

# egk mixnet maths

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Preliminary explorations of mixnet implementations to be used with the ElectionGuard Kotlin library.

The ElectionGuard Kotlin library [7] is used for the cryptography primitives. This library closely follows the ElectionGuard 2.0 specification [1].

The math here mostly recapitulates the work of Wikström [6]; Haenni et. al. [2], [3] in explaining the Terelius / Wikström (TW) mixnet algorithm [4], [5]; and the work of Haines [9] that gives a formal proof of security of TW when the shuffle involves vectors of ciphertexts.

Instead of psuedocode, the kotlin code acts as the implementation of the math described here. It can act as a reference and comparison for ports to other languages.

Ive tried to avoid notation that is hard to read, preferring for example, multiple character symbols like  $pr$  instead of  $\tilde{r}$  or  $\hat{r}$ , since the glyphs can get too small to read when they are used in exponents or subscripts, and can be hard to replicate in places other than high quality Tex or PDF renderers.

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## Definitions

### The ElectionGuard Group

- $\mathbb{Z} = \{\dots, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots\}$  is the set of integers.
- $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1\}$  is the ring of integers modulo  $n$ .
- $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$  is the multiplicative subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  that consists of all invertible elements modulo  $n$ . When  $p$  is a prime,  $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1\}$
- $\mathbb{Z}_p^r$  is the set of  $r$ -th-residues in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ . Formally,  $\mathbb{Z}_p^r = \{y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \text{ for which there exists } x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \text{ where } y = x^r \bmod p\}$ . When  $p$  is a prime for which  $p-1 = q * r$  with  $q$  a prime that is not a divisor of the integer  $r$ , then  $\mathbb{Z}_p^r$  is an order- $q$  cyclic subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , and for any  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ ,  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^r$  if and only if  $y^q \bmod p = 1$ .

The ElectionGuard Kotlin library [7] and ElectionGuard 2.0 specification [1] is used for the cryptography primitives, in particular the parameters for  $\mathbb{Z}_p^r$ , the variant of ElGamal encryption described next, and the use of HMAC-SHA-256 for hashing.

### Permutations

A *permutation* is a bijective map  $\psi : 1..N \rightarrow 1..N$ . We use  $\mathbf{px}$  to mean the permutation of a vector  $\mathbf{x}$ ,  $\mathbf{px} = \psi(\mathbf{x})$ , so that  $x_i = px_j$ , where  $i = \psi(j)$  and  $j = \psi^{-1}(i)$ .  $x_i = px_{\psi^{-1}(i)}$ ,  $px_j = x_{\psi(j)}$ ,

A *permutation*  $\psi$  has a *permutation matrix*  $B_\psi$ , where  $b_{ij} = 1$  if  $\psi(i) = j$ , otherwise 0. Note that  $\psi(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{px} = \mathbf{Bx}$  (matrix multiply).

If  $B_\psi = (b_{ij})$  is an  $N$ -by- $N$  matrix over  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_N)$  a vector of  $N$  independent variables, then  $B_\psi$  is a permutation matrix if and only

$$\sum_{i=1}^n b_{ij} = 1 \quad (\text{Condition 1})$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n b_{ij} x_i = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \quad (\text{Condition 2})$$

## ElGamal Encryption and Reencryption

(2a)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Encr}(m, \xi) &= (g^\xi, K^{m+\xi}) = (a, b) \\ \text{Encr}(0, \xi') &= (g^{\xi'}, K^{\xi'}) \end{aligned}$$

(2b)

$$\begin{aligned} (a, b) * (a', b') &= (a * a', b * b') \\ \text{Encr}(m, \xi) * \text{Encr}(m', \xi') &= (g^{\xi+\xi'}, K^{m+m'+\xi+\xi'}) = \text{Encr}(m+m', \xi+\xi') \end{aligned}$$

(2c)

$$\begin{aligned} (a, b)^k &= (a^k, b^k) \\ \text{Encr}(m, \xi)^k &= (g^{\xi*k}, K^{(m*k+\xi*k)}) = \text{Encr}(m*k, \xi*k) \end{aligned}$$

(2d)

$$\begin{aligned} \prod_{j=1}^n \text{Encr}(m_j, \xi_j) &= (g^{\sum_{j=1}^n \xi_j}, K^{\sum_{j=1}^n m_j + \sum_{j=1}^n \xi_j}) = \text{Encr}(\sum_{j=1}^n m_j, \sum_{j=1}^n \xi_j) \\ \prod_{j=1}^n \text{Encr}(m_j, \xi_j)^{k_j} &= \text{Encr}(\sum_{j=1}^n (m_j * k_j), \sum_{j=1}^n (\xi_j * k_j)) \end{aligned}$$

(2e)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ReEncr}(m, r) &= (g^{\xi+r}, K^{m+\xi+r}) = \text{Encr}(0, r) * \text{Encr}(m, \xi) \\ \text{ReEncr}(m, r)^k &= \text{Encr}(0, r*k) * \text{Encr}(m*k, \xi*k) \end{aligned}$$

(2f)

$$\begin{aligned} \prod_{j=1}^n \text{ReEncr}(e_j, r_j) &= (g^{\sum_{j=1}^n (\xi_j + r_j)}, K^{\sum_{j=1}^n (m_j + \xi_j + r_j)}) \\ &= \text{ReEncr}(\prod_{j=1}^n e_j, \sum_{j=1}^n r_j) \end{aligned}$$

(2e)

$$\begin{aligned} \prod_{j=1}^n \text{ReEncr}(m_j, r_j)^{k_j} &= \prod_{j=1}^n \text{Encr}(0, r_j * k_j) * \prod_{j=1}^n \text{Encr}(m_j * k_j, \xi_j * k_j) \\ &= \text{Encr}(0, \sum_{j=1}^n (r_j * k_j)) * \prod_{j=1}^n \text{Encr}(m_j, \xi_j)^{k_j} \end{aligned}$$

Let

1.  $e_j = \text{Encr}(m_j, \xi_j)$
2.  $re_j = \text{ReEncr}(m_j, r_j) = \text{ReEncr}(e_j, r_j) = \text{Encr}(0, r_j) * e_j$

Then

$$\begin{aligned}
re_j &= Encr(0, r_j) * e_j \\
\prod_{j=1}^n re_j^{k_j} &= \prod_{j=1}^n Encr(0, r_j)^{k_j} * \prod_{j=1}^n e_j^{k_j} \\
&= Encr(0, \sum_{j=1}^n (r_j * k_j)) * \prod_{j=1}^n e_j^{k_j}, \quad (Equation 1)
\end{aligned}$$

## Verificatum

### Pedersen Commitments

For a set of messages  $\mathbf{m} = (m_1 \dots m_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ , the *Pedersen committment* to  $\mathbf{m}$  is

$$Commit(\mathbf{m}, cr) = g^{cr} * h_1^{m_1} * h_2^{m_2} \dots h_n^{m_n} = g^{cr} * \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{m_i}$$

where  $(g, \mathbf{h})$  are generators of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^r$  with randomization nonce  $cr \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ . (section 1.2 of [4])

If  $\mathbf{b}_i$  is the  $i^{th}$  column of  $B_\psi$ , then the *permutation commitment to  $\psi$*  is defined as the vector of committments to its columns:

$$Commit(\psi, \mathbf{cr}) = (Commit(\mathbf{b}_1, cr_1), Commit(\mathbf{b}_2, cr_2), \dots, Commit(\mathbf{b}_N, cr_N)) =$$

where

$$c_j = Commit(\mathbf{b}_j, cr_j) = g^{cr_j} * \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{b_{ij}} = g^{cr_j} * h_i, \text{ for } i = \psi^{-1}(j)$$

### Proof Construction

Let

- $n$  = number of rows
- width = number of ciphertexts in each row
- $\vec{w}$  = rows of ciphertexts ( $n \times \text{width}$ )
- $\vec{wp}$  = shuffled and reencrypted rows of ciphertexts ( $n \times \text{width}$ )
- $\vec{rn}$  = reencryption nonces ( $n \times \text{width}$ ). All nonces are  $\in \mathbb{Z}_q$
- $\psi$  = permutation function
- $ipe$  = inverse permutation function =  $\psi^{-1}$
- $h_0, \vec{h}$  = generators of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^r$

### Commitment to permutation

Choose  $n$  random permutation nonces  $\vec{pn}$ .

And form permutation commitments  $\vec{u}$  that will be public:

$$u_j = g^{pn_j} h_i, \quad j = \psi(i) \quad \text{TODO}$$

### Commitment to shuffle

Choose  $n$  random nonces  $\vec{e}$  that will be public. Let  $e' = \psi^{-1}(\vec{e})$ .

Choose  $n$  random nonces  $\vec{e}$  that will be private.

Choose random nonces  $\alpha, \gamma, \delta$  that will be private.

Form the following values:

$$\begin{aligned} A' &= g^\alpha \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{\epsilon_i} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^r \\ B &= g^\gamma \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^r)^n \quad \text{TODO} \\ B' &= g^\gamma \in (\mathbb{Z}_p^r)^n \quad \text{TODO} \\ C' &= g^\gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_p^r \\ D' &= g^\delta \in \mathbb{Z}_p^r \end{aligned}$$

### Commitment to exponents

Choose *width* random nonces  $\vec{\phi}$  that will be private.

Form the following values:

$$\begin{aligned} wpcolj &= jth \text{ column of } \vec{wp} \in ciphertext^n, j = 1..width \\ F'_j &= Encr(0, -\phi_j) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n (wpcolj)_i^{\epsilon_i} \in ciphertext, j = 1..width \end{aligned}$$

Note that  $F'$  has *width* components, one for each of the columns of  $\vec{wp}$ . This disambiguates  $\prod_{i=1}^n wp^\epsilon$ , which is interpreted as shorthand for *width* equations, using the column vectors of  $wp$ .

### Reply to challenge v:

A challenge  $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  is given, and the following is the reply:

$$\begin{aligned} k_A &= v \cdot \langle \vec{r} \cdot \vec{e} \rangle + \alpha, \in \mathbb{Z}_q \\ \vec{k}_B &= v \cdot \vec{b} + \beta, \in (\mathbb{Z}_q)^n \\ k_C &= v \cdot \sum_{i=1}^n r_i + \gamma, \in \mathbb{Z}_q \\ k_D &= v \cdot d + \delta, \in \mathbb{Z}_q \\ \vec{k}_E &= v \cdot \vec{e}' + \vec{\epsilon}, \in (\mathbb{Z}_q)^n \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} rncolj &= jth \text{ column of reencryption nonces } \vec{rn}, j = 1..width \\ k_{F,j} &= v \cdot \langle rncolj, e' \rangle + \phi_j \end{aligned}$$

### Serialization of the TW Proof of Shuffle

```
data class ProofOfShuffle(  
    val mixname: String,  
    val u: VectorP, // permutation commitment
```

```

// τ^pos = Commitment of the Fiat-Shamir proof.
val B: VectorP,
val Ap: ElementModP,
val Bp: VectorP,
val Cp: ElementModP,
val Dp: ElementModP,
val Fp: VectorCiphertext, // width

// σ^pos = Reply of the Fiat-Shamir proof.
val kA: ElementModQ,
val kB: VectorQ,
val kC: ElementModQ,
val kD: ElementModQ,
val kE: VectorQ,
val kEF: VectorQ,
val kF: VectorQ, // width
)

```

## Proof Verification

The following equations are taken from Algorithm 19 of [6] and checked against the verificatum implementation. The main ambiguity is in the meaning of  $\prod_{i=1}^n w_i^{e_i}$  and  $\prod_{i=1}^n wp_i^{k_{E,i}}$  in steps 3 and 5. These are interpreted as a short hand for *width* equations on the column vectors of  $w$  and  $wp$ . We use one-based array indexing for notational simplicity.

The Verifier is provided with:

- $n$  = number of rows
- $width$  = number of ciphertexts in each row
- $\vec{w}$  = rows of ciphertexts ( $n \times width$ )
- $\vec{wp}$  = shuffled and reencrypted rows of ciphertexts ( $n \times width$ )
- $h_0, \vec{h}$  = generators of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^r$
- *ProofOfShuffle* and *Reply*

The  $\vec{h}$  (generators),  $\vec{e}$  nonces, and challenge are deterministically recalculated. This prevents those from being carefully chosen to subvert the proof.

The following are computed:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A &= \prod_{i=1}^n u_i^{e_i} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^r \\
 C &= (\prod_{i=1}^n u_i) / (\prod_{i=1}^n h_i), \in \mathbb{Z}_p^r \\
 D &= B_n \cdot h_0^{\prod_{i=1}^n e_i} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^r
 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$F_j = \prod_{i=1}^n (wcolj)_i^{e_i} \in ciphertext, j = 1..width$$

where  $wcolj$  = jth column of  $\vec{w}$ , is an array of ciphertexts of length n

Then the following are checked, and if all are true, the verification succeeds:

$$\begin{aligned} A^v \cdot A' &= g^{k_A} \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{k_{E,i}} \\ B_i^v \cdot B_i' &= g^{k_{B,i}} B_{i-1}^{k_{E,i}}, \text{ where } B_0 = h_0, i = 1..N \\ C^v \cdot C' &= g^{k_C} \quad (\text{sum of each row of } \psi \text{ is } 1) \\ D^v \cdot D' &= g^{k_D} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} F_j^v F_j' &= Encr(0, -k_{F,i}) \prod_{i=1}^n (wpcolj)^{k_{E,i}}, j = 1..width \\ \text{where } wpcolj &= jth \text{ column of } \vec{w_p} \in ciphertext^n \end{aligned}$$

## issues

**Calculation of  $\vec{h}$  (generators),  $\vec{e}$  and the challenge nonces** are highly dependent on the VMN implementation. The verifier is expected to independently generate, ie they are not part of the ProofOfShuffle output).

**generators** may need to be carefully chosen, see section 6.8 of vmnv: "In particular, it is not acceptable to derive exponents  $x_1, \dots, x_N$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  and then define  $h_i = g^{x_i}$ "

## ChVote

This follows Haenni et. al. [2], which has a good explanation of TW, sans vectors.

## Pedersen Commitments

For a set of messages  $\mathbf{m} = (m_1 \dots m_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ , the *Extended Pedersen commitment* to  $\mathbf{m}$  is

$$Commit(\mathbf{m}, cr) = g^{cr} * h_1^{m_1} * h_2^{m_2} \dots h_n^{m_n} = g^{cr} * \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{m_i}$$

where  $(g, \mathbf{h})$  are generators of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^r$  with randomization nonce  $cr \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ .

If  $\mathbf{b}_i$  is the  $i^{th}$  column of  $B_\psi$ , then the *permutation commitment to  $\psi$*  is defined as the vector of commitments to its columns:

$$Commit(\psi, \mathbf{cr}) = (Commit(\mathbf{b}_1, cr_1), Commit(\mathbf{b}_2, cr_2), \dots Commit(\mathbf{b}_N, cr_N)) =$$

where

$$c_j = \text{Commit}(\mathbf{b}_j, cr_j) = g^{cr_j} * \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{b_{ij}} = g^{cr_j} * h_i, \text{ for } i = \psi^{-1}(j)$$

## Proof of permutation

Let  $\mathbf{c} = \text{Commit}(\psi, \mathbf{r}) = (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_N)$ , with randomization vector  $\mathbf{cr} = (cr_1, cr_2, \dots, cr_N)$ , and  $crbar = \sum_{i=1}^n cr_i$ .

*Condition 1* implies that

$$\prod_{j=1}^n c_j = \prod_{j=1}^n g^{cr_j} \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{b_{ij}} = g^{crbar} \prod_{i=1}^n h_i = \text{Commit}(\mathbf{1}, crbar). \quad (5.2)$$

Let  $\mathbf{u} = (u_1 \dots u_n)$  be arbitrary values  $\in \mathbb{Z}_q$ ,  $\mathbf{pu}$  its permutation by  $\psi$ , and  $cr_u = \sum_{j=1}^N cr_j u_j$ .

*Condition 2* implies that:

$$\prod_{i=1}^n u_i = \prod_{j=1}^n pu_j \quad (5.3)$$

$$\prod_{j=1}^n c_j^{u_j} = \prod_{j=1}^n (g^{cr_j} \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{b_{ij}})^{u_j} = g^{cr_u} \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{pu_i} = \text{Commit}(\mathbf{pu}, cr_u) \quad (5.4)$$

Which constitutes proof that condition 1 and 2 are true, so that  $\mathbf{c}$  is a commitment to a permutation matrix.

## Proof of equal exponents

Let  $\mathbf{m}$  be a vector of messages,  $\mathbf{e}$  their encryptions  $\mathbf{e} = \text{Encr}(\mathbf{m})$ , and  $\mathbf{re}(\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{r})$  their reenryptions with nonces  $\mathbf{r}$ . A shuffle operation both reenrypts and permutes, so  $\text{shuffle}(\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{r}) \rightarrow (\mathbf{pre}, \mathbf{pr})$ , where  $\mathbf{pre}$  is the permutation of  $\mathbf{re}$  by  $\psi$ , and  $\mathbf{pr}$  the permutation of  $\mathbf{r}$  by  $\psi$ .

$$re_i = \text{ReEncr}(e_i, r_i) = \text{Encr}(0, r_i) * e_i$$

$$pre_j = \text{ReEncr}(pe_j, pr_j) = \text{Encr}(0, pr_j) * e_j$$

Let  $\mathbf{u}$  be arbitrary values  $\in \mathbb{Z}_q$  (to be specified later) and  $\mathbf{pu}$  its permutation.

If the shuffle is valid, then it follows from *Equation 1* above that

$$\begin{aligned} \prod_{j=1}^n pre_j^{pu_j} &= \prod_{j=1}^n (\text{Encr}(0, pr_j) * e_j)^{pu_j} \\ &= \text{Encr}(0, \sum_{j=1}^n (pr_j * pu_j)) * \prod_{j=1}^n e_j^{pu_j} \quad (\text{Equation 1}) \\ &= \text{Encr}(0, sumru) * \prod_{j=1}^n e_j^{pu_j} \end{aligned}$$



where  $sumru = \sum_{j=1}^n (pr_j * pu_j)$ .

However,  $e_j^{pu_j} = e_i^{u_i}$  for some i, so  $\prod_{j=1}^n e_j^{pu_j} = \prod_{i=1}^n e_i^{u_i}$ , and we have:

$$\prod_{j=1}^n pre_j^{pu_j} = Encr(0, sumru) * \prod_{i=1}^n e_i^{u_i} \quad (5.5)$$

**Note** that (5.5) from [2] and line 141 of the code in *GenShuffleProof* in [8] has

$$Encr(1, \tilde{r}), \text{ where } \tilde{r} = \sum_{j=1}^n pr_j * u_j$$

whereas we have

$$Encr(0, \tilde{r}), \text{ where } \tilde{r} = \sum_{j=1}^n pr_j * pu_j$$

The  $Encr(0, \dots)$  is because we use exponential ElGamal, so is fine. Their use of  $u_j$  instead of  $pu_j$  appears to be a mistake. Its also possible there is a difference in notation that I didnt catch.

## Shuffling vectors

### Simple

Much of the literature assumes that each row to be mixed consists of a single ciphertext. In our application we need the possibility that each row consists of a vector of ciphertexts.

So for each row i, we now have a vector of  $w = width$  ciphertexts:

$$\mathbf{e}_i = (e_{i,1}, \dots, e_{i,w}) = \{e_{i,k}\}, k = 1..w$$

The main work is to modify the proof of equal exponents for this case.

Suppose we are looking for the simplest generalization of 5.5:

$$\prod_{j=1}^n pre_j^{pu_j} = Encr(0, sumru) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n e_i^{u_i} \quad (5.5)$$

one could use the same nonce for all the ciphertexts in each row when reencrypting:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{r} &= \{r_j\}, j = 1..n \\ re_{j,k} &= ReEncr(e_{j,k}, r_j) = Encr(0, r_j) \cdot e_{j,k} \quad (case1) \end{aligned}$$

or generate  $N = nrows * width$  nonces, one for each ciphertext:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{r} &= \{r_{j,k}\}, j = 1..n, k = 1..w \\ re_{j,k} &= ReEncr(e_{j,k}, r_{j,k}) = Encr(0, r_{j,k}) \cdot e_{j,k} \quad (case2) \end{aligned}$$

Then eq 5.5 is changed to

$$\prod_{j=1}^n \prod_{k=1}^w pre_{j,k}^{pu_j} = Encr(0, sumru') * \prod_{i=1}^n \prod_{k=1}^w e_{i,k}^{u_i}$$

where, now

$$\begin{aligned} sumru' &= \sum_{j=1}^n width * (pr_j * pu_j) \quad (case1) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^n (pr_{j,k} * pu_j) \quad (case2). \end{aligned}$$

In algorithms 8.4, 8.5 of [2], the challenge includes a list of all the ciphertexts and their reencryptions in their hash function:

$$\mathbf{u} = Hash(\dots, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{pe}, pcommit, pkq, i, \dots)$$

Here we just flatten the list of lists of ciphertexts for  $\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{pe}$ , so that all are included in the hash. Since the hash is dependent on the ordering of the hash elements, this should preclude an attack that switches ciphertexts within a row.

## Haines Proof of vector shuffling

Haines [9] gives a formal proof of security of TW when the shuffle involves vectors of ciphertexts.

We will use the notation above for case 2, using a separate nonce for each ciphertext:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{r} &= \{r_{j,k}\}, j = 1..n, k = 1..w \\ re_{j,k} &= ReEncr(e_{j,k}, r_{j,k}) = Encr(0, r_{j,k}) \cdot e_{j,k} \quad (case2) \end{aligned}$$

This gives an  $nrows \times width$  matrix  $R$  of reencryption nonces. The vector notation is a shorthand for component-wise operations:

$$\begin{aligned} R &= (\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_n) \\ Encr(\mathbf{e}_i) &= (Encr(e_{i,1}), \dots, Encr(e_{i,w})) \\ ReEncr(\mathbf{e}_i, \mathbf{r}_i) &= (ReEncr(e_{i,1}, r_{i,1}), \dots, ReEncr(e_{i,w}, r_{i,w})) \end{aligned}$$

so now we have vector equations for reencryption:

$$\mathbf{re}_i = ReEncr(\mathbf{e}_i, \mathbf{r}_i) = Encr(0, \mathbf{r}_i) * \mathbf{e}_i$$

and the permuted form, as is returned by the shuffle:

$$\mathbf{pre}_j = ReEncr(\mathbf{pe}_j, \mathbf{pr}_j) = Encr(0, \mathbf{pr}_j) * \mathbf{e}_j$$

which corresponds to ntnu equation (p 3) of [9]:

$$\mathbf{e}'_i = ReEncr(\mathbf{e}_{\pi(i)}, R_{\pi(i)}), \pi = \pi_M$$

Let  $\omega$  be width random nonces,  $\omega'$  = permuted  $\omega$ , and  $\mathbf{pe}_i$  = permuted  $\mathbf{e}_i = \mathbf{e}'_i$  as before. Then the  $t_4$  equation (p 3, paragraph 2 of [9]) is a vector of width components:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{t}_4 &= ReEnc(\prod_i^n \mathbf{pe}_i^{\omega'_i}, -\omega_4) \\
&= (ReEnc(\prod_i^n \mathbf{pe}_i^{\omega'_i}, -\omega_{4,1}), \dots, (ReEnc(\prod_i^n \mathbf{pe}_i^{\omega'_i}, -\omega_{4,w}))
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\prod_i^n \mathbf{pe}_i^{\omega'_i}$$

must be the product over rows of the  $k_{th}$  ciphertext in each row:

$$\begin{aligned}
&(\prod_i^n \mathbf{pe}_{i,1}^{\omega'_i}, \dots, \prod_i^n \mathbf{pe}_{i,w}^{\omega'_i}) \\
&= \{\prod_i^n \mathbf{pe}_{i,k}^{\omega'_i}\}, k = 1..width \\
\mathbf{t}_4 &= \{ReEnc(\prod_i^n \mathbf{pe}_{i,k}^{\omega'_i}, -\omega_4)\}, k = 1..width
\end{aligned}$$

**(quite a bit more complicated than "our simplest thing to do" above)**

**extra**

to go back to (2f) and unravel this:

$$\begin{aligned}
\prod_{j=1}^n ReEncr(e_j, r_j) &= ReEncr(\prod_{j=1}^n e_j, \sum_{j=1}^n r_j) \quad (2f) \\
\prod_{j=1}^n ReEncr(\mathbf{pe}_i^{\omega'_i}, r_j) &= ReEncr(\prod_{j=1}^n \mathbf{pe}_i^{\omega'_i}, \sum_{j=1}^n r_j)
\end{aligned}$$

## Timings (preliminary)

Environment used for testing:

- Ubuntu 22.04.3
- HP Z840 Workstation, Intel Xeon CPU E5-2680 v3 @ 2.50GHz
- 24-cores, two threads per core.

### Regular vs accelerated exponentiation time

Regular exponentiation is about 3 times slower after the acceleration cache warms up:

```
acc took 15288 msec for 20000 = 0.7644 msec per acc
exp took 46018 msec for 20000 = 2.3009 msec per exp
exp/acc = 3.01007326007326
```

## VMN

### Operation counts

- $n$  = number of rows, eg ballots or contests
- $width$  = number of ciphertexts per row
- $N$  =  $nrows * width$  = total number of ciphertexts to be mixed

	shuffle	proof of shuffle	proof of exp	verify
regular exps	0	$4 * n$	$2 * N$	$4*N + 4 * n + 4$
accelerated exps	$2 * N$	$3 * n + 2 * width + 4$	0	$n + 2*width + 3$

Even though  $N$  dominates, width is bound but  $nrows$  can get arbitrarily big.

Could break into batches of 100-1000 ballots each and do each batch in parallel. The advantage here is that there would be complete parallelization.

### Timing results

See [VMN spreadsheets](#) for graphs of timing results (work in progress).

## OpenChVote

### operations count

	shuffle	proof	verify
regular exps	0	$2N + 5n$	$4N + 4n + 6$
accelerated exps	$2 * N$	$2N + 3n$	8

### wallclock time vs verifacatum

$nrows = 1000$ ,  $width = 34$ ,  $N=3400$

Time verificatum as used by rave

```
RunMixnet elapsed time = 67598 msecs
RunMixnet elapsed time = 67853 msecs)
RunMixnetVerifier elapsed time = 68855 msecs
RunMixnetVerifier elapsed time = 68738 msecs
```

nrows=1000, width= 34 per row, N=34000, nthreads=24

```
shuffle: took 5511 msecs
proof: took 12944 msecs
verify: took 27983 msecs
total: took 46438 msecs
```

nrows = 100, width = 34, N=3400

Time verificatum as used by rave

```
RunMixnet elapsed time = 27831 msecs
RunMixnet elapsed time = 26464 msecs)
RunMixnetVerifier elapsed time = 12123 msecs
RunMixnetVerifier elapsed time = 12893 msecs
```

total = 79.311 secs

Time egk-mixnet

```
shuffle1 took 5505
shuffleProof1 took 17592
shuffleVerify1 took 33355
shuffle2 took 5400
shuffleProof2 took 17213
shuffleVerify1 took 33446
```

total: 119.711 secs, N=3400 perN=35 msecs

Vmn proof  $27/(17.4+5.4) = 1.18$  is 18% slower

Vmn has verifier  $33355/12123 = 2.75$  faster, TODO: investigate if theres an algorithm improvement there. Possibly related to the "wide integer" representation, eg see

```
BigInteger.modPowProd(BigInteger[] bases, BigInteger[] exponents, BigInteger
modulus)
```

More likely there are parallelization being done, eg in the same routine. So to compare, we have to run vmn and see what parelization it gets.

Also note BigInteger.magic that allows use of VMGJ.

Vmn in pure Java mode, using BigInteger. TODO: Find out how much speedup using VMGJ gets.

SO why doesnt same speedup apply to proof?

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