



QUADRATIC VOTING FOR UNSC REFORM

A MECHANISM-DESIGN PROTOTYPE BALANCING FAIRNESS, STABILITY, AND ACTION.
FINAL SYMPOSIUM — CULTIVATING INITIATIVE AND ACADEMIC EXCHANGE

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INTRODUCTION

P5 unilateral veto stalls action; we test Quadratic Voting (QV) to unlock consensus while preserving stability.

OBJECTIVE

Design and assess QV with credits as a practical UNSC decision rule improving fairness and efficiency.





METHODOLOGY

- Equal credits per member; casting k votes costs k^2 credits.
- Simulated multi-issue sessions; outcomes compared to veto baseline.

RESULTS/FINDINGS

- Higher pass rates and fewer abstentions in QV scenarios.
- Costly veto curbs overuse; small-state coalitions become viable.

CHARTS EXPLAINED



ANALYSIS

Quadratic pricing elicits truthful intensity, rebalancing power with accountability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Run Model-UN/classroom trials; tune budgets/rollover.
Add blockchain ledger for transparent credit accounting.

CONCLUSION

QV preserves great-power voice, reduces gridlock, and improves legitimacy of outcomes, offering a principled middle ground between veto-based rigidity and majority-rule volatility. By making influence costly, it incentivizes genuine consensus rather than obstruction, ensuring that decisive action reflects both strength and fairness.

CITE KEY REFERENCES USED IN THE STUDY