

BloodHound:

Attack Graphs Practically Applied to Active Directory



HELLO!

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SPECTEROPS

HELLO!

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SPECTEROPS

Agenda

- The Problem
- The Solution
- Conclusion



Purpose

We want to demonstrate how **graphs** can be an **elegant and practical solution** to incredibly **complex problems**, and inspire **you** to consider using **graphs** for problems you face



The Problem




Pushed Into a Corner, circa 2014-2015


- Remote Code Execution (RCE) flaws in Windows become increasingly rare and risky to exploit
- Maturing vulnerability management programs ensure ephemerality of RCE in the enterprise
- A common methodology appeared...






























Domain Admin!



Domain Admin!




The Data is RIGHT... THERE!

- Question: Where are users logged on?
- Answer: *NetSessionEnum*
- Question: Who are local admins on a system?
- Answer: *NetLocalGroupGetMembers*
- Question: Who belongs to what security group?
- Answer: *Basic LDAP queries*

By default, all data is accessible by any domain authenticated principal on systems before Windows 10 Anniversary (1607)



An effective, albeit tedious and naive approach...



The Problem, In Short

- We have a reliable, proven methodology for escalating rights in almost any Active Directory deployment
- That methodology is enhanced by data which, by default, anyone in a domain can access
- The data is way too complicated to analyze by hand



The Solution



It's a graph, dummy!

- Every principal (user, group, computer) is a **node**
- Every privilege (and group membership) is a **relationship**
- Graphs are phenomenally fast at finding **paths** between disparate nodes





Bob User



Helpdesk Group

Data Source: LDAP



Computer 1



Alice Admin



Domain Admins



Bob User



Helpdesk Group

Data Source: LDAP



Computer 1



Alice Admin



Domain Admins





Bob User



MemberOf



Helpdesk Group



AdminTo



Computer 1

Data Source:
`NetLocalGroupGetMembers`



Alice Admin



MemberOf



Domain Admins





Bob User



MemberOf



Helpdesk Group



AdminTo



Computer 1



HasSession



Alice Admin



MemberOf



Domain Admins


Data Source:
NetSessionEnum




Now You're Thinking With Graphs

- Manual “derivative local admin” takes **days to months**
- Data collection, graph analysis, and attack path execution takes **minutes to hours**







Conclusion



Three Problems Graphs Solved

- Complexity - Analyzing thousands of paths became possible
- Readability - Presenting concepts to non-technical audiences became easier
- Accessibility - Opened up the methodology to both the defensive and offensive side



Three Exciting Defensive Applications

- Easier, more effective, more accurate permission auditing
- Attack path identification and mitigation/elimination
- Empirical key terrain identification



If There's One Thing to Take Away From this Talk

- Graphs are **not the solution to every problem**; however, they allow you to look at problems in a **unique way** and **solve complex problems** that otherwise would be **insanely difficult** to visualize, compute, or solve



Acknowledgements and Prior Work

<http://alicezheng.org/papers/sosp2009-heatray-10pt.pdf>

<https://www.sixdub.net/?p=591>

<https://bitbucket.org/iwseclabs/bta>

<https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/AD-control-paths>

<https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/>



Thank you!

QUESTIONS?

You can find us at:

- specterops.io
- @SpecterOps
- @_wald0
- @CptJesus
- BloodHound: <https://bit.ly/GetBloodHound>
- BloodHound Slack: <https://bloodhoundgang.herokuapp.com>



S P E C T E R O P S