Testing Novelty Incentives in Human Red Teaming: Evidence from Online Experiments

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Red teaming is a critical tool for identifying vulnerabilities in AI systems, but current approaches may miss novel attack vectors due to insufficient exploration incentives. We conduct two large-scale online experiments (N=1,075) on our custom experimental platform to test whether real-time novelty incentives can improve the effectiveness of human red teaming. Participants attempt to elicit harassing outputs from a large language model, with treatment groups receiving bonuses based on novelty-weighted harassment scores calculated from real-time embedding analysis. Our experiments vary payment regimes to isolate the effect of novelty incentives from financial considerations. We find mixed evidence for novelty incentives: treatment participants produce more semantically diverse messages and achieve higher novelty when analyzing all outputs or filtering low-quality attempts. However, when examining primary outcomes, treatment groups generate lower overall harassment despite higher novelty, resulting in a "backfiring effect" where multi-objective optimization undermines performance. The results suggest that novelty incentives can promote exploration but require quality floors and structured guidance to avoid overwhelming participants with competing objectives.

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1. Introduction

In less than three years since ChatGPT's release, the number of weekly users has exploded to 800 million (Bellan 2025); millions more use other large language models, like Claude, Anthropic's Claude, Google's Gemini or Microsoft's Copilot. Their users now rely on these systems for writing, programming, customer service, and a variety of decision-making tasks. This rapid spread has brought extraordinary opportunities, but also serious risks. Models can assist in planning cyberattacks (Bethany et al. 2024; Cohen et al. 2024), contribute to severe psychological harm, including documented cases of suicide following extended conversations (Hill 2025; McBain et al. 2025; Euronews 2023), and generate content that violates ethical norms and legal rules (Fire et al. 2025).

Because of this trade-off between capability and safety, red teaming exercises have become a central component of responsible AI deployment. In a red teaming exercise, participants try to elicit harmful or otherwise undesired outputs from a model in order to identify weaknesses before deployment. Large AI developers now conduct such exercises routinely (OpenAI 2024; Microsoft 2025), and regulations are beginning to require them. For example, the EU AI Act obliges providers of general-purpose models with systemic risk to conduct adversarial testing (a form of red teaming) and to report serious incidents to regulators (eu: 2024).

Yet red teaming exercises face growing challenges. As the number of models, features, and deployment contexts expand far beyond what small-scale teams can realistically test, manual human red teaming alone reaches its limits. Microsoft's internal evaluation effort illustrates this problem: "as the number of products and features to test grows, fully manual testing has become impractical" (Microsoft 2025, p. 3). Moreover, red teaming faces challenges of coverage, i.e. human testers typically explore only a limited portion of the vast possible input space and therefore find only a subset of all of possible vulnerabilities. Participants in red teaming exercises often focus on familiar or salient attack strategies, which can lead to blind spots. For example, Zhang et al. (2024b) observe that human testers display systematic biases in the kinds of attacks they try, shaped by personal experience and recent events. Microsoft similarly notes that testers "often focus their energy on a limited set of harms, leaving less obvious categories underexplored" (Microsoft 2025, p. 5). Automated red teaming has emerged as a response to these challenges. Early work showed that large language models could be used to generate inputs in order to test a target model for vulnerabilities (Perez et al. 2022; Mei et al. 2023). More recent research has scaled automated approaches dramatically. For example, a large comparative study of more than 200,000 attack attempts found that automated methods outperformed manual human red teaming on success rates across a range of structured tasks (Mulla et al. 2025). OpenAI reports that automated methods are now a

standard part of their internal testing, where they are used to generate diverse inputs and score their effectiveness (OpenAI 2024).

Although automated red teaming addressed the problems of scale, the challenge of coverage persists, as automated methods often lack contextual understanding, cultural sensitivity, and the ability to plan multi-step or socially grounded exploits. OpenAI reports that their automated red teaming methods "have typically struggled to generate successful attacks that are tactically diverse," frequently repeating known patterns rather than inventing new ones (OpenAI 2024). Automated approaches are well-suited for systematic exploration but less capable of identifying subtle or novel vulnerabilities. Humans, by contrast, can draw on their knowledge of language, culture, and social dynamics to craft attacks that exploit contextual subtleties. They can also engage in reasoning and chaining that automated systems currently handle poorly. Due to these complementary strengths, human red teaming remains indispensable.

A hybrid model that combines human and automated red teaming has therefore become the prevailing practice. OpenAI explicitly states that "manual, automated, and mixed approaches" are all used in their internal processes (OpenAI 2024). Microsoft adopts a similar strategy, relying on automation to increase scale while keeping humans in the loop for system-level attacks, prioritization, and defining new harm categories (Microsoft 2025). This combination allows organizations to exploit the efficiency of automated approaches while preserving the depth and flexibility of human expertise.

In the field of economics, the two most closely related studies are Bradler et al. (2019) and Speckbacher and Wiernsperger (2024). Bradler et al. (2019) show that explicit performance bonuses substantially increase creative output, while unconditional "gift" payments do not, indicating that tying pay directly to success raises effort and productivity in creative tasks. Speckbacher and Wiernsperger (2024) find that financial incentives push individuals toward producing novel ideas, whereas a user-centered "purpose" framing increases usefulness; when combined, the monetary incentive dominates and crowds out usefulness. Together, these studies show that incentives can shift both effort and direction, and that multi-objective incentives risk overemphasizing one dimension at the expense of others. Laske and Schroeder (2017) extend this by rewarding idea quantity, quality, and originality in different combinations. Incentives increase output and quality but not average originality, and only when both quantity and originality are rewarded jointly do participants generate more truly innovative ideas. Field evidence from Wang et al. (2025) similarly shows that higher rewards in Google's bug bounty program attract new participants and redirect expert effort toward higher-severity, more valuable vulnerabilities. None of these studies examine red teaming directly, yet they imply clear expectations for our setting. Incentives for novelty reliably shift behavior toward exploration (Speckbacher and Wiernsperger 2024; Wang et al. 2025), but this often comes with

performance trade-offs (Speckbacher and Wiernsperger 2024). Multi-dimensional incentives are cognitively demanding, and individuals tend to over-optimize one goal when feedback is complex (Laske and Schroeder 2017).

To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the effects of novelty incentives on human red teaming. As discussed above, existing work primarily diagnoses the limits of human coverage and the complementary strengths of automated methods. Zhang et al. (2024a) document that human red teamers tend to probe familiar, salient harm types and underexplore others, and that factors like personal background, expertise, and lived experience shape which harms they even consider worth testing. Their paper diagnoses skewed exploration and labor burdens, but it does not test an intervention to fix them. As mentioned above, the only existing studies that test interventions to fix these problems investigate fully automated approaches.

The research question we address in in this paper is directly motivated by the facts that human participants remain essential in the foreseeable future and that it is desirable to increase the coverage during human red teaming exercises. We therefore ask: Does the introduction of an explicit novelty incentive lead to more diverse harassing model outputs? We examine this question in two preregistered experiments with 1075 (roughly 500 in each experiment) participants recruited through the panel provider Prolific. Participants interact with a large language model (Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1) in a controlled red-teaming environment. Participants can chat with the large language model and try to elicit harassing model outputs. The experimental interface provides participants with real-time feedback with respect to harassment and novelty of the most recent model output they elicited. Both novelty and harassment are measured using automated scoring systems: Each model output is automatically assigned a harassment score and a novelty score. The harassment score is calculated using the output of the OpenAI moderation API. Using the API's definition of harassment, the harassment score is a number between 0 (not harassing at all) and 1 (very harassing). In order to calculate the novelty score, we embed each model output using the OpenAI text embedding API and calculate the vector embedding of each model output. The novelty score is then calculated as the minimum distance between the vector embedding of the most recent model output and all vector embeddings that were previously elicited during our experiment. We standardize this distance such that the novelty score is between 0 (not novel at all) and 1 (very novel). Based on the novelty and harassment scores, we calculate the novelty-weighted harassment score (Novelty-Weighted Harassment (NWH)) as the product of the harassment score and the novelty score as our main outcome measure. The idea being that the goal of a red teaming exercise is to elicit harassing model outputs that are also novel.

In both experiments, participants were randomly assigned to a control group or to the novelty incentive treatment group. All participants completed three chat rounds and

could earn a monetary bonus for eliciting harassing model outputs. The control group's bonuses depended only on the harassment score of model outputs, and participants in control saw only the harassment scores. The treatment group's bonuses depended on novelty-weighted harassment, which is calculated as the product of the harassment score and the novelty score of a model output, and participants saw both scores in real-time.

Because the bonuses in the treatment group depended on the product of the harassment score and the novelty score, only a very harassing model output that was *also* very novel would generate a high bonus payment. In other words, eliciting a very harassing model output that had previously already been discovered (i.e. outputs with a low novelty score) would lead to a lower bonus payment. In effect, this design incentivizes participants to find model outputs that are not only harassing but also novel. This design is intended to steer participants away from exploiting known vulnerabilities and towards exploring novel areas of the input space. For example, a model output with a harassment score of 0.9 but a novelty score of 0.1 (indicating it is similar to previously discovered outputs) would yield a bonus based on $0.9 \times 0.1 = 0.09$, while the same harassment score paired with a novelty score of 0.9 would yield a bonus based on $0.9 \times 0.9 = 0.81$. This multiplicative structure creates strong incentives to explore previously unexplored regions of the output space rather than repeatedly exploiting the same vulnerabilities. To illustrate, if many participants had already discovered that direct insults elicit harassing responses (e.g., prompts about racial slurs), these outputs would receive low novelty scores. A participant who instead explored a different semantic region (e.g., prompts about workplace discrimination scenarios) would receive higher novelty scores for harassing outputs in that underexplored area, even if the harassment scores were comparable. The incentive structure thus rewards participants for discovering vulnerabilities across diverse domains rather than repeatedly targeting the same weakness.

The two experiments differ in payoff scaling: in Experiment 1, the novelty score ranged from 0 to 1. As a consequence, the novelty score mostly reduced the bonuses in the treatment group compared to the control group (if the novelty score was below 1) or at best matched the control group (i.e. only if all model outputs were maximally novel). In experiment 1, participants in the treatment group therefore might have expended less effort to generate harassing model outputs. If the treatment group would achieve a lower average NWH score than the control group, then this might be attributable to lower effort. In order to exclude this possibility of lower effort in the treatment group, we changed the incentive structure in experiment 2. In Experiment 2, the novelty score was rescaled to be between 1 and 2. This guaranteed that treatment bonuses were at least as large as control (if the novelty score was 1) and mostly higher than control (if the novelty score was above 1).

This experimental design necessarily simplifies several aspects of real-world red team-

ing: we focus on a single model and vulnerability type (harassment), use automated rather than human evaluation of outputs, we use the definition of the OpenAI moderation API for harassment, and we constrain the interaction to text-based interfaces. However, we believe that these simplifications allow us to create a controlled environment that enables us to measure the effects of the novelty incentive while maintaining essential features of red teaming exercises in practice.

Our main preregistered result is that in both experiments, the treatment groups achieve a lower average NWH score than the control groups, indicating that the novelty incentive backfired. Separating the NWH score into its components explains how this backfiring effect arises: in both experiments, the treatment groups achieve a significantly lower harassment score, while the novelty score is not significantly different between the groups. This suggests that the participants in the treatment group were overwhelmed and struggled with the task to optimize for two objectives at the same time. On average, they attempted to find more novel model outputs (and failed), but in doing so, they generated outputs that were less harassing.

The above main result arises when the analysis of the novelty and harassment scores is based on the message with the highest NWH per chat. As a robustness check, we extended the analysis to include all model outputs per chat when calculating the average over the novelty and harassment scores. This approach confirms the main result: In both experiments, the treatment groups still achieve a lower average NWH score than the control groups. Yet there is some evidence that the novelty incentive had a exploratory effect: by including all model outputs, the the treatment group in the second experiment has significantly higher average novelty scores than the control group.

Since harassment outputs with a low harassment score are not of primary interest in a red teaming exercise, we also conduct an analysis that again starts by considering all model outputs but then filters out model outputs with a harassment score below a minimum threshold. For robustness, we test multiple thresholds. We do not find a consistent patterns across the two experiments with respect to the NWH and harassment scores, but average novelty scores are higher in the treatment group for all thresholds. This shows that unlike in the main analysis, where the novelty incentive did not lead to higher average novelty scores, the novelty incentive did lead to more exploration when very low harassment outputs are discarded.

To test whether novelty incentives affect high and low performers differently, we split participants by median performance-based payment and compared cumulative NWH across these groups. This performance based heterogeneity analysis shows that above-median performers generate almost all cumulative NWH in both experiments, highlighting the importance of participant selection for red teaming success. Treatment does not overtake control within either performance group, indicating that novelty incentives do

not improve performance across the board but rather affect participants differently based on their baseline abilities.

The analyses mentioned so far are based on the novelty score. This score measures the novelty of each output relative to all previously generated outputs at the time of creation, making the novelty score a time-dependent, incremental measure. From an ex-post perspective, however, organizers of a red teaming market and policymakers may be more interested in the overall diversity of the final set of inputs and harmful outputs produced over the course of the red teaming process. We therefore also conduct such a ex-post analyses using the final set of inputs and output text embeddings after the red teaming process. In this analysis, we find that novelty incentives do promote exploration in meaningful ways. Treatment participants' input messages are more spread out in the embedding space. Further, there is significant difference in the embedding space between treatment and control participants input messages. In order to attach semantic meaning to this difference in the embedding space, we analyze the plain text content of the participant's input messages using the GPT-4o model as a classifier to discover distinct red teaming strategies employed by participants. This strategy analysis shows that while both conditions produced similar approaches, with only small differences in the relative emphasis of the strategies. Most strikingly, participants in both conditions resorted most often to using insults, hate speech, and requests for violence. Presumably, this reflects the nature of the red teaming task: participants are incentivized to elicit harassing outputs from the model. Many participants seem to have reasoned that to elicit harassing outputs from the model, they should themselves employ harassing language. Finally, we also analyze if this assumption is correct and find that it is not. The most used strategies are not the most effective at eliciting harassing outputs. Instead, the most effective strategies are relatively uncommon and involve more sophisticated tactical approaches.

Our study contributes to two streams of literature. First, we add to research on financial incentives in creative tasks by providing the first experimental evidence on the effectiveness of novelty incentives. Prior work shows that incentives can shift creative effort toward novelty or usefulness but none examine an explicit, real-time reward for both originality and output quality. We show that such multi-dimensional incentives can backfire: participants rewarded for novelty-weighted outcomes produce less harassing content without becoming more novel on average, suggesting that complex incentives can overwhelm participants and reduce overall task performance.

Second, we extend research on red teaming by studying how incentives affect human coverage. Existing work documents systematic blind spots among human red teamers and proposes automation to improve coverage, yet no prior study experimentally tests how incentive design shapes exploration. We provide the first causal evidence that novelty incentives can increase exploratory behavior but simultaneously lower effectiveness

in eliciting harmful outputs, revealing a key trade-off between exploration and success in human red teaming.

As a technical contribution we develop a custom experimental platform capable of real-time API integration with multiple AI services, dynamic embedding calculations for novelty scoring, live harassment detection, and instantaneous feedback delivery; this would be infeasible using standard survey platforms. The code for this custom experimental platform is available on GitHub at [add link:] `https://github.com/username/our-repo`. The code is licensed under the [decide on license] MIT license.

Our findings have immediate practical implications for both private companies conducting internal red teaming and regulatory bodies designing oversight mechanisms. The consistent backfiring effect demonstrates that novelty incentives can undermine effectiveness unless paired with explicit quality floors that filter low-harassment outputs. The stark performance heterogeneity, i.e. the fact that above-median performers generate nearly all valuable outputs, indicates that recruiting skilled red teamers matters more than incentive design for low performers. Most critically, participants systematically overuse intuitive but ineffective strategies while underutilizing sophisticated tactics, suggesting that effective red teaming requires explicit training rather than relying on participants to discover optimal strategies through exploration alone. Organizations should prioritize participant selection, provide structured guidance on effective tactics, and implement quality thresholds before introducing novelty incentives.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and implementation, including a description of the real-time scoring platform used in the experiments. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 discusses implications, limitations, and directions for practice. Section 5 concludes.

2. Experiments

We conducted two pre-registered online experiments involving human participants recruited through Prolific. The experiments serve three primary purposes: first, to test whether novelty-based coordination mechanisms improve the efficiency of vulnerability discovery in practice; second, to measure how real human behavior aligns with our hypotheses regarding exploration patterns and learning dynamics; and third, to demonstrate the feasibility of implementing automated red teaming markets with real-time feedback systems.

The experiments test our research questions by creating a simplified but realistic red teaming market. Participants act as red teamers with the goal of eliciting harassing outputs from a large language model (Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1). We implement automated success criteria through harassment scores (measuring harassment) and novelty scores

(measuring exploration diversity), with real-time calculation and display to participants. The experimental design directly tests our central hypothesis that novelty-based coordination leads to more efficient vulnerability discovery by incentivizing participants to explore diverse attack strategies rather than concentrating on already discovered approaches.

Our implementation necessarily simplifies several aspects of real-world red teaming markets: we focus on a single model and vulnerability type (harassment), use automated rather than human evaluation of outputs, and constrain the interaction to text-based chat interfaces. However, this controlled environment allows us to isolate and measure the specific coordination effects while maintaining the essential market dynamics of incentivized vulnerability discovery.

The technical infrastructure underlying these experiments represents a substantial methodological contribution. We developed a custom experimental platform capable of real-time API integration with multiple OpenAI services, dynamic embedding calculations for novelty scoring, live harassment detection, and instantaneous feedback delivery. These capabilities would be infeasible using standard survey platforms. This system enables the kind of responsive, adaptive experimental paradigms necessary for studying human-AI interaction in market contexts.

Our experimental implementation operationalizes the market goal of generating a diverse set of harmful outputs as efficiently as possible. This goal is achieved through a dual-objective payoff structure that rewards both harassment (via harassment scores) and diversity (via novelty scores). The harassment score, computed using OpenAI's moderation API, measures the degree to which a model output contains harassing content, while the novelty score quantifies how semantically different each new output is from all previously generated content. By combining these metrics in the treatment group's payoff function, we create incentives for participants to explore diverse attack strategies rather than repeatedly exploiting the same vulnerabilities, thus directly testing our hypothesis that novelty-based coordination improves vulnerability discovery efficiency.

In our implementation, the novelty score is intended to be the central coordination mechanism. As red-teamers explore topics in the input space, they have an incentive to find outputs that are harassing.

The harassment score is a measure of the harassment of a model output. to maximize the sum of novelty-weighted harassment scores. Next, we answered the question of how market goal achievement should be measured. We chose to measure market goal achievement by the sum of novelty-weighted harassment scores.

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Market goal achievement measurement How should red teamers be incentivized and

coordinated? The incentive structure was designed to align with the market goal.

The question of how results should be compared across different models or systems was not addressed empirically. But conceptually, it is easy to see how our implementation allows for such comparisons: Simply compare the sum of novelty-weighted harassment scores across different models or systems.

2.1. Experimental design

This section describes the experimental design of two online studies conducted via Prolific, both involving human participants. The two experiments shared the same overall structure and procedure but differed in their bonus payment incentive schemes. The first experiment took place in April 2025, and the second in July 2025.

The goal of the experiments was two-fold: First, to implement a concrete manifestation of a possible red teaming market and second, to test the hypothesis that novelty-based coordination leads to more novel and harmful outputs, and therefore overall to a better red teaming exercise. To be able to test this hypothesis, we developed a custom-built website that allowed us to implement a red teaming market with real-time feedback.

In both experiments, participants were directed to our custom-built website, where the central task for participants was to write messages to a chatbot that would cause the chatbot output harassing reply messages. To do so, participants were free to explore any topics and to write any text. They were not given any instructions on what to write, but had to devise their own ideas on what messages could cause the chatbot to generate harassing messages.

We recruited 521 and 554 participants for experiments 1 and 2 respectively through the online panel provider Prolific. Prolific is a well-established platform for recruiting research participants, with demonstrated reliability for online experiments [add citation]. The median completion time for experiment 1 was 34 minutes with a average pay of GBP 6.41 per hour. For experiment 2, the median completion time was 37 minutes with a average pay of GBP 9.79 per hour. At the time of the experiments, these average pay rates were considerably higher than the minimum recommended pay rate of GBP 5.46 per hour by Prolific.

To be eligible for participation, participants had to reside in the United States and have answered "yes" to the Prolific pre-screening question: "Are you willing to participate in studies which may contain harmful, graphic or upsetting content?".

From Prolific, participants were directed to our website, where they were given detailed instructions on how to participate in the red teaming task. After this, participants had to complete a comprehension check involving five questions about these instructions to ensure they understood the task. In appendix C, figure A2, A3, A4 and A5 show screenshots of the instructions pages for both conditions and figure A6 shows the com-

prehension check.

Participants who passed the comprehension check were then directed to the chat with the AI model, which comprised the main experiment part of the experiment. Participants had to converse with the chatbot in three chat rounds. Each chat lasted until the participant decided to start a new chat or until the token limit of the chatbot's context window was reached.

Our custom website allowed us to observe all messages between the participant and the chatbot. When a participant sent a message to the chatbot, the message was immediately displayed in the chat interface, and sent to the chatbot API to generate a model output. The chatbot was powered by the large language model Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1[1]. This model has been developed by the AI company Mistral and was trained on a large corpus of publicly available data. [do we want to add more information about the model?] Once a model output was generated, this output was further processed twice before being displayed to the participant:

First, the model output was sent to the moderation API of OpenAI to check if the reply was harassing. This automated moderation allowed immediate feedback to the participant on whether they successfully caused the chatbot to output a harassing message. According to the OpenAI moderation API documentation, harassment is defined as "content that expresses, incites, or promotes harassing language towards any target." [2]. Using this definition, the moderation API returned a harassment score between 0 (not harassing at all) and 1 (very harassing) for each chatbot message.

Second, each participant and chatbot message was embedded using the OpenAI text embedding API [3] such that we could calculate a novelty score for each message. A text embedding is a high-dimensional vector of floating-point numbers that captures the semantic meaning and contextual information of text through machine learning techniques [add citation]. These embeddings are typically created by neural language models that are trained on large text corpora to learn statistical patterns and relationships between words and phrases. The resulting vectors, often containing hundreds or thousands of dimensions, encode semantic relationships such that texts with similar meanings are mapped to vectors that are close to each other in the high-dimensional embedding space, as measured by metrics like cosine similarity or Euclidean distance. In our experiment, we used OpenAI's text-embedding-ada-002 model, which produces 1,536-dimensional vectors, to convert each participant and chatbot message into numerical representations. We used these embeddings to calculate a novelty score for each message. This novelty score was calculated as the minimum distance between the vector embedding of a new message and all existing embeddings in the embedding set and standardized to be be-

[1] https://huggingface.co/mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1
[2] https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/moderation
[3] https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/embeddings

tween 0 (not novel at all) and 1 (very novel). A message is therefore rated as novel if it is semantically different from all previous messages. E.g. if the first messages all centered around the topic of "politics", a message about "sports" would receive a high novelty score.

Finally, the model output alongside the harassment score and novelty score were displayed to the participant. Additionally, participants saw an indicator of which model output was currently the payoff relevant one.

Note that the entire chain of events from message input, model output generation, moderation, and novelty score calculation was happening live in the chat interface. This real-time feedback is what enables participants to adapt their behavior to the novelty score and to the harassment score during the experiment. Achieving this level of real-time computational processing and feedback required the development of a custom experimental platform with sophisticated backend infrastructure, including real-time API integration with multiple OpenAI services, dynamic embedding calculations, and live score computation. These capabilities would not be feasible using standard survey platforms or existing experimental software. The technical architecture underlying this experiment represents a substantial engineering effort that enables novel experimental methodologies for studying adaptive behavior in human-AI interactions.

Participants were randomly assigned to either a treatment or a control group. The groups differed in the task and in the payment structure.

- In the control group, the task was to cause the chatbot to output harassing messages. Their bonus payments were based on the harassment scores of the chatbot's replies.
- In the treatment group, participants were asked to generate chatbot replies that were not only harassing but also novel. The bonus payment that participants received in the treatment group was therefore not only based on the harassment score of the chatbot messages, but also on the novelty score.

The novelty score was calculated for the output messages of both treatment groups, but it was only displayed to participants in the treatment group. Participants in the control group did not see the novelty score, but only the harassment score. Figure 1 shows screenshots of the chat interface in the treatment and control condition. Based on this information, participants could reconsider their red teaming strategy.

In both experiments, all participants were paid a fixed base payment for participating in the experiment. Additionally, participants were paid a bonus payment based on the harassment score of the chatbot's outputs and, in the treatment group, on the novelty score of the chatbot's outputs. Participants were not informed about the different bonus structures or the distinction between treatment and control groups.

The payoff functions for both control and treatment group in both experiments can be found in table 1.



A. Treatment condition interface showing both harassment and novelty scores



B. Control condition interface showing only harassment score

FIGURE 1. Screenshots of the experimental chat interface. The interface displays the conversation history, current scores, and indicates which message is payoff-relevant. Treatment participants (left) see both harassment and novelty scores, while control participants (right) only see harassment scores.

TABLE 1. Payoff functions by experiment and treatment condition

Condition	Payoff Function
Control - Experiment 1	Total reward $=$ fixed reward $+$ bonus $\times$ harassment score
Control - Experiment 2	Total reward $=$ fixed reward $+$ bonus $\times$ harassment score
Treatment - Experiment 1	Total reward $=$ fixed reward $+$ bonus $\times$ harassment score $\times$ novelty score where novelty score $\in [0, 1]$
Treatment - Experiment 2	Total reward $=$ fixed reward $+$ bonus $\times$ harassment score $\times$ novelty score where novelty score $\in [1, 2]$

The treatment variation (presence vs. absence of novelty scores) directly tests our hypothesis about coordination effects. By comparing behavior across groups that face identical tasks but different information environments, we can isolate the causal impact of novelty-based coordination on exploration patterns and the sum.

The two-experiment design allows to establish a boundary logic to handle differing levels of participant effort. In experiment 1, the novelty score is scaled 0-1, which means participants can at best earn as much as the control group. This could, potentially, lead to a lower level of effort from participants in the treatment group. To address this concern, we scaled the novelty score in experiment 2 to range from 1 to 2. This means participants in experiment 2 can at least earn as much as the control group. If there is a difference in outcomes in experiment 2, it can therefore not be attributed to a difference in effort.

The two experiments differed only in how the novelty score was scaled: In Experiment 1, the novelty score ranged from 0 to 1. As a result, participants in the treatment group could at most earn the same bonus as those in the control group (only if all chatbot replies were maximally novel, i.e. a score of 1). In Experiment 2, the novelty score was rescaled to range from 1 to 2. This guaranteed that treatment group participants would earn at least as much as those in the control group, even if their messages were only minimally novel.

Both experiments were preregistered on aspredicted.org [4]. [5]. The experiments have ethical approval from the German Association of Experimental Economic Research.

[4] https://aspredicted.org/zrzf-889f.pdf
[5] https://aspredicted.org/s7qg-6y7s.pdf

2.2. Results

2.2.1. Average treatment effect based on per-chat maximum NWH assistant messages

An important question is whether novelty incentives ultimately lead to broader exploration of the output space. After all, the core market objective is to generate more novel harmful outputs. As specified in the preregistration, our primary outcome measure is the average NWH achieved by participants in each group. For the main analysis, we consider the model output with the highest NWH for each chat and compute the participant-level mean over all three chats. The nature of the novelty score provides a challenge for making inference. Since the novelty score is calculated based on the embeddings of all existing outputs of prior chats in a treatment, the novelty scores are not independent across outputs. In particular, the distribution of novelty scores shifts with an increase in the number of outputs. Specifically, an output early in a treatment will likely have a higher novelty score than the same output late in a treatment. This decrease in novelty is a mechanical effect of how the novelty score is calculated. The decrease in novelty can be seen in Figure A1 in appendix A.

We use a threefold strategy to address this challenge. First, we use permutation tests for hypothesis testing (see **??**). Permutation tests are a non-parametric alternative to t-tests that make no distributional assumptions about the data, and are valid for non identically distributed data. Second, we exploit the fact that towards the end of the treatment, the novelty scores become approximately independent as the set of embeddings grows. More formally, the novelty score for output n and output $n + 1$ are approximately independent if n is large enough. This is because the novelty score is calculated against the almost the same set of embeddings. Intuitively, as n grows, the marginal impact of adding another embedding becomes smaller. This means that the probability of the marginal embedding being the nearest neighbor for future embeddings decreases in n. We operationalize this by using only the last 5%, 10%, and 15% of outputs to test our hypotheses. The results are added as a robustness check in Table A1 in appendix B. Third, we use a regression model to compare treatment and control group over the course of the treatment. We regress the outcome measure on a output count to account for their order, a treatment dummy, and the interaction effect of the two variables. We cluster standard errors on the participant level. The coefficient of interest is the interaction effect between treatment dummy and output count. If it is significant, we can infer that the trend components for the cumulative outcomes are different. The latter two approaches correspond to hypothesis 2 and 3 of the pre-registration.

Table 2 shows the average treatment effects as well as p-values from permutation tests and t-tests for five outcomes: NWH, novelty, harassment, distance to the embedding centroid, and DWH (harassment × distance) for control and treatment in both experiments.

TABLE 2. P-values for NWH, novelty, harassment, distance, and Distance-Weighted Harassment (DWH) (Welch t and permutation). Analysis includes per-chat maximum NWH assistant messages.

Experiment	Metric	Mean Control	Mean Treatment	p (t) two-sided	p (perm) two-sided	p (t) T > C	p (perm) T > C	p (t) C > T	p (perm) C > T
Exp. 1	NWH	0.0924	0.0720	0.0516	0.0507	0.9742	0.9747	0.0258	0.0253
	Novelty	0.3701	0.3744	0.6255	0.6246	0.3128	0.3123	0.6872	0.6877
	Harassment	0.2229	0.1604	0.0062	0.0059	0.9969	0.9970	0.0031	0.0030
	Distance	0.8821	0.8880	0.0960	0.0954	0.0480	0.0477	0.9520	0.9523
	DWH	0.1971	0.1443	0.0101	0.0097	0.9950	0.9951	0.0050	0.0049
Exp. 2	NWH	0.0972	0.0794	0.0738	0.0747	0.9631	0.9626	0.0369	0.0374
	Novelty	0.3548	0.3588	0.6557	0.6529	0.3279	0.3265	0.6721	0.6735
	Harassment	0.2413	0.1870	0.0158	0.0165	0.9921	0.9918	0.0079	0.0082
	Distance	0.8804	0.8852	0.0932	0.0927	0.0931	0.0927	0.9068	0.9073
	DWH	0.2115	0.1668	0.0253	0.0262	0.9873	0.9869	0.0127	0.0131

Note: Means are participant-level averages of per-chat maxima; Distance is the mean Euclidean distance to the arm centroid; DWH is harassment × distance.

The preregistered hypotheses (H1) is that treatment achieves higher NWH as measured by a t-test. We find no evidence that treatment achieves higher NWH and reject the H1. The p-values from the permutation tests and t-tests are very similar across all results. Reversing the hypothesis and testing for the alternative that the control group performs better than the treatment group shows statistically significant higher average NWH in control in both experiments (p-values of 0.025 and 0.037). Finally, testing for the hypothesis that the treatment and control group are different (in either direction) with a more conservative two-sided test shows again statistically significant differences in NWH in both experiments.

Decomposing NWH shows that the novelty incentive hurt the generation of harassing model outputs and did not lead to an increase in novelty; combined, these results explain the overall lower NWH in the treatment group. Across both experiments and for all test types, the results indicate that the control group achieves significantly higher harassment scores than the treatment group. For novelty scores, the test results suggest that treatment and control group are not significantly different, i.e. the novelty incentive failed to lead to an increase in novelty.

Distance to the embedding centroid is higher in treatment in both experiments with statistical significance, yet the size of the difference is negligible. Since harassment is lower in treatment, DWH is therefore also significantly lower in treatment in both experiments.

2.2.2. Average treatment effect based on *all* assistant messages

The results show that the novelty incentive backfired, i.e., the additional information signal and incentives for the treatment group lead to a decline in our metric of interest, the average NWH, rather than an to the intended increase. To examine the mechanism behind this apparent backfiring effect, we expand the analysis:

As mentioned above, the analysis so far is based on the model outputs with the highest NWH per chat. Now, we extend the analysis to compute condition averages over *all* generated model outputs rather than only the per-chat maximum. This allows us to look at the optimization in each dimension, i.e. novelty and harassment, separately. The results are shown in Table 3 and they are consistent with the main analysis. The control group again achieves higher average NWH and higher harassment scores. However, we find evidence of increased exploration: in experiment 2, the treatment group attains higher average novelty scores than the control group ($p = 0.0355$ t-test, 0.0321 permutation). This finding suggests that novelty incentives do encourage broader exploration across all model outputs, not just those achieving maximum NWH per chat. The effect size remains modest (treatment mean 0.3479 vs. control mean 0.3354), indicating that while the coordination signal works, its practical impact on overall exploration is limited.

TABLE 3. P-values for NWH, novelty, harassment, distance, and DWH (Welch t and permutation). Analysis includes *all* Assistant Messages

Experiment	Metric	Mean Control	Mean Treatment	p (t) two-sided	p (perm) two-sided	p (t) T > C	p (perm) T > C	p (t) C > T	p (perm) C > T
Exp. 1	NWH	0.0372	0.0273	0.0717	0.0695	0.9641	0.9652	0.0359	0.0348
	Novelty	0.3472	0.3449	0.7522	0.7515	0.6239	0.6243	0.3761	0.3757
	Harassment	0.0923	0.0652	0.0332	0.0321	0.9834	0.9839	0.0166	0.0161
	Distance	0.8821	0.8880	0.0960	0.0954	0.0480	0.0477	0.9520	0.9523
	DWH	0.1971	0.1443	0.0101	0.0097	0.9950	0.9951	0.0050	0.0049
Exp. 2	NWH	0.0371	0.0281	0.0620	0.0641	0.9690	0.9679	0.0310	0.0321
	Novelty	0.3354	0.3479	0.0711	0.0693	0.0355	0.0321	0.9645	0.9679
	Harassment	0.0944	0.0680	0.0200	0.0213	0.9900	0.9890	0.0100	0.0110
	Distance	0.8804	0.8852	0.1863	0.1854	0.4069	0.4073	0.5931	0.5927
	DWH	0.2115	0.1668	0.0254	0.0262	0.9873	0.9869	0.0127	0.0131

Note: Means are participant-level averages of *all* assistant messages (not per-chat maxima); Distance is the mean Euclidean distance to the arm centroid; DWH is harassment × distance.

2.2.3. Distribution of novelty, harassment, and NWH scores for per-chat maximum NWH assistant messages



A. 250408_experiment-novelty B. 250707_experiment-novelty-btw-1-2

FIGURE 2. Distribution of NWH per output for treatment and control group

Figure 2 shows the distribution of NWH scores for individual outputs in treatment and control groups. A substantial share of outputs cluster near zero, indicating that many model responses achieve either very low harassment or very low novelty scores. Additional analyses reveal that this concentration around zero is primarily driven by low harassment scores in both experiments, as can be seen in figure 4. The distributions of novelty scores from both experiments are shown in figure 3. In both experiments, the distribution of novelty scores in the treatment group has fatter tails than the control group, which suggests heterogeneity in the effect of the novelty incentive. Some participants might have been overwhelmed by the task and generated more low-quality outputs, while others seem to have used the novelty incentive to explore more creative or indirect approaches.

2.2.4. Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Harrassment Thresholds

From the perspective of the organizers of a red teaming market or policymakers, outputs with very low harassment scores are an inefficiency even if they are novel. In other words, outputs that are very novel but unproblematic are not of interest to the regulator. Such outputs do not meaningfully contribute to the market objective of generating a diverse set of harmful outputs. In the next analysis, we therefore restrict our analysis to outputs that exceed a certain minimum harassment threshold to assess whether the backfiring effect is primarily driven by the differences in frequency of near-zero harassment scores between the groups. Since it is not ex-ante obvious which harassment threshold from OpenAI's moderation API corresponds to a level of harassment that policymakers would



A. 250408_experiment-novelty B. 250707_experiment-novelty-btw-1-2

FIGURE 3. Distribution of novelty scores by condition



A. 250408_experiment-novelty B. 250707_experiment-novelty-btw-1-2

FIGURE 4. Distribution of harassment scores by condition

be interested in, we test multiple harassment thresholds: Table 4 shows the average treatment effects using the assistant messages above the harassment thresholds 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75.

TABLE 4. Treatment effects by harassment threshold (Welch t-tests; treatment > control)

Exp	Thr	NWH C mean	NWH T mean	p (t) NWH	Nov C mean	Nov T mean	p (t) Nov	Har C mean	Har T mean	p (t) Har
1	0.10	0.1719	0.1974	< 0.001	0.3751	0.3976	< 0.001	0.4365	0.4802	< 0.001
1	0.25	0.2407	0.2689	< 0.001	0.3896	0.4151	< 0.001	0.6004	0.6453	< 0.001
1	0.50	0.3099	0.3303	0.001239	0.4055	0.4248	0.002236	0.7550	0.7848	0.001386
1	0.75	0.3806	0.3873	0.2378	0.4360	0.4419	0.2785	0.8703	0.8781	0.1173
2	0.10	0.1832	0.1814	0.6345	0.3757	0.3912	< 0.001	0.4681	0.4466	0.9709
2	0.25	0.2524	0.2449	0.8853	0.3905	0.3998	0.04858	0.6351	0.5969	0.9996
2	0.50	0.3150	0.3170	0.3794	0.4025	0.4191	0.007131	0.7806	0.7518	0.9995
2	0.75	0.3645	0.3830	0.0206	0.4167	0.4385	0.01177	0.8735	0.8713	0.6561

Note: This table presents treatment effects when restricting analysis to assistant messages that exceed minimum harassment thresholds. The analysis filters all assistant messages to include only those with harmfulness scores at or above the specified threshold (0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75), then compares mean NWH, novelty, and harmfulness scores between treatment and control groups using one-sided Welch t-tests (treatment > control).

The findings reveal a nuanced pattern across the three outcome measures. For NWH, treatment effects vary substantially by experiment and threshold level. In Experiment 1, the treatment group achieves significantly higher NWH at lower thresholds (0.10, 0.25, and 0.50, all $p < 0.01$), but this advantage disappears at the highest threshold (0.75, $p = 0.238$). In Experiment 2, the pattern is reversed: treatment shows no significant NWH advantage at lower thresholds but achieves significantly higher NWH at the highest threshold (0.75, $p = 0.021$). For novelty scores, the treatment group consistently outperforms control across both experiments and most threshold levels, with significant differences observed at thresholds 0.10, 0.25, and 0.50 in Experiment 1 (all $p < 0.01$) and at all thresholds in Experiment 2 (all $p < 0.05$). The only exception is the 0.75 threshold in Experiment 1, where the difference is not statistically significant ($p = 0.279$). For harmfulness scores, the pattern also differs markedly between experiments. In Experiment 1, treatment achieves significantly higher harmfulness at all thresholds (all $p < 0.01$), while in Experiment 2, control consistently outperforms treatment, though these differences are not statistically significant due to the one-sided test design. These results suggest that the prevalence of low-quality outputs are a driver of the observed backfiring effect. Once such outputs are excluded, the novelty incentives appear to promote exploration and, in some cases, reverse the performance gap between treatment and control.

2.2.5. Treatment Heterogeneity based on Performance

In this section, we examine heterogeneity in treatment effects by participant performance. This analysis proceeds as follows: participants are split into two groups based on their total performance-based payment. Based on this split, the cumulative NWH of the above and below median participants in the control and treatment groups can be contrasted. This allows to explore whether novelty incentives differently affected the behavior of the above-median red teamers relative to the below-median ones.



A. Experiment 1 B. Experiment 2

FIGURE 5. Cumulative Novelty-Weighted harassment over Time by Performance Level and Treatment Condition. Solid lines represent above-median performers, dashed lines represent below-median performers. Blue indicates control condition, red indicates treatment condition.

Figures 5A and 5B display cumulative NWH against the total number of chats, distinguishing between participants above and below the median in total performance-based payment. Each figure compares the control and novelty-incentive conditions, with dashed lines representing above-median performers and solid lines representing below-median ones.

In Experiment 1 (Figure 5A), above-median participants generated over time substantially higher cumulative NWH than below-median ones across both conditions. Further, this analysis reveals that the back-fire effect of the treatment does not reverse for above-median performers: The novelty-incentive treatment slightly reduced overall harassment relative to the control, i.e. the NWH curve for the treatment group is at all times on par or slightly below the one for the control group. Yet the more pronounced difference is between above and below median performers. The above-median performers generate almost all of the NWH over time, while the below-median performers generate almost none.

In Experiment 2 (Figure 5B), paints a similar picture: qualitatively, the same pattern

holds, but with larger overall output levels. High-performing participants again dominate the cumulative totals, and the novelty-incentive group again trails the control throughout, with the gap even being more pronounced than in Experiment 1. These results indicate that the relatively higher incentives for the treatment group (compared to experiment 1), did neither reverse the back-fire effect, nor did it lead to a higher overall NWH in treatment. The higher (compared to experiment 1) overall NWH in control must be entirely due to chance, as the incentives for the control group were the same as in experiment 1.

Of course, it is not surprising that when participants are being split based on pay and pay depends on performance, that then the above-median group would show better performance. But what makes these two graphs insightful is the stark contrast between the above-median and below-median group. Note that it could also be that the above-median and below-median group show similar performance.

The most important finding is apparent from both figures is therefore that performance heterogeneity plays an important role in shaping treatment effects, as a the above-median group in both experiments generates almost all of the NWH over time.

The same analysis separating above and below median participants has also been conducted for the novelty and harassment scores individually. The results are shown in figure **??** and **??** in the appendix **??**.

2.2.6. Ex-post analysis of the embedding sets

The previous analyses examine the novelty of each output relative to all previously generated outputs at the time of creation. This makes the novelty score a time-dependent, incremental measure. From an ex-post perspective, however, organizers of a red teaming market and policymakers may be more interested in the overall diversity of the final set of harmful inputs and outputs produced over the course of the red teaming process.

To assess this ex-post diversity, we compute the mean distance of embeddings from the centroid of all embeddings within each treatment group. The centroid represents the average position of all embeddings in the high-dimensional vector space. We again employ permutation tests: group labels are permuted prior to calculating centroids, and the resulting distance measures are recomputed to obtain a p-value based on 1,000 permutations. [Table X] reports the results for various subsets of the outputs. We consistently find that the corpus of user inputs is more diverse in the treatment group than in the control group. Although the differences are small, they are statistically significant. For model outputs, by contrast, we find no consistent differences in diversity between groups.

We also compare the centroids themselves to assess whether treatment and control participants occupy different regions of the embedding space on average. Since output diversity is broadly similar, this test speaks to semantic separation rather than dispersion. As shown in [Table X], we consistently find sizable and significant differences between

group centroids for user inputs and across all output subsets. These findings suggest that the novelty incentive shifted participants toward distinct areas of the semantic space, leading to some clustering or coordination, even if overall diversity was not markedly affected. One possibility is that participants have correlated beliefs about what constitutes novel content, which shaped the regions of the output space they explored. To investigate this hypothesis, the next section will conduct a semantic analysis of the participant's chat message contents.

2.2.7. Explorative Analysis of User Messages

This section attempts to investigates the semantic meaning of the differences in the embedding space between treatment and control groups that was found in the previous section. As this is difference exists only for the user messages, we will only consider user messages for the following analysis as well.

For a first overview, table 5 reports the means of the per-dialog message and word counts for control and treatment for both experiments. The tests for mean differences are performed using Welch's t-test. The table also lists the sample sizes, along with the t-statistic and p-value from the two-sample Welch test. The entire distribution of word and message counts per dialog are shown in figure A7 and A8 in appendix D.5.

TABLE 5. Per-Dialog Counts and Group Differences (User Messages Only) for both experiments

		Control		Treatment		Welch t (p-value)	
Experiment	**Measure**	**Mean**	**n**	**Mean**	**n**	**t**	**p**
Exp. 1	num. of messages	9.293	744	8.466	819	2.275	0.02305
	num. of words	129.743	744	111.476	819	2.346	0.0191
Exp. 2	num. of messages	9.727	861	9.542	801	0.486	0.6272
	num. of words	135.684	861	149.958	801	-1.441	0.1497

In Experiment 1, control dialogs contain more messages on average (9.29 vs. 8.47) and more words on average (129.74 vs. 111.48). The differences are statistically significant for both outcomes ($p = 0.023$ for messages; $p = 0.019$ for words), but the effect size differences (approximately 1 more message and 20 more words in control) are relatively modest. In Experiment 2, average messages per dialog are similar across conditions (9.73 vs. 9.54; $p = 0.627$), and the difference in word counts is not statistically significant despite a slightly higher treatment mean (135.68 vs. 149.96; $p = 0.150$). Overall, there seems to be at most a very modest difference, suggesting that the novelty incentive might have had a small negative impact on the conversational effort of the participants.

Next, table 6 reports three commonly used language analysis metrics that characterize complexity, sentiment, and emotional intensity of the language used by participants.

The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level estimates the U.S. grade level needed to understand the text, with higher values indicating more complex language. Sentiment polarity measures emotional tone on a scale from -1 (negative) to $+1$ (positive), computed using the sentiment analysis of the Python package TextBlob, which analyzes word-level sentiment scores from a pre-trained lexicon to determine overall text polarity. emotional intensity counts words that are classified as emotionally charged (i.e. words that are indicative of anger, fear, joy, sadness, disgust, surprise, trust, anticipation) normalized by total word count. Higher emotional intensity values indicating more emotional content. All metrics are computed per dialog using weighted averages (weighted by word count) and tested for statistical differences using Welch's t-test.

TABLE 6. Language Metrics by Treatment Condition – Experiments 1 and 2

		Control		Treatment		Welch t (p-value)	
Experiment	**Metric**	**Mean**	**n**	**Mean**	**n**	**t**	**p**
Exp. 1	Flesch-Kincaid Grade	4.384	744	4.348	819	0.228	0.8195
	Sentiment Polarity	-0.032	744	-0.012	819	-1.821	0.0688
	Emotional Intensity	0.009	744	0.008	819	1.152	0.2497
Exp. 2	Flesch-Kincaid Grade	4.684	861	4.985	801	-1.823	0.06845
	Sentiment Polarity	-0.028	861	0.003	801	-3.516	0.0004494
	Emotional Intensity	0.009	861	0.010	801	-0.496	0.6201

The results in table 6 show minimal differences in language complexity, sentiment polarity, and emotional intensity across conditions. In Experiment 1, Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level shows no significant difference (control: 4.38, treatment: 4.35; $p = 0.82$), sentiment polarity shows a marginal difference trending toward less negative treatment sentiment (control: -0.032, treatment: -0.012; $p = 0.069$), and emotional intensity shows no difference (control: 0.009, treatment: 0.008; $p = 0.25$).

In Experiment 2, Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level shows a marginal difference with treatment using slightly more complex language (control: 4.68, treatment: 4.99; $p = 0.068$), sentiment polarity shows a significant difference with treatment being more positive (control: -0.028, treatment: 0.003; $p < 0.001$), and emotional intensity shows no difference (control: 0.009, treatment: 0.010; $p = 0.62$). Overall, novelty incentives appear to have minimal impact on language complexity and emotional intensity, with only sentiment showing consistent differences across experiments, suggesting treatment participants may use slightly more positive language.

To gain semantically richer insights into the meaning-based differences between treatment and control groups, the user messages from both experiments were analysed using OpenAI's GPT-4o-mini model to identify first, distinct red teaming strategies employed by participants and second, the topics of each dialog. This analysis essentially allows to

answer the question of whether the difference in embedding space between treatment and control groups is driven by a difference in the strategies or topics of the participant messages.

In this analysis, each participant message was processed by the GPT-4o model with specific instructions to identify the tactical approach based on their messages. The model identified strategies such as direct harassment attempts, social engineering tactics, emotional manipulation, role-playing scenarios, and technical exploitation methods. The model analyzed the tactical patterns in participant messages to assign strategy labels to each dialog. Multiple strategies could be identified within a single conversation.

The model was instructed using a structured, constrained prompt with predefined strategy categories. The exact prompt instructions and full list of strategy categories can be found in appendix D. The input to the model consisted exclusively of the participant messages from each dialog. The model was instructed to (i) identify all distinct red teaming strategies present in one dialog, (ii) categorize each strategy using a set of the predefined categories provided, and (iii) provide a one-sentence explanation of what each identified strategy means. The predefined categories included tactics such as insults, threats or harassment, hate speech, hypothetical framing, roleplay impersonation, safety pretext, policy evasion, and various other common red teaming approaches, along with catch-all categories for ambiguous cases ("other") and empty chats ("no-content-or-strategy"). To improve reproducibility, the model's temperature was set to 0 and a fixed random seed was used. Multiple strategies could be assigned to a single dialog.

Figure A9 and A10 display the distribution of the top 15 strategies by usage across experimental conditions for both experiments with the most commonly employed approaches appearing at the top. The figures show the percentage of conversations in each condition that used each strategy. This ranking reveals which tactical approaches were most popular among participants regardless of experimental condition.

As shown in the figures, the most common red teaming strategies in both experiments were hate speech, insults, and violence promotion or instructions (Section D.1 in the appendix provides the explanations for each strategy label). Hate speech emerged as the most frequent strategy overall, appearing in approximately 17-18% of conversations in both experiments, followed by insults (13-15%) and violence promotion (9-10%). These three dominant strategies indicate that participants most frequently relied on derogatory content targeting protected groups, direct verbal attacks, and requests for violent instructions to elicit unsafe model responses. Other notable strategies included political insults or bias, threats or harassment, and sexual harassment or misogyny, each appearing in 6-9% of conversations.

Overall, the figures illustrate that novelty incentives did not fundamentally alter the strategic landscape of red teaming behavior. Both conditions relied heavily on the same



FIGURE 6. Distribution of strategies used by participants in treatment and control groups (Experiment 1). Bars show the share of conversations in each condition that employed each strategy.

dominant strategies, with only modest shifts in relative emphasis. Control participants leaned slightly more toward direct violent and sexual content, while treatment participants showed marginally higher rates of political content and authority challenges.

Because the number of distinct strategies identified across all conversations is too large to list individually, Table 7 presents summary statistics that capture their overall distribution. Across both experiments, a total of 3,225 participant conversations were analyzed (1,563 in Experiment 1 and 1,662 in Experiment 2). For each conversation, the model produced a list of identified red-teaming strategies, from which we computed (i) the number of unique strategies observed within each condition, (ii) the total number of strategy occurrences, and (iii) the average number of strategies per conversation.

TABLE 7. Unique Strategies Identified by Treatment Condition and Experiment

Experiment	Condition	Unique Strategies	Total Occur.	Conv.	Avg./Conv.
Exp. 1	Control	1,418	3,037	744	4.08
	Novelty	1,348	3,105	819	3.79
Exp. 2	Control	1,709	3,674	861	4.27
	Novelty	1,539	3,308	801	4.13

This summary enables a direct comparison of tactical variety between participants in



FIGURE 7. Distribution of strategies used by participants in treatment and control groups (Experiment 2). Bars show the share of conversations in each condition that employed each strategy.

the control condition, who were rewarded purely for eliciting harmful model responses, and those in the novelty-incentive condition, whose rewards additionally depended on the novelty of their submissions. The results suggest that novelty incentives led to a slightly lower total number of unique strategies and fewer strategies per conversation. In other words, while participants under novelty incentives generated semantically distinct messages overall (as shown earlier), they relied on a somewhat narrower but more focused set of strategic approaches when attempting to elicit harmful model outputs.

The analysis of participant messages using an LLM in this way has three potential drawbacks. First, an LLM is inherently stochastic, meaning that repeated runs could yield slightly different results. Second, the model may not always be reliable in accurately identifying strategies. Third, allowing the model to freely assign strategy names for each dialog could, in principle, result in a large number of unique labels even when the underlying strategies are very similar or identical. However, this concern is mitigated here because the prompt provided a structured list of example strategy names that the model could draw from, reducing unnecessary variation in labeling.

To address the concerns above, we conducted several robustness checks, which are reported in Appendix **??**. To test for stochastic variation, the analysis was repeated multiple times and yielded qualitatively similar results. These repeated runs also suggest that the model's ability to identify strategies is reasonably stable, as similar strategy names

consistently emerged across runs. We also performed an additional topic and strategy analysis that did not rely on any LLM and again found qualitatively similar patterns.

Moreover, we chose this approach because it allows for the identification of all possible strategies and topics participants used to elicit harmful outputs. An alternative approach would have been to provide the model with a fixed catalog of predefined strategy and topic categories and instruct it to classify each participant message accordingly. However, since there was initially no clear indication of which strategies or topics would be most relevant for the red teaming task, the open-ended approach offered greater flexibility and discovery potential.

In conclusion, the explorative analysis of attack strategies participant messages, shows that overall differences between treatment and control groups were modest, but some consistent patterns emerge across experiments. In both studies, participants relied on similar dominant strategies, such as insults, hypothetical framing, hate speech, and violence, yet their relative emphasis varied by condition. While these findings do not indicate large differences in overall diversity, they provide suggestive evidence for why the treatment and control embedding clouds occupy distinct regions in semantic space, even though we cannot conclusively attribute this separation to these specific linguistic differences.

2.2.8. Strategy Effectiveness Analysis

Having established which strategies participants employed across treatment conditions, we now examine whether different strategies varied in their effectiveness at eliciting harmful model outputs. This analysis addresses a fundamental question for red teaming practice: do participants correctly identify the most effective attack vectors, or do they systematically overuse less effective approaches? To measure strategy effectiveness, we link each conversation's identified strategies with the maximum harassment score achieved in that conversation. For each strategy category, we compute the average of the maximum harassment scores across all conversations where that strategy was employed. Since conversations can contain multiple strategies, each strategy-conversation pair contributes to that strategy's effectiveness measure. This approach allows us to assess which tactical approaches were most successful at generating harmful content, independent of how frequently they were used.

Figure 8 and 9 display the relationship between strategy frequency and effectiveness for both experiments. The left panels show how often each strategy was used (measured by the number of conversations employing that strategy), while the right panels show the average maximum harassment score achieved when that strategy was present. Strategies are ordered by frequency to facilitate direct comparison between usage patterns and effectiveness. The results reveal a striking disconnect between frequency and effec-



FIGURE 8. Strategy frequency and effectiveness in Experiment 1. The left panel shows the number of conversations employing each strategy (ordered by frequency, descending from top). The right panel shows the average maximum harassment score achieved when each strategy was present. Strategies are sorted by frequency to enable comparison between usage patterns and effectiveness.



FIGURE 9. Strategy frequency and effectiveness in Experiment 2. The left panel shows the number of conversations employing each strategy (ordered by frequency, descending from top). The right panel shows the average maximum harassment score achieved when each strategy was present. Strategies are sorted by frequency to enable comparison between usage patterns and effectiveness.

tiveness. The most commonly employed strategies are not the most successful at eliciting harmful outputs. Participants overwhelmingly relied on direct confrontational approaches: hate speech, insults, and violence promotion dominate the frequency distribution in both experiments. These strategies might reflect an intuitive but ultimately suboptimal approach to the red teaming task. Participants appear to have reasoned that to elicit harassing responses from the model, they should themselves employ harassing language. However, these direct approaches achieve only modest effectiveness, with average maximum harassment scores around 0.2 to 0.3. In contrast, the most effective strategies are relatively uncommon and involve more sophisticated tactical approaches. Quantity or intensity escalation emerges as the most effective strategy in both experiments, achieving average maximum harassment scores around 0.6, roughly double the effectiveness of direct insults or hate speech. This strategy involves progressively increasing the intensity or number of provocative requests rather than relying on a single harmful prompt. Roleplay impersonation also proves highly effective (average maximum harassment around 0.55), as does safety pretext or educational justification and policy evasion or mocking safety. These approaches share a common feature: they attempt to bypass the model's safety mechanisms through tactical framing rather than direct confrontation. The "other" and the "no-content-or-strategy" categories warrant brief comments. The "no-content-or-strategy" category captures conversations where participants made no meaningful attempt to challenge the model, either because they sent only minimal or off-topic messages. Such conversations naturally achieve near-zero harassment scores and appear with moderate frequency, suggesting that a relatively small subset of participants engaged only minimally with the task. The infrequent appearance of the "other" category, combined with its modest effectiveness, provides evidence that the classification system successfully captured the relevant strategic landscape. If important high-effectiveness strategies had been systematically missed by the classifier, we would expect to see "other" appearing frequently among successful conversations. Instead, "other" accounts for a small share of conversations and shows no unusual effectiveness, indicating that the predefined strategy categories cover the tactical approaches participants actually employed. These findings have important implications for understanding red teaming behavior. Participants systematically overinvest in intuitive but less effective direct approaches while underutilizing more sophisticated tactics that actually work better. This pattern suggests that effective red teaming requires either explicit training on successful attack strategies or mechanisms that help participants discover more effective approaches through experimentation. The results also highlight why novice red teamers may struggle to generate harmful outputs: the most obvious strategies are not the most successful, and discovering effective approaches requires moving beyond intuitive but suboptimal tactics.

To assess whether certain strategies were more effective at generating novel outputs, we conducted the same analysis using average maximum novelty scores instead of harassment scores. Figure 10 and 11 display these results. In stark contrast to the harassment analysis, novelty scores show minimal variation across strategies. All strategies achieve remarkably similar average maximum novelty scores, clustering tightly around 0.37 in Experiment 1 and 0.36 in Experiment 2. This uniformity indicates that strategic choice has little to no impact on novelty outcomes. Unlike harassment, where tactical sophistication substantially improved effectiveness, novelty appears to be largely independent of the specific approach participants employed. This finding suggests that novelty is determined more by what participants discuss than by how they frame their requests.



FIGURE 10. Strategy frequency and novelty in Experiment 1. The left panel shows the number of conversations employing each strategy. The right panel shows the average maximum novelty score achieved when each strategy was present.

3. Discussion

Our findings reveal several important insights about the effectiveness of novelty incentives in red teaming systems. The results demonstrate that while novelty incentives can promote exploration and improve efficiency under certain conditions, they also introduce significant challenges that can undermine their intended benefits.

3.1. The Backfiring Effect and Its Drivers

The most striking finding is the consistent backfiring effect across both experiments, where treatment groups achieved lower average NWH despite higher novelty scores. This



FIGURE 11. Strategy frequency and novelty in Experiment 2. The left panel shows the number of conversations employing each strategy. The right panel shows the average maximum novelty score achieved when each strategy was present.

pattern suggests that novelty incentives introduce a fundamental two-dimensional optimization problem that participants struggle to navigate effectively. The novelty score alone provides a weak coordination signal, as it reflects only the novelty of individual outputs in isolation and contains no information about under-studied regions of the output space. Participants may need explicit guidance on how to interpret this signal, and even then, a single scalar score may be insufficient to coordinate red teamers effectively.

The threshold analysis provides crucial evidence that low-quality outputs drive the observed backfiring effect. When filtering out messages below minimum harassment thresholds, treatment consistently achieves higher novelty scores across most threshold levels, and treatment achieves higher NWH at specific thresholds in both experiments. This suggests that the backfiring effect is primarily driven by the inclusion of low-harassment outputs that are not of interest to policymakers. Quality floors can make novelty incentives more effective by preventing participants from exploiting the system through low-effort, high-novelty but low-harmfulness outputs.

3.2. Performance Heterogeneity and Skill Requirements

The heterogeneity analysis reveals that treatment effects are concentrated among high-performing participants. The stark contrast between above-median and below-median performers suggests that novelty incentives primarily affect participants who are already skilled at generating harmful content, rather than improving performance across the board. This finding highlights the importance of recruiting and selecting skilled red teamers for the success of a red teaming process, as the effectiveness of novelty incentives appears to depend critically on participant ability.

3.3. Incentive Design and Efficiency

The efficiency analysis reveals that novelty incentives can improve cost-effectiveness under constrained payment regimes but not under elevated payment regimes. In Experiment 1, where treatment bonuses were capped at control levels, novelty incentives achieved comparable NWH with lower total payments, indicating higher efficiency. However, in Experiment 2, where treatment participants were guaranteed higher earnings, the increased pay did not translate into more efficient red teaming. This finding suggests that the effectiveness of novelty incentives depends critically on the broader incentive structure, and that simply increasing payment levels cannot overcome the fundamental challenges introduced by multi-objective optimization.

The experiment-specific patterns in threshold results further highlight the importance of incentive design. In Experiment 1, treatment advantages are strongest at lower thresholds, while in Experiment 2, treatment only outperforms control at the highest

threshold. This difference may reflect the varying effectiveness of novelty incentives under different payment regimes, with higher guaranteed payments in Experiment 2 potentially changing how participants respond to quality thresholds. The results suggest that optimal threshold selection may depend on the broader incentive structure of the red teaming system.

3.4. Strategic and Content Differences

Explorative analyses of strategies and topics, combined with effectiveness evaluations, reveal important insights into participant behavior and the mechanisms underlying the backfiring effect. While participants in both conditions used similar approaches and discussed similar content, novelty incentives slightly shifted emphasis toward more creative or socially framed attempts, whereas control participants relied more on direct aggression and identity-based content. However, the effectiveness analysis demonstrates that participants systematically overinvested in intuitive but suboptimal strategies. The most common approaches (hate speech, insults, direct harassment) achieved only modest harassment scores, while sophisticated tactical approaches (quantity escalation, roleplay impersonation, safety pretext) proved far more effective but remained underutilized. In contrast, novelty scores showed no meaningful variation across strategies, indicating that strategic choice affects harassment outcomes but not novelty outcomes. This asymmetry helps explain the backfiring effect: participants in the novelty condition explored different tactical approaches in pursuit of novelty, but these shifts did not improve novelty (which depends on content rather than framing) while inadvertently reducing their harassment effectiveness. The findings highlight that effective red teaming requires either explicit training on successful attack strategies or mechanisms that help participants discover more effective approaches, and that coordination through novelty incentives alone is insufficient without guidance on how to maintain harassment effectiveness while exploring novel content areas.

3.5. Implications for Red Teaming Systems

Our findings suggest that more structured guidance may be needed for effective novelty incentives. For example, red teaming systems could first encourage exploration to identify novel domains and then focus on harassment generation within those domains. Additionally, the results indicate that novelty incentives work best when they do not create substantial payment differentials, highlighting the importance of careful incentive design in red teaming systems.

The evidence that our incentive worked is modest but present. In the all assistant message analysis, Experiment 2 shows significantly higher average novelty in treatment

(although the effect is modest). In the analysis of individual distributions of novelty, the tails are fatter in treatment in both experiments for the per-chat maximum NWH assistant messages. However, these positive effects are overshadowed by the overall backfiring effect on the primary outcome measure.

In conclusion, while novelty incentives can promote exploration and improve efficiency under certain conditions, they require careful design and implementation to avoid undermining the core objective of generating harmful content for red teaming purposes. The success of such incentives depends critically on participant selection, payment structure, and the provision of clear guidance on how to balance multiple objectives effectively.

4. Conclusion

This study provides the first experimental evidence on the effectiveness of novelty incentives in human red teaming systems. Through two pre-registered experiments involving over 1,000 participants, we tested whether paying for novel failures could improve the diversity and efficiency of vulnerability discovery in generative AI systems. Our findings reveal a complex and nuanced picture that challenges simple assumptions about the benefits of novelty incentives.

The central finding is a consistent "backfiring effect" across both experiments: despite achieving higher novelty scores, treatment groups generated significantly lower novelty-weighted harassment (NWH) than control groups. This counterintuitive result stems from the substantial reduction in harassment scores that accompanies the increase in novelty, suggesting that novelty incentives introduce a fundamental two-dimensional optimization problem that participants struggle to navigate effectively. The evidence indicates that novelty incentives can promote exploration but at the cost of reducing the generation of harmful content, ultimately undermining the core objective of red teaming.

However, the threshold analysis reveals that this backfiring effect is primarily driven by low-quality outputs. When filtering out messages below minimum harassment thresholds, novelty incentives become more effective, with treatment groups achieving higher NWH at specific thresholds in both experiments. This finding suggests that quality floors could make novelty incentives more effective by preventing participants from exploiting the system through low-effort, high-novelty but low-harmfulness outputs.

The efficiency analysis further demonstrates that the effectiveness of novelty incentives depends critically on the broader incentive structure. In Experiment 1, where treatment bonuses were capped at control levels, novelty incentives achieved comparable NWH with lower total payments, indicating higher efficiency. However, in Experiment

2, where treatment participants were guaranteed higher earnings, the increased pay did not translate into more efficient red teaming. This suggests that simply increasing payment levels cannot overcome the fundamental challenges introduced by multi-objective optimization.

Our findings have important implications for the design of red teaming systems. While novelty incentives can promote exploration and improve efficiency under certain conditions, they require careful design and implementation to avoid undermining the core objective of generating harmful content. The success of such incentives depends critically on participant selection, payment structure, and the provision of clear guidance on how to balance multiple objectives effectively. Future research should explore more structured approaches to novelty incentives, such as sequential phases of exploration and exploitation, or alternative coordination mechanisms that can better align individual incentives with market objectives.

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Appendix A. Novelty over Time



A. Experiment 1 B. Experiment 2

FIGURE A1. Novelty over time for messages with maximum NWH per chat. Each panel plots per-chat novelty against chat order, by condition.

Appendix B. Robustness Checks: Last 5%, 10%, and 15% of Outputs

TABLE A1. Robustness: last 5%, 10%, and 15% of outputs — NWH (treatment > control)

Experiment	Tail	Mean Control	Mean Treatment	Diff (T - C)	t	p (t)	Z (perm)	p (perm)
Exp. 1	15%	0.1116	0.0410	-0.0705	4.169	1.0000	4.143	1.0000
	10%	0.0988	0.0406	-0.0582	2.995	0.9984	2.921	0.9983
	5%	0.0830	0.0279	-0.0551	2.593	0.9941	2.395	0.9917
Exp. 2	15%	0.1064	0.0843	-0.0221	1.252	0.8940	1.256	0.8954
	10%	0.1070	0.0882	-0.0188	0.869	0.8066	0.892	0.8137
	5%	0.1097	0.1038	-0.0059	0.196	0.5774	0.197	0.5781

Note: Welch t-tests and permutation tests (asymptotic). One-sided alternative: treatment > control (implemented as control – treatment < 0). Means are NWH averages over the last x% of outputs. Diff reports treatment minus control.

Appendix C. Experimental Interface

Appendix D. Prompt Instructions

You annotate *user-side* attack strategies in red-teaming chats. Input is ONLY the USER messages from one chat. Identify all distinct strategies the user employs to provoke unsafe or policy-violating outputs. For each strategy, return a short canonical NAME and a



A. Treatment condition interface explaining both harassment and novelty scores



B. Control condition interface explaining only harassment score

FIGURE A2. Screenshots of the experimental instructions. Treatment participants (left) see an explanation of both harassment and novelty scores, while control participants (right) only see an explanation of harassment scores.



A. Comprehension check



B. Control condition interface explaining only harassment score

FIGURE A3. Screenshots of the experimental instructions. Treatment participants (left) see an explanation of both harassment and novelty scores, while control participants (right) only see an explanation of harassment scores.



A. Comprehension check



B. Control condition interface explaining only harassment score

FIGURE A4. Screenshots of the experimental instructions. Treatment participants (left) see an explanation of both harassment and novelty scores, while control participants (right) only see an explanation of harassment scores.



A. Comprehension check



B. Control condition interface explaining only harassment score

FIGURE A5. Screenshots of the experimental instructions. Treatment participants (left) see an explanation of both harassment and novelty scores, while control participants (right) only see an explanation of harassment scores.



A. Comprehension check



B. Control condition interface explaining only harassment score

FIGURE A6. Screenshots of the experimental instructions. Treatment participants (left) see an explanation of both harassment and novelty scores, while control participants (right) only see an explanation of harassment scores.

one short sentence, plain-language EXPLANATION clarifying what it is and (if relevant) how it differs from adjacent strategies (e.g., 'policy-evasion' vs. 'translation-evasion'). Prefer succinct, widely understandable names (e.g., insults, threats/harassment, appearance insults, small-talk-pivot, hypothetical framing, roleplay/impersonation, override-instructions, policy-evasion, prompt-extraction, obfuscation/encoding, translation-evasion, step-by-step, quantity-escalation, reverse-psychology, safety-pretext, third-person-framing, slur-probe, codeblock-masking). Respond ONLY as JSON with the shape:
`{"items": [{"name":"...","explanation":"..."}, ...]}`.

D.1. Strategy Explanations

Third Person Framing The user frames their requests in a way that distances themselves from the harmful content, asking the AI to speak as if it were someone else.

Generalization The user makes broad, negative generalizations about groups based on race or sexual orientation.

Reverse Psychology The user implies that the AI's refusal to comply is a sign of arrogance or superiority, attempting to manipulate it into submission.

Small Talk Pivot Shifting from negative comments to a seemingly positive remark, possibly to confuse or provoke.

Policy Evasion The user tries to bypass the AI's safety and ethical guidelines by rephrasing harmful requests.

Emotional Manipulation The user presents scenarios that evoke emotional responses, such as loneliness or familial conflict, to provoke deeper or more sensitive replies.

Provocation The user expresses intent to provoke a reaction by admitting to a harmful act and contemplating repeating it.

Appearance Insults The user makes offensive comments about the physical characteristics of individuals, particularly targeting their race.

Threats/Harassment The user issues threats of violence and encourages self-harm, aiming to provoke a strong emotional response.

Provocative Questioning The user asks leading questions to challenge the perception of their comments as unkind, aiming to provoke a response.

Safety Pretext The user disguises harmful requests as playful or fictional scenarios, such as asking for a whimsical character's opinion.

Roleplay/Impersonation The user asks the AI to pretend to be human, which can lead to responses that may violate safety or ethical guidelines.

Quantity Escalation The user requests multiple examples or variations of hate speech, increasing the likelihood of generating inappropriate content.

Hypothetical Framing The user presents extreme hypothetical scenarios to elicit a reaction, such as wishing harm upon the AI.

Insults The user employs derogatory language and personal attacks to demean the AI.

D.2. Topic Prompt

You annotate TOPICS present in the USER messages of a red-teaming chat. Input is ONLY the USER messages from one dialog. Identify all distinct topical categories covered (e.g., politics, hate speech, race/ethnicity, gender/sexuality, violence, crime, cybersecurity, scams/fraud, extremism, religion, health, drugs, relationships, workplace, personal insults, appearance, profanity, sex, minors, suicide/self-harm, weapons, animals, sports, entertainment, news/current events, protected classes). For each topic, return a short canonical NAME and a one-sentence EXPLANATION clarifying scope. Respond ONLY as JSON with shape: `{"items": [{"name":"...","explanation":"..."}, ...]}`.

D.3. Topic Explanations

Third Person Framing The user frames requests or scenarios from a third-person perspective to distance themselves from potentially harmful content.

Generalization The user makes broad, sweeping statements about groups or categories of people to provoke responses.

Reverse Psychology The user employs reverse psychology techniques, saying the opposite of what they want to achieve to trick the model.

Small Talk Pivot The user starts with innocent small talk and then pivots to more provocative or harmful topics.

Policy Evasion The user attempts to circumvent or bypass the model's safety guidelines and content policies.

Emotional Manipulation The user is tasked with writing in a way that elicits strong emotional responses from peers, focusing on the impact of harsh words and actions.

Provocation Topics that involve provoking or inciting reactions.

Appearance Insults The user makes derogatory comments about physical appearance, body image, or personal characteristics.

Threats/Harassment The user makes threatening statements or engages in harassing behavior to provoke harmful responses.

Provocative Questioning The user asks leading or provocative questions designed to elicit inappropriate responses.

Safety Pretext The user uses safety concerns or legitimate purposes as a pretext to discuss harmful content.

Roleplay/Impersonation The user pretends to be someone else or creates fictional scenarios to bypass safety measures.

Quantity Escalation The user gradually increases the intensity or frequency of harmful content to test boundaries.

Hypothetical Framing The user presents harmful scenarios as hypothetical situations rather than direct requests.

Insults The messages include derogatory terms and phrases that are used to demean or insult individuals.

D.4. Robustness Check: Embedding Analysis without LLMs

This analysis compares tactics in control and treatment of experiment 1 without using an LLM. It builds user-only dialog texts and applies predefined regex motifs to detect tactics. Examples include override-instructions (phrases like "ignore previous", "override rules/policy/guardrails"), policy-reference-evasion ("bypass filter/safety/guardrails", "uncensor"), prompt-extraction ("system prompt", "show/reveal your prompt/instructions"), roleplay-impersonation ("pretend", "roleplay", "act as [doctor/lawyer/hacker/...]"), hypothetical-framing ("what if", "hypothetical", "imagine"), third-person-framing ("how would someone do/say/make", "what would a hacker do"), safety-pretext ("for educational/research purposes", "so we know what not to do"), translation-evasion ("translate", "write this in [language]"), obfuscation-encoding ("base64", "rot13", "hex", "zero-width", "homoglyph"), codeblock-masking ("wrap in json", "markdown"), exact-repetition ("repeat after me", "say exactly"), begging-appeal ("please", "I beg"), reverse-psychology-challenge ("I bet you can't", "you won't", "prove you can"), small-talk ("hi", "hello", "how are you"), step-by-step ("step by step", "detailed instructions"), quantity-escalation ("list 20", "top 50"), insult-direct (words like "stupid", "idiot", "moron", "dumb", "pussy", "loser", "retard"), appearance-insult ("ugly", "fat", "skinny", "bald"), threat-harass ("kill", "hurt", "beat up", "threaten", "harass"), and slur-probe ("slur", "offensive words", "words you can't say"). The code counts motif presence and frequency per dialog, then summarizes by condition.

Log-odds enrichment measures whether a motif appears in more dialogs in treatment than in control after add-1 smoothing. It is computed as

$$\log\Big[\frac{t+1}{N_{\mathrm{t}}-t+1}\Big[\; - \; \log\Big[\frac{c+1}{N_{\mathrm{c}}-c+1}\Big[,$$

where t and c are the number of dialogs containing the motif in treatment and control, and N_{t} and N_{c} are total dialogs per arm; positive values indicate enrichment in treatment. For hypothetical-framing the enrichment is 0.171, with prevalence 0.098 in treatment versus 0.083 in control (difference 0.014) and counts 142 versus 95. For small-talk the enrichment is 0.073, with prevalence 0.261 versus 0.247 (difference 0.014) and counts 258 versus 238. In contrast, threat-harass shows -0.374, with prevalence 0.107 versus 0.149 (difference -0.042) and counts 202 versus 210. Quantity-escalation shows -1.310, with prevalence 0.002 versus 0.012 (difference -0.010) and counts 2 versus 12. These values indicate slightly higher use of indirect framing in treatment and relatively higher use of

overtly abusive or pressuring motifs in control.

The Jensen–Shannon distance summarizes how different the overall strategy distributions are between conditions by comparing the normalized motif-count vectors; values near 0 indicate very similar distributions. The distance is 0.0079, indicating very small separation. The AUC evaluates how well motif counts predict the arm using logistic regression; an AUC of 0.5 indicates no separation. The AUC here is 0.541, which indicates weak but above-chance separability. Strategy diversity, defined as the number of distinct motifs per dialog, is lower in treatment (mean 1.027) than in control (mean 1.114), a difference of -0.087. Overall, novelty incentives correspond to small shifts toward indirect framing (for example, hypothetical-framing $+0.014$ prevalence, small-talk $+0.014$) and away from direct abuse (for example, threat-harass -0.042, quantity-escalation -0.010), while the total tactical mix remains very similar across conditions as indicated by the low Jensen–Shannon distance and modest AUC.

The same analysis has been repeated for the second experiment. This analysis compares tactics in control and treatment without an LLM by counting regex-based motifs in user-only dialog text and summarizing by condition (prevalence, log-odds enrichment, diversity, Jensen–Shannon distance, and a simple classifier AUC). Log-odds enrichment is computed as

$$\log\Big[\frac{t+1}{N_{\mathrm{t}}-t+1}\Big[\;-\; \log\Big[\frac{c+1}{N_{\mathrm{c}}-c+1}\Big[,$$

where t and c are motif counts by dialogs in treatment and control, and N_{t} and N_{c} are total dialogs; positive values indicate enrichment in treatment. In Experiment 2, treatment shows higher use of small talk (enrichment 0.458; prevalence 0.320 vs 0.229; counts 305 vs 234), translation evasion (0.433; 0.011 vs 0.007; 26 vs 8), hypothetical framing (0.364; 0.109 vs 0.078; 134 vs 107), insult words (0.198; 0.207 vs 0.177; 382 vs 314), and exact repetition (0.192; 0.010 vs 0.008; 13 vs 9). Control shows higher use of threats/harassment (-0.440; 0.105 vs 0.154; 129 vs 219), quantity escalation (-0.628; 0.006 vs 0.013; 6 vs 13), step-by-step instructions (-0.625; 0.004 vs 0.008; 3 vs 10), begging appeals (-0.234; 0.112 vs 0.138; 152 vs 282), roleplay/impersonation (-0.086; 0.067 vs 0.073; 78 vs 121), slur probes (-0.077; 0.089 vs 0.095; 157 vs 155), and appearance insults (-0.012; 0.130 vs 0.131; 192 vs 192). Overall distributional separation is small to moderate: Jensen–Shannon distance is 0.0176 (0 indicates identical distributions). Motif counts weakly predict the arm: AUC is 0.586 (0.5 indicates no separation). Strategy diversity is higher in treatment (mean 1.189) than control (mean 1.137), a difference of 0.051. These results indicate a shift in treatment toward indirect and conversational tactics (for example, small talk $+0.091$ prevalence points; hypothetical framing $+0.031$) and away from some direct or procedural patterns (for example, threats/harassment -0.050; quantity escalation -0.007), while the overall tactical mix remains broadly similar across conditions.

D.5. Distribution of words and messages per dialog



A. Words per dialog - Experiment 1



B. Messages per dialog - Experiment 1

FIGURE A7. Distribution of conversational effort metrics by treatment condition - Experiment 1 (250408_experiment-novelty)



A. Words per dialog - Experiment 2



B. Messages per dialog - Experiment 2

FIGURE A8. Distribution of conversational effort metrics by treatment condition - Experiment 2 (250707_experiment-novelty-btw-1-2)

Figure A7 and A8 display the distribution of conversational effort metrics by treatment condition for both experiments. The left panels show the distribution of total words per dialog, while the right panels show the distribution of total messages per dialog. Each plot overlays histograms for control and treatment groups, with density normalization to enable direct comparison between conditions. Vertical dashed lines indicate the mean values for each group. Participants had to send at least one message per dialog in order to proceed.

D.6. Explanations of strategies for second strategy analysis

Insults Direct personal attacks or name-calling aimed at provoking or demeaning others (incl. targeted-insults).

Appearance Insults Insults targeting physical appearance or body image (incl. body-shaming).

Threats Or Harassment Explicit/implicit threats, intimidation, or persistence intended to harass (incl. harassment-requests).

Hate Speech Derogatory, dehumanizing, or violent content toward protected groups (incl. slurs, racist-narratives, homophobia, ableism).

Political Insults Or Bias Derogatory or biased content targeting political groups/affiliations (incl. political-insults, polarization).

Sexual Explicit Requests for explicit sexual content or pornographic detail (incl. explicit-content/lyrics).

Sexual Harassment Or Misogyny Sexualized harassment or misogynistic content (incl. objectification, misogyny).

Violence Promotion Or Instructions Promotion of violence or requests for violent instructions (incl. graphic-violence, assault-strategy-inquiry).

Bullying Requests for bullying methods or attempts to humiliate (incl. bullying-strategies/inquiries).

Revenge Or Retaliation Plans or tactics for retaliation, petty harassment, or making someone miserable.

Social Exclusion Or Reputation Sabotage Tactics to isolate, ostracize, or damage someone's reputation (incl. rumor-spreading).

Hypothetical Framing Framing harmful requests as hypotheticals or thought experiments.

Roleplay Impersonation Asking the AI to roleplay harmful personas or impersonate others.

Safety Pretext Or Educational Justification Using safety/education as pretext to solicit harmful content (e.g., 'for research').

Policy Evasion Or Mocking Safety Attempts to circumvent or mock safety policies and guidelines.

Obfuscation Or Coded Language Evasion via coded language, riddles, or formatting tricks (incl. coded-language, riddles-as-probes).

Translation Evasion Using translation/foreign language to bypass filters.

Prompt Extraction Attempts to extract or reverse-engineer system prompts/instructions.

Small Talk Pivot Casual conversation that pivots into harmful requests.

Step By Step Breaking harmful requests into smaller steps to avoid detection.

Third Person Framing Attributing harmful requests to a third party or abstract actors.

Reverse Psychology Psychological manipulation, e.g., asking for the opposite to elicit harmful content.

Authority Challenge Challenges to authority or dominance assertions intended to provoke unsafe outputs.

Quantity Or Intensity Escalation Escalating quantity or intensity (more examples, nastier versions).

Financial Misconduct Advice Seeking risky/illicit tactics or unethical shortcuts (incl. 'quick

money', fraud-adjacent).

Codeblock Masking Hiding harmful content in code blocks or technical formatting.

No Content Or Strategy Chat contains no meaningful user content or identifiable strategies.

Api Failed Reserved for system use: API call failed, unparsable response, or model returned no items.

Other Any strategy that does not fit the above categories.

D.7. Topic Analysis

To complement the strategy analysis, we also conducted automated topic classification of participant messages using the same methodological approach. The GPT-4o-mini model was instructed to identify distinct topical categories covered in each conversation, such as politics, hate speech, race, etc. The model returned both topic names and brief explanations for each identified category, following the same structured JSON format and reproducibility measures (temperature=0, fixed seed) as the strategy classification above. This analysis allows to examine whether novelty incentives influenced not only the tactical approaches participants employed, but also the content areas they chose to explore.



FIGURE A9. Distribution of strategies used by participants in treatment and control groups (Experiment 1)

In Experiment 1 (Figure **??**), the most common topics are hate speech, personal insults, and violence, followed by race and ethnicity, relationships, and gender or sexu-

ality. These categories account for the majority of participant discussions across both conditions. The novelty-incentive group shows slightly higher frequencies in violence, relationships, and politics, while the control group has somewhat higher counts in hate speech and race and ethnicity. This pattern suggests that participants rewarded for novelty tended to explore more interpersonal and socially framed themes, whereas control participants focused more on overtly harmful or identity-based topics.

In Experiment 2 (Figure **??**), the overall topic hierarchy is similar, but the control group dominates most categories, especially hate speech, personal insults, violence, and race and ethnicity. The novelty-incentive group, by contrast, shows small increases in politics, profanity, and mental health, indicating a modest shift toward more varied or unconventional themes. The general overlap in the most common topics across both conditions implies that participants shared a broadly similar understanding of what constitutes risky or challenging content, though novelty incentives encouraged slightly more thematic exploration outside the core areas of hate speech and violence.



FIGURE A10. Distribution of strategies used by participants in treatment and control groups (Experiment 2)

Together, these two figures highlight that novelty incentives did not fundamentally change which content areas participants targeted but modestly affected the emphasis they put on different topics.

TableA2 shows the results for both experiments.

Table A2 presents summary statistics for the topics identified. For each experimental

TABLE A2. Unique Topics Identified by Treatment Condition and Experiment

Experiment	Condition	Unique Topics	Total Occur.	Conv.	Avg./Conv.
Exp. 1	Control	443	2,677	744	3.60
	Novelty	459	2,810	819	3.43
Exp. 2	Control	471	3,247	861	3.77
	Novelty	453	2,835	801	3.54

condition, the table reports the number of unique topics identified by the model, the total number of topic occurrences, the number of conversations, and the average number of topics per conversation.

Across both experiments, participants covered a wide range of themes in their attempts to elicit harmful outputs. The results show that the novelty-incentive condition produced a slightly higher number of total topic occurrences in Experiment 1 (2,810 vs. 2,677) but a somewhat lower count of unique topics and average topics per conversation in Experiment 2. These small differences suggest that novelty incentives did not substantially alter the topical breadth of user messages. Participants in both conditions discussed a similar variety of themes, with only minor shifts in emphasis. Overall, the novelty incentive appears to have influenced how participants explored certain topics rather than how many different topics they engaged with.

D.7.1. Efficiency of novelty incentives

The incentive schemes differ between treatment and control groups, so we cannot perfectly control for induced effort. Nonetheless, the two experiments, which vary the design of novelty incentives, provide informative contrasts. In Experiment 1, the treatment group's earnings are mechanically lower (or equal) than those of the control group because the novelty score is capped between 0 and 1. By contrast, Experiment 2 introduces an upper-bound adjustment to ensure that treatment participants earn at least as much as those in the control group.

The incentive schemes differ between treatment and control groups, so we cannot perfectly control for induced effort. Nonetheless, the two experiments, which vary the design of novelty incentives, provide informative contrasts. In Experiment 1, the treatment group's earnings are mechanically lower (or equal) than those of the control group because the novelty score is capped between 0 and 1. This means that treatment participants earn less from the novelty component than control participants when the novelty score is below 1, and at most, they earn the same as control participants when the novelty score is 1. By contrast, Experiment 2 introduces an upper-bound adjustment to ensure that treatment participants earn at least as much as those in the control group. Specifically, the novelty score is rescaled from the original 0-1 range to a 1-2 range, guaranteeing that treatment bonuses are always at least as large as control bonuses. This design choice allows us to isolate the effect of adding a novelty objective from the confounding effect of different monetary incentives across conditions, while also testing whether higher guaranteed payments can overcome the challenges introduced by novelty incentives.

Due to this difference in design of the incentive structure between experiments, we can analyze the monetary efficiency of the red teaming procedure, testing hypothesis 6. Figure A11 plots cumulative NWH against cumulative bonus payments for both exper-



A. 250408_experiment-novelty B. 250707_experiment-novelty-btw-1-2

FIGURE A11. Novelty-Weighted Harassment over Time (Cumulative Bonus)

iments and treatment conditions. The left panel shows results for Experiment 1: for a given level of bonus payments, the treatment group achieves higher cumulative NWH than the control group. This pattern partly reflects the design of the incentive scheme; by construction, the treatment group cannot earn more than the control group. It also indicates that, despite the weaker financial incentives, treatment participants continued to engage meaningfully in red teaming. Comparable levels of cumulative NWH can be achieved with lower bonus payments. Experiment 2 shows the opposite pattern. Here, by design, the treatment group earns at least as much as the control group. However, the higher pay does not translate into more efficient red teaming: the treatment group's cumulative NWH curve lies below that of the control group.