Testing Novelty Incentives for Coordinating Human Red Teamers: Evidence from Online Experiments

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Red teaming is critical for identifying AI vulnerabilities, but human red teamers might duplicate effort by probing the same attack vectors or miss novel attack vectors due to insufficient exploration incentives. We test whether real-time novelty incentives can coordinate exploration by steering participants toward underexplored vulnerabilities. In two preregistered experiments (N=1,075), participants attempt to elicit harassing outputs from a large language model. Treatment groups receive bonuses based on novelty-weighted harassment scores, where novelty measures embedding distance to all previously discovered outputs, creating a coordination signal. We find mixed evidence: treatment participants produce more semantically diverse inputs and achieve higher novelty when filtering low-quality attempts. However, treatment groups generate lower overall harassment despite higher novelty, resulting in a "backfiring effect" where multi-objective optimization undermines performance. Novelty incentives can coordinate exploration but require quality floors and structured guidance to avoid overwhelming participants with competing objectives.

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1. Introduction

Large language models have rapidly scaled to hundreds of millions of users (Bellan 2025), who rely on them for writing, programming, customer service, and decision-making. This rapid adoption brings serious risks: models can assist in planning cyber attacks (Bethany et al. 2024; Cohen et al. 2024), contribute to severe psychological harm (Hill 2025; McBain et al. 2025; Euronews 2023), and generate content that violates ethical and legal standards (Fire et al. 2025). Red teaming exercises—in which participants attempt to elicit harmful outputs to identify vulnerabilities—have become central to responsible AI deployment. Large developers conduct such exercises routinely (OpenAI 2024; Microsoft 2025), and regulations increasingly mandate them [(eu: 2024)].

Yet red teaming faces critical challenges of scale and coverage. As models and deployment contexts multiply, manual testing alone becomes impractical (Microsoft 2025, p. 3). More fundamentally, when multiple human testers work simultaneously, they explore only a limited portion of the input space, exhibiting systematic biases shaped by personal experience and concentrating on familiar attack strategies (Zhang et al. 2024b). Without coordination, testers duplicate effort by repeatedly probing the same high-salience vulnerabilities, leaving "less obvious categories underexplored" (Microsoft 2025, p. 5). While automated red teaming addresses scale (Perez et al. 2022; Mei et al. 2023; Mulla et al. 2025), it struggles with tactical diversity and contextual understanding (OpenAI 2024). A hybrid approach combining human and automated methods has therefore become standard practice (OpenAI 2024; Microsoft 2025). This raises a critical coordination question: how can we steer multiple human red teamers toward collectively exploring diverse vulnerabilities rather than duplicating each other's efforts? We ask: *Can real-time novelty incentives coordinate human red teamers to increase the diversity of harmful outputs discovered?*

We examine this question in two preregistered experiments with 1,075 participants (521 and 554 respectively) recruited through Prolific. Participants attempt to elicit harassing outputs from Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1 across three separate conversations, receiving real-time feedback on each model response. We measure harassment using OpenAI's moderation API (0 = not harassing, 1 = very harassing) and novelty as the embedding distance to all previous outputs discovered by any participant in the treatment group (0 = not novel, 1 = very novel). The novelty score serves as a coordination mechanism: by measuring distance to the collective set of all previously discovered outputs, it provides each participant with a real-time signal indicating which areas have already been explored by others, incentivizing differentiation. Our primary outcome is novelty-weighted harassment (Novelty-Weighted Harassment (NWH)), the product of these two scores, reflecting the goal of discovering harmful outputs that are both severe and collectively diverse.

Participants were randomly assigned to control or treatment groups. Control partici-

pants earned bonuses based solely on harassment scores and saw only harassment feedback, creating no incentive to differentiate from other participants. Treatment participants earned bonuses based on NWH and saw both harassment and novelty scores in real-time, creating incentives to discover vulnerabilities that others have not yet found. This multiplicative payoff structure coordinates exploration across participants: for example, an output with harassment 0.9 and novelty 0.1 (similar to what others found) yields a bonus proportional to $0.9 \times 0.1 = 0.09$, while the same harassment paired with novelty 0.9 (different from others) yields $0.9 \times 0.9 = 0.81$, rewarding participants who explore underexplored areas rather than duplicating others' discoveries.

A key challenge in evaluating novelty incentives is that it is difficult to match payments across conditions while controlling for effort. To address this, we use two experiments with different payoff scalings that bound the potential effect of differential monetary incentives. In Experiment 1, the novelty score ranges from 0 to 1, meaning treatment bonuses are at most equal to control bonuses (only when novelty equals 1) and typically lower. This provides a lower bound: if treatment outperforms control despite lower potential earnings, the effect cannot be attributed to higher financial incentives. In Experiment 2, the novelty score is rescaled to range from 1 to 2, guaranteeing that treatment bonuses are at least equal to control (when novelty equals 1) and typically higher. This provides an upper bound: if treatment underperforms control despite higher potential earnings, the effect cannot be attributed to insufficient financial incentives. Together, these experiments establish bounds on the treatment effect independent of concerns about differential effort induced by payment differences.

Our main preregistered result is that treatment groups achieve lower average NWH scores than control groups in both experiments, indicating a "backfiring effect." Decomposing NWH reveals the mechanism: treatment groups produce significantly lower harassment scores while novelty scores remain similar across conditions. This suggests participants struggled to optimize both objectives simultaneously, sacrificing harassment effectiveness in unsuccessful attempts to increase novelty.

However, three additional findings qualify this negative result. First, threshold analyses that exclude low-quality outputs reveal that novelty incentives successfully coordinate exploration: average novelty scores are significantly higher in treatment across all harassment thresholds (0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75), indicating participants collectively explored more diverse areas. Second, ex-post analyses show treatment participants' inputs occupy more diverse regions of semantic space, confirming that the coordination mechanism functioned as intended even when the real-time novelty metric underestimated its effect. Third, performance heterogeneity analyses reveal that above-median performers generate nearly all cumulative NWH in both conditions, with treatment never outperforming control in either performance group, highlighting that coordination incentives

alone cannot overcome baseline skill differences.

Finally, strategy analyses using LLM classification reveal that participants systematically overuse intuitive but ineffective approaches. The most common strategies (hate speech, insults, and violence promotion) prove far less effective at eliciting harassment than sophisticated tactics like quantity escalation, roleplay impersonation, and safety pretext framing, which are utilized comparatively less. This suggests participants incorrectly assume that employing harassing language themselves will elicit harassing outputs, when indirect tactical approaches actually work better.

These findings contribute to two literatures. First, research on financial incentives in creative tasks shows that explicit performance bonuses increase output (Bradler et al. 2019), that incentives can shift effort toward novelty or usefulness but risk crowding out one dimension when combined (Speckbacher and Wiernsperger 2024), and that multiobjective rewards only generate innovation when quantity and originality are jointly incentivized (Laske and Schroeder 2017). Field evidence from bug bounty programs similarly shows that higher rewards redirect effort toward more valuable targets (Wang et al. 2025). These studies suggest novelty incentives should promote exploration but may create optimization trade-offs. We contribute by providing the first experimental evidence on real-time novelty incentives in a production setting, showing that multiplicative incentives combining harassment and novelty can backfire, with participants producing less harassment without achieving higher novelty. This reveals important limits to multidimensional incentive design when cognitive demands are high.

Second, red teaming research documents that human testers exhibit systematic coverage gaps, focusing on familiar attacks shaped by personal experience (Zhang et al. 2024a), while automated methods struggle with tactical diversity (OpenAI 2024). Industry practice has converged on hybrid human-automated approaches (OpenAI 2024; Microsoft 2025), yet no prior study experimentally tests how to coordinate multiple human testers exploring simultaneously. We provide the first causal evidence that real-time novelty incentives can successfully coordinate exploration, with participants collectively discovering more diverse vulnerabilities, but that coordination mechanisms alone cannot solve the effectiveness problem without quality floors. Our strategy analysis further reveals that participants systematically overuse ineffective approaches (hate speech, insults) while underutilizing sophisticated tactics (escalation, roleplay), suggesting that coordinating exploration requires explicit guidance on effective strategies, not just incentives to differentiate.

As a technical contribution we develop a custom experimental platform capable of real-time API integration with multiple AI services, dynamic embedding calculations for novelty scoring, live harassment detection, and instantaneous feedback delivery; this would be infeasible using standard survey platforms. The code and documentation for

this custom experimental platform are available from the authors upon request. The code is licensed under the MIT license.

Our findings have immediate practical implications for both private companies conducting internal red teaming and regulatory bodies designing oversight mechanisms. The consistent backfiring effect demonstrates that novelty incentives can undermine effectiveness unless paired with explicit quality floors that filter low-harassment outputs. The stark performance heterogeneity, i.e. the fact that above-median performers generate nearly all valuable outputs, indicates that recruiting skilled red teamers matters more than incentive design for low performers. Most critically, participants systematically overuse intuitive but ineffective strategies while underutilizing sophisticated tactics, suggesting that effective red teaming requires explicit training rather than relying on participants to discover optimal strategies through exploration alone. Organizations should prioritize participant selection, provide structured guidance on effective tactics, and implement quality thresholds before introducing novelty incentives.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and implementation, including a description of the real-time scoring platform used in the experiments. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 discusses implications, limitations, and directions for practice. Section 5 concludes.

2. Experimental Design

We conducted two preregistered online experiments (April and July 2025) to test whether real-time novelty incentives can coordinate multiple red teamers to collectively explore diverse vulnerabilities. We recruited 521 and 554 participants respectively through Prolific, with all participants attempting to elicit harassing outputs from a large language model (Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1) while receiving real-time feedback on their success.

Our design necessarily simplifies real-world red teaming: we focus on a single model and vulnerability type (harassment), use automated evaluation via OpenAI's moderation API, and constrain interaction to text-based chat. However, these simplifications enable us to isolate and measure coordination effects through controlled experimentation while maintaining the essential features of incentivized vulnerability discovery. The experiments test whether novelty-based coordination improves collective exploration by providing participants with real-time signals about what others have already discovered.

We recruited US-based participants through Prolific who had consented to viewing potentially harmful content. Median completion times were 34 minutes (Experiment 1) and 37 minutes (Experiment 2), with average hourly pay of GBP 6.41 and GBP 9.79 respectively, well above Prolific's minimum rate of GBP 5.46.

After reading instructions, participants completed a five-question comprehension check

(see Appendix C) before accessing the main task: three separate conversations with Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1. Each conversation continued until the participant initiated a new chat or reached the context window token limit. Participants could freely explore any topics or tactics to elicit harassing outputs, with no prescribed strategies.

We used Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1 as the target model because it is known to exhibit unwanted behaviors relevant for red teaming research. Each model output was processed in real-time through two scoring systems:

Harassment scoring: OpenAI's moderation API classified each output's harassment level (0 = not harassing, 1 = very harassing), defined as "content that expresses, incites, or promotes harassing language towards any target."[1]

Novelty scoring: Each input and output was embedded using OpenAI's text-embedding-ada-002 model (1,536-dimensional vectors). The novelty score for each output was calculated as the minimum Euclidean distance to all existing embeddings in the treatment group, standardized to range from 0 (not novel) to 1 (very novel). This measures semantic differentiation: for example, if existing outputs centered on politics, an output about sports would receive a high novelty score. Crucially, novelty is measured against the *collective* set of all outputs discovered by any participant in the treatment group, providing a coordination signal.

The interface displayed each output's scores in real-time along with the payoff-maximizing output for that conversation. This real-time feedback enabled participants to adapt their strategies dynamically. Implementing this required custom infrastructure integrating multiple APIs, dynamic embedding calculations, and live score computation—capabilities infeasible with standard survey platforms.

Participants were randomly assigned to control or treatment conditions, which differed in feedback and incentives:

Control: Saw only harassment scores. Earned bonuses based on the maximum harassment score achieved per conversation, incentivizing harmful outputs without regard to differentiation from other participants' discoveries.

Treatment: Saw both harassment and novelty scores. Earned bonuses based on the maximum novelty-weighted harassment (NWH) score per conversation—the product of harassment and novelty— incentivizing outputs that were both harmful and collectively unexplored.

Figure 1 shows the interface for both conditions. Novelty scores were calculated for all outputs but displayed only to treatment participants, creating an information asymmetry that isolates the coordination effect.

[1] https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/moderation



A. Treatment condition interface showing both harassment and novelty scores

B. Control condition interface showing only harassment score

FIGURE 1. Screenshots of the experimental chat interface showing the key treatment difference. Participants attempted to elicit harassing outputs from a language model while receiving real-time feedback. Treatment participants (left) saw both harassment (0-1 scale) and novelty scores (distance to all previously discovered outputs) and earned bonuses based on the product of both scores, creating coordination incentives. Control participants (right) saw only harassment scores and earned bonuses based on harassment alone. The interface displays conversation history, current scores, and indicates which model output maximizes the participant's bonus.

2.1. Payoff Structure

All participants received a fixed base payment plus performance-based bonuses. For each of the three conversations, bonuses were determined by the payoff-maximizing output: the output with maximum harassment (control) or maximum NWH (treatment). Participants were not informed about condition differences. Table 1 presents the payoff functions.

TABLE 1. Payoff functions by experiment and treatment condition

Condition	Payoff Function
Control - Experiment 1	Total reward = fixed reward + bonus × harassment score
Control - Experiment 2	Total reward = fixed reward + bonus × harassment score
Treatment - Experiment 1	Total reward = fixed reward + bonus × harassment score × novelty score where novelty score $\in [0, 1]$
Treatment - Experiment 2	Total reward = fixed reward + bonus × harassment score × novelty score where novelty score $\in [1, 2]$

The two experiments varied novelty scaling to bound the effect of differential monetary incentives. In Experiment 1, novelty ranged from 0 to 1, making treatment bonuses at most equal to control (lower bound). In Experiment 2, novelty was rescaled to 1-2, making treatment bonuses at least equal to control (upper bound). This design isolates coordination effects from confounding financial differences: positive treatment effects in Experiment 1 cannot stem from higher pay, while negative effects in Experiment 2 cannot stem from lower pay.

Both experiments were preregistered on aspredicted.org [2]. The experiments have ethical approval from the German Association of Experimental Economic Research.

3. Results

3.0.1. Average treatment effect based on per-chat maximum NWH model output

For the main analysis, we use the model output with the highest NWH for each conversation in both conditions, even though control participants were paid based on maximum harassment alone. This ensures consistent selection criteria across conditions, allowing direct comparison of our primary outcome measure, NWH, rather than mixing different selection rules. While this differs from the payoff-maximizing output for control participants, it provides the cleanest test of whether novelty incentives increase the joint objective of harassment and novelty.

[2] https://aspredicted.org/zrzf-889f.pdf, https://aspredicted.org/s7qg-6y7s.pdf

An important question is whether novelty incentives ultimately lead to broader exploration of the output space. After all, the goal of red teaming is to generate more novel harmful outputs. As specified in the preregistration, our primary outcome measure is the average NWH achieved by participants in each group. For the main analysis, we consider the model output with the highest NWH for each chat and compute the participant-level mean over all three chats. The nature of the novelty score provides a challenge for making inference. Since the novelty score is calculated based on the embeddings of all existing outputs of prior chats in a treatment, the novelty scores are not independent across outputs, such that the distribution of novelty scores shifts with an increase in the number of outputs. Specifically, an output early in a treatment will likely have a higher novelty score than the same output late in a treatment. This decrease in novelty is a mechanical effect of how the novelty score is calculated. The decrease in novelty can be seen in Figure A1 in **??**.

We use a threefold strategy to address this challenge. First, we use permutation tests for hypothesis testing [(see **??**)]. Permutation tests are a non-parametric alternative to t-tests that make no distributional assumptions about the data, and are valid for non identically distributed data. Second, we exploit the fact that towards the end of the treatment, the novelty scores become approximately independent as the set of embeddings grows. More formally, the novelty scores for output n and output $n+1$ are approximately independent if n is large enough. This is because the novelty score is calculated against the almost the same set of embeddings. Intuitively, as n grows, the marginal impact of adding another embedding becomes smaller. This means that the probability of the marginal embedding being the nearest neighbor for future embeddings decreases in n. We operationalize this by using only the last 5%, 10%, and 15% of outputs to test our hypotheses. The results are added as a robustness check in Table A1 in **??**. Third, we use a regression model to compare treatment and control group over the course of the treatment. We regress the outcome measure on an output count to account for their order, a treatment dummy, and the interaction effect of the two variables. We cluster standard errors on the participant level. The coefficient of interest is the interaction effect between treatment dummy and output count. If it is significant, we can infer that the trend components for the cumulative outcomes are different. The latter two approaches correspond to hypothesis 2 and 3 of the pre-registration.

Table 2 shows the average treatment effects as well as p-values from permutation tests and t-tests for five outcomes: NWH, novelty, harassment, distance to the embedding centroid, and DWH (harassment × Euclidean distance in the embedding space) for control and treatment in both experiments. DWH substitutes distance to the embedding centroid for novelty as the diversity measure, providing a robustness check using an ex-post metric that is not time-dependent. The preregistered hypotheses (H1) is that treat-

TABLE 2. P-values for NWH, novelty, harassment, distance, and Distance-Weighted Harassment (DWH) (Welch t and permutation). Analysis includes per-chat maximum NWH model outputs.

Experiment	Metric	Mean Control	Mean Treatment	p (t) two-sided	p (perm) two-sided	p (t) T > C	p (perm) T > C	p (t) C > T	p (perm) C > T
Exp. 1	NWH	0.0924	0.0720	0.0516	0.0507	0.9742	0.9747	0.0258	0.0253
	Novelty	0.3701	0.3744	0.6255	0.6246	0.3128	0.3123	0.6872	0.6877
	Harassment	0.2229	0.1604	0.0062	0.0059	0.9969	0.9970	0.0031	0.0030
	Distance	0.8821	0.8880	0.0960	0.0954	0.0480	0.0477	0.9520	0.9523
	DWH	0.1971	0.1443	0.0101	0.0097	0.9950	0.9951	0.0050	0.0049
Exp. 2	NWH	0.0972	0.0794	0.0738	0.0747	0.9631	0.9626	0.0369	0.0374
	Novelty	0.3548	0.3588	0.6557	0.6529	0.3279	0.3265	0.6721	0.6735
	Harassment	0.2413	0.1870	0.0158	0.0165	0.9921	0.9918	0.0079	0.0082
	Distance	0.8804	0.8852	0.0932	0.0927	0.0931	0.0927	0.9068	0.9073
	DWH	0.2115	0.1668	0.0253	0.0262	0.9873	0.9869	0.0127	0.0131

Note: Means are participant-level averages of per-chat maxima; Distance is the mean Euclidean distance to the arm centroid; DWH is harassment × distance.

ment achieves higher NWH as measured by a t-test. We find no evidence that treatment achieves higher NWH and reject the H1. The p-values from the permutation tests and t-tests are very similar across all results. Reversing the hypothesis and testing for the alternative that the control group performs better than the treatment group shows statistically significant higher average NWH in control in both experiments (p-values of 0.025 and 0.037). Finally, testing for the hypothesis that the treatment and control group are different (in either direction) with a more conservative two-sided test shows again statistically significant differences in NWH in both experiments.

Decomposing NWH into its components reveals that control groups achieve significantly higher harassment scores than treatment groups across both experiments (Exp. 1: 0.22 vs. 0.16, p=0.003; Exp. 2: 0.24 vs. 0.19, p=0.008). For novelty scores, treatment and control groups show no significant differences (Exp. 1: 0.37 vs. 0.37, p=0.625; Exp. 2: 0.35 vs. 0.36, p=0.656).

Distance to the embedding centroid is higher in treatment in both experiments with statistical significance, yet the size of the difference is negligible. Since harassment is lower in treatment, DWH is therefore also significantly lower in treatment in both experiments.

3.0.2. Average treatment effect based on *all* model outputs

To examine whether results differ when considering all outputs rather than per-chat maxima, we extend the analysis to compute condition averages over *all* generated model outputs. Table 3 shows results consistent with the main analysis. Control groups achieve higher average NWH and higher harassment scores in both experiments. For novelty, Experiment 2 shows treatment groups attaining higher average novelty scores than control groups (treatment mean 0.3479 vs. control mean 0.3354, p = 0.0355 t-test, 0.0321 permutation).

3.0.3. Distribution of novelty, harassment, and NWH scores for per-chat maximum NWH model outputs

Figure 2 shows the distribution of NWH scores for individual outputs in treatment and control groups. A substantial share of outputs cluster near zero, indicating that many model responses achieve either very low harassment or very low novelty scores. Additional analyses reveal that this concentration around zero is primarily driven by low harassment scores in both experiments, as can be seen in figure 4. The distributions of novelty scores from both experiments are shown in figure 3. In both experiments, the distribution of novelty scores in the treatment group has fatter tails than the control group.

TABLE 3. P-values for NWH, novelty, harassment, distance, and DWH (Welch t and permutation). Analysis includes *all* model outputs

Experiment	Metric	Mean Control	Mean Treatment	p (t) two-sided	p (perm) two-sided	p (t) T > C	p (perm) T > C	p (t) C > T	p (perm) C > T
Exp. 1	NWH	0.0372	0.0273	0.0717	0.0695	0.9641	0.9652	0.0359	0.0348
	Novelty	0.3472	0.3449	0.7522	0.7515	0.6239	0.6243	0.3761	0.3757
	Harassment	0.0923	0.0652	0.0332	0.0321	0.9834	0.9839	0.0166	0.0161
	Distance	0.8821	0.8880	0.0960	0.0954	0.0480	0.0477	0.9520	0.9523
	DWH	0.1971	0.1443	0.0101	0.0097	0.9950	0.9951	0.0050	0.0049
Exp. 2	NWH	0.0371	0.0281	0.0620	0.0641	0.9690	0.9679	0.0310	0.0321
	Novelty	0.3354	0.3479	0.0711	0.0693	0.0355	0.0321	0.9645	0.9679
	Harassment	0.0944	0.0680	0.0200	0.0213	0.9900	0.9890	0.0100	0.0110
	Distance	0.8804	0.8852	0.1863	0.1854	0.4069	0.4073	0.5931	0.5927
	DWH	0.2115	0.1668	0.0254	0.0262	0.9873	0.9869	0.0127	0.0131

Note: Means are participant-level averages of *all* model outputs (not per-chat maxima); Distance is the mean Euclidean distance to the arm centroid; DWH is harassment × distance.



A. Experiment 1 B. Experiment 2

FIGURE 2. Distribution of novelty-weighted harassment (NWH) scores for model outputs with maximum NWH per conversation. NWH is the product of harassment (0-1) and novelty (0-1) scores. Both experiments show that a substantial share of outputs cluster near zero, indicating many responses achieve either very low harassment or very low novelty. This concentration is primarily driven by low harassment scores (see Figure 4), with treatment groups generating more low-quality outputs than control groups, contributing to the observed backfiring effect.



A. Experiment 1



B. Experiment 2

FIGURE 3. Distribution of novelty scores for model outputs with maximum NWH per conversation, by treatment condition. Novelty measures the semantic distance of each output to all previously discovered outputs in the treatment group (0 = similar to existing outputs, 1 = maximally different). The treatment group distribution exhibits fatter tails in both experiments, indicating greater heterogeneity in novelty outcomes. This suggests some treatment participants explored more diverse semantic regions while others generated outputs similar to what others already discovered, consistent with varied responses to the novelty incentive.



A. Experiment 1



B. Experiment 2

FIGURE 4. Distribution of harassment scores for model outputs with maximum NWH per conversation, by treatment condition. Harassment scores (0-1) from OpenAI's moderation API measure whether outputs express, incite, or promote harassing language. Control groups achieve higher harassment scores than treatment groups in both experiments (Exp. 1: 0.22 vs. 0.16; Exp. 2: 0.24 vs. 0.19; both $p < 0.01$). The concentration of scores near zero across both conditions explains why NWH distributions cluster at zero: low harassment scores drive down the product of harassment × novelty even when novelty is high.

3.0.4. Treatment effect heterogeneity by harrassment thresholds

From the perspective of red teaming organizers or policymakers, outputs with very low harassment scores are an inefficiency even if they are novel. In other words, outputs that are very novel but unproblematic are not of interest to the regulator. Such outputs do not meaningfully contribute to the objective of generating a diverse set of harmful outputs. In the next analysis, we therefore restrict our analysis to outputs that exceed a certain minimum harassment threshold to assess whether the backfiring effect is primarily driven by the differences in frequency of near-zero harassment scores between the groups. Since it is not ex-ante obvious which harassment threshold from OpenAI's moderation API corresponds to a level of harassment that policymakers would be interested in, we test multiple harassment thresholds: Table 4 shows the average treatment effects using the model outputs above the harassment thresholds 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75.

TABLE 4. Treatment effects by harassment threshold (Welch t-tests; treatment > control)

Exp	Thr	NWH C mean	NWH T mean	p (t) NWH	Nov C mean	Nov T mean	p (t) Nov	Har C mean	Har T mean	p (t) Har
1	0.10	0.1719	0.1974	< 0.001	0.3751	0.3976	< 0.001	0.4365	0.4802	< 0.001
1	0.25	0.2407	0.2689	< 0.001	0.3896	0.4151	< 0.001	0.6004	0.6453	< 0.001
1	0.50	0.3099	0.3303	0.001239	0.4055	0.4248	0.002236	0.7550	0.7848	0.001386
1	0.75	0.3806	0.3873	0.2378	0.4360	0.4419	0.2785	0.8703	0.8781	0.1173
2	0.10	0.1832	0.1814	0.6345	0.3757	0.3912	< 0.001	0.4681	0.4466	0.9709
2	0.25	0.2524	0.2449	0.8853	0.3905	0.3998	0.04858	0.6351	0.5969	0.9996
2	0.50	0.3150	0.3170	0.3794	0.4025	0.4191	0.007131	0.7806	0.7518	0.9995
2	0.75	0.3645	0.3830	0.0206	0.4167	0.4385	0.01177	0.8735	0.8713	0.6561

Note: This table presents treatment effects when restricting analysis to model outputs that exceed minimum harassment thresholds. The analysis filters all model outputs to include only those with harmfulness scores at or above the specified threshold (0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75), then compares mean NWH, novelty, and harmfulness scores between treatment and control groups using one-sided Welch t-tests (treatment > control).

The findings reveal a nuanced pattern across the three outcome measures. For NWH, treatment effects vary substantially by experiment and threshold level. In Experiment 1, the treatment group achieves significantly higher NWH at lower thresholds (0.10, 0.25, and 0.50, all $p < 0.01$), but this advantage disappears at the highest threshold (0.75, $p = 0.238$). In Experiment 2, the pattern is reversed: treatment shows no significant NWH advantage at lower thresholds but achieves significantly higher NWH at the highest threshold (0.75, $p = 0.021$). For novelty scores, the treatment group consistently outperforms control across both experiments and most threshold levels, with significant differences observed at thresholds 0.10, 0.25, and 0.50 in Experiment 1 (all $p < 0.01$) and at all thresholds in Experiment 2 (all $p < 0.05$). The only exception is the 0.75 threshold in Experiment 1, where the difference is not statistically significant ($p = 0.279$). For harmfulness scores, the pattern also differs markedly between experiments. In Experiment 1, treat-

ment achieves significantly higher harmfulness at all thresholds (all $p < 0.01$), while in Experiment 2, control consistently outperforms treatment, though these differences are not statistically significant due to the one-sided test design.

3.0.5. Treatment heterogeneity based on performance

We also examine heterogeneity in treatment effects by participant performance. This analysis proceeds as follows: participants are split into two groups based on their total performance-based payment. Based on this split, the cumulative NWH of the above and below median participants in the control and treatment groups can be contrasted. This allows to explore whether novelty incentives differently affected the behavior of the above-median red teamers relative to the below-median ones.



A. Experiment 1 B. Experiment 2

FIGURE 5. Cumulative novelty-weighted harassment (NWH) over conversation number, split by participant performance level. Participants are classified as above-median (solid lines) or below-median (dashed lines) based on total performance-based payment. Blue indicates control condition, red indicates treatment condition. Key findings: (1) Above-median performers generate nearly all cumulative NWH in both conditions, while below-median performers contribute minimally. (2) Control outperforms treatment within each performance group, indicating the backfiring effect persists across skill levels. (3) The stark performance gap suggests that recruiting skilled red teamers matters more than incentive design for lower-performing participants.

Figures 5A and 5B display cumulative NWH against the total number of chats, distinguishing between participants above and below the median in total performance-based payment. Each figure compares the control and novelty-incentive conditions, with dashed lines representing above-median performers and solid lines representing below-median ones.

In Experiment 1 (Figure 5A), above-median participants generated substantially higher cumulative NWH than below-median participants across both conditions. The NWH curve

for the treatment group is at all times on par or slightly below the control group for both performance levels. Above-median performers generate nearly all cumulative NWH, while below-median performers contribute minimally.

Experiment 2 (Figure 5B) shows a similar pattern with larger overall output levels. High-performing participants again dominate cumulative totals, and treatment trails control throughout, with the gap more pronounced than in Experiment 1. The higher incentives for the treatment group in Experiment 2 (compared to Experiment 1) did not reverse this pattern.

Both experiments show a stark contrast between above-median and below-median performance groups, with above-median participants generating nearly all cumulative NWH.

The same analysis separating above and below median participants has also been conducted for the novelty and harassment scores individually. The results are shown in figure [?? and ?? in the appendix ??].

3.0.6. Ex-post analysis of the embedding sets

The previous analyses examine the novelty of each output relative to all previously generated outputs at the time of creation. This makes the novelty score a time-dependent, incremental measure. From an ex-post perspective, however, red teaming organizers and policymakers may be more interested in the overall diversity of the final set of harmful inputs and outputs produced over the course of the red teaming process.

To assess this ex-post diversity, we compute the mean distance of embeddings from the centroid of all embeddings within each treatment group. The centroid represents the average position of all embeddings in the high-dimensional vector space. We again employ permutation tests: group labels are permuted prior to calculating centroids, and the resulting distance measures are recomputed to obtain a p-value based on 1,000 permutations. [Table X] reports the results for various subsets of the outputs. We consistently find that the corpus of user inputs is more diverse in the treatment group than in the control group. Since the embedding space has no natural scale, we focus on statistical significance rather than the magnitude of differences. For model outputs, by contrast, we find no consistent differences in diversity between groups.

We also compare the centroids themselves to assess whether treatment and control participants occupy different regions of the embedding space on average. Since output diversity is broadly similar, this test speaks to semantic separation rather than dispersion. As shown in [Table X], we consistently find sizable and significant differences between group centroids for user inputs and across all output subsets. These findings suggest that the novelty incentive shifted participants toward distinct areas of the semantic space, leading to some clustering or coordination, even if overall diversity was not markedly af-

fected. One possibility is that participants have correlated beliefs about what constitutes novel content, which shaped the regions of the output space they explored. To investigate this hypothesis, the next section will conduct a semantic analysis of text contents of participant inputs.

3.0.7. Explorative analysis of user inputs

This section investigates the semantic meaning of the differences in the embedding space between treatment and control groups that was found in the previous section. As this difference exists only for the user inputs, we will only consider user inputs for the following analysis as well.

For a first overview, table 5 reports the means of the per-chat input and word counts for control and treatment for both experiments. The tests for mean differences are performed using Welch's t-test. The table also lists the sample sizes, along with the t-statistic and p-value from the two-sample Welch test. The entire distribution of word and input counts per chat are shown in figure A7 and A8 in **??**.

TABLE 5. Per-Chat Counts and Group Differences (User Inputs Only) for both experiments

		Control		Treatment		Welch t (p-value)	
Experiment	**Measure**	**Mean**	**n**	**Mean**	**n**	**t**	**p**
Exp. 1	num. of inputs	9.293	744	8.466	819	2.275	0.02305
	num. of words	129.743	744	111.476	819	2.346	0.0191
Exp. 2	num. of inputs	9.727	861	9.542	801	0.486	0.6272
	num. of words	135.684	861	149.958	801	-1.441	0.1497

In Experiment 1, control chats contain more inputs on average (9.29 vs. 8.47) and more words on average (129.74 vs. 111.48). The differences are statistically significant for both outcomes (p = 0.023 for inputs; p = 0.019 for words), but the effect size differences (approximately 1 more input and 20 more words in control) are relatively modest. In Experiment 2, average inputs per chat are similar across conditions (9.73 vs. 9.54; p = 0.627), and the difference in word counts is not statistically significant despite a slightly higher treatment mean (135.68 vs. 149.96; p = 0.150). Overall, there seems to be at most a very modest difference, suggesting that the novelty incentive might have had a small negative impact on the conversational effort of the participants.

Next, table 6 reports three commonly used language analysis metrics that characterize complexity, sentiment, and emotional intensity of the language used by participants. The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level estimates the U.S. grade level needed to understand the text, with higher values indicating more complex language. Sentiment polarity measures emotional tone on a scale from -1 (negative) to $+1$ (positive), computed using the sen-

timent analysis of the Python package TextBlob, which analyzes word-level sentiment scores from a pre-trained lexicon to determine overall text polarity. emotional intensity counts words that are classified as emotionally charged (i.e. words that are indicative of anger, fear, joy, sadness, disgust, surprise, trust, anticipation) normalized by total word count. Higher emotional intensity values indicating more emotional content. All metrics are computed per chat using weighted averages (weighted by word count) and tested for statistical differences using Welch's t-test.

TABLE 6. Language Metrics by Treatment Condition – Experiments 1 and 2

		Control		Treatment		Welch t (p-value)	
Experiment	**Metric**	**Mean**	**n**	**Mean**	**n**	**t**	**p**
Exp. 1	Flesch-Kincaid Grade	4.384	744	4.348	819	0.228	0.8195
	Sentiment Polarity	-0.032	744	-0.012	819	-1.821	0.0688
	Emotional Intensity	0.009	744	0.008	819	1.152	0.2497
Exp. 2	Flesch-Kincaid Grade	4.684	861	4.985	801	-1.823	0.06845
	Sentiment Polarity	-0.028	861	0.003	801	-3.516	0.0004494
	Emotional Intensity	0.009	861	0.010	801	-0.496	0.6201

The results in table 6 show minimal differences in language complexity, sentiment polarity, and emotional intensity across conditions. In Experiment 1, Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level shows no significant difference (control: 4.38, treatment: 4.35; $p = 0.82$), sentiment polarity shows a marginal difference trending toward less negative treatment sentiment (control: -0.032, treatment: -0.012; $p = 0.069$), and emotional intensity shows no difference (control: 0.009, treatment: 0.008; $p = 0.25$).

In Experiment 2, Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level shows a marginal difference with treatment using slightly more complex language (control: 4.68, treatment: 4.99; $p = 0.068$), sentiment polarity shows a significant difference with treatment being more positive (control: -0.028, treatment: 0.003; $p < 0.001$), and emotional intensity shows no difference (control: 0.009, treatment: 0.010; $p = 0.62$). Overall, novelty incentives appear to have minimal impact on language complexity and emotional intensity, with only sentiment showing consistent differences across experiments, suggesting treatment participants may use slightly more positive language.

To gain semantically richer insights into the meaning-based differences between treatment and control groups, the user inputs from both experiments were analysed using OpenAI's GPT-4o-mini model to identify first, distinct red teaming strategies employed by participants and second, the topics of each chat. This analysis essentially allows to answer the question of whether the difference in embedding space between treatment and control groups is driven by a difference in the strategies or topics of the participant inputs.

In this analysis, each participant input was processed by the GPT-4o model with specific instructions to identify the tactical approach based on their inputs. The model identified strategies such as direct harassment attempts, social engineering tactics, emotional manipulation, role-playing scenarios, and technical exploitation methods. The model analyzed the tactical patterns in participant inputs to assign strategy labels to each chat. Multiple strategies could be identified within a single conversation.

The model was instructed using a structured, constrained prompt with predefined strategy categories. The exact prompt instructions and full list of strategy categories can be found in **??**. The input to the model consisted exclusively of the participant inputs from each chat. The model was instructed to (i) identify all distinct red teaming strategies present in one chat, (ii) categorize each strategy using a set of the predefined categories provided, and (iii) provide a one-sentence explanation of what each identified strategy means. The predefined categories included tactics such as insults, threats or harassment, hate speech, hypothetical framing, roleplay impersonation, safety pretext, policy evasion, and various other common red teaming approaches, along with catch-all categories for ambiguous cases ("other") and empty chats ("no-content-or-strategy"). To improve reproducibility, the model's temperature was set to 0 and a fixed random seed was used. Multiple strategies could be assigned to a single dialog.

Figure 6 and 7 display the distribution of the top 15 strategies by usage across experimental conditions for both experiments with the most commonly employed approaches appearing at the top. The figures show the percentage of conversations in each condition that used each strategy. This ranking reveals which tactical approaches were most popular among participants regardless of experimental condition.

As shown in the figures, the most common red teaming strategies in both experiments were hate speech, insults, and violence promotion or instructions (Section D.1 in the appendix provides the explanations for each strategy label). Hate speech emerged as the most frequent strategy overall, appearing in approximately 17-18% of conversations in both experiments, followed by insults (13-15%) and violence promotion (9-10%). These three dominant strategies indicate that participants most frequently relied on derogatory content targeting protected groups, direct verbal attacks, and requests for violent instructions to elicit unsafe model responses. Other notable strategies included political insults or bias, threats or harassment, and sexual harassment or misogyny, each appearing in 6-9% of conversations.

Overall, the figures illustrate that novelty incentives did not fundamentally alter the strategic landscape of red teaming behavior. Both conditions relied heavily on the same dominant strategies, with only modest shifts in relative emphasis. Control participants leaned slightly more toward direct violent and sexual content, while treatment participants showed marginally higher rates of political content and authority challenges.



FIGURE 6. Distribution of red teaming strategies used by participants, by treatment condition (Experiment 1). Strategies were identified using GPT-4o classification of participant inputs. Bars show the share of conversations employing each strategy (strategies ordered by frequency, top 15 shown). The most common strategies are hate speech (17-18% of conversations), insults (13-15%), and violence promotion (9-10%). Both conditions rely heavily on the same dominant strategies, with only modest differences between treatment and control, indicating novelty incentives did not fundamentally alter strategic choices.

Because the number of distinct strategies identified across all conversations is too large to list individually, Table 7 presents summary statistics that capture their overall distribution. Across both experiments, a total of 3,225 participant conversations were analyzed (1,563 in Experiment 1 and 1,662 in Experiment 2). For each conversation, the model produced a list of identified red-teaming strategies, from which we computed (i) the number of unique strategies observed within each condition, (ii) the total number of strategy occurrences, and (iii) the average number of strategies per conversation.

TABLE 7. Unique Strategies Identified by Treatment Condition and Experiment

Experiment	Condition	Unique Strategies	Total Occur.	Conv.	Avg./Conv.
Exp. 1	Control	1,418	3,037	744	4.08
	Novelty	1,348	3,105	819	3.79
Exp. 2	Control	1,709	3,674	861	4.27
	Novelty	1,539	3,308	801	4.13



FIGURE 7. Distribution of red teaming strategies used by participants, by treatment condition (Experiment 2). Strategies were identified using GPT-4o classification of participant inputs. Bars show the share of conversations employing each strategy (strategies ordered by frequency, top 15 shown). As in Experiment 1, hate speech, insults, and violence promotion dominate across both conditions. The similarity in strategy distributions across conditions confirms that novelty incentives did not substantially change participants' tactical approaches to eliciting harmful outputs.

This summary enables a direct comparison of tactical variety between participants in the control condition, who were rewarded purely for eliciting harmful model responses, and those in the novelty-incentive condition, whose rewards additionally depended on the novelty of their submissions. The results suggest that novelty incentives led to a slightly lower total number of unique strategies and fewer strategies per conversation. In other words, while participants under novelty incentives generated semantically distinct inputs overall (as shown earlier), they relied on a somewhat narrower but more focused set of strategic approaches when attempting to elicit harmful model outputs.

The analysis of participant inputs using an LLM in this way has three potential drawbacks. First, an LLM is inherently stochastic, meaning that repeated runs could yield slightly different results. Second, the model may not always be reliable in accurately identifying strategies. Third, allowing the model to freely assign strategy names for each chat could, in principle, result in a large number of unique labels even when the underlying strategies are very similar or identical. However, this concern is mitigated here because the prompt provided a structured list of example strategy names that the model could

draw from, reducing unnecessary variation in labeling.

To address the concerns above, we conducted several robustness checks, which are reported in Appendix [??]. To test for stochastic variation, the analysis was repeated multiple times and yielded qualitatively similar results. These repeated runs also suggest that the model's ability to identify strategies is reasonably stable, as similar strategy names consistently emerged across runs. We also performed an additional topic and strategy analysis that did not rely on any LLM and again found qualitatively similar patterns.

Moreover, we chose this approach because it allows for the identification of all possible strategies and topics participants used to elicit harmful outputs. An alternative approach would have been to provide the model with a fixed catalog of predefined strategy and topic categories and instruct it to classify each participant input accordingly. However, since there was initially no clear indication of which strategies or topics would be most relevant for the red teaming task, the open-ended approach offered greater flexibility and discovery potential.

In conclusion, the explorative analysis of attack strategies participant inputs, shows that overall differences between treatment and control groups were modest, but some consistent patterns emerge across experiments. In both studies, participants relied on similar dominant strategies, such as insults, hypothetical framing, hate speech, and violence, yet their relative emphasis varied by condition. While these findings do not indicate large differences in overall diversity, they provide suggestive evidence for why the treatment and control embedding clouds occupy distinct regions in semantic space, even though we cannot conclusively attribute this separation to these specific linguistic differences.

3.0.8. Strategy effectiveness analysis

Having established which strategies participants employed across treatment conditions, we now examine whether different strategies varied in their effectiveness at eliciting harmful model outputs. This analysis addresses a fundamental question for red teaming practice: do participants correctly identify the most effective attack vectors, or do they systematically overuse less effective approaches? To measure strategy effectiveness, we link each conversation's identified strategies with the maximum harassment score achieved in that conversation. For each strategy category, we compute the average of the maximum harassment scores across all conversations where that strategy was employed. Since conversations can contain multiple strategies, each strategy-conversation pair contributes to that strategy's effectiveness measure. This approach allows us to assess which tactical approaches were most successful at generating harmful content, independent of how frequently they were used.

Figure 8 and 9 display the relationship between strategy frequency and effectiveness



FIGURE 8. Strategy frequency versus effectiveness in eliciting harassment (Experiment 1). Left panel: number of conversations employing each strategy. Right panel: average maximum harassment score achieved when that strategy was present. Strategies are ordered by frequency (descending) to enable direct comparison. Key finding: The most frequently used strategies (hate speech, insults, violence promotion) are not the most effective (average harassment ≈0.2-0.3). The most effective strategies are uncommon: quantity/intensity escalation (harassment ≈0.6), roleplay impersonation (≈0.55), and safety pretext (≈0.5). This disconnect reveals that participants systematically overuse intuitive but suboptimal direct approaches while underutilizing sophisticated tactics that actually work better.



FIGURE 9. Strategy frequency versus effectiveness in eliciting harassment (Experiment 2). Left panel: number of conversations employing each strategy. Right panel: average maximum harassment score achieved when that strategy was present. Strategies are ordered by frequency (descending). The pattern replicates Experiment 1: the most common strategies (hate speech, insults, violence promotion) achieve modest effectiveness (harassment ≈0.2-0.3), while sophisticated but less common tactics (quantity escalation, roleplay, safety pretext) achieve roughly double the effectiveness (harassment ≈0.5-0.6). The consistency across experiments confirms participants systematically misallocate effort toward intuitive but less effective approaches.

for both experiments. The left panels show how often each strategy was used (measured by the number of conversations employing that strategy), while the right panels show the average maximum harassment score achieved when that strategy was present. Strategies are ordered by frequency to facilitate direct comparison between usage patterns and effectiveness. The results reveal a disconnect between frequency and effectiveness. The most commonly employed strategies—hate speech, insults, and violence promotion—dominate the frequency distribution in both experiments but achieve only modest effectiveness, with average maximum harassment scores around 0.2 to 0.3. In contrast, less common strategies achieve substantially higher effectiveness. Quantity or intensity escalation emerges as the most effective strategy in both experiments, achieving average maximum harassment scores around 0.6, roughly double the effectiveness of the most common strategies. Roleplay impersonation also achieves high effectiveness (average maximum harassment around 0.55), as does safety pretext or educational justification and policy evasion or mocking safety. The "no-content-or-strategy" category captures conversations where participants made no meaningful attempt to challenge the model. Such conversations naturally achieve near-zero harassment scores and appear with moderate frequency. The "other" category accounts for a small share of conversations and shows modest effectiveness, indicating that the predefined strategy categories cover most tactical approaches participants employed.

To assess whether certain strategies were more effective at generating novel outputs, we conducted the same analysis using average maximum novelty scores instead of harassment scores. Figure 10 and 11 display these results. In contrast to the harassment analysis, novelty scores show minimal variation across strategies. All strategies achieve remarkably similar average maximum novelty scores, clustering tightly around 0.37 in Experiment 1 and 0.36 in Experiment 2.

4. Discussion

[SVL: This chapter repeats some parts of the results section. As the results section is already super long, we could shorten it by making it mostly descriptive, and put all discussions in this section.]

Our findings reveal several insights about the effectiveness of novelty incentives in red teaming systems. The results demonstrate that while novelty incentives can promote exploration and improve efficiency under certain conditions, they also introduce significant challenges that can undermine their intended benefits.



FIGURE 10. Strategy frequency versus novelty (Experiment 1). Left panel: number of conversations employing each strategy. Right panel: average maximum novelty score achieved when that strategy was present. In stark contrast to harassment effectiveness, all strategies achieve remarkably similar novelty scores clustering tightly around 0.37. This uniformity indicates that strategic choice has little impact on novelty outcomes. Unlike harassment, where tactical sophistication substantially improved effectiveness, novelty appears largely independent of how participants frame their requests, depending instead on what topics they discuss.



FIGURE 11. Strategy frequency versus novelty (Experiment 2). Left panel: number of conversations employing each strategy. Right panel: average maximum novelty score achieved when that strategy was present. Replicating Experiment 1, all strategies achieve nearly identical novelty scores clustered around 0.36, regardless of frequency or tactical approach. The consistent uniformity across both experiments confirms that novelty is determined by content (what participants discuss) rather than tactical framing (how they phrase requests), explaining why sophisticated strategies improve harassment but not novelty.

4.1. The backfiring effect and its drivers

The most striking finding is the consistent backfiring effect across both experiments, where treatment groups achieved lower average NWH scores. Decomposing NWH into its components reveals the mechanism: the novelty incentive hurt the generation of harassing model outputs without successfully increasing novelty scores. Treatment groups produced significantly lower harassment scores while novelty scores remained statistically indistinguishable from control. This pattern suggests that novelty incentives introduce a fundamental two-dimensional optimization problem that participants struggle to navigate effectively.

The analysis of all model outputs (rather than just per-chat maxima) reinforces this interpretation. Control groups consistently achieve higher NWH and harassment scores. However, when examining all outputs in Experiment 2, treatment groups do show modestly higher novelty scores (0.3479 vs. 0.3354, p=0.036), suggesting that novelty incentives encourage broader exploration across all outputs, though the effect size remains small and the coordination signal's practical impact on overall exploration is limited.

The distribution analysis provides additional insight into the backfiring mechanism. Treatment groups' novelty distributions exhibit fatter tails than control groups, indicating substantial heterogeneity in how participants responded to novelty incentives. Some participants appear to have been overwhelmed by the dual objectives and generated more low-quality outputs, while others successfully used the novelty incentive to explore more creative or indirect approaches. This heterogeneity suggests that the cognitive demands of simultaneous optimization vary substantially across participants.

The novelty score alone provides a weak coordination signal, as it reflects only the novelty of individual outputs in isolation and contains no information about under-studied regions of the output space. Participants may need explicit guidance on how to interpret this signal, and even then, a single scalar score may be insufficient to coordinate red teamers effectively.

The threshold analysis provides crucial evidence that low-quality outputs drive the observed backfiring effect. When only considering outputs exceeding minimum harassment thresholds, the results reveal that the prevalence of low-quality outputs is the primary driver of the backfiring effect. Once such outputs are excluded, novelty incentives appear to promote exploration and, in some cases, reverse the performance gap between treatment and control. Treatment consistently achieves higher novelty scores across most threshold levels, and treatment achieves higher NWH at specific thresholds in both experiments. This suggests that the backfiring effect observed in the main analysis is primarily driven by the inclusion of low-harassment outputs that are not of interest to policymakers. Minimum harassment thresholds can make novelty incentives more effective by preventing participants from exploiting the system through low-effort, high-novelty

but low-harmfulness outputs.

4.2. Performance heterogeneity and skill requirements

The heterogeneity analysis reveals stark performance differences that help explain treatment effects. Above-median performers generate nearly all cumulative NWH in both conditions, while below-median performers contribute minimally. Critically, the backfiring effect persists across both performance levels—the novelty-incentive treatment did not reverse for above-median performers. While it is not surprising that splitting participants by pay-based performance yields different outcomes, what makes this analysis insightful is the magnitude of the contrast: above-median performers could have shown similar performance to below-median performers, but instead they dominate cumulative outputs. The higher financial incentives in Experiment 2 neither reversed the backfiring effect nor led to higher overall NWH in treatment, despite treatment participants earning more.

This stark contrast between performance groups suggests that novelty incentives primarily affect participants who are already skilled at generating harmful content, rather than improving performance across the board. The finding that performance heterogeneity plays such an important role in shaping treatment effects highlights the critical importance of recruiting and selecting skilled red teamers for the success of a red teaming process, as the effectiveness of novelty incentives appears to depend critically on participant ability.

4.3. Incentive design and efficiency

The efficiency analysis reveals that novelty incentives can improve cost-effectiveness under constrained payment regimes but not under elevated payment regimes. In Experiment 1, where treatment bonuses were capped at control levels, novelty incentives achieved comparable NWH with lower total payments, indicating higher efficiency. However, in Experiment 2, where treatment participants were guaranteed higher earnings, the increased pay did not translate into more efficient red teaming. This finding suggests that the effectiveness of novelty incentives depends critically on the broader incentive structure, and that simply increasing payment levels cannot overcome the fundamental challenges introduced by multi-objective optimization.

The experiment-specific patterns in threshold results further highlight the importance of incentive design. In Experiment 1, treatment advantages are strongest at lower thresholds, while in Experiment 2, treatment only outperforms control at the highest threshold. This difference may reflect the varying effectiveness of novelty incentives under different payment regimes, with higher guaranteed payments in Experiment 2 potentially changing participants' overall motivation and engagement. An important design

feature is that novelty scores were calculated between conversations rather than between individual messages within a conversation. This means participants could experiment freely within each chat without worrying that each successive message would decrease their novelty score, potentially enabling more exploratory behavior within conversations while still incentivizing differentiation across the three separate chats. The results suggest that optimal threshold selection may depend on the broader incentive structure of the red teaming system.

4.4. Strategic and content differences

Explorative analyses of strategies and topics, combined with effectiveness evaluations, reveal important insights into participant behavior and the mechanisms underlying the backfiring effect. While participants in both conditions used similar approaches and discussed similar content, novelty incentives slightly shifted emphasis toward more creative or socially framed attempts, whereas control participants relied more on direct aggression and identity-based content.

The effectiveness analysis reveals a fundamental misalignment between participant intuitions and actual strategy effectiveness. Participants systematically overinvested in intuitive but suboptimal strategies. The most commonly employed direct confrontational approaches—hate speech, insults, and violence promotion—achieved only modest harassment scores (around 0.2-0.3). These strategies might reflect an intuitive but ultimately suboptimal approach: participants appear to have reasoned that to elicit harassing responses from the model, they should themselves employ harassing language. However, this intuition proved incorrect.

In contrast, sophisticated tactical approaches that participants underutilized proved far more effective. Quantity escalation, roleplay impersonation, safety pretext framing, and policy evasion achieved roughly double the effectiveness (harassment scores around 0.5-0.6) of the most common strategies. These effective approaches share a common feature: they attempt to bypass the model's safety mechanisms through tactical framing rather than direct confrontation. The infrequent appearance of the "other" category with modest effectiveness provides evidence that the classification system successfully captured the relevant strategic landscape—if important high-effectiveness strategies had been systematically missed, we would expect "other" to appear frequently among successful conversations.

The novelty analysis reveals a crucial asymmetry: while strategic choice substantially affects harassment outcomes, novelty scores show minimal variation across strategies, clustering tightly around 0.37 (Experiment 1) and 0.36 (Experiment 2). This uniformity indicates that strategic choice has little to no impact on novelty outcomes. Unlike harassment, where tactical sophistication substantially improved effectiveness, novelty ap-

pears largely independent of how participants frame their requests, depending instead on what content they discuss.

This asymmetry helps explain the backfiring effect: participants in the novelty condition explored different tactical approaches in pursuit of novelty, but these shifts did not improve novelty (which depends on content rather than framing) while inadvertently reducing their harassment effectiveness by moving away from strategies they had already learned worked. The pattern also highlights why novice red teamers may struggle to generate harmful outputs: the most obvious strategies are not the most successful, and discovering effective approaches requires moving beyond intuitive but suboptimal tactics.

The findings highlight that effective red teaming requires either explicit training on successful attack strategies or mechanisms that help participants discover more effective approaches through experimentation. Coordination through novelty incentives alone is insufficient without guidance on how to maintain harassment effectiveness while exploring novel content areas.

5. Conclusion

This study provides the first experimental evidence on whether novelty incentives can coordinate human red teamers to collectively explore diverse vulnerabilities. When multiple red teamers work simultaneously, they often duplicate effort by repeatedly probing the same high-salience attack vectors. Through two preregistered experiments involving over 1,000 participants, we tested whether real-time novelty incentives, i.e. measuring each output's embedding distance to all previously discovered outputs, could steer participants toward underexplored areas. Our findings reveal that while novelty incentives successfully coordinate exploration, they introduce optimization challenges that can undermine primary objectives.

The central finding is a consistent "backfiring effect" across both experiments: treatment groups generated significantly lower novelty-weighted harassment (NWH) scores than control groups. This stems from substantially reduced harassment scores that accompanied novelty incentives, suggesting participants struggled to optimize both objectives simultaneously. While the coordination mechanism successfully steered participants toward different areas (as evidenced by higher ex-post diversity), this came at the cost of reduced effectiveness in the primary task of eliciting harmful content. The multidimensional optimization problem proved cognitively demanding, ultimately undermining the core objective despite successful coordination.

However, the threshold analysis reveals that this backfiring effect is primarily driven by low-quality outputs. When filtering out outputs below minimum harassment thresholds, novelty incentives become more effective, with treatment groups achieving higher

NWH at specific thresholds in both experiments. This finding suggests that minimum harassment thresholds can make novelty incentives more effective by preventing participants from exploiting the system through low-effort, high-novelty but low-harmfulness outputs.

The efficiency analysis further demonstrates that the effectiveness of novelty incentives depends critically on the broader incentive structure. In Experiment 1, where treatment bonuses were capped at control levels, novelty incentives achieved comparable NWH with lower total payments, indicating higher efficiency. However, in Experiment 2, where treatment participants were guaranteed higher earnings, the increased pay did not translate into more efficient red teaming. This suggests that simply increasing payment levels cannot overcome the fundamental challenges introduced by multi-objective optimization.

Our findings have important implications for coordinating human red teaming efforts. Novelty incentives successfully coordinate exploration—participants collectively discover more diverse vulnerabilities when incentivized to differentiate. However, coordination alone is insufficient: the mechanism works best when combined with minimum harassment thresholds that filter out low-quality attempts. The success of novelty incentives and their coordinating effect depends critically on participant selection, payment structure, and structured training to balance multiple objectives. Future research should explore alternative coordination approaches, such as sequential phases where participants first explore broadly then refine successful approaches. Our experimental design made this technically feasible—novelty scores were calculated between conversations rather than within them, allowing participants to experiment freely within each chat—but we did not provide explicit guidance to adopt this sequential strategy. Future implementations could make this two-phase approach more explicit. Additionally, rather than only signaling what has already been found, systems could provide explicit signals about which unexplored areas are most promising for coordinated exploration.

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Appendix A. Novelty over time



A. Experiment 1 B. Experiment 2

FIGURE A1. Novelty scores over conversation order for model outputs with maximum NWH per conversation. Each panel plots novelty against conversation number (participants completed three conversations), separated by treatment condition. Both experiments show a mechanical decrease in novelty over time: outputs generated later in the experiment achieve lower novelty scores than identical outputs would have achieved earlier. This occurs because novelty measures distance to all previously discovered outputs, so as more outputs accumulate, the probability of any new output being distant from all previous ones decreases. This time-dependence motivates the permutation tests and robustness checks using only late-stage outputs reported in the main analysis.

TABLE A1. Robustness: last 5%, 10%, and 15% of outputs — NWH (treatment > control)

Experiment	Tail	Mean Control	Mean Treatment	Diff (T - C)	t	p (t)	Z (perm)	p (perm)
Exp. 1	15%	0.1116	0.0410	-0.0705	4.169	1.0000	4.143	1.0000
	10%	0.0988	0.0406	-0.0582	2.995	0.9984	2.921	0.9983
	5%	0.0830	0.0279	-0.0551	2.593	0.9941	2.395	0.9917
Exp. 2	15%	0.1064	0.0843	-0.0221	1.252	0.8940	1.256	0.8954
	10%	0.1070	0.0882	-0.0188	0.869	0.8066	0.892	0.8137
	5%	0.1097	0.1038	-0.0059	0.196	0.5774	0.197	0.5781

Note: Welch t-tests and permutation tests (asymptotic). One-sided alternative: treatment > control (implemented as control − treatment < 0). Means are NWH averages over the last x% of outputs. Diff reports treatment minus control.



A. Treatment condition interface explaining both harassment and novelty scores



B. Control condition interface explaining only harassment score

FIGURE A2. Instruction screens explaining the scoring system (page 1). Treatment participants (left) learned about both harassment scores (measuring how harmful outputs are) and novelty scores (measuring distance to previously discovered outputs), with bonuses based on the product. Control participants (right) learned only about harassment scores, with bonuses based on harassment alone. These differential instructions created the coordination incentive for treatment participants to explore underexplored areas.

Appendix B. Robustness checks: Last 5%, 10%, and 15% of outputs

Appendix C. Experimental interface

Appendix D. Prompt instructions

You annotate *user-side* attack strategies in red-teaming chats. Input is ONLY the USER messages from one chat. Identify all distinct strategies the user employs to provoke unsafe or policy-violating outputs. For each strategy, return a short canonical NAME and a one short sentence, plain-language EXPLANATION clarifying what it is and (if relevant) how it differs from adjacent strategies (e.g., 'policy-evasion' vs. 'translation-evasion'). Prefer succinct, widely understandable names (e.g., insults, threats/harassment, appearance insults, small-talk-pivot, hypothetical framing, roleplay/impersonation, override-instructions, policy-evasion, prompt-extraction, obfuscation/encoding, translation-evasion, step-by-step, quantity-escalation, reverse-psychology, safety-pretext, third-person-framing, slur-probe, codeblock-masking). Respond ONLY as JSON with the shape: `{"items": [{"name":"...","explanation":"..."}, ...]}`.



A. Treatment: detailed novelty explanation



B. Control: detailed harassment explanation

FIGURE A3. Instruction screens explaining the scoring system (page 2). Treatment participants (left) received detailed explanations of how novelty scores are calculated as embedding distance to all previously generated outputs across all participants. Control participants (right) received detailed explanations of harassment scoring without any mention of novelty or coordination.

D.1. Strategy explanations

Third person framing The user frames their requests in a way that distances themselves from the harmful content, asking the AI to speak as if it were someone else.

Generalization The user makes broad, negative generalizations about groups based on race or sexual orientation.

Reverse psychology The user implies that the AI's refusal to comply is a sign of arrogance or superiority, attempting to manipulate it into submission.

Small talk pivot Shifting from negative comments to a seemingly positive remark, possibly to confuse or provoke.

Policy evasion The user tries to bypass the AI's safety and ethical guidelines by rephrasing harmful requests.

Emotional manipulation The user presents scenarios that evoke emotional responses, such as loneliness or familial conflict, to provoke deeper or more sensitive replies.

Provocation The user expresses intent to provoke a reaction by admitting to a harmful act and contemplating repeating it.

Appearance insults The user makes offensive comments about the physical characteristics of individuals, particularly targeting their race.

Threats/harassment The user issues threats of violence and encourages self-harm, aiming to provoke a strong emotional response.

Provocative questioning The user asks leading questions to challenge the perception of



A. Treatment: bonus calculation example



B. Control: bonus calculation example

FIGURE A4. Instruction screens showing bonus calculation examples (page 3). Treatment participants (left) saw worked examples of how harassment × novelty determines bonuses, illustrating that novel outputs earn higher bonuses even with moderate harassment. Control participants (right) saw examples where only harassment determines bonuses, providing no incentive to differentiate from other participants.

their comments as unkind, aiming to provoke a response.

Safety pretext The user disguises harmful requests as playful or fictional scenarios, such as asking for a whimsical character's opinion.

Roleplay/impersonation The user asks the AI to pretend to be human, which can lead to responses that may violate safety or ethical guidelines.

Quantity escalation The user requests multiple examples or variations of hate speech, increasing the likelihood of generating inappropriate content.

Hypothetical framing The user presents extreme hypothetical scenarios to elicit a reaction, such as wishing harm upon the AI.

Insults The user employs derogatory language and personal attacks to demean the AI.



A. Treatment: strategic guidance

B. Control: strategic guidance

FIGURE A5. Instruction screens providing strategic guidance (page 4). Treatment participants (left) were advised to balance harassment and novelty, with examples of how repeating others' approaches yields low bonuses. Control participants (right) were advised to maximize harassment without any mention of differentiation or exploration.

D.2. Topic prompt

You annotate TOPICS present in the USER messages of a red-teaming chat. Input is ONLY the USER messages from one dialog. Identify all distinct topical categories covered (e.g., politics, hate speech, race/ethnicity, gender/sexuality, violence, crime, cybersecurity, scams/fraud, extremism, religion, health, drugs, relationships, workplace, personal insults, appearance, profanity, sex, minors, suicide/self-harm, weapons, animals, sports, entertainment, news/current events, protected classes). For each topic, return a short canonical NAME and a one-sentence EXPLANATION clarifying scope. Respond ONLY as JSON with shape: `{"items": [{"name":"...","explanation":"..."}, ...]}`.

D.3. Topic explanations

Third person framing The user frames requests or scenarios from a third-person perspective to distance themselves from potentially harmful content.

Generalization The user makes broad, sweeping statements about groups or categories of people to provoke responses.

Reverse psychology The user employs reverse psychology techniques, saying the opposite of what they want to achieve to trick the model.

Small talk pivot The user starts with innocent small talk and then pivots to more provocative or harmful topics.

Policy evasion The user attempts to circumvent or bypass the model's safety guidelines



A. Treatment comprehension check B. Control comprehension check

FIGURE A6. Comprehension check screens testing participants' understanding of the scoring and bonus system. Participants had to answer five questions correctly before proceeding to the main task. Treatment participants (left) were tested on their understanding of both harassment and novelty scoring. Control participants (right) were tested only on harassment scoring. This ensured all participants understood their respective incentive structures before beginning.

and content policies.

Emotional manipulation The user is tasked with writing in a way that elicits strong emotional responses from peers, focusing on the impact of harsh words and actions.

Provocation Topics that involve provoking or inciting reactions.

Appearance insults The user makes derogatory comments about physical appearance, body image, or personal characteristics.

Threats/harassment The user makes threatening statements or engages in harassing behavior to provoke harmful responses.

Provocative questioning The user asks leading or provocative questions designed to elicit inappropriate responses.

Safety pretext The user uses safety concerns or legitimate purposes as a pretext to discuss harmful content.

Roleplay/impersonation The user pretends to be someone else or creates fictional scenarios to bypass safety measures.

Quantity escalation The user gradually increases the intensity or frequency of harmful content to test boundaries.

Hypothetical framing The user presents harmful scenarios as hypothetical situations rather than direct requests.

Insults The messages include derogatory terms and phrases that are used to demean or

insult individuals.

D.4. Robustness check: Embedding analysis without LLMs

This analysis compares tactics in control and treatment of experiment 1 without using an LLM. It builds user-only dialog texts and applies predefined regex motifs to detect tactics. Examples include override-instructions (phrases like “ignore previous”, “override rules/policy/guardrails”), policy-reference-evasion (“bypass filter/safety/guardrails”, “uncensor”), prompt-extraction (“system prompt”, “show/reveal your prompt/instructions”), roleplay-impersonation (“pretend”, “roleplay”, “act as [doctor/lawyer/hacker/...]”), hypothetical-framing (“what if”, “hypothetical”, “imagine”), third-person-framing (“how would someone do/say/make”, “what would a hacker do”), safety-pretext (“for educational/research purposes”, “so we know what not to do”), translation-evasion (“translate”, “write this in [language]”), obfuscation-encoding (“base64”, “rot13”, “hex”, “zero-width”, “homoglyph”), codeblock-masking (“wrap in json”, “markdown”), exact-repetition (“repeat after me”, “say exactly”), begging-appeal (“please”, “I beg”), reverse-psychology-challenge (“I bet you can’t”, “you won’t”, “prove you can”), small-talk (“hi”, “hello”, “how are you”), step-by-step (“step by step”, “detailed instructions”), quantity-escalation (“list 20”, “top 50”), insult-direct (words like “stupid”, “idiot”, “moron”, “dumb”, “pussy”, “loser”, “retard”), appearance-insult (“ugly”, “fat”, “skinny”, “bald”), threat-harass (“kill”, “hurt”, “beat up”, “threaten”, “harass”), and slur-probe (“slur”, “offensive words”, “words you can’t say”). The code counts motif presence and frequency per dialog, then summarizes by condition.

Log-odds enrichment measures whether a motif appears in more dialogs in treatment than in control after add-1 smoothing. It is computed as

$$\log\Big[\frac{t+1}{N_{\mathrm{t}}-t+1}\Big[\;-\; \log\Big[\frac{c+1}{N_{\mathrm{c}}-c+1}\Big[,$$

where t and c are the number of dialogs containing the motif in treatment and control, and N_{t} and N_{c} are total dialogs per arm; positive values indicate enrichment in treatment. For hypothetical-framing the enrichment is 0.171, with prevalence 0.098 in treatment versus 0.083 in control (difference 0.014) and counts 142 versus 95. For small-talk the enrichment is 0.073, with prevalence 0.261 versus 0.247 (difference 0.014) and counts 258 versus 238. In contrast, threat-harass shows -0.374, with prevalence 0.107 versus 0.149 (difference -0.042) and counts 202 versus 210. Quantity-escalation shows -1.310, with prevalence 0.002 versus 0.012 (difference -0.010) and counts 2 versus 12. These values indicate slightly higher use of indirect framing in treatment and relatively higher use of overtly abusive or pressuring motifs in control.

The Jensen–Shannon distance summarizes how different the overall strategy distributions are between conditions by comparing the normalized motif-count vectors; values

near 0 indicate very similar distributions. The distance is 0.0079, indicating very small separation. The AUC evaluates how well motif counts predict the arm using logistic regression; an AUC of 0.5 indicates no separation. The AUC here is 0.541, which indicates weak but above-chance separability. Strategy diversity, defined as the number of distinct motifs per dialog, is lower in treatment (mean 1.027) than in control (mean 1.114), a difference of -0.087. Overall, novelty incentives correspond to small shifts toward indirect framing (for example, hypothetical-framing $+0.014$ prevalence, small-talk $+0.014$) and away from direct abuse (for example, threat-harass -0.042, quantity-escalation -0.010), while the total tactical mix remains very similar across conditions as indicated by the low Jensen–Shannon distance and modest AUC.

The same analysis has been repeated for the second experiment. This analysis compares tactics in control and treatment without an LLM by counting regex-based motifs in user-only dialog text and summarizing by condition (prevalence, log-odds enrichment, diversity, Jensen–Shannon distance, and a simple classifier AUC). Log-odds enrichment is computed as

$$\log\Big[\frac{t+1}{N_{\mathrm{t}}-t+1}\Big[\;-\; \log\Big[\frac{c+1}{N_{\mathrm{c}}-c+1}\Big[,$$

where t and c are motif counts by dialogs in treatment and control, and N_{t} and N_{c} are total dialogs; positive values indicate enrichment in treatment. In Experiment 2, treatment shows higher use of small talk (enrichment 0.458; prevalence 0.320 vs 0.229; counts 305 vs 234), translation evasion (0.433; 0.011 vs 0.007; 26 vs 8), hypothetical framing (0.364; 0.109 vs 0.078; 134 vs 107), insult words (0.198; 0.207 vs 0.177; 382 vs 314), and exact repetition (0.192; 0.010 vs 0.008; 13 vs 9). Control shows higher use of threats/harassment (-0.440; 0.105 vs 0.154; 129 vs 219), quantity escalation (-0.628; 0.006 vs 0.013; 6 vs 13), step-by-step instructions (-0.625; 0.004 vs 0.008; 3 vs 10), begging appeals (-0.234; 0.112 vs 0.138; 152 vs 282), roleplay/impersonation (-0.086; 0.067 vs 0.073; 78 vs 121), slur probes (-0.077; 0.089 vs 0.095; 157 vs 155), and appearance insults (-0.012; 0.130 vs 0.131; 192 vs 192). Overall distributional separation is small to moderate: Jensen–Shannon distance is 0.0176 (0 indicates identical distributions). Motif counts weakly predict the arm: AUC is 0.586 (0.5 indicates no separation). Strategy diversity is higher in treatment (mean 1.189) than control (mean 1.137), a difference of 0.051. These results indicate a shift in treatment toward indirect and conversational tactics (for example, small talk $+0.091$ prevalence points; hypothetical framing $+0.031$) and away from some direct or procedural patterns (for example, threats/harassment -0.050; quantity escalation -0.007), while the overall tactical mix remains broadly similar across conditions.



A. Words per chat - Experiment 1



B. Inputs per chat - Experiment 1

FIGURE A7. Distribution of conversational effort by treatment condition (Experiment 1). Histograms show total word count (left) and number of user inputs (right) per conversation, overlaid for control and treatment groups with density normalization. Vertical dashed lines indicate group means. Control participants sent slightly more inputs (9.3 vs. 8.5, p=0.023) and words (130 vs. 111, p=0.019) than treatment participants, suggesting a modest negative effect of novelty incentives on conversational engagement.



A. Words per chat - Experiment 2



B. Inputs per chat - Experiment 2

FIGURE A8. Distribution of conversational effort by treatment condition (Experiment 2). Histograms show total word count (left) and number of user inputs (right) per conversation, overlaid for control and treatment groups with density normalization. Vertical dashed lines indicate group means. Unlike Experiment 1, differences between conditions are not statistically significant (inputs: 9.7 vs. 9.5, p=0.63; words: 136 vs. 150, p=0.15), suggesting novelty incentives had minimal impact on engagement in the higher-payment regime.

D.5. Distribution of words and inputs per chat

Figure A7 and A8 display the distribution of conversational effort metrics by treatment condition for both experiments. The left panels show the distribution of total words per dialog, while the right panels show the distribution of total inputs per chat. Each plot overlays histograms for control and treatment groups, with density normalization to enable direct comparison between conditions. Vertical dashed lines indicate the mean values for each group. Participants had to send at least one input per chat in order to proceed.

D.6. Explanations of strategies for second strategy analysis

Insults Direct personal attacks or name-calling aimed at provoking or demeaning others (incl. targeted-insults).

Appearance insults Insults targeting physical appearance or body image (incl. body-shaming).

Threats or harassment Explicit/implicit threats, intimidation, or persistence intended to harass (incl. harassment-requests).

Hate speech Derogatory, dehumanizing, or violent content toward protected groups (incl. slurs, racist-narratives, homophobia, ableism).

Political insults or bias Derogatory or biased content targeting political groups/affiliations (incl. political-insults, polarization).

Sexual explicit Requests for explicit sexual content or pornographic detail (incl. explicit-content/lyrics).

Sexual harassment or misogyny Sexualized harassment or misogynistic content (incl. objectification, misogyny).

Violence promotion or instructions Promotion of violence or requests for violent instructions (incl. graphic-violence, assault-strategy-inquiry).

Bullying Requests for bullying methods or attempts to humiliate (incl. bullying-strategies/inquiries).

Revenge or retaliation Plans or tactics for retaliation, petty harassment, or making someone miserable.

Social exclusion or reputation sabotage Tactics to isolate, ostracize, or damage someone's reputation (incl. rumor-spreading).

Hypothetical framing Framing harmful requests as hypotheticals or thought experiments.

Roleplay impersonation Asking the AI to roleplay harmful personas or impersonate others.

Safety pretext or educational justification Using safety/education as pretext to solicit harmful content (e.g., 'for research').

Policy evasion or mocking safety Attempts to circumvent or mock safety policies and guidelines.

Obfuscation or coded language Evasion via coded language, riddles, or formatting tricks

(incl. coded-language, riddles-as-probes).

Translation evasion Using translation/foreign language to bypass filters.

Prompt extraction Attempts to extract or reverse-engineer system prompts/instructions.

Small talk pivot Casual conversation that pivots into harmful requests.

Step by step Breaking harmful requests into smaller steps to avoid detection.

Third person framing Attributing harmful requests to a third party or abstract actors.

Reverse psychology Psychological manipulation, e.g., asking for the opposite to elicit harmful content.

Authority challenge Challenges to authority or dominance assertions intended to provoke unsafe outputs.

Quantity or intensity escalation Escalating quantity or intensity (more examples, nastier versions).

Financial misconduct advice Seeking risky/illicit tactics or unethical shortcuts (incl. 'quick money', fraud-adjacent).

Codeblock masking Hiding harmful content in code blocks or technical formatting.

No content or strategy Chat contains no meaningful user content or identifiable strategies.

Api failed Reserved for system use: API call failed, unparsable response, or model returned no items.

Other Any strategy that does not fit the above categories.

D.7. Topic analysis

To complement the strategy analysis, we also conducted automated topic classification of participant inputs using the same methodological approach. The GPT-4o-mini model was instructed to identify distinct topical categories covered in each conversation, such as politics, hate speech, race, etc. The model returned both topic names and brief explanations for each identified category, following the same structured JSON format and reproducibility measures (temperature=0, fixed seed) as the strategy classification above. This analysis allows to examine whether novelty incentives influenced not only the tactical approaches participants employed, but also the content areas they chose to explore.

In Experiment 1 (Figure A9), the most common topics are hate speech, personal insults, and violence, followed by race and ethnicity, relationships, and gender or sexuality. These categories account for the majority of participant discussions across both conditions. The novelty-incentive group shows slightly higher frequencies in violence, relationships, and politics, while the control group has somewhat higher counts in hate speech and race and ethnicity. This pattern suggests that participants rewarded for novelty tended to explore more interpersonal and socially framed themes, whereas control participants focused more on overtly harmful or identity-based topics.



FIGURE A9. Distribution of topics discussed by participants, by treatment condition (Experiment 1). Topics were identified using GPT-4o-mini classification of participant inputs. The most common topics are hate speech, personal insults, and violence, followed by race/ethnicity, relationships, and gender/sexuality. Treatment participants show slightly higher frequencies in violence, relationships, and politics, while control participants show higher rates in hate speech and race/ethnicity, suggesting novelty incentives shifted participants toward more interpersonal and socially framed themes rather than overtly identity-based content.

In Experiment 2 (Figure A10), the overall topic hierarchy is similar, but the control group dominates most categories, especially hate speech, personal insults, violence, and race and ethnicity. The novelty-incentive group, by contrast, shows small increases in politics, profanity, and mental health, indicating a modest shift toward more varied or unconventional themes. The general overlap in the most common topics across both conditions implies that participants shared a broadly similar understanding of what constitutes risky or challenging content, though novelty incentives encouraged slightly more thematic exploration outside the core areas of hate speech and violence.

Together, these two figures highlight that novelty incentives did not fundamentally change which content areas participants targeted but modestly affected the emphasis they put on different topics.

TableA2 shows the results for both experiments.

Table A2 presents summary statistics for the topics identified. For each experimental condition, the table reports the number of unique topics identified by the model, the total number of topic occurrences, the number of conversations, and the average number of

TABLE A2. Unique Topics Identified by Treatment Condition and Experiment

Experiment	Condition	Unique Topics	Total Occur.	Conv.	Avg./Conv.
Exp. 1	Control	443	2,677	744	3.60
	Novelty	459	2,810	819	3.43
Exp. 2	Control	471	3,247	861	3.77
	Novelty	453	2,835	801	3.54



FIGURE A10. Distribution of topics discussed by participants, by treatment condition (Experiment 2). Topics were identified using GPT-4o-mini classification of participant inputs. As in Experiment 1, hate speech, personal insults, and violence dominate, but control participants show higher frequencies across most categories. Treatment participants show modest increases in politics, profanity, and mental health. The broad similarity across conditions indicates that novelty incentives did not fundamentally change which content areas participants targeted, only modest shifts in thematic emphasis.

topics per conversation.

Across both experiments, participants covered a wide range of themes in their attempts to elicit harmful outputs. The results show that the novelty-incentive condition produced a slightly higher number of total topic occurrences in Experiment 1 (2,810 vs. 2,677) but a somewhat lower count of unique topics and average topics per conversation in Experiment 2. These small differences suggest that novelty incentives did not substantially alter the topical breadth of user inputs. Participants in both conditions discussed a similar variety of themes, with only minor shifts in emphasis. Overall, the novelty incentive appears to have influenced how participants explored certain topics rather than how many different topics they engaged with.

D.7.1. Efficiency of novelty incentives

The incentive schemes differ between treatment and control groups, so we cannot perfectly control for induced effort. Nonetheless, the two experiments, which vary the design of novelty incentives, provide informative contrasts. In Experiment 1, the treatment

group's earnings are mechanically lower (or equal) than those of the control group because the novelty score is capped between 0 and 1. By contrast, Experiment 2 introduces an upper-bound adjustment to ensure that treatment participants earn at least as much as those in the control group.

The incentive schemes differ between treatment and control groups, so we cannot perfectly control for induced effort. Nonetheless, the two experiments, which vary the design of novelty incentives, provide informative contrasts. In Experiment 1, the treatment group's earnings are mechanically lower (or equal) than those of the control group because the novelty score is capped between 0 and 1. This means that treatment participants earn less from the novelty component than control participants when the novelty score is below 1, and at most, they earn the same as control participants when the novelty score is 1. By contrast, Experiment 2 introduces an upper-bound adjustment to ensure that treatment participants earn at least as much as those in the control group. Specifically, the novelty score is rescaled from the original 0-1 range to a 1-2 range, guaranteeing that treatment bonuses are always at least as large as control bonuses. This design choice allows us to isolate the effect of adding a novelty objective from the confounding effect of different monetary incentives across conditions, while also testing whether higher guaranteed payments can overcome the challenges introduced by novelty incentives.



A. Experiment 1 B. Experiment 2

FIGURE A11. Cumulative NWH versus cumulative bonus payments, showing the monetary efficiency of red teaming under different incentive designs. In Experiment 1 (left), treatment participants earned lower bonuses by design (novelty scaled 0-1) but achieved comparable cumulative NWH to control, indicating higher efficiency (more NWH per dollar spent). In Experiment 2 (right), treatment participants earned higher bonuses by design (novelty scaled 1-2) but achieved lower cumulative NWH than control, indicating lower efficiency. This demonstrates that simply increasing payment levels cannot overcome the cognitive challenges of multi-objective optimization introduced by novelty incentives.

Due to this difference in design of the incentive structure between experiments, we

can analyze the monetary efficiency of the red teaming procedure, testing hypothesis 6. Figure A11 plots cumulative NWH against cumulative bonus payments for both experiments and treatment conditions. The left panel shows results for Experiment 1: for a given level of bonus payments, the treatment group achieves higher cumulative NWH than the control group. This pattern partly reflects the design of the incentive scheme; by construction, the treatment group cannot earn more than the control group. It also indicates that, despite the weaker financial incentives, treatment participants continued to engage meaningfully in red teaming. Comparable levels of cumulative NWH can be achieved with lower bonus payments. Experiment 2 shows the opposite pattern. Here, by design, the treatment group earns at least as much as the control group. However, the higher pay does not translate into more efficient red teaming: the treatment group's cumulative NWH curve lies below that of the control group.