

Enigmatic L0: A Layer 0 Communication Protocol

5. Security Model

5.1 Threat Model Definition

We define the global blockchain state as a tuple: $S = (\mathcal{U}, \mathcal{B}, T)$ where:

- \mathcal{U} is the set of all UTXOs,
- \mathcal{B} is the ordered set of DigiByte blocks,
- T is the mempool transaction graph.

Enigmatic L0 assumes adversaries with the following capabilities:

- Full node access
- Chain analytics tooling
- Ability to reorder non-mined transactions via fee pressure
- Ability to observe address clustering heuristics

Adversaries cannot:

- Break modern symmetric encryption
- Predict witness randomness
- Modify already-mined blocks
- Violate DigiByte's consensus rules

5.2 Confidentiality Guarantees

Message confidentiality derives from AES-GCM encryption:

$C = \text{AES_GCM}_k(P, \text{nonce})$ where:

- P is plaintext
- k is a session key derived via:

$k = H(\text{sk}_A \cdot \text{pk}_B)$ through elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman over secp256k1.

UTXO encoding preserves ciphertext secrecy because:

$v_i = C_i \bmod N$ and recovering C_i from v_i without keys is equivalent to brute forcing the entire ciphertext space.

5.3 Integrity & Authenticity

Integrity is provided by:

- AES-GCM authentication tags
- Deterministic order constraints between UTXO frames
- Transaction-level commitment: $h = H(v_1 || v_2 || \dots || v_n || \text{fee})$

Authenticity derives from private key ownership of the UTXO-spending address: $\text{sig} = \text{ECDSA}_{\text{sk}}(h)$

This forms an implicit sender identity without exposing metadata.

6. Threat Analysis

6.1 Chain Surveillance Resistance

Standard chain analysis heuristics operate on:

- address reuse
- common input ownership
- clustering
- transaction fingerprinting

Enigmatic L0 disrupts these heuristics due to:

- rotating address families
- symmetric UTXO chunk structures
- fees mimicking organic variance
- entropy injected by ECDSA randomness

Formally, detectability is defined as:

$D = \Pr[A(S) = 1]$ where A is a classifier attempting to detect L0 traffic.

Our design aims to minimize:

$D \approx 0.50$ i.e., indistinguishable from random noise.

6.2 Transaction Pattern Obfuscation

The protocol introduces controlled randomness: $v'_i = (v_i + r_i) \bmod N$ where the jitter term r_i is derived from:

$$r_i = H(\text{txid} || i) \bmod N$$

This ensures no UTXO appears deterministically crafted.

6.3 Replay & Manipulation Protection

Replays are mitigated through:

$$\text{nonce} = H(\text{prev_txid})$$

Manipulation is prevented because altering any UTXO amount changes: $H(\text{raw_tx})$ breaking OP_RETURN checksums and AES-GCM tags simultaneously.