Gradualism

ECN 490

May 1, 2018

1 Original Model with Government / Lobbying Effort

Lobby

$$\max_{e^t, m^t, l^t} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} \left\{ A(m_t) F^{\alpha} \cdot l_t^{1-\alpha} \left[P^W + \tau(\gamma(e_{t-1})) \right] - l_t - \mu_t - e_t \right\} \quad \text{ s.t. } \quad m_t = m_{t-1} + \mu_t$$

Bellman Equation

$$V_l(e_t, m_t) = \max_{e_t, m_t, l_t} \left\{ A(m_t) F^{\alpha} \cdot (l_t)^{1-\alpha} \left[P^W + \tau(\gamma(e_{t-1})) \right] - l_t - \mu_t - e_t + \beta V_l(e_{t+1}, m_{m+t}) \right\}$$

Value Function

$$V_l(e_t^*, m_t^*) = \left\{ A(m_t^*) F^{\alpha} \cdot (l_t^*)^{1-\alpha} \left[P^W + \tau(\gamma(e_{t-1}^*)) \right] - l_t^* - \mu_t^* - e_t^* + \beta V_l(e_{t+1}^*, m_{t+1}^*) \right\}$$

t =this period

t + 1 = next period

 $\beta = discount factor$

l = lobby

2 No Government / Lobbying Effort, Technology Depreciates

Lobby

$$\max_{m^t, l^t} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} \left\{ A(m_t) F^{\alpha} \cdot l_t^{1-\alpha} \cdot P^W - l_t - \mu_t \right\} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad m_{t+1} = (1-\delta) m_t + \mu_t$$

$$\text{So } \mu_t = m_{t+1} - (1-\delta) m_t$$

Bellman Equation

$$V_l(m_t) = \max_{m_t, l_t} \left\{ A(m_t) F^{\alpha} \cdot (l_t)^{1-\alpha} \cdot P^W - l_t - (m_{t+1} - (1-\delta)m_t) + \beta V_l(m_{t+1}) \right\}$$
In the optimal stage $m_t = m_t^* = m_{t+1}^*$

Value Function

$$V_l(m_{t+1}^*) = \left\{ A(m_{t+1}^*) F^{\alpha} \cdot (l_t^*)^{1-\alpha} \cdot P^W - l_t^* - (m_{t+1}^* - (1-\delta)m_{t+1}^*) + \beta V_l(m_{t+1}^*) \right\}$$
Which implies that

$$V_l(m_{t+1}^*) = \frac{1}{1-\beta} \left[A(m_{t+1}^*) \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot (l_t^*)^{1-\alpha} \cdot P^W - l_t^* - \delta(m_{t+1}^*) \right]$$

FOCs

$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial V_l(m_{t+1}^*)}{\partial m_{t+1}^*} &= \frac{1}{1-\beta} \cdot \left[\frac{\partial A(m_{t+1}^*)}{\partial m_{t+1}^*} \cdot F^\alpha \cdot l_t^{*1-\alpha} \cdot P^W - \delta \right] \\ \frac{\partial V_l}{\partial m_t} &= \frac{\partial A(m_t^*)}{\partial m_t^*} \cdot F^\alpha \cdot l_t^{*1-\alpha} \cdot P^W + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot \left[\frac{\partial A(m_{t+1}^*)}{\partial m_{t+1}^*} \cdot F^\alpha \cdot l_t^{*1-\alpha} \cdot P^W - \delta \right] \cdot (1-\delta) = \delta \\ \frac{\partial V_L}{\partial l_t} &= (1-\alpha)A(m_t^*) \cdot F^\alpha \cdot l^{-\alpha} \cdot P^W = 1 \\ \text{rearrange } l_t^{*1-\alpha} &: (1-\delta)A(m_t^*) \cdot F^\alpha \cdot P^W = l_t^{*\alpha} \\ \text{square } \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \right) \text{ on both sides } = \left[(1-\delta)A(m_t^*) \cdot F^\alpha \cdot P^W \right]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} = l_t^{*1-\alpha} \end{split}$$

Euler Equation:

$$\frac{\partial A(m_t^*)}{\partial m_t^*} \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot \left[(1 - \delta) A(m_t^*) \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot P^W \right]^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot P^W + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \cdot (1 - \delta)
\cdot \left[\frac{\partial A(m_{t+1}^*)}{\partial m_{t+1}^*} \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot \left[(1 - \delta) A(m_t^*) \cdot F^{\alpha} \cdot P^W \right]^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot P^W - \delta \right] = \delta \quad (1)$$

Simplified Euler Equation:

$$\begin{split} \operatorname{Set} \left[\frac{\partial A(m_t^*)}{\partial m_t^*} \cdot F^\alpha \cdot P^W \right] &= \Pi \text{ and } \operatorname{Set} \left[(1-\delta)A(m_t^*) \cdot F^\alpha \cdot P^W \right]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} = Z \\ \operatorname{Then} \Pi + Z + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot (1-\delta) \cdot \Pi \cdot Z - \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot (1-\delta) \cdot \delta = \delta \\ \Pi \cdot Z \left[1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot (1-\delta) \right] &= \delta + \left[\frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot (1-\delta) \right] \\ \Pi \cdot Z \left(\frac{1-\beta+\beta-\beta\delta}{1-\beta} \right) &= \frac{\delta(1-\beta)}{1-\beta} + \frac{\beta\delta-\beta\delta^2}{1-\beta} \\ \Pi \cdot Z \left(\frac{1-\beta\delta}{1-\beta} \right) &= \frac{\delta-\beta\delta^2}{1-\beta} \\ \Pi \cdot Z &= \frac{\delta(1-\beta\delta)}{1-\beta} \cdot \frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta\delta} \\ \Pi \cdot Z &= \delta \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} \operatorname{Change} \big[(1-\delta) A(m_t^*) \cdot F^\alpha \cdot P^W \big]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} & \text{ to } \Big[(1-\delta)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot A(m_t^*)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot F^{1-\alpha} \cdot P^{W\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \Big] \\ & \frac{\partial A(m_t^*)}{\partial m_t^*} \cdot F \cdot P^{W\frac{1}{\alpha}} \cdot (1-\delta)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot A(m_t^*)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} = \delta \\ & \frac{\partial A(m_t^*)}{\partial m_t^*} \cdot A(m_t^*)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} = \frac{\delta}{(1-\delta)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \cdot F \cdot P^{W\frac{1}{\alpha}}} \\ & t = \text{this period} \\ & t+1 = \text{next period} \\ & \beta = \text{discount factor} \\ & \delta = \text{depreciation rate} \end{split}$$

l = lobby