


2. Stationary Equilibrium

Adv. Macro: Heterogenous Agent Models

Jeppe Druedahl & Patrick Moran 2023







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 - 1. Is in active development
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• Literature: Aiyagari (1994)

Ramsey-recap

Ramsey: Firms

- Production function: $Y_t = F(\Gamma_t, K_{tt-1}, L_t)$ [note timing of capital] where Γ_t is technology
- Profits: $\Pi_t = Y_t w_t L_t r_t^K K_{t-1}$
- Profit maximization: $\max_{K_{t-1}, L_t} \Pi_t$
 - 1. Rental rate: $\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial K_{t-1}} = 0 \Leftrightarrow r_t^K = F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t)$
 - 2. Real wage: $\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial L_t} = 0 \Leftrightarrow w_t = F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t)$

Zero profits: $\Pi_t = 0 \Rightarrow$

 $Y_t = w_t L_t + r_t^K K_{t-1}$ [functional income distribution]

Ramsey: Zero-profit mutual fund

- Owns all capital
- Capital depreciate with rate $\delta \in (0,1)$,

$$K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + I_t$$

• **Deposits** (from households), A_{t-1} : The rate of return is

$$r_t = r_t^K - \delta$$

Balance sheet:

$$A_{t-1} = K_{t-1}$$

Ramsey: Households

Utility maximization:

$$v_0(A_{-1}^{hh}) = \max_{\{C_t^{hh}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t^{hh})$$
s.t.
$$A_t^{hh} = (1+r_t)A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - C_t^{hh}$$

Exogenous labor supply: $L_t^{hh} = 1$

• Euler-equation (implied by Lagrangian):

$$u'(C_t^{hh}) = \beta(1 + r_{t+1})u'(C_{t+1}^{hh})$$

• Capital market: $K_t = A_t = A_t^{hh}$

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- Goods market: $Y_t = C_t^{hh} + I_t$
- Walras: Capital and labor market clears ⇒ goods market clears

$$C_t^{hh} + I_t = \left[(1 + r_t) A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - A_t^{hh} \right] + (K_t - (1 - \delta) K_{t-1})$$

$$= \left[(1 + r_t) K_{t-1} + w_t L_t - K_t \right] + (K_t - (1 - \delta) K_{t-1})$$

$$= r_t^K K_{t-1} + w_t L_t$$

$$= Y_t$$

Ramsey: Summary

Simplified form:

$$u'(C_t^{hh}) = \beta(1 + F_K(\Gamma_t, K_t, 1) - \delta)u'(C_{t+1}^{hh})$$

$$K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + F(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, 1) - C_t^{hh}$$

Ramsey: Summary

Simplified form:

$$u'(C_t^{hh}) = \beta(1 + F_K(\Gamma_t, K_t, 1) - \delta)u'(C_{t+1}^{hh})$$

$$K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + F(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, 1) - C_t^{hh}$$

Extended form:

$$\begin{aligned} r_t^K &= F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t &= F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t &= r_t^K - \delta \\ A_t &= K_t \\ A_t^{hh} &= (1 + r_t) A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - C_t^{hh} \\ u'(C_t^{hh}) &= \beta (1 + r_{t+1}) u'(C_{t+1}^{hh}) \\ A_t &= A_t^{hh} \\ L_t &= L_t^{hh} \end{aligned}$$

Ramsey: As an equation system

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_t^K - F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t - F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t - (r_t^K - \delta) \\ A_t - K_t \\ A_t^{hh} - ((1 + r_t)A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - C_t^{hh}) \\ u'(C_t^{hh}) - \beta(1 + r_{t+1})u'(C_{t+1}^{hh}) \\ A_t - A_t^{hh} \\ L_t - L_t^{hh} \\ \forall t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}, \text{ given } K_{-1} \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}$$

Note I: There is *perfect foresight*.

Note II: This is the so-called *sequence-space* formulation.

Ramsey: Steady state

• Euler-equation can be solved for K_{ss}:

$$u'(\mathcal{C}_{ss}) = \beta(1 + F_{\mathcal{K}}(\Gamma_{ss}, \mathcal{K}_{ss}, 1) - \delta)u'(\mathcal{C}_{ss}) \Leftrightarrow$$
 $F_{\mathcal{K}}(\mathcal{K}_{ss}, 1) = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta$

• Accumulation equation then implies C_{ss} :

$$egin{aligned} \mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{ss}} &= (1 - \delta) \mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{ss}} + F(\Gamma_{\mathsf{ss}}, \mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{ss}}, 1) - \mathcal{C}_{\mathsf{ss}} \Leftrightarrow \ \mathcal{C}_{\mathsf{ss}} &= (1 - \delta) \mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{ss}} + F(\Gamma_{\mathsf{ss}}, \mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{ss}}, 1) - \mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{ss}} \end{aligned}$$

HANC

- 1. **Firms:** Rent capital from mutual fund and hire labor from the households, produce with given technology, and sell output goods
- 2. **Zero-profit mutual funds:** Own capital and rent it to firms, take deposits and pay return to household
- Households: Face idiosyncratic productivity shocks, supplies labor exogenously and makes consumption-saving decisions
- 4. Markets: Perfect competition in labor, goods and capital markets

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Model blocks:

- 1. **Firms:** Rent capital from mutual fund and hire labor from the households, produce with given technology, and sell output goods
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Other names:

- 1. The Aiyagari-model
- 2. The Aiyagari-Bewley-Hugget-Imrohoroglu-model
- 3. The Standard Incomplete Market (SIM) model

$$\begin{aligned} v_0(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) &= \max_{\{c_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_i^t u(c_{it}) \\ \text{s.t.} \\ \ell_{it} &= z_{it} \\ a_{it} &= (1 + r_t) a_{it-1} + w_t \ell_{it} - c_{it} + \Pi_t \\ \log z_{it+1} &= \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1}, \ \psi_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{\psi}, \sigma_{\psi}), \ \mathbb{E}[z_{it}] &= 1 \\ a_{it} &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Utility maximization for household i:

$$\begin{aligned} v_0(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) &= \max_{\{c_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_i^t u(c_{it}) \\ \text{s.t.} \\ \ell_{it} &= z_{it} \\ a_{it} &= (1 + r_t) a_{it-1} + w_t \ell_{it} - c_{it} + \Pi_t \\ \log z_{it+1} &= \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1}, \ \psi_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{\psi}, \sigma_{\psi}), \ \mathbb{E}[z_{it}] &= 1 \\ a_{it} &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Where are there heterogeneity?

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- Where are there heterogeneity?
 - 1. Ex ante due to different preferences, β_i

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- Where are there heterogeneity?
 - 1. Ex ante due to different preferences, β_i
 - 2. Ex post due to stochastic productivity, z_{it}

$$\begin{aligned} v_0(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) &= \max_{\{c_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_i^t u(c_{it}) \\ \text{s.t.} \\ \ell_{it} &= z_{it} \\ a_{it} &= (1 + r_t) a_{it-1} + w_t \ell_{it} - c_{it} + \Pi_t \\ \log z_{it+1} &= \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1}, \ \psi_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{\psi}, \sigma_{\psi}), \ \mathbb{E}[z_{it}] &= 1 \\ a_{it} &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- Where are there heterogeneity?
 - 1. Ex ante due to different preferences, β_i
 - 2. Ex post due to stochastic productivity, z_{it}
- Incomplete markets due to borrowing constraint (fancy words: partial self-insurrance, lack of Arrow-Debreu securities)

Recursive formulation

Value function (at decision)

$$\begin{aligned} v_t(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) &= \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \beta \underline{v}_{t+1}(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it}) \\ \text{s.t.} \\ \ell_{it} &= z_{it} \\ a_{it} &= (1 + r_t) a_{it-1} + w_t \ell_{it} - c_{it} + \Pi_t \\ \log z_{it+1} &= \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1} \\ a_{it} &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Beginning-of-period value function (before shock realization):

$$\underline{v}_t(\beta_i, z_{it-1}, a_{it-1}) = \mathbb{E}\left[v_t(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) \mid \beta_i, z_{it-1}, a_{it-1}\right]$$

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Envelop-condition:

$$\underline{v}_{a,t}(\beta_i, z_{it-1}, a_{it-1}) \equiv \frac{\partial \underline{v}_t}{\partial a_{it-1}} = \mathbb{E}\left[(1 + r_t) c_{it}^{-\sigma} \mid \beta_i, z_{it-1}, a_{it-1} \right]$$

Euler-equation

Proof: Using *variation argument* (see previous lecture)

Euler-equation:

$$c_{it}^{-\sigma} = \beta_i \underline{v}_{a,t+1}(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it})$$

$$= \beta_i \mathbb{E}_t \left[v_{a,t+1}(\beta_i, z_{it+1}, a_{it}) \right]$$

$$= \beta_i (1 + r_{t+1}) \mathbb{E}_t \left[c_{it+1}^{-\sigma} \right]$$

$$= \beta_i (1 + r_{t+1}) q(z_{it}, a_{it})$$

where q is the post-decision marginal value of cash

Distributions and aggregates

Policy functions: Aggregate prices are hidden as inputs, i.e.

$$x_t^*(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = x^*(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}, \{r_\tau, w_\tau\}_{\tau \ge t}) \text{ for } x \in \{a, \ell, c\}$$

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Distributions (vector of probabilities):

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- Distributions (vector of probabilities):
 - 1. Beginning-of-period: $\underline{\mathbf{D}}_t$ over β_i , z_{it-1} and a_{it-1}

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- Distributions (vector of probabilities):
 - 1. Beginning-of-period: $\underline{\mathbf{D}}_t$ over β_i , z_{it-1} and a_{it-1}
 - 2. Productivity transition: $\mathbf{D}_t = \Pi_z' \underline{\mathbf{D}}_t$ over β_i , z_{it} and a_{it-1}

Policy functions: Aggregate prices are hidden as inputs, i.e.

$$x_{t}^{*}(\beta_{i}, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = x^{*}(\beta_{i}, z_{it}, a_{it-1}, \{r_{\tau}, w_{\tau}\}_{\tau \geq t}) \text{ for } x \in \{a, \ell, c\}$$

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 - 3. Savings transition: $\underline{\boldsymbol{D}}_{t+1} = \Lambda_t' \boldsymbol{D}_t$ where again

$$\Lambda_t = \Lambda\left(\left\{r_\tau, w_\tau\right\}_{\tau \geq t}\right)$$

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$$x_t^*(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = x^*(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}, \{r_\tau, w_\tau\}_{\tau \geq t}) \text{ for } x \in \{a, \ell, c\}$$

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$$\Lambda_t = \Lambda\left(\left\{r_\tau, w_\tau\right\}_{\tau \geq t}\right)$$

Aggregate consumption and savings:

$$X_t^{hh} = \int x_t^*(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_t = X^{hh} \left(\left\{ r_\tau, w_\tau \right\}_{\tau \geq t}, \underline{\mathbf{D}}_0 \right) \text{ for } x \in \left\{ a, \ell, c \right\}$$

Equation system

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_t^K - F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t - F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t - (r_t^K - \delta) \\ A_t - K_t \\ \boldsymbol{D}_t - \Pi_z' \underline{\boldsymbol{D}}_t \\ \underline{\boldsymbol{D}}_{t+1} - \Lambda_t' \boldsymbol{D}_t \\ A_t - A_t^{hh} \\ L_t - L_t^{hh} \\ \forall t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}, \text{ given } \underline{\boldsymbol{D}}_0 \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}$$

where
$$K_{-1}=\int a_{it-1}d{m {\cal D}}_0$$

- 1. Perfect forsight wrt. aggregate variables
- 2. **Stationary equilibrium:** Time-constant solution.
- 3. **Transition path:** Time-varying solution due to e.g. initial conditions or temporary deviations of exogenous variables.

Solution method

- Must be solved numerically:
- Household problem: $u(c_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$
 - 1. Discretize and evaluate with interpolation
 - 2. Make recursion until convergence
- Transition path:
 - 1. Find the stationary equilibrium
 - 2. Find Jacobian around stationary equilibrium (next time)
 - 3. Solve using quasi-Newton solver (next time)

Solution of household problem

- **Solve:** Separately for each β_i and z_{it}
 - 1. Find solution from FOC for each \tilde{a}_{it} in exogenous grid

$$\tilde{\mathbf{c}}_{it}^{-\sigma} = \beta_i \underline{\mathbf{v}}_{a,t+1}(\beta_i, \mathbf{z}_{it}, \tilde{\mathbf{a}}_{it}) \Leftrightarrow \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_{it} = (\beta_i \underline{\mathbf{v}}_{a,t+1}(\beta_i, \mathbf{z}_{it}, \tilde{\mathbf{a}}_{it}))^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

- 2. Calculate endogenous grid $\tilde{m}_{it} = \tilde{a}_{it} + \tilde{c}_{it}$
- 3. Interpolate at $m_{it} = (1 + r_t)a_{it-1} + w_t z_{it} + \Pi_t$ to get optimal a_{it}
- 4. Enforce constraint by $a_{it} = \max\{a_{it}, 0\}$
- 5. Consumption is $c_{it} = m_{it} a_{it}$

Expecation:

$$\underline{v}_{a,t}(\beta_i, z_{it-1}, a_{it-1}) = \sum_{i_z=0}^{\#_z-1} \pi_{i_z-,i_z} (1+r_t) c_{it}^{-\rho}$$

Market clearing

- Capital market: $K_t = A_t = \int a_t^*(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_t$
- Labor market: $L_t = \int \ell_t^*(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_t = \int z_{it} d\mathbf{D}_t = 1$
- Goods market: $Y_t = C_t^{hh} + I_t$
- Walras: Capital and labor market clears ⇒ goods market clears

$$C_t^{hh} + I_t = \int c_{it}^* d\mathbf{D}_t + [K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}]$$

$$= \int [(1 + r_t)a_{it-1} + w_t z_{it} - a_{it}] d\mathbf{D}_t$$

$$= [(1 + r_t)K_{t-1} + w_t L_t - K_t] + [K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}]$$

$$= r_t^K K_{t-1} + w_t L_t$$

$$= Y_t$$

Stationary Equilibrium

Stationary equilibrium - equation system

The **stationary equilibrium** satisfies

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_{ss}^{K} - F_{K}(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, L_{ss}) \\ w_{ss} - F_{L}(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, L_{ss}) \\ r_{ss} - (r_{ss}^{K} - \delta) \\ A_{ss} - K_{ss} \\ \mathbf{D}_{ss} - \Pi_{z}^{\prime} \mathbf{\underline{D}}_{ss} \\ \underline{\mathbf{D}}_{ss} - \Lambda_{ss}^{\prime} \mathbf{D}_{ss} \\ A_{ss} - A_{ss}^{hh} \\ L_{ss} - L_{ss}^{hh} \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}$$

Note I: Households still move around »inside« the distribution due to idiosyncratic shocks

Note II: Steady state for aggregates (quantities and prices) and the distribution as such

Stationary equilibrium - more verbal definition

For a given Γ_{ss}

- 1. Quantities K_{ss} and L_{ss} ,
- 2. prices r_{ss} and w_{ss} (always $\Pi_{ss} = 0$),
- 3. the distribution D_{ss} over β_i , z_{it} and a_{it-1}
- 4. and the policy functions a_{ss}^* , ℓ_{ss}^* and c_{ss}^*

are such that

- 1. Household maximize expected utility (policy functions)
- 2. Firms maximize profits (prices)
- 3. D_{ss} is the invariant distribution implied by the household problem
- 4. Mutual fund balance sheet is satisfied
- 5. The capital market clears
- 6. The labor market clears
- 7. The goods market clears

Direct implementation

Technology: $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha}$

Root-finding problem in K_{ss} with the objective function:

- 1. Set $L_{ss} = 1$ (and $\Pi_{ss} = 0$)
- 2. Calculate $r_{ss} = \alpha \Gamma_{ss} (K_{ss})^{\alpha-1} \delta$ and $w_{ss} = (1 \alpha) \Gamma_{ss} (K_{ss})^{\alpha}$
- 3. Solve infinite horizon household problem backwards, i.e. find $\textit{a}^*_{\textit{ss}}$
- 4. Simulate households forwards until convergence, i.e. find $oldsymbol{D}_{ss}$
- 5. Return $K_{ss} \boldsymbol{a}_{ss}^{*\prime} \boldsymbol{D}_{ss}$

Direct implementation (alternative)

Technology: $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha}$

Root-finding problem in r_{ss} with the objective function:

- 1. Set $L_{ss}=1$ (and $\Pi_{ss}=0$)
- 2. Calculate $K_{ss} = \left(\frac{r_{ss} + \delta}{\alpha \Gamma_{ss}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha 1}}$ and $w_{ss} = (1 \alpha)\Gamma_{ss}(K_{ss})^{\alpha}$
- 3. Solve infinite horizon household problem backwards, i.e. find \boldsymbol{a}_{ss}^*
- 4. Simulate households forwards until convergence, i.e. find $oldsymbol{D}_{ss}$
- 5. Return $K_{ss} \boldsymbol{a}_{ss}^{*\prime} \boldsymbol{D}_{ss}$

Indirect implementation

Technology: $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha}$

Consider Γ_{ss} and δ as »free« parameters:

- 1. Choose r_{ss} and w_{ss}
- 2. Solve infinite horizon household problem backwards, i.e. find a_{ss}^*
- 3. Simulate households forwards until convergence, i.e. find $oldsymbol{D}_{ss}$
- 4. Set $K_{ss} = \boldsymbol{a}_{ss}^{*\prime} \boldsymbol{D}_{ss}$
- 5. Set $L_{ss}=1$ (and $\Pi_{ss}=0$)
- 6. Set $\Gamma_{ss} = \frac{w_{ss}}{(1-\alpha)(K_{ss})^{\alpha}}$
- 7. Set $r_{ss}^K = \alpha \Gamma_{ss} (K_{ss})^{\alpha 1}$
- 8. Set $\delta = r_{ss}^k r_{ss}$



Calibration

- Preferences: $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$
 - 1. Discount factors: $\beta \in \{0.965, 0.975, 0.985\}$ in equal pop. shares
 - 2. Relative risk aversion: $\sigma = 2$

Income:

- 1. AR(1): $\rho_z = 0.95$
- 2. Std.: $\sigma_{\psi} = 0.30 \sqrt{(1 \rho_{z}^{2})}$
- Technology: $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha}$
 - 1. Capital share: $\alpha = 0.36$
 - 2. TFP: $\Gamma_{ss} = 1.082$
 - 3. Depreciation: $\delta = 0.193$

Steady state:


- 1. Prices: $r_{ss} = 0.01$ and $w_{ss} = 1$
- 2. Quantities: $K_{ss}/Y_{ss} = 1.776$


Consumption function

• Euler-equation still necessary for $a_{it} > 0$:


$$c_{it}^{-\sigma} = \beta_i (1 + r_{t+1}) \mathbb{E}_t \left[c_{it+1}^{-\sigma} \right]$$

- Precautionary saving:
 - 1. Low consumption for low cash-on-hand \rightarrow buffer-stock target
 - 2. Steep slope for low cash-on-hand \rightarrow *high MPC*






Low vs. high β_i



Distribution, D_t

- Productivity: Marginal distribution over only z_{it}
- **Savings:** Marginal distribution over a_{it} cond. on β_i



Drivers of wealth inequality:

- 1. Stochastic income
- 2. Heterogeneous patience \rightarrow savings behavior

Steady state interest rate

Representative agent / complete markets:

Derived from aggregate Euler-equation

$$C_t^{-\sigma} = \beta (1 + r_{t+1}) C_{t+1}^{-\sigma} \Rightarrow C_{ss}^{-\sigma} = \beta (1 + r_{ss}) C_{ss}^{-\sigma} \Leftrightarrow \beta = \frac{1}{1 + r_{ss}}$$

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- Heterogeneous agents: No such equation exists
 - 1. Euler-equation replaced by asset market clearing condition
 - 2. Idiosyncratic income risk affects the steady state interest rate

σ_{ψ}	PE ($r_{ss} = 1\%$), A^{hh}	GE, r _{ss}	GE, A ^{hh}
0.09	2.78	1.00%	2.78
0.14	7.39	0.12%	2.97
0.19	13.68	-1.11%	3.30

Partial Equilibrium: Same interest rate.

General Equilibrium: Capital+labor market clearing.

Calibration

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- Internal calibration: Set remaining parameters so the model fit a number of chosen macro-level and/or micro-level targets based on empirical estimates
 - 1. Informal: Roughly match targets by hand
 - 2. Formal:
 - 2a. Solve root-finding problem
 - 2b. Minimize a squared loss function
 - 3. **Estimation:** Formal with squared loss function + standard errors

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 - 2a. Solve root-finding problem
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 - 3. **Estimation:** Formal with squared loss function + standard errors
- Complication: We must always solve for the steady state for each guess of the parameters to be calibrated

Exercises

Exercise: HANCGovModel

- No production. No physical savings instrument
- Households: Get stochastic endowment z_{it} of consumption good
- Government:
 - 1. Choose government spending
 - 2. Collect taxes, τ_t , proportional to endowment
 - 3. Bonds: Pays 1 consumption good next period. Price is $p_t^B < 1$

$$p_t^B B_t = B_{t-1} + G_t - \int \tau_t z_{it} d\mathbf{D}_t$$

Exercise: Households

Households:

$$\begin{aligned} v_t(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) &= \max_{c_{it}} \frac{c_{it}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[v_{it+1}(z_{it+1}, a_{it}) \right] \\ \text{s.t. } p_t^B a_{it} + c_{it} &= a_{it-1} + (1-\tau_t) z_{it} \geq 0 \\ &\log z_{it+1} = \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1} \ , \psi_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{\psi}, \sigma_{\psi}), \ \mathbb{E}[z_{it}] = 1 \end{aligned}$$

Euler-equation:

$$c_t^{-\sigma} = \beta \frac{\underline{v}_{a,t+1}(z_{it}, a_{it})}{p_t^B}$$

Envelope condition:

$$\underline{v}_{a,t}(z_{it-1},a_{it-1})=c_{it}^{-\sigma}$$

Exercise: Questions

- 1. Define the stationary equilibrium
- 2. Solve and simulate the household problem with $p_{ss}^B = 0.975$ and $\tau_{ss} = 0.12$.
- 3. Find the stationary equilibrium with $G_{ss} = 0.10$ and $\tau_{ss} = 0.12$.
- 4. What happens for $\tau_{ss} \in (0.11, 0.15)$?
- 5. When is average household utility maximized?

Note: Full solution in repository folder *HANCGovModel*

Summary

Summary and next week

- Today:
 - 1. The concept of a stationary equilibrium
 - 2. Introduction to the GEModelTools package
- Next week: Transition path
- Homework:
 - Work on completing the HANCGovModel exercise (solution in repository folder HANCGovModel)
 - Read documentation for GEModelTools (except on linearized solution and simulation)
 - 3. Skim-read at Auclert et. al. (2021) and Kirkby (2017)