

#JonSecOps

Detecting Local Account Creation (T1136.001) with Atomic Red Team and Splunk

FIGURE 1: LOGICAL DIAGRAM




FIGURE 2: SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS



Windows 10 / Target PC / VM : 192.168.10.100
Splunk Universal Forwarder

Splunk Enterprise
Sysmon
Atomic Red Team

- Installed Atomic Red Team on TARGET-PC
- Configured exclusions in Windows Virus & Threat Protection settings to the C: drive to prevent the security software from blocking or interfering with the deployment of simulated MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- Executed MITRE ATT&CK ID: T1136.001 (Create Account - Local Account)
- Verified the creation of a new account by investigating the output of the net user and net localgroup Administrator commands.
- Captured telemetry data using Splunk Enterprise



Splunk Server VM: 192.168.10.10

- Ubuntu Server with Splunk installed and sending telemetry to TARGET-PC

FIGURE 3: CONFIGURED EXCLUSIONS IN WINDOWS VIRUS & THREAT PROTECTION SETTINGS




FIGURE 4: ATOMIC RED TEAM INSTALLATION ON TARGET PC

```
Try the new cross-platform PowerShell https://aka.ms/pscore6

PS C:\Windows\system32> powershell -exec bypass
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Try the new cross-platform PowerShell https://aka.ms/pscore6

PS C:\Windows\system32> Install-Module -Name invoke-atomicredteam,powershell-yaml -Scope CurrentUser
NuGet provider is required to continue
PowerShellGet requires NuGet provider version '2.8.5.201' or newer to interact with NuGet-based repositories. The NuGet
provider must be available in 'C:\Program Files\PackageManagement\ProviderAssemblies' or 'C:\Users\TARGET
PC\AppData\Local\PackageManagement\ProviderAssemblies'. You can also install the NuGet provider by running
'Install-PackageProvider -Name NuGet -MinimumVersion 2.8.5.201 -Force'. Do you want PowerShellGet to install and import
the NuGet provider now?
[Y] Yes [N] No [S] Suspend [?] Help (default is "Y"): y

Untrusted repository
You are installing the modules from an untrusted repository. If you trust this repository, change its
InstallationPolicy value by running the Set-PSRepository cmdlet. Are you sure you want to install the modules from
'PSGallery'?
[Y] Yes [A] Yes to All [N] No [L] No to All [S] Suspend [?] Help (default is "N"):
WARNING: User declined to install module (Invoke-AtomicRedTeam).
WARNING: User declined to install module (powershell-yaml).
PS C:\Windows\system32> Install-Module -Name invoke-atomicredteam,powershell-yaml -Scope CurrentUser
Untrusted repository
You are installing the modules from an untrusted repository. If you trust this repository, change its
InstallationPolicy value by running the Set-PSRepository cmdlet. Are you sure you want to install the modules from
'PSGallery'?
[Y] Yes [A] Yes to All [N] No [L] No to All [S] Suspend [?] Help (default is "N"): Y
PS C:\Windows\system32> Import-Module "C:\AtomicRedTeam\invoke-atomicredteam\Invoke-AtomicRedTeam.ps1" -Force
PS C:\Windows\system32>
```

FIGURE 5: MITRE FRAMEWORK T1136.001 TACTIC & TECHNIQUE INFORMATION

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MITRE ATT&CK® is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. The ATT&CK knowledge base is used as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies in the private sector, in government, and in the cybersecurity product and service community.

With the creation of ATT&CK, MITRE is fulfilling its mission to solve problems for a safer world – by bringing communities together to develop more effective cybersecurity. ATT&CK is open and available to any person or organization for use at no charge.

ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

layout: side ▾
[show sub-techniques](#)
[hide sub-techniques](#)

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Late Move
10 techniques	8 techniques	10 techniques	14 techniques	20 techniques	14 techniques	44 techniques	17 techniques	32 techniques	9 techniques
Active Scanning (3) Gather Victim Host Information (4) Gather Victim Identity Information (3) Gather Victim Network Information (6) Gather Victim Org Information (4) Phishing for Information (4) Search Closed Sources (2) Search Open Technical Databases (5) Search Open Websites/Domains (2)	Acquire Access Acquire Infrastructure (8) Compromise Accounts (3) Compromise Infrastructure (8) Develop Capabilities (4) Establish Accounts (3) Obtain Capabilities (7) Stage Capabilities (6) Supply Chain Compromise (3)	Content Injection Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Exploitation for Client Execution Phishing (4) Replication Through Removable Media Create or	Cloud Administration Command Command and Scripting Interpreter (11) Container Administration Command Deploy Container Browser Extensions Compromise Host Software Binary Native API Scheduled Task/Job (5) Serverless Execution	Account Manipulation (7) BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14) Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5) Account Manipulation (7) BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Debugger Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5) Create or Modify System Process (5) Domain or Tenant Policy Modification (2) Domain or Tenant Policy Modification (2) Cloud Account	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (6) Access Token Manipulation (5) Account Manipulation (7) Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14) Account Manipulation (7) BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Debugger Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5) Create or Modify System Process (5) Domain or Tenant Policy Modification (2) Domain or Tenant Policy Modification (2) Cloud Account	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (6) Access Token Manipulation (5) BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Debugger Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5) Create or Modify System Process (5) Domain or Tenant Policy Modification (2) Domain or Tenant Policy Modification (2) Cloud Account	Adversary-in-the-Middle (4) Brute Force (4) Credentials from Password Stores (6) Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Direct Volume Access Forge Web Credentials (2) Input Capture (4) Modify Authentication Process (9) Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Account Discovery (4) Application Window Discovery Browser Information Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Cloud Storage Object Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Debugger Evasion Device Driver Discovery	Exploit Remote Services Internal Spearph Lateral T Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking Remote Services Replicat Through Removal Media Software Deploy Tools

- For this attack the Persistence tactic / Create Account/ Local Account T1136.001 technique is used.

Create Account: Local Account

Other sub-techniques of Create Account (3)

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

For example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows `net user /add` command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the `dscl -create` command can be used to create a local account. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common [Network Device CLI](#) commands such as `username`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.^{[1][2]}

Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

ID: T1136.001

Sub-technique of: [T1136](#)

① Tactic: Persistence

① Platforms: Containers, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS

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[Version](#) [Permalink](#)

FIGURE 6: AVAILABLE EXECUTIONS WITHIN T1136.001 TECHNIQUE DISPLAYED IN POWERSHELL

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Invoke-AtomicTest T1136.001 -ShowDetailsBrief  
PathToAtomsicsFolder = C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics  
  
T1136.001-4 Create a new user in a command prompt 1  
T1136.001-5 Create a new user in PowerShell 2  
T1136.001-8 Create a new Windows admin user 3  
T1136.001-9 Create a new Windows admin user via .NET 4
```

T1136.001 executions

FIGURE 7: T1136.001 DEPLOYMENT & EXECUTIONS

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Invoke-AtomicTest T1136.001
PathToAtomsicsFolder = C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomsics
Executing test: T1136.001-4 Create a new user in a command prompt 1
The password does not meet the password policy requirements. Check the minimum password length, password complexity and password history requirements.
More help is available by typing NET HELPMSG 2245.
Exit code: 2
Done executing test: T1136.001-4 Create a new user in a command prompt
Executing test: T1136.001-5 Create a new User in PowerShell 2
Name          Enabled Description
-----
T1136.001_PowerShell True
Exit code: 0
Done executing test: T1136.001-5 Create a new User in PowerShell 3
Executing test: T1136.001-8 Create a new windows admin user
The command completed successfully.
The command completed successfully.
Exit code: 0
Done executing test: T1136.001-8 Create a new Windows admin user
Executing test: T1136.001-9 Create a new Windows admin user Via .NET
This script creates a new user, adds it to a local administrator group and then deletes the user.
User 'NewLocalUser' created successfully.
User 'NewLocalUser' added to the 'Administrators' group.
Newly Created User Info:
User name      NewLocalUser
Full Name       NewLocalUser
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code    000 (System Default)
Account active     Yes
Account expires    Never
Password last set  12/16/2024 3:42:52 PM
Password expires   Never
Password changeable 12/17/2024 3:42:52 PM
Password required  Yes
User may change password No
Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon        Never
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships  *None
The command completed successfully.
User 'NewLocalUser' deleted successfully.
Exception calling "Add" with "3" argument(s): "The network path was not found." 4
```

Activate Windows
Go to Settings to activate Windows.

FIGURE 8: TARGET PC NET USER & NET LOCALGROUP INFORMATION

```
C:\Users\TARGET PC>net user  
  
User accounts for \\TARGET5PC  
  
Administrator          DefaultAccount      Guest  
T1136.001_Admin        T1136.001_PowerShell  TARGET PC  
WDAGUtilityAccount  
The command completed successfully.  
  
C:\Users\TARGET PC>net user T1136.001 Admin  
User name                T1136.001_Admin  
Full Name  
Comment  
User's comment  
Country/region code       000 (System Default)  
Account active            Yes  
Account expires           Never  
  
Password last set         12/16/2024 3:42:54 PM  
Password expires          1/27/2025 3:42:54 PM  
Password changeable       12/17/2024 3:42:54 PM  
Password required          Yes  
User may change password  Yes  
  
Workstations allowed      All  
Logon script  
User profile  
Home directory  
Last logon                Never  
  
Logon hours allowed       All  
  
Local Group Memberships   *Administrators    *Users  
Global Group memberships  *None  
The command completed successfully.
```

```
C:\Users\TARGET PC>net localgroup Administrators
Alias name      Administrators
Comment        Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain

Members

-----
Administrator
LAB\Domain Admins
T1136.001_Admin
TARGET PC
The command completed successfully.
```

FIGURE 9: ATTACK ORDER

Attack Order

1. Event ID 4798 - A user's local group membership was enumerated
 - **Reconnaissance:** Attackers query group memberships to identify accounts with elevated privileges.
2. Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password
 - **Initial Compromise or Privilege Escalation:** Attackers try to reset passwords to gain access to or control over accounts.
3. Event ID 4738 - A user account was changed
 - **Privilege Escalation or Persistence:** Attackers modify accounts, e.g., changing attributes or passwords to maintain control.
4. Event ID 4722 - A user account was enabled
 - **Persistence:** Attackers re-enable disabled accounts to exploit dormant or forgotten credentials.
5. Event ID 4720 - A user account was created
 - **Persistence:** Attackers create new accounts to maintain access without relying on existing credentials.
6. Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted
 - **Cleanup:** Attackers may delete accounts to hide traces of their activity or disrupt operations.

FIGURE : SPLUNK TELEMETRY IN ATTACK ORDER

i	Time	Event
	8:42:53.000 PM	<pre>LogName=Security EventCode=4798 EventType=0 ComputerName=TARGET5PC.LAB.local SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing. Type=Information RecordNumber=4395 Keywords=Audit Success TaskCategory=User Account Management OpCode=Info Message=A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1001 Account Name: TARGET PC Account Domain: TARGET5PC Logon ID: 0x7ACB2 User: Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1009 Account Name: NewLocalUser Account Domain: TARGET5PC Process Information: Process ID: 0xcd0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe Collapse</pre> <p>EventCode = 4798 host = TARGET5PC source = WinEventLog:Security sourcetype = WinEventLog:Security</p>

i	Time	Event
>	12/16/24 8:42:52.000 PM	<p>12/16/2024 03:42:52 PM</p> <p>LogName=Security</p> <p>EventCode=4724</p> <p>EventType=0</p> <p>ComputerName=TARGET5PC.LAB.local</p> <p>SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.</p> <p>Type=Information</p> <p>RecordNumber=4389</p> <p>Keywords=Audit Success</p> <p>TaskCategory=User Account Management</p> <p>OpCode=Info</p> <p>Message=An attempt was made to reset an account's password.</p> <p>Subject:</p> <p>Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1001</p> <p>Account Name: TARGET PC</p> <p>Account Domain: TARGET5PC</p> <p>Logon ID: 0x7ABCB2</p> <p>Target Account:</p> <p>Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1009</p> <p>Account Name: NewLocalUser</p> <p>Account Domain: TARGET5PC</p> <p>Collapse</p> <p>EventCode = 4724 host = TARGET5PC source = WinEventLog:Security sourcetype = WinEventLog:Security</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Activate Windows Go to Settings to activate Windows</p>

> 12/16/24 12/16/2024 03:42:52 PM
8:42:52.000 PM LogName=Security
EventCode=4738
EventType=0
ComputerName=TARGET5PC.LAB.local
SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
Type=Information
RecordNumber=4391
Keywords=Audit Success
TaskCategory=User Account Management
OpCode=Info
Message=A user account was changed.

Subject:
 Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1001
 Account Name: TARGET PC
 Account Domain: TARGET5PC
 Logon ID: 0x7ABC2

Target Account:
 Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1009
 Account Name: NewLocalUser
 Account Domain: TARGET5PC

Changed Attributes:
 SAM Account Name: NewLocalUser
 Display Name: NewLocalUser
 User Principal Name: -
 Home Directory: <value not set>
 Home Drive: <value not set>
 Script Path: <value not set>
 Profile Path: <value not set>
 User Workstations: <value not set>
 Password Last Set: 12/16/2024 3:42:52 PM
 Account Expires: <never>
 Primary Group ID: 513

i	Time	Event
>	12/16/24 8:42:52.000 PM	<p>12/16/2024 03:42:52 PM</p> <p>LogName=Security</p> <p>EventCode=4722</p> <p>EventType=0</p> <p>ComputerName=TARGET5PC.LAB.local</p> <p>SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.</p> <p>Type=Information</p> <p>RecordNumber=4387</p> <p>Keywords=Audit Success</p> <p>TaskCategory=User Account Management</p> <p>OpCode=Info</p> <p>Message=A user account was enabled.</p> <p>Subject:</p> <p> Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1001</p> <p> Account Name: TARGET PC</p> <p> Account Domain: TARGET5PC</p> <p> Logon ID: 0x7ABCB2</p> <p>Target Account:</p> <p> Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1009</p> <p> Account Name: NewLocalUser</p> <p> Account Domain: TARGET5PC</p> <p>Collapse</p> <p>EventCode = 4722 host = TARGET5PC source = WinEventLog:Security sourcetype = WinEventLog:Security</p>

> 12/16/24 12/16/2024 03:42:52 PM
8:42:52.000 PM LogName=Security

EventCode=4720
EventType=0
ComputerName=TARGET5PC.LAB.local
SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
Type=Information
RecordNumber=4386
Keywords=Audit Success
TaskCategory=User Account Management
OpCode=Info
Message=A user account was created.

Subject:
Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1001
Account Name: TARGET PC
Account Domain: TARGET5PC
Logon ID: 0x7ABCB2

New Account:
Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1009
Account Name: NewLocalUser
Account Domain: TARGET5PC

Attributes:
SAM Account Name: NewLocalUser
Display Name: <value not set>
User Principal Name: -
Home Directory: <value not set>
Home Drive: <value not set>
Script Path: <value not set>
Profile Path: <value not set>
User Workstations: <value not set>
Password Last Set: <never>
Account Expires: <never>
Primary Group ID: 513

Activate W
Go to Settings

> 12/16/24 12/16/2024 03:42:53 PM
8:42:53.000 PM LogName=Security
EventCode=4726
EventType=0
ComputerName=TARGET5PC.LAB.local
SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
Type=Information
RecordNumber=4397
Keywords=Audit Success
TaskCategory=User Account Management
OnCode=Info
Message=A user account was deleted.

Subject:
 Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1001
 Account Name: TARGET PC
 Account Domain: TARGET5PC
 Logon ID: 0x7ABCB2

Target Account:
 Security ID: S-1-5-21-4034659041-4078518514-33229716-1009
Account Name: NewLocalUser
 Account Domain: TARGET5PC

Additional Information:
 Privileges -
 Collapse

Activate Windows
Go to Settings to activate Windo

EventCode = **4726** | host = TARGET5PC | source = WinEventLog:Security | sourcetype = WinEventLog:Security