

Module 3: Storing and Analyzing ATT&CK® Mapped Data

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Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Public Release Case Number 23-4342

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FOR A SAFER WORLD®

Module 3 Agenda



Lesson 3.1: Storing and
Displaying ATT&CK mapped
Data



Lesson 3.2: Expressing
ATT&CK mapped Data



Lesson 3.3: Analyzing
ATT&CK mapped Data



Lesson 3.4: Compare Layers
in ATT&CK Navigator



Lesson 3.1

Storing and

Displaying

ATT&CK® Mapped

Data





Lesson 3.1 Objectives

- 1 Consider who (or what) will be consuming the mapped CTI
- 2 Identify the most effective storage platform for your environment and requirements



Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data: Considerations

Who's consuming it?

Human or machine?

What are the intelligence requirements?

How will you provide context?

How detailed will it be?

Include full text?

Just a Technique/sub-technique, or a Procedure?

How will you capture that detail?

- (Free text?) How will you link it to other CTI?
- Incident, group, campaign, indicator?

How will you import and export data?

What format will you use?



Storing and Displaying ATT&CK Mapped Data



Scheduled Task

Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system.^[1]

An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.

Contents [hide]

- 1 Examples
- 2 Mitigation
- 3 Detection
- 4 References

Scheduled Task

Scheduled Task	
Technique	
ID	T1053
Tactic	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Platform	Windows
Permissions	User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Required	
Effective	User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Permissions	
Data Sources	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Supports Remote	Yes
CAPEC ID	CAPEC-557 🔗
Contributors	Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeck, @leoloobeck, Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security

Examples

- APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled



Storing and Displaying ATT&CK Mapped Data

Tags tip:white x Unstructured x osint:source-type="technical-report" x dnc:malware-type="CoinMiner" x +

Date 2018-11-13

Threat Level Undefined

Analysis Completed

Distribution All communities ⓘ

Info OSINT: WebCobra Malware Uses Victims' Computers to Mine Cryptocurrency

Published Yes (2019-01-26 14:09:07)

#Attributes 44

First recorded change 2018-11-13 16:10:27

Last change 2018-11-13 16:10:27

Modification map

Sightings 0 (0) ↗

Galaxies

Intrusion Set Q
+ ⓘ Tropic Trooper

Attack Pattern Q
+ ⓘ Valid Accounts

+ ⓘ Rundll32 - T101

+ ⓘ Web Shell - T11

+ ⓘ Registry Run K

+ ⓘ Accessibility F

+ ⓘ DLL Side-Load

+ ⓘ Deobfuscate/D

+ ⓘ Application Wi

+ ⓘ File and Direct

+ ⓘ Process Discov

+ ⓘ Query Registry

+ ⓘ System Inform

+ ⓘ System Service

+ ⓘ Standard Crypt

+ ⓘ Remote File Co

+ ⓘ Exfiltration Ov

Threat Actor Q
- Sofacy Q ⓘ

Description The Sofacy Group (also known as APT28, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear and Sednit) is a cyber espionage group believed to have ties to the Russian government. Likely operating since 2007, the group is known to target government, military, and security organizations. It has been characterized as an advanced persistent threat.

Synonyms APT 28
APT28
Pawn Storm
Fancy Bear
Sednit
TsarTeam
TG-4127
Group-4127
STRONTIUM
Grey-Cloud

Source MISP Project

Authors Alexandre Dulaunoy
Florian Roth
Thomas Schreck
Timo Steffens
Various

Country RU

Refs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sofacy_Group



Add new cluster

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Storing and Displaying ATT&CK Mapped Data

The screenshot shows the MISP web interface. At the top, there's a search bar and navigation links. Below it, a list of indicators is displayed:

- 2018-10-16, Name: ip-port, References: 0+, Referenced by: 1+, Inherit: ✓, ID: 1234567890. This indicator has three sub-indicators: Network activity (hostname: sincirewdo.ru), Attack Pattern (Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041), and Attack Pattern (Data Encrypted - T1022).
- 2018-10-16, Network activity, ip: 46.36.220.116, Inherit: ✓, ID: 1234567890. This indicator has two sub-indicators: Attack Pattern (Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041) and Attack Pattern (Data Encrypted - T1022).
- 2018-10-16, Network activity, dst-port: 443, Inherit: ✓, ID: 1234567890. This indicator has one sub-indicator: Attack Pattern (Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041).
- 2018-10-16, External analysis, attachment, Inherit: ✓, ID: 1234567890. This indicator has one sub-indicator: Attack Pattern (Spearphishing Attachment - T1193). A screenshot of a phishing attachment is shown, featuring a fake UPS login page.

Courtesy of Alexandre Dulaunoy

Ability to link to
indicators and files



Lesson 3.1 Summary

- 1 Considered how the ATT&CK mapped data would be consumed, linked, contextualized, and imported/exported
- 2 Reviewed internal and external storage platform options for your environment and requirements



Lesson 3.2

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK® Mapped Data



Lesson 3.2 Objectives

1 Review methods for expressing and storing mapped-data

2 Identify the most effective approach for your environment and requirements



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Who Is Calling? CDRThief Targets Linux VoIP Softswitches

(published: September 10, 2020)

A new malware named “CDRThief” has been identified by ESET researchers. Targeting VoIP softswitches Linknat VOS2009 and VOS3000, the malware exfiltrates call data such as caller, call duration, call fee, callee IP address among other information. The call information is stolen from an internal MySQL database which is accessed using credentials taken from the softswitch config files. While the passwords are encrypted, CDRThief is able to decrypt them for use.

MITRE ATT&CK: [\[MITRE ATT&CK\] Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027](#) | [\[MITRE ATT&CK\] System Information Discovery - T1082](#) | [\[MITRE ATT&CK\] Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041](#)

Techniques at the end of a report

ANOMALI



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Techniques at the end of a report

Analyzing Operation GhostSecret: Attack Seeks to Steal Data Worldwide

MITRE ATT&CK techniques



- Exfiltration over control server channel: data is exfiltrated over the control server channel using a custom protocol
- Commonly used port: the attackers used common ports such as port 443 for control server communications
- Service execution: registers the implant as a service on the victim's machine
- Automated collection: the implant automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server
- Data from local system: local system is discovered and data is gathered
- Process discovery: implants can list processes running on the system
- System time discovery: part of the data reconnaissance method, the system time is also sent to the control server
- File deletion: malware can wipe files indicated by the attacker



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Growing Tensions Between U.S., DPRK Coincide with Higher Rate of CHOLLIMA Activity

Techniques Observed

- Persistence: New Service
- Defense Evasion: Masquerading
- Discovery: System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, File and Directory Discovery
- Command and Control

Techniques at the beginning of a report



CROWDSTRIKE

Consistent with reporting trends across the community, OverWatch saw an increase in threat activity attributed to North Korea in 2017. For example, in mid-May, STARDUST CHOLLIMA actors exploited a web-facing SMB server belonging to a high-profile research institution located in the U.S. They leveraged access to install the following malicious DLL:

<https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2018-crowdstrike-global-threat-report-blurring-the-lines-between-statecraft-and-tradecraft/>

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data



In-text
Techniques
in a report



Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

Original release date: February 18, 2020 | Last revised: July 16, 2020

Print

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Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) encourages asset owner operators across all critical infrastructure sectors to review the below threat actor techniques and ensure the corresponding mitigations are applied.

CISA responded to a cyberattack affecting control and communication assets on the operational technology (OT) network of a natural gas compression facility. A cyber threat actor used a *Spearphishing Link* [T1192] to obtain initial access to the organization's information technology (IT) network before pivoting to its OT network. The threat actor then deployed commodity ransomware to *Encrypt Data for Impact* [T1486] on both networks. Specific assets experiencing a *Loss of Availability* [T826] on the OT network included human machine interfaces (HMIs), data historians, and polling servers. Impacted assets were no longer able to read and aggregate real-time operational data reported from low-level OT devices, resulting in a partial *Loss of View* [T829] for human operators. The attack did not impact any programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and at no point did the victim lose control of operations. Although the victim's emergency response plan

<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-049a>

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

digital shadows_

Mitre ATT&CK™ and the Mueller GRU Indictment:
Lessons for Organizations

Adding additional
info to an ATT&CK
technique

MITRE ATT&CK Stage



1. Initial Access

GRU Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

Trusted Relationship


Mitigation Advice

- 3rd parties, such as suppliers and partner organizations, typically have privileged access via a trusted relationship into certain environments.
- These relationships can be abused by attackers to subvert security controls and gain unauthorized access into target environments.
- Managing trusted relationships, like supply chains, is an incredibly complex topic. The NCSC (National Cyber Security Center) has an excellent overview of this challenging topic.

<https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/mitre-attck-and-the-mueller-gru-indictment-lessons-for-organizations/>



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

PLAYBOOK VIEWER	
Description	Indicator Pattern
Technique: T1064: Scripting <small>REFERENCE</small> Sysget writes a batch script in the %TEMP% folder to clean up the original files and spawning a newly written winlogon.exe executable.	[process:command_line = '@echo off :t timeout 1 for /f %%i in (\`tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq [original_executable_name]\`" ^ find /v /c "\`") do set YO=%%i if %%YO%%==4 goto :t del /F "[original_executable_path]" del /F "[tmp_file]" start /B cmd /c "[startup_winlogon.exe]" del /F "[self]" exit']

Technique: T1071: Standard Application Layer Protocol <small>REFERENCE</small>	
Description	Indicator Pattern
C2 server communicates over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header.	[domain-name:value = '2014.zzux.com']

https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Event Triggered
Execution:
Component Object
Model Hijacking

APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate `MMDeviceEnumerator` object with a payload.^{[23][11]}

<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/>

Full-Text Report

APT15 was also observed using Mimikatz to **dump credentials** and generate **Kerberos golden tickets**. This allowed the group to persist in the victim's network in the event of

ATT&CK Technique
OS Credential Dumping (T1003)

<https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/>



Lesson 3.2 Summary

- 1** Reviewed various methods and levels of detail for expressing and storing mapped-data
- 2** Examined how to identify the most effective approach for your environment and requirements



Lesson 3.3

Analyzing ATT&CK®

Mapped Data



Lesson 3.3 Objectives




- 1 Review the ATT&CK Navigator process for storing, analyzing, visualizing and exporting data in ATT&CK Navigator
- 2 Learn how to prioritize techniques and sub-techniques to inform actionable intelligence

APT28 Techniques

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Active Scanning	Acquire Infrastructure	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Account Manipulation	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Brute Force	Account Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Archive Collected Data	Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Account Access Removal	
Gather Victim Host Information	Compromise Accounts	Exploit Host Facing Application	Exploitation for Client Execution	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Credentials from Password Stores	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Audio Capture	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Destruction	
Gather Victim Identity Information	Compromise Infrastructure	External Remote Services	Inter-Process Communication	BITS Jobs	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Exploitation for Credential Access	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Automated Collection	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Data Encrypted for Impact	
Gather Victim Network Information	Develop Hardware Additions	Hardware Capabilities	Native API	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Forced Authentication	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking	Clipboard Data	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Data Manipulation	
Gather Victim Org Information	Establish Accounts	Obtain Capabilities	Phishing	Shared Modules	Create or Modify System Process	Input Capture	Cloud Service Dashboard	Remote Services	Data from Cloud Storage Object	Dynamic Resolution	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Defacement	
Phishing for Information	Replication Through Removable Media	Supply Chain Compromise	Software Deployment Tools	Create Account	Event Triggered Execution	Execution Guardrails	Cloud Service Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Data from Collection Repository	Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Disk Wipe	
Search Closed Sources	Search Open Technical Databases	Trusted Relationship	System Services	Group Policy Modification	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	File and Directory Modification	Domain Trust Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data from Collection Repository	Fallback Channels	Endpoint Denial of Service	Resource Hijacking	
Search Open Websites/Domains	Valid Accounts	User Execution	Event Triggered Execution	Hijack Execution Flow	Group Policy Modification	File and Directory Modification	Network Service Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Data from Local System	Ingress Tool Transfer	Firmware Corruption	Service Stop	
Search Victim-Owned Websites	Windows Management Instrumentation	Valid Accounts	Hijack Execution Flow	External Remote Services	Hijack Execution Flow	Group Policy Modification	Network Share Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication Material	Data from Network Shared Drive	Scheduled Transfer	Inhibit System Recovery	System Shutdown/Reboot	
Sub-techniques in collapsed view													

APT29 Techniques & Sub-techniques



Sub-techniques in expanded view

Comparing APT28 and APT29



Overlay
known gaps

APT28

APT29

Both Groups



Choose Your Layer in Navigator

The screenshot shows the MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator interface. At the top left, there is a tab labeled "new tab x" and a plus sign for creating new tabs. In the top right corner, it says "MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator". On the left side of the main content area, there is a green box containing the text "Now with domains and versions". At the bottom left, there is a speaker icon with a volume dial.

Create New Layer
Create a new empty layer

Enterprise **Mobile** **ICS**

More Options

version * Choose the version for the new layer. **Versions prior to ATT&CK v4 are not supported by Navigator v4.0.*

domain Choose a domain for the new layer.


Create

Open Existing Layer Load a layer from your computer or a URL


Create Layer from other layers Choose layers to inherit properties from

Create Customized Navigator Create a hyperlink to a customized ATT&CK Navigator

1. Create an APT28 Layer in Navigator



2. Assign a Score and Rename the Layer



3. Create a New Layer

The screenshot shows the ATT&CK Navigator interface with a dark blue header. In the top left, there's a tab labeled "APT28" with a close button ("x") and a plus sign icon. Below the header, there are four categories: "Renaissance Techniques", "Resource Development" (6 techniques), "Initial Access" (9 techniques), and "Execution" (10 techniques). A "new tab" tab is also visible.

The main content area displays a "Create New Layer" dialog box with a dark border. The dialog has two sections: "Create New Layer" and "Create a new empty layer". It includes three tabs: "Enterprise" (selected), "Mobile", and "ICS". A "More Options" button is located at the bottom of this section. Below the dialog, there are three collapsed sections: "Open Existing Layer", "Create Layer from other layers", and "Create Customized Navigator". Each section has a brief description and a collapse/expand arrow.

A green rectangular selection box highlights the "Create New Layer" dialog and the "Open Existing Layer" section below it.



4. Repeat the Process but Assign New Score

MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator

APT28 x APT29 x +

selection controls layer controls technique controls

Connnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Comm Col	Impact
0 techniques	6 techniques	9 techniques	10 techniques	18 techniques	12 techniques	37 techniques	14 techniques	25 techniques	9 techniques	17 techniques	16 techniques	13 techniques
Scanning (0/2)	Acquire Infrastructure (1/6)	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (2/8)	Account Manipulation (0/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (1/4)	Abuse Token Manipulation (0/5)	Brute Force (0/4)	Account Discovery (0/4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Archive Collected Data (0/3)	Application Layer Protocol (0/4)	Automated Exfiltration (0/1)
Victim Host Compromise (0/4)	Compromise Accounts (0/2)	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Exploit for Client Execution	BITS Jobs	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (2/12)	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Credentials from Password Stores (0/3)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Audio Capture	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits
Victim Identity Compromise (0/3)	Compromise Infrastructure (0/6)	External Remote Services	Inter-Process Communication (0/2)	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (2/12)	BITS Jobs	Exploitation for Credential Access	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Automated Collection	Clipboard Data	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (0/3)	Data Encryption for Impact
Victim Network Capabilities (0/6)	Develop Capabilities (1/4)	Hardware Additions	Native API	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Direct Volume Access	Forced Authentication	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Remote Service Session Hijacking (0/2)	Data Encoding (0/2)	Data Manipulation
Victim Org Phishing (0/4)	Establish Accounts (0/2)	Phishing (2/3)	Scheduled Task/Job (1/6)	Browser Extensions	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Execution Guardrails (0/1)	Input Capture (0/4)	Cloud Service Dashboard	Cloud Service Discovery	Data from Cloud Storage Object	Data Obfuscation (1/3)	Defacement
Eng for Capabilities (0/3)	Obtain Capabilities (0/6)	Replication Through Removable Media	Shared Modules	Compromise Client Software Binary	Create or Modify System Process (0/4)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Man-in-the-Middle (0/2)	Cloud Service Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Data from Configuration Repository (0/2)	Dynamic Resolution (0/3)	Disk Wipe
Closed Supply Chain (0/2)	Open Trusted Relationships (0/5)	Supply Chain Compromise (0/3)	System Services (0/2)	Create Account (0/3)	Create or Modify System Process (0/4)	Event Triggered Execution (2/15)	File and Directory Permissions Modification (0/2)	Domain Trust Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Data from Information Repositories (0/2)	Encrypted Channel (0/2)	Endpoint Detection of Service (0/1)
Open Trusted Domains (0/2)	Open Victim-Owned Accounts (1/4)	Trusted Relationship	User Execution (1/2)	Create or Modify System Process (0/4)	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Group Policy Modification	File and Directory Discovery	File and Directory Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (0/1)	Firmware Corruption
Victim-Owned Accounts (1/4)		Windows Management Instrumentation		Event Triggered Execution (2/15)	Group Policy Modification	Hide Artifacts (0/7)	Network Sniffing	Network Service Scanning	Cloud Service Discovery	Ingress Tool Transfer	Inhibit System Recovery	
				External Remote Services	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	OS Credential Dumping (0/8)	Network Share Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Multi-Stage Channels	Network Defense	
				Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Process Injection (0/11)	Impair Defenses (0/7)	Steal Application Access Token	Network Sniffing	Cloud Service Discovery	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Resource Hijacking	
						Indicator Removal on	Steal or Forge	Password Policy Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Service Stop	
											System Shutdown/	



5. Combine Layers & Adjust Score Colors

The screenshot shows the MITRE ATT&CK Navigator interface. On the left, a sidebar lists tabs: APT28 (selected), APT29, and new tab. The main area has a title bar "MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator".

Create New Layer Dialog:

- Create New Layer: Create a new empty layer.
- Open Existing Layer: Load a layer from your computer or a URL.
- Create Layer from other layers:
 - domain: Enterprise ATT&CK v8
 - score expression: `a+b` (highlighted with a blue box)
 - gradient: Choose which layer to import the scoring gradient from. Leave blank to initialize with the default scoring gradient.
 - coloring: Choose which layer to import manually assigned colors from. Leave blank to initialize with no colors.
 - comments: Choose which layer to import comments from. Leave blank to initialize with no comments.
 - states: Choose which layer to import enabled/disabled states from. Leave blank to initialize all to enabled.
 - filters: Choose which layer to import filters from. Leave blank to initialize with no filters.

Lateral Movement Techniques List:

- Discovery techniques
- Lateral Movement 9 techniques
- Exploitation of Remote Services (0/4) (highlighted with a red box)
- Internal Spearphishing
- Lateral Tool Transfer
- Remote Service Session Hijacking (0/2)
- Storage Object
- Data Obfuscation (2/3)
- Data from Configuration
- Dynamic

Scoring Gradient Controls:


- Tactic Row Background: show #dddddd
- Scoring Gradient:
 - Low value: #ff6666
 - remove #66b1ff
 - remove #9f0e94
 - add another color
 - High value: #333333
- presets

"Create Layer from other layers", combine the scores you have in your two layers (a,b,), and enter the expression "a + b" into the score expression field.



Set low value for 1 and high value (combined techniques) for 3

6. Expand Sub-Techniques & Export/Visualize



7. Combined Layers Visualized in SVG



Lesson 3.3 Summary



- 1 Learned how to map multiple threat groups in ATT&CK Navigator to enable analysis and identification of overlapping techniques/sub-techniques.
- 2 Examined how to prioritize techniques and sub-techniques for actionable intelligence

Lesson 3.4

Exercise 3:

Comparing Layers in ATT&CK® Navigator



Lesson 3.4 Objectives



1

Practice defining and comparing layers in
Navigator

2

Review the overlapping techniques and sub-
techniques

Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in Navigator

- Refer to the Resources section for Exercise 3
 - The techniques and sub-techniques are listed in the “APT39 and Cobalt Kitty Techniques” PDF

- 1. Open ATT&CK Navigator: <http://bit.ly/attacknav>
- 2. Enter the techniques and sub-techniques from APT39 and Cobalt Kitty/OceanLotus into separate Navigator layers with a unique score for each layer.
- 3. Combine the layers in Navigator to create a third layer
- 4. Color score your third layer
- 5. Make a list of the techniques and sub-techniques that overlap between the two groups

- Please pause. We suggest giving yourself 15 minutes for this exercise.



Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in Navigator



**APT39
Techniques/Subs**

**APT32 (OceanLotus)
Techniques/Subs**

**Overlapping
Techniques/Subs that
both groups employ**



Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in Navigator

- What are some of the overlapping techniques and sub-techniques you identified?



Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in ATT&CK Navigator

Here are the overlapping techniques between APT39 and APT32:

Phishing:Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001)

Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002)

Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059)

Scheduled Task/Job:Scheduled Task (T1053.005)

User Execution: Malicious Link(T1204.001)

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001)

Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)

Network Service Scanning (T1046)



Lesson 3.4 Summary



- 1 Worked through defining and comparing layers in Navigator process and identified the overlapping techniques and sub-techniques
- 2 Reviewed the APT32 and APT39 intersecting outcomes

Next Up:

Module 4:
Making Defensive
Recommendations from
ATT&CK® Mapped Data



End of Module 3

