FIVE

WHAT WE KNOW

We saw in the previous chapter how Dewey conceives of knowledge. We will now consider what it is that we know, in his view. Dewey maintains that when we have knowledge we never grasp facts in their pure, given state, but always construct and reorganize them to render them more idealized. We will see in this chapter how our aim in this endeavor, for Dewey, is to *know* the facts—that is, to relate them together into a systematic whole, so that each becomes intelligible. What we would like to achieve as inquirers is complete knowledge. We would like to justify an intuition we have of there being a whole world, an ordered cosmos, to which we and everything else belong and in which everything can find its place. But the full, rational justification of this intuition is a hard-won achievement, not yet attained, the desire for which drives us on to discover more and more things about the world and to organize it more adequately. As we grow in knowledge, we approximate the final state of all knowing, the achievement of a complete understanding of the universe as an interconnected whole. But we have yet to achieve this result. The ideal

of this complete understanding, however, drives us on to negate, and then to idealize, every isolated fact, placing it in an ordered system of known things. And as a result our knowledge grows, even if we have no ultimate guarantee that in the end we will know everything (EW 2:200–1; 212).

All knowledge involves idealization, in other words, and it occurs in stages. We begin, not with mind-independent facts, but with our sensations, and we try to organize these into objects, which we then try to arrange in a systematic fashion, which in turn allows us to grasp the objects (or "the facts") in their true relationships. Thus, at one stage of knowledge there are sensations that are less idealized, and at another stage there are sensations that have become more idealized, more systematically arranged, and so are more firmly known. In between these two stages are varying degrees of idealization (EW 2: 137). The different stages of knowledge, in order from less idealized to more idealized, or less systematically known to more systematically known, are "Perception, Memory, Imagination, Thinking, Intuition" (EW 2: 138).

External Objects

Perception is knowledge of particular things, or of actual objects in the world. Such objects as they occur to us in perception are 1) different from the self; 2) distinguishable from one another; and 3) out there in space (EW 2: 139–40). Dewey tries to account for these features of perception wholly in terms of the conditions of knowing that we have seen so far, and hence wholly in terms of the form of idealism that he has so far advanced.

Perceptual objects are apparently different from us and exist out there independently of us. But Dewey notes that the perceived world, contrary to our first assumption, is not entirely an external, wholly real world existing "out there." "The perceived world is more than an *existent* world; it is a world existent for the consciousness of the individual, a *known* world" (EW 2: 140). Perceptual objects are always perceptual objects *for* someone. They must, therefore, be explained on this basis. Sensations by themselves cannot account for the externality of perceived objects, because they do not tell us anything by

themselves, least of all that an existent world is there, distinct from me and my perceptions of it (EW 2: 140–41). In fact, the self has to *do* something to the sensations to make them yield an (apparently) external world of perceived objects. The self appropriates sensations and "takes them and projects them" out into a sphere of external things (EW 2: 141). The sensations of red and sweet that I experience, for example, must be held together by my knowledge of them as features of an apple, an object that I perceive to be out there in the world and that I can eat.

Dewey claims that the unity of the object, what makes it a single entity distinguishable from other objects, comes about in this way, which, as he notes, we have seen already at work (EW 2: 141). Presentative association occurs among our separate sensations and unifies them into the perception of an object along with the "redintegration" (or representative association) of previous sensations, which enlarges our understanding of what the object is there before us; attention then allows us to recognize that the unified sensations refer to an actual, specific thing, which we can use or respond to in some way based on our needs and interests (EW 2:88). The sensations of orange and round, occurring together, are associated and taken as signs (through redintegration) of something I can eat and get nourishment from (an orange), and distinguished (through dissociation) from other things I cannot (EW 2: 141).

The perception of objects in space also happens partly through our own activity; "all objects, as perceived, are projected in space, and given definite position" (EW 2: 142). Spatial relations are not presented to the mind at first; we do not have immediate knowledge of them. "If an adult lays his hand upon something he has a vague perception of space relations, while it requires movement to explore the outlines and make it definite. Infants, however, have not even such a vague perception. It is, therefore, the result of a process by which tactual sensations have become symbolic of motor" (EW 2: 143). We must learn the shape of things, learn to perceive things as spatial objects. Our perception of objects in space arises, more specifically, from the association of our movements with certain perceptions,

which we are then capable of having even when we do not move. We come to "see" the experiences associated with our experience of certain movements, which we afterwards perceive as depth and the specific arrangement of objects even when we are not moving (EW 2: 144–45).

As Dewey puts it, "to say that an object is seen to be at such a distance, means that so much muscular sensation must be had before it can be touched; to say that it is of such an outline, is to say that certain muscular and local sensations would be had if the hand were passed about it, etc." (EW 2: 144). This is George Berkeley's argument, as Dewey notes, and in its wake everything concerning spatial relations militates against materialism and stays in the realm of sensations that are constructed by the self. "According to this theory, originally propounded by Bishop Berkeley, spatial relations are not originally perceived by the eye, but are the result of the association of visual sensations with previous muscular and tactual experiences" (EW 2: 144). Dewey adds, "[T]he adult comes to *see* all that he could touch if he tried. The visual sensations immediately and instantaneously call up all the tactual perceptions which have been associated with them, so that the individual has all the benefit of his previous experiences without being obliged to repeat them, or in this case actually to touch the objects" (EW 2: 144–45).

The process occurs in the following way, at least in the case of touch, on which I will focus. From out of a mass of indistinct sensations, we first isolate specific sensations, then associate them with the experience of our movements, and thereafter "intelligence . . . interprets" these specific sensations, now associated with our experience of movement, "into spatial order" (EW 2: 142). In other words, we feel our way into spatial relations, with the help of the mind.

First, we isolate specific sensations. Suppose we had two or more tactile sensations happening at the same time. They would not by themselves tell us anything about how any objects were arranged in space. "The mere presence of simultaneous sensations . . . is not identical with perception of spatial coexistence. The mind must recognize their distinction, and construe them spatially" (EW 2: 142). We must

first distinguish the sensations from one another and then interpret them in spatial terms. The way the mind comes to understand the distinction between the two sensations is through the use of what Dewey calls a *local sign* (EW 2: 52). A local sign is a sensation, which we have come to "localize" somewhere specifically on our bodies, that results from a certain pressure on some part of the body, as well as from our own intellectual activity (EW 2: 52). We learn by contrast. Given a variety of pressures on the body, we learn to distinguish between different pressures of this kind, on different parts of the body, as an "*exercise* in discrimination" (EW 2: 52). If two different pressures are "sufficiently differentiated in quality," there will be two different experiences, or local signs, that we recognize as such because the self is able to discriminate between them, to keep them distinct, or to make them local to each sensation, based on the self's attention to the difference in quality of the sensation that is experienced (EW 2: 52). Through intellectual discrimination, we thus come to identify different experiences with different parts of our body.

But we still do not have an experience of a spatial relationship, only sensations that we make out to be separate and distinct from one another and that are therefore "kept from fusion with others" by reference to the local signs (EW 2: 143). The second thing that needs to take place is that we must associate the different local signs with the experience of our movement, so that, when we move, the "muscular sensations" we undergo are tied to different experiences of different local signs (EW 2:143). As I experience the movement of wrapping my hand around a cup, for example, different local signs will occur on my fingers and hand as I move around the cup. I associate the experience of this movement with the different local signs. The movement, in fact, gives rise to "certain fixed associations" between the local signs (EW 2: 143). The local signs thus come to be associated with these movements, but in such a way that they are coordinated, brought into one fluid experience of holding a cup, with the experience of the movement involved in rendering the cup more definite tied to the local signs that are experienced and coordinated. The cup takes on depth. Moreover, after these associations have been

fixed, even when my hand is at rest on the cup, I have acquired something like a spatial perception of the cup, because I now associate the local signs with the experience of the movement of my hand around the cup, even when I am not moving my hand.

Lastly, the mind fills out this perception and reads into the world the perception of objects in space. "Intelligence . . . interprets these local signs, through their association with muscular sensations, into spatial order" (EW 2: 142). It advances my own experience as something that is actually going on out there, my own anticipation of resulting local signs being read into the world as a perception of objects with depth.

To show how it all works, Dewey uses the example of "the infant, as his hand is at rest upon some object" (EW 2: 143). Thanks to local signs, he can experience different qualities of sensation on different parts of his hand, instead of only one massive sensation. When he moves his hand, a certain motor sensation is experienced, and this experience will alter depending on the local signs and what it takes to experience them. "It will not give the same kind of sensation to go from the little finger to the thumb as from the latter to the wrist" (EW 2: 143). These different experiences of movement will produce different local signs, but the sum of the experience of movements will gather the local signs into a coordinated relationship with the experience of the movement. The infant will eventually be able to experience the depth of the cup, even when the infant is not moving his or her hand, for the touch stands in for the movement, which was definite in the past. The mind then interprets this experience of depth as a spatial relationship existing among objects. "The perception of spatial relations is due to the association of muscular sensations with others, interpreted by the apperceptive activity of mind" (EW 2: 142).

Differentiation between "self and not-self" in spatial perception also occurs by the very activity of the processes that Dewey has so far laid out. To unify separate sensations into distinct objects and project them into space is already to jettison into the world the not-self, and to distinguish it from the self (EW 2: 150). Here the mind excels at its power of dissociation, which becomes uppermost (EW 2: 151). The

reason this occurs is to be found in the will. Only by the exertion of muscular movements (occasioned by the will) can the unified objects become projected into space. And indeed it is only through such acts of will that we can distinguish subjective from objective sensations at all—as when, to tell if an object on the wall we sense as red really is red, we move our eyes and bodies to see if it stays red under varying circumstances. If the object stays red, it is objectively red; if its color alters, it is subjectively red (EW 2: 151). "Were there no will to originate these movements, there is no reason to believe that we should ever come to distinguish sensations as objective or referred to things, or as subjective, referred to the organism" (EW 2: 151). There would be no distinction between self and not-self, but only one unified, fuzzy, massive sensation. There would be no perception of objects. But precisely because of my activities, the perception alters; and I am able to perceive certain objects as being out there in a more real and enduring fashion, and others as originating more from my own subjective states.

Knowledge of the Past

Memory is the next stage of knowledge. Perception alone cannot be complete knowledge, because it supplies us with awareness only of particular things here and now, and there is more to what can be known than this. We can also know the past. Said another way, we can have "*knowledge of particular things or events once present, but no longer so*" (EW 2: 154; italics in original). But how do we do this? Just because we have had the experience, it does not follow that we would still have it and remember it. For the experience is gone; it exists no more (EW 2: 155). The answer is that the mind must actively assemble the past experience.

> Memory is not a passive process in which past experiences thrust themselves upon the mind, any more than perception is one where present experiences impress themselves. It is a process of construction. In fact it involves more of constructive activity than perception. In perception the objects, at all events, do exist before

> the perception construes them [that is, they do refer to some sensations that are occasioned by some actual external movements]. In memory they do not. Our past experiences are gone just as much as the time in which they occurred. They have no existence until the mind reconstructs them. (EW 2: 155)

In memory, the mind's idealization of things becomes even greater than in perception, for the remembered object exists entirely in the mind and through the mind's construction. The remembered object has no actual existence, although it may correspond to a particular thing or event that *did* once have existence.

To see that the object in this case is entirely ideal, the product of the mind's constructive activity, consider that association alone cannot account for it. At best, association will give us "the *presence* of the object" (EW 2: 156). But we must also be able to "*re-cognize*" the object as having been "a previous" part "of our experience," and so we must situate it in terms of "temporal" relations: "the mind must actively take hold of the idea and project it into time, just as in perceiving it takes hold of the sensation and projects it into space" (EW 2: 156).

We do this in the following ways. First, we form a mental image. This occurs primarily through association. Representative association ensures that some past object is linked up with some present object; disassociation, however, also makes manifest the differences between the present object and the past one. The image of the past object then stands out in its own right, as occasioned by the present object but distinguished from it, its own object, an image of the past event (EW 2: 158–59). Attention further allows us to focus on one such image; rather than letting association drag up random chains of past events with respect to that image, attention allows the self to recall specific moments as it needs to. This process Dewey calls *recollection* (EW 2: 160).

The image must also be related to other past experiences in succession, however, if it is to constitute a remembered object proper (EW 2: 160). We always remember an event as occurring at some specific time in relation to other events occurring at other times; we situate the event temporally. This happens, according to Dewey, primarily "through the sensation of hearing" (EW 2: 161). Sounds occur one

after the other; moreover, they are associated with muscular movements, as in rhythm (EW 2: 161). Indeed, rhythm plays a crucial role in time perception, in this account. Rhythm is so essential to human life that "all the early traditions of the race are expressed by its means," and dance, which accompanies rhythm, "may, in some way, be considered more natural than walking, which is, after all, but a more regular dance" (EW 2: 161–62). Through rhythm we acquire the rudimentary, the fundamental basis of the perception of things in time. "In rhythm every sound points, by its very structure, both to the past and future. Every part of the sound is at once a continuation of the old sound . . . and a transition from it" (EW 2: 163). This is a prelude to what happens in our perception of time: we recognize some event as "changed from some previous event, and still connected with it" (EW 2: 163–64). Moreover, in rhythm there are repetitions and changes, the sense at once of both permanence (a temporal stretch that continues) and elements that fade away (the actual moments of time that pass). The basic emergence of time can be seen in the rhythms of the hungry child: "hunger and satisfaction . . . are exceedingly different from each other, and yet one succeeds the other. They may, accordingly, form the rudiments of the perception of succession. . . . The very tendency of the child, while hungry, to recall his previous satisfaction, and to anticipate the coming one, is the beginning of the recognition of time" (EW 2: 164). We project our lived rhythms into things, and temporal succession is born. It becomes more orderly and definite when we consciously link up events with other events and speak of their relationship: which came first and which later, and so on (EW 2: 164).

Lastly, memory involves, not simply the placement of distinct events in a successive order, but also the distinction of the self from these successive events. This seems implausible at first, since one could argue that the self must actually be identified with its passing moments, but Dewey's argument is that memory involves the necessity of a self who is remembering, a self-same self in both past and present, who *has* memories, and so consequently is not to be identified fully with them. There must indeed be a present self (if there is

to be someone who has a memory), and the present self must be having a past idea (if there is to be a memory). There must be "a now and a then," and a self who is aware of the now and the then. But this means, according to Dewey, that the self must recognize itself as present both now and then—that is, as the same enduring self, who is the link connecting present and past experience (EW 2: 165). In Dewey's words, "memory requires a now and a then—the recognized difference between past and present; and this is not possible without the recognition of the difference between a self which is present both now and then, permanently present, and the idea which changes, and consequently *was then*, but is not now" (EW 2: 165). Memory requires a present self aware of itself as the enduring connecting link between present and past experience.

At this point in his argument, Dewey notes that his account of memory only confirms what he said earlier about knowledge requiring both unity and difference. Knowledge of remembered things requires the unity of all times to be part of the same time; and it requires each point of time to be its own point, different from every other point (EW 2: 166). The aim of all knowledge is "the complete unity of perfectly discriminated or definite elements" (EW 2: 151–52). For this reason, perception and memory are not everything that knowledge can be. Perception cannot be all of knowledge, because there are connections between things (and their unity) that exist beyond the mere grasp of immediately present things, as we see in the case of memory, for example, where a relation of a *succession* of events (and unity in succession) is also possible (EW 2: 152). Likewise, memory excludes some important relations between things, particularly the relations of the self to things, since, though in memory the sensation is more internal than in perception, yet it still wears an external aspect, excluding the self as different from the succession of events, as we have seen. With the relations of self to the world (and to itself) at a minimum, we do not have a complete picture of all the connections of things in their peculiarity. Higher stages of knowledge are therefore necessary.

Imaginary Objects

The next stage of knowledge is *imagination*. Here what is known is a particular thing, as in perception and memory, but one without any reference to actual existence, unlike in perception and memory, where some particular real event is still referenced, or may be, as in memory. Imagination, accordingly, is the grasp of a particular thing without existence, that is, existing completely in the mind (EW 2:168). As Dewey puts it, in imagination, the image gets "independent, free existence, severed from connection with some facts actually existing, or some event which has really occurred" (EW 2: 169). Through this process, the self breaks out of routine, selecting its own activities; its aims are made ends in themselves, which the self can engage in for its own purposes, in reference to nothing outside of itself. "Imagination has no external end, but its end is the free play of the various activities of the self, so as to satisfy its interests" (EW 2: 173). In imagination, the self thus gets closer to itself, at least in the sense that it becomes free to exercise itself, without reference to anything else but itself. It is freer than in other modes of thought to work upon itself and its sensations (and their relations to each other).

The imaginative process occurs in the following way. Dissociation separates the imagined object from any real existence, and attention then shapes it according to the direction of the self. "Dissociation disengages the image, and prepares it for free recombination; attention transforms into novel and unexperienced products" (EW 2: 169). Through the experience of "varying concomitants," the image gets dissociated: this happens when you experience something in so many different and varying contexts that you are able to frame an idea of the thing as such. Dewey uses as an example the idea of a man, which "occurs under so many different circumstances" that finally the idea, separated from any special spatial and temporal circumstances, occurs to you, and "thus gets an independent and ideal existence" (EW 2: 170). The image suddenly breaks out of the actual, normal round of experience and becomes an independent something.

Once isolated, the image (or imagined thing) undergoes a process of "recombination" in one of three ways. In *mechanical imagination*, some everyday, unimagined object (the result of association) is separated off from its usual circumstances and placed in some imagined setting (the result of dissociation; EW 2: 170). A writer imagines that his book is published, for example, so that he imagines himself as an accomplished author—that is, in a set of circumstances different from those he is currently in.

In our *fancy*, or *fantasy*, "the formation and connection of images is controlled by an exceedingly vivacious and receptive emotional disposition" (EW 2: 170). Here an excess of imagined content abounds, a fantasy world is created—Dewey gives the example of "A Midsummer Night's Dream" (EW 2: 170)—and everything becomes imbued with the emotions of the particular self who fantasizes. Fancy "affords keen delight," but it is "not revealing in its nature" (EW 2: 171). For this, a higher stage of imagination is required, one that does not express the emotions of the individual self, however lively and entertaining, but captures the situation and truth of all human beings.

This higher stage is *creative imagination* (EW 2: 171). In this type, the separations and recombination serve a higher purpose, giving us access to deeper meanings about ourselves. In perception and memory, the occurrence of meaning depends entirely on some particular existence (or its memory), but in creative imagination "existence is subordinate to meaning" (EW 2: 172). Everything is about the meaning that can be revealed; the sensations are made to exist solely for this purpose. Here meaning develops into something far exceeding the bare connections of sensations, one with the other. In terms of form, the sensations now exist in such a way that all the parts fit into one whole, and the whole is in the parts. No part is introduced without meaning something in the totality of what appears, and no whole is devoid of its appropriate parts (EW 2: 171). In terms of content, imagination when it is creative takes on monumental proportions—meanings far transcend our sensations and tell us something that everyone needs to hear. Creative imagination has, in fact, a universal component, as Dewey sees it. "It sets the idea of memory or

perception free from its particular accidental accompaniments, and reveals it in its universal nature,'' so that others may experience it as well (EW 2:172).

Of course, creative imagination can pertain to one's own peculiar interests as well, as when its meanings are subordinate to ''the individual and peculiar tastes and experiences of their authors'' (EW 2: 174). But this risks becoming fancy, and in any case it is ''ephemeral,'' passing in significance as the generations pass, or else ''morbid and unhealthy,'' too involved in the life of a narrow self (EW 2: 173). And here we find the first expression of a theme that is subtly at work throughout the *Psychology*: the theme of unhealthiness (and its equally important opposite, healthiness). This theme will appear again and again in the book, especially in the section on feelings. It reveals a core interest of Dewey's—how to remain healthy, steadfast, and alive. In this first manifestation, Dewey uses the concept of unhealthiness to identify an improper use of the creative imagination. He says, ''The product of the imagination may also be the result of morbid and unhealthy feeling. It then falls into what Ruskin has well named 'the pathetic fallacy' '' (EW 2: 173). In this misuse of the creative imagination, the artist's personal state is read into nature, as when ''the hero attributes his own feelings to the rose and the lily'' (EW 2: 173). This is morbid and unhealthy because it treats the individual self as so important, so infused with meaning, that nature must answer in response; indeed nature must become the self. Said another way, the individual, with all of his peculiarities, is taken as the main principle of things, regardless of his *actual* connections to others and to nature. This is a kind of sickness—a kind of narcissism, if not megalomania. The individual is actually set apart from nature and from others, made to stand on his own, as his own peculiar, isolated, completely distinct self. We have here the first example of the unhealthy, modernist type of self that Dewey will later make the object of intense criticism, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter 7.

The healthy use of the imagination, on the other hand, is the expression of what is ''true'' and of interest to all human beings. ''The poem of Homer, the art of Michael Angelo, and the drama of

Shakespeare are true to the universal side of humanity, not to the individual and peculiar tastes and experiences of their authors" (EW 2: 174). These works demonstrate the "fundamental unity between man and man and between man and nature" (EW 2: 174). If this unity were not expressed in imagination, imagination would be completely idiosyncratic, nothing more than "unreal and fantastic" (EW 2: 174). But it is not so: imagination is deep. It can give us insight into how we should think of ourselves as human beings, namely as connected both with other people—possessing a "unified life of humanity, with common interests, in spite of separation of time and space"—and with nature—finding ourselves "in some way in nature" (EW 2: 174). "Not all identification . . . with nature" is unhealthy, only that kind which puffs up the individual self and his emotions to the point of being everything. In fact, we can find "joy" in nature, "in the degree in which we find ourselves therein, and are able to identify the workings of our spirit with those of nature" (EW 2: 174). In such cases, as in the poetry of Wordsworth, "we do not find ourselves in a strange, unfamiliar land" (EW 2: 174).

With this quote, we can see clearly where Dewey's true intentions lie. They lie in his effort to confront and combat modernism and the pessimistic philosophy that defines it. For the unhealthy and pathetic use of the imagination that Dewey identifies here is one with the modernist tradition that we have seen at work in the early Dewey's day. It is man separated from nature and from other men. And similarly, the healthy use of imagination that Dewey here insists upon is one that finds a connection between man and nature and between man and other men. In other words, healthy imagination must show that reality is conducive to the "workings of our spirit" and that we are not alien and foreign beings within reality, but are at home within it and among one another (EW 2: 174). Healthy imagination reveals the goal of all knowledge: the "fundamental unity between man and man and between man and nature" (EW 2: 174).

In these few revealing comments, we have the whole of Dewey's effort in the *Psychology* laid bare. This is the same language Dewey uses in "Poetry and Philosophy" when he praises Browning's poetry

for its "realization that the world was made for man, and that man was made for man" (EW3: 120). In the language of "The Present Position of Logical Theory," the *Psychology* must show that facts are consistent with thoughts or meanings.

Dewey goes on in the *Psychology* to discuss the other uses of creative imagination, the *practical* and the *theoretical* (EW 2: 174). The practical use of imagination results in inventions, while the theoretical use results in scientific creations, the more so "as it advances . . . for it recedes further from the sphere of that which is sensuously present to the realm of hidden, ideal significance and meaning, while it is constantly necessary to body these ideas in concrete forms" (EW 2: 175). A scientific model of a geographical feature, for example, can tell us much more about the feature than our simple, unthinking perception of it can. By becoming more abstract in our grasp of a concrete feature, we can gain more knowledge about it. In any case, we can see how the early Dewey's epistemology is developing. We are moving from knowledge that is less ideal to knowledge that is more ideal. That is, we are moving from things we know (objects in the world) that embody human meanings and aspiration to a lesser extent, to things that *embody them more*, things that are more systematic and idealized, more rich and deep than bare facts alone. We are watching the early Dewey's deepest intuition—"'*How the world is made for each of us!*'" (EW 3: 120)—become progressively justified in philosophical terms.

With imagination, we have reached a stage between perception and memory and the next stage of knowledge, which is thinking. In both perception and memory, particular objects—that is, objects that are not the self—still function in knowledge to a great extent. In thinking, as we will see, the universal is the sole focus and reality. Imagination accounts for the transition from perception and memory to thinking by involving the grasp of a particular thing that nonetheless embodies an ideal—that is, by being of a particular thing (say, a horse), but without actual existence, with wholly ideal or imaginative existence. Like acid that eats away at the necessities of actual existence, the imagination "dissolves this ideal element out of its hard concretion in the sphere of actual particular fact, and sets it before

the mind as an independent element, with which the mind may freely work" (EW 2: 175).

Things Thought Of

Thinking, as Dewey understands the term, denotes the mind's involvement with the universal as such. Through this process, the mind gains a higher knowledge—a knowledge of things not considered as this or that particular fact, but in their universal relations to other things. This is not to say that the mind disregards the facts and considers only abstractions. On the contrary, the idea here is that, in grasping the universal meaning and import of the facts, the mind encompasses and explains the facts, giving them a richer meaning even as the facts render thought's universalizations more definite (EW 2: 177–78).

It should be kept in mind in this discussion that thought, thus defined, is ideal; it provides meanings to the facts, which otherwise, as isolated particulars, devoid of any relations, lack all meaning. Thought takes up the fact, which has already been constructed out of sensations into a perceived object and its relationships with other objects, grasps what is universal about it, and relates the universalized content to other universalized contents with which it is familiar. In this, thought brings out what is truly involved in the fact, which the fact by itself, in its bare existence as a fact, cannot tell us (EW 2: 177–78).

Indeed, since the self supplies the universal content and relations by which all given facts are compared, Dewey develops the following conception of truth: "a judgment is called true when it harmonizes with all other judgments; false when it is in contradiction to some other" (EW 2: 189). The early Dewey has, in effect, developed a version of the coherence theory of truth. "The mind always tests the truth of any supposed fact," he says, "by comparing it to the acquired system of truth" (EW 2: 190). This view serves Dewey's idealism well, since it removes the fact from its own self-standing authority and gives the force of truth to the self that knows the fact. As we have seen, too, even the fact of a sensation is never given in itself, since it is only a product of the self's activity

as well, namely its power of dissociation and its ability thereby to render some sensations isolated from others. The fact itself, in effect, is already ideal, so that, in Dewey's view, we are again far removed from any wholly external fact determining what is in the mind (since the fact is the result of the mind's distinguishing activity), let alone what is true about the fact (since the mind supplies the relations relative to which the fact harmonizes or not with our previous judgments, and is thus rendered true or not).

Let us look more closely at Dewey's account of how thinking is supposed to work. Thinking has four aspects: "conceptualization," "judgment," "reasoning," and "systematization" (EW 2: 178–79; 201–02). *Conception* is the process of abstracting what is universal about a presentation, that is, the attainment of "some law or principle in accordance with which a thing or number of things may be constructed" (EW 2: 179). I will use Dewey's own example: the concept of a man. "To think man," he says, "is to apprehend that universal element of ideal significance which constitutes a man wherever and whenever he is found" (EW 2: 178). When I form this concept, through the powers of attention, I notice what is "common to all men," at the same time bringing various actual men under the concept (EW 2: 177–78). Conception is thus a matter of analysis and synthesis, the picking out of some abstract feature to focus on, thus universalizing it, and the comparison of this with actual instances of the principle, thus giving the universalized feature concrete specificity of meaning as well. The universal concept thereby grows "more definite," Dewey says, and the particular thing is enriched by noting its universal similarities to other instances of its type. Conception is thus "the recognition of a one comprehending many differences" (EW 2: 182).

It is through language that the universality of concepts is applied to actual cases. A name is universal, while the thing named is particular. Language completes the conception, indeed makes it possible, by getting the universal "projected into real existence" (EW 2: 186).

Language takes the form of *judgments*; or rather, the mind's activity of forming judgments finds expression in language. When we

form a judgment, we are explicitly applying a concept to existence. "Judgment may be defined as *the express reference of the idea or universal element to reality, the particular element*" (EW 2: 186, emphasis in the original). We are making a claim about reality. We are saying that some universal element—some concept—applies to it. We always do this in two ways, both by forming a judgment in which we apply a predicate to a subject (applying some ideal to a real) and by asserting that some predicate or general class of things contains a subject as one of its members (subsuming some real under an ideal). Again to use one of Dewey's examples, "when I say that 'a lion is a quadruped,' the judgment states one element of the meaning of lion, the idea of fourfootedness, and it also includes the lion in the class or number of objects called quadrupeds" (EW 2: 187). In the former case, we "idealize a real thing, by stating its meaning"; in the later case, we "realize an idea by asserting that it is one of the universe of objects" (EW 2: 187). Ideals are involved in any case, getting reference to real things through the process of judgments.

The connecting of real and ideal is at work in every activity of mind. There is always at work in our mental activities a process of connecting meaning and existence, since the mind, as we saw, contains both apperceptive, idealizing powers and reference to some actual sensations, and works up their unity of relationships (EW 2: 187). Judgment is simply this normal mental process itself, when recognized and made explicit in our minds. It is going on when we perceive, and remember, and so on. "Perception is a judgment of place; memory, a judgment of time; imagination, a judgment of ideal worth" (EW 2: 187–88). We exercise focused judgment when we explicitly direct our minds toward the assertion of some concept applying to reality, but in any case "the typical act of intelligence" by the mind is judgment-forming (EW 2: 187). The mind makes judgments; this is how it gets connected to actual things, that is, how its meanings inform and structure its sensations.

Judgments may be analytic or synthetic. And Dewey thinks that every judgment actually contains both aspects, not that the analytic and the synthetic form two distinct sorts of judgments. They are two

different moments of "the same judgment" (EW 2: 188). To say that a judgment is synthetic is to say that in the mind the power of identity is uppermost: If I say, for example, that "a hog is a pachyderm," what happens is that "I identify both ideas; I form a connection or synthesis" between the two ideas (EW 2: 188). In this case, I enlarge my conception of the meaning of "hog" by identifying it with another conception. A synthetic judgment "enriches the conception by some new meaning, or refers it to some reality to which it had not been previously referred" (EW 2: 188). To say that a judgment is analytic is to say that in the mind the power of differing is uppermost. We can see this, Dewey holds, when we realize that "there can be no judgment where there is only one idea. A judgment involves duality. No one, except a formal logician, ever makes an identical judgment only. When we say, 'a man's a man,' we still imply difference. We mean that, in spite of all differences of rank, wealth, education, etc., every man *is distinguished* by the possession of manhood" (EW 2: 188–89). In this case, we are rendering two different meanings, even though they are expressed as one: we are breaking them apart into two different senses. To return to Dewey's previous example of a synthetic judgment, "a hog is a pachyderm" (EW 2: 188), consider that in this case, too, the judgment is also analytic, in that we intend to express a difference between the two concepts. For here the two concepts, "hog" and "pachyderm," do seem different, since one presents the creature from an everyday perspective and the other presents it from a more technical scientific perspective, presenting a meaning distinct from the common meaning of the word *hog*. Once again, the point Dewey is trying to make is that the mind always both identifies and differentiates. This is how intelligence functions (EW 2:187–89).

Truth

We have seen above what Dewey claims with regard to the truth or falsity of a judgment—namely, that the test of the truth of a judgment comes in asking: Does it fit with what we already know?

> When a novel proposition is brought before the mind, intelligence views it in the light of what it already regards as true, or in the light of relations previously laid down. If the new relation coincides with the former, still more if the new one expands them, or *vice versa*, it is judged to be true; if there is irreconcilable conflict, one or the other must be false. (EW 2: 190)

Dewey stresses that there is no method for getting at the truth of any single judgment, taken by itself. There is no sure-fire way for testing any one judgment. All we can do is depend on the store of knowledge we have, and the more extensive this is, the greater the chance that we can gain knowledge of the truth of a judgment put forward (EW 2: 190). "There is no simple criterion or rule for determining truth which can be applied immediately to every judgment; the only criterion is relation to the whole body of acquired knowledge, or the acquired system of relations, so far as it is realized" (EW 2: 190).

It is worth lingering here to consider the argument for Dewey's position. Though he never explicitly states it this way, his position presupposes that we must accept some such coherence theory of truth as this because, first of all, there is nothing ever given to the mind in a pure, unidealized state to which our judgments can correspond, so we cannot rely on a correspondence theory of truth. We have already seen that even sensations do not amount to meanings simply given to the mind. They always requires the self's interpretation based on its past experience and knowledge. The sensations of orange, sweet, round, and so forth must be interpreted by me as "an orange," based on everything I know already about objects, colors, edible things, fruits, and so forth. Moreover, we have seen that all intellectual meaning consists of grasping an object in terms of its relations to other objects. It stands to reason, therefore, that a judgment will be true only insofar as it captures the object's relationships in a way that is consistent with everything else we know—that is, consistent with all of our other judgments.

Stated another way, Dewey's position amounts to this: "there is no such thing as purely *immediate* knowledge. Any cognition is dependent; that is, it is *because of* some other cognition" (EW 2: 192). There

are no fundamental, given facts of which we have immediate and certain knowledge. There is only an extensive chain of interpretations into which a fact must fit, a process of mediation in which each fact has to be interpreted and situated in reference to the system of known things in order to become itself known (EW 2:192).

Reasoning is the next aspect of thinking that Dewey considers; and, as he sees it, reasoning involves "the explicit recognition of this mediate element involved in all knowledge" (EW 2: 192). When I reason, I move from one judgment to another, trying to determine the truth of some judgment. In other words, I acknowledge in my very activity that something is the case not because of its bare existence, but because of its reference to something other than itself, to its placement in the chain of reasons, its relation to other judgments of mine. Reasoning is "consciously knowing that a thing is so *because* of, or through, its relations, its reference to something beyond its own existence" (EW 2: 192). It is a clever argument that Dewey makes here: even to reason is to admit the primacy of mediated knowledge as he defines it. There is no immediate reasoning. All reasoning, as a process involving inferences, or a movement of judgments implying one another, already establishes that knowledge is "a going beyond what is sensuously present to its connection with something else," indeed, a going beyond of any immediate known object to its connections to other known objects (EW 2: 192). And when we reason we more or less openly acknowledge this mediated property of all knowledge, whereas in perception, for example, the same mediated process occurs without our being fully aware of it, because we get lost in the apparently external aspect of the object (EW 2:192).

We start with particular sensations, which we conceptualize. Let us expand on one of Dewey's previous examples, "man." We have various sensations, particular in nature, of various aspects of various men that we then conceptualize by bringing them under the general category of "man." We form a judgment about the concept, adding a predicate to it, such as "Man is mortal." In the judgment, as we have seen, the universal and particular work together to give us knowledge. We are claiming something about man (that is, about all men, and

hence about this particular man also), namely, that man has the general property of mortality (or that mortality is a class that contains the reality of man). This judgment serves to bring meaning to the concept of man by connecting it to another concept, mortality. Again, we are far from any given, original sensation, working only in concepts or universals; and yet we have true knowledge, since we are forming a judgment about things that clearly harmonizes with previous judgments that we know to be true, namely, that every particular man is mortal; this is consistent with what we know about men, who are finite, and become unhealthy, and so forth. We arrive at this judgment, this knowledge, through a process of reasoning, and we may expand this judgment in this way as well. We may take the judgment "man is mortal," for example, and reason about it in relation to other judgments, thus:

> Man is mortal.
>
> This is a man.
>
> Therefore, this man is mortal.

We thereby gain increased knowledge of other judgments; we come to understand that this particular man is mortal. And reasoning enriches the original judgment also (EW 2: 200). As the new judgment emerges, it affects the one it was based on, since now "man is mortal" is something that we know to include this unique person as well. "Mortal" comes to mean something that includes this particular person's death; his death has become part of what it means for man to die. The new judgment fleshes out, and gives fuller meaning, to what it means for man to be mortal.

Reasoning in this way brings "a particular under a universal," which is deduction, or, when it "starts from the particular facts, and discovers in them the universal, the law, the process is one of *induction*" (EW 2: 195–96). Some individual is always reasoned about, some specific item, which then becomes "a richer object of knowledge"; it is "becoming more universal," or is "identified with other individuals under some common relation or idea," and it becomes

"more definite" as well, "for these various relations which are thus recognized are taken into it, and become part of its content; they enlarge its significance and serve to distinguish it" (EW 2: 200). Law and fact mutually reinforce each other in reasoning to produce more universal and definite knowledge.

Dewey also makes the point in this way: "Law is the *meaning* of fact; it is its universal aspect; the side that gives it relation. . . . Law, on the other hand, has no existence for us except in connection with some fact" (EW 2: 198). A law is the meaning of the fact; the fact is the existence of the law in a real case. The two are parts of the same mental process. What is known, some "concrete mental content," is therefore always "a union of universal and particular, of identity and difference, of fact and meaning, of reality and ideal significance" (EW 2: 199). In other words, to know an object is to grasp its meaning, what universal set of relations it embodies, and therefore to know it in its own specificity all the more. It is to bring this object under some general category, and therefore to know *it* with greater insight. It is to access a fact always in relation to its ideal meaning, and only thereby to know the fact. Everything thought of is "a union of universal and particular . . . of fact and meaning" (EW 2: 199). There is a universal, but it exists only in some fact. There is a fact, but it exists only in and through its universal meaning.

What follows from this is that facts never exist without meaning, just as real meanings never exist without reference to some facts (i.e., some sensations we have already idealized). Facts are, precisely, elements of knowledge that are always meaningful for us. Therefore, the given world of facts is meaningful. And so Dewey has achieved his basic purpose: to show that facts do actually germinate into meanings. They always do whenever we know an object. But if this is correct, then modernism is mistaken that facts and meanings are separate, that the world and man stand forever divided and opposed. And this, in turn, means that we are wrong to be pessimistic about this division and what it seems to say about the deadening indifference of facts, of brute matter. For in our intellectual activities—in perception, in memory, in imagination, and especially in

thought—we are all the time grasping facts in their meaning. We are grasping meaning. And we are grasping a meaning that bears a relation to ourselves—namely, we are grasping an intelligible order to the facts that lets us understand and know them. But as we will see, this meaning that we grasp is never quite complete; the facts are not yet fully idealized. The best we can do is have faith that the universe will continue to allow this meaning to occur just as we construct it, in the shape of an intelligible order—a faith that in turn keeps us going and trying to produce more meaning and more intelligible order.

But though such unifying activity is at work in the mind when it knows, bringing facts into existence always in relation to their significance, the reasoning mind does not necessarily know this. It is fixated on the actual things reasoned about, lost in the actual reasoning, and does not reflect on the underlying import of such reasoning. To reflect on this import is the task of philosophy, "this higher development of reasoning" (EW 2: 201). When we reflect on what is going on in reasoning rather than merely reasoning, we find that, since all reasoning renders some individual both more universal and more definite, the complete state of reasoning, the aim of reasoning, is to achieve "unity in variety" (EW 2: 202). "A completely universalized or related individual, which is at the same time perfectly definite or distinct in all its relations, is . . . the end of knowledge" (EW 2: 200–01). When we reflect on reasoning and realize that, as we have seen, reasoning always gives us an individual in its universal relations, while simultaneously rendering the individual ever more particularly and definitely itself, then we see that the point of knowledge as such is to bring everything together into a system—that is, to show that "each is what it is, because of its connection with and dependence upon others" (EW 2: 201). When we know, we are trying to connect each single thing to the whole, that is, to its total relation to other things, and to understand it better and more fully therefore in its relations to these other things, in its relations to the whole.

Systematic Knowledge

This takes us to the next aspect of thinking, what Dewey calls *systematization* (EW 2: 201). Here the mind recognizes that systematic knowledge is the task of reasoning; the task becomes explicit for it. The mind realizes that knowledge is all about relations, about grasping them and the individuals that are related, and so the mind understands that knowledge presupposes a totality. The mind knows that knowledge "presupposes that there is no such thing as an isolated fact in the universe, but that all are connected with each other as members of a common whole" (EW 2: 201). We give ourselves this goal, in other words, whenever we try to know and inquire, namely to know everything together at once in all of its diverse interconnections. We postulate, as the ultimate object of our knowledge, "a true *universe*; a world which, in spite of its difference, or rather *through* its difference, is one" (EW 2: 202). It would be a world in which human beings, for example, are seen to be connected with all other things, but in such a way that each of us becomes a distinct individual in and through this connection.

Dewey is claiming in this section of the *Psychology* that to have knowledge at all is to presuppose this type of universe, in which each member is a distinct part of the whole. To try to know is to search for such a universe, if not in every particular act of knowing, at least in reflection on the task of knowing, in seeing what it is about, what its overall aims and intentions are.

Intuition

Intuition is the highest stage of knowledge. It is the actual knowledge we have of any given thing, "knowledge of an individual," where this knowledge is understood to be a product of both a concrete and universal grasp of what the thing is (EW 2: 205). The knowledge of any individual thing, we should understand by now, "involves both the identifying and the distinguishing activities" (EW 2: 205). All the previous stages of knowledge utilized such activities. Reasoning was

required to render perception more universal, and perception was required to provide something distinct to which the universal can pertain; "the union of perception and reasoning involved in every act constitutes *intuition*" (EW 2: 205). In effect, intuition, as Dewey understands it, is simply the knowledge we have of an individual—namely, that this individual is this particular instance of a universal. When I know a person, for example, I know them as this unique instance of a human being; or, conversely, as what a human being means in this unique instance.

Dewey thinks it should be clear by this point that any traditional account of intuition, as simply seeing and understanding immediately that something is the case, cannot be correct.

> Something perceived by intuition is supposed to be just what it is by virtue of its own independent existence. We are in a position to recognize that there cannot possibly be intuition of such a kind. Every act of mind involves relation; it involves dependence; it involves *mediation*. A thing as known gets its meaning by its symbolism; by what it points to beyond itself. (EW 2: 205)

Intuition, properly understood, is a grasp of the individual thing only in and through many layers of mediation. The particular person that I know, for example, is someone I have gained knowledge about because of what his particularity "points to beyond itself," that is, to all of my past dealings with him, my own interests relative to him, and also to a more universal understanding of him as a human being, someone who will die someday, someone who requires food, water, and shelter to live, and so on (conversely, of course, my knowledge of what it means for a human being to die or to need food, water, and shelter takes on more meaning and depth by pertaining to this particular unique human being and his death or his needs). When I see this particular person, I see beyond him; and only in seeing beyond him, do I really see him. This kind of "seeing" is intuition.

But if we consider, not simply our intuition of a particular person, but of "ultimate reality" itself—our knowledge of that—then we seem to have a problem (EW 2: 206). For "it is evident that this cannot be

related to anything beyond itself; it can symbolize only itself" (EW 2: 206). The solution to this problem is to see that "all dependence, all mediation, must be *within* itself" (EW 2: 206). Ultimate reality, considered something to be known, must be "self-related"; it must constitute a whole because of the differences within itself (EW 2: 206).

And we have an intuition of such a self-related whole, Dewey wants to say. For one thing, intuition is at work in all of our knowledge, as we have seen; all of it involves the universal and the particular. And what our knowledge does is make sense of things by organizing them in terms of a universal set of relations. It stands to reason that the more universal the whole, that is, the more relations of things the whole can encompass, the more it will give us knowledge of any particular thing. Perhaps the most comprehensive universal set of relations we can conceive of would be the world, which would then have to be a self-related thing, for we would never know it by pointing to something beyond it. As a vast cosmos of interconnected things, it would seem to encompass all things within itself. And we do seem to have an "intuition of the world," Dewey wants to say (EW 2:206–7).

In fact, our intuition of the world, or knowledge of the world as an individual thing, as an entity for consideration, occurs in several stages. At first we are aware of sensations, then of existence, or "that these sensations are objectified" (EW 2: 207). We then proceed to the idea of "*substance*," or the idea that these objectified sensations have a being, then to many objects in "coexistence," sequenced according to space and time, to the ideas of "force" and "motion," then to "cause and effect," and to the idea of "order," and finally to the idea of relations, and at last we arrive at the idea of one world, "the intuition of reality as a whole" (EW 2: 207–8). Dewey quotes a poem by Tennyson that exhibits this final stage of intuition about the world:

> Flower in the crannied wall,
> I pluck you out of the crannies;—
> Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
> Little flower—but if I could understand
> What you are, root and all, all in all,
> I should know what God and man is.
> (EW 2: 208–09)

The realization we come to is that all things are parts of the whole, parts of the self-same world. More importantly, "we *see* in the part the whole" (EW 2: 209). We grasp that each single element not only never stands alone but implicates all the others; that each element mirrors or reflects the whole working process of the world itself, with all of its events and history contained within it. This is the original intuition that science and philosophy then systematize and try to make more explicit and intelligible (EW 2: 209). Through this intuition, we arrive at the idea of "necessity," because we understand that all the parts of the world are interconnected and that they come to be, accordingly, only in and through what the others have been (EW 2: 209).

We then proceed to an "intuition of the self." We arrive at this intuition because, in having an intuition of the world, we are grasping a more and more intelligent organization of events—more and more of an *intellectual* meaning and order to the facts—and we come to recognize this aspect of the world. We come to recognize the intelligence of the world, its intelligent ordering, which leads to the recognition that the world's "true existence is in its relation to mind" (EW 2: 210). As Dewey puts it, quite significantly, "this intuition of the whole in a part is the recognition of *all* that the part *means*, and meaning is put into fact from the activity of the self" (EW 2: 209). Since we recognize an intelligent ordering of the world, that is, that each part means its relation to the whole, we must recognize the self at the basis of this ordering of the world, for meaning only gets into facts and their ordering from the self. So, the self must be at the basis of the world's intelligence, for nothing else could supply it (nothing else supplies intellectual meaning or ordering to facts). Especially since all relations must be self-related, taking the world by itself will not do; it cannot be the highest stage of intuition, because we then leave out one of the world's obvious and most fundamental relations, the relation it bears to the self (EW 2: 210). Hence, the self must be included in our intuition of the world, and it must be included as its basis or fundament.

We thus proceed to the ideal aspect of every individual known (and we recognize it). Normally, we only recognize intellectual meanings without seeing where they come from (EW 2: 210). In intuition of the self, however, we see where these meanings come from, namely from the "self alone." Since we realize that these meanings come from the self alone, we also arrive at "the *conception* of *freedom*" (EW 2: 211), for the meanings are seen to be coming solely from mind, without support from any other direction or force. They are a free, unsupported manifestation of the self, offered to its own sensations, and they undo our previous belief in necessity, which we had supposed was at work in the interconnection of all events of the world.

Next, and last, we proceed to the "intuition of God" or the Absolute. At this point we realize that the world, to be known, requires the self that knows it; and the self, to know, requires the world that is known (EW 2:211–12). Everything seems to work together to suggest that self and world (each a candidate for a self-related entity) in truth require one another. They must be related to one another to form the one, genuine self-related thing, given what it means to know, that is, for the ideal to become real (and the real to become ideal). The universalizing and distinguishing activities of mind would seem to assert themselves in this case also, enabling us to grasp the world as a particular entity only in relation to the universal self, and the universal self only in relation to embodiment in the actual world. Thus, Dewey asserts that "the true self-related must be the organic unity of the self and the world, of the ideal and the real, and that is what we know as God" (EW 2: 212). God or the Absolute would be "perfectly realized intelligence," the actual world regarded as totally intelligible (EW 2: 212). It would be the complete explanation, rendering every isolated fact entirely understandable to a rational mind.

But Dewey quickly reminds us that the intuition of the Absolute is mediated; it is not direct knowledge. The intuition of the Absolute, he thinks, is "the primal and the ultimate intuition," but it is still an intuition (EW 2: 212). The intuition lies at the basis of all knowledge, since all of it is an effort to fuse to the extent that we can the real and

the ideal, the particular thing and universal meaning; so we always understand, in a way, that a complete knowledge of everything is something that is possible. But this understanding, again, is an intuition; it is a belief we have. Science and philosophy have yet to demonstrate it; they exist in order to try to prove what the intuition maintains (EW 2: 209; 212). And yet, it seems, they keep coming up short, for there is an inexhaustible wealth in our intuition. "There is more truth, in short, implied in the simplest form of knowledge than can be brought out by our completest science or philosophy" (EW 2: 212). No matter how complete our knowledge has become so far, it has yet to exhaust our intuition of the Absolute. Said another way, our intuition of the Absolute, of a world that is completely intelligible, is a *belief* we have, a belief that both goes beyond what our science and philosophy currently offer, but that also inspires these activities to pursue their knowledge in the first place and to keep going to try to complete themselves.

Summary and Conclusion

Our knowledge begins with amorphous, external "motions"—an indeterminate and malleable vagueness—that engender the activities of a self. The self develops these motions into sensations, and then shapes the sensations into objects. The self then connects the objects to one another in more and more coherent ways; it does this through its own acts of perception, memory, imagination, and so on. The self also reflects on the work it is doing, the systematic world of objects in their relations that it is creating, and forms judgments about it. It then reasons about these judgments, trying to see which are true and which are false—that is, trying to determine the ways some specific objects relate to others, or pertain to one another in the self's own systematic ordering of things.

"All knowledge is thus, in a certain sense, self-knowledge" (EW 2: 126), because, in knowing, the self is only revisiting the work it has already done—throughout the ages in human culture and even in its own daily unconscious operations—to produce a unified, organized

world of objects. The self creates an ordered cosmos and then eventually recognizes its own work. In knowing the external world, the self apparently returns home to itself. It seems to find an intelligible, rational world that is conducive to itself, for it seems to find a world that it has already constructed and that is based on its own needs. When we look out at the world, therefore, we believe that we see a familiar face. We believe that we see something like a human face looking back at us.

But the self only has an intuition that it returns home to itself in this way, never immediate knowledge. We believe that reality must be capable of being fully understood (fully idealized), but this belief is a mediation, not a given fact. The intuition goads us on, and our science and philosophy try to justify the intuition. It provokes us to keep striving to know more, to seek a total, realized system of all knowledge. But the intuition of the whole is not the same thing as a fully worked-out, scientific confirmation of the whole, which is something for which we are still waiting. We think God must be there to complete the system, but the system does not yet show and demonstrate that God is there.[1]

And so, in the end, our knowledge is driven in its whole complex development by a basic intuition of the unity of the world. But this is just to say that our knowledge itself has not yet realized this unity—the intuition of it is the hidden force that keeps us producing known things, with higher and higher meanings. The intuition of the completion of knowledge is an ideal that makes possible the actual knowledge that we do possess. We seem to be moving closer to a complete grasp of the whole, all of our knowledge builds in that direction, and yet we cannot know for sure, for our science has not yet confirmed our primal intuition. We can, however, have faith that we are moving in the direction of complete understanding, for we do possess the intuition that this complete understanding is possible and our knowledge can become more and more systematic; and as a result we can reject the view that "ultimate reality is unknowable" (EW 2: 212). This faith is, in fact, a vital intellectual resource. It is this faith that the world *can* be known (that it is intelligible to us) that lies behind our

efforts to make sense of the world from the very beginning; it is this faith that compels us to try to understand things to the extent that we can, and it is this faith, therefore, that allows us to find things conducive to our understanding to the extent that we do find them to be so.