilities 
$$+\left(0.7 - \frac{0.3 \times \text{short-term liabilities}}{\text{long-term liabilities}}\right) \times \text{long-term liabilities}$$



Asset Value

$$DD = \frac{\log(V) - \log(\text{default threshold}) + \left[E(ROA) - \frac{\sigma_V^2}{2}\right] \times \text{maturity}}{\sigma_V \times \sqrt{\text{maturity}}}$$

## Final step: Report estimated default frequency (EDF)

- Once the distance to default is computed, the expected default frequency can be found.
- The EDF will be associated with a particular credit rating (e.g., BBB).

## **Summary: Estimation Approaches**

Туре	Characteristics
Historical Data Approach	<ul> <li>A transition matrix is helpful in calculating default probabilities because it identifies the historical probabilities of credit rating migration between periods.</li> <li>This methodology assumes the transition matrix is constant over time and hence unaffected by the business cycle, an observation not supported by empirical evidence. In general, credits are more likely to be downgraded than upgraded.</li> </ul>
Risk-Neutral Approach	<ul> <li>The risk-neutral probability of default is derived from the observed credit spread and the market price of a traded credit security.</li> <li>Empirical evidence indicates that risk-neutral default probabilities are significantly larger than real-world default probabilities.</li> </ul>
Equity-Based Approaches	<ul> <li>The Merton model uses equity market data to estimate default probabilities.</li> <li>The KMV approach uses a proprietary approach built on the Merton model, but it relaxes several of its assumptions.</li> </ul>

## **Rating Assignment Methodologies**

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<b>Experts-based Approaches</b>	Statistical-based Models	Heuristic and Numerical Approaches
Structured Experts-based Systems	Structural approaches: based on economic and financial theoretical assumptions.	'Heuristic methods': opposed to algorithms-based approaches, as 'expert systems' based on artificial intelligence techniques.
Agencies' ratings	Reduced form approaches: using the most statistically suitable set of variables and disregarding the theoretical and conceptual causal relations  • Statistical method  • Unsupervised techniques: 'Cluster analysis' & 'Principal component analysis'	'Numerical methods': reach optimal solutions adopting 'trained' algorithms to take decisions in highly complex environments
Experts-based Internal Ratings Used by Banks	Cash Flow Simulations	

**Default Intensity Models** 

## **Poisson Distribution & Exponential Distribution**

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Bernoulli trial	<ul> <li>Default risk for a single company can be represented as a Bernoulli trial.</li> <li>An important property of the Bernoulli distribution is that each trial is conditionally independent. (memoryless property)</li> </ul>
Binomial Distribution	This series of <i>independent and identically</i> (i.e., same probability of default) distributed Bernoulli trials is characterized by a <i>binomialdistribution</i> .
Poisson random variable	<ul> <li>p(X = x) = λxe-λ/X!</li> <li>The mean and variance of a Poisson distributed random variable is equal to λ and, as it turns out, the mean of the exponential distribution is equal to 1/λ and the variance is equal to 1/λ²</li> </ul>
Exponential Distribution	<ul> <li>The exponential distribution is often used to model waiting times such as how long it takes an employee to serve a customer or the time it takes a company to default.</li> <li>f(x) = 1/β × e<sup>-x/β</sup>, x &gt; 0</li> <li>The scale parameter, 6, is greater than zero and is the reciprocal of the "rate" parameter (i.e., λ=1/β)</li> <li>The rate parameter measures the rate at which it will take an event to occur. In the context of waiting for a company to default, the rate parameter is known as the hazard rate and indicates the rate at which default will arrive.</li> </ul>



The *hazard rate* (i.e., default intensity ) is represented by the (constant) parameter  $\lambda$  and *the probability of default over the next, small time interval, dt, is \lambda dt.* 

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Survival rate & cumulative PD	<ul> <li>The survival distribution: P(t*≥t)=1-F(t)=e<sup>(-λt)</sup>.</li> <li>The cumulative default time distribution F(t) represents the probability of default over (0,t):P(t* &lt; t) = F(t) = 1 - e<sup>-λt</sup></li> <li>As t increases, the cumulative default probability approaches 1 and the survival probability approaches 0.</li> </ul>
Marginal default probability	$\lambda e^{-\lambda t}$

### **Risk-neutral Hazard Rates**

- $e^{-(r_{\tau}+z_{\tau})\tau} = e^{-r_{\tau}\tau} [e^{-\lambda_{\tau}^*\tau} \times 1 + (1 e^{-\lambda_{\tau}^*\tau}) \times RR]$
- $\lambda_{\tau}^* \approx \frac{z_{\tau}}{1-RR}$

### **Credit Risk Measurement**

### **Advantages of Using CDS Market**

- CDS spreads are observable.
- Our previous analysis on estimating hazard rates did not fully capture the complexities of the bond market.
- CDS can overcome these difficulties because liquid contracts exist for several maturities.

Time-varying hazard rate: 
$$\lambda(t)$$
  $\Rightarrow$  
$$\begin{cases} \pi_t = 1 - e_0^{-\int_0^t \lambda(s) ds} \\ \lambda_t = \begin{cases} \lambda_1 \\ \lambda_2 \\ \lambda_3 \\ \lambda_4 \\ \lambda_5 \end{cases} \text{ for } \begin{cases} 0 < t \le 1 \\ 1 < t \le 3 \\ 3 < t \le 5 \\ 5 < t \le 7 \\ 7 < t \end{cases}$$
 The hazard rates used in default models are not constant but will not vary each instant in time

### Constructing the hazard rate curve uses a bootstrapping methodology

$$\int_{0}^{t} \lambda(s)ds = \begin{cases} \lambda_{1}t \\ \lambda_{1} + (t-1)\lambda_{2} \\ \lambda_{1} + 2\lambda_{2} + (t-3)\lambda_{3} \\ \lambda_{1} + 2\lambda_{2} + 2\lambda_{3} + (t-5)\lambda_{4} \\ \lambda_{1} + 2\lambda_{2} + 2\lambda_{3} + 2\lambda_{4} + (t-7)\lambda_{5} \end{cases} for \begin{cases} 0 < t \le 1 \\ 1 < t \le 3 \\ 3 < t \le 5 \\ 5 < t \le 7 \\ 7 < t \end{cases}$$

- The hazard rate was extracted from the default probability.
- The fact that the CDS swap spread is observable allows for the inference of default probability for the 1-year maturity by equating (PV of expected payments in default) and (PV of expected premiums paid). The hazard rate can be inferred for the first period.
- The bootstrapping procedure is then employed so that the *hazard rate for the first period is used to infer the* hazard rate for the second period from the piecewise function.

# **Section 11**

**Loss Given Default and Recovery Rate** 

# **Factors Effecting Recovery Rates**

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Factor	Impact
Seniority of the debt	Seniority ↑⇒ Recovery rates ↑
	Market value ↑⇒ Recovery rates ↑
Collateral	Liquidity ↑⇒ Recovery rates ↑
	Uniqueness ↑⇒ Recovery rates ↓
State of aconomy	Expansion ⇒ Recovery rates ↑
State of economy	Recession ⇒ Recovery rates ↓ ○ ○ M
	Tangible assets ↑⇒ Recovery rates ↑
Obligor's characteristics	Previous rating ↑⇒ Recovery rates ↑
	Bankruptcy law ↑⇒ Recovery rates ↑
Jurisdiction	Facilitate liquidation ↑⇒ Recovery rates ↑
	Encourage reorganization ↑⇒ Recovery rates ↑

# **Section 12**

**Credit Exposure** 


# **Credit Exposure Metrics** ★★★




概念对比

Key terms	Definition
Expected mark to market (MtM)	The <i>expected value</i> of a transaction at a <i>given point</i> in the future.
Expected exposure (EE)	The amount that is <b>expected to be lost</b> if there is positive MtM and the counterparty defaults. It is <b>larger than expected MtM</b>
Potential future exposure (PFE)	The <i>worst exposure</i> that could occur at a <i>given time</i> in the future at a given confidence level.
Maximum PFE	The <i>highest PFE</i> value over a stated time frame
Expected positive exposure (EPE)	The average EE through time
Negative exposure	The exposure from the <i>counterparty's point of view</i> , is represented by negative future values. The <i>expected negative exposure (ENE)</i> and the negative expected exposure (NEE) are the exact opposite of EPE and EE.
Effective EE & Effective EPE	Effective EE is equal to nondecreasing EE.  Effective EPE is the average of the effective EE.


**Figure 1: Potential Future Exposure** 




Time



### Figure 2: Credit Exposures





### **Credit Exposure Factors**


- Future uncertainty. In situations where there is a single payout at the end of the life of a contract, uncertainty
  regarding the value of the final exchange increases over time. Example: Foreign exchange forwards and FRAs
- Periodic cash flows: Unlike the situation where there is a single payout, when cash flows occur regularly, the negative impact of the future uncertainty factor is reduced. Example: interest rate swap
- **Combination of profiles**: when the credit exposure of a product results from the **combination of multiple underlying risk factors**. Example: cross-currency swap.
- Optionality\ Exercise decisions (e.g., a swap-settled interest rate swaption) will have an impact on credit exposure.
- Collateral will also have a significant impact on credit exposure, as it typically reduces the level of credit
  exposure.


### **Exposure Profiles of Different Security Types**




### **Interest Rate Swaps**

### **Stochastic process for the interest rate**






### For par bond with the fixed rate




# Diffusion effect (DE, 扩散效应): Interest rate uncertainty ↑⇒ DE ↑ Amortization effect (AE, 摊销效应):

Bond's duration  $\downarrow \Rightarrow$  AE  $\uparrow$ 

### **Exposure of interest rate swap**



- Assume that the bond's (modified) duration is proportional to the remaining life, D = k(T - t) at any date t.
- The volatility from 0 to time t:  $\sigma_{r_1-r_0} = \sigma \sqrt{t}$
- Hence the swap volatility:  $\sigma(V) = [k(T t)] \times \sigma \sqrt{t}$
- Thus peak exposure occurs :  $t_{MAX} = \frac{1}{3}T \Leftarrow \frac{d\sigma(V)}{dt} = 0$



### **Other Security Types**

Types	Description	
Loans, Bonds and Repos	<ul> <li>The exposures of bonds, loans and repos can usually be considered almost deterministic and approximately equal to the notional value.</li> <li>Bonds typically pay a fixed rate and therefore will have some additional uncertainty since, if interest rates decline, the exposure may increase.</li> </ul>	
Options	The general <i>exposure</i> profile of a <i>long option</i> position tends to <i>increase</i> until exercise due to the <i>increased possibility that the option can be highly in the money</i>	
Credit Derivatives	The <i>increase in exposures in early years</i> is the result of the <i>CDS premium</i> (or credit spread) <i>widening</i> . The maximum exposure for the CDS occurs at a credit event where the notional value is paid less the recovery value.	





### **Modeling Netting Agreements**

### The benefit of correlation

- Positive correlations have lower netting benefits than negative correlations, with perfect positive correlation providing the least netting benefit.
- Negative correlations provide stronger netting benefits, with perfect negative correlation leading to the greatest netting benefit.

### **Netting factor**

netting factor = 
$$\frac{\sqrt{n+n(n-1)\overline{\rho}}}{n}$$

- Netting benefit improves (i.e., netting factor declines) with a larger number of exposures and a lower correlation.
- It is important to note that the *netting benefit also* depends on the initial MtM of transactions.

### **Impact of Collateral on Credit Exposure**

### Certain parameters impact the effectiveness of collateral

- **Remargin period**: the time between the call for collateral and its receipt.
- *Threshold*: exposure level below which collateral is not called. It represents an amount of uncollateralized exposure.
- Minimum transfer amount: the minimum quantity or block in which collateral may be transferred. Quantities below this amount represent uncollateralized exposure as well.
- **Independent amount**: an amount posted independently of any subsequent collateralization. This is also referred to as the initial margin.
- **Rounding**: the process by which a collateral call amount will be adjusted (rounded) to a certain increment.

### **Impact of Collateral on Credit Exposure**

The remargin period also known as the margin call frequency is the period from which a

	collateral call takes place to when collateral is actually delivered.
Remargin Period	Expected exposure (EE): $EE = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \times \sigma_E \times \sqrt{T_M} \approx 0.4 \times \sigma_E \times \sqrt{T_M}$

Remargin Period	Expected exposure (EE): $EE = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \times \sigma_E \times \sqrt{T_M} \approx 0.4 \times \sigma_E \times \sqrt{T_M}$
	Potential future exposure (PFE): $PFE = k \times \sigma_E \times \sqrt{T_M}$
	• Collateralization may be deficient due to terms in the collateral agreement, such as threshold, minimum transfer amount, and rounding.

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{Imperfect} & \text{exposure}_{t-\Delta} > \text{collateral}_{t-\Delta} \\ & \bullet & \text{Exposure could increase } \textit{between margin calls}. \\ & \text{exposure}_{t} > \text{collateral}_{t-\Delta} \end{array}$ 

# **Section 13**

**Counterparty Risk** 

### **Introduction of Counterparty Risk**



概念对比

A type of credit risk that one of the parties to a transaction will **not fulfill its obligations**. Counterparty risk is typically a **two-way transaction**.

### **Counterparty Risk & Market Risk**

- Market risk is the risk that the value of an underlying position will move against the trader due to adverse market factors, which may result in a negative NPV of the investment.
- Counterparty risk is the conditional risk that the NPV is positive, however, the counterparty fails to perform its obligations.

### **Counterparty Risk & Lending Risk**

**Lending risk** has two notable characteristics

- The *principal* amount at risk is usually *known*.
- Only one party takes on risk.

Counterparty risk

- the value of the underlying instrument is *uncertain*
- Counterparty risk is bilateral in that each party takes on the risk that the counterparty will default

Counterparty Risk Terminology		
Credit exposure	Credit exposure is the loss that is "conditional" on the counterparty defaulting.	
Credit migration	There is <i>mean reversion in credit quality</i> , so the implication is that counterparties with strong credit ratings tend to deteriorate and those with weak credit ratings tend to improve.	
Recovery LGD = 1 - recovery rate		
Mark-to-market	MtM = present value of all expected inflows less the present value of expected payments	

# **Managing and Mitigating Counterparty Risk**



概念对比

Approaches	Description
Close-out	The immediate closing of all contracts with the defaulted counterparty.
Collateralization (i.e., margining)	Occur in the form of a collateral agreement between two counterparties that reduces exposure by requiring sufficient collateral to be posted.
Walkaway feature	A walkaway feature allows a party to cancel the transaction if the counterparty defaults. It is advantageous if a party has a negative MtM and the counterparty defaults.
Mark-to-market	MtM = present value of all expected inflows less the present value of expected payments
Diversification	Limit credit exposure to any given counterparty
Exchange and centralized clearinghouses	Exchange and centralized clearinghouses take on the role of the counterparty and guarantee all trades by removing all counterparty risk from trades.
Netting	commonly used to mitigate counterparty risk
Hedging	Using credit derivatives allows an organization to reduce counterparty exposure to its own clients

### **Credit Value Adjustment (CVA)**

- The credit value adjustment (CVA) is defined as the expected value or price of counterparty credit risk. A positive value represents a cost to the counterparty that bears a greater propensity to default.
- Risky value = risk-free value CVA

### ★★★ 名词掌握、结论

### CVA as a spread

• This would be a charge to the weaker counterparty.  $CVA \ as \ a \ spread = X^{CDS} \times EPE$ 

### Impact of Changes in Credit Spread assumptions on CVA

### **Credit Spread:**

- The CVA will most often increase given an increase in the credit spread.
- However, the impact will not be linear because default probabilities are limited to 100%. If a counterparty is very close to default, the CVA will actually decrease slightly, and in default the CVA will fall to zero.

### **Credit spread curve**

• The CVA will be *lower* for an *upward-sloping curve* compared to a flat and a downward-sloping curve, and the CVA will be *higher* for a *downward-sloping* curve compared to a flat and an upward-sloping curve.

Incremental CVA	Change (or increment) in CVA that a <i>new trade will create, taking netting into account.</i>
Marginal CVA	<ul> <li>By using a marginal CVA measure, it will be possible to break down a CVA for any number of netted trades into trade level contributions that sum to the total CVA.</li> <li>This metric allows for more rigorous analysis as it is useful for better understanding which trades have the greatest impact on a counterparty's CVA.</li> </ul>

### Wrong-Way Risk Vs. Right-Way Risk



名词掌握、结论

### Wrong-Way Risk

- An outcome of any association, dependence, linkage, or interrelationship between exposure and counterparty creditworthiness that generates an overall increase in counterparty risk.
- An increase in the amount of the credit value adjustment (CVA).

### **Right-Way Risk**

- Any dependence, linkage, or interrelationship between the exposure and default probability of a counterparty producing an overall decrease in counterparty risk is described as right-way risk.
- RWR decreases the CVA and increases the DVA

Examples of Wrong-Way Risk and Right-Way Risk		
Over-the-Counter Put Option	WWR (Assume the counterparty and the underlying issuer are the same.)	
Over-the-Counter Call Option	RWR	
Credit Default Swaps (CDSs)	<b>WWR</b> (The 2007-2009 credit crisis offers a classic example )	
Foreign Currency Transactions	<b>WWR</b> (for the financial institution in the developed economy)	
Interest rate swaps	WWR (The decline in the euro swap rate also increased the counterparty risk exposure. Deteriorating economic conditions also increased the default probability of Italian financial institutions)	
Commodities	WWR .	

# **Section 14**

**Portfolio Credit Risk** 

# Credit Risk Portfolio Models ★★

rates of an industrial sector.

CreditPortfolioView

概念对比

Models	Description
CreditRisk+ (Credit Suisse)	<ul> <li>Each obligor has its own sensitivity to each of the <i>common risk factors</i>.</li> <li>The model allows for <i>only two outcomes (default or non-default)</i> for a loss of a fixed size.</li> <li>The model assumes that defaults are <i>uncorrelated across obligors</i>.</li> </ul>
CreditMetrics (J.P. Morgan)	<ol> <li>Steps in calculating credit VaR using CreditMetrics:</li> <li>Determine rating class for debt claim.</li> <li>Use historical rating transition matrix to determine the probability that claim will migrate.</li> <li>Estimate the distribution of value for claim by computing the expected values for one year.</li> <li>Use the 1-year forward zero curves rates to get current price of zero-coupon bond.</li> <li>Assume annual coupons to compute value of bond for each possible rating for next year.</li> <li>Compute the expected bond value E(BV<sub>p</sub>) = ∑p<sub>i</sub>BV<sub>i</sub>. Then compute the credit value at risk (VaR) for a given confidence level.</li> </ol>
Moody's KMV	<ul> <li>Use of current equity values in the model. This allows for the impact of a current event to immediately affect the probability of default. Ratings changes occur with a considerable lag.</li> <li>The use of equity values allows for probabilities of default to change continuously as equity values change. In the CreditMetrics approach, the value of the firm change without any impact on the probability of default.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Model the transition matrices using macroeconomic or economic cycle data.</li> </ul>

• CreditPortfolioView estimates an *econometric model for an index that drives the default* 

# **Comparison of Credit Risk Models**

	CreditMetrics	CreditRisk+	Moody's KMV	Credit Portfolio View
Originator	JPMorgan	Credit Suisse	KMV	McKinsey
Model type	Bottom-up	Bottom-up	Bottom-up	Top-down
Risk definition	Market value (MtM)	Default losses(DM)	Default losses (MTM/DM)	Market value (MtM)
Risk drivers	Asset values	Default rates	Asset values	Macro factors
Credit events	Rating change/ default	Default	Continuous default probability	Rating change/default
Probability	Unconditional	Unconditional	Conditional	Conditional
Volatility	Constant	Variable	Variable	Variable
Correlation	From equities (structural)	Default process (reduced-form)	From equities (structural)	From macro factors
Recovery rates	Random	Constant within band	Random	Random
Solution	Simulation/ analytic	Analytic	Analytic	Simulation

### **Default Correlation for Credit Portfolios**



Default correlation: 
$$\rho_{12} = \frac{\pi_{12} - \pi_1 \pi_2}{\sqrt{\pi_1 (1 - \pi_1)} \sqrt{\pi_2 (1 - \pi_2)}}$$

计算

### 结论

### **Drawbacks in Credit Portfolio Framework**

- The number of required calculations: There are 2<sup>n</sup> event outcomes. The number of correlations is equal to n(n-1).
- Certain characteristics of credit positions do not fit well in the default correlation credit portfolio model.
- The limited data for estimating defaults: Firm defaults are relatively rare events.

### Credit VaR & Default Correlation (看基础班讲义例题)

- Default correlation impacts the volatility and extreme quantiles of loss rather than the expected loss.
  - If default correlation is 1, then there are no credit diversification benefits, and the portfolio behaves as if there were just one credit position.
  - A default correlation equal to 0 implies the portfolio is a binomial-distributed random variable because there is no correlation with other firms/ credits.
- "Granular": reducing the weight of each credit as a proportion of the total portfolio by increasing the number of credits.
  - As a credit portfolio becomes more granular, the credit VaR decreases. However, when the default
    probability is low, the credit VaR is not impacted as much when the portfolio becomes more granular

### Single Factor Model ★

### 结论

### Firm i's individual asset return is defined as:

• (1) the return on a market factor m that denotes the correlation between default and the state of the economy, and (2) a shock  $\varepsilon_i$  that captures idiosyncratic risk.

$$\alpha_i = \beta_i m + \sqrt{1 - \beta_i^2} \, \varepsilon_i$$

• Assuming that  $each \, \varepsilon_i$  is not correlated with other credits, each return on asset,  $a_i$  is a standard normal variate. The correlation between pairs of individual asset returns between two firm's i and j is  $\beta_i \beta_i$ 

### **Conditional Independence**

- The *unconditional default distribution* is a standard normal distribution.
- The *conditional distribution* is a normal distribution with a mean of  $\beta_i \overline{m}$  and a standard deviation of  $\sqrt{1-\beta_i^2}$ .

### **Credit VaR with a single-factor model**

### The unconditional distribution used to calculate credit VaR


- 1. The default loss level is assumed to be a random variable X with realized values of x.
- 2. The market factor return,  $\overline{m}$ , for a given loss level,  $\overline{x}$ , is determined based on the following relationship


$$\Phi^{-1}(\bar{x}) = (\frac{k - \beta m}{\sqrt{1 - \beta^2}})$$

- 3. The market factor is assumed to be standard normal, and therefore, a loss level of 0.01 (99% confidence level) is equal to a value of -2.33 based on the standard normal distribution.
- 4. These steps are repeated for each individual credit to determine the loss probability distribution.

# **Section 15**

**Credit Derivatives** 





Settlement methods			
Physical delivery	<ul> <li>The buyer of the CDS delivers the reference obligation to the seller of the swap and receives the par value.</li> <li>Delivery squeeze</li> <li>An advantage of physical delivery is that there is no need to determine the size of the loss</li> </ul>		
Cash delivery	<ul> <li>(100 - Z)% * the notional principal (Z is midpoint)</li> <li>There is no need to own or purchase the defaulted securities.</li> <li>A problem arises because the market price is fluid</li> </ul>		

### Basket credit default swap

### First-to-default basket swap

 $\rho_{ii} \downarrow \Rightarrow premuim \uparrow$ 

### Nth-to-default basket swap (N≥2)

$$\rho_{ij} \uparrow \Rightarrow premuim \uparrow$$

**Pricing Model** 

One-factor Gaussian copula model for time to default

### Senior basket CDS & Subordinated basket CDS

Basket (A,B,C,D,E) \$50 million Final loss level Payments for (\$30 million) Senior basket **CDS** Pre-specified loss

Payments for

Subordinated basket-

CDS

- Senior basket CDS (高级篮子信用违约互换) will not receive any compensatory payment until a pre-specified loss level is reached.
- Subordinated basket CDS (次级篮子信用违约 互换) will receive compensatory payments for cumulative losses below the pre-specified loss level.

计算


Recover rate Present value of a dollar 定价  $\Rightarrow$   $V_{CDS} = PV_{payoff} - s(PV_{spread}) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} k_t (1)$ 

level (\$20 million)

Marginal default rate from now to year t Marginal default rate in year t

### **Other Credit Derivatives**


### Total return swaps (TRS) ★★★ 结论



### **Vulnerable Option** 了解

- An option with default risk. The vulnerable option holder receives the promised payment only if the value of the counterparty firm, V, is greater than the required payment on the option. The payoff of the vulnerable option is: Max[Min(V, S - X), 0]
- $\rho(V, S)$ : correlation between the value of the firm and the underlying asset value. If  $\rho(V, S)$  is strongly negative then vulnerable option has *little value*. If  $\rho(V, S)$  is strongly positive then there is no credit risk.





### **Portfolios of Credit Derivatives** \*



### **CDS index: most popular**


- The two most popular (and liquid) indices are the CDX NA IG and iTraxx Europe.
- CDS indices are created with a *fixed maturity and static* constituents. If there is a significant credit event, the affected credit entity will be removed, but not replaced, from the index.
- Each tranche is described by its attachment point (X%) and detachment point (Y%), denoted [X%, Y%], and the width of each tranche is Y% - X%.

### **Super senior risk**

 Super-senior tranches represent the portion of the capital structure for credit indices that has the highest subordination level and lowest probability of incurring losses. Informally, these tranches are termed super triple-A and quadruple A tranches.

number of defaults = 
$$n\left(\frac{X\%}{1-\text{revovery}}\right)$$

 The primary risk of these tranches is counterparty risk (termed super-senior risk) as this risk is positively correlated to tranche seniority. That is, higher seniority tranches have higher levels of counterparty risk.



# **Section 16**

**Structured Credit Risk and Securitization** 


### Types of Structured Products \*



概念对比

### **Types of Structured Products**

Principal and interest is paid and quaranteed by the originator and is not based on the Covered bonds performance of the underlying assets themselves. Covered bonds are not true securitizations since the assets are **not part of a bankruptcy-remote structure**  MBS are true off-balance sheet securitizations. • Most pass-throughs are agency MBS that carry implicit or explicit government guarantee. The MPS primary risk is due to prepayment of principal by the homeowner. CMOs are MBSs that tranche cash flows into different securities. **CMOs** • The most basic structure is the waterfall or sequential pay structure. Tranche 1 will have a very low prepayment risk Structured The difference is that structured credit products create *tranches that have different amounts of* credit products credit risk. **ABS** MBS is a special case of the more general ABS.



### **Waterfall Structure**

- The most *senior* tranches at the top of the capital structure will have the *highest priority* to receive principal and interest and earns a relatively low fixed coupon
- The *equity* tranche is the slice of the cash flow distribution with the *lowest priority and will absorb the first losses up to a prespecified level*.
- Between the senior and equity tranches is the *mezzanine* tranche (i.e., the junior tranche). The mezzanine tranches will *absorb losses only after the equity tranche* is completely written down.

### **Three-Tiered Securitization Structure**

- Inflows prior to maturity = interest on the collateral (L<sub>t</sub>) + the recovery from the sale of any defaulted assets in the current period (R<sub>t</sub>)
- The terminal cash flows in the final year = last interest payment + principal and recovery of defaulted assets.
- The *outflows* (B) = the coupon payments paid to senior + mezzanine note holder.

### To determine the cash flow to equity, the following steps must be performed:

- Is the current period interest sufficient to cover the promised coupons: L<sub>+</sub>-B ≥0?
  - If yes, then the following overcollateralization test must be performed to see: L<sub>t</sub>-B ≥ K?
    - If yes, then K is diverted to trust, and  $L_t$ -B K flows to equity holders:  $OC_t = K$ .
    - If no, then  $L_t$ -B is diverted to trust, and nothing flows to equity holders:  $OC_t = L_t$ -B
  - *If no*, then the interest is not sufficient to pay bondholders and all L<sub>t</sub> flows to bondholders. Therefore, the shortfall is B- L<sub>t</sub>.

Internal credit enhancement		Overcollateralization (hard credit enhancement)
		Excess spread (soft credit enhancement): the difference between the cash flows collected and the payments made to all bondholders
		Subordinating note classes (tranches)
		SPV Structures
Amortizing structure		
<ul> <li>Principal payments of the assets are paid in large lump sums rather than a pre-specified amortization schedule. (Credit card debt and auto loans)</li> </ul>		

**Credit Enhancements** 

insurance or wraps purchased from a third party

External credit enhancement

### structures Under a revolving structure, payments are not simply passed through. Rather, principal payments are often used to purchase new receivables • A master trust structure *allows an SPV to make frequent issues or multiple securitizations.*

Master trust • the master trust structure enables the SPV to issue multiple ABS through the single trust.

• The ability of SPV master trust structures to sell multiple issues to investors that **share excess** structure spreads over these multiple series

### **ABS and MBS Performance Tools**

Performance Analysis Tools	Asset Type	Calculation
loss curves	auto loans	expected cumulative losses
absolute prepayment speed (APS)	auto loans	Prepayments/pool balance
delinquency ratio	credit cards	past due receivables/pool balance
default ratio	credit cards	Defaults/pool balance
monthly payment rate (MPR)	credit cards	receivables collected/pool balance
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)	commercial mortgages	NOI / debt payments
weighted average coupon (WAC)	mortgages	weighted pool coupon payment
weighted average maturity (WAM)	mortgages A O A D E I	weighted pool maturity
weighted average life (WAL)	mortgages	∑(a/365) xPF(t)
single monthly mortality (SMM)	mortgages, home-equity, student loans	prepayment / pool balance
constant prepayment rate (CPR)	mortgages, home-equity, student loans	1-(1-SMM) <sup>12</sup>
Public Securities Association (PSA)	mortgages, home-equity, student loans	100PSA: [CPR/(0.2)(months)] x 100

### Structured Credit Risk ★★★



结论

### **Impact of Probability of Default and Default Correlation**

PD

Increasing the probability of default will negatively impact the values of all tranches.

### Convexity

**Senior** tranches exhibit *negative convexity*. **Equity** tranches exhibit *positive convexity*. The *mezzanine*: negative convexity at low default rates, positive convexity at high default rates.

### **Equity tranche**

- A low correlation implies a predictable, but positive, number of defaults. In turn, the equity tranche will assuredly *suffer writedowns*.
- the equity tranche increases in value from increasing correlation as the possibility of zero (or few) credit losses increases from the high correlation.

### Mezzanine tranche

- When **default rates are low**, increasing the correlation increases the likelihood of losses to the junior bonds (similar to senior bonds).
- When *default rates are relatively high*, increasing the correlation actually decreases the expected losses to mezzanine bonds (similar to equity tranche)

### **Senior tranches**

increasing correlation decreases the value of senior tranches as the pool is now more likely to suffer extreme losses.



### **Increasing Default Probability** (Holding Correlation Constant)

### **Increasing Correlation** (Holding Default Probability Constant)

	Mean Value	Credit VaR		Mean V
Equity tranche	<b>\</b>	$\downarrow$	Equity tranche	$\uparrow$
Mezzanine tranche	$\downarrow$	↑then↓	Mezzanine	$\downarrow$ (at low def
Senior tranche	$\downarrow$	<b>↑</b>	tranche	个(at high de
			Senior tranche	

	Mean Value	Credit VaR
Equity tranche	$\uparrow$	$\uparrow$
Mezzanine tranche		$\uparrow$
Senior tranche		$\uparrow$

Measuring Default Sensitivities: 1/20[(mean value/loss based on  $\pi+0.001$ ) – (mean value/loss based on  $\pi-0.001$ )]

### **Implied Correlation**

• For securitized tranches, starting with observed market prices and a pricing function for the tranches, it is possible to back out the unique implied correlation to calibrate the model price with the market price.

### Other Risk Factors for Structured Products

- **Systematic risk:** high systematic risk expressed in high correlations can still severely damage a portfolio.
- **Tranche thinness:** The *equity and mezzanine tranches* are relatively *thin*. The implication is that given that the tranche has been breached, the loss is likely very large.
- Loan granularity: Loan granularity references the loan level diversification.

# **Section 17-18**

The Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)



# **The Subprime Securitization Process**

Prime loans that meet conforming standards are sold to government sponsored enterprises (GSEs).

The remaining loans are increasingly being sold and taken off the originators' balance sheet.

Frictions in Subprime Securitization			
Friction 1: mortgagor & originator	The lender may steer the borrower to products that are not suitable.		
Friction 2: Originator and arranger	The arranger operates at an information disadvantage to the originator.		
Friction 3: Arranger and third-parties	The arranger of the pool of mortgages will possess better information about the borrower than third parties (Resolution: Due diligence)		
Friction 4: Servicer and mortgagor	The homeowner in financial difficulty does not have the incentive to upkeep tax payments, insurance, or maintenance on the property.		
Friction 5: Servicer and third-parties	Moral hazard: Between servicer & asset manager; Between servicer & credit rating agencies		
Friction 6: Asset manager and investor	It is difficult for the investor to comprehend the investment strategy (same <i>moral hazard</i> problem as shareholder-manager)		
Friction 7: Investor and credit rating agencies	Rating agencies are compensated by the arranger. (conflict of interest)		

### **Characteristic of The Subprime Mortgage Market**

### **Protection to Investors**

- Subordination: creating tranches of differing priority levels.
- Excess spread: the weighted average coupon (less servicing expenses) exceeds the weighted average payout.
- Shifting interest: senior investors receive all principal in the pool while mezzanine investors receive only interest.
- Performance triggers: release of overcollateralizion which is applied from the bottom of the capital structure up
- Interest rate swaps: Since the first few years of the pool are fixed, the pool faces interest rate risk. As protection, interest rate swaps are used where the pool will pay a fixed rate and receive a floating rate.

### **The Credit Ratings Process**

### Credit ratings for subprime securities differ from corporate ratings

- First, corporate bond ratings are based on the firm-specific characteristics of the issuer. Systematic risk and
  degree of correlation between assets is important in the latter but not the former.
- In addition, the forecasts for ABS incorporate future economic conditions since the cash flow stream is tied to the macro environment.
- Finally, while corporates and ABSs with the same rating may indicate similar default probabilities, the *ABS* will exhibit much wider variation in losses.

### **Predatory Lending and Borrowing**

lying on the mortgage application allows the borrower to the buy the house with the expectation that continued
appreciation will allow a favorable refinancing.

### Flaws in The Securitization of Subprime Mortgages


- Originate-to-distribute model: OTD models have produced three primary benefits.
  - The first benefit is that loan originators enjoy increased capital efficiency and decreased earnings volatility
  - The second benefit is that *investors have a wider array of diversification options for the fixed income portion* of their portfolios
  - The third benefit is that borrowers have expanded access to credit and lowered borrowing costs.
- Under the traditional originate-to-hold (OTH) lending model, credit assets are retained at the business unit level.

### **Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques**

Туре	Definition
Bond insurance	Purchase insurance PZACADEMYCOM
Collateralization	The losses sustained by the lender will be offset by the value of the collateral
Termination	A certain trigger event, such as a downgrade, has occurred and the issuer was obligated to repay the loan early
Reassignment	Give the right to assign one's position as a counterparty to a third party
Netting	Net replacement value represents the true credit risk exposure.
Marking-to-market	periodically acknowledging the true market value of a transaction.
Loan syndication	multiple lenders all working together as a team to provide funding to a given borrower
Outright selling	Outright selling of a loan portfolio in the secondary market

### **Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)**

### **Cash-flow CDOs & Synthetic CDOs**



# **Section 19**

**Risk Mitigation Techniques** 

结论 ★



### **Netting and Close-Out**

### **Netting and Close-Out Between Two Counterparties**

- Payment netting: combining the cash flows from different contracts with a counterparty into a single net amount
- Close-out netting: the netting of contract values with a counterparty in the event of the counterparty's default

### **Netting and Close-Out Between Multiple Counterparties**

• Netting arrangements would involve multiple counterparties to mitigate counterparty and operational risk.

Typically, multilateral netting is achieved with a central entity, such as an exchange or clearinghouse.

### **Termination Features**

### **Termination provisions**

• Termination events allow institutions to terminate a trade before their counterparties become bankrupt.

### Walkaway clauses

• Under these clauses an entity can walk away from, or avoid, its net liabilities to a counterparty that is in default, while still being able to claim in the event of a positive MtM exposure.

### **Trade compression**

- An approach for utilizing multilateral netting without the need for a membership organization.
- Compression aims to *reduce the gross notional amount and the number of trades* (e.g., OTC derivatives transactions).

### **Collateral Management**

- Collateral management has been highly standardized through the introduction of ISDA documentation. (CSA)
- There are three key parameters established with any CSA: *Threshold, Minimum transfer amount, Independent amount*

### **Central Counterparties (CCP)**

### 引入CCP

### OTC市场容易违约


### Strengths of a CCP

- Multilateral netting: Mitigate counterparty risk and reduces total credit exposures.
- Liquidity. values are set daily to adjust variation margins.
- Transparency. The process of daily valuation greatly enhances the transparency
- Legal and operational efficiency. A CCP can work directly with regulators
- Loss mutualization. This process reduces systemic risk as losses are distributed through a network of members.
- Default management through auction process. The defaulted positions are auctioned off to surviving members

### Weaknesses of a CCP

- Inability to eliminate counterparty risk. A CCP only reduces counterparty risk
- Undesirable consequences of CCP features and roles. moral hazard and adverse selection
- CCPs can potentially increase systemic risk. if a CCP defaults the result could be severe systemic problems.

### **CCP Netting Schemes**



### **CCP Trade Participants**

# ICM CCP GCM NCM NCM NCM

### loss waterfall systems

