# 1 Two-period model

Given  $\gamma_0$ 

$$\max_{l_1,e_1,\mu_1,l_2,\mu_2} \left\{ A(m_0 + \mu_1) \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot l_1^{1-\alpha} \left[ P^W + \tau \left( \gamma_0 \right) \right] - l_1 - \mu_1 - e_1 \right\} + \left\{ A(m_1 + \mu_2) \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot l_2^{1-\alpha} \left[ P^W + \tau \left( \gamma(e_1) \right) \right] - l_2 - \mu_2 \right\}$$

where  $m_1 = m_0 + \mu_1$ 

#### 1.1 Interior F.O.C.'s

$$l_1: (1-\alpha) A(m_0 + \mu_1) \cdot \left(\frac{F}{l_1}\right)^{\alpha} \left[P^W + \tau(\gamma_0)\right] = 1 \tag{1}$$

$$\mu_{1}: \frac{\partial A(m_{0} + \mu_{1})}{\partial \mu_{1}} \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot l_{1}^{1-\alpha} \left[ P^{W} + \tau \left( \gamma_{0} \right) \right] + \frac{\partial A(m_{0} + \mu_{1} + \mu_{2})}{\partial \mu_{1}} \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot l_{2}^{1-\alpha} \left[ P^{W} + \tau \left( \gamma(e_{1}) \right) \right] = 1 \quad (2)$$

$$e_1: A(m_0 + \mu_1 + \mu_2) \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot l_1^{1-\alpha} \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial \gamma} \frac{\partial \gamma}{\partial e_1} = 1$$
(3)

$$l_2: (1-\alpha) A(m_0 + \mu_1 + \mu_2) \cdot \left(\frac{F}{l_2}\right)^{\alpha} \left[P^W + \tau(\gamma(e_1))\right] = 1$$
 (4)

$$\mu_2 : \frac{\partial A(m_0 + \mu_1 + \mu_2)}{\partial \mu_2} \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot l_2^{1-\alpha} \left[ P^W + \tau \left( \gamma(e_1) \right) \right] = 1 \tag{5}$$

### 1.2 What happens when $\gamma_0$ decreases?

From Equation 1, when  $\gamma_0 \downarrow$ ,  $\frac{A(m_0 + \mu_1)}{l_1^{\alpha}} \uparrow$ . Two cases:

- $\mu_1 \uparrow$ ,  $l_1$  unchanged /  $\mu_1 \uparrow \uparrow$ ,  $l_1 \uparrow$
- $\mu_1$  unchanged,  $l_1 \downarrow / \mu_1 \downarrow$ ,  $l_1 \downarrow \downarrow$

Two cases:

1.  $\mu_1 \uparrow$  and  $l_1 \uparrow$ : increase investment in productivity

- investment in politics  $(e_1) \downarrow$
- $l_2 \uparrow$
- 2.  $\mu_1 \downarrow$  and  $l_1 \downarrow$ : reduce investment in productivity
  - investment in politics  $(e_1) \uparrow$
  - l<sub>2</sub>↓

## 2 Literature

- Hillman (1991): decide between lobbying and investing in internal monitoring of production. In book at library, HF1372.158 1991 3rd Floor (Helpman and Razin)
- Rodrik (1996): use labor to make lobbying (p. 5/15)
- Krueger (1974)
- Sturzenegger F. (1993) never got published

# 3 Feedback

SEAs, Tampa, November 2017

- Maia L. (Richmond): Why would lobby invest in technology?
- Woan Foon: what happens when there are more countries (as in GATT)?
- Kerem: why not K instead of A?
- Kamal: changing preferences...