of revelation. Thereby Bayle's position earns the tag of "semi-fideism" (p. 329).

Though the author is aware that Montaigne's and Bayle's fideism "has a somewhat negative quality" (p. 45), in the sense that "to disparage the presumption of reason is not quite the same thing as a call to faith or a eulogy of its powers" (p. 45), the author fails to sustain the emphasis on this point and evaluate it in relation to his tags of "fideism" and "semi-fideism."

In addition, to pose the problem of whether the mysteries of faith are *above* human reason or *against* it and then claim it to be "a minor point"—and this in a footnote (p. 318, n. 1)—is scarcely fitting for what otherwise stands as a sound history of ideas.

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Early Essays and Leibniz's New Essays concerning the Human Understanding. By John Dewey. Vol. I of The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1969. Pp. cviii + 435. $15.00.

This vol. I (but second published volume) in the critical edition of Dewey's writings includes his first book (the 1888 study of Leibniz's *New Essays*) and his first articles for the years 1882-88. We can use the occasion for a short course in remedial reading, because it compels us to revise our customary picture of Dewey on several scores. The mind which begins to emerge in these pages is neither ignorant of history of philosophy nor antipathetic toward its sources, but is feeding upon the sources and learning how to become critical toward them in an informed manner. Moreover, the historical inquiries made by Dewey into Spinoza and Leibniz, Kant and Spencer, lead him directly into these philosophers. He does not study them merely at second hand or through the Hegelian filter.

The book on Leibniz holds a threefold interest even now. First, it was composed about a dozen years before the turn of the century and hence before the great spurt made in Leibnizian studies through textual publications and mathematical analysis. Thus Dewey gives us a sample of the old style approach to Leibniz, yet one that is not entirely antiquated. Many of the points which Bertrand Russell's reconstructive genius subsequently overlooked in Leibniz stand forth firmly in Dewey's portrait, which remains closer to the speculative course of the German philosopher's actual thinking. Second, Dewey focuses quite keenly on what he rightly regards as Leibniz's basic problem: the relation between the individual and the universe. How can a union be secured that avoids Cartesian dualism and yet allows more room for the free play of individuality and moral activity than Spinoza can grant? This is a foreshadowing, in classic terms, of the root inquiry which Dewey himself

pursued for a lifetime. And lastly, it is worth noting where the young Dewey locates Leibniz's basic difficulty: in the futile attempt to unite the older logic of identity and contradiction with his own metaphysical conception of reality as mutual organic activity and process. On this score, there is now a better historical understanding of the logical innovations made by Leibniz in the relational order. But the criticism itself is one which Dewey was later to expand into his general account of the passage from a pre-evolutionary conception to a thoroughly evolutionary and organic view.

The other articles and essays from this early period (some of which were reprinted in Joseph Ratner's selection of Dewey essays entitled *Philosophy, Psychology and Social Practice* [New York: Putnam, 1965]) are indispensable for following the growth of a mind. Here we find a Dewey who hails Kant as the crisis or deep dividing line in modern philosophy, who affirms that psychology is irretrievably altered by scientific advances made in physiology and evolutionary biology, and hence for whom "experience is realistic, not abstract. Psychical life is the fullest, deepest, and richest manifestation of this experience." Two key essays treat of "The Psychological Standpoint" and "Psychology as Philosophic Method." Dewey holds there that the British empiricists have not been psychological enough, that is, they have presumed that the psychological standpoint is individual and subjective, whereas the Kantian and Hegelian reconstructions show that it also embraces society and cosmos. But there is a basic fuzziness in the Dewey of this first period about *how* the individual finds himself within the wider frame of reference. The trouble is that Dewey tries to determine the relationship in terms of individual self and universal self, self-consciousness and universal consciousness. He is still caught in the supposition of an all-embracing absolute self-consciousness. Yet the wonder of these early writings is that he can resolutely turn his attention to specific questions of science and democracy, where he gropes for a more determinate methodology.

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Unfinished Man and the Imagination: Toward an Ontology and a Rhetoric of Revelation. By Ray L. Hart. New York: Herder and Herder, 1968. Pp. 418. $9.50.

This work comes highly recommended and is in fact significant. "The title is a poor clue to its richly provocative contents," p. 270 will say, about someone else of course but mildly relevant here. Like the chapter-headings and indeed the whole of the text, Hart's title is formulated not so much in order to make clear and univocal what the author aims to say, but rather to arouse imaginative and exciting wonderment about what could perchance be meant. Thus the docile reader is to be jet-