SSN-3rd-Lab-JOEL_OKORE

1. Create a 2048-bit RSA key pair using OpenSSL. Write your full name in a text file and encrypt it with your private key. Using OpenSSL extract the public modulus and the exponent from the public key. Publish your public key and the base64 formatted encrypted text in your report. Verify that it is enough for decryption.

To perform this task, I made use of the openssI linux package to create a 2048-bit RSA key pair. To generate the private and public key pairs, I used the 'genpkey' command of the openssI utility, specifying RSA (with a 2048-bit key) as the algorithm of choice by setting the '-algorithm' option to RSA and '-pkeyopt' to 'rsa_keygen_bits:2048', and writing the resulting private key into a Privacy-Enhanced Mail file (private_key.pem) as shown in pic. 1.



Picture 1 - Generating RSA key pairs of length 2048 bits

I then went on to extract the public key (public_key.pem) from the just gotten private key (private_key.pem) as shown in pic. 2.

```
okore_joel@fedora:~$ openssl rsa -pubout -in private_key.pem -out public_key.pem
writing RSA key
```

Picture 2 - Extracting the public key

I also created a file (name.txt) containing my full name using the 'echo' command as illustrated below (pic. 3)

```
okore_joel@fedora:~$ echo "Joel Chidike Okore" > name.txt
okore_joel@fedora:~$
```

Picture 3 - Writing my full name to name.txt

In order to encrypted the name.txt file, I used the 'pkeyutl' command of the openssI utility, setting the 'inkey' flag to the the private key (private_key.pem) and outputting the result as a binary file (name_encrypted.bin). See picture 4.

```
okore_joel@fedora:~$ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in name.txt -inkey private_key.pem -out name_encrypted.bin
okore_joel@fedora:~$
```

Picture 4 - Encrypting name.txt

The picture below (pic. 5) is the extracted representation of the modulus and exponent of the public key.

```
okore_joel@fedora:~$ openssl rsa -in public_key.pem -pubin -text -noout
Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus:
    00:a9:d7:89:b6:72:13:44:b5:d4:ee:bf:f3:1b:2f:
    72:85:07:39:ad:39:d0:61:21:73:22:f9:ee:fd:e1:
    0e:01:0f:a8:33:89:eb:41:30:13:46:f8:16:96:57:
    49:2d:cd:df:51:5f:89:95:3a:ff:4d:f1:e0:9b:df:
    3d:a1:b9:a7:da:b2:1d:02:d7:19:d6:37:1d:84:73:
    32:c4:1b:d3:f7:c0:a4:e4:26:ce:c6:aa:ed:74:a2:
    73:f6:e9:49:4f:ea:c5:43:89:93:9f:03:2b:8b:67:
    fd:13:f1:03:4a:e9:ae:ec:e9:a7:be:57:94:d2:cd:
    ba:fc:c8:6a:4e:e6:0e:96:ce:f5:ab:c7:f0:93:73:
    82:f4:eb:71:af:aa:c0:5b:a2:79:5c:98:38:e4:47:
    50:2b:64:70:be:73:9c:f1:35:bf:a7:3e:b1:49:a7:
    0b:6f:52:3f:b3:f7:b4:23:a4:b6:c1:bb:8d:74:4e:
    2b:88:8c:5a:dd:fa:ae:ca:03:3e:2a:e6:53:72:6d:
    b4:5a:ba:f3:76:84:0c:b9:4d:32:00:b9:b1:a4:e6:
    94:4e:87:a5:14:38:58:f7:b4:d9:2b:7f:08:36:ce:
    a3:e8:43:88:98:52:81:4e:57:c9:a4:7b:05:ce:b5:
    a0:90:06:8c:90:f5:e7:5d:e0:e3:9f:0c:06:bc:7f:
    f0:79
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
```

Picture 5 - Modulus and Exponent of public key

To obtain the base64 format of the encrypted text, I made use of the 'base64' command of the openssI utility and outputted to a readable text file as illustrated in pic. 6.

Picture 6 - Getting base64 format of encrypted text (name_encrypted.bin)

Below is the encrypted text in base64 readable format (pic. 7)

okore_joel@fedora:~\$ cat name_encrypted_base64.txt
J24BGjFWJx+yGt6TztoRga9i/nT3COF9wm6K5Ey95cRe4Q5sEhHEmu0d639w/EY5
gVtqkGMt79G8CNp8tbCEelNgdaG5X3et+HhjMMROxLgV40WEU0A5cljumvpL/300
1rx/pT52zwMwzF5y2RZrDPECsj7MtPgXdehF0dDGD7wMuZtes9qQSDPbqBLzT7qq
515r0HC/20g9HaWA4Gcu19VjKKVwTeongK80Q1zlzgxV03HcBDb0wWGy2DuhEfaU
wmWZyHCmfnCv9PYiLZ3+YLe2VMYGLWYMVKUu4UwQxISc7YipA7FJ/YMxKFdWLgYI
QXYLgKVwrATy4Cvwl5JBww==

Picture 7 - Encrypted text in base64 format

To sign and verify an already encrypted file using my RSA keys, I needed to first apply a cryptographic hash to the encrypted file and then sign the hash with my private key.

Verifying the signature involves using the corresponding public key to confirm the integrity of the encrypted file.

To sign the encrypted file (name_encrypted.bin), I used the 'dgst' (digest) command of the openssI package, with 'sha256' as the hash function of choice, and outputting the result to a binary file (name_encrypted_signature.bin). See picture 8.

Picture 8 - Signing encrypted file

Finally, to confirm the integrity of the encrypted file, I verified the signature (name_encrypted_signature.bin) using my public key as shown in picture 9.

```
okore_joel@fedora: *$ openssl dgst -sha256 -verify public_key.pem -signature name_encrypted_signature.bin name_encrypted.bin
Verified OK
okore_joel@fedora: *$
```

Picture 8 - Verification Successful

2. Assuming that you are generating a 1024-bit RSA key and the prime factors have a 512-bit length, what is the probability of picking the same prime factor twice? Explain your answer

To calculate the probability of picking the same 512-bit prime factor twice when trying to generate a 1024-bit RSA key, we first need to know how many 512-bit primes they are.

The prime number theorem states that the number $\pi(x)$ of primes $\leq x$ is approximately x/ ln x. Accepting this approximation without further analysis, it can be concluded that the number of 512-bit primes is about:

```
\pi(2^512) - \pi(2^511) \approx (2^512 / \ln (2^512)) - (2^511 / \ln (2^511)) \approx 18.85 * 10^150
```

But the prime number theorem actually says that $\lim(x\to\infty) \pi(x)/(x/\ln x) = 1$. Which simply means that the percentage error in the approximation $\pi(x) \approx x/\ln x$ (that is the percentage error if we decide to follow the last calculation) goes to zero as x goes to ∞ (infinity).

J. B. Rosser and L. Schoenfeld in their 1962 journal [1] proved the inequality $0.6x/\ln x < \pi(2x) - \pi(x) < 1.4x/\ln x$, is true for all $x \ge 20.5$

If
$$x = 2^{(m-1)}$$
, then

 $\pi(2^m) - \pi(2^m-1) > 0.3 * 2^m / ((m-1) * ln 2) \approx 0.43 * 2^m / (m-1), for m \ge 6.$

This proves that the number of 512-bit primes is

$$\pi(2^512) - \pi(2^511) > 0.3 * 2^512 / (511 \ln 2) \approx 11.36 \times 10^150$$

Which is smaller than the first approximation of $18.85 * 10^{150}$.

The likelihood of selecting the same prime twice is approximately equal to randomly drawing two identical numbers from a pool of 11.36×10^{150} numbers. This is because RSA generation techniques usually select the two prime factors, p and q, independently from this vast pool of primes.

The probability of this happening is:

P (same prime) ≈ 1 / N where N $\approx 11.36 \times 10^{150}$.

Therefore the probability of picking the same prime twice is approximately:

P (same prime) $\approx 1 / (11.36 \times 10^{150})$

In practicality, this is zero, a very small number. Since 11.36×10^{150} is an almost incomprehensibly great number, there is very little probability that the same prime will be chosen twice.

3. Explain why using a good RNG is crucial for the security of RSA. Provide one

reference to a real-world case where a poor RNG leads to a security vulnerability.


Random number generation (RNG) is very important to RSA cryptography, especially for generating the prime integers p and q, which are then used to find the modulus n=p * q. These primes are selected in a random and non-

repetitive manner only if RNG is considered secure. The difficulty in factoring the modulus n back into its prime factors is the foundation of RSA's security. Security issues such as key collision and decreased entropy arises if the primes are created using an unreliable RNG.

A very popular example of a security vulnerability caused by a poor RNG is the Debian OpenSSL vulnerability with Common Vulnerability and Exposure number of CVE-2008-0166 from the official MITRE National Vulnerability Database.

This happened because an OpenSSL developer commented out the code that seeded OpenSSL's pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) in the Debian version of the OpenSSL library (persisted from version 0.9.8c-1 up to versions before 0.9.8g-9). As a result, the generated random numbers had less entropy, which made the RNG nearly predictable. Because of this, the OpenSSL library produced a very small range of potential keys for Debian-based computers, like Ubuntu. [3]

Commenting out of those sections of code ultimately affected a function within the OpenSSL library source code (RAND_poll()) such that some sources of entropy such as linux own PRNG (/dev/urandom), current user ID (getuid()), process ID (getpid()) and current time (time()), all gotten from the host computer were not read into the entropy pool, as such, they didn't affect the PRNG (Pseudo-Random Number Generator) state, which limited the maximum possible entropy space to 15 bits (the length of the current process ID, the only remaining parameter that introduced some sought of entropy). See picture 9.



Picture 9 - Visual representation of OpenSSL PRNG showing discarded parameters within the entropy pool

This meant that RSA keys generated on Debian-based systems during this period were highly predictable. It also affected every utility that made use of the flawed OpenSSL package, for example SSH keys, SSL/TLS certificates, VPN keys e.t.c. [4]

4. Here you can find the modulus (public information) of two related 1024-bit RSA

keys. Your keys are numbered using the list. Your task is to factor them i.e. retrieve p

and q. You may use any tools for this. Explain your approach.

Lacking knowledge about the cipher used to encrypt the numbered list of keys, I employed the cipher recognition tool on <u>dcode.fr</u>. After analyzing the text, the tool suggested several likely ciphers used for encryption. See picture 10 for the results.



Picture 10 - Using dcode cipher recognition tool on enciphered

text

With Vigenère Cipher identified as the most probable encryption method, I proceeded to attempt automatic decryption using the Vigenère cipher tool available on the website, as shown in pic. 11.



Picture 11 - Deciphered text

As my name was 17th on the list, I wrote a Python script to factor p and q from the moduli of the two related keys (number 17). I utilized the gmpy2 Python library to calculate the Greatest Common Divisor (GCD), as illustrated in picture 12.

Picture 11 - Obtaining key pair factors using gmpy2 python library



[*] GCD of key pair (p):



[+] Factor 1 (q1):



[+] Factor 2 (q2):

5. Now that you have the p and q for both keys, recreate the first public and private

key using this script. Encrypt your name with the private key and post the public key

and the base64 formatted encrypted data in your report.

The script below contains the first modulus along with its corresponding factors, p and q. Its purpose is to recreate the first public and private key pair, which will then be used to encrypt data (in this case, my name). See picture 12 for the script.

Picture 12 - Encrypting my name with recreated key pairs

Below is the output after running the script. It contains my encrypted name, the private and public key pair, and the base64 format of the encrypted data (Pic. 13).

Picture 13 - Output after running the script

REFERENCES

- J. B. Rosser and L. Schoenfeld. "Approximate formulas for some functions of prime numbers," III. J. Math., vol. 6, pp. 64–94, 1962
- 2. Abstract: Is there a shortage of primes in cryptography? by Samuel S. Wagstaff, Jr. -https://homes.cerias.purdue.edu/~ssw/shortage.pdf
- 3. MITRE CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0166
- 4. DEFCON 16: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yXr7KBC3G31