# TOMORROW, TOMORROW,

Cerner code Learning Lab 2017




## Understanding OAuth Background & Tutorial based on Sync for Science

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## SMART on FHIR®© – Open Platform Architecture













**Your** system here.

## Use-Case-o-matic Pick one from each row!

**User** *clinician*, patient, none

**Start from** *EHR*, portal, *none* 


Access patient, population

**Duration** *brief*, long-term

Architecture confidential, public




## OAuth 2 shines at "access delegation"





EHR, Hospital, Clinic, HIE, Lab, Insurer, etc.



User


Authorize



App

Decision support, visualization, eRx, pop health, etc.


## OAuth 2 also supports "2-legged" auth



#### **Data Holder**

EHR, Hospital, Clinic, HIE, Lab, Insurer, etc.







#### App

Decision support, visualization, eRx, pop health, etc.

## OAuth 2: Two examples!

Static HTML5 + JavaScript app (Easy to write, host...)
iOS app

[register with the EHR]
authorize to read one patient's record
get access token
access protected FHIR resources

## OAuth 2: The abstract process

#### 1.2. Protocol Flow




Figure 1: Abstract Protocol Flow

[Register]

**Authorize** 

Get token

**Access resources** 

## OAuth 2 is a "framework" :-/

Yes, spec can be **abstract**But also provides new, helpful structures...

- Access scope (a live negotiation)
- Public vs. confidential clients (e.g. web vs native)
- Specialized *flows* (for different use cases)

## Access scope (a live negotiation)

- 1. Client asks for set (a) of scopes
- 2. Authorization granted with set (b) of scopes Note: (a) and (b) can differ!

Let's look at some examples...

facebook, google drive, salesforce

## Lessons about scopes

## Scopes are independent, not composable

e.g. "read write documents" is three scopes, not one

## Granularity is critical

e.g. read all my files, or contact all my friends can be too broad

## Scopes are often implicit based on user

**e.g.** https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive.readonly in my account vs. yours

## Patient-specific apps, small scopes

## Cardiac Risk app can ask for:

patient/Patient.read
patient/Observation.read

## More complex Diabetes Monograph app:

patient/\*.read

## An e-prescribing decision support tool:

patient/MedicationRequest.write

## Population-level apps, broad scopes

"Three-legged" use case

duling app

user / npp--

user/Appointment.write

"Two-legged" use case

rs incoming lab observations

system/UDServacion.read

system/Alert.write

Question: population-level scopes limited by some principal?

- User? The app itself?
- (Allows separation of "done by" vs. "on behalf of"...)

## Public vs. confidential clients

```
.....%R}!.h$......%J}!.h%.....
000023DC
                                              00 00 00 E9
                                                          AO FD FF FF
                                                                       FF 25 4A 7D
                                                                                   21 00 68 25
                                                                                                00 00 00 E9
00002400
                                              80 FD FF FF
                                                          FF 25 3A 7D 21 00 68 27
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                                                    77 65
                                                           30 66 39 6A
                                                                       77 65 6E 38
                                                                                                67 39 77 61
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                                                                                                           10 F9 FF FF
```

### Public vs. confidential clients

OAuth 2 explicitly classifies clients by:

Can you guard a client\_secret?

→ Different security considerations apply.

## **Public client**

#### Send user to

```
http://ehr/authorize?
  client_id=123&
  redirect_uri=https://hack.me
```

Anyone can construct this URL, and get token without (or with unprotected) client\_secret

→ Dangerous Practice


## Specialized grant flows (three-legged)

#### **Authorization Code**

For confidential and public clients

#### Two steps:

- 1. authorize  $\rightarrow$  code
- 2. exchange code  $\rightarrow$  token



## Specialized grant flows (two legged)

### Client Credentials

- When a client is acting "on its own behalf"
- Trades client\_secret for a scoped access token
- Better than protecting resources with client\_secret!
- Similar to 2-legged OA1 PLAINTEXT

NB: other grants exist in OA2 core + extensions

## **Security Principle:**

User-facing apps (web, mobile, etc.) should use 3-legged OAuth + redirects

#### Not two-legged auth

EHR can ensure user is signed in

Access tokens map reliably to users

#### Not three-legged with client password grant

2-factor auth, different sign-in requirements

## **Entering Authorization flow from EHR**

## Starting from an EHR session URL-based context-passing

#### **General launch parameters**

```
[launch-url]?
  iss=https://fhir-api.smartplatforms.org&
  launch=some-opaque-context-id
```

Then app trades some-context-id for full launch context.

## **Entering Authorization flow from app**

Key idea: re-use the machinery above.

- 1. App redirects to EHR's "authorize" URL
- 2. App declares required context e.g. "launch/patient launch/encounter"
- 3. EHR "gathers" context as needed e.g. user picks patient if needed
- 4. EHR redirects to app's launch URL

## Adding on User Authentication

#### For example, via OIDC


```
"sub": "248289761001",
    "profile": "Practitioner/123"
}
```

```
OIDC claim → FHIR Resource
"fhir_resource": "/Practitioner/456"
```

#### Allows signed token (JWT) with details like

- NPI
- Specialty
- Clinical Role

## Questions Demo Discussion



#### S4S Platform - Supporting research, but not just research



#### **Medical Research**





Person-Centered Apps

#### **Consumer Health-Related**









#### Sync for Science

Patients exercising their HIPAA rights to share their health data as they choose

Provider Systems

EHR Aggregator Patient Portals


Payor Systems

**Imaging Systems** 

Lab Systems

#### **S4S Test Suite – Verifying EHR Compliance with S4S**





103 scenarios passed, 0 failed, 13 skipped, 7 warning	ıs		
378 steps passed, 7 failed, 59 skipped			
Coding systems			
System	Count	Errors	Recognized
http://loinc.org	94	0	✓
http://hl7.org/fhir/observation-category	47	0	✓
urn:oid:1.2.840.114350.1.13.0.1.7.4.798268.8600	18	0	×
urn:oid:1.2.840.114350.1.13.0.1.7.4.698288.330	18	0	×
http://snomed.info/sct	13	0	✓
urn:oid:1.2.840.114350.1.13.0.1.7.2.657369	10	0	×
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/rxnorm	9	0	✓
http://argonautwiki.hl7.org/extension-codes	7	0	×
urn:oid:2.16.840.1.113883.6.90	6	0	×
http://hl7.org/fhir/condition-category	6	0	✓
http://hl7.org/fhir/sid/cvx	2	0	<b>✓</b>
http://fdasis.nlm.nih.gov	2	0	×
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/rxnorm/	2	0	×
urn:oid:1.2.840.114350.1.13.0.1.7.2.696580	1	0	×
http://www.ama-assn.org/go/cpt	1	0	✓
http://hl7.org/fhir/ValueSet/marital-status	1	0	×
2.16.840.1.113883.5.50	1	0	×
2.16.840.1.113883.5.104	1	0	×
urn:oid:2.16.840.1.113883.6.99	1	0	×
urn:oid:1.2.840.114350.1.13.0.1.7.10.768076.4030	1	0	×
urn:oid:1.2.840.114350.1.13.0.1.7.10.768076.4040	1	0	×
http://hl7.org/fhir/ndfrt	1	0	×



#### Research App - Demonstration



## SYNC FOR SCIENCE

Demonstration of patient workflow for data sharing

TRY IT

#### Sync for Science Demonstration

This demo shows how S4S helps patients share clinical data with researchers. The public-facing components are:

#### demo portal

a mock EHR "portal" where a patient can sign in and make the decision to share data with an app

#### demo app

a mock research application where the patient can share EHR data

These components are available as part of an open-source reference implementation at: https://github.com/sync-for-science/reference-stack-docker.

Demo Src

#### **Related Work**



SMART on FHIR <u>bit.ly/smart-fhir-2017</u>, <u>gallery.smarthealthit.org</u>

Argonaut Project <u>github.com/argonautproject</u>

FHIR <u>hl7.org/fhir</u>

CDS Hooks <u>cds-hooks.org</u>

SMART C-CDA Scorecard, Analysis, Samples (2013) bit.ly/ccda-webinar, jamia.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/6/1060