HIROSHIMA AT 75

BITTER ROW STILL PERSISTS OVER THE US DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB AND THE ENOLA GAY EXHIBIT AT THE SMITHSONIAN

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Seventy-five years after it dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the Enola Gay stands, restored and gleaming, as a museum exhibit close to Washington's Dulles airport

It was not always so well looked after. For decades after the war, *the B-29 Superfortress bomber was left to rot. It was disassembled, its pieces were scattered, birds nested in its engines, and someone smashed its gun turret.*

Behind the neglect lay a deep national ambivalence about what it represented, a quandary that endures today: *was this the aircraft that finally ended the Second World War, saving hundreds of thousands of lives - or the instrument of the mass killing of civilians, which heralded a new age of nuclear terror?*

When the Enola Gay was partly restored and plans were made to put it on display at the National Air and Space Museum in 1995, historians agonized over how the exhibit might look at its legacy from all sides. *It did not go well.*

The only way the Enola Gay was allowed to be displayed from 6/28/95 until May 17, 1998. Only the fuselage in front of and without the wings. Some of the powers to be thought "less is best"

In the face of an outcry from Air Force veterans, who said the exhibition would put Japanese and US responsibility on the same moral plane, the curators scaled back or eliminated the elements focused on the 140,000 people killed in Hiroshima, and the ensuing nuclear arms race. *For the critics, even that was not enough. The museum's director, Martin Harwit, was forced to resign.*

When the plane was fully restored and moved to the museum's spectacular new building near Dulles in 2003, there were protests from Japanese survivors and others. *Red paint was hurled, denting the airframe and the plane was spit upon by many protesters.*

In the wake of those battles, the inscription below the Enola Gay today is minimal and bland.

"Although designed to fight in the European theater, the B-29 found its niche on the other side of the globe. In the Pacific, B-29s delivered a variety of aerial weapons: conventional bombs, incendiary bombs, mines, and two nuclear weapons," it reads.

All reference to the moral, political, and historical debate over the bombing of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 – and then Nagasaki three days later – *has been left off the public display*, but that has not stopped the row from surfacing in the days leading up to the 75th anniversary on Thursday.

The disagreements are not limited to historians. **While the Air Force's view – which reflects US orthodoxy – is that the use of atomic weapons stopped the war and prevented much worse bloodshed, *the National Museum of the US Navy has a different take.***

"The vast destruction wreaked by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the loss of 135,000 people made little impact on the Japanese military.

“However, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9 August – fulfilling a promise of the Yalta conference in February – changed their minds.”

The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender,” *wrote Adm William Leahy, who presided over the combined US-UK chiefs of staff.*

The general who had won the war in Europe months earlier, Dwight Eisenhower, recalled his reaction to being told by the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, that the atomic bomb would be used.

“I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first based on my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon,” Eisenhower told his biographer, Stephen Ambrose.

One of the most contentious issues remains the role of the *US Secretary of State, James Byrnes*, in influencing the decisions of the new president, Harry Truman, who was inexperienced in foreign policy.

At the Potsdam conference in mid-July 1945, which brought together Truman, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill (replaced during the summit by Clement Attlee*), an ultimatum was issued to Japan to surrender.* Byrnes was instrumental in removing a *paragraph offering to allow Emperor Hirohito to retain his title, the primary Japanese condition.*

I'd say Soviet entry into the war had a more decisive impact on the decision to surrender.

“The proclamation was issued without any assurances, knowing that it could not be accepted, and then the bombs went forward,” said the historian Gar Alperovitz, a professor of political economy at the University of Maryland and the author of two books on the diplomacy surrounding the decision to use atomic weapons.

Michael Kort, a social sciences professor at Boston University, who wrote The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb*, argues the inclusion of the offer in the Potsdam Declaration would not have shortened the war on its own*.

“The Japanese military had a whole bunch of other conditions as well,” Kort said. “Also, what we meant was the Emperor stays on the throne as a constitutional monarch. What the Japanese meant was their demand that the Emperor remain with all his powers.”

When the Enola Gay dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August*, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow was sounding out the Soviets on terms for a negotiated end to the war.*

The Enola Gay returns from the mission to Hiroshima.

The destruction of Hiroshima did not change the Japanese negotiating position. That came with a double blow starting two days later. On the evening of 8 August, the Soviets announced they would be entering the war against Japan, as Stalin had promised Franklin Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta*. Hours after that, the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.*

Historians are divided over whether the bombs or the Soviet declaration alone might have ended the war.

"Despite the Hiroshima bomb, the Japanese government continued to seek the termination of the war through Moscow's mediation," said Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, former research professor at the University of California in Santa Barbara, and an expert on Soviet-Japanese diplomacy at the time.

"I would say that the Soviet entry into the war had a more decisive impact on the decision to surrender than the atomic bombs. "That view is disputed by the Rev Wilson Miscamble, a history professor at the University of Notre Dame.

"Even after the Soviet entry into the war, certain elements of the Japanese military wanted to continue fighting. But it was Hirohito's motivation, *brought on by his recognition of the damage of the bombs, that brought him to engage directly with his government, and to order the surrender," Miscamble said.*

"So, if the bomb was most decisive on Hirohito, and if Hirohito was the most decisive figure in ordering surrender*, I think we can conclude that the bombs were the decisive element in bringing about Japan's surrender."*

The US invasion of the Japanese home islands was not due until November, so some have argued Truman could have put off the decision to use atomic weapons for some time to see what effect the Russian intervention would have. Alperovitz argues that the timing of the bombs was aimed at stopping the war before the Red Army moved too deep into Manchuria.

"It is not an accident the bombs were dropped on 6 August and 9 August, just around the time we had expected the Russians to enter the war," he said.

Miscamble argues that takes too narrow a view of the scope of the war and the number of lives at stake.

"The object was to end the war as quickly as possible because lives were being lost all over Asia," he said. "Would it have been moral to stand aside to maintain one's supposed moral purity, while a vast slaughter occurred at the rate of over 200,000 deaths a month? Is there not a tragic dilemma here – which innocent lives to save?"

For years after the war, the crew of the Enola Gay never wavered in their belief they did what they had to do. None of them liked it, but all believed it preserved life by ending a terrible war where a lot more killing was expected. Almost to a man, they admitted they would do it again if the circumstances were the same.

"War is a terrible thing. It takes and it destroys," the mission's radar operator Richard Nelson told a reporter on the 50th anniversary of the bombing. "Anyone feels sorry for people who are killed. We are all human beings. But I don't feel sorry I participated in it. If I had known the results of the mission beforehand, I would have flown it anyway."

THE WINGS WERE UNITED FUSELAGE ON APRIL 10, 2003 FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1950

JUSTIFICATION FOR USING THE BOMB

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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BY TOM NICHOLS

NO CHOICE: WHY HARRY TRUMAN DROPPED THE ATOMIC BOMB ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

Critics of the decision to use the "special bomb" in 1945 are judging men born in the 19th century by the standards of the 21st.

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Nuclear arms are hideous, immoral weapons whose existence continues to threaten our civilization. To say, however, that Harry Truman should have sacrificed hundreds of thousands of American lives because of what happened in the nuclear arms race decades later is not only ahistorical, it is moral arrogance enabled from the safe distance provided by time and victory.

Every summer, as the anniversaries of the U.S. nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki approach, Americans engage in the painful moral exercise of wondering whether President Harry Truman should have ordered the use of nuclear weapons (or as they were called at the time, the "special bombs") against Japan in August 1945.

And every year, as we get farther away in time from those horrible events, we wonder if we were wrong. *(This first appeared in 2016)*

In 1945, Americans overwhelmingly supported the use of the bomb; seventy years later, that number is now a bare majority (some polls suggest less), with support for Truman's decision concentrated among older people.

Truman, for his part, thought he was bringing the war to a swift close. Taken in its time, the decision was the right one. As historian David McCullough has been known to say, "people living 'back then' didn't know they were living 'back then'," and to judge the decisions of people in 1945 by the standards of 2015 is not only ahistorical, it is pointless. Truman and his advisers made the only decision they could have made; indeed, considered in the context of World War II, it wasn't much of a decision at all. *(This first appeared in 2015.)*

There are three arguments usually marshaled against the use of the bomb in 1945. *First, that to* use the bomb only against Japan was racist; second, that it was pointless; and third, that it was done purely for political effect that had more to do with the Soviet Union than with the war in the Pacific. These objections make little sense when weighed against counterfactual thinking about American alternatives.

***Was the use of nuclear bombs against Japan racist?* Would Truman have used the bomb against the Germans? After all, America had a "Germany first" strategy from the very beginning of its involvement in the war, so why drop the bomb on Japan? Was American nuclear devastation reserved only for Asians but not Europeans?**

It is difficult to believe that the Allies would have spared the Germans anything after turning the streets of German cities like Dresden to glass under repeated firebombing.

The more obvious objection, however, is that the first atomic test took place in July 1945, two months after the Nazi surrender in May. *There is some evidence that FDR's advisers thought about using the bomb against Germany, but by the time Truman took office, it was a moot point:* the Nazis were beaten and the invasion of Germany was winding down, not gearing up.

Truman's detractors, in the absence of any evidence, merely claim that Truman would have done no such thing, especially at a time when so many Americans were of German descent. There is no arguing with this point, as I learned in the mid-1990s. At the time, I was teaching at Dartmouth College, where I had a chance encounter with a well-known historian on the subject. Truman's papers had been unsealed in those years, and there was no evidence that Japan was singled out for any other reason than it was still fighting. (*Indeed, the Americans specifically tried to seek out military targets rather than simply butcher the Japanese.)*

I asked this colleague what he thought of the new evidence. "I don't care," he said. For people who hold to the "it was about racism" theory, that's about as far as you're going to get.

But what about a stronger objection, that Truman should have realized that Japan was beaten? This is one of those arguments that assumes modern-day omniscience on the part of historical figures. The fact of the matter is that Japan was not preparing to surrender; it was preparing to fight to the death. The invasion of the Japanese home islands was not going to look like the invasion of Germany, where the Nazi armies were crushed between advancing U.S. and British forces on one side and an avalanche of enraged Soviet troops on the other.

The Japanese invasion, on the other hand, was likely to cost a half-million Allied and Japanese lives— all in what should have been the last months of the war.

Here, I will candidly admit that I am not objective about this question. In 1945, my father finished infantry school in Georgia and was immediately shipped to California to await his orders to carry a rifle during the invasion of Japan. Fortunately, as things turned out, he did nothing more than fight "the Battle of Fort Ord," as my mother wryly called it. My father, for the remainder of his life, *considered nuclear weapons to be an awful and inhumane instrument of war, but he was certain that they saved his own life.*

Still, let's assume, as some historians have done, that Harry Truman was either duped or made an honest mistake, and that the invasion casualty estimates were way off. (One historian *has suggested that these estimates were ten times too high.*) What should Truman have done? If the figure of 500,000 casualties was wrong, perhaps Truman would have been risking only—o*nly*—50,000 lives. But would even *one* more Allied death have been worth not dropping the bomb, in the minds of the president and his advisors, after six years of the worst fighting in the history of the human race?

Imagine if Truman had decided to hold back. The war ends, with yet more massive bloodshed, probably at some point in 1946.

Truman at some point reveals the existence of the bomb, and the president of the United States explains to thousands of grieving parents and wounded veterans that he did not use it because he thought it was too horrible to drop on the enemy, even after a sneak attack, a global war, hundreds of thousands of Americans killed and wounded in two theaters, and years of ghastly firebombing. Seventy years later, we would likely be writing retrospectives on "The Impeachment of Harry S. Truman."

Finally, what about the argument, imbued (wrongly) in several generations of students of international relations, that Truman only dropped the bomb to impress the Soviets and establish U.S. dominance in the coming Cold War?

There's no doubt that the Americans wanted the war over before the Soviets could enter Japan—ironically, something we had asked them to do when we thought we would have to invade. From the victory at Stalingrad in 1943 onward, U.S. leaders (at least those other than the sickly Roosevelt) realized that Stalin's Soviet Union was not interested in a peaceful world order policed by the great powers.

The Americans were in a hurry to force a Japanese surrender, but they had no way of knowing whether that surrender was imminent. Ward Wilson, for one, claims that the Japanese surrendered not because of the bomb but because of the Soviet entry into the Pacific war, but only the most cold-blooded president would have counted on this and held America's greatest weapon in reserve.

Again, consider the counterfactual. For years after World War II, the Soviets charged that the nuclear attacks on Japan were a warning to the USSR. Imagine, however, a world in which America held back the bomb, and allowed the Soviets to fight their way through Japan, taking huge casualties along the way. The speeches Stalin and his successors would have given during the Cold War themselves: "America allowed Soviet soldiers to spill their blood on the beaches of Japan, while Truman and his criminal gang protected the secret of their ultimate weapon. We shall never forget, nor forgive, this squandering of Soviet lives…"

In reality, of course, as soon as the bomb was tested, Truman told Stalin that America had a weapon of great power nearing completion.

Stalin, well-informed due to his spy networks inside the U.S. nuclear effort, knew exactly what Truman meant, and he told the U.S. president to make good use of this new addition to the Allied arsenal. Both leaders were being cagey, but it was the only conversation these two men, leading huge armies against the Axis, could have had in 1945 that would have made any sense.

In the 1995 film *Crimson Tide*, *Gene Hackman played a Navy captain* whose views are no doubt how critics see American thinking about the decision to use nuclear weapons. "If someone asked me if we should bomb Japan," he opines while enjoying a cigar in the wardroom, "a simple 'Yes.' By all means, sir, drop that [expletive]. Twice."

The actual decision to drop the bomb was not nearly as casual as "a simple yes." Critics of the decision to use the "special bomb" in 1945 are judging men born in the 19th century by the standards of the 21st. Had Truman and his commanders shrunk from doing everything possible to force the war to its end, the American people would never have forgiven them. This judgment no doubt mattered more to these leaders than the disapproval of academic historians a half-century later, and rightly so.

Nuclear arms are hideous, immoral weapons whose existence continues to threaten our civilization. To say, however, that Harry Truman should have sacrificed hundreds of thousands of American lives because of what happened in the nuclear arms race decades later is not only ahistorical, it is moral arrogance enabled from the safe distance provided by time and victory.

THE REASONS WHY THE BOMB SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN USED

POINT-COUNTERPOINT: THE DEBATE OVER THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS

HISTORYNET

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Critics of Truman's decision usually cite similar reasons they think should have swayed him against the bomb. The bomb should not have been used because:

1. ***Japan had already lost the war.*** Indeed, by any reasonable criteria, Japan had been beaten by August 1945. But this argument misses the point. Truman's problem that summer was not how to defeat the Japanese; it was how to get Japan's leaders to acknowledge that defeat and surrender instead of committing national suicide. Only after suffering the shock of two atom bombings did Emperor Hirohito accept the Potsdam Declaration (the Allied ultimatum of July 26 that demanded Japan surrender immediately "or suffer prompt and utter destruction") and agree to capitulate ***(although he never once mentioned the word "surrender" in his radio address announcing this decision).*** The atomic bombings provided the Emperor with the very leverage necessary to overcome the fanatical opposition by die-hard military members of his cabinet.

In this regard, one member of Hirohito's cabinet called the bombs ***"gifts from the gods."***

2. ***Japan was trying to surrender.*** Japan had more than ample opportunities to surrender at any time during the summer of 1945 but stubbornly chose not to. The Potsdam Declaration, for example, was met only by stony silence on Japan's part. Even after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, Japanese leaders callously chose not to take advantage of the opportunity to surrender at any time during the three days that elapsed between the first and second bombings.

The principal evidence critics repeatedly cite that Japan was actively trying to surrender is an ambiguous message transmitted by Foreign Minister Togo to the Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Since it only stated that the Emperor "desires from his heart that [the war] may be quickly terminated," it hardly represented a serious effort to surrender. Moreover, Japan's military leaders unrealistically would only agree to" termination *of hostilities"* under conditions that were unacceptable to the Allies, including no Allied occupation of Japan; disarmament of its military forces under Japanese supervision; and no Allied trials of Japanese war criminals. Other "peace feelers" were floated unofficially by individual Japanese diplomats during 1945, but, like the one to the Soviets, they were all violently opposed by the cabinet's military fanatics bent on national suicide. When, after the atomic bombings, the Japanese finally decided to surrender, they had no difficulty immediately transmitting that desire to the United States through the Swiss embassy.

3. *There were other means at hand, short of an invasion, to force Japan to capitulate*. U.S. Navy leaders, anxious to promote their service's contribution to the defeat of Japan, wanted to forego using the atomic bombs and continue the naval blockade of the home islands until the Japanese finally surrendered. How long that would have taken is unknown, but certainly, it would have required many more weeks, if not months, to produce a surrender. Likewise, U.S. air commanders, eager to establish their service as the "war winner," wanted their strategic conventional bombing campaign to be continued indefinitely until it finally forced Japan to surrender.

Meanwhile, thousands of American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines were dying each month from combat and military accidents (almost 4,000 died in July 1945 alone) merely to maintain the blockade and prosecute the conventional bombing campaign. Truman's objective was to end the war as soon as possible, something that neither blockade nor conventional air attack could have achieved. The final straw grasped at by the "other means" proponents is their claim that the Soviet declaration of war on Japan and its massive offensive (begun August 9) – 1.5 million Red Army troops took part – against Japanese forces in Manchuria would have forced a surrender.

Although Stalin's declaration of war shocked Japanese leaders, they were still debating how many *months* not *days* Japan might hold out in their cabinet discussions in the immediate wake of the Russian attack.

While the atomic bombings combined with the Soviet offensive certainly produced a dual shock that influenced Japan's leaders to surrender, the Russian attack alone could not have forced an expeditious, early decision. While it seems certain that the combination of these "non-invasion" actions — naval blockade, strategic bombing, and Soviet attack — would have eventually forced Japan to surrender, none of them could have ended the war, as the atomic bombs did, in August 1945.

4. *The bombs were only meant to intimidate the Soviet Union.* Some Cold War historians, engrossed in the geopolitical maneuverings and Machiavellian intrigue of the 50-year confrontation between the superpowers, have claimed that Truman's principal motivation in dropping the atomic bombs was to impress or even intimidate the U.S.S.R.

This theory emanates from a dual premise: first, it presumes that the bombings were not necessary to secure Japan's surrender; and, second, it endows Truman with a prescient insight through which he somehow predicted the coming half-century-long Cold War and the confrontational nature of future relations with the Soviet Union.

Neither the historical record of the deliberations over the use of the bombs nor Truman's dealings with Stalin at the time support this theory.

Despite his frustrations regarding Stalin's behavior during the Potsdam Conference (July 1945), Truman remained hopeful in August 1945 that the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be able to cooperate in the post-war world.

Historian J. Samuel Walker, in his insightful and influential book, *Prompt & Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan*, lays out the definitive case against this theory although the President's influential Secretary of State, James Byrnes expressed "hope that the bomb would provide diplomatic benefits by making the Soviets more tractable," Truman merely saw this as a bonus. Walker concluded, "Growing differences with the Soviet Union were a factor in the thinking of American officials about the bomb but were not the main reason that they rushed to drop it on Japan." Above all, this theory is based primarily upon perfect hindsight, not upon the knowledge and conditions that existed at the time Truman made his decision., pointing out that, "Truman's foremost consideration in using the bomb," Walker noted, "was not to frustrate Soviet ambitions…it was to end the war at the earliest possible time."

5. *The estimates of U.S. casualties resulting from an invasion are inflated.* This is, perhaps, the most outrageous criticism of all*, since it is promulgated upon the argument that not enough American troops would have died in an invasion of Japan to "justify" the bombings.* Since Truman, in the years following the war, used what now seems (arguably) to be exaggerated U.S. casualty estimates to subsequently justify his atomic bomb decision, critics have used these figures as a basis to attack the bombings. Certainly, Truman's oft-quoted figure that the bombings avoided 1,000,000 American combat *deaths* that would have resulted from an invasion of Japan seems difficult to justify (a common rebuttal figure claims that "only" about 46,000 invading U.S. troops would have been killed). Yet, reducing the debate over the use of the atomic bombs to, essentially, a squabble over potential "body count" numbers obscures any real analysis of all the other major issues that influenced Truman's decision. In one way, this "numbers game" is somewhat analogous to the strategy employed by the lawyer representing the woman who sued McDonald's because she spilled hot coffee on herself. Once her lawyer had reduced the court case to an argument over how hot the coffee was, he had it won. Similarly, critics who can show that Truman's casualty numbers are demonstrably imprecise, attempt to turn that "Gotcha!" into "proof" that the bombs were unnecessary. Not even Truman's critics dispute the fact that the bombings saved substantial numbers of American and Japanese lives; but the question their criticism logically leads to becomes, "How many dead Americans (and Japanese for that matter) would it take to make Truman's critics feel better about his atomic bomb decision?" The only sensible answer to that question seems to be the one provided in an editorial in the Washington *Post* (February 10, 1995) by Yale University's James R. Van de Velde who wrote, "Did the bombs save lives? Absolutely yes … the two atomic bombs helped hasten this terrible war's end—period. And that was unambiguously good."

Continuing to criticize Truman's decision by impugning the estimated casualty figures is simply quibbling over "the temperature of the coffee" and represents merely a "red herring" in the atomic bomb debate.

6. *The second atomic bombing was unnecessary.* The final major criticism of Truman's decision claims that the dropping of the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki on August 9 was unnecessary and represented an act of American vengeance motivated by racism and hatred of the Japanese people.

Mushroom cloud over Nagasaki

The purveyors of this criticism, however, ignore the actual situation that existed within Hirohito's wartime cabinet in the wake of the Hiroshima bombing. Walker wrote that, even after the extent of the destruction of the first bombing was realized, Japan's Supreme Council for the Direction of the War could not reach a consensus on surrender and "were hopelessly deadlocked."

The fanatical militarists in the council continued to hold out for a bloody campaign of national suicide and had "dismissed the reality that the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was an atomic explosive and that the United States had more weapons of equal power." It took the dropping of the second atomic bomb to "demolish the argument of *the* die-hards" and provide the cabinet's surrender proponents with the ammunition they needed to finally convince the Emperor to intervene. While it is undeniable that most Americans in 1945 harbored a visceral hated of the Japanese people and it is also true that, as John Dower showed in his excellent book, *War Without Mercy*, racism on both sides made the Pacific war particularly brutal, neither hatred nor racism was Truman's primary motivation in his authorization of the Nagasaki bombing. Indeed, even more than the first atomic bombing, it was the second bomb that proved to be most necessary to influence Japan's surrender decision.

LEGACY OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS

The criticisms and second-guessing of Truman's decision have come up over the decades since percent. The war ended never present in 1945 and the immediate aftermath of the war. *In Gallup polls taken in the fall of 1945, for example, 85 percent endorsed the atomic attacks while the percentage of those opposed to their use was less than 5 Nearly one-quarter of respondents in one of the polls even wished that the U.S. had dropped "many more" atomic bombs on Japan before it surrendered*. The sentiment expressed by one Marine preparing for the bloody invasion of Japan likely represents a common feeling of relief among American troops when they got the word: "Thank God for the Atom Bomb!" he wrote.

The tenor of moral outrage that taints much of the criticism seems more a product of the Cold War's anti-nuclear movement than any supposed qualms held by the Greatest Generation. Likewise, recent critics' overriding concern over safeguarding the lives of enemy civilians smacks more of idealistic late-20th-century hand-wringing than realistic mid-century warfighting between nations waging total war. As Walker rightly points out, "In the summer of 1945, the Truman administration was not looking for ways to avoid using the bomb. It was seeking ways to end the war."

Moreover, if unnecessary civilian deaths — the 130,000 to 250,000 who died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki — have provoked the critics' outrage, where is their anger over the 12 *million* slaughtered Chinese innocents? One legacy of the atomic bombings, however, may be laced with historical irony — subsequent generations of Japanese have been able to use their status as the initial "victims" of atomic warfare as a moral fig leaf behind which to hide their nation's war crimes against the conquered peoples of Asia.

HIROSHIMA BOMB – LITTLE BOY



NAGASAKI BOMB-FAT MAN

THIRD BOMB – GADGET + +
(SEE LATER ARTICLE)

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