Religion and Presidential Politics in Florida: A List Experiment*

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Objective. Although national surveys indicate that Americans have become more accepting of the prospect of a Jewish presidential candidate, this could reflect some voters' desire to be seen as having socially correct opinions. The present study uses a survey technique known as the "list experiment" to assess public reaction to the nomination of Jewish candidates for high office. *Methods.* Two telephone surveys of registered voters in Florida, each employing the list-experiment methodology, were conducted in October 2000 and May/June 2002. *Results.* We find only limited evidence of negative affect directed at either the vice presidential candidacy of Joseph Lieberman in 2000 or a hypothetical (unnamed) Jewish presidential candidate who might choose to run in the future. *Conclusions.* Although there still are enough voters with anti-Semitic views to affect the outcome of a close election, their numbers do not appear to be as great as some observers have feared.

On August 8, 2000, presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Al Gore surprised the political world by naming Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman as his vice presidential running mate. An observant Jew, Lieberman broke an unwritten rule that confined nominations for national office to white Christian males. As the first Jewish vice presidential candidate of a major party, he represented a breakthrough roughly comparable to the nomination (Al Smith) and election (John F. Kennedy) of the first Roman Catholics in 1928 and 1960, respectively, and the nomination of the first woman in 1984 (Geraldine Ferraro).

Joseph Lieberman's nomination for the vice presidency was the culmination of a long rise to respectability for American Jews. As recently as the mid-20th century, Jews faced barriers to full inclusion in the form of quotas at elite universities, discriminatory hiring practices, and restrictive housing covenants that barred access to desirable neighborhoods. The

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combination of postwar social changes and vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws put an end to these practices, thereby permitting Jews full participation in all aspects of American life, including the political. Constituting less than 3 percent of the population, Jews in the United States are today statistically overrepresented as candidates, elected officials, political contributors, campaign activists, and as likely voters in primary and general elections (Wald, 1997). More than 25 Jewish senators and over 150 House members have served in Congress (Maisel and Forman, 2001), while many others have been elected to state and local office.

In purely political terms, Lieberman's presence on the national ticket in 2000 seemed to help Al Gore in several ways. Being "[d]evoutly religious, and one of the first Democrats to criticize Bill Clinton's affair" with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, he helped the vice president to distance himself from the personal scandals that had led to Clinton's impeachment a year and a half earlier (Mayer, 2001:40). Lieberman also was ideologically to the right of Gore, thereby strengthening the latter's credentials as a "New Democrat" and (in principle) making him more attractive to middle-of-the-road swing voters. Finally, the fact that Lieberman was Jewish "won Gore plaudits for being *bold* and *exciting*—two adjectives not often applied to the vice president" (Mayer, 2001:40, emphasis in original). In terms of geography, Gore strategists were especially hopeful that Lieberman would enhance their prospects of carrying the soon-to-be-critical State of Florida (Simon, 2001).

The danger, of course, was that some voters might not accept a Jewish candidate—*any* Jewish candidate—for the second-highest office in the land. Lieberman's selection was generally celebrated within the Jewish community as a sign of that group's integration into the political and cultural mainstream. Yet even as many echoed the candidate's "only in America" sentiment, there were a few who worried that his nomination would unleash torrents of anti-Semitism from the extreme right. Although such fears may seem incongruous in light of Jewish success and acceptance in postwar America, the experience of persecution and genocide has left a residue of anxiety and vulnerability among Jews (Tobin and Sassler, 1988). Apart from a handful of incidents and some malicious postings on websites, however, the campaign was not noticeably marred by anti-Semitic outbursts and Lieberman emerged as a possible contender for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004.

Given the success that candidates have enjoyed at the subpresidential level, why has there not been a greater Jewish presence in national politics? One possibility is that prejudice against Jewish candidates is still prevalent in America. In fact, national survey data provide little evidence that this might be the case. For over 60 years, the Gallup Organization has tracked citizens' willingness to vote for an individual with various demographic and religious characteristics. The question asks: "If your party nominated a generally well-qualified person for president who happened to be [religion/race], would

you vote for that person?'' Whereas most citizens in the 1930s said they would not support a Jewish candidate, by 1999 an overwhelming 92 percent (compared with 94 percent for both a Catholic and a Baptist) expressed a willingness to do so.[1] At least on the surface, then, it appears that significant levels of prejudice against a Jewish candidate for national office no longer exist.

Nevertheless, there is reason to doubt that generic survey questions such as the one employed by Gallup can measure how people truly feel about the prospect of electing minority candidates to high political office. Prior research has, for example, documented the persistence of prejudicial feelings against blacks despite the declines in overt racism registered by traditional indicators (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens, 1997; Kuklinski et al., 1997; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997). In addition, several experimental studies dealing with candidates' racial and ethic characteristics provide further grounds for skepticism about the validity of the Gallup item (e.g., Sigelman et al., 1995). What the item may actually reveal is evidence of *social desirability* among white Americans (Schuman and Presser, 1981); that is, some whites claim they would support a qualified black because to do otherwise would violate social norms and make the respondent appear as racist to the interviewer. Such self-censorship helps to explain why black candidates routinely do less well on election day than they do in preelection polls (Citrin, Green, and Sears, 1990) and accords with a substantial literature suggesting that survey respondents occasionally shade their answers on sensitive questions to conform to the presumed preferences of interviewers (Tourangeau and Smith, 1996). Utilizing a survey-based technique that appears to minimize social desirability, this article attempts to gauge voters' reactions to the prospect of Jewish candidates for national office.

Data and Methodology

The Gallup data imply that many Americans experience little or no hostility when confronted with the prospect of a Jewish president or vice president; assuming social desirability, however, others may feel the need to hide their negative affect from interviewers by falsely claiming that they would be willing to support a qualified Jewish candidate for national office. Using the ''list-experiment'' methodology developed by Kuklinski and his colleagues (1997; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997), we attempted to uncover the public's true sentiments without respondents being aware of our efforts to do so. The list experiment is actually quite simple. It begins with a representative sample of voters being divided randomly into two halves. One-half is given a series of four statements and asked to indicate how many of those statements—not *which ones*, just *how many* in total—make them

[1]Gallup data were obtained from ⟨http://www.gallup.com/poll/release/pr990329.asp⟩.

angry or upset; the other half is presented with the same four statements, plus one additional (introducing the attitude object of interest) and asked to say how many make them angry or upset.

With random selection of half samples, respondents' answers should produce an equivalent mean number of anger-generating statements for the four items that the two groups have in common. Any difference between means for the two halves can therefore be attributed to the additional item presented to the second subsample. Participants presumably understand that the interviewer cannot figure out *which* of the five statements make them angry and, as a result, they will be more likely to express their true feelings even when those feelings might normally be hidden due to social desirability considerations. We adapted the list experiment (originally designed to measure levels of racial prejudice) for our own research by having the fifth statement refer indirectly to Joseph Lieberman's presence on the Democratic ticket in 2000 (Study 1) or to the prospect of a Jewish presidential candidate (Study 2). By comparing half samples in these two studies we can determine, in the aggregate and for various subgroups,[2] the degree of antagonism elicited by Jewish candidates for national office.

Following the format employed by Kuklinski and his associates,[3] our list experiments began with the following statement: "Now I'm going to read you four (five) things that sometimes make people angry or upset. After I read all four statements, just tell me *how many* of them upset you. I don't want to know which ones, just *how many*." Interviewers then read four statements to those in the baseline sample.

- "One: the way gasoline prices keep going up."
- "Two: professional athletes getting million-plus salaries."
- "Three: requiring seat belts be used when driving."
- "Four: large corporations polluting the environment."

The same four statements were read to the test sample, followed by one additional item.

- Study 1: "Five: a Jewish candidate running for vice president."
- Study 2: "Five, a Jewish candidate running for president."

Our assumption is that any person who acknowledges being angry or upset about a Jewish candidate for either office is, in fact, expressing a negative attitude toward Jews becoming full and active participants in American politics. We want to emphasize that these statements were chosen because

[2]Individual-level analysis is, of course, not possible with these data.

[3]We did make a few minor wording changes, the most notable of which involved replacing "the federal government increasing the tax on gasoline" (original version) with "the way gasoline prices keep going up." We also increased the number of statements in the baseline condition from three to four in order to reduce the probability that some respondents in the test condition would say that all five statements made them angry, thereby revealing their anti-Semitic sentiments to the interviewer (Sniderman and Carmines, 1997:43–48).

they reflected important real-world political events, and not because we thought they were the best indicators of Jewish affect among voters. Just as whites are more likely to report feeling angry about interracial dating than about the prospect of a black family moving in next door to them (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens, 1997:330), there undoubtedly are circumstances to which some non-Jews would react more negatively than they do here. We are not attempting to measure the level of broad-based anti-Semitism, however, but rather the degree to which anti-Jewish views may have been activated by the nomination of Joseph Lieberman as a candidate for vice president of the United States, or by the prospect of a future Jewish presidential candidate.

Our analysis is based on data from two statewide telephone surveys of registered voters conducted by the *Florida Voter* survey organization.[4] The first survey ($N = 606$) was done in October 2000, roughly two weeks prior to election day; the second ($N = 601$) took place during May and June 2002. Although no state is a perfect microcosm of the entire country, Florida—from its small towns and rural areas in the north, to the retirement communities in the southeast, to the I-4 Corridor and Disney World in between—is quite diverse in sociodemographic terms, and its political behavior in 2000 closely mirrored the national pattern.

In addition to determining whether there was a negative reaction to Jewish candidates statewide, we also will look for evidence that hostility was concentrated in specific electoral subgroups. Prior research has explained anti-Semitism by drawing on theories of localism, religious intolerance, interethnic competition, and power conflict. The strongest findings, associated with localism theory, show that negative feelings toward Jews are most common among people who are themselves socially marginal, for example, less educated, poorer, older, and less urban (Martire and Clark, 1982; Anti-Defamation League, 1998). We will isolate each of these characteristics in our analysis. We also will test to see whether anti-Jewish sentiment was more pronounced among evangelical Protestants, who appear to have the greatest religious differences with Jews and who are major proponents of the "Christian America" concept (Smith, 1996). In addition, we will break down responses for ethnic minorities (predominantly Hispanics and African Americans) who might perceive Jews as competitors either politically or in the economic marketplace. Given that political factors could activate opposition to a Jewish candidate, we will examine differences based on partisanship and ideological self-classification (our expectation being that the level of anger is higher among Republicans and conservatives).[5] Finally, we will test for differences associated with gender;

[4]Sampling frames were created from a random selection (derived from current population rolls) of likely voters in 2000, and of all eligible voters (using random-digit dialing) in 2002.

[5]Some studies dealing with whites' racial attitudes suggest otherwise. Using the list-experiment methodology, Kane (1997–1998) found that anti-black views in Florida (as measured by the test item "blacks pushing themselves where they are not wanted") were more

while prior research provides mixed signals, we anticipate finding that men have a more negative view of Jewish candidates than women.[6]

Results of Study 1

The first stage of our analysis involves estimating the percentage of voters who became angry or upset at the idea of a Jewish candidate for vice president in 2000.[7] This entails computing the mean number of anger-generating statements for both baseline and test conditions, and then subtracting the former from the latter and multiplying by 100.[8] In fact, a comparison of the two half samples (left-hand portion of Table 1) suggests that, in the aggregate, the Lieberman nomination failed to elicit an appreciable degree of anger among Florida voters. For all non-Jewish respondents in our baseline condition ($N = 282$), the mean is 2.17 statements as compared with 2.20 in the test condition ($N = 280$), a trivial and nonsignificant difference. With just 3 percent of the electorate ($2.20 - 2.17 \times 100$) expressing anger, it does not appear that Al Gore's selection of a Jewish running mate cost him much, if any, popular support in this critical battleground state.

On the other hand, it is possible that the overall pattern masks animosity among smaller segments of the population. Earlier we hypothesized that anger at the Lieberman nomination would be stronger among those with less education, lower incomes, older citizens, people living in less urban areas (defined here as North Florida[9]), evangelical Protestants, ethnic minorities, Republicans, ideological conservatives, and men. To make a long story short, our tests uncovered very little in the way of anti-Jewish affect among these groups. Using the 0.05 confidence level as a cut-off point (a relatively forgiving test given the sample size), we identified only one marginally significant difference for the two sets of means displayed in Table 1, that is, a 23-point difference between Republican identifiers in the baseline and test

common among Democrats and liberals (as well as moderates; see also Kuklinski et al., 1997; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997). If racist and anti-Semitic sentiments are held by many of the same people (Allport, 1954), our hypothesis could prove to be well off the mark.

[6]This is based on the assumption that racism and anti-Semitism are related, and on research showing that men are more likely to express anger about the prospect of a black family moving in next door (Kuklinski et al., 1997) and about "blacks pushing themselves where they are not wanted" (Kane, 1997–1998). In all cases, univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to determine whether differences in the level of anger across sociodemographic and political subgroups are statistically significant.

[7]For obvious reasons, we have eliminated those (about 6 percent of the electorate according to recent *Florida Voter* surveys) who reported their religious affiliation as Jewish.

[8]A simple *t*-test was used to compare means by form within categories of the control variables.

[9]North Florida basically includes everything north of Alachua County, which is home to the University of Florida. Despite several decades of growth and change throughout the state, significant pockets of the Old South remain in the rural areas and smaller towns that stretch from northern Florida into the southern parts of both Georgia and Alabama.

TABLE 1

Estimated Mean Level of Anger Over a Jewish Candidate Running for National Office (Non-Jews Only)

	Study 1: Vice President			Study 2: President		
	Baseline Condition	Test Condition	Percent Angry	Baseline Condition	Test Condition	Percent Angry
All Non-Jews	2.17 (282)	2.20 (280)	3	2.17 (284)	2.28 (282)	11
Education						
High school or less	2.46 (79)	2.46 (94)	0	2.15 (85)	2.37 (103)	22
Some college/degree	2.11 (158)	2.15 (130)	4	2.19 (148)	2.33 (134)	14
Postgraduate	1.97 (36)	1.89 (47)	0†	2.18 (49)	1.96 (45)	0†
Family Income						
Under $30k	2.37 (64)	2.44 (70)	7	2.41 (78)	2.16 (82)	0†
$30–70k	2.21 (114)	2.19 (112)	0†	2.22 (118)	2.31 (114)	9
Over $70k	1.89 (62)	2.02 (51)	13	1.91 (54)	2.16 (49)	25
Age						
Under 60	2.06 (121)	2.18 (119)	12	2.11 (218)	2.30 (200)	19
60 and older	2.31 (150)	2.28 (152)	0†	2.41 (63)	2.24 (74)	0†
Region						
North Florida	2.17 (69)	2.16 (61)	0†	2.17 (63)	2.10 (67)	0†
Rest of state	2.18 (233)	2.21 (243)	3	2.17 (221)	2.34 (215)	17
Religion						
Evangelical Protestant	2.46 (28)	2.30 (20)	0†	2.31 (61)	2.17 (70)	0†
Other non-Jewish	2.18 (235)	2.21 (243)	3	2.12 (185)	2.31 (158)	19
Ethnicity						
White	2.20 (240)	2.23 (241)	3	2.15 (190)	2.37 (202)	22
Nonwhite/Hispanic	2.09 (33)	2.26 (35)	17	2.19 (85)	2.08 (64)	0†
Partisanship						
Republican	2.03 (122)	2.26 (101)	23	2.13 (121)	2.08 (105)	0†

TABLE 1—Continued

	Study 1: Vice President			Study 2: President		
	Baseline Condition	Test Condition	Percent Angry	Baseline Condition	Test Condition	Percent Angry
Independent	2.33 (85)	2.25 (83)	0†	2.41 (29)	2.63 (30)	22
Democrat	2.26 (92)	2.15 (114)	0†	2.17 (109)	2.38 (120)	21
Ideology						
Conservative	2.21 (121)	2.20 (105)	0†	2.13 (125)	2.24 (102)	11
Moderate	2.18 (107)	2.24 (104)	6	2.37 (57)	2.29 (68)	0†
Liberal	2.06 (36)	2.17 (52)	11	2.07 (67)	2.38 (71)	31
Gender						
Men	2.09 (140)	2.13 (124)	4	2.21 (143)	2.17 (122)	0†
Women	2.25 (142)	2.26 (156)	1	2.13 (141)	2.37 (160)	24
Lieberman Thermometer						
Cool (< 40 degrees)	1.77 (47)	2.17 (35)	40	n/a	n/a	n/a
Intermediate (40–60 degrees)	2.26 (126)	2.31 (114)	5	n/a	n/a	n/a
Warm (> 60 degrees)	2.15 (94)	2.18 (106)	3	n/a	n/a	n/a
Anti-Jewish Sentiment						
Least anti-Jewish	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.08 (138)	2.32 (129)	24
Intermediate	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.27 (107)	2.18 (125)	0†
Most anti-Jewish	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.22 (27)	2.79 (24)	57

†Mean score is higher (but not significantly so) for baseline group than for test group.

NOTE: Table entries are the mean number of anger-inducing statements (*N* for each group in parentheses). Partisanship variable classifies leaning independents as independents. For ideology, liberals are those who score 1–3 and conservatives those who score 5–7 on a 7-point scale. None of the within-group differences shown here are significant at the 0.05 level.

conditions, which nonetheless exceeded the 0.05 level by the barest of margins. Although a few other groups did score higher in the test condition than in the baseline—sometimes in the direction we anticipated (17 percent of nonwhites/Hispanics angry), sometimes not (13 percent of those with incomes over $70,000, 12 percent of respondents under age 60, 11 percent of liberals)—in no instance are the half-sample means from which these percentages have been derived significantly different from one another at the 0.05 level. In sum, our results suggest that neither Florida voters in general, nor specific subgroups of them, harbored any real hostility to the selection of Joseph Lieberman as Democratic nominee for vice president in the 2000 election.

It is possible that hostility existed but we were unable to pick it up due to problems associated with our measuring instrument. This seems unlikely, especially given that the list-experiment approach has been used successfully (including in Florida; see Kane, 1997–1998) to tap affect toward blacks among white citizens. Moreover, our findings are consistent with the fact that Lieberman was held in fairly warm regard (warmer, as it happens, than Al Gore: 57.6 vs. 51.1 degrees on the 100-point feeling thermometer) by most non-Jewish voters in Florida. Among the handful of respondents who scored Lieberman below 40 degrees on the thermometer, there was a clear negative reaction to his presence on the ticket (1.77 baseline mean, 2.17 test mean, 40 percent angry)—further evidence that the list experiment is working as it should, though even this apparently huge gap falls short of reaching statistical significance due to the small *N*s involved (47 and 35, respectively). Thus, if Florida voters as a whole failed to exhibit a significant degree of anti-Jewish affect in response to our methodology, it is probably because such affect simply was not very common.

Results of Study 2

Two aspects of the 2000 campaign could have served to depress the observed level of anti-Jewish affect among our election-year sample: Lieberman himself and the office he sought. Whatever doubts some individuals may have entertained about Jewish candidates in the abstract, it is possible that these concerns were allayed by Joseph Lieberman's record in the U.S. Senate and by his performance during the campaign. Much as the administration of John F. Kennedy made clear that there was little to fear from a Catholic president, Floridians in 2000 may have observed Lieberman's demeanor, learned about his background, listened to what he had to say, and decided that his religion was not an issue. A second possibility is that voters' relative indifference to the vice presidency made Lieberman less salient. Because the presidency is the core symbol of American government, citizens' anxieties are more likely to be evident at that level than in their attitudes toward the vice presidency. Thus, the conditions

in Study 1 may have understated the degree of hostility to Jewish involvement in national politics.

To address these possibilities, we conducted a second survey that differed in both timing and stimulus from the first. As noted earlier, the fieldwork for Study 2 was done in mid-2002 when voters' minds were presumably less focused on Joseph Lieberman and the 2000 campaign. To reduce further the Lieberman factor and also heighten the salience of the issue for respondents, the fifth statement in our list experiment referred to a Jewish *presidential* candidate. The right-hand portion of Table 1 displays the mean number of anger-inducing statements for baseline (2.17, $N = 284$) and test (2.28, $N = 282$) conditions; by comparing the two figures, we are once again able to estimate the proportion of the population that was angered by the prospect of a Jewish candidate running for president (11 percent). As anticipated, removing Lieberman from the equation and raising the stakes by asking about the presidency produced a somewhat higher level of anger in the aggregate than we saw in 2000. Yet the gap between the two groups is still well below any reasonable threshold of statistical significance, suggesting that observed differences could well be due to sampling error.

Table 1 also breaks down the responses of registered voters using the same political and sociodemographic variables as in Study 1, but with two notable changes. First, we improved our measure of evangelical Protestantism by adding to that category mainline Protestants who take a literal view of scripture, say that religion is both salient and a strong source of guidance in their daily lives, and report attending church at least once a week (see Kellstedt, 1989). Second, to gauge the effect of overt anti-Semitism, our survey asked voters whether they believe that the following statements are "probably true" or "probably false": (1) "Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind"; and (2) "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America." For the analysis here, respondents were classified as being most anti-Jewish (both statements true), least anti-Jewish (both statements false), or intermediate (any other combination including volunteered "mixed" answers for at least one of the two statements). This variable tells us whether individuals who subscribe to certain negative stereotypes about Jews translate those views into anger at the prospect of a Jewish candidate for president.

Although absolute differences between baseline and test condition means are generally larger in Study 2 than in Study 1, they once again fail to achieve statistical significance in any instance.[10] We nevertheless remain confident that our experiment is measuring the independent variable

[10]As with Study 1, subgroup comparisons frequently yield results that are contrary to the expectations based on prior research, for example, higher (though not significantly higher) levels of anger among liberals, white Anglos, nonevangelicals, persons under age 60, those residing outside of North Florida, and women than among their counterparts. Under the circumstances, we feel that further research is warranted in order to reevaluate conventional wisdom regarding the social basis of intergroup hostility (also see Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Kane, 1997–1998).

accurately. For one thing, the effects of education are roughly as they should be. In what is virtually an "iron law" derived from the study of anti-Semitic attitudes, education has been the strongest and most consistent (negative) predictor of hostility toward Jews (Cohen, 1995). Although differences across education categories are negligible in Study 1, we see the expected pattern clearly in Study 2: people who never advanced beyond high school exhibited the greatest anger, and those with postgraduate educations the least, at the prospect of a Jewish candidate for president. This finding provides some degree of validation for our measure of anti-Jewish affect.

Even more powerful evidence emerges from an analysis of the two items tapping overt anti-Semitism. Specifically, 57 percent of respondents who believe that Jews care only for "their own kind" and that they are more loyal to Israel than to the United States were angered by the thought of a Jewish presidential candidate, compared with just 24 percent of those who reject both statements and an anomalous 0 percent of those with mixed opinions. Small *N*s (27 and 24 in the baseline and test conditions, respectively) preclude any realistic possibility that this figure might reach statistical significance. However, combined with the earlier finding that 40 percent of those with cold feelings toward Lieberman on the feeling thermometer felt angry about a Jewish candidate for vice president, its magnitude is sufficient to suggest not only that the list-experiment methodology is working properly, but also *that citizens with anti-Semitic views are, as one would expect, unlikely to support a Jewish candidate for national office*.[11] The good news is that, both in Florida and (if Gallup results are accurate) nationwide, the number of people who feel this way is not nearly as large as it once was.

Conclusion

We began by asking whether the professed willingness of 90-some percent of the electorate to vote for a Jewish candidate for president was an artifact borne of social desirability. The list experiment, which has been used successfully to confirm the existence of hidden racism, seems well suited for determining whether this is indeed the case. In general, our results suggest that most Americans (or at least Floridians) say what they believe when asked in surveys about their openness to a Jewish candidate for national office. In Study 1 we learned that Joseph Lieberman's presence on the Democratic ticket in 2000 generated little if any negative reaction among voters. In Study 2, conducted more than six months after the election and focusing on the presidency rather than the vice presidency, the level of anger at the prospect of a Jewish candidate was higher but not significantly so (11 percent of respondents compared with 3 percent in the early survey). Most

[11]Although we suspect that there is a positive relationship between anti-Semitism and negative assessments of Lieberman, this is an empirical question that cannot be answered with data from our independent cross-sectional surveys.

of the negative sentiment that did exist was contributed, in the first instance, by the small number of individuals who did not care for Lieberman and, in the second instance, by the one-tenth of the sample (perhaps including many of the same people) that openly endorsed anti-Semitic views. Although there are enough of these voters to affect the outcome of a close election, there do not appear to be as many as some observers have feared.

This is not to say that the religious affiliation of Jewish candidates has become irrelevant to voters. As noted earlier, prior research indicates that some people forswear overt racism while still allowing racial factors to creep into their judgments through the back door; that is, they attribute to candidates whatever qualities are suggested by predominant stereotyping about the candidate's minority group. When stereotypes are both positive and negative, they may offset one another and thus disguise the role of race-based thinking in candidate evaluations (Sigelman et al., 1995). We know from national studies that Jews are often stereotyped with both negative and seemingly benign qualities (Wilson, 1996). It is possible that these assumed traits offset one another in our studies, thereby canceling out the effect of negative views on assessments of both real and hypothetical Jewish candidates for national office.

Alternatively, it may be that the list-experiment methodology simply does not measure anti-Jewish sentiment as effectively as it does negative affect toward blacks. Because black political demands are often perceived in a zero-sum context and imply a strong indictment of American society, they appear to cause genuine anger among a sizable portion of the white electorate. The political emergence of American Jews is of a different order, perhaps producing among some non-Jews a sense of concern or unease rather than anger. To the extent that this is true, a different measurement approach than the one used here may be needed to determine how citizens really feel about the prospect of a Jewish candidate for president or vice president.

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