Executive Summary

Background

Agents at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have been investigating the repeated theft of intellectual property. Several companies have claimed that a Chinese hosted website is posting and selling copied home building plans. A suspect was identified as Andrew Connor. His home was raided but no computers were present and neither was he. A 1GB USB thumb drive was recovered at the scene. Agents are hoping the thumb drive might have enough evidence to charge Connor with the theft of intellectual property. A note was found at the scene that vaguely indicated a meeting but no other information was recovered.

Request

Mr. McBride is to review the USB thumb drive for information related to the suspected crime and potential meeting with the suspect. Please report on the following information: • Where is the suspect meeting his contact? • Who is the contact at the meeting? • Provide the name of the item to be ordered. • What are the names of the plans being stolen? • What website are the plans stolen from? • What software does it appear the suspect has been using to duplicate the original plans?

Summary of Findings

During the investigation, pertinent information such as password encryption and hidden files were obtained and reported in the analysis section of this report.

Evidence

Table 1 outlines the evidence items of this case.

Description	Designation	Filename	MD5 Hash
Evidence	Working	USB.001	13f2b3f7bdb9dd568d53e9b429ca0e1b
Created	Copy		
Supplemental	Text File	USB.001	N/A
Files			

Table 1: Case evidence items

Collection and Analysis

Collection

The USB drive that was captured during the raid was investigated and the findings are within the analysis section below.

Analysis


During the investigation, a text document named USB.001 was investigated. This file displayed information such as device info, physical drive information, computed hashes, image information and image verification results as displayed in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1: DEVICE INFORMATION

```
USB.001 - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.2.0
Case Information:
Acquired using: ADI3.1.2.0
Case Number: L16-0500
Evidence Number: 1
Unique description: 1GB USB
Examiner: Agent James Parker
Notes:
Information for I:\CF3\USB:
Physical Evidentiary Item (Source) Information:
[Device Info]
 Source Type: Physical
[Drive Geometry]
 Cylinders: 122
 Tracks per Cylinder: 255
 Sectors per Track: 63
 Bytes per Sector: 512
 Sector Count: 1,968,128
[Physical Drive Information]
 Drive Model: Flash USB Disk USB Device
 Drive Serial Number: 3727016BD9D2A70228597
 Drive Interface Type: USB
 Removable drive: True
 Source data size: 961 MB
 Sector count:
                  1968128
[Computed Hashes]
 MD5 checksum: 13f2b3f7bdb9dd568d53e9b429ca0e1b
 SHA1 checksum: cd1abfcb5fc30fce6c830c356bce4b7bdda20141
Image Information:
 Acquisition started: Sat Dec 03 17:31:09 2016
 Acquisition finished: Sat Dec 03 17:36:08 2016
 Segment list:
  I:\CF3\USB.001
Image Verification Results:
 Verification started: Sat Dec 03 17:36:09 2016
 Verification finished: Sat Dec 03 17:36:13 2016
 MD5 checksum: 13f2b3f7bdb9dd568d53e9b429ca0e1b : verified SHA1 checksum: cd1abfcb5fc30fce6c830c356bce4b7bdda20141 : verified
```


The AccessData FTK Imager software was used to open the USB.001 file that displayed system information. While using FTK Imager the root folder displayed a text file named Alice opens doors.txt with a message as displayed in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2: TEXT FILE MESSAGE




Further investigation in the root file displayed a file named White_Rabbit_Extended.wav which is congruent to the text file message as displayed in Figure 3.

FIGURE 3: WAV FILE



The wav file was then exported from FTK Imager, saved within the Windows document folder and inputted into the DeepSound software to be investigated which displayed that a password was need displayed in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4: DEEPSOUND SOFTWARE WITH A PASSWORD NEEDED TO OPEN WAV FILE



With constructive thinking the password Alice was successful with opening the wav file and revealed a .docx file as well as a .zip file as displayed in Figure 5.





FIGURE 5: REVEALED FILES WITHIN WAV FILE


The Tinker_TailorS.docx file was password encrypted. Further investigation in FTK revealed a folder named Checked Items and revealed a sqlite file named places as displayed in Figure 6.

FIGURE 6: PLACES SQLITE FILE



The places sqlite file was investigated using SQLite Studio and displayed a folder named moz_places. By searching the term password in the search bar, revealed two passwords displayed in Figure 7.

FIGURE 7: PASSWORD



The password Wond3rL4nd was used for the Tinker_TailorS.docx file and revealed the following message displayed in Figure 8.

FIGURE 8: TINKER TAILOR DOCUMENT


Instructions for the exchange

Meet at 43°06′12.20″N 75°13′39.35″W

Order the first wine on the list and wait for the contact (pastry chef) at the table


The plans zip file was also password encrypted and revealed 5 different file formats as displayed in Figure 9.

FIGURE 9: PLANS ZIP FOLDER




Further investigation using FTK Imager revealed a Dictionary txt file within the root folder displayed in Figure 10.

FIGURE 10: DICTIONARY TEXT FILE



The Dictionary text file will be used as a custom dictionary using PRTK to decrypt the plans.zip file. This process displayed the password Ta1l0r as displayed in Figure 11.

FIGURE 11: PLANS.ZIP PASSWORD IN PRTK




This password was used to decrypt the plans.zip file. When opening the files in the Plans folder, the files were unable to either open or read. Using HexEditor revealed that the files were PNG files because of the starting header of 89 50 4E 47 as displayed in Figure 12.

FIGURE 12: PLANS FOLDER DOCUMENT HEADERS USING HEXEDITOR




This validated that the files were not either a .doc, .exe, .xls, .zip or .ppt as previously displayed in Figure 9. Each file was then copied in the Plans folder and renamed with the file extension .png as displayed in Figure 13.

FIGURE 13: REFORMATTED FILES




IranView was used to open the all five reformatted files and displayed five different home floor plans displayed in Figure 14.


FIGURE 14: FLOOR PLAN COMPILATION USING IRANVIEW



1.png




2.png



3.png



4.png




5.png

REQUEST ANSWERS

The obtained latitude and longitude information obtained from the Tinker_TailorS.docx file was used to find where the suspect is meeting his contact displayed in Figure 15.

FIGURE 15: MEETING LOCATION



By inputting the address in Google Maps revealed the name of the meeting place which is The Tailor & The Cook displayed in Figure 16.


FIGURE 16: GOOGLE MAPS MEETING PLACE LOCATION



94 Genesse Street, Utica NY, 13502

The contact of the meeting was revealed in the Tinker_TailorS.docx file which is the pastry chef at The Tailor & The Cook as displayed in Figure 8. The item being ordered was revealed in the Tinker_TailorS.docx file in Figure 8 which was obtained by going to The Tailor & The Cook website found at URL http://thetailorandthecook.com/menu. This website revealed a beverage menu which was clicked and displayed multiple wine options and displayed the first wine item to be ordered named 2016 ANTHONY ROAD PINOT GRIS displayed in Figure 17.


FIGURE 17: WINE MENU OPTIONS



The names of the plans being stolen as displayed in Figure 14:
Amara House - Archival Design - First Floor Plan
Austin River House - First Floor Plan
St. Catherine's House Plan - First Floor
Medinah House Plan - First Floor
Old Wesley House Plan - First Floor

Possible other floor plans being stolen were found in the places database under the moz_places folder using SQLite Studio displayed in Figure 18.


FIGURE 18: MORE POSSIBLE FLOOR PLANS BEING STOLEN



The website that the floor plans are being stolen from is www.archivaldesigns.com.

The software that suspect appears to be using to duplicate the floor plans is called Chief Architect Software. This was found using SQLite in the places database under the moz_places folder by searching software as displayed in Figure 19.

FIGURE 19: SUSPECTS SOFTWARE USED FOR DUPLICATION OF FLOOR PLANS



Conclusion

The requested information was obtained and documented in this report by the examiner. Using tools such as FTK Imager, FTK, IranView, SQLite and HexEditor contributed to successful findings which should lead to a successful criminal conviction of the suspect being considered.