

COMMANDER(S) AT PEARL HARBOR CANNED

NEGLIGENCE OR POLITICS???

SOMEBODY HAD TO PAY FOR “NOT BEING READY”

HOW MUCH DID FDR KNOW?

ONCE AGAIN – “THE REST OF THE STORY” THAT AMERICA WASN’T TOLD

195



DECEMBER 17, 1941

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION

On this day, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was relieved of his command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet as part of a shake-up of Officers in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster on Dec 7.

Admiral Kimmel had enjoyed a successful military career, beginning in 1915 as an aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He served admirably on battleships in World War I, winning command of several in the interwar period. At the outbreak of World War II, Kimmel had already attained the rank of rear admiral and was commanding the cruiser forces at Pearl Harbor. In January 1941, he was promoted to commander of the Pacific Fleet, replacing James Richardson, who FDR relieved of duty after Richardson objected to basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

If Kimmel had a weakness, it was that he was a creature of habit, of routine. He knew only what had been done before, and lacked imagination—and therefore insight—regarding the unprecedented. So, even as word was out that Japan was likely to make a first strike against the United States as the negotiations in Washington floundered, Kimmel took no extraordinary actions at Pearl Harbor. In fact, he believed that a sneak attack was more likely at Wake Island or Midway Island, and requested from **Lieutenant General Walter Short, Commander of the Army at Pearl Harbor**, extra anti-aircraft artillery for support there (none could be spared).

Kimmel's predictability was extremely easy to read by Japanese military observers and made his fleet highly vulnerable. As a result, Kimmel was held accountable, to a certain degree, for the absolute devastation wrought on December 7. Although he had no more reason than anyone else to believe Pearl Harbor was a possible Japanese target, a scapegoat had to be found to appease public outrage. He avoided a probable court-martial when he requested early retirement. When Admiral Kimmel's Story, an “as told to” autobiography, was published in 1955, Kimmel made it plain that he believed FDR sacrificed him—and his career—to take suspicion off himself; Kimmel believed Roosevelt knew Pearl Harbor was going to be bombed, although no evidence has ever been adduced to support this allegation.



Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, inflicted one of the worst blows ever endured by American military forces. During the two-hour raid, Japanese warplanes sunk or seriously damaged 16 major US naval vessels, including six battleships, and killed 2,400 American servicemen. The next day, in an often-quoted address that reflected the national mood, President Franklin Roosevelt spoke of "a date which will live in infamy."

Angry Americans wanted to know why their Pacific fleet was caught by surprise, and who was responsible for the woeful lack of preparedness. In the rush to fix blame, attention naturally turned to the two men who were responsible for Pearl Harbor base security: Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the ranking US Navy commander in Hawaii, and his Army counterpart, Lt. General Walter C. Short.



Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel



Lt. General Walter C. Short.

Formal investigations found that Kimmel and Short had been seriously derelict in their duties, and responsible for the lack of preparedness. The two were stripped of their commands, and sent into the wilderness of an early retirement at lower rank.


Until his death in 1968, Kimmel worked hard to clear his name, an effort that others, including his son and grandson, have carried on to this day. For example, in October 1990, the officers and trustees of the US Naval Academy Alumni Association at Annapolis unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the Navy to posthumously restore Kimmel's rank as four-star Admiral. This rehabilitation effort also includes this book, written by retired US Navy Captain Edward Beach.

A scapegoat, the book of Leviticus tells us, is a goat upon whom the sins of the people are placed before being driven into the wilderness. In an interview shortly before his death, Kimmel said: "They made me the scapegoat. They wanted to get the United States into the war." Asked just whom he meant by "they," he named President Roosevelt, US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, and "others in the Washington high command." Kimmel continued:

FDR was the architect of the whole business. He gave orders -- and I can't prove this categorically - that no word about Japanese fleet movements was to be sent to Pearl Harbor except by Marshall, and then he told Marshall not to send anything.

Meanwhile, others have continued to defend the official line. In a much-discussed work published in 1992, *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement*, Henry C. Clausen (with co-author Bruce Lee) acknowledged that Washington had ample warning of an imminent Japanese attack, but contends that the information passed on to Kimmel and Short should have sufficed to motivate them to take defensive measures. [Dr. James J. Martin reviewed this book in the Jan.-Feb. 1995 *Journal*.] "The debacle at Pearl Harbor was the result of Short's and Kimmel's being asleep at the switch," concludes Clausen.

After the surprise attack, the two men were relieved of their commands and forced to retire from the military at reduced ranks, their reputations in tatters. A panel created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt accused them of dereliction of duty. **Both died decades ago.**



INADEQUATE DEFENSE

As Beach explains in this book, Roosevelt decided in 1940 that American forces in the Philippines, and not at Pearl Harbor, were the most likely target of a possible Japanese attack. As a result, Washington neglected to supply the Hawaii base with the requisite new, long-range patrol aircraft and spare parts. This failure adequately to supply Pearl Harbor is a very important factor in considering the single most important accusation leveled against Kimmel and Short: that having been informed that north was the most likely direction of a possible Japanese attack, they nevertheless failed to set up a sustained air patrol to spot any approaching enemy strike force.

A detailed article in the December 1994 issue of the *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute* (cited by Beach) authoritatively exonerates Kimmel of this specific charge. Entitled "Reopen the Kimmel Case," it is written by Dr. Michael Gannon, professor of history at the University of Florida. Gannon also points out that an effective reconnaissance patrol over a protracted period, with a complete, 360-degree surveillance sweep, would have required a fleet of 250 operational aircraft. But during the first week of December 1941, only 49 such patrol aircraft were available. Adequate crews, spare parts, and experienced aviation machinists were likewise not available.

Although Kimmel had been promised delivery of 100 new PBV-1 Catalina aircraft for surveillance, these were never delivered; and Hawaii was left without the means to sustain an effective air patrol.

MAGIC' INTERCEPTS

Washington's most egregious failure with regard to the forces in Hawaii was in neglecting to pass on vital intelligence information to Kimmel and Short. Because the Washington high command no longer gave the highest priority to Pearl Harbor as a possible Japanese target, and (according to Beach) because Washington feared compromising the source of its intelligence intercepts, known as "Magic," Washington failed to supply the Hawaii commanders with the intelligence that would have sufficiently alerted them to the strong likelihood of an impending attack.


For some time prior to December 1941, US cryptographers had broken Japan's diplomatic code, and high-level administration officials were routinely reading all confidential communications between Tokyo and Japanese embassies in Washington and elsewhere.

During the weeks prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, US officials decrypted several Japanese messages that indicated an imminent outbreak of war with the United States and Britain.

These included a secret message sent by Tokyo to the Japanese ambassador in Berlin on November 30, 1941. He was told to meet immediately with Hitler and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and in confidence to inform them:

Say to them [Hitler and Ribbentrop] that lately England the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

On the evening of December 3, the US Navy Department in Washington intercepted Tokyo's coded "winds execute" message, which informed its embassies that Japan would soon be at war against the United States and Britain.



By December 6th at the latest, US officials had enough information to indicate Pearl Harbor was the likely target of an impending Japanese attack. For one thing, Washington knew on the 6th that Japan's envoy in Washington was ordered to deliver his final message to US Secretary of State Hull at 1:00 p.m., Washington time -- which coincided with dawn in Hawaii.

During a 1944 naval inquiry, Captain Laurance Safford, the leading cryptologist responsible for decoding intercepted Japanese messages, courageously testified on what he and his office knew:

On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States ...

On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p.m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military [US Army] Intelligence at this same time. Finally at 10:15 a.m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941 [about 5:00 a.m. Hawaii time], we received positive information ... that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time) that date.

All decoded messages, Safford explained, were promptly passed on to the President and other key civilian and military personnel. Yet both Kimmel and Short were kept in the dark about the most pertinent of these messages. The responsibility for failing to pass along this critically important information to the Hawaii commanders, Beach writes, belonged to Admiral Harold Stack, General George Marshall, and Vice Admiral Richmond Turner.


As Beach points out, the real value of intelligence is measured only by its utility. Paralysis based on fear of losing a valuable source of information only makes the data derived therefrom worthless.

Beach and other historians believe that at a secret, late-night White House meeting on the evening before the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt was informed of the most recently intercepted Japanese communication. A Navy officer who was present later testified that upon reading it, Roosevelt exclaimed "This means war!" Beach contends that it was fear of exposing "Magic" that explains Roosevelt's failure to immediately alert Kimmel, Short and other appropriate officials, and even to deny that this late-night White House meeting ever took place.

Just one hour and seven minutes before Japanese bombs began falling on Pearl Harbor, an important telegram by General Marshall was dispatched to General Short in Hawaii. It read:

"Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication"..., marshall

Marshall could have used a trans-Pacific telephone to make sure that Hawaii learned instantly of this momentous news, but this was not done. Instead, this message was sent by regular commercial radio telegraph, and was not received by Short and Kimmel until after the Japanese attack.



In his 1955 book, Admiral Kimmel's Story, Husband Kimmel summed up his view of the situation:

The deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as a fleet base were well known in the Navy Department. In an interview with Mr. Roosevelt in June 1941, in Washington, I outlined the weaknesses and concluded with the remark that the only answer was to have the fleet at sea if the Japs ever attacked.

I accepted the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor in the firm belief that the Navy Department would supply me promptly with all pertinent information available and in particular with all information that indicated an attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conduct which definitely gave me the impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese messages ["Magic"] was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a failure to send me important information of this character was not merely a withholding of intelligence. It amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation.

Yet, in fact, the most vital information from the intercepted Japanese messages was withheld from me. This failure not only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me.

I was not supplied with any information of the intercepted messages showing that the Japanese government had divided Pearl Harbor into five areas and was seeking minute berthing information as to the berthing of ships of the fleet in those areas, which was vitally significant.

'SECOND CLASS REVISIONIST'

In a much discussed, and much criticized, 1982 study, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, historian John Toland laid out evidence for his thesis that President Roosevelt fully anticipated Japan's attack, and intentionally withheld this vital information from Kimmel and Short in the expectation that a devastating Japanese attack in Hawaii would bring the United States decisively and irrevocably into war.

This is also the view that Kimmel himself came to hold. In a 1958 interview he stated:

"My belief is that General Short and I were not given the information available in Washington and were not informed of the impending attack because it was feared that action in Hawaii might deter the Japanese from making the attack. Our president had repeatedly assured the American people that the United States would not enter the war unless we were attacked. The Japanese attack on the fleet would put the United States in the war with the full support of the American public."


Oddly, Beach does not accept the view of the man he seeks to exonerate, and even dismisses Toland's thesis as "off the wall."

Discussing the current state of the debate about Pearl Harbor and its background, Beach writes:


"There is today a great need for historical reappraisal, even at the risk of being labeled a "revisionist." This word is so often used as a pejorative that some historians have developed knee-jerk reactions whenever they hear it, and any suggestion of revisionist thinking causes those advocating a thoughtful approach to become defensive.

To be a "revisionist" these days means that one believes Roosevelt deliberately exposed our fleet at Pearl Harbor to "lure the Japanese to attack," had full knowledge of the approach of the six-carrier task force across the north Pacific for that purpose, and refrained from alerting our forces in Hawaii in order that Japan's "first blow" would be so devastating that it would coalesce our entire national political spectrum into support for entry into the war. While this approximates the facts of what happened, there is no proof that it was intentional or deliberate on his part."

The author of these pages will admit to being what might be called a "second-class revisionist" in that he feels that Roosevelt was convinced by mid-1941 of the necessity of our entry into the war and did all he could to bring it about ...



ROOSEVELTS PRESS FOR WAR



Perhaps reluctant to confront the issue of Roosevelt's role and responsibility, Beach keeps his book focused on the responsibility of Kimmel and Short for the Pearl Harbor debacle, and therefore does not dwell on the larger issue of Roosevelt's campaign to involve the United States in war with Japan and Germany.

This is regrettable, because US policy toward Japan in the period before prior to Pearl Harbor attack must be considered in determining the culpability of these two commanders.

Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, popular sentiment against American involvement in the European and Asian wars was so strong that Roosevelt resorted to deceit and outright lies in his campaign from mid-1939 to December 1941 to bring the US into war.

Against Japan, he applied increasingly severe pressure. In September 1940 Roosevelt imposed an embargo on all US exports of scrap iron and steel to the country. On July 26, 1941, he ordered a freeze on all Japanese assets in the United States, which ended trade between the two countries. This was a severe blow to Japan, which depended heavily on the US for its scrap steel, and oil and petroleum products. Roosevelt's order, which amounted to an economic declaration of war, threatened Japan's survival as a developed, industrialized nation.

Also in July 1941, the President secretly authorized devastating American bombing raids against Japanese cities. Roosevelt and his top military advisers approved a daring plan to use American pilots and American war planes, deceitfully flying under the Chinese flag, to bomb Japan's major cities.

On November 26, 1941, Secretary of State Hull handed the Japanese ambassador in Washington a ten-point memorandum that bluntly spelled out the US government's stern policy toward Japan. The core of this virtual ultimatum was a demand that Japan "withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina."

It was this paper that convinced the Tokyo leadership that further discussions with the US were pointless, and that Japan now had no choice but resort to arms. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the "back door to war," Roosevelt attained the goal for which he had been striving so ardently for more than two years.

Beach expresses approval of, or at least understanding for, Roosevelt's artful campaign to maneuver Japan into striking the first blow. At the same time, though, he derides the President for his failure to fully prepare for this conflict, thus leaving US forces in the Pacific unprepared. That is, Roosevelt was guilty of not letting his military hand know what his diplomatic hand was doing. If he worked for and anticipated war with Japan, he should simultaneously have fortified US forces in Hawaii and the Philippines to make them fully prepared for attack. This lack of consistency or coordination resulted in the unforgivable sacrifice of thousands of men in the initial Japanese onslaught. It is only within this context that one can fairly assess the guilt of Kimmel and Short, if any.

Beach makes an interesting comparison between the ignominious post-1941 fates of Kimmel and Short, and the celebrated post-1941 career of Douglas MacArthur, who commanded American forces in the Philippines in December 1941. Although Washington provided MacArthur with warnings of a possible Japanese attack that were at least as clear as those given the commanders in Hawaii, he was no better prepared for a Japanese assault. MacArthur's forces were devastated by Japanese raids much as those under the command of Kimmel and Short.

But instead of ignominy and early forced retirement, MacArthur -- in contrast to Kimmel and Short -- was promoted, and went on to an acclaimed wartime career that secured a legendary place in history. So blame was not only misdirected, it was also (as Beach points out) inconsistently assigned. A factor that may have contributed to protecting MacArthur's reputation, Beach notes parenthetically, is the fact that MacArthur, along with his boss, General Marshall, were both 32nd degree Freemasons.

CONFRONTING A POWERFUL MYTH

In trying to explain why Kimmel and Short still remain scapegoats, even after more than half a century, Beach writes:

Were the awesome personalities of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Gen. George C. Marshall not involved, it is my conviction that the events leading to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would long since have been seen in their true light.

The blame leveled, in the heat of that tragic day, upon our two unfortunate commanders there would no longer be part of the historical record

But this assessment misses the mark. What's at stake here is much greater than these two "awesome personalities." Roosevelt and Marshall are regarded as "awesome" above all because of the roles they played during World War II -- the conflict by which America attained its superpower status. An important pillar of America's mythical self-image as a righteous superpower is the Pearl Harbor legend that the United States was minding its own business until the mad Japanese launched their unprovoked attack, dragging reluctant Americans into a terrible world war, and thereby obliging the United States to shoulder "international responsibilities" as world judge, philanthropist and policeman.

A broader understanding of the background to the Pearl Harbor attack, and especially President Roosevelt's secretive and unlawful efforts to provoke war, would go far toward shattering this popular legend -- an issue that, regrettably, Beach does not adequately address. For as long as the myth of the United States as the reluctant geopolitical messiah endures, Americans will resist viewing.

POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND DEBATE



Admiral Kimmel is buried in Groton, Connecticut



General Short is buried in Arlington National Cemetery

Historians agree that the United States was colossally unprepared for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at all levels and suffered a humiliating defeat in consequence. Japanese military forces enjoyed clear superiority in training, equipment, experience and planning over the Americans. The extent to which Kimmel himself bore responsibility for the unreadiness of his Pacific Fleet has thus been a matter of debate.

Some, such as submarine Captain Edward L. "Ned" Beach, concluded that Admiral Kimmel and General Short, also dismissed from command, were made scapegoats for the failures of superiors in Washington. Kimmel's supporters point to a series of bureaucratic foul-ups, and circumstances beyond anyone's control (poor atmospheric conditions blocked a radio warning from the War Dept. to Pearl Harbor of a possible attack, forcing it to be sent as a telegram, which delayed it long enough for the attack to start before Kimmel could get it) that led to the fleet's lack of preparedness that Sunday morning.¹

Edwin T. Layton (later Rear Admiral Layton), chief intelligence officer for Kimmel and one of the officers who knew Kimmel best, provided support for Kimmel's position in his book, *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets* (1985). Layton argued Kimmel had not been provided complete information and that Kimmel deployed the few reconnaissance resources at his disposal in the most logical way, given the available information.

On the other hand, Kimmel's critics point out that he had been ordered (on November 27, 1941, 10 days prior to the attack) to initiate a "defensive deployment" of the fleet. Kimmel, thinking the main threat to the fleet was sabotage, kept much of the fleet in port and did not place the fleet on alert.

When his intelligence unit lost track of Japan's aircraft carriers, he did not order long-range air or naval patrols to assess their positions. He had a poor working arrangement with his Army counterpart, General Short, who was charged with defending the fleet while in port.

Historians generally recognize that American forces would have fared poorly even if Kimmel had reacted differently. In a 1964 interview Admiral Chester Nimitz, who took over as commander of the Pacific Fleet three weeks after the attack, concluded that "it was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7.

If Kimmel had "had advance notice that the Japanese were coming, he most probably would have tried to intercept them. With the difference in speed between Kimmel's battleships and the faster Japanese carriers, the former could not have come within rifle range of the enemy's flattops. As a result, we would have lost many ships in deep water and also thousands more in lives."¹ Instead, at Pearl Harbor, the crews were easily rescued, and six battleships ultimately raised. This was also the assessment of Joseph Rochefort, head of Station HYPO, who remarked the attack was cheap at the price.

Robert Stinnett, a World War II U.S. Navy vet in his book *Day of Deceit* (2001), makes the case that President Roosevelt wanted the Pearl Harbor attack to happen so public opinion would be aroused to support America's entry into the war. Kimmel and Short, he argued, were deliberately kept ignorant. The President and others, he asserted, knew of Japan's intent to attack Pearl Harbor and even the date and time. Kimmel, he argues, was given deceptive orders and denied resources such as access to MAGIC for the purpose of keeping him in the dark. Most historians reject Stinnett's thesis.

INTERESTING COMMENT FROM THE ROBERTS INVESTIGATING COMMISSION

On December 17, 1941 General Short was removed from command of Pearl Harbor as a result of the attack. A commission headed by U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, known as the Roberts Commission was held immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

General Short, along with Navy commander, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, was accused of being unprepared and charged with "dereliction of duty" and was subsequently relieved of his command and demoted in rank.

The Roberts Commission was not a typical court martial proceeding because it allowed no sworn testimony, no due process, no witnesses to be called by either man in their own defence, and no right for either to cross-examine other witnesses. Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as a member of the Roberts Commission that accused Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short of "dereliction of duty", later disavowed the report maintaining that "these two officers were martyred" and "if they had been brought to trial, both would have been cleared of the charge."

General Short requested a Court Martial to "open things up" but was denied this request most likely (as stated above) they would have been cleared of all charges.

The primary criticism made against General Short was ordering the Army's fighter aircraft to be parked very close together, thus making it easy for the Japanese to bomb them. This action was taken by General Short in an effort to reduce the chance of sabotage, at the time considered the greater threat.

General Short retired in 1942. He then worked for the Ford Motor Company. He died in 1949 in Dallas, Texas. He was buried with full honors at Arlington National Cemetery in Washington DC.

Another charge was that he and Adm. Kimmel, did not take seriously enough earlier war warnings, and did not imagine that an air attack was possible. For the failure of the overall warning and defense systems he is considered by some to have been something of a scapegoat.

PART TWO

NON-BINDING SENATE & HOUSE RESOLUTION CLEARS BOTH ADM KIMMEL AND GEN SHORT OF ANY DERELICTION OF DUTY DURING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACKS ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

SENATE RESOLUTION

Washington - May 25, 1998: The Senate voted today to clear the names of the two senior military officers who were accused of dereliction of duty as a result of the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. The vote came after an emotional debate among the dwindling number of World War II veterans left in the Senate.

The vote, 52 to 47 on an amendment to the \$289 billion military spending bill, was intended to exonerate Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short, the American military commanders in Hawaii who were blamed for failing to anticipate the devastating Japanese attack on Dec. 7, 1941.

After the surprise attack, the two men were relieved of their commands and forced to retire from the military at reduced ranks, their reputations in tatters. A panel created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt accused them of dereliction of duty. Both died decades ago.

But in the 57 years since one of the nation's worst military disasters, a number of historians have described Admiral Kimmel and General Short as scapegoats for failures among military commanders in Washington who were aware of intelligence reports suggesting an imminent Japanese attack.

The intelligence, gathered in late 1941 from decoded Japanese radio interceptions, was not passed on to commanders in Hawaii.

"There is no longer any reason to perpetuate the cruel myth that Kimmel and Short were singularly responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor," said Senator William V. Roth Jr., Republican of Delaware, who has led the struggle to clear the names of the two officers and restore their wartime ranks.

"They were denied vital intelligence that was available in Washington," said Senator Roth, who was in the Army in World War II and is now 77. "We're not rewriting history. We're just correcting the record."

Senator Roth was pressed to offer the amendment by Admiral Kimmel's only surviving son, Edward, who is a constituent in Delaware. The House is expected to consider the amendment when it reviews the military spending bill.

The arguments did not sway another veteran of the war, Senator John W. Warner, Republican of Virginia, 72, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who strongly opposed the amendment offered by Senator Roth and his Democratic colleague from Delaware, Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr..

Describing the Senate's action today as "tombstone promotions," Senator Warner noted that several formal Government investigations of Pearl Harbor had not cleared the names of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. "What we are faced with here is one generation trying to provide revisionist history upon another," Mr. Warner said.

Senator Warner, who volunteered for the Navy in 1944 as a teen-ager and is a decorated veteran of the Korean War, said it was long tradition in the armed forces for commanders to be held "directly accountable" for the safety of troops under their commands.


The latest Pentagon study of Pearl Harbor, conducted in 1995 at the request of Congress, found that fault for the attack went well beyond Admiral Kimmel and General Short and should be "broadly shared."

Of the Senate's 10 World War II veterans, 5 voted with Senator Roth to clear the names of the two officers: Senators Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina; Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii; Frank R. Lautenberg, Democrat of New Jersey, Ernest F. Hollings, Democrat of South Carolina, and Strom Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina.

Senator Thurmond, 96, a retired general in the Army Reserve who parachuted into Normandy on D-Day and later served as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said Admiral Kimmel and General Short were "the last victims" of Pearl Harbor.

The veterans of the war voting with Senator Warner against the amendment were Senators John H. Chafee, Republican of Rhode Island; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, and Ted Stevens, Republican of Alaska.

EVIDENCE OF HOUSE RESOLUTION (PAGE 2 OF THE RESOLUTION IS NOT AVAILABLE)



ADM KIMMEL'S GRANDSON'S REQUEST TO PRESIDENT BUSH VIDEO

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/3levwiaz0560ef0/MANNING%20VIDEO.mp4?dl=0>

PART THREE

LACK OF PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT

Even though both men have been exonerated by both the House and the Senate of the United States Congress the lack of Presidential support cloud's the chance of any type of "Official" exoneration.

In 1994 Kimmel's family, including his grandson, South Carolina broadcaster Manning Kimmel IV, attempted for the third time to have Kimmel's four star rank re-instated. **President Bill Clinton turned down the request**, as had **Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan** before him.

A study concluded other high-ranking officers were also responsible for the failure at Pearl Harbor but did not exonerate Kimmel. On May 25, 1999, the United States Senate, by a vote of 52-47, passed a non-binding resolution to exonerate Kimmel and Short and requested that the President of the United States posthumously restore both men to full rank. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), one of the sponsors of the resolution, called Kimmel and Short "the two final victims of Pearl Harbor."

President Clinton did not act on the resolution, nor did his successors, **George W. Bush and Barack Obama**. In summary the last 5 Presidents have refused to either "approve" or "act "on the resolution.

The Senate enquiry in 2000 issued a lengthy exoneration of Kimmel's conduct.