Block Ciphers

Rohit Musti

CUNY - Hunter College

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
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One Time Pad Security Game: Chosen Plaintext Attack



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• A PRF $F: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{C}$ is secure if $F(k,\cdot)$ is indistinguishable from a random function $f \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} (\mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C})$

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
Block Ciphers

Security of PRPs and PRFs


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
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
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
















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C \\
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\text{if } b = 0 : f \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} (\mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}) \\
\text{if } b = 1 : k \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}, E(k,\cdot)
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








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
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











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


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Security Lemma

• a secure PRP is equivalent to a secure PRF

• block ciphers can be thought of as PRPs

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- ullet its message space and ciphertext space are the same: $\mathcal{M}=\mathcal{C}$
- Shares the correctness requirement with Shannon Ciphers D(k, E(k, m)) = m

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


Image Credit: Diana Maimut




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


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


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
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
Future HW: describe an attack to break CPA given ECB


Image Encryption using ECB

















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- You can use a unique IV (i.e. counter mode) but then you have to sample a new IV each round, but you don't need to send the IV with the cipher text
- It is best to use a random IV every message and send it with the cipher text

Image Encryption using CBC vs EBC







Image Credit: (the NSA)

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