

4

The Cognitive and the Noncognitive in Dewey's Theory of Valuation

John Dewey maintained that his theory of valuation is a “special case” of his general method of inquiry¹ (Dewey 1943: 315; LW 15: 70); that valuation judgments are not marked off “methodologically” from other kinds of scientific judgments² (Dewey 1949: 77; LW 16: 357); that a “unified logical method” is needed for the solution of all problematic situations (value problems being in their general features like all other problems) (Logic: 79; LW 12: 84)³; and that “knowledge of the relations between changes which enable us to connect things as antecedents and consequences *is science*” (QC: 274; LW 4: 219), such knowledge of *relations* extending into valuational situations. The claim that methodology has logical applications to any and all kinds of subject-matters and that the study of valuational subject-matters is only a “special case” of the use of a general methodology forms the context of this paper. The hypothesis to be proved is that certain crucial problems appear in Dewey’s conception of methodology as applied to valuational subject-matters, problems that Dewey never adequately solved. It will be shown that as Dewey stated his theory of valuation and the methodology applicable to it certain consequences result that are incompatible with his intended purpose. It will be shown, further, that it is possible to construct an answer to these difficulties if other parts of Dewey’s philosophy are brought to bear upon the troublesome issues and if a certain interpretation of his theory of valuation and his general methodology as applied to it be allowed.

The role of methodology in Dewey’s philosophy appears to be a clue to his entire position (EN, LW 1: ch. 1). A complete description of his methodology would carry us beyond this study, for our concern is with those points at which methodological procedures emerge in human

First published in *Journal of Philosophy* 58 (7), 30 March 1961, 179–95. © Elizabeth Eames.

behavior and at which they are consummated. It is at these junctures in experience that the problems centering around the relation of the *cognitive* and the *noncognitive* are found. The order of development in Dewey's philosophy is from *gross qualitative experience* through *mediation* or *inquiry* and back to gross qualitative experience (*ibid.*: 36; *ibid.*: 39). There are two junctures in the process of importance to valuational theory: (1) where gross qualitative experience emerges into inquiry; and (2) where inquiry comes back to gross qualitative experience. In other words, the problems emerge where *immediacy* passes into *mediation* and again where *mediation* comes back to *immediacy*.

At the first juncture of the two phases of experience, where immediacy passes into mediation, there are crucial issues in Dewey's theory. What is the relation of the "given value" or the "qualitatively immediate value" to the "mediating" conditions that follow? Or what is the relation of antecedent reality to the consequent thought processes that follow upon it? Is valuing a discrete kind of experience such that it is completely cut off from the thought processes that follow? Is there some principle that connects these two phases of experience? If so, what is this principle? And if these two phases of experience are connected by some principle, has Dewey adequately explained it in his theory of valuation?

At the second juncture, where inquiry comes back to gross qualitative or immediate experience, there are other problems. The principal difficulty at this juncture of the two phases of experience concerns Dewey's view of the relation of mediation to existence, or the relation of the *continuum of inquiry* to the *continuum of experience*. How are the abstract relations of thought processes or discourse made applicable to existential conditions met in experience? What is the relation of the cognitive to the noncognitive, that is, the relation of inquiry to existence?

The problem of the relation of the immediate to the mediate in valuational theory comes ultimately to this question: Are the qualitatively given valuations discrete and different in kind from the mediated values that follow them? As the problem of the relation of the immediate to the mediate is one of the most crucial in modern philosophy⁴ (*Logic*: 515; *LW* 12: 508), methodological approaches to valuational theory must somehow defend whatever position is explicitly taken or implicitly assumed on the issue. In the case of Dewey's valuational theory, if he holds that valuations are discrete and completely cut off from the mediation that follows (and he admitted that he had gone too far in this direction [Dewey 1949: 75n; *LW* 16: 354n]), then he is a realist. If his theory can be read as a type of realism, then he is caught up in the problem of showing how "ideas" of value, or thought-forms employed in thinking or mediation, somehow "agree" with the antecedent reality of the valuations that are given in experience. If, on the other hand, Dewey's theory is read

in such a way that the relation of the immediate to the mediate is a matter of *degree* or *emphasis*, then it seems that he is caught between two consequences that are disturbing for his theory of valuation. He must hold either (1) that all valuings and evaluations are immediate, and thus his theory of valuation collapses into immediacy or into some form of subjectivity; or (2) that mediation, that is, inquiry, thought-forms, rational discourse, or whatever one wishes to call it, exhausts all reality, and this position means that his theory becomes some sort of idealism. I shall show that it is possible to read Dewey's theory as it now stands in either of these directions, and therefore the theory is vague and incomplete.

Dewey makes a distinction between "valuing" and "evaluation" (TV: 19–33; LW 13: 208–20), and, from the standpoint of methodology, the relation of these two phases of experience is the relation of the immediate to the mediate. Let us examine Dewey's description of the term 'valuing', the process by which valuings "pass into" evaluations, and the problems which present themselves at this first juncture of experience.

At various times Dewey assigns numerous synonyms to the term 'valuing.' In one passage, 'valuing' has as synonyms such terms as 'prizing', 'holding dear', 'honoring', 'regarding highly', 'esteeming' (TV: 5; LW 13: 195). In another passage, he lists 'prizing', 'cherishing', 'admiring', 'relishing', 'enjoying' (PM: 269; LW 15: 80).⁵ The first distinctive description of valuing may be found in what Dewey calls *qualitative immediacy*, or the bare occurrence of a value. Valuing is at first "a dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good." Bare existence and qualitative immediacy can only be "pointed at," or "denoted" in the sense in which Dewey uses that term. Discourse cannot give one the experience of these immediate qualities; it can only intimate connections which may lead one to the experience. In Dewey's account of valuings, the meaning of the term is further complicated by his description of experiences like believing in ghosts, devils, etc., as cases of qualitative immediacy. This suggests that (at least in some contexts) he probably holds that there are levels of immediacy (EN: 396–405; LW 1: 297–303).

In Dewey's view of experience, there is denoted both stability and instability, so that stable things become unstable, unsettled; and on the other hand, unstable things become stable, settled. If it were not for the former, thought would never intervene in experience; if it were not for the latter, life would be one long experience of neurosis (AE: 60f.; LW 10: 66f.). These generic traits of existence, of course, apply to the field of value. Qualitative immediacy of the things or persons prized or enjoyed becomes disrupted. The disruption is "felt" as immediate, too, and the pulsation of these feeling states *may* bring about mediation, but there is no guarantee that this will be the case (PM: 269f.; LW 15: 80f.). If values were plentiful there would be no occasion for mediation, but such

is not the case in the kind of world in which we live. Values in their immediacy are as “unstable as the forms of clouds.”

The manner in which the immediately enjoyed objects pass into mediation is not entirely clear in Dewey’s theory of valuation. Evidence for this statement is found in the cases in which he speaks of how immediacy “passes insensibly” over into mediation and in cases in which he describes a definite shock or felt difficulty. He claims that “the possession and enjoyment of goods passes insensibly and inevitably into appraisal” (EN: 398; LW 1: 298). “Passing insensibly” from conscience, taste, conviction, and enjoyment into critical judgment appears oversimplified when one considers Dewey’s description of the *problematic situation*. In his controversy with Philip Rice over theory of valuation, he held that the key word in his view is ‘situation’, and that a situation is held to be *directly and immediately qualitative* (PM: 257; LW 15: 69). In another work he describes the felt immediacy of the problematic situation as “confused, obscure, conflicting, relatively disordered qualities” (Logic: 105f.; LW 12: 109f.). Again, he says, “There is nothing intellectual or cognitive in the existence of such situations, although they are the necessary condition of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves they are precognitive” (Logic: 107; LW 12: 111). This statement shows that the gross qualitative experience that precedes inquiry, out of which inquiry arises, is noncognitive. Inquiry, or mediation, is cognitive. However, even in this statement, which may be taken to be one of the most direct Dewey ever made on the problem, there is still no consideration of the *relation* of the noncognitive to the cognitive. The foregoing quotations are taken from his general methodology; let us turn to statements of a similar nature made in his theory of valuation. A value situation is described as follows:

Valuation takes place only when there is something the matter; when there is some trouble to be done away with, some need, lack, or privation to be made good, some conflict of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions. This fact in turn proves that there is present an intellectual factor—a factor of inquiry—whenever there is valuation, for the end-in-view is formed and projected as that which, if acted upon, will supply the existing need or lack and resolve the existing conflict. (TV: 34; LW 15: 221)

Other cases of the immediately qualitative and felt valuing experiences being the stimulus to inquiry or mediation only repeat the previous point. In *The Quest for Certainty*, he says: “Without the intervention of thought, enjoyments are not values but problematic goods, becoming values when they re-issue in a changed form from intelligent behavior” (QC: 259; LW 4: 207). In another place, he says: “their unsettled or dubious state

qua value is precisely that which calls out judgment . . ." (PM: 270; LW 15: 81).

"After the first dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good, subsequent perception of the good contains at least a germ of critical reflection" (EN: 401; LW 1: 300). The crucial issue here is the meaning of the relation between the immediate and the mediate as found in the expression "contains at least a germ of critical reflection." At what point in experience does mediation occur? Again, Dewey writes: "the moment we begin to discourse about these values, to define and generalize, to make distinctions in kinds, we are passing beyond value-objects themselves; we are entering, even if only blindly, upon an inquiry into causal antecedents and causative consequents, with a view to appraising the 'real,' that is the eventual, goodness of the thing in question" (EN: 403; LW 1: 301f.). Dewey seems to be saying that when symbolic behavior enters into experience we are entering into mediation. Furthermore, he claims that when we go beyond direct occurrence, then definition and a process of discrimination imply a reflective criterion (EN: 398; LW 1: 298).

Any discussion of the problem of the relation of the immediate to mediation in Dewey's theory of valuation would be incomplete without an analysis of the distinction he makes between the "desired" and the "desirable." "The fact that something is desired only raises the *question* of its desirability; it does not settle it" (QC: 260; LW 4: 208). Another dimension must be added to the desired object to bring about its emergence into a value. This distinction is an important one for Dewey, for he claims that it is "the key to understanding the relation of values to the direction of conduct" (QC: 261; LW 4: 209). The regulation of desires in terms of the direction of conduct is what Dewey thinks separates his view from the traditional empirical views.

When the generic traits of experience, such as stability and instability, are brought into the analysis of the valuational situation, the locus of specific imbalances in valuational behavior may occur in either of two broad contexts: (1) in the organism itself, or (2) in the environment (Logic: 25f.; LW 12: 31f.). But the organism-environment constitutes one functioning unit, so the term 'locus' of the instability seems appropriate (Logic: 107; LW 12: 111).

Once this approach is made to valuational behavior, Dewey then describes at various places in his writings how the immediately felt difficulties or imbalances take place. (1) The "changes in ourselves" are not limited to the exhaustion of the organs; other organic changes may cause enjoyed objects to become unstable. When there is added to these organic changes "the external vicissitudes to which they [values] are subjected . . . there is no cause to wonder at the evanescence of

immediate goods” (EN: 399; LW 1: 299). (2) A thing enjoyed at one time may lead to disturbing consequences. (3) Enjoyment ceases to be a datum and becomes a problem. (4) The pleasing experience of an object may be a warning to look out for consequences. (5) Enjoyments may become problematic, thus arousing reflective inquiry (EN: 398f.; LW 1: 297). (6) Enjoyments provide the primary material of problems of valuation (TV: 39; LW 13: 225). (7) A desire may be questioned as to its desirability.

Dewey thinks that immediate values should be lifted out of immediacy and subjected to inquiry in order to make values secure; and he thinks the model used in the natural sciences is the pattern to adopt in the theory of valuation. Since he thinks intelligence or inquiry is the primary method of the successful management of scientific objects, it follows that this method is the one he hopes will be successful in the management of secure valuational objects (QC: 260f.; LW 4: 208f.).

The distinction Dewey has made in the foregoing analysis between the immediate and the mediate creates a serious problem for his theory of valuation. As the statement of his theory of valuation now stands, several questions arise. Is the value that arises after inquiry is instituted related to immediate valuings or is it discrete and different? If it is discrete and different, then has not Dewey the problem of showing how the *constructed* object in inquiry is related to the *antecedently given* value object? The problem centers around what Dewey calls the “immediate value-object” and the “ulterior value-object,” the “given” good and the “reflective” good, the “now-apparent” good and the “eventual” good (EN: 402f.; LW 1: 300f.).

What makes a study of Dewey’s theory of valuation difficult is that, throughout his major works on the subject, he assumed a certain position concerning the immediate and the mediate that was not stated explicitly until after all his important works on valuational theory were written. In his article “Some Questions about Value,” Dewey raises the question of “whether the undeniable difference between direct valuing and the indirectness of evaluation is a matter of *separation* or of *emphasis*” (PM: 278; LW 15: 105). In this article, Dewey did not himself take a position on the question he raised. But later, in his essay in the Lepley volume “The Field of ‘Value’,” he wrote in a footnote:

The answer to the question I raised in my original list of ‘Questions’ as to whether the distinction between direct valuings and evaluations as judgments is one of separate kinds or one of emphasis is, accordingly, answered in the latter sense. I am the more bound to make this statement because in some still earlier writings I tended to go too far in the direction of separation. I still think the reason that actuated me is sound. In current discussion, traits distinctive

of valuing are frequently indiscriminately transferred to valuation.

But the resulting confusion can be escaped by noting the distinction to be one of phase in development. (Dewey 1949: 75n; LW 16: 354n)

By rejecting the position that the immediate and the mediate are discrete and separate existences, Dewey rejects the distinction that creates a problem for the realists, although it must be said that the foregoing analysis shows that in his actual writings he makes the distinction between the immediate and the mediate quite sharp. This, of course, he admits. But our analysis does show that there is a certain vagueness of the theory at this point, making it possible to read the theory in many different directions. For, if he takes the position that the relation of immediate to mediated values is one of degree, he must face other consequences to his theory, which again he seems not to have met. Taking the position that the relation is one of degree entails other problems in Dewey's theory that he must solve if he is to escape the charge of being an idealist, a position that his denotative method seeks to avoid. For this position entails either of two kinds of idealism: (1) a kind of idealism in which all values collapse into immediacy; or (2) a kind of idealism in which cognition exhausts all reality.

It has already been shown that Dewey's theory starts with valuings—such as prizing, enjoying, desiring—that are immediately felt. The shock of instability is also immediately felt. Furthermore, the process of inquiry or mediation has likewise an element of immediacy to it (EEL: 18; MW 10: 330). But there are other passages in which the immediacy of all aspects of the situation is stressed and that seem to lead to a kind of subjective idealism. The vagueness of Dewey's position came out in his discussion with Philip Rice, when Dewey admitted that he had been misunderstood and restated his view to say: “The undeniable *centering* of the events which are the more immediate condition of the occurrence of events in the way of observation and of knowledge generally, within a particular organism, say that of John Smith, has been taken as proof that the resulting *observation* is itself ‘individual’” (PM: 263; LW 15: 75). Resorting to a specific example to explain his position, Dewey claimed that (1) the *pain* of a toothache is centered in an organism; and (2) the *knowledge* of the toothache is also centered in an organism. Now, if valuings are immediate, if the shock or unstable condition that brings about inquiry is immediate, if the process of evaluation has elements of immediacy in it, if events are “centered” in organisms, and if knowledge of such events is also centered in organisms, there is little wonder that many have read Dewey's theory as collapsing into immediacy, or some kind of subjectivism. At the very least, Dewey's analysis needs a more extended treatment.

Further problems are involved in Dewey's theory of valuation when purely mediational aspects are considered. His behavioral approach makes it possible to formulate propositions about such events as enjoying, prizing, liking, and so forth. Such a catalog of propositions about what humans have enjoyed, desired, liked, or prized, would, on Dewey's view, be only a sociological description and report (TV: 58; LW 13: 243).

As "thought goes beyond immediate existence to its relationships," we take it that appreciation, criticism, appraisal, and judgment are therefore entrances into mediation, and that any specific instance of this kind of thinking may be termed an 'evaluative process'. Now, Dewey maintains that the passage from immediacy to mediation is marked by the occurrence of such logical procedures as defining, generalizing, classifying, discriminating. At one place he says that mediation begins when we look to see what *sort* of value is present (EN: 400; LW 1: 299). Dewey assumes in another passage that values are classified into *kinds*, and that some kinds of prizing are thought to be better than others (TV: 20; LW 13: 208f.).

How do values become classified into sorts or kinds? The answer to this problem is found in Dewey's notion of the existential situation; it is the problematic situation which generates the end-in-view. While each situation is unique in that it occurs at a particular time and place, there is a "generality" of situations, that is, there are "recurrent kinds of situations," and on this account there are recurrent kinds of ends-in-view. The generalized "ideas" of ends-in-view in valuational behavior originate in the same manner as "ideas" are generated in other types of inquiry (TV: 44; LW 13: 230). The starting place in organic behavior is in excitation-reaction and stimulus-response. The recurrence of similar problems and responses builds up and consolidates a habit, a habit being a generalized mode of behavior. As generalized modes of behavior, habits become the organic bases for ends-in-view. Traces of these stimulus-response sequences in organic behavior make possible the emergence of memory. The "simple presence of distance stimuli" becomes the organic basis for imagination; but the condition for setting up goals and ends-in-view is more complicated than what is found in the simple presence of distance stimuli, for the "intervening process of search" for the attainment of the goal or end-in-view becomes "more seriated in temporal span and in connecting links" (Logic: 34; LW 12: 41). We take it that the "intervening process of search" refers to "means" in the total process of the "means-end" relationship. Thus Dewey says: "A schedule of general ends results, the involved values being 'abstract' in the sense of not being directly connected with any particular existing case but not in the sense of independence of all empirically existent cases" (TV: 44; LW 13: 230).

If these clues from Dewey's general methodology are traced through his treatment of valuational subject-matters, we would expect to find an application there of his view of propositions, terms, and judgments to this part of his theory. Unfortunately, Dewey never worked out this part of his theory of valuation in detail. It suffices to point out here that Dewey did think that inquiry involves propositions: "inquiry, involving propositions so determined and arranged as to yield final judgment, is the logical whole upon which propositions depend, while terms as such are logically conditioned by propositions" (Logic: 349; LW 12: 347). On his view, judgment is about the whole situation (Logic: 166; LW 12: 168).

Dewey claims that inquiry arises out of a "biological matrix"; nevertheless, he claims that "thought" and "rational discourse" are of a different order from that of the mere given or immediate (Logic: 278f.; LW 12: 276f.). Take, for instance, his treatment of the subject-predicate relation, when he holds that "the subject-matters of subject and predicate are determined in correspondence with each other in and by the process of 'thought,' that is, inquiry" (Logic: 125; LW 12: 128). Another passage closely parallels this position when he writes, "Operational thinking needs to be applied to the judgment of values just as it has now finally been applied in conceptions of physical objects" (QC: 258; LW 4: 206). Speaking of ends-in-view in *Theory of Valuation*, he says that "ends-in-view as anticipated results reacting upon a given desire are *ideational* by definition or tautologically. . . . Any given desire is what it is in its actual content or 'object' because of its ideational constituents" (TV: 52; LW 13: 237).

Thus, by Dewey's own description of his theory of valuation and of the methodology applicable to it, we arrive at the following summary: (1) mediation is entrance into "thought"; (2) determination of subject-predicate relationship in inquiry is a process of thought; (3) while abstract universals and generic universals are conjugate, the abstract universals or definitions found in "thought" determine the structures of the generics; (4) ends-in-view are objects of thought, or, as he says, are ideational; (5) even though the final judgment is individual, that is, about the situation in question, the final judgment as such is an ideational construction.

Now, if Dewey's theory of valuation is taken in its own terms, value inquiries are thought processes, and the existential qualitative experiences to which they are to apply are in a separate realm. In that case the "real" value would be the value constructed in thought, even though this has been extrapolated from existential gross qualitative experience. The eventual value, even though dialectically worked over and transformed by abstract conceptions both in the theory of general ideas and in the propositions that carry them, would still be cut off from experi-

ence of the existential type. This would encourage an idealistic interpretation of Dewey's theory of value.

Our analysis has shown that the actual statements that Dewey has written on theory of valuation are often confusing and are often worded in such a way that it is easy for some to accuse him of being a realist, others to see aspects of subjectivism, others to find marks of idealism. It is my contention that all of these interpretations are incorrect and that Dewey is partially responsible for these in failing to make explicit the naturalistic criteria of experience. I shall try to show in these concluding pages how I think other parts of Dewey's philosophy can be brought in to make more explicit a naturalistic view of valuation. My starting place is a passage from *Experience and Nature*. Dewey says:

Emotional conditions do not *occur* as emotions, intrinsically defined as such; they occur as 'tertiary' qualities of objects. Some cases of awareness or perception are designated 'emotions' in retrospect or from without, as a child is instructed to term certain perceptual situations anger, or fear, or love, by way of informing him as to their consequences. Immediately, every perceptual awareness may be termed indifferently emotion, sensation, thought, desire; not that it *is* immediately any one of these things, or all of them combined, but that when it is taken in some *reference*, to conditions or to consequences or to both, it has, in contextual reference, the distinctive properties of emotion, sensation, thought, or desire. (EN: 304f.; LW 1: 230f.)

The previous quotation points up two main principles in Dewey's view of experience: immediately felt qualities and the principle of interconnections.⁶ Immediately felt qualities have no meaning in and of themselves; they must be *connected* with other events to become meaningful. The significant phrase in the quotation is "to conditions or to consequences or to both." Now, these conditions or consequences of the feeling state I take to be the connections that Dewey finds in experience, such connections being either personal or nonpersonal. They form the basis for Dewey's view of scientific method as applied to physical matters and to human valuation. In an answer to Reichenbach, Dewey once wrote: "the actual operative presence of *connections* (which when formulated are *relational*) in the subject-matter of direct experience is an intrinsic part of my idea of experience" (Dewey 1951: 535; LW 14: 20). In another work Dewey called such connections in experience *existential involvements*. Again, he claims that sign-significances describe things in their connection with one another. Existential involvements and sign-significances are necessary for the basic meaning of inference and for evidential functions (Logic: 51–54; LW 12: 57–60). Furthermore, this basic principle is necessary for an understanding of the term "conditions

and consequences," for his notion of cause and effect, and for his view of means-ends relationships.

When Dewey applies the principle of interconnections to the human organism, it yields the concept of "transaction" (or 'interaction' in his earlier sense); when applied to desire it refers to the *conditions* for desire or the *consequences* of desire. Thus, the principle underlies his contention that desires are not just subjective states of immediacy centered in an organism; desires are connected with things outside its skin. Subjectivity is explained as the abstracting of only one side of the two-sided experience, namely, the immediately felt quality, and making it a self-enclosed reality shut off from the interconnections an organism has with its environment. Thus, the causes that produce the immediately felt quality and the consequences that flow from it are but other instances of the principle of interconnections running through the human organism.

Furthermore, Dewey alludes to his basic principle of interconnections in experience when he discusses competing theories of valuation, such as mentalism and emotivism. Mentalistic views attempt to lodge value in a separate and unconnected realm of the "knower." Emotive theories attempt to isolate certain behavioral events from the causes and consequences involved in them. The principle of interconnections is involved further in Dewey's view of naturalism when he deals with means-ends relationships; it is possible to contend that Dewey believes that when one deliberately selects a connection in experience, a connection determined to be a cause-effect relationship, it becomes a means-end relationship. Again, it seems that it is on this principle that his view of "norm" in valuational theory is to be understood. When he describes a norm as a "condition to be conformed to," it is a condition already determined by the interconnections finally wrested from experience and formulated symbolically into a cause-effect relationship. This seems to be his meaning when he says that normative statements "rest upon" descriptive statements. It appears, then, that if the principle of interconnections in Dewey's total view of naturalism is made explicit in his theory of valuation, any charge of subjectivism must be dismissed.

It remains to clear up the vagueness in Dewey's theory of valuation concerning the relation of the continuities of inquiry and the continuities of experience. How do thought-forms, developed in inquiry, get into touch with existence? How is the immediately given valuing experience transformed into an eventual value?

In the first place, we must turn to Dewey's treatment of signs, meanings, and linguistic symbols for clues to the problem of the relation of inquiry to existence. It will be recalled that he speaks of three relational aspects of experience in this respect. First, there are existential involvements or interconnections between objects of experience. This is the

order of existence, but the special interpretation Dewey gave to this dimension of nature is that it is the relational aspects of sign-qualities that constitute meaning on this level. Second, Dewey holds that symbols are implicated with one another in sets, no symbol standing alone, and such implicatory functions of symbols make the strict and powerful systems of formal logics possible. If the analysis is left here, we would have the situation described in his valuational theory: an order of existence on the one hand and an order of symbolic formulations on the other. But such is not the case in Dewey's theory of general methodology. There is a third relation, namely, that of reference, but reference understood in a very special sense. How do symbolic formulations get in touch with existence? Symbols themselves must be brought to *interact* (using the principle of interconnections) with the objects of existence. On this point Dewey says:

Without the intervention of a specific kind of existential operation they [symbols] cannot indicate or discriminate the *objects* to which they refer. Reasoning or ordered discourse, which is defined by development of symbol-meanings in relation to one another, may (and should) provide a basis for performing these operations, but of itself it determines no existence. (Logic: 54; LW 12: 60)

Thus, there is “a specific kind of existential operation” that gets symbols in touch with existence. There seems to be no other principle of experience upon which these operations can be performed other than the principle of interconnections. Thus, the principle of interconnections must then be brought into the process of solving a valuational problem in order to get the symbolically formulated value-object in touch with existence.

In the second place, while the point is not made explicit in his theory of valuation, Dewey does maintain in his general methodology that abstract universals and generic universals are conjugate in their functions in inquiry. While the abstract universals are definitional and do not refer to existence, they are tested in their function of resolving a problem. Dewey deplores that kind of abstract conceptualism in which such concepts are not “applied” to natural existence. The formal logics erred in this respect: “The necessity of existential operations for application of meanings to natural existence was ignored” (Logic: 58; LW 12: 64). Failure to institute particular existential involvements of symbols and existences worked for the detriment of both. Without deliberate connection of symbols with existences, there is no way to “test” such abstract symbols; and, of course, the abstract symbols are needed in order to classify existences into “kinds.” The conjugate relation of these constituents of inquiry must be brought into valuational theory to make explicit how “the generalized ideas of ends-in-view” are connected with

existence. Again, the principle that is needed to make the valuational theory complete and to save it from the charge of being some kind of idealism is the principle of interconnections.

In the third place, we propose that Dewey's theory of valuation can escape the consequences of symbolic formulations cut off from existence by considering the special way in which he used the principle of continuity. We should remember that Dewey himself maintains that his contribution to naturalistic theory is to be found in the way in which he connects the principle of continuity with the human organism. But this point involves all three principles that I deem integral to pragmatic naturalism. For the continuity of the organism involves a continuity of feeling, and feeling pervades all the experiences of the human organism, symbolic and nonsymbolic, immediate and mediate alike. There seems to be only one passage in Dewey's value writings that makes this point explicit. He says: "Since human life is continuous, the possibility of using any one mode of experience to assist in the formation of any other is the ultimate postulate of *all* science—non-ethical and ethical alike" (PM: 245; MW 3: 35). Thus, the principle of continuity as applied to the organism ties all the activities of the organism together. It is *one* organism that thinks and feels and relates one part of experience to another. So the principle of feeling is always present as is the principle of continuity wherever there is life. But when Dewey claims that "one mode of experience" can be used "to assist in the formation of any other," there is a third principle involved, namely, the principle of interconnections.

In the fourth place, we must consider the way in which Dewey thinks of the purpose of science, for in this respect we are able to connect symbolic formulations with existence. Science is for the "direction of further experience," and, as scientific inquiry is carried on by a human organism, any part of one type of experience can be related to any other experience. It is noted on Dewey's view that scientific determinations of cause-effect relationships (involving the principle of interconnections) become the basis of means-ends relationships (also involving the principle of interconnections). Since it is one and the same, continuous organism undergoing both scientific inquiries of the physical type and inquiries of the valuational type, then, on Dewey's theory, there is no reason for a complete separation of the two types of experience and there is no reason to rule out the "distinctive traits" of each type. The principles of continuity, interconnections, and feeling are principles that bring together all the activities of the valuing experience and unify them into a contextual whole.

There is one further consideration to be given to this phase of Dewey's valuational theory. The theory of experience that underlies his theory of valuation is constituted by a gross qualitative aspect undergoing, as

we have seen, certain shocks or disruptions out of which inquiry or mediation emerges. There is a line of continuity from the starting place of inquiry to its close, eventuating in the valuational judgment that is about the situation. The starting place of inquiry and the terminus of inquiry may be regarded as interrelated aspects. Thus, inquiry is a *function* or *form* that emerges in human behavior. It is only by use of the principle of continuity and of the category of transformation that such functions can be understood. And the starting place of inquiry in behavior and the terminus of inquiry in behavior can be understood only upon the principle of interconnections.

Notes

1. Dewey says: “And in calling my theory on this matter a special case of my *general* theory I intend to call attention to the fact that I have denied that as judgments, or in respect to method of inquiry, test, and verification, value-judgments have any peculiar or unique features” (PM: 258; LW 5: 70f.).
2. “There is nothing whatever that methodologically (*qua* judgment) marks off ‘value-judgments’ from conclusions reached in astronomical, chemical, or biological inquiries” (Dewey 1949: 77; LW 16: 357).
3. Cf. “Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality,” PM: 211–49; MW 3: 3–39.
4. “The difference between idealistic and realistic theories of knowledge ultimately depends upon the attitude taken towards immediate and mediate elements in knowledge” (Logic: 516; LW 12: 508).
5. Dewey added other synonyms for ‘valuing’ in “Some Questions about Value” (PM: 273; LW 15: 101). Other synonyms were used in “The Field of ‘Value’” in the Lepley volume (Dewey 1949: 68; LW 16: 347).
6. By introducing these two principles designated later as feeling and interconnections, along with a third, namely, continuity, a claim is made that these three principles constitute Dewey’s metaphysics of experience. More analysis of these three principles in Dewey’s philosophy is needed, particularly in regard to how Dewey’s metaphysics of experience is related to Peirce’s categories. In the present study Dewey’s principles of experience are simply used in order to show how they clear up problems in Dewey’s theory of valuation.

5

Immediate and Mediated Values

Empirical theories of value have usually been built upon a psychological theory that takes impulse, desire, and emotion as the touchstones of experience in which is found whatever is called “a value.” Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill may be taken as the more recent historical antecedents of this position and, in the contemporary world, the theory finds various shades of expression in the writings of many logical empiricists and pragmatic naturalists. It is my contention that most of these theories rest upon a view of immediate value, which, granted its starting place as worthy of attention, fails to be faithful to much of commonsense experience and to those kinds of experience in which a critical component is present, in which such terms as ‘appreciation’, ‘appraisal’, and ‘evaluation’ are used. The theories of Charles L. Stevenson and of John Dewey (Stevenson 1944; TV) are the most promising in attempting to show the relation of immediate to mediated values, and I shall use these theories as bases from which I attempt the following sketch of an empirical theory of value.

Some empirical theories of value have been built (1) upon a particular human psychology that takes impulses, desires, emotions, and sensations to be atomistically separate and discrete; (2) upon a general theory of meaning and symbols that treats of semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics in a very special sense; and (3) upon a theory of knowledge that bifurcates the nature of knowledge into sharp divisions of the cognitive and the noncognitive. Some empiricist theories, traditional and contemporary, tend to designate all value experience as falling into a realm in which immediate valuing becomes the sole source as well as the only criterion of value. Some of these theories tend to reduce all valuing, even that which others call “mediated values,” to immediacy.

The connection of value with impulse seems essential for any naturalistic theory, for the postulate upon which any naturalism is built is

First published in *Akten des XIV. Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie* 4. Wien: Herder. 2–9 September 1968, 167–72. © Elizabeth Eames.

continuity of prior qualities and relations with emergent qualities and relations, and it is this notion that demarcates naturalistic, empirical theories from transcendental theories that lodge value in a realm remote from human feeling-states, both physical and psychological. Since the time of Kant, critics of empirical, naturalistic theories of value of the kind here described have pointed out, from their view, that such theories tend to be subjectivistic, anthropological, even solipsistic, and to result in a relativity that produces chaos and irreconcilable conflicts when the valuations of different persons disagree. The current state of the discussion brings us to this question: Can an empirical theory of value be developed that keeps value connected with impulse and desire and yet does not fall into the difficulties that are pointed to by the critics?

In the first place, it seems necessary to start with a different empirical psychology, a psychology that does not begin with a view of human beings as having an antecedently fixed nature, with various parts of that nature atomistically separated into discrete impulses or into discrete sensations. By considering the human organism in a behavioral rather than a behavioristic way, we can start with activities, with movements of the organism. These movements of the entire organism are responses, not reactions taken in the narrowly mechanical sense. If we view impulse as a movement of the organism toward or away from specific objects in either selection or rejection, we have the starting place of a behavioral theory of value. Impulse and desire, then, are connected with objects; their content is known in terms of their functions, and thus they are not barren and devoid of content. This approach makes for a theory of value that is more empirical than that, say, of Ralph Barton Perry, who defined a value as “any object of any interest,” for it shows that human behavior is directed toward or away from specific objects, not just *any* object.

It has been held by some philosophers that impulses and desires are just *there* in experience; they are *given* and that is all there is to it. It may be the case that impulses and desires viewed as activities become hardened into habitual forms and often function in a mechanical way, but this is not a complete description of their natures. A theory of human psychology in which activities, movements of the organism toward and away from objects, are the starting place, and in which activities can be classified, defined, and discriminated, opposes the psychological view that takes these human phenomena as fixed and isolated from other parts of experience. For example, impulses and desires can be seen to have “conditions” for their appearance and to have “consequences” flowing from their occurrence. This psychological view needs more extended treatment than can be given here, but a sketch of its direction may be noted. Activities, say those of the very early years, are given

meanings by adults. The random activities of grabbing, of pulling close or pushing away helpful or harmful objects, are given meanings in terms of the consequences to which they lead. In some such way, specific fears, loves, hates, angers, likes, and dislikes, are given meanings in the child's behavior. Of course, these are specific loves and fears, specific likes and dislikes. This way of describing value-behavior seems to be more faithful to commonsense observations and to those sociological studies that indicate that the fears and loves of specific kinds of objects vary from culture to culture and from group to group. Thus, this psychological starting place seems to be more sociologically sound than those theories that allow no variation in the functions of impulses and desires in human behavior.

A crucial aspect of some empirical theories of value is found in their acceptance of a theory of knowledge that divides human psychology into knowing and feeling. The cognitive, or knowing, process classifies the subject-matter as formal, covering such studies as logic and mathematics, and as empirical, covering such studies as the natural and social sciences. Since it is claimed that impulse plays no part in the knowing process, then valuations, which by definition are relegated to impulse and desire, are not knowledge. The origin, understanding, and criteria for values is sealed off from any kind of knowledge relation. The relation of symbols to impulse and desire is one in which symbols "express" the emotion, or one in which symbols "incite" another person to action. Stevenson, on the contrary, tries to show how knowledge enters into valuations on two different patterns of analysis. On the first pattern, reasonings (logic and scientific statements) are applied to conflicts in valuational behaviors in the description of how one might try to persuade others. On the second pattern, Stevenson shows how the symbol 'good' can have scientific content accrue to it. Dewey approaches the value problem in a slightly different way, but along a similar line of analysis, when he says, "After the first dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good, subsequent perception of the good contains at least a germ of critical reflection" (EN: 401; LW 1: 300).

Most empirical theories of value have overlooked those experiences in which particular value-objects fail us or there is a more extensive disruption in our value-structures. Some objects "sweet in the having are bitter in after-taste" (EN: 398; LW 1: 298), writes Dewey; thus it is often the case that a frustration, a conflict, is set up in the valuational situation. This kind of value-frustration has many psychological and sociological implications, as psychiatrists, for instance, know. But in the lesser value-frustrations, in which there is no catastrophic breakdown in the organism's activities of valuing or total value scheme, the organism endures, and often it is possible to construct a value-object that will

enable a person to find a way out. Of course, this is not the case in regard to every value problem, as some contemporary analyses of the human condition have shown, but when it is, then a certain pattern of investigation emerges. When the value-object fails, then inquiry must be undertaken into the “conditions and the causes” that brought about the value situation’s frustration or into the “consequences” to which the value-object led. The impulses and desires that inclined the organism toward the object may be questioned, and the past and current selections of a particular value-object in a particular kind of situation may be questioned as well. Thus, the question of the “worth” of the value-object is raised.

The primary theoretical and practical problem at this juncture is, however, whether value experience involving impulse and its specific object can be brought into the cognitive process. If this cannot be done, if immediate valuings cannot be mediated, then all value experience built upon impulse is destined to be immediate and unreflective. Furthermore, value theory appears to be at an impasse if certain psychological, semantical, and epistemological theories are taken for granted in stating the value problem. This is why it seems better to strike out on a different empirical psychology, a behavioral one, and a different theory of meaning, a relational one. Again, the relation of the noncognitive to the cognitive must be approached from the standpoint of continuity rather than discreteness. If there can be shown to be a continuity between the noncognitive and the cognitive, then it is possible to relate impulse and desire to the cognitive process in a way that makes them transactive, that is, influencing and correcting each other. There are empirical grounds for approaching impulse and knowledge in this way; for instance, the impulsive movement of the organism toward or away from objects in terms of selection and rejection. Acceptance is a kind of affirmation, and rejection is a kind of negation. Thus, the organism in its responses to objects begins to classify, to define, and to discriminate them.

In humans the supervening of symbolic behavior upon existential situations opens the way for a precise logic and a controlled methodology. When a relational theory of meaning and of symbols is brought into the analysis, then denotation and reference is possible, but other dimensions of the symbolic situation are also present. Denotation is not simply the relation between a symbol and an object or an activity, but between a symbol and objects in their relation to other objects, of activities to other activities, of impulsive activities to objects. The intimacy of impulse and knowing makes the line between the noncognitive and the cognitive one of continuity, of emergence of the latter out of the former. Immediate values described as specific objects tied to specific behavioral activities (impulses) can now be questioned in terms of their grounds

or consequences, a critical appraisal can be applied to them, and mediation can enter into value experience. If immediate values are never questioned or found to fail us, they remain immediate values. On this theory, there is no guarantee that immediate valuations will always be lifted into the cognitive process to be questioned, critically analyzed, appraised, and evaluated.

It was pointed out above that commonsense experience does encounter some situations in which a value-object is questioned, in which examination into its ground and condition is made, and in which the problem of "worth" emerges. And people do take inventory of their value-objects, of the things they love and hold dear, and they do this with regard to how the value-objects function in sustaining and maintaining a certain quality of life. A cursory examination of the value patterns of individuals shows that valuations concerning certain objects of some individuals, at least, have been changed by the knowledge of what scientific discovery tells us about the consequences of holding a certain object as a value. The impact of medical science on the specific matters of health as an object of value is an example. Selections and rejections of value-objects have shifted with various scientific discoveries about the meanings of those objects. A descriptive psychology and sociology of the actual valuational activities of people is needed as a base from which to develop a thoroughgoing theory of value. The outline and direction of value inquiry presented above turns the examination of values in a new direction. It attempts to get value considerations out into the open where they can be observed, thus cutting the ground from under any charge of subjectivism or mentalism. By adopting a theory of meaning and symbols that treats of qualities in terms of their relations and by using a theory of inquiry that ties impulse to reason in a more intimate manner, it will be possible to study the conditions and consequences of valuational activities. For instance, the recurring *kinds* of situations and the *kinds* of objects that best fulfill them could be the starting place for building up a stock of generic value-objects. With value-objects classified, defined, and discriminated in terms of value situations, it would then be possible to develop a logic of evaluation, a logic that runs the entire gamut from judgments of perception to final judgments concerning the solutions of value problems.

In the final analysis it may turn out, as Aristotle suggested, that much knowledge may precede an act, but the quality of such an act seems by common sense and by the history of science destined to be one in which reason and impulse are intimately connected. It may be the case, as Hume suggested, that much reasoning must precede the coming into existence of a proper sentiment, that in the valuational process reason and sentiment somehow concur. If the foregoing proposal can be car-

ried out, if immediate valuings can be questioned, criticized, and evaluated in terms of the sustaining and expansive nature of mediated values, then valuational activities can be approached in such a way that civilized impulses, desires, and emotions can be developed and made more secure for all humankind.