ARGUMENTATIVE INDICATORS

A Pragma-Dialectical Study

Frans H. van Eemeren, Peter Houtlosser
and A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
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A Pragma-Dialectical Study

FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands

PETER HOUTLOSSER
Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands

A. FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS
Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Springer

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PREFACE

Argumentative Indicators in Discourse: A Pragma-Dialectical Study is the result of a research project aimed at identifying and analysing words and expressions that are of special significance to the analysis of argumentative discourse in discussions and texts. In the project, we systematically connected pragmatic insights in the linguistic characteristics of argumentative language use and dialectical insights in the argumentative moves that are instrumental in resolving differences of opinion by testing the acceptability of the standpoints at issue in a critical discussion.

Initially, the project concentrated on argumentative indicators in Dutch. It was subsidised by the *Vlaams-Nederlands Comité voor Nederlandse Taal en Cultuur* (Flemish-Dutch Committee for Dutch Language and Culture) of The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, NWO, dossier 205-41-012, and carried out at the University of Amsterdam in the *Instituut voor Functioneel Onderzoek van Taal en Taalgebruik* (Institute for Functional Research of Language and Language Use). After the completion of the Dutch study, we continued the project in the *Instituut voor Cultuuranalyse* (Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis, ASCA) as part of the research programme 'Argumentation in discourse'. In this new phase of the project, we concentrated on translating our Dutch study of argumentative indicators into English, replacing Dutch indicators by English indicators in the process. This meant that the set-up of the project had to be slightly modified. Regretfully, one of the initiators of the project, our dear colleague Rob Grootendorst, had passed away in 2000, so that we had to carry on without his expert advice. Fortunately, in the English part of the project, we were greatly helped by very helpful comments on the manuscript by Manfred Kienpointner and by the assistance of Reinier Zwartjes, translator, and our PhD student Bilal Amjarso. We thank all three of them very much!

Amsterdam, 19 January 2007

Frans H. van Eemeren
Peter Houtlosser
A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans

Department of Speech Communication,
Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric
Universiteit van Amsterdam

CHAPTER 1

THE IDENTIFICATION OF ARGUMENTATIVE INDICATORS

1.1 ARGUMENTATIVE MOVES AND ARGUMENTATIVE INDICATORS

Some words and expressions used in argumentative discussions and texts often indicate that a particular argumentative move is being made. The use of 'in my opinion', 'to my mind', 'the way I see it' or 'thus' or 'therefore' may, for example, introduce a standpoint, and the use of 'because' or 'given that' argumentation. We call words and expressions that may refer to argumentative moves such as putting forward a standpoint or argumentation *argumentative indicators*. The use of these argumentative indicators is a sign that a particular argumentative move might be in progress, but it does not constitute a decisive pointer. The word 'therefore', for instance, can also be used as filler, and, next to an argumentation, the word 'because' may introduce an explanation. Nevertheless, depending on the context, the use of these words is sufficient reason to consider whether a standpoint or an argumentation is being introduced. Other argumentative indicators refer to argumentative moves in a similar way.

Anyone who wishes to critically evaluate an argumentative discussion or text can only do so properly after a careful analysis of the discourse, in order to ensure that the judgment is based on a correct understanding of the argumentative process. Consequently, the analyst of an argumentative discussion or text needs solid grounds to establish what argumentative moves are made in the discourse, and what these moves imply. We, and others, have previously noted in textbooks on the analysis and evaluation of discussions and texts that indicators can play a useful role in such cases.[1] Argumentative indicators constitute keystones in the discourse, facilitating the identification and reconstruction of argumentative moves that are made in argumentative discussions and texts.

Obviously, when justifying an analysis one cannot refer to argumentative indicators until specific words and expressions have been identified as such. For this reason, it makes sense to have an overview that is as comprehensive as possible of the words and expressions that can function as argumentative indicators in a particular language. Naturally, such an overview is only useful for a justification if it is clear to which argumentative moves exactly the different indicators could pertain. *Argumentative Indicators in Discourse* is a study in which we try to answer this need. It is impossible to comprehensively list all argumentative indicators that

[1] See, for example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1996) and van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002).

are to be found in English. Instead, we attempt to provide a fair representation of the various types of words and expressions that can serve as indicators of crucial argumentative moves occurring in argumentative discussions or texts, and to point out when these words and expressions are able to fulfil their indicative function.

We started this study using a wide-ranging definition of the notion of 'argumentative indicators'. This means that we do not consider argumentative indicators to be merely words and expressions that directly refer to *argumentation*, but consider argumentative indicators to include all words and expressions that refer to *any of the moves* that are significant to the argumentative process. Therefore, first and foremost, we need to indicate as accurately as possible which moves we are talking about. For this purpose, section 1.2 describes argumentative practice in the form of a systematic representation known as the *ideal model of a critical discussion* (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 2004).[2] Subsequently, chapter 2 specifies the different types of argumentative moves that are part of a critical discussion in more detail. Adopting this approach enables us to discuss the argumentative indicators in a broad perspective, as well as systematically.

1.2 THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE

This study makes use of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentative discourse. This means that our study of argumentative indicators is guided by four meta-theoretical principles, each of which has specific methodological consequences (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 9–41). With the aid of these principles, a foundation is laid for the integration of critical and empirical insight into argumentative discourse, allowing the normative and descriptive dimensions of argumentation studies to unite, which is necessary to create a suitable theoretical framework for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discussions and texts. The four principles consist of 'externalisation', 'socialisation', 'functionalisation' and 'dialectification' of the object of study (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984: 4–18).

Our point of departure in the explanation of these pragma-dialectical principles is that argumentation is an attempt to resolve or prevent a difference of opinion by critically testing the acceptability of a standpoint that is in doubt. Although the act of advancing a particular argumentation, just like the act of retracting, doubting, rejecting, or attacking a particular standpoint, might be initiated by all kinds of 'internal' motives, the crucial point is that one can only be held responsible for what one has put forward, either directly or indirectly, and for what one, explicitly or implicitly, has committed oneself to. For this reason, argumentation theory is, in our view, not in the first place concerned with internal processes of reasoning or the psychological dispositions of those involved in a

[2] Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) constitutes an English adaptation of the Dutch van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1982), and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) is an English adaptation (and correction) of the Dutch van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2000).

difference of opinion, but rather with the positions that are verbally expressed or indicated. This is the reason why pragma-dialectical argumentation theorists primarily focus on the speaker's or writer's externalised or externalisable commitments as they can be derived from the discourse.

Externalisation of commitments is in pragma-dialectics achieved by primarily focusing the attention on the specific obligations a speaker or writer creates in a certain context through the speech acts performed in an argumentative discussion or text. In this approach, significant concepts, like 'accepting' and 'disagreeing', do not simply indicate a certain state of mind, but obtain a concrete meaning because they are described in terms of public commitments in a context of disagreement. For example, in its externalised form 'accepting' boils down to expressing a positive commitment to the proposition under discussion. 'Disagreeing' involves two different parties expressing incompatible commitments to one or more propositions. Consequently, 'convincing' can be externalised as the explicit acceptance of a positive commitment to a proposition, where the one accepting this positive commitment previously had an incompatible position.

Argumentation is always part of a communication process between individuals or groups engaged in a (usually partly implicit) exchange of views starting from a difference of opinion. In spite of this social embedding of argumentation in a process of communication, in some theoretical approaches to argumentation the study of argumentation is completely isolated from the way in which this process occurs in practice. In those cases, elements of the argumentative discussion or text, such as 'major premises' and 'minor premises', are distinguished on 'structural grounds' that are independent of the communication process in which they are expressed. Pragma-dialectics on the other hand acknowledges explicitly that argumentative discourse is part of a communicative activity. That is why the argumentation that is advanced is always analysed in relation to the way in which the verbal interaction between the participants in the communication process proceeds. Bringing forward standpoints and argumentation and responding to the (real or assumed) standpoints and argumentation of others are viewed as socially motivated moves in a collective process of conflict management.

Socialisation of argumentative discourse means that commitments to argumentative moves are related to the verbal interaction in which they occur. In pragma-dialectics, socialisation is realised by taking the utterances that are made in an argumentative discussion or text to be parts of a dialogue aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by having a critical argumentative exchange. In addition, the argumentative moves made in this dialogue are related to the interactive roles the parties involved in the difference of opinion fulfil in the interaction. These roles are connected with the specific positions to which the parties have committed themselves with regard to the difference of opinion or to which they, in view of the commitments they made during the interaction, can be held accountable. Commitments that are concomitant to taking up certain positions can be activated within the context of the interaction and during the resolution process new commitments may be added, depending on the utterances that are made and the stage of the resolution process in which they occur. Therefore, the context of interaction plays an important part in the analysis of contributions made to resolving a difference of opinion in an argumentative discussion or text.

Argumentation is put forward as a response to, or in anticipation of, a difference of opinion, and serves a function in the regulation of disagreement. In principle, the argumentation that is advanced is geared to resolving a difference of opinion by providing a justification – or refutation – of the standpoint under discussion, thus ending any doubts about the acceptability of this standpoint. The need for argumentation, as well as the structure of the argumentation and the requirements that the argumentation should meet when being evaluated, are related to the doubt or criticism that must be overcome by means of arguing. That is why the purely structural characterisation of argumentation to be found in various formal and informal approaches, even though it might be illuminating to a certain extent, falls short since it does not start from a functional rationale for this type of discourse.[3] In pragma-dialectics, argumentative discourse is understood as a purposive verbal activity that has a function in the regulation of disagreement and has a structure that is essentially determined by this function.

Functionalisation of argumentative discourse means that each verbal activity which is executed in an argumentative discussion or text is treated as a purposive act. In pragma-dialectics, functionalisation is realised by considering the utterances which are made in argumentative discourse as 'speech acts', and, subsequently, by specifying the 'identity conditions' and the 'correctness conditions' that apply to the performance of these speech acts (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 30–33). The analysis of the speech acts performed enables us to determine which argumentative move is made in a particular stage of the resolution process. Identifying the identity and correctness conditions sheds light on the disagreement space that exist in a particular case and clarifies the way this disagreement space is exploited in the argumentation (Jackson 1992: 261, van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs 1993: 102–104). Against this background, it is easier to analyse an utterance of which the purpose is not immediately obvious and to determine which communicative and interactive goals the speech act may be expected to serve within the resolution process.

Argumentation is suitable for resolving a difference of opinion in a critical way only if, in principle, it may be helpful in overcoming the antagonist's doubts or criticism. This implies that the approach towards argumentative discussions and texts chosen in developing a theory of argumentation needs to do justice to the requirements for resolving a difference of opinion and cannot be limited to giving a description of the actual practice of argumentation. In order to ascertain to what extent the way in which argumentative discourse is performed actually is beneficial to the resolution of the difference of opinion, we need a standard by which we can judge the quality of the discourse. For this reason we use in pragma-dialectics an ideal model of a 'critical discussion' that is optimally directed at resolving a difference of opinion.

[3] This holds true for characterisations of the 'internal' structure of argumentation in terms of argument schemes as causal argumentation, comparative argumentation and symptomatic argumentation, as well as for characterisations of the 'external' structure, in terms of multiple, coordinative and subordinative argumentation (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 73–89, 94–102).

Dialectification of argumentative discourse is realised in pragma-dialectics by treating the moves that are made in an argumentative discussion or text as speech acts that must conform to the rules that are to be observed in a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. The purpose of a dialectical approach is to determine how differences of opinion can be resolved by testing the acceptability of the standpoints at issue. The standard provided by the ideal model of a critical discussion allows us to systematically examine in which respect, and to what extent, argumentative practice deviates from the critical ideal of reasonableness. The rules for a critical discussion regulate the parties' discourse, and together form a dialectical discussion procedure, in which the structure of the process of resolving a difference of opinion is indicated in a systematic way and the speech acts are specified that play a role in the various stages of the resolution process.

The principles of externalisation, socialisation, functionalisation, and dialectification have some general consequences for our pragma-dialectical study of argumentative indicators. Our analysis of words and expressions that may indicate argumentative moves will focus on the specific argumentative commitments created for the speaker or writer by the use of these words and expressions. Our analysis will place the words and expressions concerned in a context of purposive interaction with listeners or readers. Our basic units of analysis are speech acts, or combinations of speech acts. All words and expressions that may be indicators of argumentative moves made by performing these speech acts are analysed from the perspective of a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by testing the acceptability of the standpoints that are at stake in the difference of opinion.

1.3 ORGANISATION OF THIS STUDY

The identification and analysis of words and expressions that can function as argumentative indicators is important, in the first place for establishing an analysis of argumentative discussions and texts that can serve as a starting point for a well-founded evaluation. Such a reconstructive analysis has to result in an 'analytic overview' that represents the following: the difference of opinion around which the argumentative discussion or text revolves, the way in which different stages of the resolution process are manifested in the discussion or text, the division of the burden of proof with regard to the standpoints under discussion, the common procedural and material starting points, the (explicit and implicit) arguments that are brought forward in the resolution process, the argument schemes used in these arguments, the way in which the arguments are organised in more or less complex argumentation structures, and the way in which the discussion is concluded (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 93–94).

When making an inventory of words and expressions that could serve as indicators of argumentative moves, we start from the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion intended to resolve a dispute. We make use of 'dialectical profiles' describing the course of the resolution process which are inspired by the 'profiles of dialogue' introduced by Walton and Krabbe (1995). We identify and analyse the argumentative indicators typical of the different stages of the resolution process by determining, for each stage of the critical discussion, the words

and expressions indicating the (combinations of) argumentative moves that can be carried out in that particular stage and by discussing the problems that occur in their identification and analysis. Every time we discuss clues in (1) the presentation of the moves, (2) the criticism that the moves receive, and (3) the speaker's or writer's continuation of the argumentative discussion or text (immediately) afterwards. In this endeavour, we start from examples drawn from spoken and written argumentative practice and give attention to the conditions to be met before particular words or expressions are able to fulfil a certain argumentative function.[4]

Chapter 2 provides a description of the theoretical framework for this study, presenting us with an overview of the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion. First, we indicate the dialectical stages that should be distinguished in resolving a difference of opinion. Second, we examine pragmatic moves that play a constructive part in the different phases of a critical discussion. Starting from this overview of a critical discussion, we look closer at the 'dialectical profiles' that are our point of departure in the treatment of the linguistic clues that serve as a tool in tracing and analysing the various (combinations of) pragmatic moves.

Chapter 3 deals with the indicators that play a role in the 'confrontation stage', the starting phase of a critical discussion. In order to deal with the indicators of confrontation systematically, we first outline the dialectical profiles for the types of differences that need to be distinguished in an analytical overview. After discussing some general tools for the identification of standpoints, we pay attention to 'propositional attitude indicating expressions' and 'force modifying expressions', distinguishing between 'weak assertive' and 'strong assertive' propositional attitude indications and tenor modifications. The explanation of these terms sets the ground for a discussion about dispute indicators such as *doubt* in a 'single non-mixed difference'. In this discussion, we distinguish between questions aimed at obtaining an explanation (enquiries), and questions aimed at obtaining support (requests). In addition to indicators of non-mixed differences, we also discuss indicators of 'mixed differences' as well as indicators of 'qualitatively multiple differences'.

Chapter 4 focuses on indicators of the distribution of the burden of proof. This chapter starts by explaining what is meant by the distribution of the burden of proof. (First, we explain what the burden of proof consists of.) Next, we outline the dialectical profiles for establishing the burden of proof and use them to examine some issues pertinent to the analysis of the distribution of the burden of proof. After this, several types of indicators are reviewed: indicators of a challenge to defend a standpoint, indicators of the acceptance of a one-sided burden of proof, indicators of the rejection of a one-sided burden of proof, and indicators pertaining to the distribution of sequence in the case of a two-sided burden of proof.

Chapter 5 deals with indicators of the starting point of a discussion. When discussing words and expressions that can be of use in the identification of a starting point, we start from a 'dialectical core profile' of the establishment of

[4] Our collection of material includes texts and argumentative discussions from the Eindhoven Corpus, proceedings of the Dutch Lower House, the Internet, letters to the editor and other publications in newspapers and magazines.

a starting point. In the analysis of the establishment of starting points, we first deal with indicators concerning a suggestion to accept a proposition as a starting point. In relation to this, we distinguish expressions which suggest that a starting point has already been accepted, expressions indicating that a – assumed – starting point is actually being used as basic assumption in an argumentation, and other indicators. The different uses of 'given that' and 'because', ranging from justifying statements to stating reasons and denoting causes, are given special attention. Subsequently, we focus on indicators of responses to a suggestion to accept a proposition as a starting point. This may concern an unrestricted acceptance of the proposition or an acceptance with restrictions on the argumentative use of the proposition. Of course, the rejection of a starting point, reasoned or not, is of importance as well.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to indicators of argument schemes. First, we discuss the use of argument schemes in a critical discussion. Second, we look at indications for argumentation by analogy, indications for symptomatic argumentation, and indications for causal argumentation. Each type of argumentation is typified in detail. Third, we give attention to indications in the presentation, such as expressions pointing to the relationship between the type of argument involved and the standpoint and expressions pointing to an aspect of this relationship or a particular subtype of it. Next, we discuss indications in the criticism targeted at the argumentation of the type in question. After this, we concentrate on indications in the follow-up of the argumentation after the speaker or writer criticised it. Finally, we pursue some complications that might occur in relation to indicators of argument schemes.

Chapter 7 is about indicators of the argumentation structure. In this chapter, the different forms of complex argumentation are distinguished. Next, we discuss indications in the verbal presentation of 'subordinate argumentation', 'multiple argumentation', and 'coordinative argumentation'. For this purpose, we distinguish between unambiguous and ambiguous indications for the relationship in question. In the case of coordinative argumentation, we also distinguish between indications for 'cumulative' coordinative argumentation, and indications for 'complementary' coordinative argumentation. We then go on to discuss indications for the argumentation structure that can be found in the criticism targeted at arguments and deal with a number of complications regarding complex argumentation.

In chapter 8 we conclude our study with a discussion of the indicators of the end result of the argumentation. Starting from a diagram of dialectical closing profiles, we first examine indicators that establish the end result achieved by the protagonist and then indicators that establish the end result achieved by the antagonist. In doing so, the pragma-dialectical treatment of indicators is concluded in a systematic way. Because the division of the book neatly fits the specific theoretical perspective in which the treatment takes place, in this case there is no sense in adding an index to the volume. After all, those who are familiar with pragma-dialectics know where they have to look while for those without knowledge of the pragma-dialectical terminology an index would be useless because they would not know what to look for. Instead, we made sure to provide a detailed table of contents.

CHAPTER 2

THE IDEAL MODEL OF A CRITICAL DISCUSSION AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 DIALECTICAL STAGES IN A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

In order to clarify the meaning of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentative discourse, an ideal model of a critical discussion has been formulated that is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 2004).[5] This model specifies the dialectical stages that have to be distinguished in resolving a difference of opinion, as well as the verbal moves that serve a constructive purpose in the different stages of the resolution process. The point of departure is that a difference of opinion is resolved only when the parties involved agree whether the controversial standpoint is acceptable or not. This means either that one party must be convinced through the other party's argumentation that his standpoint is acceptable, or that the other party has to retract his standpoint, because he recognises that his argumentation is unable to withstand the criticism passed on it. Resolving a difference of opinion is not the same thing as *settling* a dispute. A dispute is settled when the difference of opinion has been ended one way or the other, for example, by means of a vote or because an outsider intervened. However, this does not have to mean that the difference of opinion has actually been resolved. The latter is only the case if a regulated exchange of arguments and criticism occurs and eventually leads to a common agreement about the acceptability or unacceptability of the standpoints under discussion.

In a critical discussion, the parties involved in a difference of opinion try to resolve their difference by means of a regulated exchange of views, in order to reach agreement on the acceptability or unacceptability of the standpoints under discussion. If the 'protagonist' and the 'antagonist' of each standpoint comply with the dialectical procedure, they try to reach a reasonable agreement concerning the tenability of the protagonist's standpoints in the light of the antagonist's critical responses.[6]

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[5] A critical discussion constitutes a reflection of the Socratic ideal, which has been adopted in critical rationalism, to subject everything one believes in to a dialectical test: factual judgements as well as value judgements and normative standpoints (Albert 1975). Starting from the fallibility of human thought and action, the basic principle for judging all standpoints is the methodological principle of a critical test.

[6] For an illustration of this method, see the 'formal dialectics' of Barth and Krabbe (1982) that present a method to establish whether or not a proposition is tenable. This method implies a systematic check to ascertain whether maintaining the proposition leads to contradictions or not. The 'intersubjective testing procedure' of pragma-dialectics corresponds with this basic principle (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984: 169).

Unlike the procedures followed in logical approaches, dialectical procedures for conducting a critical discussion do not only concern the logical relationship between the premises and the conclusion of the reasoning used in argumentation, but concern all speech acts that play a part in the assessment of the acceptability of standpoints. In dialectical procedures, the emphasis is on consistency. In line with critical rationalist thinking, the testing of statements is put on a par with tracking inconsistencies. If in the same discussion contradictory statements are explicitly maintained, at least one of them must be withdrawn (Albert 1975: 44).

When analysing and evaluating argumentative discussions and texts, the ideal model of critical discussion serves both a heuristic and a critical function. The heuristic function is that the model serves as a guiding principle. The model enables us to track, and theoretically interpret, all aspects and elements in the discourse that are relevant to a well-considered assessment. In the case of institutionalised discourse activities, such as lawsuits, scientific discussions, policy documents and political debates, the guiding quality of the ideal model of a critical discussion is supplemented with specific conventional expectations concerning the structure of the text and the speech acts relevant in it.[7] The critical function of the model is that it provides a standard for assessment. It specifies in fact a number of standards in light of which we are able to determine how an argumentative exchange of views deviates from the course of events conducive to resolving a difference of opinion.

The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation assumes that argumentative discourse is part of an exchange of views between two parties with a difference of opinion, even in cases in which the exchange of views occurs in the form of a monologue. The argumentative part of this monologue is then regarded as that portion of a critical discussion in which the protagonist has the floor to defend his standpoint while the antagonist's portion of the critical discussion remains implicit. Even if the role of the antagonist is not actively filled, it is possible to analyse the protagonist's argument as a contribution to a critical discussion intended to meet (possible) doubts or criticism.

The different stages of a critical discussion correspond to the stages that – from an analytical point of view – must be completed in an argumentative exchange of views in order to resolve a difference of opinion. In pragma-dialectics, we distinguish four stages in the resolution process, which we call the discussion stages of a critical discussion. They are the 'confrontation stage', the 'opening stage', the 'argumentation stage', and the 'concluding stage'.[8] Argumentative practice usually does not require the explicit completion of all four stages, but it is impossible

[7] Those expectations are derived from knowledge about the communicative 'activity type' or type of text that is being analysed and the prevailing formal and informal institutional conventions (see, for example, Feteris 1989). Understanding the verbal and non-verbal context and utilising general and specific background knowledge are important too.

[8] Although the 'rationale' of the classification differs, the discussion stages that are distinguished in pragma-dialectics overlap to some extent the rhetorical phasing (*exordium*, *narratio*, *argumentatio*, *peroratio*). The dialectical phasing is instrumental in resolving the difference of opinion; the rhetoric phasing is instrumental in acquiring the audience's assent.

to resolve a difference of opinion in a reasonable way unless each stage of the resolution process has been dealt with in an adequate manner.

In the *confrontation stage* of a critical discussion it is made clear that a standpoint is not accepted because it encounters doubts or objections, which imply a difference of opinion. The difference of opinion can be expressed explicitly, but in practice it may quite possibly remain implicit as well. If the latter is the case, either the existence of a difference of opinion is presupposed or a possible difference of opinion is anticipated in the argumentative exchange of views. Without such a – real or supposed – confrontation of argumentative positions, there would not be a reason to have a critical discussion.

In the *opening stage*, those involved in the difference of opinion work out whether they share sufficient starting points (in the form of shared knowledge, values, rules, etc.) for a fruitful discussion. Only if there is mutual commitment to a common point of departure, which might also include procedural agreements, it makes sense to have a go at clearing up a difference of opinion by means of an argumentative exchange of views. One of the parties must then be prepared to take on the part of protagonist and to defend the controversial standpoint while the other party must be prepared to take on the part of antagonist and respond critically to the standpoint and the defence of the protagonist.[9] In an argumentative exchange of views, the opening stage usually remains largely implicit, because the existence of the required common basis is taken for granted. In actual practice, the opening stage corresponds with the stage of the resolution process in which the parties manifest themselves as such and determine whether there is a basis for a meaningful exchange of views.

In the *argumentation stage*, the protagonist comes up with arguments for his standpoint that systematically refute the doubts or critical responses of the antagonist or deny their relevance. The antagonist considers whether he accepts the adduced argumentation. If he thinks the argumentation, or part of it, is not convincing or not completely convincing, he asks for more support. The protagonist then provides further argumentation, etc. This way, the structure of the protagonist's argumentation can become very complicated. Consequently, some texts may have a simple argumentation structure while others have a very complex argumentation structure.[10] In argumentative practice, some elements of the argumentation stage often remain implicit, but obviously we cannot speak of an argumentative discussion or text if no argumentation has actually been put forward. In order to resolve a difference of opinion, it is also essential that the argumentation that is advanced is assessed in a critical manner. If this is not the case, we cannot speak of a critical discussion.

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[9] It is possible that the role of antagonist coincides with the role of protagonist of another (opposite) standpoint, but doubting a standpoint does not necessarily imply taking a standpoint of ones own. As soon as the antagonist takes an opposite standpoint, the difference of opinion is mixed.

[10] Because argumentation can be complex in different ways, different argumentation structures need to be distinguished, ranging from 'multiple' argumentation to 'coordinatively compound' and 'subordinatively compound' argumentation. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 73–89) and Snoeck Henkemans (1992, 2003b).

In an argumentative exchange of views, the *concluding stage* corresponds with the stage of the critical discussion in which the parties decide on what the attempt to resolve the difference of opinion has produced. The dispute can only be considered resolved if the parties have either agreed that the standpoint of the protagonist is acceptable, which means that the antagonist's doubt must be withdrawn, or that the standpoint of protagonist must be withdrawn. In the first case the dispute is resolved in favour of the protagonist, in the second case in favour of the antagonist. In practice, the result is usually put into words by one of the parties, but if the other party does not agree, there is no resolution either.

When the concluding stage is concluded, the argumentative exchange of views has come to an end, but this does not mean that the same arguers cannot start a new discussion. The issue in this new discussion can be a difference of opinion that is totally different from the former one, but it can also be a more or less altered version of the former difference of opinion, possibly using other starting points. In order to resolve this new difference of opinion, the same discussion stages must be completed, i.e. from the confrontation stage to the concluding stage.

2.2 PRAGMATIC CHARACTERISATION OF ARGUMENTATIVE MOVES AS SPEECH ACTS

Speech act theory provides a suitable instrument for dealing with verbal communication that is directed at resolving a difference of opinion in accordance with the pragma-dialectical principles. Using this theory, the verbal moves made in the various stages of a critical discussion to resolve a difference of opinion can be described as speech acts.[11] This way, we are able to shed light on the conditions that the various moves have to meet. On the basis of the typology of speech acts proposed by Searle (1979), we shall indicate which speech acts provide a constructive contribution to resolving a difference of opinion. This typology distinguishes five types of speech acts, some of which are immediately significant to a critical discussion, while others are not – at least not directly, but they can play a part in a critical discussion if they *indirectly* express some other type of speech act that *is* relevant (see van Eemeran 1987).

The first type of speech acts distinguished by Searle are the assertive speech acts, or *assertives*. These are speech acts through which the speaker or writer describes a state of affairs regarding a certain matter. By performing a speech act of this type someone commits himself to a lesser or greater degree to the acceptability of a particular proposition. The prototype of an assertive is an assertion by which the speaker or writer commits himself to the truth of a proposition, e.g. 'I claim that Chamberlain and Roosevelt never met'. However, many assertives do not involve a declaration of truth, but rather a judgement on the acceptability of the proposition in a broader sense. In such assertives, the speaker or writer gives his view on the event or the state of affairs expressed in a proposition, 'In my opinion, there are no exceptions to the freedom of speech', 'It seems to me that Reve is the best Dutch writer', 'Baudelaire is the greatest French poet'.

[11] See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1991) for the importance of the speech act perspective for the different components of the study of argumentation.

In principle, all varieties of assertives can occur in a critical discussion. They may serve not only to express the standpoint under discussion, but also to advance argumentation in defence of the standpoint, or to determine the result of the discussion. Standpoints or arguments can be put forward using such assertives as statements, claims, suppositions, and denials. The belief in the proposition and the degree of commitment to the proposition expressed in a standpoint or argument may range from exceptionally strong, like in the case of an assertion or a statement, to considerably weaker, like in a supposition.[12] If the standpoint is found to hold true when a conclusion is reached, it will be maintained in the concluding stage by means of an assertive ('It is (therefore) the case that …'), and if the standpoint must be withdrawn, it is denied using an assertive ('It is not so that …').

The second type of speech act consists of the *directives*. By means of these speech acts the speaker or writer attempts to persuade the listener or reader to do something or to give up something, e.g. to request and to forbid. The prototype of a directive is an order, which requires a special position of the speaker or writer with regard to the listener or reader. The phrase 'Come to my room' can only be an order if the speaker has a certain authority over the listener, otherwise it would be a request or an invitation. 'To ask' is a directive that amounts to a special form of request: it is a request to perform a verbal act, i.e. to answer. Other examples of directives are to recommend, to beg, and to challenge.

Not all of the directives serve a constructive role in a critical discussion, but some do. Their constructive function is to challenge the party who has come up with a standpoint to defend this standpoint, to request arguments to support the standpoint, or to request a definition, an explanation or another *usage declarative* (see below). Directives such as orders and prohibitions are fundamentally banned from a critical discussion. In addition, the party who has come up with a standpoint can only be challenged to argue his standpoint; a challenge to a fight, for instance, is in this case not permitted.

The third type of speech act is made up of *commissives*. By means of these speech acts a speaker or writer commits himself to the listener or reader to do something or to give up something. Contrary to the directive, the commissive implies that the speaker or writer acts himself, instead of the listener or reader. The prototype of a commissive is a promise, in which the speaker or writer explicitly commits himself to do something or to give it up, e.g. 'I promise you I won't tell your father'. To accept or to agree with something are both commissives too. It is also possible that the speaker or writer commits himself to something the listener or reader could be less enthusiastic about, 'I promise you that I shall fight your ideas in every way I can'.

Commissives may play different roles in a critical discussion:
(1) to accept a standpoint or not; (2) to accept a challenge to defend a standpoint; (3) to decide to begin a discussion; (4) to agree to take on the part of protagonist or antagonist; (5) to agree with the rules of discussion; (6) to accept argumentation

[12] In argumentative practice, speech acts are often performed implicitly, and besides assertives other speech acts may indirectly serve as a standpoint or an argument as well. In those cases the pragma-dialectical analysis involves an analytic reconstruction.

or not; and – if relevant – (7) to decide to start a new discussion. Some commissives that are useful in a critical discussion, like agreeing with the rules of the discussion, can only be performed in collaboration with the other party.

The fourth type of speech act is made up of the *expressives*. The speaker or writer uses this type of speech act to express his feelings by congratulating, thanking, regretting, etc. Examples are, 'I congratulate you with your appointment', 'Thanks for your help', 'What a pity things turned out this way'. There is no clear prototype of this speech act. An expression of joy would be, for example, 'I'm glad you are back to normal again'. There is a mix of hope and envy in the expressive, 'I wish I could have a nice girl friend like you have'. Finally, there is irritation in 'I'm fed up with you hanging around here all day'.

Expressives do not have a specific constructive role in resolving a difference of opinion because the mere expression of feelings does not create propositional commitments relevant to resolving. This means that expressives do not play a part in a critical discussion. Of course, this is not to say that they cannot have any influence on the success of argumentative discourse. If someone groans that the discussion will not go anywhere or that he is unhappy with the discussion, he is expressing an emotion which draws the attention away from the development of the resolution process, which means that (in this case) these expressives could influence the course of events negatively by distracting the participants.

The fifth type of speech act consists of *declaratives* or *declarations*. If the speaker performs these speech acts, he brings a specific state of affairs into the world, for instance if a chairman says, 'I call the meeting to order'. The performance of a declarative creates a new reality. If an employer addresses one of his employees with the words, 'You are fired', he does not just describe a certain state of affairs, but actually creates this state of affairs by uttering these words. As a rule, declaratives are tied to institutionalised contexts, like meetings and church ceremonies, in which there is no doubt who has the authority to perform the speech act. An important exception to this rule is the subtype of *usage declaratives*, distinguished by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 109–112), which particularly relate to language use, and which are not tied to a specific institutional context. The purpose of usage declaratives – including, for instance, to define, to specify, to explain, and to elucidate – is to increase or facilitate the listener's or reader's understanding of other speech acts. The speaker or writer performs these speech acts to shed light on how a particular speech act (or part of a speech act) should be interpreted.

With the exception of usage declaratives, declaratives do not play a role in a critical discussion, because they do not directly contribute to resolving a difference of opinion by mutual agreement. They are based on the authority of the speaker or writer in a particular institutional context and the best they could do is play a part in settling a difference of opinion. Usage declaratives, however, can serve a useful function in a critical discussion. Their performance does not require the existence of a special institutional relationship between the participants in the discussion and they increase the understanding of other speech acts in the discussion. Usage declaratives may occur in any of the four stages of a critical discussion, and in each stage of the discussion the performance of a usage declarative may be requested. For example, performing a usage declarative in the confronta-

tion stage could have the constructive result that a pseudo dispute is exposed as such. In the opening stage, a usage declarative can resolve uncertainties about a discussion rule or another component of the point of departure. In the argumentation stage, a usage declarative can prevent premature acceptance or rejection. Finally, in the concluding stage, a usage declarative can prevent reaching a bogus solution. In the same way, usage declaratives can prevent a lot of superfluous discussion moves.

Now that we have systematically described which types of speech acts from the range of speech act categories can play a role in a critical discussion, we conclude with a summary for each type of speech act (see Figure 2.1).

The distribution of the different types of speech acts among the different stages of the resolution process is described in the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion. The ideal model describes for each stage of the discussion which representative of a particular type of speech acts serves a specific role in that stage of the discussion. We provide a summary of the distribution of speech acts in a critical discussion in Figure 2.2.

	ASSERTIVES
I	expressing a standpoint
III	advancing an argumentation
IV	maintaining or retracting a standpoint
IV	establishing a result
	COMMISSIVES
I	acceptance of a standpoint or not, repeating that the standpoint is not accepted
II	acceptance of a challenge to defend a standpoint
II	decision to discuss; agreement on discussion rules
III	acceptance of an argumentation or not
IV	acceptance of a standpoint or not, repeating that a standpoint is not accepted
	DIRECTIVES
II	challenge to defend a standpoint
III	requesting an argumentation
I-IV	requesting a usage declarative
	USAGE DECLARATIVES
I-IV	provide a definition, a specification, amplification, et cetera

FIGURE 2.1 The role of different types of speech acts in resolving a difference of opinion

I	CONFRONTATION
ASSERTIVE	expressing a standpoint
COMMISSIVE	acceptance a standpoint or not
[DIRECTIVE	requesting a usage declarative]
[USAGE DECLARATIVE	definition, specification, amplification, et cetera]
II	OPENING
DIRECTIVE	challenge to defend the standpoint
COMMISSIVE	acceptance of the challenge to defend the standpoint
	agreement on premises, and the discussion rules
[DIRECTIVE	requesting a usage declarative]
[USAGE DECLARATIVE	definition, specification, amplification, et cetera]
III	ARGUMENTATION
DIRECTIVE	requesting argumentation
ASSERTIVE	advancing argumentation
COMMISSIVE	accepting argumentation or not
[DIRECTIVE	requesting a usage declarative]
[USAGE DECLARATIVE	definition, specification, amplification, et cetera]
IV	CONCLUDING
COMMISSIVE	acceptance of the standpoint or not
	repeating that the standpoint is not accepted
ASSERTIVE	maintaining or retracting a standpoint
	establishing the result of the discussion
[DIRECTIVE	requesting a usage declarative]
[USAGE DECLARATIVE	definition, specification, amplification, et cetera]

FIGURE 2.2 Distribution of speech acts among the four stages of a critical discussion

2.3 DIALECTICAL PROFILES FOR PRAGMATIC PATTERNS OF MOVES

The ideal model of a critical discussion is a good starting point for the description of argumentative indicators for two reasons. In the first place, the model provides a specification of all the speech acts that can have a constructive function in the various stages of critically resolving a difference of opinion. This allows us to include in our study not only indicators of a standpoint or argumentation, such as 'therefore' and 'given that', but also indicators of other moves that play a role in the resolution process. For instance, which verbal indicators signify that a participant in a discussion accepts the burden of proof for his standpoint (or tries to get out of it)? Which indicators are related to the establishment of the premises of the argument? And which indicators refer to the result of the discussion? Secondly, since the function of the different moves is linked to the different stages of the resolution process, the model provides the possibility to classify the different kinds of indicators in a functional manner.

Assuming that argumentative discussions and texts and the argumentative moves made in such argumentative discourse have – at least potentially – the objective of resolving a difference of opinion in a critical way, we believe this model can be considered a template for the crucial tasks that parties involved in the difference of opinion have to perform. If it turns out that language users do not fulfil all these tasks in everyday argumentative discourse or do not fulfil all of them completely, it still holds true that all the tasks specified in the model are functional for scrupulously resolving a difference of opinion, and so, technically, they should be performed one way or the other. Consequently, one of the uses of the model is to identify moves which in real world cases are not explicitly or completely expressed. Even in the case of moves that are apparently (or even actually) fallacious, we are of the opinion that it is methodologically acceptable to use the ideal model for conducting a critical discussion to identify these moves as argumentative moves.

Participants in argumentative discourse who want to resolve a difference of opinion in a reasonable way have the freedom to make use of 'strategic manoeuvring' to advance and sell their standpoint as convincingly as possible (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002). In our terms, this strategic manoeuvring consists of rhetorically exploiting the pursuit of the dialectical goals that have to be realised in the different stages of the critical resolution process. This manoeuvring can be legitimate, but it can also derail, and become fallacious. Because every discussion move needed in the resolution process is open to strategic manoeuvring, it is basically possible for each move to derail and become fallacious. Particularly, because we cannot tell in advance whether the dialectically relevant moves needed in the resolution process will be carried out in a legitimate way, we should also use the ideal model of a critical discussion to identify moves which are potentially or actually fallacious.

How do we expect to identify the moves that are relevant according to the ideal model of a critical discussion? When we explained the model, we provided a general picture of tasks that have to be performed in a critical discussion, but we did not specify the manner in which the various contributions to the resolution process can be established. According to the overview of the opening stage of a critical discussion, for example, the participants in the discussion have to agree

on the procedural and material points of departure for the discussion, but it is not specified in the model which moves could lead to such an agreement in this stage. However, our objective requires that we do have a detailed specification at our disposal, since we can only establish that a particular expression indicates a particular move when it has become clear exactly which moves are involved.

We intend to provide a step-by-step specification of the moves that can help to accomplish a specific task in a certain stage or substage of the discussion that the participants in the discussion have to perform. The heuristics we have developed for this purpose consists of the use of *dialectical profiles*. These heuristics are inspired by the notion of 'profiles of dialogue' as presented and applied by Walton and Krabbe in several publications (Walton 1989, Krabbe 1992, Walton & Krabbe 1995, Krabbe 1999). A dialogue profile is, according to Walton and Krabbe, 'a connected sequence of moves and countermoves in a conversational exchange of a type that is goal-directed and can be represented in a normative model of dialogue' (Krabbe 1999: 2, Walton 1999: 53). In the same vein, we understand a dialectical profile, more specifically, as a specification of the sequential pattern of the moves that the parties are allowed to make, or should make, in a particular stage or substage of a critical discussion in order to realise a particular dialectical goal.

In order to explain in greater detail what we mean by a dialectical profile, we provide an example of how such a profile is created. This example shows how in the opening stage of a critical discussion agreement is reached about the burden of proof for a standpoint that has been put forward in the confrontation stage. In the simplest case, in which the standpoint only meets with doubt, i.e. a non-mixed dispute, this agreement either entails that the protagonist will defend the standpoint, or that he will not. But what kind of deliberation leads to these results?[13] And which moves can the parties make in either case to reach one of these results?

When we draw up a profile, we first need to determine which party has to initiate the deliberation, and what kind of move this party has to make. The proper procedure for conducting a critical discussion entails that the party who has advanced a standpoint in the confrontation stage of the discussion (we will call him P) may be challenged in the opening stage by the other party (A) to defend his standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). Once the challenge has become a fact, it is up to P to respond. He may either accept the challenge or reject it. If P accepts the challenge, this particular deliberation is over: the result is that P will defend his standpoint. If P refuses to accept the challenge, A may respond to this refusal. He has two options. His first option is to demand that P withdraws his standpoint while he maintains his doubt about P's standpoint. In that case the deliberation is over as well. A's second option is to ask P *why* he thinks he does not need to defend his standpoint. Subsequently, P's response to this request could be that he either withdraws his standpoint after all or comes up with a reason why he thinks he does not need to defend his standpoint here and now. The deliberation may then continue on the subject of P's reasons. For instance, P might say that he does not want to

[13] The word *deliberation* (not intended as a technical term) is used to indicate a specific part of a critical discussion in which the discussing parties deliberate upon – or negotiate – the material and procedural positions they will take for the duration of the discussion.



FIGURE 2.3 Example of a dialectical 'starting' profile

defend his standpoint because he believes that it would be a good idea if A, who is so much better at arguing, played the devil's advocate and tried to defend the standpoint instead. In turn, A should respond to this proposal, etc. However, for the time being, we will stick to the 'starting profile' shown in Figure 2.3.

This dialectical profile shows the moves that are relevant to reaching a consensus in the opening stage of the discussion on the issue whether the burden of proof for a standpoint should be accepted or not.

Because a dialectical profile specifies the moves which are dialectically pertinent to a particular stage of a critical discussion, such profiles constitute a good starting point for the identification of argumentative indicators. Incidentally, this does not mean that 'everything is now fixed', since there is not automatically a one-to-one correspondence between moves and the verbal indicators of these moves. In reality, there is no unequivocal indicator available for every move. We imagine the indicators to be different types of points on a scale which ranges from explicit verbal indicators, such as, 'I put forward the following standpoint …', to a little less explicit, but still rather solid verbal indicators, such as 'I have two arguments supporting this …', to more abstract functional indicators, such as the class of speech acts the move is regarded to be part of, to formal indicators, such as the grammatical mood of the sentence in which the move is made, and finally to a total absence of indicators. In addition, some argumentative moves, such as standpoints, are generally equipped with (explicit or implicit) verbal indicators, while other moves usually have to do without an indicator.[14]

[14] Some of the verbal indicators of argumentative moves consist of words or expressions, such as 'given that' and 'because', that also have been studied by other authors, but from another theoretical perspective and with another objective. See, for example, Anscombre and Ducrot (1983), van Belle (1989), Knott and Mellish (1996), Knott and Sanders (1998), Mann and Thompson (1988), Pit (2003), Roulet (1987), Roulet, Filliettaz, and Grobet (2001), Sanders (1992, 1997) and Sweetser (1990). Snoeck Henkemans (2001) compares the theoretical starting points of a number of these approaches with the theoretical starting points of the pragma-dialectical approach of argumentative indicators.

CHAPTER 3

INDICATORS OF CONFRONTATION

3.1 DIALECTICAL CONFRONTATION PROFILES

Because each argumentative discussion or text is based on a dispute with a real or imaginary opponent, it must be clear what the dispute entails in order to be able to adequately judge the discussion or discursive text. Which standpoints do the parties involved take, and what type of dispute is exactly at stake? A pragma-dialectical analysis identifies the various elements in an argumentative discussion or text that contribute to the constitution of the dispute, and reconstructs the parts involved in terms of moves in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. In this chapter, we shall examine which words and expressions are able to fulfil an indicative function for this analysis.

Like we showed in chapter 2, a dialectical profile – that is, the dialectically endorsed sequence of moves that might develop in the interaction between parties in a particular stage of a critical discussion – provides a good lead to investigate which words and expressions in the various stages of the discussion could have an indicative function for the relevant moves. For this reason, in this chapter we shall first describe the dialectical core profiles of the course of the discussion in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. In designing these confrontation profiles, we start from the types of disputes in which this discussion stage might result.

The structure of a dispute may be more or less complicated. In the simplest case, one party advances a standpoint, while the other party expresses doubt about the acceptability of this standpoint. An example of such a simple confrontation is dialogue (1):

(1) Per: This state visit to China is no more than sheer opportunism!
Åse: Well, I'm not sure about that …

Here, Per and Åse externalise a *single non-mixed* dispute about the question whether the state visit of the Swedish King to China was motivated by opportunism. Per puts forward a positive standpoint, Åse signals that she does not accept this standpoint just like that. If Per and Åse would decide to conduct a critical discussion in order to try to resolve their dispute, Per would have the obligation to defend his standpoint. Åse has only expressed doubt, and, viewed dialectically, this means she does not have to defend herself.

The dialogue becomes more complicated if Åse not only doubts Per's standpoint, but states an opposite standpoint against his as well:

(2) Per: This state visit to China is no more than sheer opportunism!
Åse: That's not true at all. Of course, it isn't opportunism!

Åse's response creates a *mixed* dispute. Now, she has a standpoint to defend as well. In his turn, Per is expected to doubt the acceptability of Åse's standpoint. As in the case of Åse, who does not have to demonstrate that Per's standpoint is untenable, this does not mean that he is obliged to demonstrate that Åse's standpoint is untenable. Nevertheless, the proposition both standpoints relate to cannot be both true and false. The two standpoints disagree with each other, and for this reason we can assume that Per considers Åse's standpoint untenable, and that Åse considers Per's standpoint untenable. However, their obligation to defend themselves is limited to the defence of their own, positive or negative, standpoint.

A dispute may also become more complex if, rather than one issue, several issues become subject of discussion. If for each of these issues a standpoint is taken which is not accepted, each standpoint necessitates an obligation to defend it, this way creating a multiple dispute. Whether this multiple dispute is mixed or non-mixed depends on the responses given to the standpoints. The dispute in the following dialogue is both *multiple* and *non-mixed*:

(3) Per: This state visit to China is no more than sheer opportunism! And I don't trust the Chinese an inch either.
Åse: Well, I'm not sure about that … And the Chinese … What is one supposed to think about them?

The questions that are raised in this type of multiple non-mixed dispute can be solved independently. Such a 'quantitative' multiple dispute can therefore without difficulty be dissected into a number of single disputes. This would also be the case if the dispute were – wholly or partially – mixed, instead of non-mixed. The dispute would become wholly mixed if Åse reacted to Per's standpoints with, 'That is not true at all. Of course, it isn't opportunism, and the Chinese are a very reliable people'. The dispute would be partially mixed and partially non-mixed if Åse would say something like, 'Opportunism? I'm not sure about that. But, in any case, the Chinese are very reliable people'.

The dispute becomes really complicated if Per puts forward only one standpoint while Åse not only states a standpoint that is contradictory to it, but also provides an alternative that is contrary to Per's standpoint. This occurs in the following dialogue:

(4) Per: This state visit to China is no more than sheer opportunism!
Åse: That's not true at all. I think it is a sincere attempt at ideological reconciliation.

Because Åse has advanced a contradictory as well as a contrary standpoint, the dispute becomes both mixed and multiple. Actually, the dispute would also have been multiple and mixed if Åse had limited herself to advancing an alternative standpoint. This kind of dispute presents a problem to the analyst, because it

may not always be clear whether the alternative standpoint is a contrary standpoint or just a different standpoint. In such cases, the use of 'but' points to a contrary relationship.[15] However, the point of this example is not just multiplicity in a 'quantitative' sense, as described above, for Åse does not put forward two standpoints about two separate issues, but two standpoints about the same issue. On top of this, the dialectical relationship between her standpoints is such that a successful defence of the contrary standpoint would imply a successful defence of the opposite standpoint as well. If Åse succeeded in making a reasonable case for the standpoint that the state visit to China is a sincere attempt at ideological reconciliation, she would at the same time make a reasonable case for the idea that this state visit is not merely motivated by opportunism. We call this type of dispute *multiple in a qualitative sense*.

A dispute that is multiple in a qualitative sense is always also mixed with regard to the issues under discussion. The one who has advanced the original standpoint may not have stated explicitly that the *opposite* of the contrary standpoint is true, but if he maintains his own standpoint against the contrary standpoint, he does take responsibility for this at a later stage. If someone who claims it is hot meets an opponent who claims it is cold, the first person also has to take responsibility for the claim that it is not cold, if he wants to live up to his claim. Conversely, if someone claims it is not hot in such a situation, he obviously does not have to take responsibility for the claim that it is cold: contrary claims cannot be both true, but they can be both false. Dialogues (5) and (6) are examples of these cases:

(5) T1: It is hot in here.
T2: Hot?
T1: Yes.
T2: I would say it was cold in here.

(6) T1: It is hot in here.
T2: It is not hot in here.
T1: It is.
T2: I would say it was cold in here.

At first, T2 only signals in (5) that he does not accept the standpoint of T1, but after this he puts forward an alternative standpoint of his own. In (6), T2 puts forward two standpoints that must be defended independently. If the claim that it is not hot in a place has been defended, this does not automatically provide defence for the claim that it is cold in that place. In this qualitative variety of a multiple mixed dispute, the standpoints are connected in a special way. After all, a successful defence of the second standpoint implies that the first standpoint has been defended as well: if it is cold in a place, then – assuming the same standards – it is not hot in that place. A dispute, like the one in dialogues (5) and (6), is not (only) multiple in a quantitative sense, but (also) in a qualitative sense.

[15] See section 3.3.3.

	T1	T2
Single non-mixed	+|–/p	?/(+|–/p)
Single mixed	+|–/p	+|–/p
Quantitative multiple non-mixed	+|–/p1, +|–/p2	?/(+|–/p1), ?/(+|–/p2)
Quantitative multiple mixed	+|–/p1, +|–/p2	–|+/p1, –|+/p2
Qualitative multiple mixed	+|–/p1, –|+/p2	–|+/p1, +|–/p2 [D+|–/p2→ D–|+/p1]

p = the proposition the standpoint relates to; + = positive standpoint;

– = negative standpoint; ? = doubt; / = with regard to; | = or; D = defence of;

→ = implies

FIGURE 3.1 A pragma-dialectical typology of disputes

Essentially, the types of disputes that are distinguished in the pragma-dialectical theory have now been described. We have a 'single non-mixed' dispute, in which one of the parties advances a standpoint and the other party casts doubt on it, a 'single mixed' dispute, in which the parties state opposite standpoints, a 'quantitatively multiple' non-mixed or mixed dispute, in which one party advances a number of standpoints, which are doubted or rejected by the other party; and a 'qualitatively multiple' dispute, in which both parties advance standpoints and at least one standpoint has a contrary relationship to a standpoint of the other party.[16] Figure 3.1 represents a formal notation of the types of disputes that may occur between language user 1 (T1) and language user 2 (T2).

In order to show how a specific type of dispute may be verbally marked, we shall first clarify in which prototypical ways the different types of disputes can be established. This we do by specifying with the aid of 'confrontation profiles' which sequences of moves in a wholly externalised discussion lead to a particular type of dispute. On the basis of these confrontation profiles, we systematically verify which (combinations of) words and expressions can function as indicators of the different kinds of disputes.

Dialectical profiles of the different types of disputes

A dispute is initiated when one party (T1) puts forward a standpoint and the other party (T2) makes clear that he does not share this standpoint; at least not just like that. The dispute, as it is reflected at first, does not have to be the definitive dispute, for in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion both parties have the opportunity to maintain their position on further consideration or not (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984). For instance, it is possible that someone who has put forward

[16] In most taxonomies of coherence relationships (e.g. Sanders 1992), the kind of 'confrontation relationship' between the positions of two different parties, about which we are talking here, is not specified.

a standpoint decides, on second thoughts, not to start a discussion about this standpoint, and prefers to withdraw it instead. And someone may take back his doubt, because, on reflection, the other person's standpoint appeals to him. On the other hand, it is also possible that he accentuates his doubt to an opposite standpoint. So, in the confrontation stage several 'rounds' might be necessary before the type of dispute that constitutes the issue of the discussion has been definitely established. The following newspaper article illustrates the fact that, in practice, it is often considered necessary to pass through several rounds in the confrontation stage:

(7) Supporters and opponents of IJburg meet

> Amsterdam – Probably, the IJmeer dyke near Durgerdam has never seen so many people on a drizzly and windy Sunday before. Many citizens of Amsterdam used their last free day before the referendum about the new IJburg district to size up the situation. Many strollers are still unsure about the standpoint they are going to take on Wednesday. 'Before I vote, I want to see what the area looks like,' says Ethel ten Brink. 'I was against the plan, but now that I see this I'm beginning to have doubts about what I have to do'. [...] Her friend Wim Vermeer is confident, 'I'm still against the plan. I think building flats above the motorway is a better plan. […] I don't see why there should be apartment blocks over here'. Two people from Utrecht, Gerard Hoskens and Marja Boer, do not understand why the citizens of Amsterdam are making such a fuss. 'Looking at it from here, I would vote in favour of the plan', says Marja Boer. But they consider it hard to weigh the pros and cons.
>
> […] 'I'm in doubt, but I'm inclined to say no, because this area is a vital link in a chain of wetlands between Waterland and the lake area near the Gooi', says Lydia, who does not want to reveal her last name. […]
>
> (*de Volkskrant*, 17 March 1997)

The ideal model of critical discussion does justice to the possibility of withdrawal, adjustment, and revision of the standpoints taken, by allowing the definitive positions, i.e. the constitutive elements of the eventual dispute, to establish themselves in two (or more) confrontation rounds. By means of dialectical profiles, we shall indicate the different patterns in the moves that are made in the different rounds, leading to disputes of a particular type. Using dialectical profiles, the genesis of all types of disputes can be specified in this way.

A *single non-mixed dispute* arises because T2 doubts T1's standpoint, and both parties maintain their position, or because T2, at first, expresses a standpoint that is opposite to T1's standpoint, but, on second thoughts, reduces it to doubt. Assuming an initially positive standpoint of T1, which is maintained at a later stage, these two possibilities can be represented in a dialectical core profile as in Figure 3.2.

A possible complication is that T1 may review his standpoint, which could cause the parties to agree, after all, in the second round, or could even lead to a single non-mixed dispute about a negative standpoint. Conversely, an initially negative standpoint may also give rise to a single non-mixed dispute about a positive standpoint. These complications we are leaving out of consideration.



FIGURE 3.2 Dialectical core profile for a single non-mixed dispute



FIGURE 3.3 Dialectical core profile for a single mixed dispute

A *single mixed dispute* arises because T2 immediately expresses a standpoint that opposes T1's standpoint and maintains it, or because he first only doubts T1's standpoint but accentuates it to become an opposite standpoint at a later stage (see Figure 3.3).

Obviously, here too, it holds true that the course of the dialogue might be more complicated.

More than one standpoint is under discussion in a *multiple dispute*. Whether these standpoints only meet with doubt or that opposite standpoints are taken as well, determines whether the multiple dispute is wholly mixed, wholly non-mixed, or partly mixed and partly non-mixed (see Figure 3.4).

A multiple dispute that corresponds to this profile can easily be divided into a number of single disputes. This means that the dialectical profile of the genesis of a multiple dispute comes down to a combination of the dialectical profiles of single disputes that were specified previously. The matter becomes more complicated if a multiple dispute arises because T2, after externalising that he does not accept T1's standpoint, on second thoughts, takes up an alternative standpoint against T1's standpoint. In such a case of qualitative multiplicity, the alternative



FIGURE 3.4 Dialectical core profile for a multiple dispute



FIGURE 3.5 Dialectical core profile of a quantatively and qualitatively multiple dispute

standpoint is not just another standpoint, as we have mentioned earlier, but a standpoint whose defence has direct implications for the first standpoint under discussion. If a dispute is not just multiple in a quantitative sense, but also in a qualitative sense, the relationship between T2's first and second standpoint must be accounted for in the core profile. We do this by making clear that T2's alternative standpoint, viewed dialectically, implies a standpoint that is opposite to T1, and by symbolising this as [→ −/p1] (see Figure 3.5).

Obviously, in practice, T2 could advance an alternative standpoint immediately after T1 has expressed his standpoint, but in a wholly externalised dialectical exchange T2 would have to express, at first, that he does not accept T1's standpoint. After all, T1 must have the chance to adjust or withdraw the standpoint he adopted in response to T2's opposition. And, in his turn, T2 may not see the need to state an alternative against T1's standpoint until it is clear that he maintains it. A follow-up in which T1 rejects T2's alternative standpoint is unnecessary. From the fact that T1 adopted, and has maintained, a standpoint that is ruled out by T2's alternative standpoint it follows that he rejects T2's alternative standpoint.

Because T1 does not need to respond, T2 has no cause to state explicitly that he maintains his alternative standpoint.

Now we have described the dialectical core profiles of the genesis of the different pragma-dialectical disputes we continue this chapter by examining which words and expressions may serve as indicators of the various moves that are made in the profiles. Section 3.2 starts with the indicators of the move that in all profiles initiates the dispute: putting forward a standpoint. Subsequently, section 3.3 examines the indicators of the different forms of opposition against a standpoint and the dispute structures that arise in various cases.

3.2 INDICATORS OF STANDPOINTS

3.2.1 Tools for the identification of standpoints

In order to be able to determine systematically the type of dispute that is at issue in a particular case, we need to know which words and expressions indicate that someone has taken a standpoint in a real situation. For this reason, it should first be clear what exactly we mean by a *standpoint*. The best way to answer this question in the framework of a speech acts analysis as is conducted in pragma-dialectics, is by formulating the conditions under which an utterance may be interpreted as a standpoint.

In principle, in the Searlean typology of speech acts, an utterance in which a standpoint is expressed would be considered to belong to the category of the *assertives*. The performance of assertives has to meet specific felicity conditions (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, van Eemeren 1987, and, in particular for standpoints, Houtlosser 1995, 2002). According to the essential condition of the speech act of advancing a standpoint, an utterance that constitutes a standpoint entails taking responsibility for a positive or negative position with regard to a particular proposition. This means that the speaker (or writer) commits himself to defending a positive or negative position with regard to that proposition. The proposition to which the positive or negative position relates consists, according to the propositional content condition, of one or more utterances. In the case of standpoints, the preparatory condition is that the party who advances the standpoint assumes that the other party will not accept it just like that, but that he will be able to defend his standpoint with the help of arguments. According to the responsibility (or sincerity) condition, the speaker assumes that his standpoint is acceptable, and he intends to actually defend it with the help of arguments if requested to do so.

A positive standpoint expresses a positive judgement concerning a proposition, and a negative standpoint a negative judgement. In both cases, the speaker performs an assertive that is not acceptable to the listener at face value. Even if the speaker assumed that the assertive he performed would be acceptable to the listener, and, at first, had not at all the intention to advance a standpoint, if he not withdraws it, he is considered responsible for the standpoint if the listener doubts it, and is then compelled to make it acceptable to the listener. This means that the following criterion can be laid down for considering the performance of an assertive as 'advancing a standpoint':

An assertive may be considered a standpoint if it is clear that the speaker supposes (or may be expected to suppose on the basis of the listener's response) that the assertive is not immediately acceptable to the listener.

How does it become apparent that this criterion has been met? Primarily, of course, this becomes clear if the listener expresses opposition. In section 3.2.2, we examine the indicators of opposition. First, however, we focus on the speaker's presentation of an assertive that might be a standpoint:

In which way can it become clear from the presentation of an assertive that the speaker supposes that the assertive he has performed will not be acceptable to the listener at face value?

In answering this question we distinguish two types of presentation indicators. In the linguistic literature these indicators are called 'propositional attitude indicators' and 'force modifying expressions'.[17] (8), (9), (10), and (11) are examples of the use of indicators of a propositional attitude; (12), (13), (14), and (15) are examples of the use of force modifying expressions:

(8) *I really believe that* Hank is a bit soft in the head.

(9) *I believe that* she is coming.

(10) *I think that* you might as well forget it.

(11) *I'm sure that* Barbara never said anything about it.

(12) *In my view*, there's no sense in pressing the point.

(13) *It is quite certain that* aunt Corry wants another biscuit.

(14) *Of course*, you mustn't take your chance with those people.

(15) Right, *to my mind*, the matter is cleared up now.

Pragma-linguistic knowledge of the mechanisms active in language use teaches us that the use of propositional attitude indicators or force modifying expressions can tell us something about the force the speaker wants his assertion to have, and about his estimation of the situation. If he uses an propositional attitude indicator, such as 'I believe that', he does not only make it obvious that he believes something, but also that he assumes that the listener needs this extra information to understand that the assertion involves a (subjective) notion of the speaker. A speaker who uses a force modifying expression, such as 'it is quite certain that' does not only signal that he wants to assure the listener of something, but also that he assumes that, without this addition, the listener would not understand that the speaker wishes to assure him of something. So, besides his literal words, the speaker indicates something more with the use of such expressions.

[17] See also Houtlosser (2002), and for a description of other, less directly relevant, types of presentation indicators Houtlosser (1995, chapter 5).

The fact that a speaker uses an attitude indicating expression or a force modifying expression, both to clarify the force of his assertive and to signal the necessity of this clarification, does not have an immediate relevance to the problems of identifying standpoints. That relevance arises only when it is clear that the speaker who is using these means does not do so because he assumes the addition is necessary to clarify the force of his assertive, but rather because he expects that the listener is not going to accept the assertive at face value. We can use Grice's theory on the rationality of conversation to explain how this meaning can be conveyed, for, strictly speaking, the use of the attitude indicating or force indicating expression is in this case superfluous, since the clarification is not required, according to the speaker. The fact that, in spite of this, an attitude indicating expression or a force modifying expression is used could be considered a violation of the Cooperative Principle, unless we assume that something special is implicated by it. In section 3.2.2, we show that under certain conditions this implicature may entail that the speaker signals that he expects that the listener will not accept his assertive at face value. In that case, the use of a propositional attitude indicator or a force modifying expression could signify that the speaker anticipates the listener's doubt about the acceptability of his assertive, which means the assertive must be considered a standpoint.[18]

3.2.2 Several kinds of propositional attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions

The use of propositional attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions may signify that the speaker anticipates doubt on the listener's side if both the following conditions are met: (a) the expressions can be used parenthetically, (b) they are actually used that way.[19]

Expressions can be used parenthetically if they can be placed in different positions in the sentence without producing an ungrammatical utterance. For instance, 'I believe' in the sentence 'I believe that John will come in the afternoon' can be moved to the middle of the sentence or to a final position in the sentence without affecting the grammaticality of the sentence, e.g. 'John will come, I believe, in the afternoon', and 'John will come in the afternoon, I believe'. However, this does not apply to expressions such as 'I am sorry that', and 'it is likely that', judging by the ungrammaticality of 'John will come, I'm sorry, this afternoon', and 'John will come this afternoon, it is likely'. So, these expressions cannot be used parenthetically, and they cannot signify a standpoint in the sentence because they cannot serve to modify the force of the assertive. Someone who says 'I'm sorry you haven't told me this earlier' does not claim that the listener has not told 'this' earlier, but that he regrets that the listener has not told *him* earlier. Someone who says, 'It is likely that John will come this afternoon' does not claim that John will come in the afternoon, but rather that it is probable that he will come in the afternoon.

[18] Katriel and Dascal also point out that force modifying indicators do not necessarily have a mere explicatory function. For instance, they mention that a phrase like 'let me tell you' does not just explicitly formulate the intension of the message, but also indicates 'the speaker's awareness of the hearer's lack of agreement with his view' (1984: 8).

[19] A great number of the notions on which the following explanation is based, is derived from Hooper (1975).

Figure 3.6 shows an overview of propositional attitude indicators (PAI) and force modifying expressions (FME).

Figure 3.6 distinguishes between 'weak assertive', 'strong assertive', and 'semi-assertive' attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions. In *weak assertive* attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions, *only* the complementary proposition is asserted (in parenthetical usage), and the

PAI	FME
Weak assertives	*Weak assertives*
I believe that	in my opinion/judgement
I find that	in my view
I am of the opinion/take the view that	to my mind
I think that	as I see it
I suppose that	it is likely/probable that
I assume that	(probably)
I expect that	(supposedly)
I suspect that	it is right/true/the case/correct that
I have the impression that	(in fact, indeed)
It seems to me that	
Strong assertives	*Strong assertives*
I am sure/certain that	it is clear/obvious that
I am convinced that	it is beyond dispute/question/a (shadow of a) doubt
	there can be no two ways about it/there is no doubt that
	it goes without saying that
	it is certain that
	it is unquestionably/absolutely certain (definite, absolute, real, actual, true, factual)
Semi-assertives	*Semi-assertives*
I know that	it goes without saying that
	(self-evident, of course, natural)

FIGURE 3.6 Propositional attitude indicators (PAI) and force modifying expressions (FME)

used expression or adjunct is not part of the assertion. In *strong assertive* attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions, both the complementary proposition and the indicating expression or modifying adjunct are asserted. The difference becomes clear if a weak assertive attitude indicating expression, e.g. 'I believe that', and a strong assertive attitude indicating expression, e.g. 'I'm sure that', are negated in combination with a proposition. In 'I don't believe that John will come this afternoon', the belief of the speaker is not necessarily negated, but in 'I'm not sure that John will come this afternoon' it is.[20] What is negated in this utterance is not the proposition, but rather that the speaker is sure that John will come. In *semi-assertive* attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions the used expression or adjunct is asserted, while the complementary proposition is in part asserted and in part presupposed. For example, if someone says, 'I know that John will come', he asserts that John will come, but at the same time he presupposes that it is true that John will come. For this reason, semi-assertive expressions and adjuncts are also called *semi-factives*. The characteristic they share with real assertive attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions is that they can be used parenthetically. The characteristic they share, more particularly, with the subcategory of strong assertive expressions is that negating the expression or adjunct, e.g. 'I don't know if', results in the fact that the complementary proposition is no longer asserted, even if it is not denied.

What do parenthetically used attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions owe their potential indicative value to? Literally speaking, the use of such an expression is superfluous if it is clear that the speaker does not assume the addition to be necessary to clarify the exact force of his assertion. This would not constitute a violation of the Cooperative Principle only if we assume that something is implicated. But what would be implicated? This can be determined by examining which Gricean maxim is violated if an attitude indicating expression or force modifying expression is used 'superfluously', and which maxim is actually observed with that violation. We will demonstrate this for weak assertive, strong assertive, and semi-assertive attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions.

In the case of a *weak assertive* attitude indicating expression or force modifying expression the speaker adds to the assertion that he believes or means what he is asserting – which has already been implicated by the sincerity condition of the assertion. Literally speaking, there is no violation of the maxim of Quantity. Assuming that the speaker is not altogether backing out of the Cooperative Principle, we must start from the idea that he is violating in order to avoid a conflict with another maxim. This can be justified by assuming that the violation is committed in order to prevent a more serious violation of the second maxim of Quality, which requires that the speaker should not say anything without sufficient justification or proof. The speaker who initiates an assertion with a weak

[20] Weak asserting force modifying expressions cannot be denied, unless they have the form 'It is X that' ('it is plausible that'). But all force modifying expressions can be converted into this form. For instance, 'I believe that it's raining' can be converted into 'I believe that it is true that it is raining'. Denial of this sentence only causes denial of the complementing proposition ('I believe it is not true that it is raining').

assertive attitude indicating expression, such as 'I think that' or a weak assertive force modifying expression, such as 'in my view', tries to prevent the listener from thinking that what he has said is founded on strong evidence.[21] The implicature of this operation is that the listener who accepts this does so at his own risk.[22] This analysis is supported by the fact that this implicature is, in fact, consistent with the first maxim of Quality, which states that the speaker should not say something he does not believe, for the speaker explicitly says that this maxim has been observed. The implicature makes an issue of the acceptability of the performed assertion.

The category of *strong assertive* attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions includes expressions and adjuncts that express a certain degree of certainty or likelihood. A speaker who avails himself of such an expression or adjunct makes, in fact, two assertions: he asserts the complementary proposition, and he asserts that it is certain or likely that the complementary proposition is correct. However, it remains to be seen what role the expression of certainty or probability plays here: after all, the assertion of a proposition in itself implicates that the speaker deems the proposition true: whether the truth of the proposition is certain or probable does not add anything in a logical sense. So, the expression of certainty or obviousness is unnecessary, unless we assume that the speaker does something else, besides just expressing the certainty or obviousness on which he has based his assertion that the complementary proposition is true. We suppose that the speaker observes the Cooperative Principle, and that the latter assumption is, in fact, the case. This means the speaker implicates that the listener *should accept* the asserted proposition. This implicature comes about as follows: by needlessly adding that the truth of the asserted proposition is certain (obvious, clear, beyond doubt, etc.), the speaker violates the maxim of Quantity. However, by this violation, he shows that he is not violating the first or the second maxim of Quality. By asserting that the truth of the complementary proposition is certain, real, etc., the speaker demonstrates that he is not saying something he believes not to be true (first maxim), and by asserting that the truth of asserted proposition is obvious, clear, beyond doubt, etc., he indicates that he is not saying something for which he has no proof (second maxim).[23] In both cases, he implicates that the listener can accept the asserted proposition and should do so. This implicature also makes an issue of the acceptability of the performed assertion. After all, the speaker would not have to implicate that the listener should accept the asserted proposition if he took it for granted that the listener would do so anyway.

Semi-assertive attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions resemble, to a large extent, strong assertive attitude indicating expressions and force

[21] According to Hooper, he does this 'by suspending the implication that [he] *knows* the proposition to be true' (1975: 101).

[22] Or, like Urmson (1963: 227) says, 'should be received with the right amount of caution'.

[23] Strictly speaking, the speaker shows only indirectly that he does not break this rule. He does not say that he has evidence, but he implies it. After all, what is evident, clear or crystal clear does not need to be proved: it is presupposed that the evidence exists and is known to all, including the listener.

modifying expressions that express certainty (e.g. 'I'm certain', 'I know (for certain) that'). We assume that they also share the same implicature. As is the case in strong assertive expressions and adjuncts, the use of semi-assertive expressions and adjuncts implicates that the listener can accept the asserted proposition and should do so. The use of assertive and semi-assertive attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions brings the acceptability of the performed assertion into discussion on the basis of the implicature. But when do these expressions and adjuncts have the implicature involved? They should, at least, be used parenthetically. But how do we determine if this is the case? And are there still cases in which the implicature is not established after all? We shall try to answer these questions below. First, we deal with a prominent representative of the category of weak assertive expressions, 'I believe that', and then with a few other representatives of this category, 'I think that', 'I find that', and 'in my view'. Subsequently, we discuss the most important representatives of the category of the strong assertive expressions, 'I am sure that', 'I know that', 'it is clear that', and 'of course'.

Weak assertive propositional attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions

As a rule, weak assertive attitude indicating expressions are used parenthetically. This also applies to 'I believe'. Which *exceptions* are there to its parenthetical use? Let us call the non-parenthetical use of 'I believe that' the *reported* use: the speaker is reporting that he is in a specific state of mind. He reports how he has something 'in his mind'. When exactly do we speak of reported use?

The 'I believe that' assertion is reported if at least one of the following three conditions is met: (1) the assertion is a response to a question of the listener about the state of mind of the speaker; (2) the assertion is the (affirmative, negative or corrective) response to the listener's attributing a state of mind to the speaker; or (3) the assertion is a response to doubt or a denial with regard to the reality of the state of mind the speaker implicated in a previously performed assertion to be in under the sincerity condition of that assertion. We provide examples of all three cases:

(16) T1: Do you believe what he said about Gonnie?
T2: *I* do *believe* it, yes. But perhaps I'm too gullible: it might not be true at all.

(17) T1: So, you just know that you are going to finish the book?
T2: Yes, no, wait a moment. *I believe* I will. It is quite possible it won't happen after all, for one reason or the other.

(18) T1: Do you really believe that it will do Hank some good if he gets away from it all for a while, or are you just saying that?
T2: No, *I* really do *believe* that.

In (16), T2 lets T1 know that he believes the story about Gonnie. He primarily complies with T1's request to inform him about his (T2's) state of mind. The

particular purpose of T2 in (16) is not to commit himself to the correctness of the story about Gonnie. He suggests himself that the story might prove to be untrue. In (17), T2 does not assert the complementary proposition either, and, again, he explicitly states that his belief might be unfounded. In (18), T2 does assert something, not the elementary proposition that it would do Hank some good if he 'gets away from it all', but the complex proposition that he (T2) really believes that it would do Hank some good if he 'gets away from it all'. This way, T2 tries to ward off T1's accusation that he is insincere.

How can we identify the reported functions of 'I believe that' assertions? One clue is that it is possible for an assertion to have such a function only if the speaker responds to the utterance of another speaker. It follows that an initiating 'I believe that' assertion can hardly be a reported assertion. In cases of 'I believe that' assertions that are a response to an utterance of another speaker, only the assertions with which the speaker tries to parry an accusation of insincerity are easy to identify. A cause for thinking that this is the case is the use of the adverb 'really'. A speaker who says 'I really believe that' tries to assure the other party that he believes what he says he believes.

Besides the reported use of 'I believe that', there is another exception to the establishment of the implicature that the asserted is not founded on evidence and that the listener accepts it at his own risk. This is the case when the 'I believe that' assertion constitutes a *concession* (see also chapter 5). In the case of concessive use of 'I believe that', the speaker indicates that he accepts the content of the assertion, but that, according to him, the listener's opinion does not follow from it. An example is (19):

(19) *I believe that* .. er .. that something has to change there, but I don't believe that you – that you can say that you that everybody should simply earn the same salary .. I don't think anyone would want that.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

The assertion that something has to change is here not a softened assertion, but an assertion that functions as a concession. The speaker admits that something has to change, but also indicates that it does not follow that everybody should earn the same amount of money.

Concessive use of 'I believe that' can be identified on the basis of *adversative connectives*. The concessive character of the first 'I believe that' assertion in (19) is established when the assertion is followed by another assertion which is introduced by the adversative connective 'but'. The concessive use of 'I believe that' can also be indicated by adverbs like 'certainly', 'indeed', 'truly' and 'really'. Unfortunately, these adverbs are not exclusively used for concessions. They may also occur in non-concessive and even non-parenthetical 'I believe that' assertions. The following example illustrates this for the parenthetical, but non-concessive use of 'I truly believe that'.

(20) *I truly believe that* if it is going to revive, the economy, you would keep those – those jobs, they would always remain vacant, so *I truly believe that* .. er .. it isn't a passing thing that it would always stay this way.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

Except in the case of reported and concessive use, 'I believe that' always implicates that the speaker's assertion is not grounded on proof and that the listener who accepts the assertion does so at his own risk.[24] In order to determine whether an 'I believe that' assertion may be considered a standpoint, however, something else is significant, that is whether or not it concerns a weak or a strong belief. There are at least two *variants of meaning* of the parenthetical 'to believe', a weak one and a strong one. In *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), the weak variety (21) is described as 'to hold (something) as an opinion; think', and the strong variant (22) is described as 'to accept that (something) is true, especially without proof'.

(21) The daughter always says, it's just like Peyton Place over here, but *I believe that* you get this sort of thing at all campsites.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

(22) Well, I don't think it is the cold, *I* simply *believe that* it has more to do with the company.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

In (21), the speaker puts his daughter's assertion that it is like 'Peyton Place' at the campsite into perspective after 'but'. His words after 'but' can be paraphrased as 'I assume that this occurs on every campsite'. In (22), 'simply' indicates that the speaker voices a strong opinion, which can be paraphrased as 'I consider it true that the company is causing the trouble'.

In our opinion, we can only say with a reasonable degree of certainty that assertions constitute a standpoint if they express a *strong* belief with regard to the complementary proposition. This variant of 'I believe that' assertions expresses a strong conviction while the speaker implicates that he does not have real proof. Someone who makes such an assertion implicitly invokes the question what his grounds are. And that question initiates the obligation to defend, which is characteristic of a standpoint.

When is 'I believe that' strong enough to assume that a standpoint is introduced? As far as we are concerned, the rule of thumb would be that we have a standpoint if 'I believe that' can be paraphrased by 'it is my opinion that' or 'I am sure that'. If a paraphrase like 'I suspect that', 'I assume that' or 'if I am correct' seems to be more appropriate, the context decides whether or not we still have a standpoint. This becomes clear if we look at the different uses of 'I believe that' in the following text:

(23) *I believe that* the work that surgeon does is a lot heavier than that nurse's job, and that you simply have to, yes it may sound silly, but that you somehow have to pay for that man's education as well, I don't know, *I believe that* it

[24] An exception seems, in first instance, the use of 'I believe that' in combination with an *argumentative* assertion. However, introducing an argumentative assertion with 'I believe that' has the effect that the acceptability of that assertion is disputed and needs to be supported. So, besides as an argument, the assertion then functions as a *sub-standpoint*.

takes about seven years, or probably even more, and during that time he had to sacrifice a lot, and *I believe that* he must be rewarded for that, yes.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

The first 'I believe that' introduces the opinion that surgeons have a more difficult job than nurses. The interpretation that the speaker expresses an assumption is contradicted by the use of the qualifier 'a lot' before 'heavier'. The third use of 'I believe that' does not introduce an assumption either, but rather the opinion that more difficult work must be rewarded accordingly. However, with the assertion that is introduced by the second 'I believe that' the speaker expresses his uncertainty rather than that he posits his opinion about a surgeon's period of study. The fact that a paraphrase like 'if I am correct' would be more suitable is confirmed by the speaker correcting himself ('or probably even more'). An opinion would not allow for such an immediate correction.

The verb 'to believe' can also be identified as being of the strong variant, if adverbs such as 'absolutely', 'certainly', and 'just' are present. In the weak variant, a combination with these adverbs would be less likely. An indication of the weak variant would be the presence of 'I think', as in (24) and (25):

(24) There is a side-street in-between them .. *I believe* it's called the Borgerstraat .. and it's in that street .. it's in a – I think it's an old school … and it houses a furniture factory that's not expensive .. my mother in law has had that sofa for about seven years now, and it still looks nice, it's sturdy enough.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

(25) I believe that .. er .. that something has to change there, but *I don't believe* that you – that you can say that you – that everybody should simply earn the same salary .. I don't think anyone would want that.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

In (24) as well as in (25) 'I think' can be paraphrased by 'I suppose'. The assertion 'I don't think anyone would want that' (25) sounds more like formulating an opinion than 'I think it's an old school', but still the possibility of paraphrasing it using 'I suppose' indicates that an opinion is out of the question.

In addition, the two variants of 'I believe that' cannot introduce the same types of proposition.[25] The strong variant, which can be paraphrased as 'it is my opinion that' or 'I'm sure that', may introduce a descriptive, an evaluative or an appellative proposition. The weak variant, which can be paraphrased as 'I suppose that' or 'I assume that', can only be combined with a descriptive proposition. It is true that 'I suppose it is a good book' is possible too, but this combination changes the nature of the proposition. The term 'good' is not used to express a value judgment, but rather to indicate that certain descriptive criteria have been met, which means

[25] Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) distinguish between descriptive, evaluative and appellative propositions. A descriptive proposition describes facts and events, an evaluative proposition expresses an assessment of facts or events, and an appellative proposition indicates that a certain approach should be followed or not.

that the term 'good' is used here in a descriptive sense.[26] The proposition is not evaluative, as becomes clear when one considers that the speaker does not give his own opinion but indicates that the book (probably) comes under a category of (good) books which has been established by others.[27] Something similar goes for the appellative proposition, e.g. 'I suppose we have to go'. Instead of the speaker, others are the source of 'have to'. The speaker implicates that someone else thinks that 'we' should go, rather than that he thinks so himself.

In what way does 'I believe that' relate to the other weak assertive attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions, such as 'I think that', 'I find that', and 'in my opinion'? Considering all weak assertive indicators of attitude and force modifying expressions, 'I think that' comes closest to 'I believe that' in neutrality (or multi-functionality). Like 'I believe that', 'I think that' has a weak variant and a strong variant. The strong 'I think that' can be paraphrased as 'I am of the opinion that', the weak 'I think that' as 'I suppose that' or 'I have the notion that'. A strong 'I think that' almost certainly points to a standpoint, but a weak 'I think that' does not. In order to be able to interpret an assertion introduced by a weak 'I think that' as a standpoint, more clues are needed. Like in the case of 'I believe that', a clear hint would be that arguments are adduced in support, as in (25). Apart from that, the same condition applies as for 'I believe that', i.e. the expression must be used parenthetically and non-concessively.

Like in the case of the weak and the strong 'I believe that', specific conditions apply in case of the weak and in case of the strong 'I think that' with regard to its suitability for different types of propositions. Only if 'I think that' is combined with a descriptive proposition, it can be adequately paraphrased as 'I suspect that' or 'I have the notion that'; in combination with an evaluative or appellative proposition, only the paraphrase 'I am of the opinion that' would be suitable. Example (26) shows a strong, example (27) a weak 'I think that':

(26) *I think that* one day I will also buy one of these things. It's a good pastime, I used to do it in the past, but you know, these things you – they shatter before you know it, or a wing breaks off.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

(27) Yes, I wonder if that is – is the cheapest way, you know … *I think that* it would be a smart move if we just bought a ticket from .. er .. London to .. er .. the tip of England or something … and there you can buy one of these tickets again.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

Contrary to 'I believe that' and 'I think that', the expression 'I find that' has only one variant: 'I find that' is always strong, and can only be combined with an evaluative or appellative proposition. If, on the face of it, 'I find that' introduces a descriptive proposition, such as in 'I find that it is four o'clock', the proposition

[26] See, for example, Hare (1952: 145), Toulmin (1958: 33), and Mackie (1977: 55–56).
[27] See Ducrot et al. (1980: 57–92).

must still be regarded as evaluative. We have an *interpretation* in such cases, not a factual conclusion. Such an interpretation is an implicit judgment, for instance, the judgment that it is also four o'clock if the big hand has not yet reached the hour.

If 'I find that' is used parenthetically and non-concessively, it always designates a standpoint. 'I find that' can always be paraphrased by 'I am of the opinion that'. Moreover, it introduces a rather strong opinion, as (28) and (29) will show. For this reason, it may sometimes even be necessary to qualify the utterance, e.g. by 'quite', as occurs in (30):

(28) *I find that* a housewife has .. er .. so much spare time at her disposal .. and so much time to plan for herself that I can't call it a profession.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

(29) In The Netherlands, 170 thousand people earn more than a hundred thousand a year, and many more have a substantial income. Of course, I know that we need part of our money to pay for (expensive) holidays, but are we aware of the fact that these victims will probably never again be able to go on holiday? *I find* it spineless and selfish to unload all responsibility onto the government. *I find that* we have the obligation to close the gap completely. This concerns our closest neighbours, and the problem is calculable and manageable, contrary to global problems. Should we not be able to look each other in the eye without feeling shame the next time we are on holiday in Limburg?
(*de Volkskrant*, 8 January 1994)

(30) *I find that* we did quite a good job, for the roads were icy, ow! terrible! and with all that snow, you couldn't see your hand in front of your face … why, isn't it a bit late to take the meat out of the fridge?
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

Expressions of the type 'I find it Y (that/to)' (where Y is a variable for a characterisation such as 'stupid', 'ridiculous' or 'very positive') come in this category of standpoint indicators as well, for this type of expressions can be substituted by a 'I find that' construction without a substantial change in meaning:

(31) *I* always *find* it so hard to buy summer shoes, I always think sandals are so drab … I much prefer to walk on boots, but well .. you can't do that in summer … I do find that one, yes .. well, I have got a nice denim that – I find those denim jumpers really nice, don't you think, the ones with those cut-in sleeves.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

(32) Changing foreign words in the Dutch language *I find* ridiculous. By changing a word like shampoo into 'sjampo', you take away all its original value. If one really feels that adopting words from another language

is necessary, they should remain as they are. If these words are changed, Dutch becomes a peasant's language, and it looses a certain elegance.
(*de Volkskrant*, U-pagina, 22 January 1994)

(33) Always against these poles … I have thrown bleach against them again … *I* do *find* that so dirty, that yellow dog comes … from over there or something, one of these – these blood pudding dogs, really nice, lovely for the nose.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

In (31), 'I always find it so hard' becomes after conversion 'I find that it is always so hard'; in (32), 'I find ridiculous' becomes 'I find that … is ridiculous'; in (33), 'I do find that so dirty' becomes 'I (do) find that that is so dirty'. In fact, expressions of the type 'I find that X is Y' include two standpoint indicators: 'I find that' and 'X is [evaluative qualification] Y'. However, indicators of the latter type belong to the propositional contents of the assertion. Their indicative function we will deal with below. Incidentally, also expressions of the type 'I find A Y' (where A is a person, or a conduct, and Y a qualification), which occur in (29) and (31), can be converted into an 'I find that' construction. So, this type of expressions signifies a standpoint as well.

Contrary to 'I find that', the force modifying 'in my view' (like many of these adjuncts) can only be used parenthetically. Even an accusation of insincerity cannot be parried by means of 'in my view', unless the speaker at the same time *asserts* what is, in his view, the case:

(34) T1: Is it really true, in your view, that it did Hank some good that he got away from it all for a while, or are you just saying that?
T2: No, *in my view*, it is really true.

On the other hand, 'in my view', like 'I find' and all other weak assertive attitude indicating expressions, can be concessive:

(35) So, *in my view*, it is possible, but if – […] if they behave just as responsibly as .. er .. men I don't know.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

Like in the case of 'I find that', 'in my view' has only one variant: the strong one. On the other hand, it is possible to combine 'in my view' with all types of propositions, not just the evaluative and appellative propositions to which a combination with 'I find that' is limited. In (36), 'in my view' is combined with a descriptive proposition. In (37), the proposition is evaluative, and in (38), it is appellative:

(36) If you drop a ball of cork and a ball of lead, *in my view*, the lead ball would hit the ground first.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

(37) Yes, but *in my view*, that is not exactly what I would call the .. er .. right attitude, I don't know, but I would rather sit alone, than with someone I'm .. er .. not really completely happy with.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

(38) And, on top of that, I would like to add that, *in my view*, you shouldn't mess too much with these – these – with these .. er .. so-called terrible differences in income, at least not in our more or less regulated society.
(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

Except in the case of its concessive use, 'in my view' always indicates a standpoint. In a pragma-dialectical perspective, in which a standpoint can relate to any type of proposition, this expression would be a standpoint indicator *par excellence*. A speaker can use 'in my view' to express his view with regard to any proposition.

With regard to the remaining members of the weak assertive attitude indicating and force modifying expressions we can say that what goes for 'I find that' also goes for other expressions and adjuncts that express an *opinion* ('in my opinion/belief/judgement/view', 'to my mind', 'as I see it', 'it seems to me'), and that what goes for the weak 'I believe that' also applies to other expressions and adjuncts that express a *conjecture* ('I assume that', 'it is likely that', 'I am under the impression that', 'probably', 'I suspect that', 'I expect that', 'I suppose that').

An exception in the category of weak assertive expressions and adjuncts is the type of expression 'it is right/true/the case/correct that'. This can be demonstrated on the basis of 'it is true that'. This attitude indicator does not express a mental state (opinion or conjecture) of the speaker, and can only be used to *confirm* the complementing proposition in response to a (possibly hypothetical) question (but in that case usage would be non-parenthetical), or to make a *concession*. The consequence of these qualities is that an assertive that is introduced by the expression 'it is true that' cannot be regarded as a standpoint. The same holds true for an assertive that is introduced by 'it is right/the case/correct that'.[28]

Summarising, we can state that the use of weak assertive propositional attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions indicates a standpoint, unless these expressions are used non-parenthetically, i.e. reportedly or concessively, or unless the expression can be paraphrased as 'I suppose that'. In addition, some expressions, such as 'I find that', cannot be used in a reported manner, and do not allow a paraphrase like 'I suppose that' either. So, except in the case of concessive use, they always indicate a standpoint. Other expressions, such as 'it is true that',

[28] When these expressions are combined with a negation, as in 'It is not true/accurate/the case/correct that John is ill', no concession is made, but what someone else has said or presupposed before is rejected. In that case, the assertion in which the negating expression is used can be considered a negative standpoint (see also below).

can only be used non-parenthetically or concessively, and, consequently, do not indicate a standpoint.

Strong assertive propositional attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions

To conclude this section, we discuss the most important representatives of the category of *strong assertive* attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions: 'I am sure/certain that', 'it is clear that', 'I know that', and 'of course'. We determine in what way the use of these expressions relates to the use of the other members of the category.

Unless they are used to report a certain mental state, assertions that are introduced by a strong assertive attitude indicating or force modifying expression always implicate that the listener should accept the asserted proposition. In some cases, it should be accepted because otherwise one would have to assume that the speaker says something for which he does not have a justification; in other cases – as in the case of 'I'm sure that' – it should be accepted because otherwise one has to assume that he is saying something that is untrue. The odd thing is that when strong assertive expressions and adjuncts are used, in addition to the complementing proposition, the indicated attitude is always asserted as well, but that these expressions and adjuncts cannot be used to assert the indicated attitude exclusively. This is illustrated in the examples (39) and (40), in which the speaker indicates that he primarily asserts the attitude of certainty, using words such as 'really' and 'just', but also asserts that Harm will be on time:

(39) *I am really sure that* Harm will be on time.

(40) *I am just sure that* Harm will be on time.

In other words, in the case of 'I'm sure that', the condition for non-reported use is met by definition. The only other condition for establishing the implicature that the listener needs to accept the asserted proposition is that the assertion does not function as a concession. As described in section 3.2.2, concessions can be identified by adverbs of concession, such as 'indeed', and adversative connectives, such as 'but'. In all non-concessive cases, the implicature is established.

Since none of the strong assertive attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions has a weak variant, which would have a reduced indicative force, its non-concessive use, and therefore also the use of 'I am sure that', always indicates a standpoint.

More or less the same goes for 'it is clear that'. This expression has the implicature that the listener should accept what is asserted, because the speaker is not saying something he cannot justify. If the expression is used non-concessively, this implicature is always in force, which means that 'it is clear that' indicates a standpoint. A difference with 'I am sure that' is that a speaker who introduces an assertion with 'it is clear that' always shields the adopted standpoint from possible criticism: who would dare to deny something that is clear? (see also section 3.2.2).

Of all strongly asserting attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions, 'I know that' is most often analysed in the literature.[29] On the other hand, in practice, this expression is not used as often as the other attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions discussed here. Even when it is used, the expression does not, as a rule, indicate a standpoint, but rather a concession. This is the case in:

(41) *I know that* it is half past three, but why not have just one more?

The following example shows that 'do' can be introduced to mark this type of concession:

(42) *I do know that* it is half past three, but let's have just one more.

Even though a concession always indirectly indicates a standpoint, the expression to which 'I know that' is added, is usually not a standpoint itself. However, it is a standpoint if 'I know that' is combined with the expression 'for certain' in 'I know for certain that'. As far as the indicative function is concerned, this combination corresponds to 'I am sure that', which we discussed above.[30]

We also wish to pay some attention to the combination of 'to know' and a *negation*: 'I don't know'. Although this combination, in itself, does not introduce a standpoint, the colloquial use of 'I don't know' often indicates that a standpoint is being taken. The reason is that 'I don't know' is often used to express doubt about the correctness of another speaker's assertion, which causes the assertion to act as a standpoint (see below). Moreover, 'I don't know' is often followed by the opposite of the assertion to which it responds. When 'I don't know' is, in fact, followed by such an opposite assertion, the use of this expression signals both a positive standpoint of the listener and a negative standpoint of the speaker.[31] This occurs in (43) and (44):

(43) Well, *I don't know* – I don't believe that was exactly why I flunked the test, but they said that I was acting jumpy while driving, and .. er .. well, my idea is – it is my idea that it must be because I keep peeking into small streets, you know.

(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

(44) So if you get groups, then you'd get all these children from different grades thrown together, so you'd get the older children and the younger ones … *I don't know* – I don't believe that would work out too well.

(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

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[29] 'I know that' is a semi-factive, but, as indicated before, we reckon the semi-factives among the strong asserting attitude indicating and force modifying expressions.

[30] An example from the testimony of F. Bovenkerk in the IRT-investigation: 'But I know for sure that big-league drug traffickers among the Kurdish people in The Netherlands, who have a lot of money in The Netherlands, of Turkish origin, are definitely being extorted by the PKK. You know you'll have to pay a certain percentage. That certainly happens'.

[31] See Tsui (1991), who distinguishes three functions of 'I don't know'.

'I don't know' can even be part of the utterance in which, though indirectly, a negative standpoint *is put forward*:

(45) In the early days, you actually were just a number in the classroom, but that, again, takes a lot of time and, because of that, a lot of money too, *I don't know* whether it is, in fact, distributed .. er .. ideally, you know, that money.

(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

Particularly the words 'in fact' indicate that 'I don't know' indirectly asserts that it is not (completely) true that the money is distributed ideally.

The last representative of the strong asserting expressions and adjuncts to be discussed here is 'of course'. Like 'I know that', 'of course' is not primarily used to introduce a standpoint. The primary function of 'of course' is to communicate that something meets the expectations the listener has, or should have, according to the speaker, or to communicate that the beliefs the listener upholds, or should uphold, according to the speaker, are shared by the speaker. The latter function of the word makes 'of course' especially suited to making a concession (see also section 5.3.1) or declaring approval of what another speaker has said. (46) is an example of a concession, (47) is an example of an expression of approval:

(46) If you don't make that much money, then .. er .. you are a larger supporter of the levelling of incomes than when you make a lot of money, that is, *of course*, to be expected .. on the other hand .. er .. I do believe the differences in pay to be way too big, I .. er .. I mean achievements are .. er .. very hard to measure.

(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

(47) […] well yes, no, but *of course*, I think so too, definitely, sure! By the way, did you know that he has not phoned her once – I mean afterwards?

(Overheard conversation)

In concessions, 'of course' is often combined with 'I know that'. The following excerpt from an open letter is an (ironic) example:

(48) *Of course I know*, like everybody else, *that* in reality The Netherlands only consist of Amsterdam. Still, people once considered it necessary to subdivide this Great-Amsterdam, and to call these subdivisions 'cities' and give them names like 'The Hague', 'Groningen', 'Goes', 'Sittard', and (my own place of residence) 'Tilburg'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 6 August 1994)

Furthermore, 'of course' can be used to bring forward a standpoint in a veiled way. Because 'of course' implies that the speaker agrees with the listener's opinion, its use has the effect of presenting the adopted standpoint as self-evident. An example:

(49) I mean, *of course*, it must be paid for somehow, because, I mean, nothing can be had for free, I mean, you will have to pay for your books and stuff yourself, I think.

(*Eindhoven colloquial language corpus*)

'Of course' shares its possibility to introduce a standpoint in a veiled way with 'it is clear that'.

In what way do the strong asserting attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions discussed here relate to the other members of this category? It is true for most strong asserting attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions that they introduce a standpoint, provided they are not used concessively. Included in this group are 'I am sure that', 'I am convinced that', the combination 'I know for sure that', and all force modifying expressions that have the same drift as 'it is clear that'. Moreover, if such a force modifying expression introduces a standpoint, that standpoint is presented as self-evident. For some force modifying expressions ('of course', 'naturally', 'obviously', and 'it goes without saying that') it is true that they point to a concession or an expression of approval more than to a standpoint, but it is still possible to use them to introduce a standpoint. When that happens, the standpoint is likewise presented as self-evident. 'I know that' is an exception in the category of strong asserting expressions and adjuncts: 'I know that' is, as a rule, used in a concession and does in such a case not point to a standpoint.

Summarising, it may be said that strong asserting propositional attitude indicating expressions and force modifying expressions point to a standpoint, unless they are used concessively. In addition, it may be said that some strong asserting expressions and adverbs are suited both for making a concession and for presenting a standpoint as self-evident.

3.3 INDICATORS OF DISPUTES

3.3.1 Doubt as an indicator of a single non-mixed dispute

In the previous section, we described how it may appear from the presentation of an assertion that the criterion has been met that the speaker presumes, or may be expected to presume, that there is doubt in the listener's mind about the acceptability of an assertion put forward by the speaker. Even more than from the presentation of an assertion, however, this can become apparent from the response to an assertion. In the simplest case, such a response implies that doubt is expressed. By such a response, the simplest form of a dispute is created: a single non-mixed dispute. In this section, we shall concentrate on this response of doubt. The question we are going to answer is: which are the identifiers for the identification of an – explicit or implicit – expression of doubt as a pointer to a single non-mixed dispute? In terms of discourse analysis, the expression of doubt regarding the acceptability of a preceding assertion is a 'dispreferred response' (Levinson 1983, Pomerantz 1984a, b). A characteristic of communicative actions in which doubt about a preceding assertion is expressed, is that these actions are, generally, marked: this means that the action

is carried out with signs of reservation. These marks can be stammering, pauses and the use of such expressions as 'uh … uh', 'well', and 'that is to say', which are used to keep one's options open. Such marks are important identifiers for the detection of responses expressing doubt.[32] In specialist literature on discourse analysis, they have been listed and analysed comprehensively (especially by Pomerantz 1984a).

Doubt concerning the proposition to which a standpoint pertains, may be expressed in an explicit way by means of a 'standard paraphrase' of disagreeing with a standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984: 114): 'My point of view is not that p is the case, nor that p is not the case, for I have no view (yet)'. Less direct, but no less explicit, the antagonist can, of course, also say something like 'I doubt that p' or – with an anaphoric reference to the doubted proposition – 'I doubt that', 'That is not immediately apparent to me' or – as a question – 'Is that really true?' Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1996: 34–35) have listed a large number of examples of more or less explicit expressions of doubt. Here is a selection:

I am not so sure about that
One can disagree about that
I do question/have doubts about that
That does raise some doubts in me
I dare say I have serious doubts about that
I am not completely sure about that
I have some objections against that
I can't accept that without question
I wonder if that is (really) true
I don't know
I am not too sure if …
But is that really the case?
But perhaps it is not true
Couldn't it be different?
Couldn't it be so that …?

When these expressions are used, the proposition to which the standpoint relates is in most cases explicitly doubted (and only that), which means that we are then dealing with unambiguous cases of a single non-mixed dispute. Even in this list, however, less unequivocal expressions can be identified. For instance, according to Tsui (1991: 607–622), the response 'I don't know' is not unequivocal: apart from weakening his commitment and signalling potential disagreement, the antagonist may use 'I don't know' to avoid voicing an opinion

[32] Non-preferred responses are generally marked because the participants in a conversation have a preference for agreement. The basis of this preference is, as Goffman indicated, the idea that it may be impolite (or even risky) to openly disagree with someone, and that non-acceptance might cause loss of face (1955, 1967). According to some conversation analysts, the principle of 'preference for agreement' is not always in force. If this is true, the markers we mentioned cannot be considered to be a necessary condition for a non-acceptance response.

that differs from the opinion expressed in the standpoint, or he can indicate that he disagrees with the opinion without expressing that explicitly. The latter is the case, for example, when 'I don't know', immediately and without hesitation, follows the protagonist's standpoint. In that case, according to Tsui, there is 'strong disagreement' – which may be expressed again in the follow-up of the confrontation – and which, in dialectical terms, comes down to having a mixed dispute. Interpretation problems like these may also occur with other markings. This constitutes a structural problem.

We shall concentrate in particular on the interpretation of expressions of doubt that are realised by means of such interrogative words as 'how do you mean' and 'why?'. Such questions pre-eminently deserve to be examined more closely here, because they are used not only to express doubt, but also to simultaneously request further justification. In terms of a critical discussion, this means that these questions do not only have a function in the confrontation stage, but also in the opening stage. An assertion of the other party is doubted, and that party is challenged to take on the role of protagonist of the standpoint under discussion and to defend it by the use of arguments. We shall return to this last function in chapter 4.

The problem with an interrogative response to a preceding assertion – in as far as the phrasing concerned can be used to realise an expression of doubt – is that there are also cases in which such a response is a request for clarification rather than for justification. In that case, doubt in dialectical terms is not the issue. In practice, it can be very difficult to distinguish between requests for justification and requests for clarification. In this section, we therefore focus on this issue.

Requests for clarification and requests for justification

In (50)–(57), the a-statements are requests for clarification while the b-statements are requests for justification. All requests start with an interrogative word and all requests are responses to the descriptive assertion 'Hank buys all of Ann's clothes':

(50a) *Who* does he want to impress with that?

(51a) *What* would I still be able to buy for her?

(52a) *Which* husband wouldn't do that for a woman like Ann?

(53a) *Where* does he buy these clothes?

(54a) *When* did he tell you that?

(55a) *How* did he come up with that idea?

(56a) *How do you mean*? Does she have no taste?

(57a) *Why* would a woman let that happen, one wonders …[33]

(50b) *Who* made you think so?

(51b) *What* kind of proof do you have for that?

(52b) *Which* joker has been telling you tales?

(53b) *Where* did you get that from?

(54b) *When* did you make that up?

(55b) *How* did you come up with that idea?

(56b) *How do you mean*? Hasn't she always done it herself?

(57b) *Why* do you think so?

Although the a-statements and the b-statements start with the same interrogative word, there is a striking difference between them, which is, in our opinion, connected with the type of request the interrogative word introduces: in the a-examples, the question always relates to an aspect, a cause, a consequence of the state of affairs described in the preceding assertion (Hank buying all of Ann's clothes for her) or to the circumstances in which the speaker gained knowledge of this state of affairs. The question in the b-examples, however, always relates to the validity of the information the speaker has provided in the preceding assertion or to the reliability of its source.[34] These differences are a good reason for making a distinction between the two types of requests introduced by an interrogative word.

Sometimes a state of affairs referred to in a preceding assertion may appear to be the subject of a request for justification as well, as in (58):

(58) *What* was Ann doing in the ladies' department of Johnstone's, if that's so? Buying clothes for Hank or what?

This question clearly relates to the state of affairs described in the preceding assertion, 'Hank buys all of Ann's clothes', and it expresses uncertainty about the

[33] In the assertion to which one reacts with these questions, an action is described for which someone (the 'actor', Hank) is responsible. This makes it possible to introduce a request for clarification using 'how do you mean', or 'why', or to make such a request by merely uttering one of those expressions. If in the preceding assertion a situation was described for which no one is responsible, like in 'It is raining', 'how do you mean' could not have been used in that way, and 'why' would have been awkward. A question like 'Why does it always rain when we want to go out?' should be interpreted as a complaint rather than as a request for clarification.

[34] Kopperschmidt makes a similar distinction between two types of 'why'-questions. He calls 'why'-questions that request for clarification 'Sachfragen', and 'why'-questions that request for justification 'Geltungsfragen' (1989: 73).

validity of the information the speaker has provided in this assertion. However, it is not a request for justification. Primarily, the listener is asking the speaker for clarification, that is, he requests an *explanation* for the fact that two incompatible states of affairs are simultaneously true. Due to the fact that, in this case, it is clearly impossible to provide such an explanation, the request for clarification functions as an indirect criticism. Given the fact that the two states of affairs cannot be both true, and assuming that the state of affairs specified in (58) is true, the state of affairs described in the assertion to which the listener responds cannot be true. This explains the apparent exception. We conclude that requests for clarification starting with an interrogative word can, in practice, be distinguished from requests for justification starting with an interrogative word. This is possible by determining whether the question relates to an aspect, a motive, a consequence of the state of affairs that was described in the preceding assertion or to the circumstances in which the speaker gained knowledge of this state of affairs, or whether it relates to the validity of the information the speaker provided in the preceding assertion or the reliability of its source. In the first case, we are dealing with a request for clarification; in the second case, with a request for justification.

There is a second difference between the a-examples and the b-examples in (50)–(57). Unlike the b-statements, the a-statements accept the truth of what is asserted in the preceding assertion. The propositional function, which, according to the propositional content condition of the stated questions, is connected with these questions presupposes that what is claimed in the preceding assertion is true. For instance, according to the propositional content condition, question (50a), 'Who does he want to impress with that?', is connected with the propositional function 'Hank wants to impress X by buying all of Ann's clothes'. This function presupposes that Hank buys all of Ann's clothes. So, stating the question implies that the speaker considers it to be true that Hank buys all of Ann's clothes. In the same way, question (51a), 'What would I still be able to buy for her?', is connected with the propositional function 'Because Hank buys all of Ann's clothes, I can only buy X for Ann'. Again, that function presupposes that Hank buys all of Ann's clothes, which implies that the speaker thinks it is true that Hank buys all of Ann's clothes. The same applies to the questions in (52a)–(57a).[35] The propositional functions connected with the questions in the b-statements do not presuppose that it is true that Hank buys all of Ann's clothes. For instance, (51b), 'What kind of proof do you have for that?', is connected with the propositional function 'S believes that he has proof X (and Y, etc.) for the supposed fact that Hank buys all of Ann's clothes', and (57b) 'Why do you think so?' is connected with the propositional function 'S thinks that Hank buys all of Ann's clothes because of reason(s) X (and Y, etc.)'. Neither of these functions presupposes that Hank buys all of Ann's clothes, because there is an intensional context (S 'believes that' and S

[35] Exceptions to this, are questions about the circumstances in which the speaker learned the supplied information, such as 'Who told you that?' and 'When did he tell you that?' Such questions do not presuppose that the listener considers the supplied information to be true, as evidenced by the possibility of 'What nonsense. Who told you that?', and 'What nonsense. When did he tell you that?'

'thinks that') within which presuppositions do not apply to propositions or propositional functions following 'that'.[36]

So, besides a difference between what a request for clarification relates to and what a request for justification relates to, there is also a difference in the presuppositions connected with the two types of requests: requests for clarification presuppose that what is asserted in the preceding assertion is true while requests for justification do not. This is the second clue that enables us to distinguish requests for clarification and requests for justification in practice.

Until now, we have just been trying to find clues to be able to distinguish the two types of interrogatives used to respond to a descriptive assertion or to an assertion with a descriptive proposition. Such requests can, however, also be made in response to an evaluative assertion or an assertion with an evaluative proposition, and in response to an appellative assertion or an assertion with an appellative proposition. In these cases, though, we meet with fewer problems. In interrogatives responding to an evaluative or appellative assertion, the interpretation that it concerns a 'request for clarification' is in a number of cases impossible. Especially, interrogatives consisting either of the interrogative words 'how do you mean?' and 'why', or starting with these words, do not allow such an interpretation. If 'How do you mean?' and 'Why?' respond to a descriptive assertion, such as 'Hank buys all of Ann's clothes', they can be interpreted as a request to give proof for what is stated, but also as a request for making Hank's motives more explicit. However, in a response to an evaluative assertion, such as 'Wind is annoying', or an appellative assertion, such as 'You should take the tram', they can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a request for justification of the expressed opinion or the imposed obligation.

In the case of requests formed by, or started with, other interrogative expressions than 'how do you mean' and 'why', it can be a problem to determine whether we look at a request for clarification or a request for justification. The question is whether the same clues can be used as for a descriptive assertion if we want to distinguish between requests for clarification and requests for justification that are responses to an evaluative or appellative assertion. We shall first examine this for both requests for clarification (the a-statements) and requests for justification (the b-statements) responding to the evaluative assertion 'Wind is annoying':

(59a) *Who* thinks so?

(60a) *What* exactly do you find annoying about it?

(61a) *How* do you view rain?

[36] An exception to this is formed by the intensional context of 'knowing'. For instance, 'S knows that p' presupposes that p is true. But this does not lead to complications when the question 'How do you know that?' is analysed. A propositional function is connected with this question that could be phrased as 'S knows in way X that Hank buys all of Ann's clothes'. The intensional context is in this function not formed by 'knowing', but by something like 'knowing in way X'.

(59b) *Who* wouldn't you think so?

(60b) *What* kind of opinion is that?

(61b) *How* did you come up with that?

In evaluative assertions, neither a state of affairs is represented, nor information provided: a judgment is presented and an opinion is expressed. So, the responses in (59)–(61) make clear that, if we wish to distinguish requests for clarification responding to an evaluative assertion, we cannot use the clue that the request relates to the state of affairs represented in the preceding assertion or the circumstances in which one has gained knowledge of it. It is also clear that, if we wish to distinguish requests for justification responding to an evaluative assertion, we cannot use the clue that the request relates to the validity of the information provided or the reliability of its source. However, this does not mean that there is no difference between that which the requests in the a-statements and the b-statements in (59)–(61) refer to. In the a-statements, the request relates to the source or (aspects of) the content of the expressed judgment, in the b-statements to the quality, validity, legitimacy, etc., of the expressed opinion. This difference provides a clue that enables us to distinguish between the two types of requests in response to an evaluative assertion.

Contrary to requests for clarification responding to a descriptive assertion, requests for clarification responding to an evaluative assertion do not presuppose the acceptability of that which is asserted in the preceding assertion. Someone who, like in the a-statements of (59)–(61), requests clarification of an opinion, may not have accepted that opinion. The listener in (60a) could have said: 'I think that's nonsense, but what exactly do you find annoying about it?' So, in this case, presupposed acceptance or rejection of the preceding assertion does not offer a clue to be able to distinguish requests for clarification from requests for justification in practice.

(62)–(64) are requests for clarification and requests for justification responding to an appellative assertion. In the a-statements, clarification of the assertion 'You should take the tram' is requested; in the b-statements, justification of this assertion is requested:

(62a) *Where* is the nearest stop?

(63a) *Which* line should one take?

(64a) *When* exactly does it leave from here?

(62b) *Where* does this so-called necessity come from?

(63b) *Which* advantages does that offer?

(64b) *When* did you become my boss?

As is evident from (62) to (64), requests for clarification responding to an appellative assertion can refer to a state of affairs, unlike requests for clarification responding to an evaluative assertion. Admittedly, this state of affairs is not represented directly in the propositional content of the preceding assertion, but it does have a connection with it. It is the situation that would exist if the listener did what he was incited to do by the speaker (in the example, that means the listener takes the tram). Requests for justification of an appellative assertion do not, as the b-statements make clear, refer to a situation, but to the validity or the legitimacy of the obligation the speaker imposes on the listener. This does not provide an adequate clue to distinguish both types of requests in practice, as requests for clarification responding to an appellative assertion can also refer to something else than a state of affairs: it may be a request to clarify the nature or the source of the obligation that is imposed in the preceding assertion. For example, the listener may respond to 'You should take the tram' by saying 'Says who?', in order to determine whether he should take the tram according to the speaker, or according to somebody whose opinion is conveyed to the listener by the speaker. The difference between a request for clarification of an appellative assertion and a request for justification of such an assertion should therefore be specified as follows: a request for clarification refers to the nature or the source of the obligation or the adherence to it, whereas a request for justification refers to the validity of the obligation imposed on the listener in the preceding assertion.

The a-statements in (62)–(64) show that a request for clarification of an appellative assertion, just like a request for clarification of an evaluative assertion, does not necessarily presuppose acceptance of the assertion. If such a request also involves clarification of the nature or the source of the imposed obligation, acceptance is even out of the question. Before the listener decides whether to accept what is asserted, he first wants to know more.

In general, in a communicative act dealing with an aspect of, a reason for, or a consequence of the situation or judgment presented in the preceding assertion, the acceptability of that assertion does not come up for discussion. This does occur in a communicative act dealing with the validity of the information or the opinion presented by the speaker in the preceding assertion or the validity of the obligation he imposes. In the former case, the truth of what is asserted is not always presupposed in the response, contrary to in requests for clarification. For example, it is possible that a listener does not understand at all what the speaker means and expresses that in a request for explanation. In that case, the listener has not yet got round to assessing the truthfulness of the assertion – or, more generally – the acceptability of the assertion. Incidentally, for distinguishing interrogatives responding to the propositional content of an evaluative and an appellative assertion, this clue could not be used anyway.

In this section, we examined a specific possibility of realising doubt about a preceding assertion: the use of interrogatives. We determined that, when interrogative words are used under certain conditions, a single non-mixed dispute arises. In order to make a dispute more complex, other types of responses are required.

In the following section, we shall focus on these responses. We start with the types of responses that create a single mixed dispute.

3.3.2 Indicators of a mixed dispute

The dialectical core profile of a mixed dispute shows that an expression of pure doubt might eventually also lead to a mixed dispute. However, a mixed dispute does not really emerge unless two opposite standpoints are set against each other. In the quick scenario, such opposite standpoints are brought forward immediately. In this section, we focus on that situation. The question we want to answer is how it becomes evident that a standpoint that is brought forward in response to another standpoint should be considered as opposite to the first standpoint.

That a standpoint brought forward in response to another standpoint should be considered as the opposite of the first standpoint can become evident, in the first place, from the fact that in the second standpoint the proposition expressed in the first standpoint is denied. The denial of the proposition to which a standpoint relates can be expressed explicitly by means of a standard paraphrase, in this case the standard paraphrase that introduces a negative standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984: 114): 'My point of view in respect of p is not that p is the case, but that p is not the case'. Slightly less verbose paraphrases that are still explicit are, 'It is not so that p', 'That is not so', 'That is not true' or 'That is not correct'. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1996: 36–37) provide a comprehensive inventory of the expressions belonging to this category, from which we quote a selection:

I profoundly/ardently disagree with that
I do not agree with that
I do not agree with you on that
That is far from the truth
That is a mistake/a misconception
That is/I find that absurd/(utter) nonsense
That is (definitely) incorrect
That is untrue
The facts contradict that
That is not/in no way right
I do not think so
I do not share that opinion
Where did you get that idea?
I have my own thoughts on that

The most unambiguous expressions in this list indicate a denial of the proposition the standpoint refers to, and therefore indicate a mixed dispute, but we are also able to point out some more ambiguous expressions. For example, an expression like 'Where did you get that idea?' might be interpreted as an expression of doubt about the existence of an illocutionary implication of

the protagonist's standpoint (does the protagonist actually have arguments?), instead as an outright denial of the proposition.

The most common – and simplest – way to deny the proposition to which someone else's standpoint refers is by repeating that proposition and adding the word 'not'. (65) is an example:

(65) T1: Smoking is bad for your health.
T2: Smoking is *not* bad for your health.

It is obvious that 'not' is a strong indicator for a mixed dispute. For this reason, we focus on this indicator. Although it is a strong indicator, the use of 'not' – in a response to an assertion of another speaker – is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the creation of a mixed dispute. It is not a necessary condition because such a dispute can also be created by responding with an affirmative statement. This would, for example, be the case, if the first statement already contains a denial, such as in:

(66) T1: Fortunately, it is not going to rain tomorrow.
T2: But it *is* going to rain tomorrow!

Responding with a statement to a standpoint can also make the dispute mixed without the standpoint containing a denial. This is the case in:

(67) T1: The light was on when I left.
T2: The light was off!

In this case, the predicates that are placed opposite each other are contradictory. There are only two possibilities and these are mutually exclusive – the light is on or off.[37]

The most important condition under which 'not' can be a strong indicator of a mixed dispute is that the negation is of a certain type. Not all types of negations that are operated by 'not', can be used to deny the acceptability of a preceding assertion. Ducrot (1984) distinguishes three types of negations that are relevant here: descriptive, polemic and metalinguistic negation.[38] A negation is *descriptive* when the assertion containing the denial is self-supporting, meaning that it is not opposite to a positive assertion that is expressed by the speaker or that is presupposed or expected in the context or generally accepted. This type of denial is, as Foolen calls it, 'world oriented' (1991: 220), and it relates to a 'negative state of affairs'. Non-contextualised examples in which descriptive negation occurs are statements in which the negation is part of figures of speech, such as 'He made no attempt

[37] It becomes more complicated when two predicates exclude each other but can be both incorrect, like in T1: It is warm in here. T2: It is cold in here! As we showed in section 3.1, this is not simply a mixed dispute, the dispute has become also a qualitative multiple dispute. The specific indicators of this form of dispute are discussed in the next section.

[38] For the characterisation of metalinguistic negation we follow Horn (1989: 425–426), who says more about this type of negation than Ducrot does.

to disguise that he was proud of her'. *Polemic* negation occurs when the proposition expressed in an opposite assertion is denied. The assertion can also be contextually presupposed or normally accepted (Ducrot 1984: 218).[39] An example of a polemic negation of a generally accepted assertion is 'Smoking is not bad for your health'. *Metalinguistic* negation occurs when, literally speaking, the expressed proposition of an opposite assertion is denied, while the literal interpretation is not the correct one, because, in reality, what is denied is not the expressed proposition, but one or more presuppositions, implications or conversational implicatures of what is asserted, or the adequacy of the utterance and/or the phrasing (Ducrot 1984: 217, also Horn 1989: 370–392). Metalinguistic negation implies, in short, that the presuppositions, the implicatures or the phrasing and/or the utterance of a preceding assertion are disputed by denying the proposition expressed in that assertion (Ducrot 1984: 217, Horn 1989: 423). An example of metalinguistic negation is: 'They didn't walk, they ran', in response to the assertion 'They walked to the train station'.[40] Only the theoretical distinction between descriptive and polemic negation, on the one hand, and metalinguistic negation, on the other, can be justified without using the concept of 'context' (descriptive and polemic negation deny a proposition, metalinguistic negation does not). The theoretical distinction between descriptive and polemic negation can only be justified by involving the contexts in which the negations are used in the analysis.

So, descriptive negation does not refer to an opposite assertion (expressed or not), polemic and metalinguistic negation do. Only if the negation in a response to an assertion is descriptive, the acceptability of a preceding assertion is not denied in that response. Although descriptive negation can only be distinguished from polemic negation by invoking the context, the identification of a descriptive negation will generally not be a problem: if an assertion containing a negation is not opposite to a positive assertion that is uttered by the other speaker, or is presupposed or expected or generally accepted in the context, then the negation is descriptive.

Because an assertion that contains a polemic or metalinguistic negation always denies the acceptability of the preceding statement, the assertion responded to when using a polemic or metalinguistic negation will technically always function as a standpoint. But do polemic negation and metalinguistic negation really include all negations related to the acceptability of a preceding assertion? This question can be answered by investigating the situation from the perspectives from which a listener can dispute the acceptability of a preceding assertion, and by subsequently investigating whether that always happens by means of a polemic or a metalinguistic negation. A listener can dispute the acceptability of a preceding assertion from five different perspectives. He can dispute that (1) the way of pronouncing or phrasing

[39] Lyons (1977: 771) calls this 'modal negation'. See also Houtlosser (1991).

[40] When used in this way, metalinguistic negation indicates a rectification. See also Moeschler (1982: 92–95). An example of a rectification that is 'opposite' to the one that we gave in our example is 'They didn't walk, they plodded'. 'They walked to the train station, but they didn't run', on the other hand, is not a rectification, according to Horn (1989: 405). The negation, therefore, is not metalinguistic, but descriptive. The same goes for 'They didn't run to the train station, but they did walk (at pace)' by which, according to Horn, a concession is made through the conjunct that is introduced by 'but'.

of what was asserted is adequate, (2) the presuppositions of what is asserted are in force, (3) the asserted is correct, (4) an implication or implicature of what is asserted is correct, and (5) the asserted is important to him. In (68)–(72), each of these five ways of disputing the acceptability of the preceding assertion is used to respond to the assertion that John has stopped smoking:

(68) John didn't stop 'smokin', he stopped 'smoking'.

(69) He didn't smoke before.

(70) John didn't stop smoking at all.

(71) As a matter of fact, he hasn't stopped buying cigarettes for himself.

(72) I don't care whether John stopped smoking or not.

In (68), the listener disputes the correctness of the speaker's pronunciation of the word 'smoking' and he corrects his pronunciation; in (69), the presupposition that John smoked before; in (70), the proposition that John stopped smoking; in (71), the implication that if John had stopped smoking he would not buy cigarettes for himself;[41] in (72), that the assertion that John stopped smoking would be important to the speaker. Which types of negation occur in these examples? In (68), the negation is metalinguistic. In (70), the negation is polemic. In (69), (71), and (72), at first glance, neither polemic nor metalinguistic negation occurs. A polemic or a metalinguistic negation can only occur when the assertion containing the negation is opposite to the assertion to which one responds. That is not the case in (69), (71), and (72). In the case of (71), however, an assertion is implied that is opposite to the preceding assertion: 'as a matter of fact, he hasn't' implies a refutation of the preceding assertion, using *modus tollens*: if it is true that John has stopped smoking, then it should not be true that John still buys cigarettes for himself; it is in fact true that John still buys cigarettes for himself, therefore it is not plausible that John has stopped smoking. So, the assertion in (71) serves as a *counter-argument* against what is asserted in the preceding assertion. This means that the negation in (71) is polemic too.

The denying assertions in (69) and (72) neither deny nor imply an assertion that is opposite to the preceding assertion. At most, (69) implies that it cannot be determined whether the assertion that John has stopped smoking is true, and (72) that the assertion that John has stopped smoking is not important to the listener. Therefore, at first glance, polemic negation does not occur. However, to interpret these denials as descriptive negations is not appropriate either: the assertions in (69) and (72) are not isolated, but they deny a certain aspect of a preceding assertion.

[41] In (71), 'as a matter of fact' is put in, because 'He did not stop buying cigarettes', without 'as a matter of fact', can also be interpreted as an informative addition to 'John has stopped smoking' (by the combination of both statements, a state of affairs is represented in which John has stopped smoking but still buys cigarettes). So, in fact, 'not' in itself does not indicate that the acceptability of the preceding assertion is disputed, but only the combination 'as a matter of fact, he hasn't'.

Because negations that are used in assertions denying the presuppositions of a preceding assertion, or disputing the significance of a preceding assertion, are not descriptive, the point can be made that, in principle, in a denying assertion the acceptability of the preceding assertion is always disputed, unless the negation in the assertion is descriptive. If a denying assertion contains a non-descriptive negation, (a particular aspect of) the assertion to which one responds will therefore function as a standpoint. Moreover, we can say that if the negation is polemic, the denying assertion constitutes a negative standpoint. After all, a polemic negation constitutes an (explicit or implicit) assertion with a content that is opposite to the content of the preceding assertion.[42] Polemic negation occurs if what is asserted in the preceding assertion is explicitly rejected, or if a counter-argument is brought against it that implies the opposite of what is asserted.

3.3.3 Indicators of a qualitative multiple dispute

In the dialectical core profile of a qualitative multiple dispute it becomes clear that the dispute situation in question, although it may arise in practice in one stroke, presupposes, viewed dialectically, a particular development in the definition of the positions. First, the potential antagonist takes a negative standpoint and then 'expands' it into a contrary standpoint. Sometimes, such a definition of positions actually takes place, as the IJburg-text shown in section 3.1 demonstrates. But even when that does not happen, the core profile of the qualitative multiple dispute makes clear what moves the parties involved have left implicit. Roughly, there are two options. Firstly, T2 does not necessarily have to set an opposite standpoint against T1's standpoint that disputes T1's standpoint explicitly; he may also immediately take an alternative standpoint that implies that he rejects T1's standpoint:[43]

(73) T1: It is bloody freezing in here.
T2: I find it quite warm in here.

Secondly, even if T2 has indeed explicitly rejected T1's standpoint, it may still have remained implicit whether the standpoint that T2 subsequently takes really is an alternative standpoint that implies opposition to T1's standpoint:

(74) T1: That Harry fellow is quite a joker.
T2: He is not a joker. He has a very boring friend.

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[42] In metalinguistic negation, there is, formally speaking, admittedly an opposition, but no opposition with regard to content. A metalinguistic negation of 'John has stopped smoking' implies, in fact, a denial of 'John used to smoke', and not of 'John has stopped smoking'. In the negation, which explicitly denies the justification or the significance of the asserted, there is no opposition, neither formally nor with regard to content.

[43] In this section, the issue often revolves around a standpoint of a participant in the discussion that is opposite to the standpoint of another participant, or is contradictory or contrary to it. In order to avoid having to speak of the one and the other discussion participant (or discussion party), we use the abbreviations T1 and T2 for these parties.

Of course, both can remain implicit as well:

(75) T1: That Harry fellow is quite a joker.
T2: He has a very boring friend.

In all cases, the crucial question is whether T2 has adopted an alternative standpoint that implies an opposition to T1's standpoint. If that is true, then it follows from this that T2 has disputed T1's standpoint. Ideally, indicators of a qualitative multiple dispute indicate both that a standpoint that T2 takes is contradictory to a standpoint of T1, and that it forms an alternative to it. As a rule, however, only one of them is indicated. First, we will discuss indicators that, in the case in which T2 does not explicitly point out that he contests the standpoint of T1 but immediately takes his own standpoint, can make clear that this standpoint is an alternative to T1's standpoint. The most important ones are the *indicators of contrariness*.

Contrariness occurs between T2's standpoint and T1's standpoint if T2's standpoint is not logically the opposite of T1's, while a successful defence of T2's standpoint does imply a successful defence of the standpoint that is opposite to T1's, as in example (73), T1: 'It is bloody freezing in here'. T2: 'I find it quite warm in here'. There is no standard phrase for putting forward a contrary position. In the explicit form, someone wanting to advance an alternative standpoint could use a phrasing like 'It is not my standpoint that p1 is the case, but that p2 is the case, which excludes that p1 is the case'. As a rule, however, an antagonist will not provide a contrary proposition to such a full sentence. A more common explicit phrasing would be: 'Not p1, but p2' or 'X is not A, as a matter of fact, X is B'.

However this may be, as a rule, it is not immediately clear whether standpoints are truly contrary or, at least, should be considered contrary in the context involved:

(76) T1: That Harry fellow is quite a joker indeed.
T2: He is very serious.

The predicates 'is quite a joker indeed' and 'is very serious' may appear contrary at first glance, but it is, of course, quite possible that someone often makes funny jokes and is a very serious person at the same time. T2 could also have stimulated the development of this interpretation by using an indicator that cancels the contradiction – and therefore the dispute –, for instance, by saying that 'Harry is also very serious'. Other words that can have this effect are 'and', 'besides', 'moreover' and – somewhat more formal – 'additionally' and 'furthermore'. Such indicators ensure that the compared properties are put next to each other, instead of opposite each other, so that there is not a contrary, but a complementary relationship. Conversely, T2 could also have accentuated the contrast – and therefore the dispute – by saying, for instance, '*On the contrary*, Harry is very serious' or 'But Harry is *outstandingly* serious'. The use of indicators like 'but', 'on the contrary' and 'outstandingly' not only shows that an alternative is presented, but also that this alternative excludes what it is put opposite to. The following newspaper clippings from *de Volkskrant* show that

these indicators of juxtaposition and opposition, respectively, are also used in non-constructed examples with the aforementioned function:

(77) Each review praises above all the humour of the book and McCourt's lack of bitterness, but there is *also* much irony.
(*de Volkskrant*, 5 September 1997)

(78) This year, the transportation specialists of the parties, again, have not failed to keep their ends up. Van der Steenhoven, member of the left wing green party, wants metropolitans to take buses; the complete metropolitan area should have bus lanes. His right-wing colleague Niederer, *on the contrary*, wants more asphalt. The money the ministries save should be spent on new or wider motorways.
(*de Volkskrant*, 4 November 1999)

If the statement in (77) that there is much irony in McCourt's book was not accompanied by the word 'also', the implication would have been that irony, to a certain extent, excludes humour and lack of bitterness, and now this is not the case. In fragment (78), saying that right wing politician Niederer, 'on the contrary', wants asphalt makes clear that bus lanes and motorway construction do exclude each other within the context of this discussion.

It becomes a little more complicated to determine whether a standpoint of T2 excludes T1's standpoint implicitly, when T2 puts forward a standpoint that only in a pragmatic sense is contrary to T1's standpoint. In this case, the question is whether T2 can be held to an implicit rejection of T1's standpoint or only to the fact that he offers a more desirable alternative for it:

(79) T1: We could go to the cinema tonight.
T2: It is *better* just to stay at home.

Strictly speaking, T2's statement does not imply here that T1's standpoint should be rejected. Since this is not an opposition between supposed facts, but an opposition between choices, while, additionally, the word 'better' demonstrates that it is a relative and gradual opposition, T2 can only mean to say that T1's standpoint is less acceptable than his. Still, the pragmatic consequence is, of course, that only one of both standpoints can be accepted, and that the other should be rejected. After all, the fact that there are good reasons to stay at home does not exclude that there are good reasons to go to the cinema, but staying at home does exclude going to the cinema, so it also excludes that the proposal to go to the cinema could be accepted in this context. If T2, instead of saying that it is better to stay at home, would have said: 'We could also stay at home' or 'We might as well stay at home', the standpoint that this is an acceptable proposal would not have to be rejected out of hand, because then T2 would not have explicitly placed his standpoint above T1's standpoint. Instead of there being a real dispute, the exchange might in that case not have been more than making an inventory of reasons for carrying out either

option. On the other hand, in common speech, the addition of 'also', as a rule, tends to express a certain preference. As the following clippings from *de Volkskrant* make clear, in spite of the literal juxtaposition, 'also' and 'as well' can be used to present one's own standpoint as an alternative that is superior to the other party's standpoint:

(80) According to Rabin, Israeli rule of the Palestinian people should end. 'One does not achieve peace through occupation', said the Prime Minister. 'We can continue killing and being killed, but we can *also* end this vicious cycle of violence'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 6 October 1999)

(81) 'Terrorism is having its last convulsions', Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia recently claimed. It seems to be just talk. The heavy bombs that went off in Algiers last week might *as well* be evidence of the successful regrouping of Islamic guerrillas.

(*de Volkskrant*, 30 December 1996)

Literally speaking, in (80), Rabin juxtaposes two options: 'continue killing and being killed' and 'end this vicious cycle of violence'. However, putting in-between the word 'but' makes clear that Rabin rejects the option of 'continue killing and being killed', which aptly illustrates that an analysis in terms of two externalised confrontation rounds can be necessary to explain what exactly happens in an implicit discussion. Incidentally, the equation of the two options by the use of 'also' would still be nullified if Rabin had not used the word 'but' in the introduction of his alternative: after all, the first alternative has a distinctly negative tenor, whereas the second is, on the contrary, quite positive. In the article about Algeria, quoted from in (81), the writer literally only declares that what is evidence for one proposition might just as well be evidence for another proposition. However, the preceding 'It seems to be just talk' makes clear that he is of the opinion that the bomb explosions constitute evidence supporting his proposition rather than Ouyahia's.

The dialectical profile of the genesis of a qualitative multiple dispute also indicates that there are cases imaginable in which T2 first explicitly disputes the T1's standpoint while it remains implicit whether the standpoint that T2 subsequently puts forward should be considered an alternative. In that case, there are two types of indicators that can provide a definite answer. Both types indicate that T1's standpoint is untenable *a fortiori*. Using the first type of indicators, T2 expresses implicitly that his own standpoint excludes T1's standpoint *a maiore*, and therefore offers an alternative to it. Using the second type of indicators, T2 expresses implicitly that his own standpoint excludes T1's standpoint *a minore*, and therefore also offers an alternative for this standpoint. The difference between these two cases mainly lies in the fact that an exclusion *a maiore*, as a rule, directly relates to the acceptability of the T1's standpoint as such, whereas an exclusion *a minore* rather relates to the nuances in the qualification given in T1's standpoint.

T2 can exclude a standpoint of T1 *a maiore* by setting a standpoint against that standpoint that amounts to an even stronger polarisation as compared to

T1's standpoint than a simple rejection. Expressions that are distinctly useful for this type of exclusion are 'even', and, in particular, 'what's more':

(82) Has it become impossible to be a mother without reading? Publishers would like us to believe so. I consider such slogans to be nonsense. Fortunately, women can be mothers without having to learn from books what feelings they should experience. *What's more*, the unique maternal feeling cannot be captured in words. You have to go through the experience to know what it means to become a mother.
(Drs. Sarina van der Brons, *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 7 April 1999)

If the unique maternal feeling cannot even be captured in words, then, *a fortiori*, one cannot learn from a book how the reader can become a good mother. After all, such a book could only be written if the words that are necessary for it would be available, but they are not. Other methods of expressions that can indicate that T2's standpoint excludes T1's standpoint *a maiore* are 'certainly not', 'and not at all' and 'let alone that'. These indicators are used in a slightly different way than 'even' and 'what's more', because they explicitly introduce the rejection of T1's standpoint. In these cases, the alternative standpoint has already preceded it.

(83) Where can we still see a glimmer of hope in that terrible genocide in Kosovo? That hope does not lie in a victory for NATO or a victory for the Kosovo Liberation Army, UCK [= *alternative*]. And *certainly not* in a victory for Milosevic.
(Reverend Harrewijn, *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, April 12th, 1999)

A construction like this one, in which the explicit rejection of the opposite standpoint follows the broader alternative, can easily be reconstructed in the form stipulated by the dialectical profile of a qualitative multiple dispute: 'The hope does not lie in a victory for Milosevic. It does not even lie in a victory for NATO or in a victory for the Kosovo Liberation Army, UCK'.

T2 can exclude T1's standpoint *a minore* by setting a standpoint against it that, admittedly, excludes T1's standpoint, but that, at a later stage, reduces the polarisation that is accomplished by the initial rejection of T1's standpoint. The implication is that the nuances of the qualification given in the standpoint are more important than the qualification as a whole. This type of exclusion can be effectuated by using expressions like 'at the most', 'just', and 'but' in combination with a stressed verb:

(84) T1: It's cold outside!
T2: It's not cold, *at the most* it's a bit chilly for the time of year.
T1: It's cold outside!
T2: It's not cold, it is *just* pretty chilly.
T1: It's cold outside!
T2: It's not cold, *but* it is pretty chilly.

Also in the following fragment occurs an exclusion *a minore* using 'but + stressed verb':

(85) Amateur clubs were not concerned when it was made public last week that tax inspectors are going to investigate payments made to players by external sponsors. *But* they *were* quite surprised, because doesn't this kind of practice only happen to others?

(*de Volkskrant*, 8 November 1999)

Going against the expectation that the amateur clubs were disturbed, the writer of this article declares that they were not disturbed, but quite surprised. Although in doing so he implies that 'being surprised' excludes 'being disturbed' here as an optimal characterisation of the way in which the clubs reacted, by using 'but' he indicates that he considers 'being surprised' only as a lesser form of 'being disturbed'. This cancels out the suggestion that he considers 'being surprised' and 'being disturbed' in all cases to be antipodal.

Incidentally, 'but + stressed verb' can also be used to present an alternative to a standpoint that is withdrawn ('Well, alright, maybe not miserly') in response to being contradicted.

(86) T1: Hank is really miserly!
T2: What makes you think that? He isn't miserly at all.
T1: Well, alright, maybe not miserly, *but* he *is* tight-fisted.

This example shows, once more, that the analyst who wants to build on words and phrases that can be indicative for certain discussion moves also needs to know the conditions under which those words and expressions fulfil the presupposed indicative function. The example also makes clear that, when determining these conditions, the context in which the aforementioned words and phrases are used should be taken into account.

CHAPTER 4

INDICATORS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF

4.1 THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF

In the opening stage of a critical discussion the parties establish the point of departure for the discussion. Together they determine the procedure they will follow in the discussion: which utterances must be defended by which party in the discussion – who has the burden of proof for what? – and which utterances do not have to be defended but can be used, instead, as starting points in the defence of other utterances under discussion? In order to be able to establish which utterances should be defended in a discussion and which not, it is important to know which words and expressions are indicators of the distribution of the burden of proof, and which words and expressions are indicators of the common starting points. In this chapter we examine indicators of the burden of proof. In chapter 5 indicators of common starting points are examined.

Establishing the burden of proof consists of conducting a deliberation in the opening stage of a critical discussion about the question of who has the obligation to defend a particular position (and has to act as the protagonist of that position), and who undertakes to critically respond to that defence (and has the role of antagonist). The objective of examining indicators of the way the burden of proof has been established is to be able to determine which *distribution of the burden of proof* the parties of the discussion have arrived at. First, we look at the types of distribution for the burden of proof that can develop in the opening stage of a critical discussion. Second, we analyse how these types of distribution can be established from a dialectical point of view, and create a dialectical core profile for each of them. These core profiles subsequently constitute a starting point for the identification of the words and expressions that may play a part in the realisation of the different types distribution of the burden of proof.

4.2 DIALECTICAL PROFILES FOR ESTABLISHING THE BURDEN OF PROOF

Although in principle the distribution of the burden of proof is determined normatively as early as in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion by the difference of opinion that is central to the discussion, the definitive distribution of the burden of proof is not established until the opening stage. The types of distribution of the burden of proof that may result from the establishment of the burden of proof in the opening stage of a critical discussion are: (1) *a one-sided burden of proof*: one

of the participants in the discussion has a burden of proof for one or more standpoints, the other participant does not have any burden of proof at all (in principle, this is always the case if the dispute is non-mixed); (2) *a distributed burden of proof*: each of the participants carries a burden of proof for their standpoints that are not opposite to standpoints of the other party (in principle, this is always the case if the dispute is non-mixed and multiple); (3) *a two-sided burden of proof*: each of the participants carries a burden of proof for one or more standpoints that are opposite to the other party's standpoints (in principle, this is always the case if the dispute is mixed). It is also possible to have a distributed, partially one-sided, partially two-sided burden of proof. In that case each of the participants has a burden of proof for one or more standpoints, and there is at least one standpoint about which there is a non-mixed dispute and at least one standpoint about which there is a mixed dispute. The different ways in which the distributions of the burden of proof are realised can be specified in dialectical core profiles.

Core profile for the genesis of a one-sided burden of proof in a single non-mixed dispute

The first move in a dialogue about the distribution of the burden of proof in a single non-mixed dispute occurs when the second participant in the discussion (T2) challenges the first one (T1) to defend the position the first participant (T1) has taken:

T2: Defend +/p![44]

The second move is T1's response. This move may imply that T1 (1) accepts T2's challenge or (2) rejects T2's challenge. T1 may also indicate that he wants to amend the position he originally took, but in that case he has to withdraw his original standpoint before he is allowed to put forward the amended standpoint. This means that the discussants must run through a new confrontation stage, as well as a new opening stage, in which a new dialogue has to take place about the distribution of the burden of proof. So, making an amendment is not part of the original opening stage, which means that we only have to consider the two follow-up possibilities mentioned before:

T2: Defend +/p!
T1: OK
T2: Defend +/p!
T1: No

At this point in the discussion, a third move – a response from T2 – is only necessary if T1 rejected the challenge to defend his standpoint. In that case, T2

[44] For the sake of convenience, in this section we always assume a situation in which the discussion has been initiated by a positive standpoint. Of course, T1 could also have taken a negative standpoint; in that case the challenge of T2 would refer to this negative standpoint.

can maintain his position of doubt or he can ask T1 why he thinks he can shirk his obligation to defend himself, thus initiating a *procedure discussion* about the validity of the burden of proof rule:[45]

T2: Defend +/p!
T1: No
T2: Then: ?/(+/p)
T2: Defend +/p!
T1: No
T2: Why 'No'?
T1: Procedure discussion

For a single non-mixed dispute, the dialectically sanctioned deliberations about the distribution of the burden of proof can be summarised in Figure 4.1.

The profiles for the realisation of a one-sided burden of proof in a multiple non-mixed dispute are a compound of the profiles that are shown for the establishment of a one-sided burden of proof in a single non-mixed dispute, and they can always be broken down into such profiles. Here we will not show profiles that can be broken down into simpler profiles.

Core profile for the genesis of a distributed burden of proof in a multiple non-mixed dispute

The profiles for the realisation of a distributed allocation of the burden of proof in a non-mixed dispute, which is multiple per definition (see above), are also a compound of the profiles for the realisation of a one-sided burden of proof in a single non-mixed dispute, although the initiating move in these profiles – challenging the other party to defend their standpoint – is made by more than one party.



Figure 4.1 Core profile for the genesis of a one-sided burden of proof in a single non-mixed dispute

[45] In such a case the deliberations may continue for an indefinite period of time, but by definition they should end with an agreement about the distribution of the burden of proof: T1 accepts it or T2 withdraws his challenge (for whatever reason) and the discussion is abandoned.

Core profile for the genesis of a two-sided burden of proof in a single mixed dispute

In a dialogue about the distribution of the burden of proof in a single mixed dispute, the first move also is that one participant in the discussion challenges the other to defend the position he has taken. There is no dialectical norm that stipulates who is allowed to challenge first in this type of dispute.[46] For this reason, from the start two profiles are possible:

T2: Defend +/p!

T1: Defend −/p!

In each of these profiles the second move is, again, a response of the other party, by which this party, just as in a single non-mixed dispute, can indicate (1) that he accepts the initial challenge or (2) that he rejects the challenge. In both cases, the ensuing profiles are the same as those for the distribution of a one-sided burden of proof in a single non-mixed dispute:

T2: Defend +/p!

T1: OK

T2: Defend +/p!

T1: No

T2: Defend −/p!

T1: OK

T2: Defend −/p!

T1: No

The follow-ups in these profiles are, at first, the same as the profiles that we have shown for the realisation of a one-sided burden of proof in a non-mixed dispute. Below we show these profiles in a concise manner:



[46] See for a pragmatic standard van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003). See also below.

[47] The right to maintain a position of doubt after the other party's refusal to defend the standpoint that this party took does, of course, not imply that the challenging party is allowed, without any further defence, to take the opposite position.

Since there is no definite dialectical norm for who has to start defending in a mixed disputes, it is possible for the challenged party to propose to reverse the order of defence. He can do this by simply refusing to (immediately) accept the other party's challenge and subsequently challenging this party to defend his standpoint first. This means that the procedure discussion, which follows in the profile above the second turn of T2, can be postponed by means of the continuation that is shown below in the core profile for dialectically sanctioned deliberations about the distribution of the burden of proof in a single mixed dispute:



Although a mixed dispute can be regarded as a compound of non-mixed disputes, and can always be broken down into non-mixed disputes, the profile for the realisation of a two-sided burden of proof in a mixed dispute cannot simply be broken down into two profiles for the realisation of a one-sided burden of proof in a non-mixed dispute: contrary to a mixed dispute, a non-mixed dispute does not give rise to a procedure discussion about the sequence in which the parties involved will defend their standpoints. This type of deliberation only comes up in a dialogue about the distribution of the burden of proof in a mixed dispute.

If a discussion about the procedure that is to be followed arises, the parties in question, lacking a dialectical criterion for the order of defending, may appeal to a pragmatic criterion. This pragmatic criterion concurs with the norm prevailing norm in everyday discourse that one is not allowed to perform, without any further clarification or support, speech acts that are unacceptable to the interlocutor. A speaker who has performed a speech act knows himself to be bound by this norm, and his interlocutor may presume that the speech act performed is acceptable. If the speaker does not comply with this norm, however, his speech act loses its presumption and the speaker acquires the burden of proof. This is generally the case when the speaker goes against the pragmatic *status quo* among the interlocutors. The pragmatic status quo is constituted by the collection of premises that up to that point have been explicitly or implicitly been accepted by both interlocutors, which determines their 'interactional relationship' in that particular situation. The pragmatic status quo is ignored or breached if, at a certain point in the interaction, one of the interlocutors performs a speech act that is incompatible with the premises that were until then mutually accepted. The criteria

for establishing whether this is the case can be derived from the fact that performing specific types of speech acts, such as making a proposal and or making an accusation, can have implications that go 'automatically' against what the interlocutor considers to be the actual interactional relationship between him and the speaker. The consequence of this kind of violation of the pragmatic *status quo* for the continuation of the defence in a mixed dispute is that the party who was the first to breach the pragmatic *status quo* must start the defence.[48]

Core profile for the genesis of a two-sided burden of proof in a multiple fully mixed dispute

The profiles for the realisation of a two-sided burden of proof in a multiple fully mixed dispute are a compound of the profiles that are shown above for the distribution of the burden of proof in a single mixed dispute. For this reason they can always be broken down into such profiles.

Core profile for the genesis of a distributed, partially one-sided, partially two-sided burden of proof in a qualitatively multiple dispute

We speak of a qualitatively multiple dispute – which is by definition mixed – when two standpoints relating to contrary points of views oppose each other in the confrontation stage. In this type of dispute the dialogue about the distribution of the burden of proof includes four different initial moves: (a) T2 challenges T1 to defend his initial standpoint, (b) T1 challenges T2 to defend his opposing standpoint, (c) T1 challenges T2 to defend his contrary standpoint, and (d) T2 challenges T1 to defend his (implicated) rejection of T2's contrary standpoint, which comes down to taking a negative standpoint with regard to the proposition that T2's contrary standpoint is related to:

T2: Defend +/p1!

T1: Defend −/p1!

T1: Defend +/p2!

T2: Defend −/p2!

According to this overview, both T1 and T2 have the possibility to challenge the other party to defend either (at first) the one or (at first) the other standpoint that this party has taken. Because each of these four possibilities to challenge the other party has different consequences, we show the deliberations that can develop in four different core profiles. In the first profile, T2 challenges T1 to defend the initial standpoint (+/p1); in the second profile, T1 challenges T2

[48] See van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003) for a more elaborate treatment of this 'sequence issue' from a pragmatic perspective.

to defend the opposite standpoint (−/p1); in the third profile, T1 challenges T2 to defend the contrary standpoint (+/p2); in the fourth profile, T2 challenges T1 to defend his rejection of the latter (negative standpoint −/p2). We will explain the first of these profiles step by step. This is the profile in which T2 challenges T1 to defend the initial standpoint. T1 can respond to that challenge in two ways:



If T1 accepts the challenge, the deliberation about this specific standpoint is over, so that the deliberations about the defence of the other standpoints can be started. If T1 refuses to accept the challenge, T2 can do two things: he can simply claim the right to maintain his doubts about +/p1 or he can ask T1 for a clarification of his refusal:

T2: Then: ?/(+/p1) Why 'No'?

Unlike in the case of a single mixed dispute, after 'Why "No"?', T1 can continue the dialogue in two different ways:

T1: Defend −/p1! Defend +/p2!

Now T2 can accept the challenge to defend −/p1 or +/p2 or he can say 'No' to one of the challenges or to both challenges, after which T1 can put forward a 'Why "No"?', which leads to a procedure discussion. The dialectical core profile for the dialogue initiated by T2 about the distribution of the burden of proof in a qualitatively multiple dispute can therefore be illustrated in Figure 4.2.

As mentioned before, it is also possible that T1 starts with a challenge. He has the choice to direct that challenge either to the negative standpoint −/p1 or to the contrary standpoint +/p2. In addition, T2 can challenge T1 to defend the implicated negative standpoint −/p2. The three profiles that can be the results of these challenges are shown below:

From a perspective of *piece-meal engineering* it could be recommended to set as a norm that challenges should be put forward in the sequence T2: 'Defend +/p1', T1: 'Defend −/p1!', T1: 'Defend +/p2!', and T2: 'Defend −/p2!', and that each previous challenge must be 'dealt with' before a next one is allowed to be taken up. Besides pragmatic considerations, rhetorical considerations might apply to this norm as well. It so happens, for instance, that in the case of a conclusive defence of −/p1 by T2, T1 still has the right to challenge T2 to defend +/p2, but in the case of a conclusive defence of +/p2, he no longer has the right to challenge T2 to defend −/p1: a conclusive defence of +/p2 already implies



FIGURE 4.2 Dialectical core profile for the distribution of the burden of proof in a qualitatively multiple dispute




T1:
Defend +/p2!
T2:
OK
No
T1:
Then: ?/(+/p2)
Why 'No'?
T2:
…
Defend –/p2!
Defend +/p1!
T1:
OK
No
OK
No
T2:
Then: ?/(–/p2)
Why 'No?'
Then: ?/(+/p1)
Why 'No'?
T1:
…
Procedure discussion
…
Procedure discussion


T2:
Defend –/p2!
T1:
OK
No
T2:
Then: ?/(–/p2)
Why 'No'?
T1:
…
Defend +/p2!
Defend–/p1!
T2:
OK
No
OK
No
T1:
Then: ?/(+/p2)
Why 'No?'
Then: ?/(–/p1)
Why 'No'?
T2:
…
Procedure discussion
…
Procedure discussion

a conclusive defence of −/p1. It can therefore be rhetorically advantageous to defend +/p2 first, because −/p1 is then defended at the same time. On the other hand, if, for example, defending +/p2 turns out to be asking a bit too much, it may be rhetorically advantageous to defend at least −/p1 conclusively.

Now we have designed the core profiles for the dialectically sanctioned deliberations about the distribution of the burden of proof in single non-mixed, multiple non-mixed, single mixed, quantitatively multiple mixed, and qualitatively multiple mixed disputes. When we consider the distinguishing characteristics of the profiles, we observe that one of two specific issues might come up in the moves that can follow a challenge to defend an adopted standpoint:

1. In dialogues about the distribution of the burden of proof in a non-mixed dispute, the question may arise whether the party that put forward a standpoint is prepared to defend the standpoint or not.

2. In dialogues about the distribution of the burden of proof in a quantitatively or qualitatively mixed dispute the same question may arise, and also the question who must start the defence.

4.3 ANALYSING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF

4.3.1 Indicators of a challenge to defend a standpoint

A challenge to defend an adopted standpoint can be put forward directly or indirectly. Direct challenges are responses to a standpoint in which arguments (evidence, reasons, etc.) are requested to support the standpoint. An example is 'Go ahead and prove it'.

As a rule, direct challenges are easy to identify and do not cause any interpretation problems. In the following fragment it is clear that Mr de Wit of the Socialist Party demands the government to proof that more tapping and intercepting of telecommunication and electronic information will actually achieve something:

(1) Mr de Wit (SP): I suppose that with regard to items 14 to 19 all kinds of proposals are going to reach the House. Do they involve new issues or just issues that have already been laid down in the new Information and Security Services Act? On what grounds does the government assume that more tapping and more interception of telecommunication and electronic information will be effective? *Is there any proof for this internationally?*
(General Lower House Debate in The Netherlands about the terrorist attacks in the United States on 24 October 2001)

As indirect challenges we regard all responses in which an informative clarification of the other party's standpoint is requested while it is also clear that providing such an informative clarification would be irrelevant in the context involved. In chapter 3 we strictly discriminated between requests for clarification and requests

for support. We indicated that *real* requests for clarification do not refer to the validity of the other party's assertion, but to an aspect of the contents or the context that is insufficiently clear to the questioner. So, a request for clarification is only an indirect challenge to defend a standpoint if it is clear that in the context concerned it would not be appropriate for the other party to give such an informative clarification. We shall first look into a few cases in which requests like 'What do you mean exactly?', which taken literally would ask for a clarification of (the contents or origin of) the standpoint under discussion, serve as an indirect challenge to defend that standpoint. Subsequently, we shall look into some cases in which requests like 'Why do you think so?', which taken literally would be asking for an explanation of the motives of the other speaker to take the standpoint in question or of the knowledge that standpoint is based on, can be considered to be such a challenge.

The fact that a request for clarification from the first category should not be interpreted as a real request for clarification of the standpoint under discussion, but rather as an indirect challenge to argue, may for example become clear from the utterances that introduce the request or follow it, or both, as in the following fragment:

(2) Mr Koenders (PvdA): My second question is: Why didn't you mention the name of Mr Lubbers in that statement? Why did we have to hear about that from your spokesman? Why is there a difference of opinion with the Prime Minister, who has expressly stated that the name wasn't mentioned? *Perhaps you can clarify this matter,* since you are the person responsible for foreign policy.
(Lower House Debate in The Netherlands about the High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 October 2000)

The questions preceding the request for clarification make clear that Koenders blames the addressee, the Foreign Secretary, van Aartsen, for keeping silent about Lubbers's candidature for the position of High Commissioner for Refugees and now expects him to justify this 'course of action'. Fragment (2) also shows that argumentative additions that immediately follow the request for clarification can help to explain that the request is an indirect challenge to defend a standpoint. This also applies to fragment (3):

(3) If there is something we don't understand, *please make it clear to us.* You are obviously working with other premises than those that traditionally underlie art. But in that case you are creating some kind of obligation as well, that is to find the terminology to make things clear to us.
(Contribution to the discussion 'Visual Arts, Design and Architecture Fund', 25 March 1999)

If clues are lacking in the preceding or subsequent context of the request for clarification, we should in principle assume that the request is actually a request for clarification. This is the case in (4):

(4) Margaret: But still everything you say must always fit within the framework you use to judge things.
Roos: Let's keep this focused for the moment.
Din: That's a well-known fact; particularly in the field of 'new media' people quite easily switch from visual arts to design.
Roos: *Can you explain that?*
Rene: The artist makes the decision; I'm afraid we are still pigeon-holing in our thinking; 90% of the applications we get is still very standard.
(Discussion 'Visual Arts, Design and Architecture Fund', 25 March 1999)

However, sometimes the lack of contextual clues for the opposite does not appear to be a decisive reason to interpret a request for clarification as a real request for clarification:

(5) Mr van Traa (Chairman): In the investigation of serious organised crime you distinguished between Dutch and foreign groups of people. Some of the foreign groups we discussed with Mr Fijnaut. *But could you shed some light on the 'why'* of that distinction?
(Interview parliamentary committee Criminal Investigation Practices, 6 September 1995)

In such a case, it is in fact the addressee who has to decide whether a clarification or a defence is required.

If an implicit request for clarification concerns a descriptive standpoint, it also depends on the nature of the question whether or not an indirect challenge to defend that standpoint is at issue. The interrogative word 'why', for instance, is slightly more neutral than the interrogative phrase 'how do you know', in the sense that in certain cases 'why' can be regarded as a question about the how and what of an *existing* state of affairs, while 'how do you know' should be regarded as a question about the how and what of a *supposed* state of affairs (to be paraphrased as 'On what basis do you conclude that?'). Comparing the responses in (6) and (7) illustrates this – slight – distinction:

(6) Karel: Hans isn't really happy with Hannie.
Carla: Why not?

(7) Karel: Hans isn't really happy with Hannie.
Carla: How do you know?

Replacement of 'do' by 'could' can contribute to the interpretation as a challenge, as in (8):

(8) Karel: Hans is not really happy with Hannie.
Carla: How could you know?

The examples above are about a request to clarify a standpoint that conveys an existing or supposed *state of affairs*. A standpoint, however, can also convey

an *opinion* or an *appeal to the addressee* – in those cases the proposition the standpoint refers to is not descriptive but evaluative or inciting. In chapter 3 we pointed out that evaluative and inciting propositions can only be clarified under specific conditions. In evaluative propositions that is only possible if the required clarification relates to the source or the content of the expressed opinion; in inciting propositions it is only possible if the required clarification relates to the nature or the source of the expressed obligation or to the way in which it has been observed. A request for clarification of a standpoint that relates to an evaluative or inciting proposition can only be regarded as a *real* request for clarification if more information is requested about the source, the nature or the way in which an obligation has been observed. If these conditions have not been met, technically, the request should always be interpreted as a challenge to defend the standpoint at issue.[49] In the following fragment none of the conditions that we mentioned have been met:

(9) Mr de Graaf: Mr IJzerman, you said during the symposium in Nijmegen in April of this year [...] that types of organised and methodical crime represent a serious threat to the integrity of society and to the preservation of a democratic constitution. *Could you amplify on that?* Especially the latter sounds rather threatening.
(Interview parliamentary committee Criminal Investigation Practices, 6 September 1995)

The standpoint attributed to IJzerman concerns the evaluative proposition that types of organised and methodical crime constitute a serious threat to the integrity of society and to the preservation of the democratic constitution. Mr de Graaf does not expect the requested explanation of this opinion to include a clarification of the source or the content of the expressed opinion: it is clear who thinks that there is a serious threat (IJzerman), and it will not be beyond anyone's understanding what a serious threat would (more or less) come down to. Mr de Graaf just wants to know why it is IJzerman's opinion that there is a serious threat.

An example of a request for clarification occasioned by an evaluative standpoint in which an informative answer is requested is (10). Carla asks in this dialogue for a specification of the opinion voiced by Hank:

(10) Hank: I just think they have a nice place.
Carla: What do you mean by 'a nice place'? 'Nice', in what sense?

Although it is quite possible that Hank is going to indicate why he thinks the house in question is nice, in view of Carla's response it would be more relevant

[49] There is also an important difference in the *contexts* in which requests for clarification are placed: in chapter 3, a request for clarification always followed a 'neutral' assertive that could or could not constitute a standpoint, but in the present chapter the request follows an assertive that certainly constitutes a standpoint. Unlike the context in chapter 3, the present context creates conditional relevance (see van Eemeren 1986) for challenges, but not for (real) requests for clarification.

if he specified first what aspect of the house his opinion refers to. In that case he would still be able to substantiate this opinion at a later stage.

An example of an indirect challenge in which, taken literally, a clarification is requested for a standpoint that relates to an inciting proposition is (11):

(11) Barbara: You are actually saying, my work is visual art, but the Fund does not want to see it that way.
Gerard: I make video. That's all. Video art.
Jerome: But if you want to qualify for an art subsidy, you need to communicate what you are doing.
Gerard: *But why should I do that?*
Roos: Because you want something.
(Discussion 'Visual Arts, Design and Architecture Fund', 25 March 1999)

Gerard's request for clarification can be regarded as an indirect challenge to defend the adduced standpoint. The justification is that the request neither concerns a clarification of the source of the obligation that is included in the standpoint (the source is Jerome), nor the contents of the obligation (a need to communicate), nor who must observe the obligation (Gerard) or how this can be done. Finally, since the request for clarification is introduced by the oppositional 'but' (see chapter 5), it can be regarded as a indirect challenge to defend the standpoint that is put forward, a defence which follows promptly (though it is not given by Jerome but by Roos – who either rushes to help, or speaks out of turn).

So far we have discussed indirect challenges to defend a standpoint in which, taken literally, more information about the source or the content of the adopted standpoint was requested. The second category of indirect challenges that we distinguished above consists of requests in which clarification is requested of the motives of the speaker in relation to taking the standpoint concerned or of the knowledge that standpoint stems from. In this type of requests an informative interpretation in itself is never irrelevant, but a challenge of the standpoint is always a possible interpretation as well, certainly if the analysis is not aimed at uncovering the reasons and motives for having a particular opinion, but rather at identifying the obligations that uttering a standpoint puts on record for themselves and each other. (12) is a good example of a case in which both interpretations are possible, but in which a challenge to defend a standpoint is, from the perspective of 'externalisation' and 'dialectification', the more obvious interpretation (see chapters 1 and 2):

(12) Mr de Hoop Scheffer (CDA): *Why* did the Prime Minister say at the press conference last Friday, I keep that for 100% between myself and the Secretary-General? In other words, I'm not going to inform the Foreign Secretary. *Why did he do that?* Doesn't that demonstrate a fundamental lack of faith on his side? This lack of faith does not concern your Foreign Secretary but the Foreign Secretary. *Now, why is that?* Could the Prime Minister answer that question?
(Parliamentary Debate in The Netherlands about the High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 October 2000)

It is clear that the questions of de Hoop Scheffer could be interpreted as informative questions about the motives of the Prime Minister. However, if we consider that not informing the Foreign Secretary can be regarded as a reprehensible omission, and that a parliamentary debate is an opportunity for members of parliament to publicly call Ministers to account for their course of action, then these questions must be interpreted as a request for a justification of the standpoint that the Foreign Secretary did not need to be informed, i.e. as a challenge to defend that standpoint.[50]

The dialogue below shows that even if the question concerns the knowledge someone's views stem from, a challenge to defend a standpoint about the acceptability of these views can be a more suitable interpretation than an interpretation as a request for clarification:

(13) Mr Bovenkerk: They fix things by using violence or by threatening with violence. We're acquainted with some very crass examples; the level of violence in the Turkish environment is by far the highest of all the ethnic groups, at least as far as absolute magnitude is concerned. Perhaps this doesn't hold true in terms of percentages but it's still a very high level.

The Chairman: *How do you know that? What do you base that on?*

(Interview parliamentary committee Criminal Investigation Practices, 6 September 1995)

Indicators that can reinforce such an interpretation are, for instance, 'actually', 'so well', and 'all that'. This type of expressions causes a certain distrust that is conveyed in an ironic form in the informative question with regard to the other party's level of information. An example is (14):

(14) Mr Weisglas (VVD) to Mr Rosenmöller (GroenLinks): The key argument for the turn GroenLinks made, as it emerged from the media in the past few days, is that the balance between the military and politics has been disturbed. You've just repeated this. *How do you know all that?* Are you everywhere?

(Parliamentary Debate in The Netherlands about developments in Afghanistan, 15 November 2001)

Obviously, this kind of irony can be used in a more sophisticated way – or more bluntly – without the addition of words like 'so well' and 'all that'. (15) shows this:

(15) Mr Bovenkerk: I think that the affair wasn't organised here, but in Morocco, and that the means of power used to keep people in line in The Netherlands, to see to it that they'd keep their appointments and pay their bills on time, are

[50] The word 'now' in the last question also contributes to the necessity of this kind of interpretation.

tied up with the organisations and the government, in as far as it's involved, in Morocco itself.

Mrs Vos (GroenLinks): *Is this just an idea of yours or do you know it to be true?*

(Parliamentary Debate in The Netherlands about developments in Afghanistan, 15 November 2001)

These examples make clear why, in the type of context concerned, i.e. an 'interrogation', questions that, taken literally, ask for the motives or the knowledge of the other party, should in fact be analysed as indirect challenges to defend a standpoint.

4.3.2 Indicators of the acceptance of a one-sided burden of proof

After our discussion of the indicators of the move that initiates all dialogues about the distribution of the burden of proof – a challenge to defend a standpoint – we focus now on the two previously mentioned issues that can arise in the moves that follow the challenge to defend a standpoint. We start with the issue that may come up in the moves that follow in the dialogue about the establishment of a one-sided burden of proof in a non-mixed dispute: whether or not the burden of proof is (to be) accepted by the challenged party.

In the explicit discussion situation that was assumed when the core profiles for the deliberations about the different types of distribution of the burden of proof were designed, the acceptance or refusal of the burden of proof is always a response to a challenge to defend a standpoint. The move by which the burden of proof is accepted in response to such a challenge is in the profiles formulated as 'OK'. It is clear that in a real discussion this move will not occur very often. People who have put forward a standpoint and are inclined to accept the challenge to defend that standpoint generally proceed to adduce arguments for that standpoint without giving a further announcement. An explicit announcement that one is going to argue in favour of the standpoint taken would sound rather solemn, as the following fragment makes clear:

(16) Mr Weisglas (VVD): […] Why do you think the balance between political-diplomatic and military action is gone? That's after all the main argument for the turn the GroenLinks made.

Mr Rosenmöller (GroenLinks): *I will tell you that*.

(Parliamentary Debate in The Netherlands about developments in Afghanistan, 15 November 2001)

Unlike explicit discussions, implicit discussions in which the party that has put forward a standpoint has not been explicitly challenged often allow an announcement that one is prepared to defend the standpoint. If someone assumes the burden of proof without being invited to do so, or refuses it, he is as it were anticipating such a challenge. There are several words and expressions which can,

in a more or less straightforward manner, point to the acceptance of the burden of proof. We start with the most straightforward one, that is to say, the explicit announcement that one has the arguments that support the adopted standpoint. This is the case in (17):

(17) Mr Rosenmöller (GroenLinks): [...] Following the 7th of October, England and the U.S.A. changed their military strategy, partly due to lack of result and increasing criticism. In bombing the frontline of the Taliban, they made an explicit choice to use the Northern Alliance as a major ally. Their troops have become the ground troops of the United States, and – aided by the bombardments – they got room to gain territory on the Taliban. *There are two arguments in favour of this strategy.*
(Parliamentary Debate in The Netherlands about developments in Afghanistan, 15 November 2001)

Although in this fragment the speaker does not announce explicitly that he *is going to put forward* arguments that support his standpoint – he only states that the arguments exist; that they support the standpoint is presupposed – this statement of 'presupposed proof' can only be interpreted as such an announcement. In (18) we see that the speaker sometimes obscures this kind of – correct – interpretation:

(18) Mr Fijnhaut: Hash trade certainly is the dominant picture. Still, there's the ongoing thought, *also based on certain signals*, that in a number of cases the hash trade is coupled with the trade in cocaine, and possibly heroin.
(Interview parliamentary committee Criminal Investigation Practices, 6 September 1995)

Fijnaut states that there are certain 'signals' which indicate that the hash trade is coupled with the trade in cocaine, even heroin, but he does not explain what these signals are (neither here, nor in the rest of the dialogue). What sense is there in mentioning 'certain signals' in this context, unless one makes known what they are? It is clear that Fijnaut fails to accept the burden of proof: he pretends to accept it, but in practice he tries to dodge it.

The same misleading impression can be created if the speaker announces that he will *clarify* his standpoint, like in (19):

(19) Mr Oudkerk: Did – based on your best memory or based on what third parties told you – members of government and Mr Docters van Leeuwen contact each other that evening or the following morning?
Mr Lubbers: I expect they did.
Mr Oudkerk: Why do you expect that?
Mr Lubbers: *I will clarify that*.
(Interview parliamentary committee Bijlmermeer Aircraft Disaster, 11 March 1999)

In such cases, we see an *indirect acceptance* of the burden of proof. Although, certainly within a context of 'interrogation' it can be rhetorically beneficial to pretend that it is the interrogator's sole aim to obtain information and not to call the person who is questioned to account, as a rule such an announcement must be regarded as an indicator that the speaker is going to defend his standpoint. (Whether or not he will actually do so is another matter.) The conditions under which there is a *real* announcement of a clarification can be inferred from the previously mentioned conditions under which a clarification of a (descriptive, evaluative, or inciting) standpoint is relevant at all. In addition, the follow-up of the dialogue provides the most important clue. Does the speaker provide a real clarification? Or is he putting forward arguments?

As in the case of indirect challenges, we can distinguish two categories in the case of indirect announcements that the burden of proof is accepted: (a) announcements that, taken literally, say that more information will be supplied about the contents or the origin of the standpoint, and (b) announcements that, taken literary, say that more information is going to be supplied about the motives of the speaker to take the standpoint in question or about the knowledge that standpoint stems from. An example of an announcement of the first category is (20):

(20) Mr Bovenkerk: The Surinamese population has developed its own retail businesses in The Netherlands, trade in all kinds of tropical products, goldsmiths, restaurants, and what have you. I think that a number of these establishments […] function as a distribution centre, sometimes without the owner even knowing about it. That sounds silly, but it indicates how normal this trade has become. *I can clarify this* with an anecdote. A Surinamese man bought some bananas from a Surinamese greengrocer's in a major city in The Netherlands […]

(Interview parliamentary committee Criminal Investigation Practices, 6 September 1995)

Of course, what follows is not a nice story about a Surinamese man who went one day to buy bananas, but a report that is supposed to serve as an argument that a number of Surinamese shops function as a distribution centre for drugs.

An announcement of the second category, which, taken literary, says that more information will be given about the motives of the speaker to take the standpoint in question, is (21):

(21) Mr van der Staaij (SGP): I've stated it before: we generally sympathise with, and on most points approve of the proposed expansions of services and jurisdictions. However, like others we have a need for a quantification of these measures. We also need a clear assessment of the shift of priorities that are going to be involved. For, in our opinion, that will take place. *I will clarify this* on the basis of some examples.

(General Lower House Debate in The Netherlands about terrorist attacks in the United States, 24 October 2001)

Van der Staaij announces that he will clarify the motives (or needs) of the SGP which necessitate a clear assessment of the 'shift of priorities'. It is not quite clear how these motives or needs can be supported with *examples*.

The problem is that it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a particular standpoint in a particular context would indeed be served with a more detailed clarification, or that one should only expect arguments. This problem occurs in the interpretation of Fijnaut's response in (22):

(22) Mr de Graaf: The report of the Ministry of Justice, to which you referred, makes a distinction between the turnover on the Dutch market and the turnover that Dutch groups supposedly make with the transit to other countries. The difference is considerable, between 0.8 billion and 1.8 billion. Setting aside these specific figures, does this proportion between the turnover on the domestic market and the total turnover of Dutch groups seem realistic to you?

Mr Fijnaut: Again, in my view it is incredibly difficult to determine these things. *I will tell you why.*

(Interview parliamentary committee Criminal Investigation Practices, 6 September 1995)

Fijnaut literally announces here that he is going to explain why it is so difficult to determine whether the proportion between the 'turnover on the domestic market' and 'the total turnover of Dutch groups' is realistic. Does it stop there? Or is he in fact on the verge to defend the standpoint that he has good reason to have the opinion that these things are hard to ascertain? In these cases it is wisest to consider the explanation that follows, whether explicitly announced or not, as an argument to defend the adopted standpoint.

Sometimes the speaker himself strongly suggests that only clarification about a particular standpoint and no argumentation is needed. Particularly in those cases it is often crucial to see the announcement as an announcement of arguments. In the following fragment such an impression is evoked by Mr Bovenkerk, who was also speaking in earlier fragments:

(23) Mr Bovenkerk: I would like to *add something in order to make this point a little clearer*. For if I say these things – and they aren't nice things – I don't only go by the material of the police and the department of criminal investigation that I have seen.

(Interview parliamentary committee Criminal Investigation Practices, 6 September 1995)

The fact that Mr Bovenkerk's standpoint, as he himself admits, will not please everybody makes it clear that the announced clarification is not so much a clarification as a defence of a standpoint. Therefore, this announcement should be considered an announcement of such a defence, veiled for rhetorical reasons.

An indirect announcement of the second category, i.e. an announcement that says, taken literary, that more information about the grounds, motives, or knowledge of the speaker will be provided is at issue in (24):

(24) I felt I ought to inform Hank about what happened and *I will tell you* what made me do it: […]

(Overheard phone call, 22 March 2002)

In this case too, it seems less obvious that the listener wants to know what exactly induced the speaker to act as he did, but rather that he wants to learn how the speaker thinks to justify his course of action in retrospect. Given the fact that the speaker is also aware of this, and that he is only verbally weakening his burden of proof, his words must be interpreted as an announcement that he is going to defend the standpoint that he was justified in informing 'Hank'.

4.3.3 Indicators of refusing a one-sided burden of proof

So far we have focused on direct and indirect ways for *accepting* the burden of proof for a standpoint. An alternative move in the core profile for the dialogue about the distribution of the burden of proof in a single non-mixed dispute is the *refusal* of the burden of proof. In what way can this move, directly or indirectly, be made?

In the first place, the party that has taken a standpoint could directly refuse the burden of proof for this standpoint by referring to a previous – supposedly successful – defence of the standpoint against the same antagonist. This is what Mr van Aartsen does in the following fragment:

(25) Mrs Vos (GroenLinks): The Prime Minister has said: at this time it is too delicate to exchange this with anyone. So, it was also too delicate to exchange it with you. I understand that you have reconciled yourself to this fact. Is that the case? And if it is, doesn't it mean that the order of rank is clear now, and that the Prime Minister is the one who runs the show in this type of foreign appointments, and that you have been side-tracked, as far as this is concerned?

Secretary van Aartsen: *I have nothing at all to add* to what I answered earlier.

(Lower House Debate in The Netherlands about the High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 October 2000)

Van Aartsen indicates that he is not going to indicate why he has not been 'side-tracked' as far as he is concerned. The reason: he has done so before. Whether the latter is true or not determines whether or not he is *justified* in refusing the challenge of Mrs Vos.

An indirect way of refusing the burden of proof consists of anticipating critical questions and brushing them aside at the very start (again while maintaining the adopted standpoint):

(26) Mr Weisglas (VVD): I couldn't care less, to be honest, about who knew what, when and why, or not. Unlike Mr de Hoop Scheffer and Mrs Vos I have no need for a reconstruction at all. […] Really, Madam Chairman, none of our voters will warm to this kind of introverted parliamentary reconstruction and the VVD will not participate in it, *not even if provoked by the questions that Mr de Hoop Scheffer and Mrs Vos might put to me*.

(Lower House Debate in The Netherlands about the High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 October 2000)

It should be clear that in this case the burden of proof is dealt with in a pretty opportunistic manner, by means of a clever *part-whole reasoning*: if the voters are not interested in a reconstruction, then the Lower House has no need to demand it.

Another indirect manner to refuse the burden of proof consists of actually *ignoring* the criticism the other party has uttered. Kok does this in the following fragment, in response to an attack by – again – Mrs Vos:

(27) Mrs Vos (GroenLinks): I understand less and less of this. You are saying that you told Mr Annan not to discuss this with anyone because you were afraid he would take Mr Pronk's candidature less seriously if you didn't. […] I stick to my opinion that this is an illogical explanation.

Prime Minister Kok: *I can only take note of that. I can hardly force you to regard my explanation as logical.*

(Lower House Debate in The Netherlands about the High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 October 2000)

Kok stands by his – implicit – standpoint that he has given a logical explanation for his communication to VN secretary Kofi Annan, against the criticism of Vos, not by giving in to the criticism and neither by rejecting the criticism, but by leaving the criticism for what it is – which is rather difficult to regard as a reasonable move in a discussion.

Even if the criticism of the opposite party is noted, the burden of proof may be refused at a later stage. Mr van Aartsen does so in response to a challenge by de Hoop Scheffer in the following fragment:

(28) Mr de Hoop Scheffer (CDA): You didn't inquire about Lubbers?

Foreign Secretary van Aartsen: That wasn't necessary, for both of us knew the underlying problem. Those were the problems the Secretary-General had. Partly because of the confidentiality of the exchanges, *I don't want to enter into the matter at length.*

(Lower House Debate in The Netherlands about the High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 October 2000)

Van Aartsen makes an appeal to the confidentiality of the conversation involved to prevent him from being accused of parrying the question and, in so doing, dodging the burden of proof for the implicit standpoint that actually he did not inquire about Lubbers. (Later in the debate it turned out that his appeal to 'confidentiality' could not save him.)

The debate becomes somewhat more rational when the burden of proof is refused only temporarily while it is indicated that it will be redeemed later, so that the burden of proof is in fact suspended. Mr Fijnaut does this directly and explicitly in the following fragment:

(29) Van Traa (Chairman): How many indications do you have of cases [of corruption] outside the police force, and where do they occur?

> Mr Fijnaut: About the figures I hesitate to speak out. *Later I will explain why*. In the domain in question I can mention two. In the first place, local authorities, apart from the police. In the second place, the prison system.
>
> (Interview parliamentary committee Criminal Investigation Practices, 6 September 1995)

Assuming that Fijnaut will actually return to the matter, it is from the point of view of *piece-meal engineering* only reasonable to deal with one matter after the other in order to prevent things becoming a muddle.

However, such acting becomes really fallacious if dodging the burden of proof is covered up by pretending that it speaks for itself that the standpoint is correct or that the standpoint even comes down to a shared standpoint, as occurs in the following fragments (in both cases they concern Mr Bovenkerk's answers to questions put by Mr van Traa, Chairman of the parliamentary committee Criminal Investigation Practices in an interview of 6 September 1995):

(30) *It is obvious that* the so-called mafia problem among Italians in the United States is connected to the period of Prohibition between 1920 and 1933 [...].

(31) Perhaps I should give some additional information. In the environment of Dutch drug traffickers […] one is told too that when you buy a substantial shipment, you buy the road and the harbour as well. There is simply a certain price tag on these things. *And it is totally clear* that this money also goes in the direction of the government.

If what Bovenkerk states here was really 'obvious' or 'totally clear', he would not have to say so, as we have explained in a Gricean way in chapter 3.

4.3.4 Indicators of sequence issues in a two-sided burden of proof

After our treatment of the indicators of the first issue that after an initial challenge to defend a standpoint may occur in the continuation of the dialogue about the distribution of the burden of proof, the issue of accepting and refusing the burden of proof for the standpoint, we change over to the second specific issue: the sequence of the defences. The sequence in which the parties that take a standpoint in a mixed dispute should acquit themselves from their obligation to defend is not dialectically regulated. According to the core profile for the dialogue about the distribution of the burden of proof in a mixed dispute, the party that is challenged to defend his standpoint can therefore, besides accepting or refusing the burden of proof, also, in its turn, challenge the challenger to defend his own, opposite standpoint. In this section we examine the indicators of this move.

Attempts to establish a reversal in the sequence of defence can be expressed more or less explicitly. In the most explicit form the challenged party says something like 'Just prove that X is *not* the case'. Although examples of such explicit reversal attempts are relatively rare, they can be found, for instance, in the religious domain, like in (32) (where the reversals are preceded by a positive defence of the speaker's standpoint):

(32) Life after death; if one doesn't believe in it, then where does all this information about and from the deceased originate that we get through *real* mediums and psychics? Just look at 'near-death experiences', deathbed visions, proof of reincarnation, the evidence of *real* prophets, over the centuries, that have proven themselves a long time ago, and also speak of life after death! *Just prove there is NOTHING* after death! There is enough proof to the contrary, though science rather speaks of indications.
(Website M. van der Dries, 3 August 2002)

More often, attempts to reverse the sequence of defence are implicit, using, for example, expressions like 'Why not?' in response to a challenge to defend a negative standpoint. An example of this case is (33):

(33) A: I expect that the number of claims will increase, also in The Netherlands. [...]
B: In the United States compensation did not go to individual smokers but to the States. Why do you think you stand a chance in The Netherlands?
A: *Why not?* There's no jurisprudence in The Netherlands. In Germany, France, England, and Australia this kind of lawsuit has taken place as well. Sometimes the manufacturer wins, sometimes the smoker.
(General meeting of Parliament in The Netherlands, 20 June 2001)

Of course, it is odd that MP 'A', in spite of the fact that he suggests that 'B' defends the opposite standpoint, immediately starts defending his own – no doubt, this has to do with the, at first sight, unreasonable nature of the 'Why not?' response: after all, B asks a question, but does not appear to take a negative standpoint. This is, however, only appearance, for in the introduction of his question B makes a case from which it 'a fortiori' follows that a smoker in The Netherlands does not stand a chance for compensation. For this reason, we do have to attribute a negative standpoint to him.

Incidentally, the use of the expression 'Why not?' does not always indicate that one of the parties suggests reversing the sequence of the defences. Actually, that is only the case if the expression is used immediately after the party that is using it is challenged to defend his own positive standpoint. In all other cases the use of such an expression simply means that the challenge refers to a standpoint with a negative content, as in the following example:

(34) Joosse: Actually, education and research are created for and by the students and staff members. So, it is important that they have a say. And they lost it. And not only the new law, the MUB, is to blame for that.
Buwalda: *Why not?*
(Peter Buwalda interviews Sofie Joosse, chairwoman of the student union LSVB, UTNieuws, 30 May 2002)

Joosse is asked to defend her standpoint that not just the MUB caused the loss of having a say. Reversal of the sequence of defending is not the issue here.

By contrast, the expression 'Why should it/he/she?' is often used to try to reverse the sequence of defence. If it was used to challenge in a regular way, responding to a standpoint with a positive content, then 'Why?' would be sufficient. Generally, the addition 'Why should it/he/she?' indicates that in the context concerned we are dealing with opposite standpoints, and that the one who has taken the negative standpoint for the moment refuses to accept the challenge to defend this negative standpoint by saying 'Why should it/he/she?'. (35) is an example of this:

(35) Wiegman: Why isn't former Alderman Frank Köhler on the list of candidates for the May elections?

Meijer: *Why should he?* The list includes a lot of Amsterdam citizens already.

(Interview between reporter Marcel Wiegman and committee chairman Herman Meijer, former Alderman, in *Het Parool*, 18 January 2002)

As in (33), the interviewee foresees that his response might seem unreasonable and therefore he still puts forward an argument – something which, upon closer consideration, he did not need to do (as the first one), because also in this case the negative standpoint of the interviewer is conveyed very clearly in his question. That is different in (36):

(36) Social security is a benefit for people who can't do anything else, which means society is stuck with them (I mean that in a positive way). So, if people *can* do something, society needn't pay for them (give me one good reason *why it should*). And yes, if a cancer patient can still peel shrimps, why not? Do you think cancer patients are pathetic, or something? Should they have a better job than the other average Dutchman? That means you consider the cancer patient as being lost already.

(Contribution to the Internet site *Forum*, 20 May 2001)

In this passage, an absent opponent is challenged to defend the standpoint opposite to the writer's. However, it does not seem very likely that someone would take that standpoint in the way it is formulated. Contrary to the one in (33), the 'counter challenge' the writer of this Forum contribution puts forward is clearly unreasonable. Rather than a proposal to reverse the sequence of defence, it is an attempt to shift the burden of proof.

It is also possible that the issue is not a problem of sequence, but entirely a problem concerning the acceptance of the burden of proof. A good example is found in (37):

(37) Horror preacher Pandy (77) stands trial [in Brussels] for the murder of six of his family members at the end of the eighties. […] Pandy insists that his two ex-wives and four of his children have not disappeared at all. According to the clergyman, his family is fine: 'They live in a small castle by the sea and own a private plane', Pandy claimed before the people's jury. […] When he was asked why they did not come to clear him if that were true, Pandy answered, '*It is not my task to prove* that my family

is alive; *you have to prove* that they are dead'. The militant Minister hit the nail on the head, because the Belgian authorities still have not been able to find hard evidence against Pandy.

(*De Telegraaf* on the Internet, 21 February 2002)

Pandy does not propose another sequence of defence, but simply shifts the burden of proof. Rightly so, according to the writer of the article.

Also, if neither the acceptance of the burden of proof nor the sequence of defence initially constitutes a problem, a 'counter challenge' can cause problems at a later stage. This may especially happen if that challenge comes 'too early' according to the opposite party, that is to say before the challenging party has defended his standpoint to the satisfaction of the opposite party. In the following example the opposite party is clearly not convinced:

(38) Alderman H. Meijer passed a vote of non-confidence against R. Heeres, councillor for GroenLinks, during the committee meeting about environmental affairs yesterday evening. 'This is the second time you have demonstrated to mismanage confidential matters. If you can't handle administrative standards of decency, you should draw the obvious conclusion', Meijer barked at Heeres. Heeres shouted angrily that Meijer should produce evidence. 'If you're able to do that, I'll give you a thousand guilders! [...] I know your practices. You are playing a game with Mol and van Dijk. *But you have to prove your statement first'*.

(Roel Toering in *Westerwoldenieuws*, 17 October 2001)

Even though, later in his tirade, Heeres actually defends his standpoint that he has not been careless with confidential information, he demands at this stage that Meijer should demonstrate that he *has been* careless with this kind of information – something which Meijer says he has already done. With this example we are closing our discussion of indicators of attempts to reverse the sequence of defence. We also wind up our discussion of indicators of crucial moves in the process of determining the burden of proof: the challenge to defend an adopted standpoint, the acceptance or refusal of that challenge, and the amendment of the sequence of defending.

CHAPTER 5

INDICATORS OF STARTING POINTS FOR THE DISCUSSION

5.1 THE IDENTIFICATION OF STARTING POINTS

In this chapter we will focus on the moves that can be constituent for another central activity in the opening stage of a critical discussion: the establishment of the material (or substantial) starting points for the discussion. As early as in classical dialectics these starting points played a crucial part, since a dialectic was interpreted as a critical dialogue in which one party, the opponent, tries to refute the standpoint of the other party, the proponent, on the basis of concessions the proponent makes in the course of the dialogue in response to strategic questions of the opponent. The opponent's aim is to obtain concessions that include a contradiction or constitute a contradiction with the standpoint of the proponent. The proponent's aim is to answer the opponent's questions in a constructive way without making concessions the opponent could use to refute the proponent's standpoint.

A similar procedure is applicable in a – pragma-dialectical – critical discussion. Leaving aside a number of smaller differences – the defence of the standpoint does not start on the basis of a specific question but as a result of a non-specific expression of doubt regarding a standpoint, and in addition to the antagonist the protagonist is allowed to try to obtain concessions as well – the most significant difference between classical dialectic and a critical discussion is that in a critical discussion the dialogue in which the concessions are obtained precedes the argumentation stage of the discussion: this dialogue takes place in the opening stage of the discussion. In the opening stage the parties involved in the dispute lay down their mutual concessions and agree to regard them as shared starting points for the discussion.

In argumentative practice such a 'dialogue about starting points' often remains implicit. Sometimes it is simply assumed that – in the case of a real discussion – the opposite party or – in the case of an argumentative text or speech – the readers or listeners share particular insights, views, wishes, and needs with the writer or speaker. Nevertheless, there are sufficient cases in which shared starting points are – directly or indirectly – referred to, or in which it is proposed to regard particular propositions as a shared starting point. Even if this is not the case, generally verbal 'traces' of such references or proposals are found in the discussion or text.

Obviously, it is imperative for somebody who wishes to pass a judgment on the quality of an argumentative text or discussion, and who for this reason needs to be able to establish the extent to which arguments and criticism are founded on shared starting points, to have an understanding of the different verbal turns of phrase that are used to bring up shared starting points. In this chapter we will give some attention to this matter. We will both deal with proposals from party T1 to regard something as a shared starting point and with possible responses to such a proposal from T2.

5.2 DIALECTICAL PROFILE FOR ESTABLISHING A STARTING POINT

In line with our working method, we start our discussion with a dialectical core profile, in this case the core profile for the moves a participant in a critical discussion can make as part of proposing a starting point and responding to such a proposal. The party who starts the deliberation in the opening stage can only make one move – although in different ways – to open the dialogue: suggest to the other party that they should accept a certain proposition X as a shared starting point for the discussion. The other party, on the other hand, cannot only respond in different ways, but also by using different types of moves. The core profile in Figure 5.1 shows what these moves are and what the possible follow-up might be.

T2 can respond to T1's proposal to regard X as a shared starting point for the discussion by accepting this proposal or by rejecting it. In the latter case, T1 can accept the rejection or ask T2 for clarification. In the first case, T2 can either accept T1's proposal right away, or impose restrictions on his acceptance, specifically that T1 should accept another proposition, Y, as a starting point for the discussion as well. In the follow-up T1 can either accept those restrictions or not accept them by either accepting Y as starting point or not accepting Y as a starting point. In case of a rejection, T2 can ask for clarification. After T1's request for clarification after T2's rejecting X, as well as after T2's request for clarification after T1 has rejected Y, a sub-discussion may ensue about the other party's rejection to either accept X or Y as a starting point.[51]

One could wonder why it is necessary to include the second possible move of T2 ('X, if proposal: Y?') in the core profile above. After all, the 'negotiations' about the acceptance of X are only about the question whether X can be regarded



['~' = 'no commitment to']

FIGURE 5.1 Dialectical core profile for establishing a starting point

[51] See for the latter possibility van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003).

as a shared starting point. Why can T2's proposal to also accept Y as a starting point not simply be regarded as the initiation of a new dialogue that is unrelated to the dialogue about the acceptance of X?

It is primarily for efficiency reasons that the profile allows the dialogue about the acceptance of Y to be part of the dialogue about the acceptance of X. The fact is that this inclusion allows for cases in which the acceptance of Y by T1 has *consequences for the argumentative value* of X, that is to say, imposes restrictions on the *argumentative use* that T1 can make in support of his standpoint. If it could not become clear as early as in the opening stage of the discussion that the acceptance of Y had these consequences, it could happen that T1 and T2 run through the whole discussion about the acceptability of T1's standpoint and agree in the concluding stage that T1 is allowed to maintain his standpoint on the basis of the support he has provided with the use of X, while it would have been clear all the time that if T2 could have proposed Y as a starting point and T1 had accepted Y as such, T1's support for his standpoint would have been overruled by an attack by T2 on the basis of Y, and T1 would therefore not be allowed to maintain his standpoint. To illustrate this point, we present two dialogues. The first dialogue runs along the first-mentioned 'inefficient' path, while in the second dialogue the overruling starting point Y is dealt with immediately:

(1) T1: Harry's finances will always be in a bad state.
T2: Why is that?
T1: He was born poor.
T2: That's true.
T1: If you are born poor, you'll never become rich.
T2: No, that's also true.
T1: So I maintain my standpoint that Harry's finances will always be in a bad state.
T2: That is your right!
[One minute passes.]
T2: Harry's finances are going to be in a good state.
T1: Why is that?
T2: He is going to inherit money from his uncle in America.
T1: Golly!
T2: And with an inheritance from an American uncle you can go a long way.
T1: As you say!
T2: So, I'm not so sure that Harry's finances will always be in a bad state.
T1: No, you could say that again!

(2) T1: Harry's finances will always be in a bad state.
T2: Why is that?
T1: He was born poor.
T2: That's true, but he is going to inherit money from his uncle in America.
T1: Oh, that changes things.

T2: Yes, with an inheritance from an American uncle you can go a long way.

T1: As you say!

T2: So, I'm not so sure that Harry's finances will always be in a bad state.

T1: No, you could say that again!

By anticipating that the argumentative use of the starting point that Harry was born poor would not aid T1 a great deal in supporting his standpoint if he knew that Harry has an inheritance in store from an uncle in America, T2 has succeeded in reducing the two discussions in the first dialogue to one discussion in the second dialogue and has thus been able to increase the efficiency of the dialectical exchange by shortening it by no less than seven moves![52]

5.3 THE ANALYSIS OF ESTABLISHING STARTING POINTS

5.3.1 Indicators of a proposal to accept a proposition as a starting point

On the basis of the core profile, we shall examine the words and expressions that could be indicative of the moves the participants are able to make in a critical discussion within the framework of proposing a starting point and responding to such a proposal. We will focus in particular on the moves that T1 and T2 can make during their first turn in the dialogue and start our examination with the indicators of T1's proposal to accept a certain proposition, X, as a starting point for the discussion.

A direct and explicit proposal to the other party to accept a certain proposition as a shared starting point for the discussion is rare, at least if such a request would have to read as follows: 'Hereby I request you to accept P as a shared starting point for the discussion'. An indirect request, for instance a question about the willingness of the other party to accept a certain proposition as a starting point for the discussion, will not occur very often either. 'To accept a proposition as a starting point for the discussion' seems hardly a description of an act one would perform in everyday life. As a rule, a request to accept something as a shared starting point will be done implicitly, either by asking someone whether or not (he also thinks that) something is the case, or by attributing a certain starting point to someone. The latter can be done by means of a rhetorical question, but also by stating that something has been accepted, or should be accepted, in the context involved.

Questions as implicit proposals to accept a proposition as a starting point

If one party asks the other party whether or not (he also thinks that) something is the case, it ultimately depends on the context whether this – informative – question can be regarded as an implicit request to accept a proposition as a starting point

[52] An alternative would be to place the information about the inheritance in the argumentation stage, that is, by making T2 say that if you were born poor, you will never become rich *unless* the person in question is expecting an inheritance from an uncle in America, as in Harry's case. However, this would be a faulty analysis, because the argumentation stage is, viewed dialectically, not the stage to bring forward new information as a starting point.

for the discussion. An example of a context in which a question about what someone thinks can serve as such a request is the 'interrogation'. The dialogue below, in which a psychiatrist remonstrates with a patient about his view that his parents should not interfere with his life, can be regarded as such a context:

(3) Patient: It's none of their business how I live. They should only […]
Psychiatrist: *Are you still living with your parents?*
Patient: Yes.
Psychiatrist: *Are they paying for everything you need?*
Patient: Yes.
Psychiatrist: Then how can they not interfere in your life?
(From: van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs 1993)

It is obvious that the first two questions of the psychiatrist are not merely informative, but are intended specifically to obtain the concessions of the patient that allow the last (rhetorical) question. Informative questions like these two do not have characteristics that distinguish them from 'normal' questions in which inquiries about somebody's opinion or circumstances are made. Still, the use of particular expressions can be an indication that the question serves as a proposal to another party in the discussion to accept something as a common starting point. An example is the expression 'isn't it true that?' The use of this expression, by which the question actually almost becomes a rhetorical question, suggests that only a positive answer to the question is possible, which could signify that the interviewer needs the answer for something, for example for using it as a starting point for his argumentation. In fragment (4), the starting points that are 'asked' for are already half-way to being used as arguments against the (non-externalised) standpoint attributed to van Wissen that language might break down:

(4) 'Language is the vehicle of the mind, but sometimes it is a creaking wagon'. Linguist Driek van Wissen impressed that profundity upon us many years ago. But *isn't it true that* creaking wagons last longer? *Isn't it true* that language and material need to be in motion?
(Albert Lubberink on the Tip Top Taal website, 5 November 2003)

Another, less 'rhetorical' expression is 'do you remember that'. If the other party is asked whether he remembers something, this may indicate – of course only in connection with other textual and contextual indications – that according to the 'inquiring' party he has committed himself in an earlier stage to a particular starting point. The following fragment illustrates this:[53]

(5) Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): Mr Zalm, *do you remember that* it says in the Strategic Agreement that a solution would be found for this? *Do you also remember that* the former government had a tailor-made bill lying

[53] This fragment originates from the corpus we often refer to in this chapter: the political debates held in Dutch parliament on the 18th and the 19th of September 2002 concerning the Budget for the year 2003, hereinafter called 'The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002'.

ready on the subject of this supplementary benefit? That's why money was reserved for these people in the budget of the Ministry for Social Services and Employment.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

It is clear that van Nieuwenhoven is not just reminiscing with Zalm, but that she excepts Zalm to remember the matters involved – and also to be prepared to draw a conclusion from them that he may not like.

Expressions that come closest to a direct proposal to consider something as a starting point for further discussion include 'do we agree that …?' and 'do you agree with me that …?' In the following fragment, which is part of a discussion about the pursuit of a 'sustainable society', the question that is introduced by 'do we agree that' is used to suggest allowing the pursuit of sustainability as a starting point:

(6) *O2 challenge scenarios* can aid us in the discussion. *Do we agree that* we strive for sustainability? What does sustainable design mean in that case? We have to look for a design frame of reference within which we can test out possible design solutions: real criteria – design practices.

(Joris Nuytten on the Industrial Design website, 25 August 2002)

The general debate in Dutch parliament about the Budget for 2003 includes a good example as well:

(7) Mr Verhagen (CDA): *You agree with me that* precisely the basic laws that are rooted in the Constitution are tied up with the values of Dutch society …

Mr Zalm (VVD): Yes.

Mr Verhagen (CDA): … *and that*, therefore, this goes beyond not standing in each other's way and involves creating a climate in which everybody in Dutch society feels committed to these same values?

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

Verhagen asks Zalm to make a statement regarding the status of basic law, and as soon as Zalm has made this statement Verhagen makes clear that he regards his answer as an acceptance of a shared starting point, from which according to Verhagen certain conclusions can be drawn that are favourable to him.

Rhetorical questions as indirect attributions of a starting point

To a greater extent than a normal question, the use of a rhetorical question may indicate that the speaker is making an implicit proposal to the other party to accept a certain proposition: whoever asks a rhetorical question indirectly states that the other party should accept the proposition implied in the question. It is, however, unclear whether this always involves establishing a shared starting point. Except as a way of making an implicit proposal to accept something as a starting point for the discussion, rhetorical questions may also serve to

(indirectly) express a standpoint (like the rhetorical question that ended dialogue (3) between the psychiatrist and the young man) (see also Slot 1993, Houtlosser 1995). It is, therefore, important that we determine how rhetorical questions in which a starting point is proposed can be distinguished from rhetorical questions in which a standpoint is brought forward. For this reason, we will elaborate some more on this subject.

The first relevant observation is that rhetorical questions often include adverbs and expressions like 'then', 'now', 'well', 'surely', 'rather', 'after all', 'also', 'eventually', 'just', and tag-questions such as 'isn't it' and 'is it'? Some of these words and expressions can indicate both that the rhetorical question in which they occur constitutes a standpoint and that the question is a starting point, but most point to one of these functions rather than to the other, or point at least under certain circumstances to one of these functions rather than the other. The latter goes for 'then', which can be used to express impatience or displeasure. This usage can manifest itself in a nominal statement, but also in the second part of a compound statement that starts with 'if'. In that case 'then' also has the function of making clear that the content of the second part of the compound statement follows from what was expressed or implied in the first part. In (8), displeasure is expressed by means of a rhetorical question in which 'then' is used; (9) is an example of a rhetorical question in which 'then' also indicates a conclusion:

(8) Is there really nothing that's any good *then*, according to you?[54]

(9) If you know so well how things are, *then* why ask me to explain them to you?

Above all, when 'then' is used to indicate at the same time a conclusion, it suggests that the rhetorical question constitutes a standpoint. In that case it demonstrates that the part of the statement in which it is used constitutes a conclusion that follows from something the listener has already accepted, which implies that the listener should accept the conclusion as well. This conclusion can be regarded as a standpoint, and the accepted statement as a starting point used to support that standpoint. So, (9) should be reconstructed as, 'You should not ask me, for apparently you know how things are'. Also if 'then' is used to express displeasure, we generally have a standpoint. This is the case, for example, in (10):

(10) Is there nobody *then* who loves me?

It is easy to interpret this statement as an (indirect) standpoint ('There is nobody in the world who loves me'), but difficult to interpret it as an implicit proposal to accept something as a starting point.

Unlike rhetorical questions in which 'then' is used, rhetorical questions in which 'after all' or a tag question are used generally indicate a starting point

[54] 'Then' also indicates a conclusion in (8): it is likely that (8) is uttered in a context within which a second speaker has (again) said that something is no good; the conclusion is in that case that if that speaker often considers something no good, *probably nothing is ever any good according to him*.

rather than a standpoint. A rhetorical question containing 'after all' introduces a starting point even by definition. In rhetorical questions using a tag question the case is less obvious. We shall point out why.

Questions to which a tag question is added are sometimes referred to as 'asking for the sake of asking'. The examples below show that this characterization holds true for at least a number of cases:

(11) I think that we have the obligation to stop the gap completely. This concerns our next-door neighbours, and the problem is calculable and manageable, contrary to global problems. We should be able to look each other in the eye without embarrassment next time we are on holiday in Limburg, *shouldn't we*?

(*de Volkskrant*, 8 January 1994)

(12) It's not my fault that I look dishier than Ellen van Langen, *is it*?

In (11), the writer assumes that the reader has already accepted what is asserted by the rhetorical question. Moreover, he mentions the consequences the reader should attach to this acceptance: that 'the gap' must be stopped completely. In (12), the consequence is not mentioned. If the context in which the statement is made is taken into consideration, that consequence does, however, become clear: *Playboy* magazine has asked Jongmans to pose for them, but they have not asked Ellen van Langen. The addressee has to acknowledge that the speaker cannot help it that the editors of *Playboy* have preferred her to Ellen van Langen.

Still, a rhetorical question to which a tag question is added may serve as a standpoint as well. Such an analysis speaks for itself if the tag question complements a so-called attitude indicating expression (see chapter 3), for example:

(13) It's too crazy for words that we came all this way for nothing, *isn't it*?

Generally, a rhetorical question to which a tag question is added is also a standpoint if it is a response to a statement that asserts the opposite of what is asserted in the rhetorical question. This is the case in the dialogue below:

(14) T1: It is a five hour walk from Dam square to the Ajax stadium.
T2: From Dam square to the Ajax stadium? That isn't a five hour walk, *is it*?

Because the assertion implied in the rhetorical question indirectly denies what is stated in the preceding assertion, the rhetorical question must be regarded as a negative standpoint.

'Rather' is a word that usually indicates a starting point if it is used in a rhetorical question, particularly if that rhetorical question inquires about the state of the listener, and the question is introduced by the conjunction 'or'. In that case, the preceding statement always serves as a standpoint:

(15) We'll have to get a taxi, or would you *rather* get wet?

In this respect 'rather' corresponds to the addition of a tag question. The question in (15) could be easily restated as a rhetorical question to which a tag question is added, like in (16):

(16) We'll have to get a taxi. You don't want to get wet, *do you*?

On top of this, both the question in which 'rather' is used and the question to which a tag question is added can be easily supplemented with 'So there you are'. This indicates that the speaker is of the opinion that the first assertion follows from the assertion that is indirectly made by means of the rhetorical question.

Naturally, it is also quite possible for a rhetorical question to be devoid of indicative words:

(17) Why is the broken Dutch of our foreign friends quoted to the letter? I find this annoying, because this way the foreigner is separated even further from integration.

(*de Volkskrant*, 8 January 1994)

In cases where no expression is used to indicate the function of the rhetorical question, the context may include indicators of the argumentative use that is made of the starting points. For instance, 'namely' and 'for' generally indicate that the preceding question is a standpoint or that the rhetorical question that follows constitutes a starting point used as an argument. If such indicators of a standpoint or argumentation are absent, we can check whether they could be added without a change in meaning, allowing us once more to determine whether the rhetorical question functions as a standpoint or as a starting point that is used in the argumentation. If an introductory 'for' can be added to a rhetorical question that follows another statement, that question functions as a starting point used in the argumentation and the preceding statement functions as a standpoint. If the rhetorical question precedes another statement and 'for' can be added to the statement that follows, that question functions as a standpoint and the preceding statement as a starting point that is used argumentatively:

(18) It's awful that you are blaming me too. Don't I have enough trouble as it is?

(19) As far as I know, not one MP has even made a remark about this. How could we explain this to the man in the street? Even with an explanation it would be unacceptable.

(*de Volkskrant*, 2 July 1994)

The possibility to introduce the rhetorical question in (18) with 'for' ('For don't I have enough trouble as it is?') indicates that the assertion that is indirectly made through the rhetorical question ('I have enough trouble as it is') is actually used as a starting point, which means in this case as an argument to support the standpoint that it is bad that the listener 'is blaming the speaker too'. In (19), 'for' can be inserted between the rhetorical question and the following statement ('How could we explain this to the man in the street? For even with an explanation it

would be unacceptable') The last statement serves as a starting point that is used as an argument for the indirect standpoint that one would not be able to explain that no MP 'has even made a remark about this'.

'For' can never be added to an initiating rhetorical question, but in that case the addition of 'since' can serve as a test. The indirect assertion that is performed by means of the rhetorical question needs in such cases to be reconstructed. If 'since' can be inserted before that assertion, the assertion functions as a starting point used in the argumentation and the statement that follows functions as a standpoint:

(20) Has Kees ever said anything that wasn't outright ridiculous? We should just leave him out.

This question cannot be introduced by 'for' (and it cannot be inserted between the question and the following statement either). If the rhetorical question is reconstructed as an assertion ('Kees never said anything that wasn't outright ridiculous'), it turns out that this assertion can in fact be introduced by 'since'. This assertion should then be regarded as a starting point that is used as an argument to support a standpoint that follows it.

If a rhetorical question is used to make a proposal to accept a proposition as a common starting point, we have in fact an assertion in which the acceptance of the proposal is presented as unproblematic, or even as a fact. The nature of the proposal is in fact only identifiable in the form of the rhetorical question. A proposal to accept a certain proposition as a common starting point can, however, also be made in such an implicit manner that the nature of the proposal is completely obscured. This is the case if a party does not suggest a starting point by means of a question, but simply states that, or acts as if, a particular proposition is a starting point, or should be one. It is assumed – correctly or incorrectly – that the other party has already accepted or will accept the proposal to treat the proposition involved as a starting point for the discussion. Below, we shall discuss the expressions that can be used for this purpose. We distinguish two groups: (1) expressions in which a starting point is presented – in ascending line – as (a) accepted by the other party, (b) accepted by both parties, (c) generally accepted, (d) irrefutable, (e) obvious or (f) presupposed within the context, and (2) expressions that indicate that an – assumed – starting point is actually used as a point of departure in the argumentation. We start our discussion with expressions from group (1).

Expressions that suggest that a starting point has been accepted

Examples of expressions that (a) present a proposition as a starting point which has been accepted by the other party 'as you said yourself', and 'you've said that yourself'. Examples of expressions (b) suggesting that a proposition is a shared starting point are 'as we agreed', and 'we agree that'. Expressions (c) presenting a proposition as a generally accepted starting point are 'everybody knows that' and 'nobody in his right mind man would deny that'. Examples of expressions (d) describing a proposition as an irrefutable starting point are 'it is clear that', 'it is as clear as day that', and 'it is self-evident that'. Expressions (e) presenting

propositions as an obvious starting point are 'obviously', 'naturally', and 'of course'. Expressions (f) that make a proposition into a starting point based on a presupposition are 'fortunately', 'sadly', and 'I regret that'. The difference between all these expressions is that, in Hooper's terminology (see chapter 3), expressions like (a) 'as you said yourself', (b) 'we agree that', (c) 'everybody knows that', and (e) 'it goes without saying that' are semi-assertive, expressions like (d) 'it is clear that' are strong-assertive, and expressions like (f) 'I regret that' are non-assertive. The difference between strong-assertive and semi-assertive expressions, like 'it is clear that' and 'it is self-evident that', and non-assertive expressions, like 'I regret that', lies in the fact that – as we explained in chapter 3 – in non-assertive expressions the complementing proposition is not asserted at all, but is presupposed in the context involved. If someone says 'I regret that John won't come this afternoon', he presupposes that John will not come in the afternoon and asserts that he regrets this. If he adds, 'That is certain' or 'That is self-evident', he can only mean that he really regrets, or that it is self-evident that he regrets, that John will not come, and not that it is certain or self-evident that John will not come. The difference in 'assertive power' between strong-assertive and semi-assertive is that in strong-assertive expressions both the expression itself and the proposition are asserted. In semi-assertive expressions the expression itself is straightforwardly asserted, but the proposition is partially asserted and partially presupposed within the context. This difference can be expressed by the fact that a succession such as 'It is clear that we'll leave early. It is even self-evident' can be interpreted in a meaningful way, while a succession such as 'It is self-evident that we'll leave early. It is even clear' cannot. Apparently, a proposition cannot be presented as partially presupposed within the context and then asserted straightforwardly, while the reverse is possible.

On the basis of this description of non-assertive, semi-assertive and strong-assertive expressions we might suppose that strong-assertive expressions are the least suitable to present a certain proposition as a starting point for the discussion, semi-assertive expressions would be somewhat more suitable and non-assertive expressions the most suitable. After all, a proposition that is asserted to a large extent or partially would not be able to rely on the acceptance of the other party without question and, therefore, would not be able to serve as a starting point for the discussion without question either. On the other hand, a proposition that is not asserted but that is presupposed in the context should have been accepted by the listener already, allowing it to serve as a starting point for the discussion. This idea needs to be qualified, however, as the following fragments of discussion show:

(21) Mr van der Vlies (SGP): *It's a pity that* the Minister of Justice has made quantitative rather than qualitative objectives the foundation of his intended policy.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2003)

(22) Mr Wijnschenk (LPF): That's a good question. It was indeed one of the basic principles of our programme. *Regrettably or fortunately*,

> depending on how you wish to see it, this is a country of coalitions. You enter into negotiations with three parties and it happens that subjects are dropped. This is one of them.
>
> (The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2003)

In these fragments, the use of the non-assertive expressions 'it's a pity that' and 'regrettably or fortunately' make presuppositions of the proposition that the Minister of Justice has made quantitative rather than qualitative objectives the starting point of his intended policy and the proposition that a certain country (The Netherlands) is a country of coalitions. However, this does not mean that these propositions are necessarily presuppositions in the context involved. In the context in which (21) is uttered, it is unlikely that the Minister of Justice is also of the opinion that he did not make qualitative objectives the starting point of his policy. But, unless the Minister protests against promoting this assumption into a presupposition, he is stuck with it for the rest of the discussion, while van der Vlies is free to use it to support his own standpoint. In the second fragment it is also clear that by making the assumption that The Netherlands are a country of coalitions into a presupposition through using 'regrettably or fortunately', the questionability of that assumption is brushed aside. Even though the argument of Wijnschenk seems strong enough to stay upright without his assumption being promoted to a presupposition, whoever is spoken to would be well advised to question the validity of this particular presupposition.

What emerges from these fragments is that, though it is true that the use of a non-assertive expression turns a proposition into a presupposition, it does not guarantee the validity of the proposition involved in the given context, while the use of the non-assertive expression at the same time sees to it that discussion partners are discouraged from making a point of this. On the one hand, the use of a non-assertive introduction indicates in these cases that the speaker is trying to bring a particular proposition into the discussion, on the other hand, the speaker is doing this in an illegitimate way, so that we might rather say that he is 'smuggling it in', making it actually impossible for the opposite party to reject the proposal to accept a proposition as a common starting point. This is one of the reasons why in the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion there is no space set aside for 'expressives', the type of speech act to which statements such as 'I regret that', according to the Searlean speech act theory, belong.

Incidentally, the use of an expression that turns a proposition into a presupposition does not necessarily imply that the speaker wishes to make his statement the starting point of the discussion. In the first place, such an expression can also be used if there is no debate at all, and even if there is a debate, a non-assertive expression may be used to put forward a standpoint instead of implicitly suggesting a starting point. However, in such cases the presupposed proposition is not the subject of the standpoint but rather that what is being expressed in the employed expression. For example, in the fragment below, Zalm's standpoint is not the invocation of God in the conclusion of the Queen's speech, but rather that he regrets this:

(23) Mr Zalm: Philosophy of life belongs to the private domain; faith is a very personal thing. That's also part of the Dutch system of values and standards. Therefore, *we regret that* God is invoked in the conclusion of the Queen's speech.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2003)

We stated earlier that non-assertive expressions such as 'it is a pity that' may appear more suited for presenting a common starting point than semi-assertive and strong-assertive expressions such as 'as you know' and 'it is clear that'. However, the semi-assertive and strong-assertive expressions are in fact more suited for this purpose, simply because the (partially or wholly) assertive quality of these expressions conveys more clearly that the proposition they introduce is not irrefutable, which means that the other party is allowed to play a role too in the decision to regard that proposition as a common starting point or not – this often in spite of the literal meaning of these expressions, which, as we shall see, could easily suggest that taking such a decision is in fact superfluous. This does not mean, incidentally, that everybody would fail to notice the deceptive use of an expression like 'it is clear that' in cases in which it is employed in an attempt to get a proposition accepted as a starting point. Mr van Brakel explains this:

(24) When someone says, *It is clear that x*, he is addressing someone who should understand this but who perhaps doesn't see it. Clarity is obviousness. If something is really obvious, it's absurd to make such a statement. Two people are watching the sun go down and one of them says, *it is clear that the sun goes down*. The best you can do is assume that humour is involved. You could argue that the statement is always absurd. After all, if something is clear, the statement is unnecessary, and in the other case it is untrue.

(Jan van Brakel on the website www.telebyte.nl/~janbakel, 3 March 2000)

It is therefore not surprising that strong-assertive expressions like 'it is clear that', which present a proposition as irrefutable and imply that the other party has no choice but to accept that proposition as a shared starting point, can indicate not only that the speaker tries to mask the fact that a suggested common starting point is no common starting point at all, but generally also that a standpoint actually has been put forward. The following fragments make this clear:

(25) Mrs van Ooij has outlined the problem quite plainly. *It's clear that* we as Robert Fleury Foundation should play a role in this. It would be a good thing if a national centre were created for sudden and late deaf people. In whatever form. The Robert Fleury Foundation would like to play a role in the realisation of such a centre.

(D.P. Ravelli, chairman of the board of management of the Robert Fleury Foundation, 3 March 2003)

In spite of the literal meaning of the expression 'it is clear that', it is far from clear that the Robert Fleury Foundation should play a role in dealing with the problem,

which becomes apparent in the follow-up, in which the speaker withdraws the *wish* to play a role in the problem. The fragment below contains an even stronger clue in the part of the sentence that follows 'it is clear that' that 'it is clear that' does not introduce a starting point but a standpoint:

(26) *It is clear that* the director does not care much for men, *for* the wickedness of the Italian is laid on thick. The sex scenes are quite explicit, and he's trying to impose his will on the girl. And even succeeds in doing so.
(W. de Bruin about the film 'Fat Girl' on the website Filmkeuze.nl, 15 December 2003)

After W. de Bruin stated that it is clear that the director does not care much for men, he adds something that would be unnecessary if it was really clear that the director does not care much for men: he gives support for his view, considering the fact that he uses 'for' and puts forward an argument – from which we can infer that the preceding statement is a standpoint, instead of a starting point.

If, contrary to what happens in the example above, the expression 'it is clear that' is *preceded* by the word 'for', it is quite possible that, according to the speaker or writer, what follows 'for it is clear that' functions as a starting point. In the following fragment the starting point is that the media have created the hype around the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn:

(27) In addition to blaming those politicians, many supporters of Fortuyn criticize the media for being an accomplice in that negative representation and are therefore guilty of instigating aggression. What a paradox, *for it is clear that* those same media made the hype around Pim Fortuyn possible in the first place.
(*Katholiek Nieuwsblad*, 12 December 2003)

Although it is clear here that 'it is clear that' preceded by 'for' introduces a starting point, the same 'it is clear that' immediately makes the reader wonder whether the media actually did create the hype around Pim Fortuyn – which proves that 'it is clear that', when it introduces a starting point, still turns the utterance into something like a standpoint. Something similar applies to 'adjacent' expressions such as 'it is as plain as day that', even if they are followed in the next sentence by a 'real' standpoint:

(28) *It is as plain as day that* at this point Turkey does not even come close to satisfying the Copenhagen criteria. This means that negotiations cannot start and that Turkey cannot become a member of the European Union.
(Joost Lagendijk on the website of GroenLinks, 12 December 2003)

Why should it be stated that it is as plain as day that Turkey does not meet the Copenhagen criteria if this would be really as plain as day and if there would not be any doubt that the negotiations with Turkey cannot begin and that Turkey cannot yet become a member of the EU? Incidentally, expressions such as 'it is clear that' or 'it is as plain as day that' can also be used in an entirely legitimate

way to introduce a starting point, like van der Vlies (SGP) does in the following fragment:

(29) Mr van der Vlies (SGP): *It is clear that* the economic growth falls short of previous estimates. For this reason rationalization will be inevitable.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

The use of 'it is clear that' in this context – in which recent figures feature – is more likely to indicate that these recent figures appear to show that economic growth is disappointing than to indicate that the speaker is trying to disguise the fact that perhaps the economic growth is not disappointing at all.

As for strong-assertive expressions like 'it is clear that', it holds true for semi-assertive expressions that they are often used to introduce a starting point in the discussion context concerned, but that this sometimes occurs in an illegitimate way. We indicated earlier that this category includes four groups of expressions: (a) expressions like 'you've said yourself that'; (b) expressions like 'we agree that'; (c) expressions like 'everybody knows that'; and (d) expressions like 'it goes without saying that'. By presenting a proposition as a starting point that has been accepted by the other party, using 'you've said yourself that' (a), the speaker signals that the other party is also obliged to accept that proposition as a common starting point for the discussion. By presenting a proposition by means of 'we agree that' (b) as a shared view, the speaker indicates that according to him the parties in question have previously agreed to regard the proposition as a common starting point. By presenting a specific proposition as a generally accepted idea using 'everybody knows that' (c), the speaker signals that the proposition should, without any problem, be functioning a fortiori as a common starting point for the parties involved. By presenting a proposition using 'it goes without saying that' or 'of course' (d), the speaker signals that the other party should have accepted the proposition as a shared starting point even without a proposal to do so. While expressions from all four groups can indicate that a particular proposition is suggested as a starting point, it will be clear that only the expressions under (a) and (b) are dialectically suited for this. By reminding the other party of the fact that he has earlier committed himself to a specific proposition, the speaker indicates in a dialectically legitimate way that in principle – i.e. provided that the other party actually did commit himself earlier to this proposition, where 'earlier' can be regarded to mean 'in the present critical discussion' (see van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2003) – it should be possible for that proposition to be used as a common starting point. The speaker indicates the same thing – under the same conditions – in a dialectically legitimate way if he reminds the other party that they are both committed to a particular proposition. Two examples of the first of these two procedures are provided by the following fragments:

(30) Mr van Hooft Jr: […] So, this means that anyone who says: this doesn't need to be paid out of the parking funds, also says that the money has to come from some other place. […] I would like to ask these people at least where they want to get this money from.
[…]

Mr van Hees: But, Mr van Hooft, *you just said yourself* that the switch to smart card parking was made because it brings in a lot of cash, because expenses are less. You earned that money out of those that do park using this card, didn't you?

Mr van Hooft Jr: I understand your line of reasoning.

Mr van Hees: And it is very clear.

(From the verbatim report of the council meeting of the Nijmegen council, 12 June 2002)

(31) Mrs Giskes (D66): Mr Balkenende, in Johannesburg *you said that* The Netherlands no longer wish to take the lead in the field of sustainable development. […] Am I correct in understanding this to mean that the cabinet has lost every ambition to protect nature and the environment?

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

In the first of these fragments, van Hees keeps van Hooft Jr to his statements with regard to 'smart card parking', and he uses these statements at once as a common starting point in the defence of his standpoint that there is no lack of funds, contrary to what van Hooft Jr claims. In the second fragment, Giskes points out that the statements of Balkenende should be used as a common starting point in the discussion about the extent to which the government dedicate themselves to nature and the environment. Anticipating Balkenende's agreement, she uses these statements in this way to defend her standpoint that the cabinet does not show any ambition in this direction.

Examples of cases in which the speaker indicates that it should be possible to use a proposition as a common standpoint because both parties have committed to it are supplied by the following fragments:

(32) I propose for this reason that we replace the word wisdom by 'Knowledge of Good and Evil'. That sounds a lot more acceptable. *We agree that* God has forbidden us the tree of wisdom. Let us then change it into 'The tree of knowledge of good and evil' in the Bible.

(From the website of United View Foundations, 18 November 2003)

(33) These elections are to some extent about amenities. We have to have a discussion about old policies to keep and new policies to create. If we then have a sum left, and *we agree that* certain amenities are really necessary, we will allow the property tax to go up. We have the courage to make that part of our election programme.

(Flip Huisman (D66) in the *Haagsche Courant*, 19 February 2002)

The writer of the first fragment makes a proposal that given the follow-up must be regarded as a standpoint, for 'we agree that' indicates here that, according to the writer, the proposition that is introduced in this way can serve as a starting point for the discussion. Next, if it also turns out that the writer assumes that the proposition involved indeed constitutes a starting point and he uses

'then' to draw a conclusion from it that agrees with the initial proposal, then we may assume that this proposal indeed functions as a standpoint. In the second fragment, the observation 'we agree that' introduces a starting point as well. However, as far as the speaker is concerned, in this case it does not involve a fixed starting point right away, because 'we agree that certain amenities are really necessary' is, like the first part of the sentence, within the scope of the 'if' that starts the sentence, so that the speaker presents it as a conditional starting point, which leaves room for the hypothetical case that 'we' might not 'agree'. Besides, the last sentence of the fragment makes clear that the conclusion that 'the property tax is allowed to go up', which is set aside from the conditional starting point and therefore cannot be more than an unconditional conclusion, is regarded as an unconditional standpoint that is stated as such in the election programme.

Contrary to the expressions in group (a) and (b), by which the speaker reminds the other party that he has previously committed himself to a particular proposition, or that both parties have done so, the expressions from group (c), like 'everybody knows that', are used to present a certain proposition as a generally accepted idea, and the expressions in group (d), such as 'it goes without saying' and 'of course', which present a proposition as self-evident, cannot be said to be pre-eminently suited for making a proposal in a dialectically legitimate way to regard the proposition involved as a shared starting point. When a proposition is presented as generally accepted or irrefutable, like in the case of strong-assertive expressions such as 'it is clear that', this implicates that the other party cannot escape from accepting that proposition as a shared starting point. We need, however, to distinguish between expressions from group (c) and expressions from group (d). Contrary to strong-assertive expressions, such as 'it is clear that', for expressions in group (c), such as 'everybody knows that', it holds true that it is quite possible that the speaker is only trying to point out that something is a starting point already. This becomes clear in the following fragments:

(34) Finding lodgings via the Internet? [...] *Kamernet* and *Marktplaats* are the only two sites that are kept up-to-date. *Everybody knows that* you have to be careful when you respond to a newspaper advertisement. The same goes for advertisements on the Internet. The providers of the sites that offer rooms do not act as mediators and do not maintain relations with the people that let rooms. So be careful.

(Marjolein Knegt in the *Ublad* of the University of Utrecht, 15 December 2003)

(35) Prime Minister Balkenende: If we experience an economic development in which the financial deficit is increasing rapidly and unemployment is rising gigantically – the reality is 7.000 to 8.000 people extra every month – and our competitive position is dwindling, then we are on the wrong track. *We all know that* the less socially privileged will suffer most from this and that is why we have to tackle this matter.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2003)

The writer in the first fragment just applies generally shared knowledge from another domain to the domain of finding lodgings via the Internet. The question remains whether indeed 'the same goes for advertisements on the Internet', but that question does not relate to the proposition that is introduced by 'everybody knows that'. With regard to the second fragment, we may also assume that everybody is aware of the fact that a bad economy affects the less socially advantaged most – not because they lose more but because when they lose a little they have nothing left. Nevertheless, expressions like 'everybody knows that' often indicate that the speaker is trying to hide that a starting point that is assumed to be common may not be a common starting point at all:

(36) *Everybody knows that* the crucial mistake was made in 1993.
Everybody knows that the Serbians committed the murders.
Everybody knows that it was impossible for Dutchbat to defend the enclave.
Why on top of that a parliamentary inquiry? What information is missing to be able to have a standpoint on this?
(Arno Visser, candidate MP for the VVD on Politiek-Digitaal.nl, 15 December 2003)

If one takes some background knowledge concerning this parliamentary inquiry into account, it soon becomes clear that the first and the last of the three propositions that are made into starting points became in fact subject of investigation in the inquiry. When the inquiry started it was not clear at all if, and to what extent, mistakes were made in 1993, and neither was it clear if it had been impossible for Dutchbat to defend the enclave. Incidentally, this fragment also shows that 'everybody knows that' lends itself well to the stylistic form of expression that was in classical rhetoric known as *repetitio*. This use agrees with the dialectical function we attribute to this expression: the speaker intends to pound certain starting points home, so to speak.

The difference between expressions as 'everybody knows that' and expressions in group (d), such as 'it goes without saying that' and 'of course', is that the latter expressions tend to be used a little more readily to suggest – in an illegitimate way – that a proposition is a common starting point. In this respect, they are closer to strong-assertive expressions like 'it is clear that' than to 'everybody knows that'. The following fragments include a number of examples:

(37) Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): It is hard to tackle the shortage of teachers in our schools. We have known for a long time that the profession needs to be made more attractive and that work pressure must be reduced. *Of course*, then it is not going to help if one reduces the salaries and sends the teaching assistants home. Apparently, the Minister of Education, Cultural Affairs and Science has not understood this yet.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2003)

(38) Mr Rosenmöller (GroenLinks): I was extremely happy yesterday, fair is fair, that Mr Wijnschenk's LPF party agreed with an increase in the

percentage of arrests. We should, *of course*, consolidate this agreement together, and that's why I present the following motion to the House, a motion that will *undoubtedly* be supported by the LPF.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/29 September 2003)

It will be clear that in the first fragment van Nieuwenhoven introduces by means of 'of course' an assertion that we do not expect to be acknowledged by the people addressed. Also, considering the use of the expression 'we have known for a long time that' in the preceding statement, the statement van Nieuwenhoven introduces by 'of course' should rather be seen as a standpoint that is derived from the previously suggested propositions for a starting point than as a proposal to agree on a starting point. This does not apply to the statement that is introduced by 'of course' in the second fragment – the real standpoint follows later – but it is still clear that a starting point that is really shared is out of the question: we do not expect much enthusiasm from Wijnschenk with regard to Rosenmöller's (obviously ironic) proposal to 'consolidate' their 'agreement'. The statement that does constitute a standpoint in this fragment is expressed at the end of the sentence by the standpoint indicator 'that is why'. The fact that this standpoint includes the expression 'undoubtedly' illustrates yet again that expressions that represent a proposition as irrefutable rather tell us that the opposite is the case – and that they indicate that the speaker tries to hide the fact that he is putting forward a standpoint.

The fragments below show that even when expressions like 'it goes without saying that' and 'of course' are used, the speaker may actually assume that a particular proposition should be able to function as a starting point:

(39) Eric Goeman: Does Belgium, like Great Britain, need a few scandals first before the image of the royal family begins to dwindle? Or will they then be able to help themselves exactly because of their financial means?

Ludwig Verduyn: *It goes without saying* that, due to their political and financial power, the royal family has an unequalled propaganda machine at their disposal, and therefore they are capable of repairing a dwindling image up to a certain extent.
(Panel discussion 'Sense and Nonsense of the Monarchy',Nieuwpoortthe ater, Nieuwpoort in Gent, 19 July 2001)

(40) On Monday October 6th the campaign, 'Say no to late-night noise' went ahead. […] *Of course*, a poster campaign alone has little effect on late-night noise or street vandalism. That's why from now on three or four policemen in uniform are going to walk the streets at night.
(Website of the KHLeuven, Department REGA, 19 October 2003)

To conclude our discussion of the expressions in category (1), which are used by the speaker to attempt to get a proposition accepted as a shared starting point, it might be appropriate to say that these fragments speak for themselves.

Expressions that indicate that an – assumed – starting point is actually used as a point of departure in the argumentation

There is no doubt that in the practice of argumentation it occurs more often than not that the starting points on which an argument is based are expressed only through the fact that they are used in the argumentation, instead of being somehow introduced beforehand. The identification of starting points that play a role in the discussion then comes down to the identification of the arguments that are explicitly brought forward in the discussion.[55] For this reason, the analyst needs to be able to determine which expressions indicate – under which circumstances – that an argument is brought forward.[56]

In the simplest case, statements can be regarded as arguments because they are clearly indicated as such, as happens in the following fragment:

(41) Prime Minister Balkenende: Knowing that the risks are great, we have to be reluctant to accept an even larger deficit at this moment. *That's the argument I'd like to employ* against your opposition budget, for that assumes a larger deficit from the start.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2003)

Other examples of this type of explicit indications for argumentation are 'my case for this is that', 'I have the following arguments for this', and 'these were my arguments'.

If this type of expressions is used in an argumentative discussion or text, it is no problem to identify the arguments, and therefore also the starting points *in use*. Even though these expressions are frequently found in argumentative discussions and texts, more often arguments, if they are indicated at all, are accompanied by indicators like 'for', 'as', 'since', 'after all', 'therefore', and 'because'. However, it is not always clear whether or not such words indicate in a specific case that an argument is being put forward. As it happens, an 'adjacent' discourse activity exists that is very similar to argumentation and in which the above-mentioned indicators feature as well: giving an explanation. The next two texts illustrate this:

(42) We have to go *because* it's five o'clock.

(43) This book is falling apart *because* it has been poorly glued.

In the first text, the speaker substantiates his standpoint that 'we' have to go by bringing it to the listener's attention that it is five o'clock (apparently the time they had agreed to leave). In the second text, the speaker explains why 'this' book is falling apart: it was poorly glued. In the first text we have an argument, and in

[55] Incidentally, generally an argument does not only rests on starting points that are explicitly expressed in the adduced arguments, but also on starting points that are implicit in the unexpressed arguments. The latter category of starting points is discussed in chapter 6.

[56] See also the following chapters, in which we examine indicators of argument schemes and complex argumentation.

the second one we have an explanation. Nevertheless the word 'because' is used in both cases.

In order to see under which circumstances words like 'because' point to an argument instead of an explanation, it must be clear what the differences are between putting forward an argument and giving an explanation. We shall clarify these differences by comparing the speech acts of 'arguing' (in the sense of putting forward argumentation) and 'explaining'.

According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst's (1982) analysis of 'arguing', the purpose of putting forward an argument is to convince somebody else of the acceptability of a standpoint by justifying the content of the standpoint (if the standpoint is positive) or by refuting it (if the standpoint is negative). Anyone who is defending a standpoint is expected to regard this standpoint acceptable and to regard the statement that constitutes the argument as both acceptable and an adequate justification or refutation of the standpoint. He is also expected to assume that the one who has to be convinced of his standpoint has not yet accepted it, but will accept the statement that constitutes the argument in favour of the standpoint and regard this argument as adequate support for the standpoint. According to Houtlosser's (1995, 2002) analysis of 'explaining', the purpose of an explanation is to increase somebody's understanding of a specific state of affairs – which constitutes the subject of the *explanandum* of the explanation – by informing him of the factors (occasion, cause, etc.) that determine the existence of that state of affairs. Anyone who gives an explanation is expected to regard both the *explanandum* and the state of affairs represented in the explanation – the *explanans* – as a fact, and also to regard this latter state of affairs as determining the existence of the state of affairs in the *explanandum*. Likewise, he is expected to assume that the people on whose behalf he gives an explanation also regard the state of affairs to be explained as a fact but lack an adequate understanding of the way in which this state of affairs has come into being, and that their understanding can be improved by pointing out that another state of affairs that they consider to be a fact determines the coming into being of the state of affairs that is to be explained.

To what extent do these two analyses provide a guide for distinguishing explanations and argumentation in actual practice? The analysis of 'arguing' shows that argumentation involves a standpoint that has not yet been accepted by the party that is to be convinced, while the analysis of 'explaining' involves an *explanandum* which represents a state of affairs that is regarded as a fact by both parties.[57] In addition, the analysis of 'arguing' does not mention any restrictions with regard to the nature of the statement that constitutes the standpoint under discussion (it may concern a descriptive, an evaluative or an appellative statement), while the statement that constitutes the *explanandum* naturally must be

[57] Of course, it is not true that nothing at all can be discussed when an explanation is given: the statement that connects the *explanans* with the *explanandum* can be brought up for discussion very well. In that case, the speaker has to substantiate his commitment to his supposition that the state of affairs as represented in the *explanans* is an adequate explanation for the state of affairs as represented in the *explanandum*.

descriptive – it represents a factual state of affairs. In other words, if a statement expresses an evaluation of something or someone, or an appeal to the listener, the statement can be a standpoint but not an *explanandum*.[58]

Armed with this information we can now examine under which circumstances implicit indicators, like the above mentioned, point to an argument and thus to an argumentatively used starting point, instead of to an explanation. We start with 'for' and 'because'. Because the differences in meaning between these two indicators can be quite subtle, we will not make use of longer and authentic 'fragments of discussion', but of short, constructed text examples.

'For' and 'because'

Both 'for' and 'because' make a connection between the statement that is introduced by this word and the statement that precedes it. A statement that is introduced by 'because' provides a reason or cause for what is described in the preceding statement. A statement that is introduced by 'for' does the same thing or justifies the preceding statement *as a statement*, i.e. it justifies that the statement is made. The following examples illustrate the different possibilities:

(44a) Hank went to bed early *because* he had to get up early.

(44b) The sea level is dropping *because* the temperature is rising.

(45a) Hank went to bed early, *for* he had to get up early.

(45b) The sea level is dropping, *for* the temperature is rising.

(46a) Ursula is not at home, *for* the lights are off.

(46b) Is Ursula really at home? *For* the lights are off.

In (44a) 'because' is used in a clause of reason, and in (44b) in a clause of cause (it can be replaced by 'caused by the fact that'). In (45a) 'for' is used in a clause of reason and in (45b) – for the right or wrong reasons – in a clause of cause. In (46a) and (46b) the statement introduced by 'for' does not contain the reason or cause of what is expressed in the preceding statement, but a justification for the fact that the statement – here a question – is made.

Justifying statements by using 'for' and 'because'

If 'for' is used to justify a preceding statement, it is argumentative per definition. After all, in that case the acceptability of making the statement is being justified.

[58] Also, if a value judgement is expressed in an argument, the opponent will have to attribute the status of starting point to this value judgement in order to be able to regard it as an argument. This means that the status of the propositions constituting the *explanans* does not differ from the status of the propositions that are expressed in the statements constituting an argument.

Unlike in all other cases in which 'for' connects two statements, it is not necessarily always the cause or reason of the state of affairs represented in the preceding statement that is stated. The statement may also involve a result or an implication. For example, the clause after 'for' in (46a), 'Ursula is not a home, for the lights are off', represents a – supposed – result of the fact that Ursula is not at home and not a cause or reason. And in 'He must be very practical, for he passed his driving test in one go' the result of his practical attitude is stated, not the cause of it. Contrary to what occurs if an explanation is given, in these examples the statement following 'for' does not include information concerning how the state of affairs represented in the preceding statement has come into being. So, an explanatory usage of 'for' is out of the question. An adequate means to identify the justificatory, argumentative function of 'for' is by checking whether, instead of the reason or cause, the result or the implication of the preceding statement is represented after 'for'. Incidentally, in informal speech, 'because' can also be used to justify the preceding statement, especially if the statement that it introduces constitutes a response to the question 'How do you know?' If the speaker says, for example, 'Ursula is not at home', and the listener's response is, 'How do you know?', it is quite possible for the speaker to answer, 'Because the lights are off'.

Using 'for' and 'because' in a clause of reason

Unlike in cases in which a statement is justified, it is complicated to determine whether we are dealing with an argument or an explanation in the case of clauses of reason. A speaker who gives a reason motivates his own action, emotion or thought, he describes someone else's reasons for acting, feeling, or thinking in a particular way, or he reports the motivation somebody else gave for his action, emotion or thought. In which of these three cases is it possible to use 'because' and in which 'for'?

It is commonly assumed that it is possible to replace 'for' with 'because' without any difficulty in a clause of reason. In our opinion, however, it is solely possible to replace 'for' by 'because' in a clause of reason when the speaker is offering a motivation of an act he performed himself or of a condition he himself is in. If the speaker describes somebody else's reasons or reports somebody else's motivations, as in (44a) 'Hank went to bed early because he had to get up early' and (45a) 'Hank went to bed early, for he had to get up early', it is impossible to replace 'for' with 'because' without a shift in meaning. We shall show that in such clauses of reason there is in fact a relevant difference between 'for' and 'because'.

In (44a) the speaker indicates the reason why Hank went to bed early from his own perspective and by means of 'because', but in (45a) the speaker reports – using semi-direct speech – Hank's consideration concerning going to bed early from Hank's perspective and by means of 'for'. That is the reason why (45a) can be amplified using 'he said' to become (45a*):

(45a*) Hank went to bed early, he said, *for* he had to get up early.

Without losing a clear view of Hank's perspective this is difficult to do in (44a):

?(44a*) Hank went to bed early, he said, *because* he had to get up early.

As soon as we reach 'because' in this last sentence, the perspective seems to shift to the speaker again. Unlike in (45a), a disjunct of modality such as 'probably' can here be added: 'Hank went to bed early, he said, probably because he had to get up early'. The possibility of adding this disjunct of modality also makes clear that in (44a) the speaker is not literally quoting Hank's words, but that, on the basis of what he heard about Hank, or understood from another source, he is reporting that the reason why Hank went to bed early had to do with the fact that he had to get up early. The speaker takes the responsibility for the accuracy of the described reason or guarantees, in other words, that the assertion that the necessity to get up early was the reason why Hank went to bed early is true. In (45a) he is not responsible for this, but only for the correct representation of Hank's considerations. In terms of the previously made distinction, we might say that in (44a) the speaker *describes* Hank's *reason* to go to bed early, while in (45a) the speaker makes use of semi-direct speech to *report* Hank's verbally expressed *motivation* to go to bed early.[59]

The difference between 'because' successions in which the speaker describes some other person's reasons for his action, emotion or thought and 'for' successions in which the speaker reports someone's motivation for his action, emotion or thought, does not correspond straightforwardly with a difference in the explanatory and argumentative functions of those successions. It is true that the motivation of an action or state can be understood as justifying – and therefore as substantiating – that action or state, but in the 'for' successions described above that motivation is not given but reported. In that respect, they do not differ from the 'because' successions. If 'for' and 'because' are used as in (45a) and (44a), we have argumentation in neither case.

We shall now proceed to type of reason-giving in which the speaker motivates his *own* action, emotion or thought. This type includes successions in which the motivated action or state is positioned in the past (47) as well as cases in which the action or state is situated in the present or the future (48):

(47) I really thought it was wonderful, *for* it was impossible to follow.

(48) I am not going to vote, *for I* don't want to participate in elections that are no more than a survey.

'For' can in such successions in both cases be exchanged by 'because':

(47a) I really thought it was wonderful, *because* it was impossible to follow.

(48a) I am not going to vote, *because* I don't want to participate in elections that are no more than a survey.

(Max Pam, *Het Parool*, 16 May 1995)

[59] 'Because' can be used to report the motivation of another speaker if the other speaker's perspective is expressed explicitly, for example by describing his thoughts, as in 'Geertman is not pessimistic. According to him, the campaigns of the mail-order business cannot be considered a game of chance, for instance, because participation is free, nobody is obliged to buy something, and anyone can win, irrespective of the fact whether they bought something or not' (*de Volkskrant*, 30 June 1994), and in 'The gasman thought the metre was broken, because the consumption of gas dropped from more than three thousand to less than two thousand cubic meters within a year' (*de Volkskrant*, 6 August 1994).

In (47) and (48) the 'for' successions are to some extent of the same nature as the 'for' successions described above in which somebody else's argumentation is reported. Also in these 'for' successions the clause that follows 'for' is presented from the perspective of the previous statement. A crucial difference with the reported successions, however, is that the speaker is the subject of the preceding statement. The speaker is responsible for the justifiability of his own action or inner state and motivates this action or state therefore with the aid of argumentation. The subject's argumentation is not *reported* by the speaker, but *brought forward* by the speaker himself. There is a similar responsibility if the statement preceding 'for' does not represent an action or state of the speaker, but constitutes an evaluation or entails an appeal to the listener. This is the case in (49) and (50):

(49) The film is rubbish, *for* you don't see anything.

(50) You have to hurry a bit, *for* there are other people waiting.

In these cases too a motivation is provided with the aid of argumentation. On the face of it, (49) and (50) differ from (47) and (48), because no action or inner condition is motivated. In our view, this is only a difference on the surface. The action and the inner condition motivated in (49) and (50) remain implicit and can easily be made explicit. After all, it is clear that (49) motivates the opinion that the film in question is rubbish, and an opinion is an inner condition. (50) involves an incitement that is motivated, and an incitement is a (speech) act. So, not only in (47) and (48), but also in (49) and (50), a clause of reason with 'for' is used to motivate an inner condition or a (speech) act, which means we have to do with argumentation. This analysis of (49) and (50) is supported by the fact that our analysis of 'giving an explanation' indicates that the *explanandum* of an explanation must concern a state of affairs, not an evaluation or an incentive as in (49) and (50).

'Because' in a clause of reason that can replace the above mentioned 'for' must be regarded as argumentative for the same reasons. Examples are:

(51) It is a difficult job *because* all the nails are still in place and you can't really get them out.

(52) You have to go there now *because* tomorrow it is Good Friday and then they will be closed.

(53) I find this annoying, *because* in this way the foreigner is separated even further from integration.

(*de Volkskrant*, 8 January 1994)[60]

It is even possible to make a specific argumentative use of a clause of reason with 'because' that is difficult to realise with a clause of reason with 'for', namely to represent the realisation of something which appears to be a state of affairs (and

[60] An indicator that is pre-eminently suited to indicate the argumentative use of 'because' in a clause of reason is 'all the more'. The speaker in (53) could have made clearer that he is substantiating his first statement (that he is annoyed) by saying, 'all the more because in this way the foreigner is separated even further from integration'. However, 'all the more' does indicate that, according to the speaker, there are more reasons for accepting what he is saying.

not an action or condition), but should, on closer inspection, be interpreted as an action or a condition. An example is 'We are here because there are unexpected developments that compel us to take new measures'. Seemingly, a reason is given for 'being here' (i.e. a state of affairs), but the reason concerns, of course, in fact the summoning to the meeting. If the action underlying the represented state of affairs is reconstructed, 'for' turns out to be correct too: 'I have summoned you here, for there are unexpected developments that compel us to take new measures'.

Is it possible to use the reason-giving 'because', which motivates the speaker's action or condition, in a non-argumentative way (so in a sense in which it cannot be substituted by 'for')? That is indeed possible, on the condition that 'because' occurs in a statement that asserts that a particular 'reason' is not the reason for a specific action or condition of the speaker. An example is (54), in which the speaker 'quotes' an explanation, which is assumed to have been, or actually has been, brought forward by the other speaker, and disputes its adequacy:

(54) I *don't* drink *because* I'm so fond of getting drunk.

However, 'because' itself is not explanatory in this context. That is neither the case if 'because' is used to confirm an explanation given by the listener, as in (55):

(55) I do indeed drink *because* I'm so fond of getting drunk.

'Because' is used as reason-giving and not argumentatively (but this time explanatory) if an explanation, which is assumed to have been, or actually has been, brought forward by the speaker, is corrected, as occurs in (56) by using 'but because', and in (57) by means of 'chiefly because'.

(56) I don't drink because I'm so fond of getting drunk, *but because* I really enjoy my wine.

(57) Of course, I also like to get drunk, but I drink *chiefly because* I really enjoy my wine.

Obviously, it is quite possible that the speaker in (56) and (57) is trying to justify his drinking habits. This is also true for the confirmation in (55). If it would become clear in the continuation of the dialogue that the part of the sentence following 'because' has that justificatory function, the statement 'because I'm so fond of getting drunk' should be analysed as an argument after all. If further clues are absent, however, this is in statements like (55), (56), and (57) not always justifiable.

Our conclusion is that 'for' and 'because' are always argumentative in clauses of reason if they are used to motivate one's own action, emotion or thought.[61]

[61] In fact, the use of 'for' and 'because' to justify a statement can be rated among the reason-giving uses of 'for' and 'because'. After all, motivating one's actions also includes justifying (the performance of) an utterance. See van Belle (1989: 13), who calls the cases in which 'for' (in his case, its Dutch equivalent 'want') is used to indicate a reason (or a cause) of what was expressed in the propositional content of the preceding statement 'a special case of justifying the first part as a statement'.

There is one exception: a 'because' succession is not argumentative if it includes an explanation that is assumed to have been, or actually has been, brought forward by another speaker that is denied, confirmed or corrected. In some other cases, in particular in those that include a reason for the action, emotion or thought of somebody else than the speaker, it is uncertain whether 'for' or 'because' is used argumentatively. The argumentative use of 'for' and 'because' in clauses of reason can be identified on the basis of the following characteristics: (a) the subject of the part of the sentence that precedes 'for' or 'because' is the action, emotion or thought of the speaker, and (b) the part of the sentence following 'for' or 'because' conveys a reason for the action, emotion or thought.[62]

Using 'for' and 'because' in a clause of cause

What can something be the cause of, and what does it entail if a speaker conveys a cause in a statement? The *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* makes a distinction between three types of cause: an *efficient* cause, an *instrumental* (means to ends) cause, and a *physical* cause. An efficient cause can be, but does not need to be, accompanied by human intervention, and causes a human condition or action. An instrumental cause is a human intervention that causes a condition in reality. A physical cause causes a condition in reality as well, but is not accompanied by human intervention: it is a 'condition or set of conditions in nature which are invariably accompanied by some change, whether these conditions are within men's control or not' (Vol II, p. 57).

What kind of causes can be indicated by means of 'for' and what kind of causes can be indicated by means of 'because'? Here are two examples of causal 'for':

(58) Bill was angry, *for* they had chosen a different undertaker.

(59) I could not take pictures any longer, *for* the lens was broken.

In (58) 'for' introduces the cause of Bill's anger and in (59) the cause of my not being able to take pictures any longer. In both cases, the cause of a human condition is indicated, not the systematic cause of a physical fact. A first impression is that 'for' can only indicate an efficient cause.[63] This suggestion is supported by

[62] Obviously, the analysis can be verified by checking whether or not the justification of the action or state of the speaker is really under discussion. This holds true especially in the case of a succession with 'because', since such a succession includes the above-mentioned exceptions.

[63] For the sake of the argumeqnt we have assumed that (58) needs a causal interpretation. We believe, however, that this interpretation is not satisfactory and that a reason-giving interpretation would be more to the point. Of course, it is possible to say that Bill's anger is caused by the fact that another undertaker was chosen (this made him angry). However, anger is a state of mind over which somebody should be expected (and in social life is expected) to have some control. As goes for all other (expressed) states of mind, somebody can be held socially accountable for his anger. That implies that, if asked to do so (or when the circumstances require it), he would have to give a justification to make that state of mind rationally acceptable. If 'for' in (58) is interpreted as reason-giving and that which follows as a report of Bill's argumentation (see above), then we can say that his argumentation consists of a justification of his anger.

the observation that 'for' in 'The sea level is dropping, for the temperature is rising' cannot be interpreted as an indication for a physical cause. So, how should we interpret (44b)? The drop in the sea level is not a human condition or action, and is not caused by a human action. So, an instrumental or efficient cause is out of the question. We are of the opinion that the only interpretation of (44b) that makes sense is that the speaker assumes that the listener does not yet accept the assertion that the sea level is dropping. This interpretation entails that the assertion introduced by 'for' motivates the preceding part of the sentence and thus the rationality of the performed statement. 'The temperature is rising' is, in other words, an argument for the standpoint 'The sea level is dropping'.[64] This means that (44b) must be included in the same category as the earlier discussed examples (45a) and (45b).

Contrary to first impressions, it seems possible to use 'for' as an indication for an instrumental cause. This is illustrated in the examples (60) and (61):

(60) He tried not to look round, *for* he knew he would then be lost.

(61) You have to push this green button first, *for* otherwise it won't ignite.

Such indications for cause, however, are not to be included under causal 'for': in (60) and (61), 'for' is used to give a reason. There is a cause involved, but the subject of the preceding statement extracts in the first place a *reason* from that cause to either carry out the action described before, or not. In (60) the speaker reports the reason of the subject to try not to look round, and in (61) he indicates the reason the listener might have to push the green button.

Unlike 'for', 'because' may indicate both an efficient cause, as in (62), and a physical cause, as in (63) = (44b):

(62) I could not take pictures any longer *because* the lens was broken.

(63) The sea level is dropping *because* the temperature is rising.

'Because' can also be used to indicate an instrumental cause:

(64) He tried not to look round, *because* he knew he would then be lost.

(65) You have to push this green button first, *because* otherwise it won't ignite.

Here too, 'because' is in fact used in a clause of reason: a reason is given for that which the subject of the preceding statement does or should do.

[64] Naturally, the argumentation is *based* on a causal connection between a drop in the sea level and a rise in temperature, but that causality is implicated, and not indicated, by 'for'. This agrees with the distinction Anscombre notes in French between *parce que* and *car*: '*car* ne présente pas la relation de causalité, il se contente de l'exploiter. C'ést une des différences avec *parce que* qui lui, sert précisément a présenter l'existence du lien de causalité' (1984: 28).

The question is now whether 'for' and 'because' are used in an argumentative or explanatory way in indicating an efficient cause and a physical cause. 'For' can only introduce an efficient cause, and it can, in our view, be used argumentatively as well as explanatory. The speaker may wish to inform the listener of the cause of something by means of a statement introduced by 'for': in that case he is giving an explanation. He may also mention that cause in order to account for the fact that he has (not) done, felt or thought something or should, could, or would (not) do, feel or think something: in that case he is arguing. For instance, it is quite possible that the speaker in (59), 'I could not make pictures any longer, *for* the lens was broken', is not just indicating the cause of the failure to make photographs, but is also accounting for the fact that he did not make any more photographs by mentioning that cause. It could be true, in other words, that he is arguing that it was impossible to make photos.

In order to determine whether 'for' is used in a causal succession to indicate argumentation or an explanation, we can make use of the clue that it makes more sense to interpret the clause as an explanation if the subject of the statement that precedes 'for' is not – as in (59) – the speaker himself, but a third person, as in 'He could not make pictures any longer, for the lens was broken'. However, this clue does not provide a definitive answer, since it is also possible that, by stating the cause, the speaker is trying to justify the action, emotion or thought of the subject of the preceding statement. Whether or not this is the case can sometimes be inferred from the use of adverbs like 'really'. For example, at first sight 'He really could not take pictures any longer, for the lens was broken' should be interpreted as argumentative rather than explanatory.

'Because' can be used both to indicate an efficient cause and a physical cause. If it is used to indicate an efficient cause, the same applies as for 'for': in that case it can either involve giving an explanation, or putting forward an argument. Generally, what goes for the identification of these two functions is the same as we observed above for the identification of argumentative or explanatory use of 'for' in a clause of cause. The use of 'because' to indicate a physical cause can be both explanatory and argumentative as well. For example, the succession 'The sea level is dropping because the temperature is rising' can explain to the listener why the sea level is dropping, but can also make a reasonable case for the drop in the sea level. However, the latter is only possible in a special (marked) context. In this context, the part of the sentence that precedes 'because' is either clearly separated from the follow-up by a comma or a pause, or the succession as a whole is a response to the question 'How do you mean?' asked with reference to the assertion that the sea level is dropping.

Our discussion of the applications of 'for' and 'because' makes clear that 'for' points to argumentation, except in cases that can be clearly specified. If the statement introduced by 'for' is used to justify the making of a particular statement, its use is always argumentative. If 'for' is used to give a reason, it is also argumentative, unless the object of the 'for' statement is an action or condition of someone else than the speaker and the speaker does not take responsibility for the justification of that action or condition. If 'for' is used to indicate a cause, it is argumentative as long as the 'for' statement is used to account for the fact that the speaker has (not) done, felt or thought something or should, could, or

would (not) do, feel or think something. To 'because' more restrictions apply. If 'because' justifies a statement, it is always argumentative, but this use actually only appears in dialogues. If 'because' gives a reason, it points to argumentation, except if the usage is reported, that is to say if the subject is an action or condition of somebody else than the speaker, or if the subject is an action or condition of the speaker and the clause of reason is a confirmation, negation or correction of a reason that is brought forward, or could be brought forward, by somebody else than the speaker. The causal 'because' indicates an explanation rather than an argument, except in very special cases in which the indication for cause constitutes a response to the question 'How do you know?' or can be reconstructed as such.

Other indicators

Previously we mentioned that, in addition to 'for' and 'because', there are other indicators that can be used in practice to distinguish an argument and an explanation: 'due to the fact that', 'the reason why', 'the reason for this/that', 'since', 'after all', 'therefore', and 'so'. We shall briefly describe these indicators.

'Due to the fact that' and similar expressions, such as 'through the fact that' and 'as a result of the fact that', can be used to replace 'because' when they indicate cause. However, if that occurs, there is a difference in meaning: a cause–effect relationship that is indicated by means of 'due to the fact that', etc., is much more difficult to interpret in an argumentative way than a cause–effect relationship indicated by means of 'because'. For example, the dialogue in (66) can be interpreted in an argumentative way, but the dialogue in (67) cannot:

(66) T1: The sea level is dropping.
T2: How do you mean?
T1: *Because* the temperature is rising.

(67) T1: The sea level is dropping.
T2: How do you mean?
T1: *Due to the fact that* the temperature is rising.

In order to be able to interpret T1's second statement in (67) as an argument, something should be added that expresses that T1 assumes that T2 did not accept his first statement. That could be done by adding 'well' ('Well, due to the fact that the temperature is rising').

'Due to the fact' can be used argumentatively if it introduces an efficient cause, like in (68):

(68) I'm late *due to the fact that* I had nothing to wear.

It is true that at first glance the speaker only gives an explanation for the fact that he is late, but it is also possible to interpret (68) in such a way that the subject is not the fact of being late but the fact that there is an excuse for it. The latter interpretation means that the speaker's explanation is an attempt to (afterwards) justify the fact that he is late.

Expressions like 'the reason why', and 'the reason for this/that' are similar to 'because' in a clause of reason. These expressions give the reason the speaker is putting forward for his own actions, emotions or thoughts, or those of somebody else. The use of these expressions indicates an explanation under the same restrictions as 'because'. In all other cases it indicates an argument.

The use of 'since' and 'after all' indicates argumentation under the same conditions as 'for' in a clause of reason. In the analysis of (69) and (70) the same considerations apply as in (44a):

(69) Hank went home early, *since* he had to get up early.

(70) Hank went home early, *after all* he had to get up early.

The difference between 'for' and 'since' is that in the case of 'for' the acceptance as a starting point of the discussion of the part of the sentence that follows 'for' is not made into a 'topic', while in the case of 'since' this does happen. 'Since' signifies implicitly that, according to the speaker, both parties have already accepted the part of the sentence that follows 'since' as a starting point for the discussion. This effect is even stronger in the case of 'after all', in which case the part of the sentence that follows is, strictly speaking, presented as a shared starting point and not as an argument. That is why it is possible to combine 'since' and 'after all' in one sentence.

Indicators such as 'after all', 'for', and 'because' point with retroactive effect to a standpoint (or an *explanandum*). The indicators 'therefore' and 'so', on the other hand, introduce a standpoint (or *explanandum*), so these indicators do not *point back* but *point forward* (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans 2002). The argumentation (or the explanation) they indicate has preceded them.

In principle, 'therefore' has the same properties as 'because'. It can be used to point at a reason or cause of what is presented in the statement that follows. That can be a state of affairs, but also the emotions, thoughts or actions of the speaker or someone else. Just like 'because', 'therefore' can only with some difficulty be used to justify a statement. The following examples illustrate the parallels between 'therefore' and 'because'.

(71a) I hit the streets, *because* I didn't feel like working anymore.

(71b) I didn't feel like working anymore. *Therefore* I hit the streets.

(72a) He hit the streets, *because* he didn't feel like working anymore.

(72b) He didn't feel like working anymore. *Therefore* he hit the streets.

(73a) The sea level is dropping *because* the temperature is rising.

(73b) The temperature is rising. *Therefore* the sea level is dropping.[65]

[65] For the same reason why, strictly speaking, 'because' in (73a) should have been substituted by 'due to the fact that', 'therefore' in (73b) should actually have been substituted by 'due to this fact'.

(74a) Ursula is not at home. *Because* the lights are off.

(74b) The lights are off at Ursula's. *Therefore* she is not at home.

On the basis of this parallelism, we assume that 'therefore' indicates argumentation under the same conditions as 'because'.

In principle, 'so' has the same properties as 'for'. In the first place, like 'for', 'so' can without any difficulty be used to justify a statement, as (75a) and (75b) illustrate:

(75a) Ursula is not at home, *for* the lights are off.

(75b) The lights are off at Ursula's, *so* she is not at home.

In other cases, 'for' can be replaced by 'so' as well (provided that the order of the connected sentences is reversed). So, basically, 'so' indicates argumentation under the same conditions as 'for'.[66] Due to the fact that 'so' also has some uses that do not correspond with those of 'for', there are some exceptions. In the first place, 'so' can be used as a synonym of 'in other words'. This is for instance the case in (76):

(76) I consider this a fact, *so* it is not something that's open to discussion.

If 'so' is used in this way, it can be hard to determine whether argumentation is given. In any case (77) is, unlike (76), definitely argumentative:

(77) I consider this to be something that is not open to discussion, *for* it is a fact.

Secondly, 'so' can be used as a stopgap. In that case it does not point to an argumentative function of the statement in which it occurs. To conclude this discussion, here is an example of this use of 'so':

(78) *So* there you are.

5.3.2 Indicators of responses to a proposal to accept a proposition as a starting point

Now that we have concluded our discussion of the various ways in which the first move of the 'opening dialogue' about the starting points of a discussion can manifest itself in the discourse by an (implicit) proposal by T1 to accept a proposition as a starting point of the discussion, we shall discuss the manifestation of the second move in this dialogue: T2's response. According to the dialectical core profile we

[66] Though of a different order, 'I conclude that' has the same function as 'so' used in an argumentative sense. Of course, there are contextual limitations to the use of 'I conclude that' (this kind of expression would be more suited for a formal lecture or text than for a conversation), but when this expression is used, it is indicative of argumentation under the same conditions as 'for' and 'so'.

outlined in section 5.2, T2 can respond in three ways to T1's proposal to accept a particular proposition as a starting point for the discussion: (1) he can accept T1's proposal without further stipulations, (2) he can accept it on the condition that T1 will also accept another proposition as a starting point, which restricts the argumentative use T1 can make of the first proposition, and (3) he can reject it.

Unrestricted acceptance of a proposition

Just like the proposal itself, the acceptance of a proposal to allow a particular proposition as a starting point for the discussion is generally realised implicitly. Even in implicit form, unrestricted acceptances seldom occur. For this reason, there are few expressions available that introduce the acceptance of a proposal *without*, as it were, automatically invoking a follow-up which expresses that the acceptance of the proposition in question comes with specific restrictions with regard to its argumentative use. Expressions of *unrestricted* acceptance include 'yes' and 'that is true', as the following fragments show. The first fragment was used in section 5.3.1 to illustrate the use of 'do you agree with me that …?'. This time we are interested in Zalm's response, who makes a statement by means of 'yes' that can in this context be regarded as an unconditional concession:

(79) Mr Verhagen (CDA): You agree with me that precisely the basic laws that are rooted in the Constitution are tied up with the values of Dutch society …

Mr Zalm (VVD): *Yes*.

Mr Verhagen (CDA): … and that, for this reason, this goes beyond not standing in each other's way and entails that it is about creating a climate in which everybody in Dutch society feels committed to these same values?

Of course, Zalm did not put up with this and he answered the next question with 'no'. But that is not the point. He answered the first question with 'yes', without any addition, and that means he made an unrestricted concession. In the following fragments an unrestricted concession is made using 'that is true':

(80) Prime Minister Balkenende: The voter has spoken. Important points of the government's policies will be adjusted. The cabinet observes that, considering the first term of the House, a majority supports the basic outlines of the plans. And that strengthens the cabinet. I see that Mrs van Nieuwenhoven is looking up, but that really is a conclusion I can draw after yesterday.

Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): *That is true*.

Minister Balkenende: Then that's the first reassuring statement from the opposition's side.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

(81) Prime Minister Balkenende: You are pointing something out that I said before the elections. *That is true*. I said before the elections, and that is also

stated in the CDA election programme: no budget deficit. At the time, we assumed that the economy would grow with a rate of 2%. What have we seen during the past few weeks and months? A considerable change for the worse in the field of financial economy. This cabinet won't ignore that. For that reason we have said that we will allow a deficit.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

In the first fragment, van Nieuwenhoven is apparently forced to reconcile herself to Balkenende's observation. Balkenende does not refrain from rubbing it in. In the second fragment, Balkenende himself is unable to escape: he has to admit, without being able to restrict his admission in an argumentative way.

Accepting a proposition with restrictions to its argumentative use

Although we have seen that the expression 'that is true' can point to an unrestricted concession, even this expression is generally followed at some distance by an expression like 'but' or 'however', which proves that the speaker does attach restrictions to the argumentative use of his acceptance. In the fragment below this occurs by means of the word 'however':[67]

(82) Prime Minister Balkenende: *It is true that* we want to pay attention to the structure. *However*, you may also have read in the CPB calculations that the effects of the Strategic Agreement will result in a policy with a moderation of the wages, a reduction of inflation and actual cost of labour and an increase in the growth of employment.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

With this example we have arrived at the second type of move that T2 can make, according to our dialectical profile.

According to the corpus material we use here, someone who accepts a particular proposition on request, and thus basically makes an unrestricted concession, tends to make clear immediately, or at least at short notice, that the other party is not allowed to draw all kinds of conclusions from that concession. In other words, the speaker restricts the concession with regard to the argumentative use that can be made of that concession. Other expressions that indicate that a speaker makes a concession to which sooner rather than later restrictions are attached, besides 'that is true', are: 'I admit that', 'I must admit that', 'certainly', and 'of course'. The latter expression is used in the following fragment:

(83) Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): As I announced at the beginning of my argument, I'm working on a list of what this cabinet is doing. *Of course*, I bear the responsibility to set the PvdA alternatives against them. I am,

[67] Also, if 'that is true', as in the above fragments, is not accompanied by restrictions, there is still something the matter. Van Nieuwenhoven's semi-ironical tone of voice in the following example shows, for instance, that, in spite of what one would expect, she thinks nothing of taking responsibility for the concession introduced by 'that is true':

however, not even halfway my speaking time. Mr Verhagen will have ample opportunity to join in with our good alternatives.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

'Of course' indicates in this fragment that van Nieuwenhoven is making a concession. But already in the next sentence she makes clear that she attaches argumentative restrictions to that concession. Note, by the way, that it is not the word 'of course' *in itself* that indicates making a concession with restrictions. In itself, 'of course' could even indicate a standpoint, as in the following fragment:

(84) Mr Rosenmöller (GroenLinks): In that case, it is clear to me that the political signal of the Minister for Social Services has not been picked up by Mr Verhagen, but that, at the same time, he does give an unambiguous signal to the trade unions in particular to moderate the wages. But this is not allowed to cost anything, and it is certainly not allowed to lead to a solution outside the tracks of the Strategic Agreement. That is, *of course,* a very one-sided approach. I would like to impress this upon Mr Verhagen.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

In general, we can say that expressions like 'of course', 'certainly', and 'that is true' are, strictly speaking, just an indication for a concession-with-restrictions if an argumentative opposition is created (or, as Anscombre and Ducrot 1983 would call it, an 'opposition of argumentative orientation'). Above we have mentioned 'but' and 'however' as expressions that can indicate that such an opposition is created. Other expressions that can indicate this are '(al)though', 'even though', 'yet', 'still', 'but still', 'in spite of', 'nevertheless', 'nonetheless', 'notwithstanding', and 'that does not mean that'. An example of the concessive-restrictive use of the latter expression is found in the following fragment:

(85) Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): Those 40 millions are not in the budget of Social Services and Employment just to sit there, are they?

Mr Zalm (VVD): There are more things in a budget that could be taken out, or so we used to think at the Ministry of Finance. The fact *that* something is included in a budget *does not mean that* it can't be allocated to something else. That's called redeployment.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

Zalm implicitly admits that the 40 millions in question are included in the budget and then explicitly points out that one cannot conclude from this that

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Mr Zalm (VVD): This concerns disappointing economical circumstances. You held out the prospect to the voter that there wouldn't be a budget deficit. So, now the voter may expect you to come with proposals that reflect this. My programme speaks of no such thing.

Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): **That's true**. As I said before to Mr Verhagen, I'm in the good company of the CDA election programme. The CDA had this in mind, as did the PvdA.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

Apparently, van Nieuwenhoven thinks that emphasising that the PvdA election programme included the idea that a budget deficit should be prevented and the VVD's did not is worth the risk that Zalm will draw an unwelcome conclusion from this.

the money cannot be used for another purpose – which was exactly the issue van Nieuwenhoven was getting at.

Even though we have indicated above that there are also a significant number of other expressions that can indicate that the speaker is attaching restrictions to a concession he has just made, we will focus in this section on 'but'. According to our corpus, this is the expression that is used most often to attach restrictions to a concession, and in addition – and perhaps for this reason – no separate word has been discussed more extensively in the scholarly literature about textual relationships and indicators.[68] We shall try to answer the question what the argumentative restrictions stated by the speaker entail, and what their consequences are for the status of the preceding concession.

'But'

The examples above show that T2 first accepts the proposal of T1 to regard a particular proposition as a starting point for the discussion. Subsequently, he places restrictions in a supplement that is introduced by 'but'. However, T2 can also impose such restrictions immediately by means of a statement introduced by 'but', that is to say without first verbally accepting T1's proposal. Though we are chiefly interested in a follow-up statement introduced by 'but' that attaches argumentative restrictions to a verbally expressed concession of T2, for a better understanding of the indications 'but' can provide it makes sense to step back and start from the situation in which T2 responds with a 'but' statement to T1's proposal to accept a proposition as a concession for the discussion.

According to Ducrot et al., whose analysis of 'but' (1980: 101–130) will be our point of departure, there are in this case two possibilities: either the 'but' statement indirectly contradicts something that is asserted in the preceding statement, or it indirectly contradicts something that can be concluded from that preceding statement.[69] In the following examples – borrowed (in translation) from Ducrot – these two possibilities are illustrated. Someone who has asked to speak to a lady responds to the maid servant's statement that this lady has just gone out and will not be back until four o'clock:

(86) But I just saw her standing in the window.

(87) But I'm in no hurry at all.

[68] There is no harm in remarking in advance that in our discussion of 'but' we shall not examine all manifestations of this expression, but limit ourselves to cases in which T2 responds to T1's proposal to regard a particular proposition as a starting point for the discussion. This implies that we shall limit ourselves to statements that contain the conjunction 'but', so we do not examine the preposition 'but' ('I have but three pounds left'). Neither do we enter into the 'corrective' use of the conjunction 'but' ('He hasn't been employed for 40 hours a week, but for 30 hours').

[69] For the advantages of the following analysis over Ducrot's see van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2005).

In the first response, the speaker indirectly contradicts (counters) that the lady in question is not in; in the second response, he indirectly contradicts the assumption that he, given the fact that the lady will not be back until four o'clock, *for that reason* would not be willing to wait.

Next to responses that *indirectly* contradict something the preceding speaker asserted or something that can be concluded from his words, we think that responses are possible – contrary to what Ducrot suggests – that directly contradict something in the assertion of the preceding speaker or something that can be concluded from that assertion. The following examples illustrate this form of direct contradiction:

(88) But, as far as I am concerned, she did not go out at all.

(89) But I'm perfectly willing to wait.

We therefore assume that in response to an assertion of a preceding speaker – an assertion that from our point of view implicitly suggests allowing the asserted proposition as a starting point for the discussion – four 'but' statements can occur. The list below renders these possibilities in a symbolised form. The proposal of T1 to regard a proposition 'p' as a starting point fo r the discussion has been put between brackets and precedes 'but', so that it is also possible to include cases in which the responding speaker recapitulates that proposal. Concerning the symbols: 'p' is the proposition suggested by T1, 'r' represents the standpoint under discussion, 'q' and 's' are restrictions stated by T2, and '?/−' symbolises doubt or negation. The difference between p and 'p' is that in the case of p the proposal is actually accepted, while in the case of 'p' it is only referred to, without being immediately accepted.

1.	('p',) but ?/−p	(T1 says 'p',)	but p is not true(?) (is it?)
2.	('p',) but s [&s− > ?/−p]	(T1 says 'p',)	but s, and s speaks against p
3.	(p,) but ?/−r	(Indeed p,)	but (nevertheless) not (just like that) r
4.	(p,) but q [&q− > ?/−r]	(Indeed p,)	but q, and q speaks against r

In the first two statements, the part following 'but' relates to the status of the proposition 'p' suggested by T1; in the last two statements, 'but' relates to the status of the standpoint under discussion, 'r'. It is clear that only the last two statements may serve to accept a proposal by T1 to regard a proposition 'p' as a starting point for the discussion and to attach specific restrictions to it. The first two statements could only be used to reject such a proposal (or a standpoint, but that is not the issue here), either with or without stating reasons. Below we provide an adjusted overview of the possibilities under the headings 'allow with restrictions' and 'reject with or without reasoning':

Allowing p as a starting point with restrictions

Direct contradiction of r

(p,)	but ?/−r	(Indeed p,)	but (nevertheless) not (just like that) r

Indirect contradiction of r
(p,) but q [&q− > ?/−r] (Indeed p,) but q, and q speaks against r

Rejecting p as a starting point with or without reasoning

Direct rejection of p
('p',) but ?/−p (T1 says 'p',) but p is not true (is it?)

Indirect rejection of p
('p',) but s [&s− > ?/−p] (T1 says 'p',) but s, and s speaks against p[70]

Evidently, the statements mentioned under 'reject with or without reasoning' are not the issue in this section. We will come back to them when we are dealing with the third move that T2 can make, according to our dialectical core profile, in response to a proposal by T1 to accept a particular proposition as a starting point for the discussion, specifically the move in which T2 rejects this proposal.[71]

The above overview shows that it is possible for T2, after he has conditionally accepted T1's proposal, to do two things by means of 'but'.[72] He can try to render the conceded proposition *harmless* as a basis for supporting T1's standpoint, and he can try to *hamper* the anticipated support of that standpoint by means of that proposition. He can try to render the conceded proposition harmless by stating that he continues to contest the standpoint of T1, even though he has accepted 'p' as a concession. Mr Verhagen does this in the following fragment:

(90) Mr Verhagen (CDA): Naturally, Mr Wijnschenk [...] can't spend this money a second time. I consider him exceptionally creative, *but* even he can't spend a penny twice.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

[70] Apart from this, it is also possible that 'but' does not oppose the contents of the preceding statement but its relevance for the present discussion (see Houtlosser, 1995). An example is:

Mr van Aartsen, Foreign Secretary: The objections did not only concern the candidature of Mr Pronk, but also the other candidatures, as was later pointed out by the Secretary General. We've been more or less busy solving these problems for him. That was also in our interest. Mr Pronk has been our candidate since the beginning of August 2000.
Mr van Middelkoop (RPF/GPV): I can well imagine that one had to hold on to the candidature of Mr Pronk, certainly to the outside world. *But* that is not the point.
(Lower House Debate in The Netherlands about the High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 October 2000)

[71] As below, we will use the above diagram as a starting point for this.

[72] In this overview, we have not made a distinction between the different ways in which the 'but' statements we distinguish could serve in an *explicit* discussion to attach specific argumentative restrictions to a proposition 'p' suggested as a starting point by T1, and the ways in which that could occur in an *implicit* discussion. We avoided that distinction on purpose, because, on the one hand, 'but' statements in which a proposal is accepted to regard a proposition as a starting point and to which only then restrictions are made by means of 'but' are, in fact, derivatives of 'but' statements that immediately respond to such proposals by making restrictions, while, on the other hand, also in explicit discussions statements that include 'but' generally recapitulate the proposal they respond to, certainly if the response does not follow the proposal immediately.

Due to the fact that Verhagen has formulated his standpoint by means of 'naturally', before he makes his concession that he considers Wijnschenk creative, it is clear that he maintains that Wijnschenk's standpoint is untenable after 'but', in spite of his creativity.

The support T1 could give for his standpoint by means of 'p', may be hampered by T2 by showing that another – according to T2 – more relevant starting point 'q' exists that actually speaks *against* T1's standpoint. An example of this can be found in the following fragment:

(91) Prime Minister Balkenende: […] We will certainly have to make sure that everything occurs in a humane way, *but* we must give serious consideration to the issue of repatriation. That means the government will and has the right to address local councils about their responsibility to become serious about repatriation.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

In this fragment, Balkenende accepts the proposition that certainly the humanitarian side of the matter should be considered as a starting point for the discussion – and he also implicitly indicates that this starting point could serve as an argument to support the standpoint that local councils should be allowed to decide whether they want to send rejected asylum seekers back to their country of origin. Next, however, he lets us know that, according to him, there is another proposition that constitutes a starting point in the discussion, which is that serious consideration should be given to the issue of repatriation. By introducing this proposition with 'but', he also signals that this starting point, according to him, speaks stronger against the 'local' standpoint than the conceded proposition speaks for it, and that this implies that the government will and has the right to address local councils about their responsibility to become serious about repatriation.

Incidentally, whether or not T2 is successful in cases in which he attempts to hamper the support T1 could give to his standpoint using 'p' by coming up with a – according to T2 – more relevant starting point 'q' that speaks against T1's standpoint, naturally depends on whether T1 is actually prepared to admit that 'q' is the case. A sub-discussion might arise about this point, as the fragment below makes clear:

(92) Prime Minister Balkenende: The starting point is neutrality with regard to the tax burden. In the beginning difficulties may arise because of an increase in the tax burden, *but* afterwards there may be reductions. That is the starting point of the cabinet and that still holds.

Mrs Giskes (D66): So, you'll see to some extra tax reductions after 2004–2005 to undo the increase that at this point might be needed even more than initially expected?

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

The ironic note in Mrs Giskes's response makes clear that she does not take the point of future tax reductions, which Balkenende considers relevant, very seriously, and therefore does not regard it as a counterargument against her standpoint that the government policy of increasing the tax burden is unacceptable.

What exactly are the consequences of T2's argumentative restrictions in the two types of 'but' successions that we distinguished here? In the first type of succession, the restrictions come down to T2 accepting the proposition that T1 suggested as a starting point on the condition that T1 does not maintain his standpoint 'r' exclusively on the basis of 'p'. In the second type of succession, the restrictions come down to T2 accepting the proposal of T1 on the condition that T1 falls in with the starting point 'q'– implicitly proposed by T2 – which, according to T2, provides a decisive counterargument against T1's standpoint. The consequences of those restrictions for the status of the preceding concession are in the first type of succession that the concession has lost to a certain extent its value for P's original purpose. In the second type of succession, the concession basically keeps its instrumental value for T1, but he has to get rid of a serious obstacle before he is able to use that concession to give decisive support to his standpoint. In the latter case, the question is how much damage T1 has suffered. The exact phrasing of T2's restriction introduced by 'but' can provide further details on this matter. Roughly speaking, we can distinguish two ways for T2 to phrase restrictions that he attaches to the acceptance of 'p' as a starting point for the discussion: he can state those restrictions categorically and he can state them in a qualified manner. With 'stating categorically' we mean the way of wording that states after 'but' that 'q' is the case or even that 'q' is *yes*, *no*, or *absolutely* the case. T2 signals with such a wording that against the argument that T1 is now able to use for his standpoint on the basis of T2's concession of 'p', there are counterarguments like 'q', which speak more strongly against T1's standpoint than 'p' speaks in its favour. The following fragments are examples of this:

(93) Prime Minister Balkenende: It is true that the deficit works out lower, *but* the disadvantages are reason for us not to adopt these plans.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

(94) Prime Minister Balkenende: The current problems in our society with regard to integration lead […] for this cabinet to the inescapable conclusion that a more restrictive immigration policy is needed. That may seem harsh in the eyes of some, *but* it is *absolutely* necessary to strengthen and maintain the cohesion of our society.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

In the first fragment, Balkenende accepts that the deficit works out lower, but he 'categorically' indicates that this does not mean that he will adopt the plans in question, because they would have decisive disadvantages. In the second fragment, he does not leave any doubt, in spite of his acknowledgment that the measures might be considered harsh, that a more restrictive immigration policy is needed, because this is the only way to strengthen and maintain cohesion in 'our' society. In both cases, the party spoken to has to take into account a – according to Balkenende insuperable – obstacle in decisively supporting his own standpoint by means of the concession made by Balkenende.

By stating a restriction 'in a qualified way' we mean the – somewhat desultory – category of phrasing by which, after 'but', it is stated that *besides*, *chiefly*, *first of*

all, *now*, *later*, *sometimes*, *also*, etc., 'q' is the case. By means of such phrasing T2 signals that, *viewed in another light*, *at another moment*, or *besides* the argument that T1 now got hold of through T2's concession of 'p' to support his standpoint, there are also matters like 'q', which speak against T1's standpoint – although not necessarily stronger than 'p' speaks for that standpoint. In other words, T2 does not create a categorical argumentative contradiction with the proposition he accepted as a concession, but only an argumentative contradiction with specific aspects of what is represented in that proposition. Examples of these types of phrasing are to be found here:

(95) Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): But doesn't that cost money as well?
Mr Verhagen (CDA): Of course that costs money, *but* we *also* have PPP. The province has possibilities, et cetera.
Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): Those possibilities are not excluded by my motion.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

(96) Mr Wijnschenk (LPF): In the first term I asked for a Football Act to control the level of hooliganism. […]
Prime Minister Balkenende: The government should always check the responsibility by way of criminal law, police and the court, *but* let's *first of all* start with the attitude of the people themselves and the role of the clubs.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

The response of van Nieuwenhoven in the first fragment indicates that she, in line with the qualified wording of Verhagen, does not consider the objection that 'we also have PPP' could constitute for sticking to her own standpoint to be insuperable. The damage is, in other words, limited – as Verhagen anticipated. In the second fragment, Balkenende accepts that the government can only carry out its responsibilities by means of the law, but he 'amends' the categorical interpretation of this starting point by stating that one has to start with the people and the (football) clubs themselves – which apparently does not alter the fact that if the judicial course has to be followed this may provide decisive support for the standpoint that there should be a 'Football Act'.

In certain cases, the argumentative contradiction that is created by a qualified way of wording can be so weak that it merely serves to contest T1's standpoint only in this strong form, or only on specific points. The following fragment provides a good example:

(97) Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): I do ask the Prime Minister to introduce the regulations as soon as possible. The PvdA initiative may be of help in this, *but* I hope that, at least before the budget of Social Services and Employment is established, something there will *also* something be coming from the side of the government.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

Van Nieuwenhoven indicates that she does not necessarily completely disagree with the standpoint ascribed to the Prime Minister that the government does not have to introduce new regulations in the short term, but that she does disagree with the weaker standpoint that the government could leave the promotion of those regulations solely to the PvdA.

Finally, it is possible that 'but' does not introduce a proposition 'q' that contests the argumentative value of 'p' for T's standpoint in a categorical or qualified way, but that the 'p, but q' situation as a whole constitutes an 'assessment argument', either for the 'standpoint' that the speaker is not really sure what he should think (something speaks for a particular standpoint, but something else speaks against it), or for a standpoint that deviates from the standpoint that could be supported by q alone (see also Snoeck Henkemans 1995). The following fragment is an example of the latter possibility:

(98) I would like to go out, *but* it is raining, so I need an umbrella.
(From: Snoeck Henkemans, 1995)

In this case, 'but' makes clear that the speaker has desires that are considered to be conflicting and can be reconciled by what is stated in the conclusion.

As said before, in response to a proposal by T1 to accept a particular proposition as a starting point for the discussion, T2 can, of course, also omit conceding 'p' and only respond with 'but q'. In that case, this may indicate that he – as would happen if he would first make the concession that 'p' is the case and would only then say 'but q' – rejects the argumentative use T1 apparently wants to make of 'p'. This occurs in the next fragment:

(99) Mr van Dijke (ChristenUnie): Then what are you going to do if you come across things in bus shelters about which we all say: they shouldn't be there? And when we see things between the television programmes at half past five and half past six of which we say: we would like to protect our children from this sort of thing?

[…]

Mr Zalm (VVD): Well, parents should certainly do their best to do so. I don't think you can lay all that at the government's door.

Mr van Dijke (ChristenUnie): *But* how are parents supposed to fight those bus shelters?

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

Van Dijke accepts Zalm's starting point that parents should do their best, but subsequently points out that this starting point does not automatically imply that the government does not bear responsibility for – for example – bus shelters.

In addition, 'but q' can also constitute a rejection of T1's proposal to accept 'p' as a starting point for the discussion. But in that case we have, in fact, arrived at T2's last option to respond to a proposal by T1 to accept a particular proposition 'p' as a starting point for the discussion: rejecting the proposal.

Rejecting a proposition as a starting point – with or without a reason

Just like proposing a starting point and – either with or without restrictions – accepting it, rejecting a proposal to regard a particular proposition as a starting point for the discussion will, as a rule, take place in an implicit way, that is, as a 'normal rejection' by means of an expression like 'I don't think so' or, in short, 'no'. A radical example of the use of this denial is provided by the following short debate:

(100) Mr Verhagen (CDA): You are crossing off tax reductions that aren't provided for 2003, but for 2005.

Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): *No*, *no*, the conditioned tax reductions were planned to expire much earlier. The property tax is announced to go by 2004.

Mr Verhagen (CDA): *No*, it is announced to go by 2005. The same is true for Kok's excise tax.

Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): *No*.

(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

It will be clear that expressions like 'no' only indicate a rejection of a starting point if there are other indications, as is the case in the dialogue above, that they are used in response to a proposal to regard a particular proposition as a starting point, or in response to an implicit performance of such a proposal, for example, by attributing a starting point to T2. After all, if there are no such indications, the rejection may refer to a standpoint that is presented by the other party that is doubted or contradicted by the rejection in question.

In real discussions, such as parliamentary debates, we often find a course of events in the rejection of a starting point in which T1, in response to a 'reminder' from T2 that T1 earlier committed himself to a specific standpoint, denies what he has said before, or at least calls the interpretation of what he did say into question. An indicator of this type of response is – not surprisingly – 'I didn't say that'. An example:

(101) Prime Minister Kok: I considered that which I heard complex and delicate to such an extent that I wanted to keep it indoors for a while. It needed to be followed up. I ask the House to respect that.

Mr de Hoop Scheffer (CDA): Apologies are to everybody's credit, so also to the Prime Minister's. If he says the House should respect that, I will.

Prime Minister Kok: *I didn't say that* there was an apology to be respected. Everyone is free to respect what he or she wishes.

(Lower House Debate in The Netherlands about the High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 October 2000)

De Hoop Scheffer twists the words of Kok in a slightly ironical sense, to which Kok replies in his turn ironically that he did not say that the House should respect his apology – after all, he did not offer one – but that the House is free to respect apologies that have not been offered.

Rejections that state a reason can be introduced without difficulty by 'no, because'. An example is found in the following fragment:

(102) Mr Rosenmöller (GroenLinks): That means the CDA is breaking a promise.
Mr Verhagen (CDA): *No, because* we are saying that the current tax increase, that 'lower gear', should be compensated for during the whole period.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

In this fragment, 'because' indicates that Verhagen does not only point out that, according to him, this is not a matter of breaking a promise, but it also points to a reason why: there is a necessity to compensate for the tax increase and that necessity is beyond control, and, because of this, breaking the promise is not at issue.

Contrary to what occurs in the fragments above, the indication that a particular proposition cannot be accepted as a starting point is sometimes omitted and, instead, the *reason why* is indicated immediately. Because the rejection must be deduced from that reason, we then have an *indirect* rejection of a starting point. Both for direct and indirect rejections, 'but' is, again, a possible indicator. In order to be able to use the indicative value of 'but', it must be made clear under which circumstances 'but' indicates a direct or indirect rejection, since we have seen before that 'but' can also point to a – conditional – acceptance.

'But', continued

Previously we represented in diagram form which possibilities T2 has to reject a proposition as a starting point for the discussion with the aid of 'but'. Now we resume our diagram:

Rejecting p as a starting point with or without reasoning

Direct rejection of p

('p',)	But ?/−p	(T1 says 'p',)	but p is not true (is it?)

Indirect rejection of p

('p',)	But s [&s− > ?/−p]	(T1 says 'p',)	but s (isn't it?), and s speaks against p

Both in the direct and the indirect rejection introduced by 'but' the starting point proposed by T1, or attributed to T2, can be resumed or not. We shall give examples of all four possibilities, which will also show that the use of 'but' to reject a starting point has the same kind of consequences as the use of 'but' to challenge the argumentative value of a starting point that has already been accepted:

(103) Mr Wijnschenk (LPF): I ask Mr Rosenmöller to show patience for three weeks.
Mr Rosenmöller (GroenLinks): *But* that's nonsense, isn't it?
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

(104) You are saying that I shouldn't worry about it because everything will sort itself out, *but* that's not true at all, is it?
(Conversation on tramline 2 in Amsterdam)

(105) Prime Minister Balkenende: We will come back to that when we deal with the education budget. The House will then receive further details.
Mrs Giskes (D66): *But* by then there won't be any money left.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

(106) Chairman: Mrs van Nieuwenhoven, you said that Mr Crone could have given the wrong piece of paper, *but* I'm having that piece of paper handed round.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

In the first dialogue, Rosenmöller rejects in a (rather) direct manner Wijnschenk's proposal to show patience. In the second dialogue, the speaker repeats the words of a second speaker who proposed to assume that everything will sort itself out, and then the first speaker rejects this proposal. In the third dialogue, Giskes indirectly rejects the starting point that the House should wait a little for the requested information by pointing out that it would then be too late to finance her plans. In the fourth dialogue, the chairman recapitulates the words of van Nieuwenhoven and points out that they could prove to be incorrect as soon as the piece of paper has been handed round.

These examples make clear that the consequences of directly or indirectly rejecting a starting point are to a certain extent similar to the consequences of directly or indirectly contesting the argumentative value of an accepted starting point: like in the case of a direct infringement of the argumentative potential of a starting point that has been accepted already, the rejected starting point has completely lost its value in the case of a direct rejection to support the opposite party's standpoint; and like in the case of an indirect attack on the argumentative value of an accepted starting point, the argumentative use of the disputed starting point for the support of the opposite party's standpoint is in the case of an indirect rejection of a starting point more or less seriously hampered, depending on the extent to which the opposite party is successful in removing the raised obstacles. The difference merely is that rejecting a starting point is more fundamental than contesting the argumentative value of an accepted starting point: after parrying a direct or indirect rejection of a starting point, it is still possible that an attack will follow on the argumentative value of the starting point that remains standing, something which is naturally impossible after successfully parrying an attack on the argumentative value of a starting point that has been accepted already.

The examples given above also make clear that whether or not the starting point suggested by T1 or ascribed to T2 is recapitulated in T2's response makes no difference to the nature of the rejection. The import of the response introduced by 'but' is the same. On the other hand, an expression that indicates such a recapitulation, like 'you say that', does constitute an additional clue for the fact that the speaker rejects a starting point that is suggested by another speaker. Then again,

however, 'you say that' can also indicate an acceptance of a starting point, as the next two fragments show:

(107) Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): *You say that* it helps, and certainly with regard to the labour market policy I won't dispute the facts. *But* by this policy you reduce the financial sphere of the municipal governments. They will have fewer possibilities to make their own decisions anyway.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

(108) Prime Minister Balkenende: We won't […] prescribe how exactly the money must be spent. *You say that* this is an option for municipal governments to realise certain functions. That's possible, *but* then that's their responsibility.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

By explicitly agreeing (in 107) with the former speaker's statement, Mrs van Nieuwenhoven recapitulates the situation, and by stating explicitly (in 108) that he deems van Nieuwenhoven's recapitulated statement a realistic possibility, the two discussants indicate that they are prepared – completely or in principle – to accept the statement of the former speaker as a starting point for the discussion. After this, they both signal, by means of 'but', that this does not, however, have decisive consequences for their own standpoints.

Whether or not 'you say that' in combination with 'but' indicates an acceptance or a rejection depends therefore on what comes after 'you say that'. The cases that occur in our corpus show that acceptances are usually explicitly stated, while rejections are usually not. Apparently, the meaning of 'you say that' in itself tends to be 'rejecting' rather than 'accepting', an implication that has to be annulled in the case of an acceptance, even if this means that the speaker then has to take the trouble to make clear that by accepting what the former speaker said he does not necessarily accept the argumentative consequences. This can be done by means of 'but', but sometimes it is necessary to accentuate the contradiction. In that case, a somewhat stronger adversative word is needed, like 'yet' in the next fragment:

(109) Mrs van Nieuwenhoven (PvdA): Mr Zalm *says that* we are only concerned with the Budget for next year. I won't contest that as far as 2003 is concerned. *Yet*, the Prime Minister himself said in his introduction […] that we are talking about a long-range policy of the cabinet.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

Van Nieuwenhoven's 'yet' serves here to unequivocally make clear that she does accept what Zalm has said, but that this is at odds with what he said earlier – so that he cannot maintain what he said earlier.

Incidentally, there is another common usage of 'you say that', that is one by which the fact that somebody said something is made to have consequences for the standpoint of that speaker. This use can be identified by means of the additional indicator 'if', which precedes 'you say that' in this case, or by the indicator 'then', which follows it, or by both, as the following fragment shows:

(110) Mr Rosenmöller (GroenLinks): I don't think we can end the debate like this. I'll try once more. *If you say that* the strategic frame is the starting point, and if you yourself refer to the 400 million, *then* I find that this is more than has now been allocated for the leave savings scheme.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

Rosenmöller accepts the budgetary starting points of the former speaker for the sake of argument, and then points out that those staring points are at odds with the trifling sum that has been allocated for the 'leave savings scheme'.

To conclude this chapter, we shall briefly discuss the further course of the dialogue about the starting points. As the core profile for the dialogue shows, the moves that can be made during the further course of the 'negotiations' are, in fact, only of the type of the moves that can also be made by T2 during the second turn of the dialogue.[73] So, there is no reason to pay any more attention to the indicators of these moves here. The only move T1 can make during the third turn that has not been discussed yet, is questioning the rejection of a starting point he previously suggested by asking: 'Why ~X?' T2 can make the same move during the fourth turn of the dialogue.

In practice, a move in which one party asks the other party why he does not want to commit himself to a starting point suggested by the first party will generally include an implicit proposal to accept a particular proposition as a starting point for the discussion. When this occurs, this may appear from the use of an expression like 'but why not (also)', as in the following fragments:

(111) Mr van Dijke (ChristenUnie): Isn't it true that the addict and the society to which he belongs are served best by clear government standards with regard to drugs policy? The cabinet is taking a few steps in the right direction, that's for sure. *But why not* review the policy of tolerance altogether?
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

(112) Mr van Dijke (ChristenUnie): Minister Heinsbroek wants to keep violence off the screen– excellent! *But why not* bar porn from the screen as well, even if that produces criticism in the rank and file of this Minister's party? I would please me if he could clear this up.
(The Budget Debate 2003, 18/19 September 2002)

Both in the first and the second fragment, the expression 'but why not' provides, in fact, three indications. In the first fragment, 'not' indicates that van Dijke assumes that the cabinet has already signalled that they do not wish to review the policy of tolerance – and thus have implicitly rejected a proposal to do so –, 'but' indicates that van Dijke himself thinks that the cabinet should have accepted this

[73] Strictly speaking, in his turn, T1 can respond to T2's move 'X, if proposal: Y?' with 'Y, if proposal: Z', to which T2 can respond, again, with a similar proposal *ad infinitum*. It is not for practical purposes alone that we leave this point out of consideration, but also because such successions of conditional acceptances hardly ever occur in argumentative practice.

proposal, and 'why' indicates that he wants to hear a reason for the cabinet's rejection. In the second fragment, van Dijke indicates by means of 'not' that he assumes that Heinsbroek does not accept the proposal to bar porn from the screen, 'but' indicates that he does think that porn should be kept off the screen, and 'why' indicates that he wants to hear Heinsbroek's reason for not accepting the proposal to bar porn from the screen. An additional indicator is 'as well', by which van Dijke indicates, once more, that he considers Heinsbroek inconsistent in not accepting the proposal.

As actually more or less happens in the last fragment, often a party does not just ask why the other party does not allow a particular proposition as a starting point, but also supplies a reason why the other party should have allowed the proposition in question as a starting point. If that is the case, a sub-discussion occurs as is included in the core profile for the dialogue about the starting points as the last 'move' (for both T1 and T2). This 'move' is not specified further in the profile. That is unnecessary, for at this point, in fact, a new discussion starts, with its own confrontation and opening stage. For the indicators of the moves that could be made in this discussion, we refer to everything we said before.

CHAPTER 6

INDICATORS OF ARGUMENT SCHEMES

6.1 THE USE OF ARGUMENT SCHEMES IN A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

Each single or coordinative argumentation is based on an argument scheme that creates a specific justifying relationship between the applied argument or (in the case of coordination) the applied arguments and the standpoint at issue.[74] A central question when evaluating an argumentative discussion or text is whether the argument schemes that the defender of a particular standpoint uses are in fact appropriate and correctly applied. The pragma-dialectical argumentation theory distinguishes, depending on the kind of justifying relationship the argumentation is based on, three (main) types of argumentation, that each have their own argument scheme: argumentation by comparison, causal argumentation, and symptomatic argumentation.[75] To each type of argumentation specific standards of evaluation apply which are tuned to the kind of justifying relationship that occurs in the argumentation. For each of the three argument schemes different critical questions are relevant. Anyone who uses a particular argument scheme takes, in fact, the first step in a dialectical testing procedure that verifies whether the argumentation can withstand relevant forms of criticism. In anticipation of this criticism, the defender of a particular standpoint may already follow up his argumentation with responses to relevant objections. In a critical discussion, the opposition's responses always relate to the evaluative issues that are relevant to the argument scheme in question. Not only the presentation of the argumentation, but also the critical responses of the opposite party and the way the speaker or writer follows up his argument can provide clues about the nature of the relationship between the argument and the standpoint.

Before the soundness of argumentation can be assessed, the relationships between arguments and standpoints must first be explicated in an analytical overview of the argumentative discussion or text, so that it becomes clear which argument schemes occur. In this chapter, we examine which clues in the verbal presentation can be used to reconstruct the relationship the argumentation is

[74] In the case of cumulative coordinative argumentation the collection of coordinative arguments is part of one and the same argument scheme: the argumentation consists, for instance, of an enumeration of characteristics that warrant a particular conclusion. In the case of complementary coordinative argumentation the relationship between the arguments is different in nature. Here, the first argument (which rests on a particular argument scheme) provides support for the standpoint and the second argument consists of taking the edge of an objection against the first argument.

[75] A similar classification is used in classical rhetorical literature and in the traditional American debate handbooks. It is, for instance, used by modern rhetoricians such as Weaver (1953).

based on and to analyse the argument scheme. In doing so we distinguish between (1) clues in the presentation of the relationship, (2) clues that can be extracted from the way in which the antagonist criticises the argumentation, and (3) clues in the way the protagonist responds to this criticism or anticipates it (by putting forward additional arguments). For each relationship we will first provide a characterisation and a dialectical profile. On this basis, we will then justify why particular words, expressions or sentence structures could be indicative of (particular aspects) of the relationship in question.[76]

6.2 CLUES FOR ANALOGY ARGUMENTATION

6.2.1 Dialectical profile for the analogy relationship

Characteristic of analogy argumentation is that in this type of argumentation someone tries to convince someone else by showing that something is similar to something else:

> The argumentation is presented as if there were a resemblance, an agreement, a likeness, a parallel, a correspondence or some other kind of similarity between that which is stated in the argument and that which is stated in the standpoint.
>
> (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 97)

The following general scheme applies to analogy argumentation (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002: 99):

Y is true of X
because Y is true of Z
and Z is comparable to X

We can, for instance, use this argument scheme to make a reasonable case that a particular judgement about X is appropriate because Z can be judged in the same way, and because Z is similar to X in relevant respects:

> An income of 800 euro a month is quite a lot. Most students are able to live on such an income (and students are similar to other people that have to live on a small income).

Comparisons are also employed to *predict* something, as in the following example:

> The plan to build a residential district in Amsterdam North is doomed to fail, for Amsterdam Southeast failed as well, and the new residential district and Amsterdam Southeast are similar projects.

In his doctoral dissertation, Garssen (1997) discusses a number of subtypes of analogy argumentation that were distinguished by Perelman (1982). The first

[76] In previous publications we have given attention to indicators of symptomatic argumentation and analogy argumentation (Snoeck Henkemans 2002, Snoeck Henkemans 2003a).

subtype is *figurative comparison* (or analogy in the strict sense). Unlike a normal comparison, in a figurative comparison the matters that are compared originate from different areas or domains. For this reason, the comparison does not refer to a similarity in real properties, but to the proportion the property of one thing bears to that of something else (1997: 16).

Analogies are not only used to defend that something should be considered or treated in a specific way because this is a similar case, but also to criticise the argumentation of the opposite party. Govier speaks in this context of 'the negative use of logical analogy'. She describes this technique as follows:

> The negative use of logical analogy is found in the technique of refuting arguments by citing parallel flawed arguments. If two arguments are fundamentally similar as to structure, and the first is flawed, that refutes the second (1987: 59).

A second subtype mentioned by Garssen is analogy argumentation in which an appeal is made to the *rule of justice*. This argumentation is used to make a reasonable case that a specific person (or a specific case) should be treated in a particular way by referring to the rule that people in the same situation should be treated in the same way (or that similar cases require a similar treatment). This form of argumentation derives its persuasiveness from the similarity of the cases in combination with the principle 'what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander'.

Another subtype in which both a similitude relationship is made and a more or less accepted principle is utilised is analogy argumentation in which an appeal is made to the *principle of reciprocity*. Garssen does not discuss this category, which originates from Perelman, as a separate subtype, but classifies it as part of the similitude relationship (1997: 77). In his *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Angeles defines 'reciprocity' as 'The giving in return of equal good (rights, benefits) for the good received' (1981: 241). This principle particularly applies to people (and countries), and implies that one person should act towards another person in the same way the other person act towards him. Expressions such as 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours' and 'one good turn deserves another' are colloquial phrasings of this principle. There is also a negative variant of this principle that seems to be less acceptable. This entails giving someone a taste of his own medicine or repaying evil with evil. In the following example the application of this principle is advised against by Walloon Christian Socialists:

> The Walloon Christian Socialists support the Dutroux report wholeheartedly, but warn against an 'eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth'. The injustice of police and the justice department must not be responded to by more injustice.
>
> (*de Volkskrant*, 18 April 1997)

The following critical questions can be asked in the case of analogy argumentation:

Are the things that are compared actually comparable?
Are there enough relevant similarities between the things that are compared?
Are there any relevant differences between the things that are compared?



FIGURE 6.1 Dialectical core profile for argumentation by comparison

In order for analogy argumentation to be sound, the first two questions should be answered in the affirmative, and the third in the negative. On the basis of the characterisation of analogy argumentation given here and the critical questions that go with it, we can design the following dialectical core profile (in which the possible follow-up of these questions has not been specified further). 'ZY' means in this profile 'Y is true for Z'; 'X', 'Y', 'Z', 'U', and 'T' represent objects, qualities, actions, events, or conditions; '≈' means 'is similar to', '?/' at the beginning of a phrase means 'I doubt if' and '?' at the end of a phrase refers to the interrogative mood (see Figure 6.1).

The different subtypes of analogy argumentation sometimes require that the critical questions are adapted or supplemented with other questions. For example, in the case of evaluating *analogous argumentation* the antagonist should not focus on the real properties of the things that are compared, but examine whether or not similarities between the compared cases exist on a more abstract level.

In the case of evaluating *argumentation based on the rule of justice* a preliminary question is relevant: 'Should people in the same situation be treated equally in this case?' This way the applicability of the rule of justice in the concrete case is called into question. In addition, the critical questions for this type of argumentation can be made more specific by making a connection between the similarity and the right to equal treatment:

1. Do the compared things show sufficient similarities to justify the proposed equal treatment?

2. Are there any relevant differences between the compared things that stand in the way?

Also in the case of *argumentation that is based on the reciprocity principle* the acceptability of the principle itself can be brought up for discussion: 'Should the one act towards the other exactly the same way the other did towards him in this case?' The question can again be made more specific:

[77] Strictly speaking, the problem of the tenability of arguments (here: that Z is true for Y) is not at issue in the argumentation stage of a critical discussion, but in the opening stage. However, because in practice the problem often occurs if an argument is given in the argumentation stage, we prefer to discuss it here.

1. Is that which the one is expected to return, in fact, in proportion with what the other did for him?

2. Are there any differences between the two situations that render the need for doing the same in return unnecessary?

6.2.2 Clues in the presentation of argumentation by comparison

Expressions indicating the comparison relationship

There are a number of expressions that can be used to make explicit that two persons or cases are comparable or similar. A first category consists of expressions containing the verb *to compare* or its derivations. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), one of the meanings of 'to compare' is to 'estimate, measure, or note the similarity or dissimilarity between'. Other terms that may be used to compare things or to represent them as similar are, for instance, 'equivalent', 'parallel', 'analogous', and 'to remind of'.

– X can be compared to Z
– X is similar to Z
– Compare X to Z
– X is the equivalent of Z
– There are parallels (to be drawn) between X and Z
– X reminds someone of Z

These expressions occur in (1)–(5):

(1) Tens of thousands of women, children and elderly people are moving to nearby Ingushetia. Ingushetian Prime Minister Achmed Malsagov is afraid tens of thousands more will follow, and alerts to a humanitarian catastrophe. 'This *can be compared to* Kosovo', he said. 'There they also had to leave everything behind and they also fled in all directions'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 27 September 1999)

(2) There is an abundance of Security Council presidencies this year. From Brazil and Gabon to Russia and Slovenia: each month another one, in alphabetical order. Last year The Netherlands pulled up a chair at the circle of conference tables in New York […] A month is very short, too short to actually make something out of the presidency, says Dick Leurdijk, UN expert at the Clingendael institute. *Compare that to* the EU, where countries have presidency for six months.
(*de Volkskrant*, 2 September 1999)

(3) Everything points to an approaching catastrophe. On the border between Zaire and Rwanda Dutch official Jacques de Milliano of *Doctors without Borders* makes a simple calculation. 'Cholera runs its course as follows. If you have ten dead people on the first day, there will be a hundred on the

next, the third day a thousand, the fourth ten thousand, and after that the number of casualties steadies itself'. De Milliano *draws a parallel with* the mortality in 1994. 'At that time there wasn't even a violent conflict in the Hutu encampments, and help arrived quickly. Still, 40 thousand people were killed by disease'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 9 November 1996)

(4) In the midst of outraged politicians tumbling over each other, Conservative MP Alan Clark has struck a fresh note. According to him the 'brave fans' in Marseille did nothing else but defend themselves against French policemen 'who were strongly prejudiced against the English' and supporters of the opponent. […] Moreover, Clark thought, present-day football matches are the *equivalent of* 'medieval tournaments', so it was 'perfectly natural for our boys to become a little recalcitrant'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 19 June 1998)

(5) It is expected that about forty million blank CDs will be sold this year, and apparently that is troublesome enough to attempt to bring about a change in mentality. *It reminds us of* that other lost battle: the campaign against moonlighting.

(*de Volkskrant*, 25 October 1999)

In (1), Malsagov draws a comparison between the situation in Kosovo in order to make a reasonable case that a humanitarian catastrophe is imminent in Ingushetia. In (2), Leurdijk argues that the Security Council presidency of one month is very short. To support his standpoint he refers to the presidency of the EU, which lasts six months. In (3), de Milliano compares the situation in East Zaire with the situation in the Hutu encampments in 1994. The situation was less serious then, and yet 40,000 people died from disease. So, *a fortiori* it holds true for East Zaire that a high mortality rate is to be expected. In (4), Alan Clark defends the standpoint that it is perfectly natural for English supporters 'to become a little recalcitrant', by drawing a comparison between the function of present-day football matches and that of medieval tournaments. Finally, in (5), a comparison is drawn with another campaign that was of little effect – the campaign against moonlighting – in order to make a reasonable case that the campaign against copying CDs will be useless.

Another way of pointing to the similarity of two matters or persons is by using the *conjunctions of comparison* 'as' and 'like'. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), 'as' can be 'used in comparisons to refer to the extent or degree of something' (the structure is 'as … as', but often the first 'as' is omitted). 'As' is often accompanied by 'just' or other words that express similarity or equality, like 'exactly' and 'the same'. 'Just' and 'exactly' can be used with 'like' as well. These expressions explicitly show that similarities exist between two things:

– X is (as) Z as Y
– X is just as/like Z
– X (verb) just as much/many Z as Y

– X is (does) the same as Z
– X is about the same as Z

In (6) to (9) some of these expressions are used in practice:

(6) 'For years The Netherlands closed its eyes to reality' – And now very strong measures have to be taken in a fairly short time?

I like to make a comparison with the closure of the mines, the textile industry, and the shipbuilding industry. In these areas dramatic changes took place in a short period of time as well. But they were necessary, *just as* they are now. We are being confronted by the inevitability of the environmental problem.
(*de Volkskrant*, 9 October 1999)

(7) Contrary to the belief of many people, a lot of digital perpetrators are easy to catch because they are so clumsy that they leave about *as many* traces *as* a coalman in a linen-cupboard.
(*de Volkskrant*, 31 May 1997)

(8) It is difficult to find out more about the bowels of the earth. Research in caves, mines and boreholes is of little use, comparatively that is *the same as* paring an apple to see how many pips it contains. The scientists are only prodding the outer layer of the earth's crust, which is about 50 to 150 kilometres thick while the earth itself is 12,757 kilometres across.
(*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 31 August 1999)

(9) Airline company British Airways has outrun arch-rival Virgin on the railroad. The British government granted BA the right to exploit Eurostar, the rail connection between Paris and London, together with the English bus company National Express and the French and Belgian railways, until 2010. […] 'To give BA that role is *about the same as* making king Herod the head of a nursery school', snorted director S. Haji-Ionnaou of cheap airline company Easyjet.
(*de Volkskrant*, 5 June 1998)

In (6), the inevitability of measures (that work out very badly for the people in question) is defended by making a comparison with the closures of mines, textile industries and shipbuilding industry some years ago, which were inevitable as well. (7) to (9) are all analogies or figurative comparisons. So, the same indicators that can be used to indicate normal comparisons can occur in figurative comparisons. In (8), we see an additional indication that the example involves an analogy and not a literal comparison: the expression 'comparatively' indicates that the comparison is directed at the proportions of the matters that are compared, instead of at the real properties.

There is another expression that appears to be pre-eminently suited to indicate figurative comparisons: the conjunction of manner 'as if' (or its synonym 'as though'). According to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989),

the meaning of *as though* is 'as would or might be the case if'. 'As though' is used to draw a comparison with a hypothetical case. The hypothetical case is presented as something that is not really true, or does not exist in reality. The expressions 'as if' and 'as though' are, in other words, used to introduce an imaginary comparison between events, actions, things or persons and are therefore a strong clue for a figurative comparison. Another expression that can be used to introduce a figurative comparison is 'that's like' or 'that's like saying'. In (10)–(12) these expressions are used as indicators of a figurative comparison:

(10) The new Minister of Social Security and Employment, Klaas de Vries, is not known as someone who exaggerates. But when he talks about the work pressure of his new job, the comparisons become worse and worse. '*It's as if* you have to cycle up the Alpe d'Huez ten times a day'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 9 December 1998)

(11) *Ellen Vanstone*: I remember running into you a few years ago, and hearing you were writing a book about pain, which made us both laugh, but I'm not sure why.
Marni Jackson: It was a bit absurd, really, to tackle such a huge subject. It's like saying, oh, I'm working on a slim volume about life. (*The Globe and Mail*, June 1, 2002).

The indicator 'as if' is also used in a negative analogy that is used to criticise somebody's argumentation. In that case, it is used to introduce a comparison between the opponent's argumentation and another argument that is untenable or absurd. The unreal character of the argument that is introduced by 'as if' then refers to the untenability, obvious incorrectness or absurdity of that argument:

(12) The Dutch justice system refuses to take action against the digital distribution of child pornography. Not because it is an overestimated problem, but because the Internet is so complicated. The latter is about the most awful argument someone could think of. *That is as if* policemen would not get courses in criminal law, 'because all those laws are so complex'. *Or as if* you would be told 'but sir, you can't expect us to just drop everything we're doing', when reporting a bank robbery.
(*de Volkskrant*, 31 May 1997)

(13) Instead of ignoring the molehill, Nuis digs out his mountaineering kit and starts climbing. He writes that with some (the stupid audience?) the impression could take root that 'the play is based on true facts'. He asks his spokesperson to explain that the play 'is not satirical in nature, but comes across as realistic' (with the stupid audience?). 'For this reason the audience might think that in reality everything happened this way'. *As if* that would be an objection. *As if* Shakespeare's history plays derive their immortality from satire. As if Nuis has any authority in this matter.
(*de Volkskrant*, 3 August 1996)

Expressions that could be used to indicate aspects and subtypes of the comparison relationship

In addition to the above-mentioned expressions that can be used to explicitly indicate that a comparison is made between two things or that similarities are observed, there are also expressions that indicate in a less straightforward manner that a comparison is made between people, situations or things. These expressions emphasise specific aspects of the comparison relationship in general or of specific subtypes of the argumentation by comparison.

They concern, in the first place, expressions that express a certain similarity without explicitly indicating that a comparison is made:

– too
– also
– as well
– either
– no less than
– likewise
– just as (much)
– a similar
– both (are, have, etc.)/to both applies
– the same (applies)

In (14)–(17) a number of these expressions are used:

(14) Anyone who gives children access to the Internet should take responsibility as well. You don't let a toddler ride his tricycle on the motorway and then expect others to be careful *either*.
(*de Volkskrant*, 26 October 1996)

(15) The distinction between alcohol, which is regarded as innocent, and other drugs, which are considered dangerous, is artificial, according to him. *To both applies* that one could become addicted.
(*de Volkskrant*, 24 June 1997)

(16) A less frenetic policy – by analogy with the 'coffee shop model' – seems obvious, although as yet this falls outside political order: hash is freely available, but advertising it is not allowed. Alcohol and tobacco could be regulated in a *similar* way. On the other hand, cannabis should be legalised to give hash growers the same status as cigarette manufacturers.
(*de Volkskrant*, 24 June 1997)

(17) He feels provoked by the fact that the media are gunning only for Royal Commissioner Leemhuis. 'The head of finance, the registrar and the deputy of finance are to blame *just as much*, if not more'.

A comparison always involves two or more things that are connected due to a particular similarity. Therefore, a comparison relationship can be indicated by

expressions that put side by side, or contrast, two times, countries, places (departments, disciplines, etc.) or communities. A few examples of such expressions are:

– Here … , there …
– We … , the others …
– Then … , now …
– In France … , in The Netherlands …
– In The Netherlands/here … , elsewhere …

Many examples that we have seen so far included such expressions (in combination with other clues). For example, in (1) 'this' is used to refer to the situation in Ingushetia, and 'there' to the state of affairs in Kosovo. In (4) the words 'present-day' and 'medieval' make clear that the comparison relates to matters from two different periods. Often only the second of the two compared matters is marked: in (2), for instance, we only find the expression 'where', in (3) just 'at that time', and in example (5) just 'that other'. In these cases, the first subject of the comparison has become clear from the foregoing. Also in (18) only the second part is marked ('in France'). The context makes clear that the first part of the comparison refers to the high-speed train in The Netherlands. In (19) the environmental sector is put explicitly against the public health sector:

(18) Contrary to what the cabinet states, the high-speed train is also able to speed on normal rail tracks. *In France* the high-speed train (HST) reaches more than 200 kilometres an hour on existing tracks, without a need for complicated power supply.
(*de Volkskrant*, 23 October 1996)

(19) According to Borst, it is time to make the tobacco industry jointly liable for damages to health caused by smoking. She sees a parallel with the development in *the environmental sector*. *In that sector* the polluter has to pay for the damage he causes to the environment. 'We could do the same thing *in the public health sector*', said Borst last Saturday in Trouw.
(*de Volkskrant*, 20 December 1999)

In (15)–(17), argumentation by comparison occurs that appeals to the rule of justice. To indicate this type of argumentation, we may therefore apply, at least, the general indicators that point to a similarity between two things or people. In addition, there are some expressions that are specific to argumentation based on the rule of justice:

– X must be treated like Z
– X … , then also Z
– X can, but Z can't?
– Why X, and not Z?

The use of these expressions is a clue that we have argumentation by comparison based on the rule of justice, because they either explicitly express that two things must be treated in the same way ('X must be treated like Y'), or indicate that a

particular behaviour with regard to X has as a consequence that this behaviour must apply to Y as well ('X, then also Z'), or indicate that an unequal treatment would be inconsistent ('Why X, and not Z?'; 'X can but Z can't?'). These expressions occur in the following examples:

(20) Smoking cigars and pipes damages your health as much as smoking cigarettes. According to the health organisation, it is time to draw the legal consequences. In the area of advertising bans, taxes and health warnings, pipe and cigar **should be treated in exactly the same way** as cigarettes.
(*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 20 April 1999)

(21) Five years ago, without hesitation, the feminist movement rallied round Anita Hill, the lawyer who accused the conservative candidate of the Supreme Court, Clarence Thomas, of sexual harassment. 'Where are these women's organisations now? **Why did** they support Anita Hill and **why don't** they stick up for Paula Jones?' said Joseph Jones, lawyer to the woman who pressed charges against the President of the United States for sexual harassment.
(*de Volkskrant*, 15 January 1997)

(22) **Putin can rampage but Sharon can't?.** Watching the rapidly escalating pressure on Israel from the safe distance of Moscow […], Vladimir Putin might afford himself a secret smile. Even as Ariel Sharon is pilloried for using a campaign against terrorism to assault Palestinian civilians and their self-government, Putin is quietly getting away with almost exactly the same crime.
(*International Herald Tribune*, April 30, 2002).

(23) The 'sorry' of one country can influence the discussion in another country. A clear indication to what extent this may happen is the claim of *Wiedergutmachung* brought by the Herero people from Namibia for the massacre of their predecessors by German troops almost a century ago. […] 'The Herero tribe are very conscious of what is happening elsewhere', said the Namibian ambassador two years ago in the EU. 'They've read that the gold the Nazis stole will be returned to the Jews. If *others* are awarded damages, **then why shouldn't they?'**
(*de Volkskrant*, 29 January 2000)

There are a number of specific expressions that indicate *argumentation based on the reciprocity principle*. Besides expressions that articulate the principle itself ('one good turn deserves another'), there are also expressions that indicate that something is expected in return ('you expect something in return', 'that should be worth something to him') or that one of the parties falls short in doing something compared to the other party ('the other way round, it would be so', 'love must be reciprocated').

– you expect something in return
– (then you should do) something in return

– one good turn deserves another
– love must be reciprocated
– there should be something in it for X
– that should be worth something to X
– the other way round it would be so

In the following passages a number of these expressions are used:

(24) Heineken does not see the good of the Gay Games, no more than Philips, ING Bank and Aegon Insurances. […] Janssens: 'It is disappointing that a number of companies aren't loyal towards the target group, while *the other way round* that has always been the case. 80 percent of the gay bars in Amsterdam serve Heineken. *You expect something in return*'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 16 January 1998)

(25) Writer Koos van Zomeren succeeds J.J. Voskuil as activist against the bio-industry. […] Honestly, I would feel unpleasant if I didn't. Pigs, cows, birds have always provided me with good texts. Now I have the opportunity *to do something in return*. So, I should do it too.
(*de Volkskrant*, 27 October 1997)

(26) The Netherlands demands an unconditional execution of the legal assistance treaty. Foreign Secretary van Mierlo recently called it a benchmark for a satisfactory relationship between the countries. But Surinam likes to see things in a broader sense. Girjasing […]: 'We regarded the legal assistance treaty as part of a broader collaboration. For instance, I've presented a list with 24 new projects, including the construction of a youth relief centre and professional training for lawyers and notaries. Nothing has happened with these requests'. It is a simple matter of '*one good turn deserves another*', he says. 'For it's just so that politics are based on that principle'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 16 December 1996)

In addition to the above-mentioned indicator 'as if', a negative analogy is often indicated along established lines. First a relationship of comparison is indicated by means of expressions of equality or similarity ('that is the same as', 'that is something/a bit like', 'also', '(n)either' 'as', 'like'). Subsequently, an expression is used to pronounce a negative judgement about the subject of the comparison. This negative judgement may be formulated explicitly ('knock it off', 'that's a miscalculation'). In other cases, expressions like '(and then) you don't say', '(and then) you wouldn't say ... would you?' or 'but that doesn't mean that' are used to make clear that in the analogous case one would not draw the conclusion which was drawn in the criticised argument. We find this pattern in the following negative analogies:

(27) Brothel keepers risk the suspension of their permit if they employ women without a residence permit or let a room to them. Patijn brushed their objections rigorously aside: 'They say they don't employ those women. *That's the same as* a coffee shop owner who says he has nothing to do with

the man who is selling drugs at a table in his shop. Please knock it off! I don't expect us to behave like hypocrites towards each other. I consider the owner responsible for everything that takes place on his premises'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 23 October 1996)

(28) [Concerning drugs in sports] Our own list needs to be constantly refined as well, for instance, in the case of nandrolone. 'Hardliners say that if you find nandrolone: go on, put him in the pillory. But it's not that simple. […] nandrolone is also used to fatten cattle, so you'll find it in humans who have eaten that meat, be it in damn small quantities. It's the easiest thing to regard the laboratory's judgement as absolute. But an interpretation can produce a very different story. It's *a bit like* passive smoking. It won't be much, but you'll find some nicotine in the lungs. *And then you wouldn't say*, go on, put him in the pillory, *would you now*?'

(*de Volkskrant*, 21 March 1998)

(29) Imam A. Akmal: 'It is true that there are people who don't believe in God. But there's so much proof, so many people who have positively testified of their contact with God. People who close their eyes and keep the curtains shut could *also* claim that the sun doesn't exist. *That's a miscalculation*. If they would open their curtains and do some research, they would irrevocably come across proof'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 5 June 1996)

(30) 'As long as the basic idea of the plan isn't questioned and the SER recommendations aren't negotiable, I don't see any possibilities. The Minister of Social Affairs doesn't offer an opening either. He thinks it's a clear draft. You can *also* make a clear draft of a square wheel, *but that doesn't mean* that you can ride with it'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 27 November 1999)

6.2.3 Indications in criticism of argumentation by comparison

Argumentation by comparison sometimes emerges from the use of specific expressions that explicitly indicate that a particular comparison is invalid. Examples of such expressions are:

– The analogy/comparison/similarity is far-fetched
– The comparison does not hold good/true/water
– You are comparing apples to oranges
– X cannot be compared to Y/You cannot compare X to Y

The following passages contain such expressions:

(31) Each day at three o'clock the head of the NATO information service, Jamie Shea, attempts to think up new sound bites about the war and the character

of Milosevic. *His analogies are becoming more and more far-fetched*. In the beginning of this week he compared the battlefields of Kosovo to the 'killing fields' of Cambodia. *That comparison does not hold water*: Pol Pot drove about 1.7 million Cambodians to their deaths. What is happening in Kosovo is tragic, but does not come close to the horrors of Cambodia in the seventies.

(*de Volkskrant*, 2 April 1999)

(32) According to [Knape], patients who are mildly sedated by non-anaesthetists stand a five times higher chance to die than those that are put under a general anaesthesia by an anaesthetist. Knape based himself on a British study. '*He compares apples to oranges*', says Dr H. Muller, chairman of the Dutch Association of Internists (NIV). '*You really can't compare* Dutch hospitals to the British ones, which are sometimes poorly equipped'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 17 June 1998)

Apart from the explicit indication that argumentation by comparison is criticised, we can also find indications in the way the antagonist motivates his criticism. In (31), the wording of 'but does not come close to the horrors of Cambodia in the seventies' demonstrates the antagonist's opinion that the compared events bear no similarity to each other (first critical question). In (32), the third critical question seems to come up: the British hospitals are poorly equipped, while the Dutch are not, which means there is a significant difference between the compared things.

An explicit indication that a comparison relationship is criticised occurs again in (33): 'You are comparing apples to oranges'. The expression 'That's America' constitutes an indication as well, because it implicates that the situation in America differs from the one in The Netherlands (third critical question). This contrast is emphasised further by the remark, 'Anyway, we consider it a nuisance'.

(33) 'Are you Mr de Zwart?'
'No, I'm not'.
'What a pity. I would have liked to ask him something on the occasion of the TeleVizier bicycle tour'.
'There is no need. We consider that a real nuisance. It's an intrusion'.
'But *in America* it's really common, isn't it?'
'*That's America*. You're *comparing apples to oranges*'.
'Anyway, *we* consider it a real nuisance'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 19 July 1996)

A relevant distinction between the two compared matters is only stated in (33), and not made plausible by means of arguments. The latter does happen in (34):

(34) The catastrophe has failed to materialise. The millennium bug did not paralyse the world, as many people feared not so long ago. […]
– Russia, Africa and South America spent only a fraction of what Western countries spent. Still, very little happened. Didn't the West spend too much?

> *In Africa and South-America* computer density is *far less than it is here*. The infrastructure of their technology *is incomparable* to ours. *That makes a difference*, and not a minor one. The Russians were offered help, in nuclear power plants, gas transport, et cetera. And it's quite possible that local businesses in these countries did a lot without us knowing about it. Really, *I'm not in the least impressed by such comparisons*.
>
> (*de Volkskrant*, 3 January 2000)

In (34), the writer indicates why the comparison between Western countries and Africa and South America does not hold true: computer density is 'far less than it is here' and the technological infrastructure of these countries is incomparable to Western countries. And there are important differences (third critical question), or as the writer formulates it, 'That makes a difference, and not a minor one'. Besides, it is not certain that less money was spent in these countries: perhaps local businesses did a lot without it becoming known to us.

Other expressions someone who responds to the other party's argumentation can use to make clear that he is of the opinion that there are relevant differences between the compared matters are:

– The difference is
– That is something else
– That is a different story
– That is different

These expressions occur in the following passages:

(35) According to critics, Albright misjudged the reaction of the Yugoslavian president Milosevic, because she took the NATO bombing of the Serbians in Bosnia as an example. Milosevic did give in that time. *The difference is*, however, that the Serbian areas in Bosnia are less dear to Milosevic. Kosovo, which is considered holy ground by the Serbians, *is a different story altogether*.

(*de Volkskrant*, 9 April 1999)

In (36), Eubanks makes clear that the computer industry cannot be blamed for the fact that computers fail more easily than machines like refrigerators. Computers cannot be compared to refrigerators, according to him, because, unlike fridges, we use them for all kinds of different things (and therefore they are far more complex machines). In order to press home his criticism of this comparison, Eubanks uses a (negative) analogy too: you can compare a fridge to a computer no more than you can compare a lawn mower to a Boeing 747. For this, he uses an indicator of negative analogy: 'you wouldn't … would you?'

(36) 'It doesn't matter what I say', responds Eubanks. 'It always sounds as if I'm defending the industry, or attacking it. And in both cases that would be unfair. It is true that computers still crash, but it's also true that we do more with them every day. That's what people overlook when they say

their computer should be *just as* reliable *as* their fridge. *You wouldn't compare* a lawn mower to a Boeing 747, *would you?*"

(*de Volkskrant*, 17 October 1998)

In (37), Grass defends himself against criticism that in making a comparison between Bismarck's aspirations to create one great German empire and the recent German reunification he was 'lumping everything together'. The criticism comes down to the idea that Grass has put things on a par that share too few similarities (second critical question). Grass defends himself by explaining that he did not have a literal comparison in view, but only a figurative one. He did *not* try to show that 'the exact same events' took place in the two periods he compared, but only that 'similar expectations and behaviours' occurred. So, according to him, the criticism of his analogy lacks relevance:

(37) Grass wanted to ask Fontane to comment on the events that took place in Germany between 1989 and 1990, so to speak. Fontane was a witness of Bismarck's aspirations to amalgamate the different German cities and states into one empire. Grass saw *a parallel* between the German reunification and that ambition. 'I have been accused of *lumping everything together*', he says jokingly. 'But of course I *don't* believe that 1870/1871 and 1989/1990 showed *exactly the same* events. My point was a certain attitude, *similar* expectations and behaviours'.

(*de Volkskrant* on the Internet 2000)

6.2.4 Indications in the follow-up of argumentation by comparison

The way in which the protagonist of a particular standpoint follows up on (possible) criticism to his argumentation by comparison may contain clues as well. We shall clarify this on the basis of a few examples.

In example (38), the writer (implicitly) defends the standpoint that NATO should have intervened in Russia, because they also intervened in Serbia. This type of argumentation by comparison, based on the rule of justice, is indicated by the expression that is often used in such argumentation, 'why (against) X and not (against) Z'. The fact that the author is using argumentation by comparison emerges from the follow-up of his argumentation: by means of additional argumentation he tries to make a reasonable case that the situation in both countries was similar. The similarity itself is indicated by the expression 'not only ... but also'. With 'whereas' the author subsequently indicates that there is a contrast between the first part of the sentence and the second. In this case, the contrast is between what one would normally expect – that equal cases receive equal treatment unless they differ in relevant respects – and the fact that in the situation in question there is no such difference. This means the author anticipates the objection 'But wasn't the situation in Serbia in relevant respects different from the one in Russia?'

(38) It is [...] hard to explain why action *was* taken against Serbia *and not* against Russia, *whereas not only* in Kosovo, *but also* in Chechnya violence was used against civilians.

(*de Volkskrant*, 14 February 2000)

In (39), Schagen argues that the decision to test illegal women and female asylum seekers for AIDS should not depend on the chance that these women are going to be expelled. His argument is founded on an argument by analogy: during World War II doctors did not treat people who ran the risk to be sent to a concentration camp any different from other patients. After that, he anticipates criticism that Africa cannot be compared to a concentration camp ('It's true that Africa can't be compared to an extermination camp'). Subsequently, he explains that, although in a literal sense Africa cannot be compared to an extermination camp, sending people with AIDS back to Africa can be compared to sending people to an extermination camp ('is the execution of a death sentence').

(39) A response to a proposal which involves that illegal women and female asylum seekers who originate from countries where aids is widespread must not be automatically tested for HIV but to let the decision depend on the chance that the woman is expelled from The Netherlands]: 'During World War II doctors *did not* treat people who ran the risk to be sent to a concentration camp *any* different from other patients, *did they*?' is Schagen's opinion. 'It's true that Africa *cannot be compared* to an extermination camp, but sending someone who has HIV back to an area where the disease can't be treated is the execution of a death sentence', Schagen writes.

(*de Volkskrant*, 21 January 2000)

In (40), Dölle defends the standpoint that the continued existence of the province should not be linked to the turnout at the elections. After that he draws a comparison with the European Parliament, the district water boards and the President of the United States. The fact that he makes this comparison becomes clear from indicators like 'we don't … do we?' and 'and what about X'. But also the follow-up of his argumentation provides clues:

(40) The 'down-with-the-province' mentality has to stop, according to Alfons Dölle, professor of local governments and senior lecturer of constitutional law. […] Dölle thinks it is ridiculous to link the existence of a whole administrative layer to the turnout at the election. '*We don't* abolish the European Parliament or the district water boards, *do we?* Who knows the district water board? But if they were gone, we would get our feet wet. *And what about* the President of the United States? *Even less* people go to the polls for him, but nobody is considering to abolish that institute for that reason'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 3 March 1999)

Dölle states (using a rhetorical question) that virtually nobody knows the district water boards, in other words that the public interest for these boards is very limited. He continues with, 'but if they were gone, we would get our feet wet'. This way he demonstrates that, as far as public interest is concerned, the province could be compared to the district water boards, and that, in spite of this, the continuing existence of the district water boards is not at issue. In a similar way he argues that the turnout of the presidential elections in the United States is low as well, but that this is no reason to abolish presidency. So, the follow-up of

Dölle's argumentation proves that he further supports the relevant similarity of the compared cases.

6.3 INDICATIONS FOR SYMPTOMATIC ARGUMENTATION

6.3.1 Dialectical profile for the symptomatic relationship

In argumentation that is based on a symptomatic relationship that a property, class membership, distinctive characteristic, or essence of a particular thing, person, or situation referred to in the argumentation also applies to the thing, person or situation referred to in the standpoint. The following general scheme applies to symptomatic argumentation:

Y is true of X
because Z is true of X
and Z goes characteristically together with Y

An example of argumentation based on a symptomatic relationship is:

(41) Bill is very egocentric because he is an only child
and egocentrism is characteristic of people who are an only child.

In this example, the fact that Bill belongs to the class of people who are an only child is used as a basis for concluding that he also has the characteristic of being egocentric that goes with this class. Such a symptomatic relation can also be used in the opposite direction. The fact that Bill is egocentric is then used as an argument for the conclusion that he must be an only child:

(42) Bill must be an only child because he is egocentric
and egocentrism is characteristic of people who are an only child.

In (42), the last utterance could be replaced by 'and his egocentrism is a sign that he is an only child'. According to their definition of symptomatic argumentation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst consider this inverse variant to be the prototypical form of symptomatic argumentation: 'The argumentation is presented as if it is an expression, a phenomenon, a sign or some other kind of symptom of what is stated in the standpoint (1992: 97). By this definition the argument can be regarded as an indication or a sign that something is the case, or that a particular qualification is justified. Perelman considers the distinction between the sign or the manifestation of a particular phenomenon and the phenomenon itself a hierarchical distinction. In his view, in relationships of coexistence (Perelman's term for symptomatic relationships), the elements that are connected are always on an unequal level:

> Liaisons of coexistence establish a tie between realities on unequal levels; one is shown to be the expression or manifestation of the other (1982: 89–90).

A prototypical example given by Perelman of the relation of coexistence is the relation between a person and his actions, opinions or works. Because there is a continual interaction between the person and his actions, the relationship can be explored in



FIGURE 6.2 Dialectical core profile for symptomatic argumentation

two ways: the image one has of the person makes it possible to arrive at conclusions about his acts (or other manifestations of the person) and vice versa (1982: 90).

In a critical discussion, the following critical questions can be asked for symptomatic argumentation:

1. Is (characteristic) Y indeed typical of (property) Z?

2. Is (characteristic) Y not also typical of something else (Z′)?

3. Are there any other characteristics (Y′) that X needs to have in order to be able to ascribe (property) Z to X?

On the basis of the characterisations of symptomatic argumentation and the critical questions belonging to this type of argumentation, we can create the following general dialectical core profile (in which the possible follow-up of these critical questions is, again, not further specified). 'XZ' means in this profile 'Z is true of X'; 'X', 'Y', 'Z', 'U', and 'T' represent objects, properties, actions, events or conditions; '//' means 'goes characteristically together with', '?/' at the beginning of a phrase means 'I doubt if' and '?' at the end of a phrase refers to the interrogative mood (see Figure 6.2).

A subtype of symptomatic argumentation is *argumentation from example*. Garssen provides the following description of this subtype:

> In argumentation from example separate facts are represented as special cases of something general: on the basis of specific perceptions a generalisation is made (1997: 11, our transl.).

The first critical question can be specified as follows for argumentation from example: 'Are the any specific cases typical for the state of affairs?' In order to answer this question the antagonist has to ask himself whether the separate cases are indeed representative and whether sufficient separate cases have been considered.

6.3.2 Indications in the presentation of symptomatic argumentation

Expressions indicating a symptomatic relationship

In characterisations of the symptomatic relationship the notions 'characteristic' and 'sign' turn out to play a crucial role. We shall therefore take these two notions as the starting point in our search for examples of expressions that are indicative of the

symptomatic relationship. We make a distinction between (1) expressions that can indicate relations in two directions: the characteristic can be mentioned either in the argument or in the standpoint, and (2) expressions that can only indicate relations in one direction (the characteristic or sign can only occur in the argument).

In order to determine which type of expressions can serve as indicators of the symptomatic relation, we start by looking at the definitions of the two key notions that are given in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989). The following uses are, among others, given for the words 'characteristic' and 'sign':

Characteristic
- a distinctive mark, trait, or feature; a distinguishing or essential peculiarity or quality
- (adj.) that seems to indicate the essential quality or nature of persons or things; displaying character; distinctive; typical

Sign
- a mark or device having some special meaning or import attached to it, or serving to distinguish the thing on which it is put
- a token or indication (visible or otherwise) of some fact, quality, etc.
- an objective evidence or indication for disease
- a trace or indication for something
- a mere semblance of something
- an indication for some coming event

According to these definitions, the notion 'characteristic' can both refer to the characteristic properties of a person or thing and to a sign of something being the case or something or someone being of a particular type. 'Sign' is used as a synonym of 'proof' or 'evidence' for the existence or the nature of something or someone. An important aspect of the meaning of a characteristic as well as a sign is that they make something perceptible – or at any rate knowable.

By also taking into account the synonyms of the terms that are used in these definitions, a non-exhaustive list can be made of expressions that may be indicative of the symptomatic relation. In these expressions it is more or less explicitly stated that the relation is symptomatic. Most of these expressions (with the exception of the last four expressions under b) will generally be found in the major premise of the argument, since this is the premise in which the relationship between standpoint and argument is expressed.

(a) Indications for symptomatic relationships in two directions
X is characteristic of Y
X is typical of Y
X is distinctive of Y
X is illustrative of Y
X marks Y

(b) Indications for symptomatic relations in one direction
X is a sign of Y
X is evidence of Y

X shows Y
X points to Y
X portends Y
X implies Y
X means Y
X proves that Y
X indicates Y
X testifies to Y
X is a token of Y
X tells us something about Y
X, (so) apparently Y
X, (so) obviously Y
X, (so) it is clear that Y
X, (so) it turns out that Y

In the examples (43)–(47), various indicators of symptomatic argumentation are used:

(43) More than in the past, a large group of floating voters existed, which may not have been able to go in all directions, but could go in a lot of directions. All this is not a coincidence. *It is typical of* modern society that people are less influenced by firm starting points but are chiefly inspired by trends.
(*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 7 December 1999)

(44) The seamless merger has cracked due to a fight over money. It mainly concerns the money of shareholders, who have to be kept satisfied by a constant increase in profit. The fear that this target could not be secured, or not to a sufficient extent, has cut short the merger plans. That might be *illustrative of* the growing power of shareholders.
(*de Volkskrant*, 10 March 1998)

(45) *Cadans* has never done anything to rehabilitate me or counsel me. I never received a benefit or sick pay, nor have I ever been medically examined. *It is clear that* there is something wrong with the organisation of this institution for social security.
(*de Volkskrant*, CD-ROM 1998)

(46) The number of benefit frauds with WW and WAO rose with 25% to more than five thousand in the course of one year. This increase *shows that* the chance of being caught has risen substantially.
(*de Volkskrant*, 21 July 1997)

(47) The woman had requested her family to have the cats put to sleep and bury them with her in the position in which they would normally sleep in her bed at night: one at the head of the bed, one on her belly and one at the foot of the bed. This development *tells us something* about our society, which *apparently* regards an animal as the substitute of a fellow human being.
(*de Volkskrant*, 10 May 1996)

A difference between the indicators of symptomatic relations in one direction and those in two directions is that the former, unlike the latter, always establish a reason-giving or argumentative connection between the two connected elements: they indicate that the one element is an argument for the other. The indicators of symptomatic relations in two directions, on the other hand, can also be used non-argumentatively. Within the group of expressions indicative of the symptomatic relationship in one direction, the expressions 'X, apparently Y', 'X, obviously Y', 'X, it is clear that Y', and 'X, it turns out that Y' constitute a separate group, because they can be combined with 'so', while this is not the case with the other expressions. Unlike the other indicators of symptomatic relationships, 'apparently', 'obviously', etc., can only occur in the standpoint of the argument, not in the major premise.

Expressions indicating aspects or subtypes of the symptomatic relation

The use of a number of specific expressions can show that the subtype argumentation from example occurs:

– Take (for instance) Y
– Just (take a) look at Y
– See (for instance) Y

According to *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary* (1988), 'for instance' is used 'when you want to mention a particular event, situation, person, etc. that illustrates the subject that you are discussing or the point you are making'. The same dictionary also refers to the use of 'to take' to introduce an example.

These expressions are used in (48–50):

(48) 'Look', says animal feed manufacturer Pierre Nijsen, '[…] meat production in The Netherlands is sheer processing of waste. *Take* the pig. The thirteen million pigs in their dark sties gobble up about seven million tons of feed, which consists for the most part of remains from the food industry, offal, old fat, rejected food and leftovers. And what do we get in return? No dirty rubbish dumps or smelly incinerators, but bacon, ham and chops. And manure, okay. Nobody is perfect'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 5 July 1999)

(49) Actually, he is not so exceptional at all. I find him a bit bloated and blown up, but I do think he has traits that are familiar to us. There are millions of people who lie and deceive and make fools of others. *Just take a look* at the commercial world. *Just take a look* at relationships. Often, relationships even start with lies. I think we all perform life threatening stunts for others at times.

(*de Volkskrant*, 12 May 2000)

(50) The Security Council still does not hesitate to send badly equipped UN peacekeeping forces to execute unstable peace agreements in places where NATO would not dare to go. See, *for instance*, Sierra Leone and Congo.

(*de Volkskrant*, 25 August 2000)

There are also expressions that can be indicative of specific aspects of the symptomatic relation. In particular, they involve aspects connected with what Perelman calls a relationship between *the person and his manifestations*. The expressions mentioned below, for example, are an indication that a particular quality, trait or behaviour is inherent in a particular person, inextricably bound up with him or her, essential to a thing or person, or (in the case of behaviour) that it continues or repeats itself. Only if these expressions occur in the major premise of the argument, they are a direct indication for a symptomatic relationship. In that case, they provide just as strong evidence as the expressions already mentioned that make the symptomatic relation explicit. All the above-mentioned expressions can also occur in the minor premise. In that case, they serve as an indirect clue that the relation in question may be symptomatic. Then the use of these expressions shows at least that the presence of certain inherent or permanent qualities plays an important role in the argument, which could be a reason to believe that we are dealing with a symptomatic argument. Some expressions may also occur in the standpoint. In that case, they also serve as an indirect indication for the symptomatic relationship.

Below we provide an overview of indications for aspects of the symptomatic relationship. For each expression we mark whether they can only occur in the argument (that is to say the major or minor premise) or also in the standpoint:

– is in the nature of [argument]
– is by nature [argument]
– is in his blood [argument]
– is a seasoned/experienced [argument/standpoint]
– is a true, real, regular, veritable, first-rate [argument/standpoint]
– is essentially, basically, at bottom, at heart, fundamentally [argument/standpoint]
– is simply/just [argument]
– is by definition [argument]
– is known as/reputed to be [argument]
– is by tradition [argument]
– will (always) be [argument/standpoint]
– remains (a) [argument/standpoint]
– always/all his (or her) life [argument/standpoint]

In example (51)–(53), expressions like these are used. In order to show clearly which statement contains the indicator, we provide a reconstruction of the argument in these examples.

(51) [A Scottish bishop turns out to have a son and to be living with a divorced woman]
Fortunately, in Kendal there was also a Mrs Mitchell, the new neighbour of the sinful Scottish bishop. She told the paper that she had no trouble understanding all this. '*Men will be men*'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 23 September 1996)

Reconstruction (indicator of relationship in *major premise*):
It is understandable that the bishop has violated the rules of celibacy (because he is a man) and *men will be men* [and it is typical of men that they find it difficult to remain celibate].

(52) 'Do you really believe that businessmen from the West set light to each other's shops?', I asked. 'It has to be so', he said. 'Because actually, we Russians are good *by nature*'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 29 August 1996)

Reconstruction (indicator of relationship in *minor premise*):
It is impossible that Russians set light to the shops because Russians are good *by nature* [and it is typical of people who are good by nature that they do not set light to shops].

(53) Brinkman has become a *real* Italian. She lives from day to day, *carpe diem*.

(*de Volkskrant*, 23 September 1999)

Reconstruction (indicator of relationship *in standpoint*):
Brinkman has become a *real* Italian since she lives from day to day [and living from day to day is typical of Italians].

Clues for the symptomatic relationship in the sentence structure

Apart from the expressions that can be indicative of the symptomatic relation or aspects of it, there is a sentence structure that is pre-eminently suitable for constituting either the standpoint or the minor premise of a symptomatic argument. Some of the expressions that point to aspects of the symptomatic relation can be combined with this sentence structure. The structure in question is the 'subject–copula–complement' sentence structure in which the predication consists of an adjective or a noun. Examples of this structure are the following:

X is (a) Y
X seems (to be) (a) Y
X appears to be (a) Y

This sentence structure has a number of properties that seem to make it suitable for presenting the standpoint or the minor premise of a symptomatic argument. According to Greenbaum, the predicate typically characterises the subject, and the verb 'to be', when used in such a construction, is a stative verb, which is a verb used in referring to a state of affairs (1996: 73–74).

Since symptomatic argumentation is generally about qualities and features and not about events or processes, it is plausible to assume that when an argument or standpoint has the sentence structure subject–copula–complement, this is already an indication that the argumentation might be based on a symptomatic relation. The similarity of the properties of this sentence structure to that of the symptomatic relation becomes even more apparent when variants of the symptomatic argument are taken into account. In his comparison of various approaches to argument schemes, Garssen considers the following types of argument that are mentioned in the literature as variants of this argument scheme (1997: 77, 120, our transl.):

– argumentation based on a classification
– argumentation based on a definition
– genus–species argumentation

– part–whole argumentation
– argumentation based on evaluation criteria
– identity relations

When we compare these variants with the functions the *Collins Cobuild English Grammar* (1991) lists of the sentence structure subject–copula–complement, there appears to be a close parallel between the purposes for which this sentence structure is used and the types of relation that are considered to be symptomatic:

– to say what type of person or thing someone or something is
– to describe or identify the subject
– to indicate what qualities someone or something has
– to indicate exactly who or what someone or something is ('indicating identity') (1991: 173–176)

The copulas 'to seem' and 'to appear' can fulfil similar functions as 'to be' when they are combined with a complement, but lend a specific modal shade to the sentence. 'To seem' and 'to appear' are both used when the speaker is making a statement of which he is not completely certain or that he knows from hearsay.

6.3.3 Clues in criticism of symptomatic argumentation

It is also possible to extract indications about the nature of the relationship the argumentation is based on from critical responses to argumentation. We shall illustrate this on the basis of some examples.

In example (54), H. Oosterling criticises the argument of the *Gay Krant*: the examples this newspaper gives do not point to new taboos, according to him. So, he does not consider the examples typical of the state of affairs to which the generalisation refers (1st critical question). To support his criticism, Oosterling argues that something can only be named a taboo if another criterion has been met (3rd critical question): breaking the taboo needs to lead to social exclusion. According to him, this criterion has not been met in the examples the *Gay Krant* mentions ('Serrano's "golden shower" poster only caused a debate about good taste').

(54) Frumpiness has struck, the *Gay Krant* recently wrote. In Tilburg and Flevoland police drive off gays that have sex on the local shores. In Amsterdam the university board wants to forbid a gay ball for fear of a porn show at the heart of the academy. The 'achievements of the seventies and eighties' could be less rock-solid than we always thought, suggests the gay newspaper. […] Are we entering upon a period of new taboos? […] The examples of 'frumpiness', as spotted by the *Gay Krant*, *do not point to* a rise of new taboos, thinks H. Oosterling, philosopher at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. Something *cannot* be called a taboo *until* breaking it leads to social exclusion. Serrano's 'golden shower' poster only caused a debate about good taste.

(*de Volkskrant*, 10 November 1997)

Example (55) also explicitly states that 'Y is not typical of Z' (1st critical question). The success of the *EO* youngsters or the Pentecostal church cannot be adduced as proof for a religious revival. De Hart supports its criticism in (55) with the argument that the *EO* hardly manages to draw young people with a non-religious background. The other examples that have been mentioned to proof a religious revival are not satisfactory either. The writers are not representative for new Catholics, and the number of new churchgoers is too small to speak of a religious revival ('not nearly enough to turn back secularisation').

(55) 'The success of the *EO* youngsters or the Pentecostal church cannot be adduced as proof for a religious revival', says researcher Dr J. de Hart. The EO knows very well how to mobilise its Reformed supporters, but hardly manages to draw young people with a non-religious background. The conversion of writers like Vonne van de Meer or Désanne van Brederode to Catholicism *does not point to* a new religious consciousness either. 'They are *not* in the least *representative*. Most new Catholics are older and have little education. On top of this they comprise only a thousand a year, *not* nearly *enough* to turn back secularisation', says de Hart.
(*de Volkskrant*, 20 June 1997)

In (56), the argumentation of the correspondent of *Le Monde* is criticised, who concludes from the fact that the OSVE observers discovered the ditch full of corpses in the morning, and not the evening before when they visited the village, that these corpses were put there by the UCK Albanians during the night. According to the critic, his reasoning is flawed: the OSVE observers did not arrive in the village until after the departure of the Serbians, which means after dark. If they did not see the corpses during their fist visit, this fact is no sign that they were not there, but may also point to something else (2nd critical question), i.e. that the darkness concealed the corpses from sight.

(56) The correspondent of Le Monde wonders whether the dead […] might not have been put in the ditch at night by UCK Albanians, who had by then returned to Racak and could then accuse the Serbians of a horrible massacre. […] According to AP and *Le Monde*, the Serbians withdrew shortly before darkness fell. In that case, should it come as a surprise that in the dark the OVSE observers did not immediately discover the ditch full of corpses at the outskirts of the village? That certainly *does not prove* that the Albanians brought those corpses to this location during the night.
(*de Volkskrant,* 23 January 1999)

6.3.4 Clues in the follow-up of symptomatic argumentation

The way a protagonist of a standpoint follows up a symptomatic argument in anticipation of possible critical reactions may also provide us with clues regarding the nature of his argumentation. An example is (57):

(57) The diminished attraction of marriage is a sign of instability, Latten thinks. Of the 'cohabitators' 25 percent has separated after eight years, of married people only 8 percent. In part this difference can be explained by the fact that married people often have a more traditional lifestyle. Latten: 'But it also plays a part that married people are more certain of their relationship. People who only live together tend to wait and see which way the cat jumps'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 28 May 1999)

To support the fact that the diminished number of marriages should be regarded as a sign of instability (1st critical question: is Y indeed typical of Z?), Latten brings forward arguments that are supposed to show that marriage is indeed a more stabile type of relationship than cohabitation. 25 percent of the 'cohabitators' has separated after eight years, while of married people only 8 percent has separated after eight years. Latten subsequently anticipates the criticism that this does not have to point to the instability of a relationship (2nd critical question) but could be a sign that married people are more traditional and for that reason unwilling to break a relationship. He admits that this is true, but then stresses that married people really have more stabile relationships ('married people are more certain of their relationship. People who only live together tend to wait and see which way the cat jumps').

In (58), the writer argues that the husband of the woman who sent a letter to the (Russian) journal *Cosmo* does not meet the ideal of the significant other of the average *Cosmo* reader because he refuses to work and she has to support him. Why he does not meet the ideal is substantiated in more detail by providing a *definition* of the Prince Charming of the average *Cosmo* reader: he not only has to satisfy all kinds of requirements, but should also earn more than she does.

(58) 'I never said that he is a burden to me. I thought things would work out over time', writes a reader who has to support her husband because he refuses to work. 'But nothing changes. What must I do?' Again, not the Prince Charming of the average *Cosmo* reader, who has to be not only complimentary, a doting father and always have time for sex, but should also earn more than she does.
(*de Volkskrant*, 14 July 2000)

In example (59), the standpoint is defended that the website *kranten.com* is a periodical in the sense of article 15 Aw [General Law Code], because of the fact that this website solely provides a live overview of the headings on the websites of various media. The author makes a reasonable case for the presumption that this method indeed justifies that the website is regarded as a periodical by indicating that the method used by the website does not differ from other news media that are regarded as periodicals according to Article 15 Aw.

(59) The website kranten.com can be regarded as a periodical according to Article 15 Aw. After all, kranten.com solely provides a live overview of the headings on the websites of various media. This makes it a news medium that periodically (i.e. daily) provides an overview of the current reports of those media, expressively mentioning the names of those media.
(*de Volkskrant*, 22 August 2000)

6.4 INDICATIONS FOR CAUSAL ARGUMENTATION

6.4.1 Dialectical profile for the causal relationship

In argumentation based on a causal relationship the argument is presented as the cause (means, instrument, etc.) of the standpoint, or the other way round: the standpoint as the cause of the argument.

> The argument is presented as if what is stated in the argumentation is a means to, a way to, an instrument for or some other kind of causative factor for the standpoint or *vice versa* (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 97).

According to Garssen, the transfer of acceptability from argument to standpoint is accomplished by presenting the cause as an accepted fact and the result as inevitable:

> By presenting something that is introduced as an accepted fact in the argument, as something that inevitably leads to the event that is mentioned in the standpoint – or the other way round –, a causal relationship is created that transfers the acceptability from the argument to the standpoint.
> (Garssen 1997: 19, our transl.)

Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002: 101) give the following general scheme for causal argumentation:

Y is true of X
because Z is true of X
and Z leads to Y

Argumentation based on this scheme can, for instance, be used to justify a prediction, as in example (60):

(60) The number of job-seekers in the region of Arnhem–Nijmegen has dropped with 10 percent last year and the number of young people even with one-fifth. One does not have to be a prophet to predict that shortages may occur.
(*de Volkskrant*, 26 March 1998)

In this example the standpoint is defended that a future shortage of labour may occur in the region of Arnhem–Nijmegen (Y is true of X), because a strong drop in the number of job-seekers has occurred in that region (because Z is true of X). The causal connection between a drop in the number of job-seekers and the chance of a shortage of labour remains implicit (Z leads to Y).

In the reverse variant of argumentation that is based on a causal relationship, the argument refers to the result and the standpoint to the cause:

Z is true of X
because Y is true of X
and Z leads to Y

This reverse variant can, for instance, be used to defend the standpoint that something is the case, or must have been the case, by introducing a factual event as the result of that which is said in the standpoint:

(61) They probably gritted here last night, for it is not icy at all (and gritting makes the road less icy).

When evaluating causal argumentation the following critical questions can be asked:

1. Does the established cause, in fact, lead to the mentioned result?

2. Are there any other factors that must be present together with the proposed cause to create the mentioned result?

3. Could the proposed result be caused by something else as well? (Garssen 1997: 20, our transl.)

The first critical question is relevant to all types of causal argumentation, the second question only to causal argumentation that mentions the cause in the argument, and the third question only to causal argumentation that mentions the result of the argument (the reverse variant).

On the basis of the characterisations of causal argumentation and the accompanying critical questions, we are able to draw the following general dialectical core profile (in which the possible follow-up of these critical questions is, again, is specified any further). 'XZ/Y' means in this profile 'Z is true of X' or 'Y is true of X'; 'X', 'Y', 'Z', 'U' and 'T' represent objects, properties, actions, events or conditions; ' = > ' means 'leads to', '?/' at the beginning of a phrase means 'I doubt if' and '?' at the end of a phrase refers to the interrogative mode (see Figure 6.3).

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst name the following subtypes of causal argumentation:

> Argumentation subtypes based on a relation of causality include those pointing to the consequences of a course of action, presenting something as a means to a certain end, and emphasising the nobility of a goal in order to justify the means (1992: 97).



FIGURE 6.3 Dialectical core profile for causal argumentation

The subtype mentioned first is sometimes called *pragmatic argumentation*. Garssen supplies the following description of this type of argumentation:

> The standpoint recommends a particular method (plan, policy) [...] and this recommendation is supported in the argumentation by pointing to the results of the course of action. A reasonable case for the standpoint that the course of action involved is recommendable is made by showing that the course of action automatically leads to a favourable or desirable situation. Pragmatic argumentation can also be used to condemn a course of action by pointing to the unfavourable or undesirable consequences of that course of action in the argumentation (1997: 21, our transl.).

Pragmatic argumentation is special because the result the speaker presupposes in the argumentation is always rated either positive or negative. For this reason, according to Garssen, the critical question must be specified as follows:

– Is that which is presented in the argumentation as the result, in fact, desirable or undesirable? (preliminary question)
– Does that which is introduced as cause indeed lead to the mentioned (un)desirable result?
– Are there any other factors that must be present, together with the proposed cause, to create the mentioned (un)desirable result?
– Does the mentioned cause have (un)desirable side effects?
– Could the mentioned result be achieved or prevented by other means as well? (1997: 22, our transl.)

The extra critical questions have to do with the fact that pragmatic argumentation is most often used in a context in which a decision has to be made about the course of action that is going to be followed. In such a context, it is important to look for possible (un)desirable side-effects and other ways to achieve the desirable result or to prevent the undesirable result.

6.4.2 Clues in the presentation of causal argumentation

Expressions used to indicate a causal relationship

A number of expressions exist that can explicitly indicate a causal (or means-end) relationship between an argument and a standpoint. These involve expressions that include terms like ‘result’, ‘cause’, ‘target’, ‘means’, and derivations of these terms (‘to cause’), or synonyms of these terms and their derivations (‘effect’, ‘consequence’, ‘purpose’, ‘to lead to’, ‘to bring about’, ‘as a result of’). Expressions such as ‘through’, ‘thereby’ and ‘in this way’ are also indicative of a causal relationship. Below a number of these expressions are listed (X indicates a cause or means, Y a result or target).

X is the cause of Y
X causes Y
X results in Y

X is the means to/the way to (achieve, accomplish, realise, etc.) Y
X leads to Y
X brings about Y
X, thus/this way (you achieve, create, etc.) Y
X, consequently Y
X, as a result Y
X, in this way Y
X, thereby Y
X, for this reason Y
Y is the result of X
Y is the consequence of X
Y is caused by X
Y, as a result of X
Y, through X

In (62)–(66) some explicit indications for the causal relationship are used:

(62) The soul has been disposed of by science and replaced by the concept of 'conscience', which, in medical terms, means no more than a number of very complicated coagulations of neurons. That is a desecration. What it *leads to* is that the human body is more and more regarded as a thing [...].
(*de Volkskrant*, 7 March 1998)

(63) 'The tendency to put more disposable bottles on the market is worrisome', says VMK manager S. Stigter. 'It reduces the recycling of plastics and *causes* street litter, which is an eyesore to everybody'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 20 March 2000)

(64) *As a result of* the spiritual agony that resounds in every Sondheim number he can really hit you hard in spite of the witty and virtuoso ideas.
(*de Volkskrant* on the Internet 1999)

(65) 'With the ticket we introduce four new trading cards. You get one with each ticket. *In this way* we hope to create an extra incentive for children, *so* they may go to the cinema once more'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 17 April 2000)

(66) The only bright spot of the cabinet's decision is that, for the time being, there won't be any drilling for gas. *Consequently*, the peace and quiet under the Dutch Wadden Sea is guaranteed.
(*de Volkskrant*, 8 December 1999)

(62) is an example of pragmatic argumentation. To support his standpoint that it is a desecration that science has replaced the notion of the 'soul' by the notion of 'consciousness', the author points to the undesirable consequences of this redefinition of the notion of the 'soul'. In (63), too, we have pragmatic argumentation. The tendency to put more disposable bottles on the market is worrisome according to

the author, because this trend leads to a reduction of the recycling of plastics and to more litter.

In (64), the standpoint that Sondheim's work can hit you hard is justified by the argument that spiritual agony resounds in all his numbers. In (65), the (implicit) standpoint is defended by means of pragmatic argumentation that it is a good idea to issue trading cards when purchasing cinema tickets, because this might us do achieve the object that children will go to the cinema more often. In (66), the fact that there will not be any drilling for gas is regarded as a positive aspect of the cabinet's decision, because this leads to peace and quiet under the Dutch Wadden Sea, which is a desirable result.

Besides explicit indications for the causal relationship, there are also expressions that refer in a less unequivocal way to a causal connection but still share enough aspects of meaning with the previously mentioned expressions to constitute a strong indication for a causal connection. These are, in the first place, expressions in which the word 'occasion' occurs ('to be the occasion of', 'to give occasion for'). According to the *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary* (1988) one of the meanings of 'occasion' is 'an event or situation that provides a reason or opportunity for something to happen or be done'. 'Occasion' can also be used as a synonym of 'cause'. If something 'contributes to' an event or situation, it is, according to *Collins*, 'one of the causes of it'. In expressions like 'X entails Y' the verb 'to entail' can mean that a second thing 'follows necessarily and inevitably from the first' (*Collins*). 'To end with/in' can be used to indicate the end of an action or condition ('The story ended with his death'), but the verb 'to end' can also express a causal connection. This becomes clearest when it is used with 'in'. If, according to *Collins*, a situation or event 'ends in a particular way, it has that particular result', so 'to end in' has also the meanings of 'to lead to' or 'to result in'. 'To mean' can be used as a synonym of 'to entail' and 'to involve' (*The Oxford English Dictionary* 1989) and it means in that case 'to result in' ('The shutdown means the dismissal of forty people'). 'To get' can be used in expressions like 'from X you get Y'. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), 'to get' can mean, for instance, to 'experience, suffer, or be afflicted with something'. Because 'to get' is then associated with external circumstances that cause a change in a (mental or physical) condition, the expression can then be used to indicate a causal relationship. Finally, 'to follow' expresses a temporal connection. If, according to *Collins*, 'an event, activity, or period of time follows a particular thing, it happens or comes after this thing'. This aspect of succession is an important characteristic of cause–result relationships (and not characteristic of symptomatic or comparison relationships). *Collins* also mentions that if 'something follows' it can be used in the sense that 'it happens as a result of something else'.

X is the occasion of/gives occasion for Y
X contributes to Y
X entails (that) Y
X ends in/with Y
X means (that) Y
from X you get Y
Y follows X

Some of these expressions occur in the following fragments:

(67) The number of people with false teeth will fall from 2.3 million to 800,000 until 2030. This *entails that* people will go to the dentist for a longer period of time, and that the complexity and duration of the average dental treatment will increase.

(*de Volkskrant*, 1 May 1999)

(68) Cardinal Simonis, the archbishop of Utrecht, spoke about the necessity to cancel the debts of the poorest countries. […] According to the Cardinal, the cancellation of debts *contributes to* the prosperity of the whole world.

(*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 8 January 1999)

(69) In traditional thinking hitting using the wrist is taboo. You *get* injuries *from* that.

(*de Volkskrant*, 14 April 2000)

(70) From now on, the first 26 weeks of unemployment benefit will be at the expense of the industry. Until now this only applied to the first thirteen weeks. This *means that* the industry sectors themselves will have to bear a greater part of the costs of dismissed employees.

(*de Volkskrant*, 21 April 1997)

(71) Rev. H. Visser rejects freedom outside Christ. 'All freedom outside Christ *ends in* doom-mongering, fear, insecurity'.

(*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 14 June 2000)

(72) Washington's U-turn was announced on Wednesday night by the American Foreign Secretary, Madeleine Albright. She invited the Iranian government to 'map out a path' that would close the gap between the two countries. The American gesture *follows* the moderate politics of the Iranian president Khatami. 'We appreciate his remarks of a few months ago', said Clinton yesterday, referring to Khatami's public condemnation of terrorism. 'We are investigating what the future may involve'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 19 June 1998)

In (67), the prediction that in future people will go to the dentist for a longer period of time, and that the complexity and duration of dental treatment will increase, is justified by presenting this development as the result of the cause stated in the argument that the number of people with false teeth is falling. In (68), Cardinal Simonis brings forward pragmatic argumentation to defend his standpoint that the debt of the poorest countries should be cancelled: this measure would have the desirable result that prosperity would increase in the whole world. (69) represents the pragmatic argument 'traditional thinkers' have for their standpoint that hitting using the wrist is taboo: this technique is said to lead to injuries. In (70), the writer defends the standpoint that in future companies will have to pay more of the costs of dismissed employees by mentioning in the argument the change in policy that is

to blame for this: from now on, the first 26 weeks of unemployment benefit will be at the expense of the industry. In (71), Rev. Visser uses pragmatic argumentation to defend his standpoint that freedom must not be sought outside Christ: that ends in doom-mongering, fear and insecurity. In (72), the (implicit) standpoint of the American government that there is a reason to make a gesture to Iran is justified by mentioning the cause for this change in attitude: the Iranian president Khatami takes a moderate line and condemns terrorism.

Expressions that can indicate subtypes of the causal relationship

There are some expressions that are indicative of causal argumentation, often in combination with other indicators. Such expressions emphasise specific aspects of the causal relationship in general or of particular subtypes of causal argumentation.

(a) Verbs that indicate a process that produces a particular effect or result

If verbs are used in the argument that indicate a process (or event or action) that results in a particular effect, this can be indicative of a causal relationship. It involves verbs that are synonymous with the construction 'to cause' (verb of causality) + noun (description of the result in question). A few examples are:

to arouse: to cause or bring into being feelings, inclinations, ideas
to destroy: to cause the disappearance, to cause the end of something
to disrupt: to cause difficulties that prevent something from proceeding easily
to breed: to cause something to develop
to increase: to cause something to become bigger

Because in the case of these verbs the end result is emphasised, they can be used to indicate the consequence of something. For this reason, these verbs are primarily indicative of pragmatic argumentation. They occur in argument (1) in the scheme of pragmatic argumentation, in which a causal relationship is made:

X is (un)desirable
for: (1) X leads to Y
and (2) Y is (un)desirable

Expressions like 'to destroy' and 'to disrupt' not only describe the process that leads to a particular result, but also classify the process as negative. The undesirability of the result (argument 2) is therefore indicated at the same time. 'To increase', 'to arouse' and 'to breed' are more neutral in this sense.

The following expressions can be indicative of pragmatic argumentation:

X increases Y
X destroys Y
X disrupts Y
X arouses irritation (agitation, interest, etc.) in Y
X breeds Y

In (73)–(76) these expressions are used as indications:

(73) But a pharmacist employed by a pharmacist remains an exception. Dynaretail, the umbrella organisation of which 900 chemists are a member, wants to change that situation. Our threshold is low, is their reasoning, and a low threshold *increases* the turnover.
(*de Volkskrant*, 27 October 1999)

(74) Schiphol did not tell the companies until recently that they would not be allowed to fly certain aeroplanes between eleven in the evening and six in the morning. 'It is extravagant that you don't hear until the 4th of July that you won't be allowed to fly on the 5th of August. That *disrupts* all foreign airports', said Martinair's senior official M. Schröder.
(*de Volkskrant*, 9 August 1997)

(75) [about the homeless] 'It makes no sense to stress the misery factor', says Jezek. 'That only *arouses irritation* in people'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 15 October 1998)

(76) 'Dirty Arabs', she was told by another, obviously anonymous caller. The television maker had dared to give attention to the fate of the Arab population, before and after the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948. This way she *breeds* understanding for terrorism, is the reproach of some critics.
(*de Volkskrant*, 4 April 1998)

(b) References to an event

In causal relationships we always observe a 'dynamic situation': something is happening or something is taking place as a result of something else. If a dynamic situation is continuous in nature, we speak of a process. If the situation is short-lived, we speak of an event (Lyons 1977: 483). Just like verbs that indicate a particular type of process, expressions that make clear that something occurs at one particular moment in time can be indicative of a causal relationship. These expressions include adverbs (or adjectives) like 'abrupt(ly)', 'sudden(ly)', 'immediate(ly)', and expressions like 'at one go/stroke' and 'it came as a shock'. Because such expressions do not emphasise a long run-up to the event in question, but rather an abrupt transition from one situation to the other, they can indicate the sudden result of an event.

– at one go/stroke
– it must have come as a shock when
– suddenly
– abruptly
– immediately

The examples (77)–(79) contain such expressions, sometimes in combination with other indicators of causal relationships:

(77) It *must have come as an enormous shock* to Hugo Robert Joan, Earl of Zuylen, when at the beginning of the seventies the then government had the 'misbegotten idea' to introduce car-free Sundays. For van Zuylen, former race car driver and exceptionally car-mad, two of his great loves were liable to suffer *at one stroke*: fast cars and his amusement park Duinrell.

(78) Until the beginning of this week publisher J.M. Meulenhoff was one of the leading literary publishers in The Netherlands. The departure of editor Hermans, with the most important Dutch authors following in her wake, *abruptly* brings this prominent position to an end.

(*de Volkskrant*, 7 September 2001)

(79) In two months time almost seven hundred thousand new subscribers made use of this offer and the 7.5 million existing customers switched over to the new price system *en masse*. The *immediate* result was predictable: a blockage occurred that lasted for days.

(*de Volkskrant*, 1 February 1997)

In addition to the indication that an event occurs abruptly, these fragments sometimes include other indicators of the causal relationship as well, such as 'brings to an end' in (78) and 'result' in (79).

(c) References to a future event

Because causal argumentation often relates to future events, expressions that refer to such events may be a clue that the argumentation is based on a causal relationship. For instance, causal arguments are often used to justify predictions. And – unless they concern the approval or rejection of a procedure followed in the past – pragmatic arguments also pass judgement on a measure yet to be carried out by pointing to results that will occur after the measure is introduced. Below are a few examples of how to indicate future events in the argumentation:

– The use of the future tense (will or shall): will produce, will happen, will become, etc.
– The use of the present progressive or verb constructions like 'to be going to' to indicate the future ('he is leaving for London', 'when we retire we are going to live in France')
– 'can be predicted'
– 'the expectation is that'

Examples of the use of these expressions are:

(80) They hope they will catch a live specimen soon. The *expectation is* that this catch *will* again *produce* a new animal species.

(*de Volkskrant*, 19 August 1997)

(81) Asked about the *future* of the Internet: 'I think the band width will increase rapidly, which will lead to more video on demand. Unfortunately, people *will become* even more individualistic and join in less activities with other people'.
(*de Volkskrant* on the Internet 2000)

(82) [On the occasion of the electoral meeting organised by Senioren 2000 in Fuengirola on the Costa de Sol for Dutchmen staying in Spain]. 'Nothing *will come* of it', *predicts* Auke van de Sluis. 'They have chosen the wrong spot altogether. Dutch people never go here, except for the members of two bridge clubs. If they'd notified me, I would have known of two or three places where they do come'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 18 April 1998)

(80) represents the argument for the standpoint that expresses the hope that a live specimen will be caught, because this will have the desirable result that a new animal species will be discovered. In (81), a causal connection is made between the argument that the band width will increase, leading to more 'video on demand', and the standpoint that in future people will become even more individualistic and will join in less activities with other people. In (82), Auke van de Sluis predicts that nothing will come of the electoral meeting organised by Senioren 2000 in Fuengirola, as a result of the fact that the spot selected for the meeting is hardly visited by Dutch people.

(d) References to the inevitability of the occurrence of the result after the cause

To transfer the acceptability of the argument to the standpoint in causal argumentation, the one who adduces the argument presents the cause in the argument (or standpoint) as something that inevitably leads to the event that is mentioned in the standpoint (or argument). Expressions that indicate the inevitability of a particular event or development may therefore also be indicative of a causal relationship. Such expressions are the following:

is a guarantee of
guarantees/ensures/assures
irrevocably
inevitable
necessarily

Some of these expressions are used in (83)–(85):

(83) Local administrators start to tremble when they hear that Zhu Rongji is on his way. China's new Prime Minister does not shrink from sacking incompetent civil servants on the spot. […] In Chinese politics, which rests on prudence and soundness of doctrine, an approach so blatantly lacking in subtlety seems to *ensure* a rapid downfall.
(*de Volkskrant*, 18 March 1998)

(84) And what does Bakker play? 'She only has the Dutch Mickey Mouse competition. Young girls such as Bakker and Derkx need to get an international job as soon as possible. Otherwise they *irrevocably* fail'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 9 February 1998)

(85) The German French relations are in need of a 'revival', 'more consultation, more unity'. Pious hopes, which go hand in hand with a feeling that things are not shaping up favourably, but yet inescapable, for France. The move of the German government to Berlin, for example. The result of this will *necessarily* be that more Polish *golonka* and less *foie gras* will be served at the German cabinet table.
(*de Volkskrant*, 23 September 1998)

These examples often include a combination of indications as well. Like 'to guarantee' and 'to ensure', the verb 'to assure' can express a causal relationship in itself. According to *Collins* 'if something guarantees something else, it is certain to cause that thing to happen or result'. 'Otherwise' in (84) is an indicator of pragmatic argumentation. (85) contains an explicit indication for the causal relationship: 'the result will be'.

(e) Specific indicators of the pragmatic argumentation subtype

We have seen that many of the expressions we discussed so far can be indicative of pragmatic argumentation. They always involve expressions that either indicate the results of a particular measure or action, or that express the (un)desirability of the course of action mentioned in the standpoint. Explicit expressions include such expressions as 'to lead to' and 'to cause', which can be used to introduce the result of something, and expressions like 'to entail' and 'to end in'. Verbs that indicate a process that leads to a specific result can be indicative of pragmatic argumentation as well. Some of these verbs express the undesirability of the result by classifying it as negative ('to destroy'). Finally, references to the inevitability of the result can constitute an indication as well, just as references to future events in the argument that points to the result of the approved or rejected course of action.

Besides the indicators of pragmatic argumentation we mentioned before, there are some other expressions that often go together with pragmatic argumentation. In the first place, they concern expressions included in the standpoint that pass a positive or negative judgement on a particular course of action. An example is the word 'better'. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989) it means, among other things, 'more desirable, satisfactory or effective' if used as an adjective or predicative ('X is better'), and as an adverb it can be used to indicate that it is preferable to do something or to do it in a specific way ('It would be better to do X'). Other expressions that can be used to express a positive judgement are 'is desirable', 'is positive' and 'is a good development'. Expressions that express a negative judgement on a particular course of action are for instance, 'is shocking', 'is incorrect' and 'is worrisome'. We have seen some of these expressions before in examples of pragmatic argumentation. A positive or negative judgement on its own is insufficient proof of pragmatic argumentation. After all, such a judgement can be vindicated with

symptomatic argumentation or argumentation by comparison as well. But if, apart from a positive or negative judgement in the standpoint, the arguments also contain indications that point to the approved or rejected course of action, we have reason to assume that the argumentation is pragmatic in nature.

A clue that the argument states results of the assessed course of action are the words 'then' and 'otherwise'. 'Then' (or 'in that case') can be used to indicate both positive and negative consequences:

It is desirable to do X, for *then* Y will happen [Y is positive]
It is desirable to do X, for *then* Y will not happen [not-Y is positive]
It is undesirable to do X, for *then* Y will happen [Y is negative]
It is undesirable to do X, for *then* Y will not happen [not-Y is negative]

According to *Collins*, 'otherwise' can have the following meaning, 'to say what the result or consequence would be if the previously mentioned situation, fact, idea, etc. was untrue or was not the case'. Unlike 'then', 'otherwise' can only be used to point to negative results if the measure or action mentioned in the standpoint is not carried out. Therefore, 'otherwise' is less suited to support a negative judgement on a particular course of action.[78]

It is desirable to do X, for *otherwise* Y will happen [Y is negative]
It is desirable to do X, for *otherwise* Y will not happen [not-Y is negative]
*It is undesirable to do X, for *otherwise* Y will happen [Y is negative]
*It is undesirable to do X, for *otherwise* Y will not happen [not-Y is negative]

'Otherwise' is used to point to the negative consequences of not carrying out a particular measure, or to positive consequences that are not following. 'Then' is used to point to the positive or negative consequences of a particular measure, and these consequences may be that something positive or negative is going to happen or that a positive result does not follow or that a negative result is prevented.

In order to indicate that a particular measure prevents a negative result, specific verbs like 'to prevent', 'to avoid', 'to counteract', 'to put right', 'to avert',

[78] Sometimes 'otherwise' is used to support a negative judgement, though: 'We can't sit here much longer, otherwise we'll be too late'. This is only possible if the standpoint includes a polemic negation, not if the negation is descriptive. In a polemic negation, the proposition that is expressed in an opposite assertive is denied, while in the case of descriptive negation the assertive that includes the denial is not opposite to a positive assertive that is uttered by the speaker or is presupposed or expected in the context (Horn 1989: 370–392, see also Houtlosser 1995: 213). In the example, 'otherwise' indicates the assertive that is presupposed or expected in the context ('We can sit here much longer'). It means in that case, 'If we do sit here much longer'. If the negation 'undesirable' would have been used ('It is undesirable that we sit here much longer'), the assertion could not be followed by 'otherwise we'll be too late'. In that case 'otherwise' would not be able to point to the positive assertion 'We can sit here much longer'. The fact that 'undesirable' indicates a descriptive negation is proven by the fact that it cannot be used very well to deny an assertion that has been made by another speaker, unless 'un' is heavily stressed. Compare: A: 'It is desirable that we leave on time'. B: 'It is undesirable that we leave on time'.

'to discourage' may be used (in combination with expressions such as 'this/that way', 'thus', and 'like this'). These expressions are all about preventing or ending a particular action, event or situation. Because of this common aspect of meaning all these verbs are suited to indicate that a particular negative result will not occur if one follows a recommended course of action.

There are also expressions that indicate that a particular result is not prevented but rather encouraged. Such expressions are, among others, 'to promote' (to benefit or encourage the working or development of something), 'to stimulate' (to promote the effectiveness of something) and 'to bring closer/nearer' (this expression is not listed as a separate entry in *Collins Cobuild* (1988) or *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989) but can mean that something nears a pursued target or ideal (through something else).

In the case of 'to bring closer/nearer' the result is positive, in the case of 'to promote' and 'to stimulate' the result can be negative as well, but this seems to occur less. Below we list the different expressions:

In the standpoint

– better X
– X is [negative or positive judgement] incorrect, worrisome, shocking, desirable, positive, remarkable, a good development, etc.

In the argument

– X, then Y
– X, otherwise Y
– X, this way (/thus/like this) you prevent, avoid, counteract, put right, avert, discourage Y
– X, that promotes, stimulates, brings Y closer/nearer

Examples of the use of these expressions to indicate pragmatic argumentation are:

(86) G. Zalm, Minister of Finance: 'It would be *better* if I was run over by a tram now, for *then* I'd go down in history with a good reputation'.
(*de Volkskrant* on CD-ROM 1998)

(87) His seventeen year old son always carries a revolver on the hip. '*Then* people speak to you in a different way', his father reasons.
(*de Volkskrant*, 25 January 1997)

(88) I have decided to surf the web only with a clear goal, *otherwise* you end up with chaos.
(*de Volkskrant*, 12 March 1999)

(89) Two years ago she said in an interview, 'I'm not fit for career planning. That might be *better* too. *That way you avoid* unnecessary dents in your ego'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 7 October 1999)

(90) If the unemployment benefit is abused, that must be dealt with. It is *incorrect* to take measures that affect employees. *The result of this* would be that people who have worked all their lives, who have always paid premiums and who are made redundant at 55 through no fault of their own, would be forced to liquidate their house and property.
(*de Volkskrant*, 31 January 1998)

(91) However, people who do not yet have a job still require a lot of attention. Their absorption in employment *is desirable* as well [...]. A greater freedom of choice *increases* the possibilities of economic independence and enables people to take care of their family.
(*de Volkskrant* on the Internet 2000)

(92) Stock exchange traders respond *positively* to the initiative. [...] 'A *remarkable* move', says D. de Jong of HSBC Investment Bank. 'In the long run this merger will *lead to* lower costs'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 16 March 2000)

(93) Dronkers stresses that 'the government has to see to it that schools do not go down, no more than fancy schools should be allowed to exploit their advantages to the bone. *Then you'd get* American differences, where one diploma isn't worth anything and the other everything'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 26 November 1999)

(94) Verhoeven is proud he got the Mannekens back in the field. 'Last week I made an emotional appeal to them. This time I made a rational speech. I asked them, what's your added advantage? I said: if you don't play, you will be held liable and *then* you'd be worse off'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 24 February 1997)

6.4.3 Clues in criticism of causal argumentation

Whether or not the argument a speaker or writer responds to is causal (or in any case taken as such) can also be apparent from the way in which he puts his criticism into words. Certain expressions can be used to refer to the different critical questions that belong to causal argumentation. The first critical question for argumentation based on a causal relationship is:

Does the proposed cause indeed lead to the mentioned result?

The same question occurs in pragmatic argumentation, but in that case it is more specific because of the presence of an (un)desirable result:

Does the proposed cause indeed lead to the mentioned (un)desirable result?

There are expressions that can be a clue that the speaker or writer thinks this question must be answered in the negative. Some of these expressions can be used to criticise all types of causal argumentation (that goes for the first two expressions in the list below). The other expressions are only suitable to criticise pragmatic argumentation.

The reason for this is that they either point to positive or negative results ('the fear that Y will occur [after X] is unfounded'), or to an intended result (purpose) that must be achieved with a particular measure ('X has an adverse effect'). The expression 'that's just banging your head against a brick wall' can be an indication that the effectiveness of a measure is questioned. This expression means, according to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), 'doggedly attempting the impossible and suffering in the process'. The meaning of the expression 'inadequate' is, according to the same dictionary, 'lacking the quality or quantity required; insufficient for a purpose'. Because it can be used to indicate that a particular measure does not lead to the intended purpose, this expression can also constitute an indication that the effectiveness of a particular measure is questioned. The following expressions can also indicate that (perhaps) the cause does not lead to the result:

– X does not lead to Y
– It remains/is the question whether X leads to Y
– There is no proof/evidence for the [deterring/disrupting] effect of X
– X is not a solution/X does not (re)solve Y
– Is X indeed effective?
– X has the opposite effect
– X has an adverse effect
– X has a counterproductive effect
– On the contrary, X puts Y in danger/increases Y, etc.
– X is counterproductive
– X will rather have a positive/negative effect
– The fear that Y will occur [after X] is unfounded
– Y does not need to happen/occur at all
– X makes little sense
– X is inadequate
– X is banging/beating your head against a brick wall
– X does not help

Expressions like these are used in (95)–(103):

(95) Work stress *does not lead to* people reporting ill. The argument that a lot of stress *leads to* a high level of absence through sickness *does not tally with the facts*. Work stress chiefly occurs among highly trained employees with varied and responsible work. Even though these professionals are overburdened and tired, they seldom report sick.
(*de Volkskrant*, 16 November 1999)

(96) 'Putting more people in prison is *not a solution*', according to McCaffrey. 'People who want to fight drugs should sit with their children at the kitchen table and talk to them'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 14 July 1998)

(97) It is the duty of Amsterdam politicians to help think about measures that could stop the increased aggression. But the proposal for a generic ban on

knives is a panic reaction, an *inadequate* answer to the public call for more security and protection against violence. [...] A general ban on knives *will* [...] *not help* to turn around aggression. Anyone who wants to do wrong or strikes in a sudden fit of madness can always find a murder weapon. In complete powerlessness we will have to recognise that criminals and the mentally disturbed cannot be stopped by a ban on potentially life threatening articles.

(*de Volkskrant*, 7 July 1998)

(98) The FNV adapts the wage claims to this juncture. The trade union federation proposes to demand options, shares and participation in the business capital when negotiating the collective labour agreement, if the members have a need for it. [...] The FNV's strategist, Inja, even calls the plan 'a revolutionary change'. That qualification is as exaggerated as the criticism that targeted the FNV. […] One of the points of criticism is the *disruptive effect* that options are supposed to have on the wage movements. The instrument is said to distort the wage structure because only employees of companies that are listed would be able to benefit. The FNV would put the solidarity of the employees to the test. This argument passes over the fact that the wage structure is long gone; what we see is rather a wage city with a large variety of districts. The market sector leads the way in with thirteent h, fourteenth and even sixteenth month salaries, bonuses and allowances, profit sharing and non-contributory pensions. It is not to be expected that the addition of options would have a disruptive effect on this motley collection. *There is rather a positive result to be expected*, namely a certain moderating effect on the wage claims in the market sector.

(*de Volkskrant*, 3 August 2000)

(99) Abroad […] suspicion prevails with regard to the right-wing populist Haider, who in the past was guilty of Nazi sympathies and xenophobia. A reason for government leaders of the European Union to threaten to place Austria in quarantine if Haider's party would become part of the government. […] The lesson Austria taught us is that *it makes little sense* to isolate politicians like Haider. On the contrary, it increases their attractiveness to the voters in the margin of society.

(*de Volkskrant*, 4 February 2000)

(100) Wilke has different fears: policy competition between countries. 'The pressure to harmonise taxes to the lowest level will increase in an internal market that is guided by a monetary union. An offensive government policy, no matter if it involves social infrastructure or environmental policies, will hardly remain possible'. A lot can be said against this too, until little remains. The main counterargument is, of course, that policy competition *will not increase but decrease because of the monetary union*. At the moment, European countries still try to enrich themselves by devaluating, but the EMU is going to end this once and for all. Secondly, the *fear that government spending will fall is unfounded*. Suppose that the

Dutch government spends more money on health care than the Belgian government, which means that the Dutch (working) population would be healthier than the Belgian population, then the policy competition does not need to be, as Wilke thinks, working out to the advantage of Belgium. Against the lower taxes in Belgium would be the healthier, more productive Dutch workers. Constructive government spending contributes to the power of companies to compete.

(*de Volkskrant*, 1 March 1997)

(101) Today the Minister consults with her colleagues in the cabinet about this. There is nothing for it but to reduce night-flying with a number of measures that are very similar to the prohibitions Schiphol wants to set up. […] But with a limited ban on flying at night the Minister will not be able to get the problems under control. For as long as new companies are allowed to come in all the time, *you might as well bang your head against a brick wall*, according to the Schiphol management. Exceeding noise level will then continue to remain a threat.

(*de Volkskrant*, 19 August 1997)

(102) Arslan wants to make working in black schools more attractive by means of a 'difficulty bonus'. Teachers would receive 500 guilders extra a month if they indeed have special skills. […] According to VVD educationalist C. Cornielje, such financial incentives have *the opposite effect*. 'Extra compensations stigmatise schools, and a side-effect would be that teachers think: that's not the place I want to be'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 27 March 1999)

(103) As part of a tougher approach to crime, virtually all American states have passed a bill that allows minors to be tried by a normal court. The idea is that this works as a deterrent. But, according to human rights organisations, it has an *adverse effect*. They argue that normal prisons will turn these minors in even worse criminals.

(*de Volkskrant*, 15 January 2000)

These examples show that the criticism that the means does not achieve the purpose is sometimes enforced by pointing out that the means has a counterproductive effect. In other cases it is also combined with the supplication of an alternative way to achieve the purpose.

The second critical question that can be asked in argumentation based on a causal relationship is:

Could the proposed result be caused by something else as well?

Expressions that may suggest this type of criticism are:

– Y has nothing to do with X (but everything with R)
– Y is rather the result of R
– It is more likely that Y is caused by R
– It is too easy to shift the problem/all problems to X

In the case of pragmatic argumentation the counterpart of this second critical question is:

Could the mentioned result be achieved or counteracted by other means as well?

The following expressions are a clue that pragmatic argumentation is criticised in this way:

– Y (takes) also (place) without X
– Y will also work with R
– R is a better way/method to reach Y
– R is a better alternative
– X comes (too) late in the day [for Y has already been realised in another way]
– To limit yourself to X/to focus on X is too simplistic
– The problem [i.e. to reach result Y] will (re)solve itself.

'That comes (too) late in the day' means, according to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), 'at a late stage in proceeding, especially too late to be useful'. If this expression is used in the context of a means-to-end-relationship, it often means that the purpose has been achieved already. For this reason, it is too late to apply the suggested means. This proves at the same time that the suggested purpose can be achieved in another way. That is why this expression has been included in the list. In (104)–(108) such expressions occur:

(104) Less than half of the students of the Eramus University Rotterdam and the Technical University Delft manage to graduate within seven years. The two universities are the worst performing scientific institutions in The Netherlands. […] The chairman of the VSNU, Prof. R. Meijerink, thinks the success rate is unsatisfactory. 'It takes too long before the student gets his or her degree. Certainly now that the performance-related grant is coming, this will have to change. That's not only the concern of the students, but also a responsibility of the universities. […]' Van de Molen is of the opinion that there is nothing wrong with the quality of education. 'It *is more likely* that the students aren't up to it. Some students simply aim too high'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 15 August 1996)

(105) A number of Rotterdam discotheques discriminate on the basis of ethnicity. This is the conclusion of GroenLinks after a random check that was carried out last week by two members of the party together with representatives of two organisations and a reporter. […] Nighttown, which boasts about its multicultural activities and mixed clientele, denies with great force that GroenLinks councillor Bourzik was not allowed to go in because of his Moroccan appearance. Spokesman J. Bosboom: 'We have a coloured hostess standing at the door. She considered it a bit strange that an older man in suit and tie popped up at half past three at night and wished to attend something that was quite clearly a youth event. The refusal *had* absolutely *nothing to do* with skin colour. […] You just can't have a trendy dance club with people who dress like ten years ago'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 14 February 2000)

(106) I was almost 16 when I arrived in The Netherlands. In Morocco we would simply speak Moroccan at home. It wasn't until I went to school that I came across classical Arabic and French. That was no problem at all. In The Netherlands all *problems* are now *blamed on* language deficiency. *That is too easy*.

(*de Volkskrant* on the Internet)

(107) After a year the project bureau has spent 4.6 million guilders on a debate that never captured the attention, because the most important question, how the knowledge machinery should be financed was hardly touched upon. At the Ministry they obviously think differently. It costs a fair amount, is the tune there, but one should regard the debate as a kind of promotion campaign for the product Knowledge, just as the dairy factories jointly promote 'Milk, the white motor'. But the 'Knowledge for tomorrow' campaign *comes too late in the day* anyway, because now that the elections are coming education is already on top of the list of promises. That *has nothing to do with* the beautiful discussions of the Knowledge debate, *but everything with* the economic upturn.

(*de Volkskrant*, 17 March 1997)

(108) 'You know, it is *too simplistic* to focus so much on Milosevic', is the opinion of Ahtisaari. This is about the refusal of the West to financially support the reconstruction of Yugoslavia as long as Milosevic is in power. 'You should first create a democracy in those parts. A democracy is fostered by stimulating the free media. See to it that the freedom of speech returns, then democracy will return. When democracy returns, Milosevic will leave. And *then the problem will have solved itself*'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 25 June 1999)

Besides the two critical questions we discussed for causal argumentation, there is a third question:

Are there any other factors that have to be present, together with the proposed cause, in order to create the mentioned result?

In the case of pragmatic argumentation this involves a desirable or undesirable result. The following expressions, which have in common that they indicate that a particular cause (or means) does not suffice on its own to create the result, or that state that more is required than the mentioned cause to reach the result, can constitute a clue that this type of criticism is given:

X alone is not the solution/X alone will not solve the problem
X alone is not effective
X will not do/will not suffice
X alone is not enough/is not feasible
X alone is insufficient
X alone won't lead to the result
X in itself does not guarantee Y
Y requires more (than X), (R should occur/change as well)

In (109)–(111) these expressions are used:

(109) 'We also look after the interests of benefits recipients. Linking the increase of social security benefit to the collective agreement wage increase *alone is not enough*. There is still a lot of silent poverty in The Netherlands. An *extra* increase of the benefits with at least 1 percent is a dire necessity'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 24 July 2000)

(110) Response of Mr. Hermans, Minister of Education, to the fact that the teacher trade unions demand more pay: 'Child care, extracurricular care, more assisting staff, more teachers; that's how you attract and keep teachers. *More* pay *alone won't be enough*. The business world would top that and pluck the people away. We can't match them in that field'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 3 May 2000)

(111) At least 1.8 million Dutchmen live in districts with a poor quality of life. In the sphere of criminality and feelings of insecurity, 40 percent of districts, inhabited by 3.9 million people, score badly. Neighbours and traffic also cause inconveniences that contribute to feelings of poor liveability. We need a second wave of urban renewal to tackle these problems. [...] The improvement of houses *alone is insufficient*. 'That *in itself is no guarantee for* liveability. Investments are needed in the whole living environment, for instance also in small-scale business activity'.
(*de Volkskrant*, 20 November 1995)

In evaluating pragmatic argumentation we can also raise the question whether the mentioned cause has (un)desirable side-effects. If the standpoint of the pragmatic argument to which a speaker responds says that doing X is desirable (because of the desirable result), then an opponent might point out that the measure has undesirable consequences as well. If the standpoint implies that doing X is undesirable (because of the undesirable consequences), a relevant criticism could be that, besides undesirable consequences, X may have positive effects that may be of greater importance than the potential adverse effects. The following expressions are a clue for this type of criticism:

– X has undesirable (unintended/bad) side-effects
– A positive (negative) side-effect of X is …
– X throws the baby out with the bathwater
– X does not only mean (does not only lead to) Y, but also (to) W
– Y, but the other side of the coin is W
– With X you jump out of the frying pan into the fire/you go from bad to worse

The use of these expressions is sometimes a clue because they explicitly refer to positive or negative side-effects, or because they indicate that another result will occur at the same time ('does not only mean … , but also …'), or that against one result there is another ('on the other hand'). In addition, there are fixed expressions that

can be used to point to undesirable side-effects. For example, according to *Collins*, if you say that 'to do a particular thing would be to jump out of the frying pan into the fire, you mean that to do it would not improve the situation, and might make things worse'. So, this expression can be used to point to the undesirable side-effects of a proposed measure that is intended to counteract particular undesirable consequences. The meaning of 'to throw the baby out with the bathwater' is, according to the *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), to 'discard something valuable along with other things that are undesirable'. Therefore, this expression can also be used to point to the negative consequences of a measure that is meant to solve a particular problem (the measure is too drastic in that case). According to *Collins*, 'the other side of the coin' is 'the opposite way of looking at the situation you have been discussing'. Expressions like these are used in the following texts:

(112) [Response to an argument that patents are useful to finance expensive biomedical research.] There are […] objections from the scientific quarter. After all, patents *not only mean* a possible source of income for researchers, *but also* a greater dependency on patent holding institutions and an increasing focus on research that is chiefly commercially attractive. *The question is if this is really desirable*.

(*de Volkskrant*, 2 August 2000)

(113) People who are less than 35 percent disabled must no longer be allowed to receive the disablement insurance benefit. VVD and CDA say this in a joint plan concerning the Disablement Insurance Act which was presented on Tuesday. […] Last autumn, VVD and CDA decided to jointly draw up a plan to reduce the number of recipients of the benefit. […] In a response, Hoogervorst yesterday warned against an *unintended side-effect* of the CDA/VVD plan. It could increase the pressure on medical examiners to declare people wholly disabled.

(*de Volkskrant*, 19 April 2000)

(114) The cabinet has decided to hold the local elections for both the province and the city council on the same day. […] The cabinet is guided by the expectation that the turnout will increase if the elections are combined. [...] Royal Commissioners van Voorst tot Voorst (Limburg) and van Kemenade (North-Holland) [...] think The Hague will completely overshadow the elections. A high turnout, but no regional campaign. In other words, *out of the frying pan into the fire*.

(*de Volkskrant*, 6 July 1999)

(115) State Secretary Netelenbos does not think the costs of smaller classes are outweighed by the benefits. According to Netelenbos, it would cost two hundred million guilders to reduce all classes by one pupil. Liemburg: 'Again and again, smaller classes come to grief in this House because of the price. But let's look at *the other side of the coin*: less people on reduced pay, less outflow to special education, and less repeaters'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 9 September 1996)

The last critical question in pragmatic argumentation refers to the desirability or undesirability of the result:

Is that which is presented as result in the argumentation indeed desirable or undesirable?

The fact that this question is raised may appear from the use of the following expressions, but only if they relate to the result of a particular measure and not to the measure itself:

– The question is whether Y is in fact desirable
– Does Y, in fact, lead to the solution/Is Y, in fact, the solution?

(116) For the time being everything would speak against elections. That is true, says OVSE man Vranitzky, the situation is far from ideal. The population has not been disarmed and the organisational problems are considerable. But it's better to have bad elections, he says, than no elections at all. Because, according to Vranitzky, as soon as the people have been to the polls, a new political stage will start. But *who says that* a new phase *will lead to a solution*?

(*de Volkskrant*, 16 June 1997)

(117) The national debate about the growth of aviation seems to have been decided before it even began. Headed by Prime Minister Kok, politicians, Schiphol Airport and KLM are making statements about a second national airport. An artificial island far off the coast is the favourite. The *question whether* the expansion of air traffic *is desirable* hardly comes up.

(*de Volkskrant*, 23 December 1996)

Finally, we quote a text in which several critical questions belonging to causal argumentation pass in review:

> For the researchers of the University of Utrecht, co-authors of the Burgers amendment, as for everybody else, the days have suddenly become turbulent. Last week the city of Utrecht caused a stir in the Dutch minorities' policy when they enthusiastically embraced the conclusions of their report and labelled them a new policy.
>
> As the first of the four larger cities, Utrecht would throw the traditional policy towards minorities overboard and replace it by a general attention to disadvantaged groups of people. Separate policies for Turks, Moroccans and trailer park residents is old-fashioned and can even be *counterproductive*, the city decides. 'The ethnical background of people is no longer a criterion for additional measures'. […]
>
> 'A separate policy for minorities has *bad* and *unintended side-effects*', Burgers thinks. 'It stigmatises the group and does not distinguish between the different minorities and the diversity among the immigrants themselves'. […] Minority professor H. Entzinger, for whom the advice of his Utrecht colleagues was anything but new, considered the time ripe for a warning. 'By a clean break with the minorities policy *the baby would be thrown out with the bathwater*', he said last week. Especially in the case of newcomers,

in health care and the job market, special attention to minorities remains necessary, according to him.

(*de Volkskrant*, 28 September 1996)

The city of Utrecht wants to stop the traditional minority's policy and replace it by general attention to disadvantaged groups of people. The city is of the opinion that a separate policy for the various minorities is counterproductive. Moreover, the traditional policy is considered to have bad and unintended side-effects. In response to the resolve to break with the current policy towards minorities, professor Entzinger warns for the adverse consequences of a clean break: 'the baby would be thrown out with the bathwater'. According to him, there are still minority groups that require special attention. If the current policy is completely abolished, such groups would fall by the wayside.

6.4.4 Clues in the follow-up of causal argumentation

The way the protagonist of a particular standpoint follows up his causal argument in response to or in anticipation of criticism may yield clues as well. We illustrate this on the basis of a few examples. In (120), president Habibie predicts that the chance that human rights are violated will increase. According to him, this is the result of poverty. In order to make a reasonable case for the idea that poverty will lead to violations of human rights, Habibie argues that, because of poverty, social unrest will increase, criminality will rise and – as a result – the sense of security will disappear. According to him, the chance that human rights are violated is greater in these circumstances.

(118) According to president Habibie, poverty *leads to* violations of human rights. 'If our economic problems can't be solved within a short period of time, their influence *will* be felt elsewhere. Social unrest *will* dominate. Criminality *will* rise. *In these circumstances the chance that* human rights are violated becomes greater', said Habibie at the opening of the meeting about human rights of the Asian Pacifist Forum.

(*de Volkskrant*, 10 September 1998)

In (119), Shelley contends that the advance of the Russian mafia gangs can only be stopped with the help of the West. A national approach of the problem is no alternative, according to Shelley, because the problem of the mafia gangs has become an international problem, due to the fact that a large part of the criminal capital has been exported to the West.

(119) As early as 1995, Shelley, professor in the American University in Washington, sketched a disturbing picture of the advance of the Russian mafia gangs. In the 'European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research' she contended that this advance could *only* be stopped *with* the support of the West. […] According to Shelley, it can no longer be regarded as a purely Russian matter. 'It has become an international problem, because so much of the criminal capital has been exported that the United States

and Europe must accept part of the responsibility. The U.S.A. and Europe have to give more attention to this flight of capital, which has been estimated to be a total of 150 billion dollar'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 31 July 1997)

In the letter quoted in (120), Helmut Kohl is advised to set aside one billion mark to dispel the coal-mine problem. According to the writer of the letter, this means does not have undesirable consequences for Germany ('For a still superrich country like Germany that should not be a problem'), it is effective ('the problem will be solved'), and it has as a positive side-effect that he would be rid of Scharping, the leader of the SPD ('you would kill two birds with one stone').

(120) 'Esteemed Chancellor, dear Helmut, I know you consider the euro more important than the troubles in your own country. But why does everything always have to be so damn intense over there? […] Last week those insane events in Gorleben and now those miners. […] As far as the coal-mines are concerned, we understand the problem. As former Minister of Finance and successor of den Uyl, my estimation is that you are out of the wood for about 1 billion a year at the most. For a still superrich country like Germany *that should not be a problem*. Give it to them and *the problem will be solved*. You *would kill two birds with one stone*, for you will also be rid of Scharping'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 13 March 1997)

When you say that a particular action will 'kill two birds with one stone', you mean, according to *Collins*, 'that this one action will have two beneficial effects'. Therefore, this expression is typical for a protagonist of a particular standpoint to indicate that not only the intended desirable result will be achieved with the measure propagated in the standpoint, but also a second desirable effect. Another expression in the follow-up of the protagonist's argument making clear that something else can be achieved without taking more trouble is 'With X you will achieve at the same time …'. The expression 'That's an added bonus' means, according to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), 'an extra and unexpected advantage'. The expressions the protagonist can use to point to the additional advantages of his measure are listed below:

– With X you kill two birds with one stone
– With X you will achieve W too/at the same time
– An added advantage of X is …
– W is an added bonus

(121) Argues in favour of paying employees of Internet companies in options. The advantage of this is that these companies can save money on personnel expenses while their employees still have the possibility to make a lot of money in the future. Subsequently, it is made plausible that this is a real possibility: 'If an Internet company gets going, a market introduction with fast rising prices is the rule rather than the exception'. In addition, there is a desirable side-effect ('added

advantage'): employees who hold options are encouraged to work harder, because their future wealth depends on the success of the company.

(121) Paying in options has [...] big advantages. Companies can save on personnel expenses, and at the same time hold out a carrot to their employees that they may become millionaires. Because if an Internet company gets going, a market introduction with fast rising prices is the rule rather than the exception. [...] An *added advantage*, says Myrick, is that employees with options are very eager, because their future wealth depends on the success of the company. 'As a rule, employees with options do not go home at five o'clock, and they don't mind working the night now and then'.
(*de Volkskrant* on the Internet 2000)

In (122), Stork wants to make 30 percent of the work force more flexible to get rid of the expenses incurred in periods without enough work. Moreover, these plans for more flexibility may have an (unintended) positive side-effect: they might mean that Stork gets rid of superfluous personnel.

(122) Personnel Manager Driessen at *Stork* does not beat around the bush. Sometimes the order flow is so quirky that one week the staff is twiddling their thumbs and the other they have to work late. 'That mismatch costs us tens of millions a year. Last year it involved 60 million'. *Stork* wants to get rid of that debit by making 30 percent of the work force flexible. […] Here and there *Stork* has too much staff. The plans for more flexibility have not been designed to slim down the company, but it would be *an added bonus* if that is a *side-effect*.
(*de Volkskrant*, 11 July 1997)

6.5 SOME COMPLICATIONS

A large number of indicators of the argument schemes that we discussed in this chapter were mentioned in previous publications on pragma-dialectics.[79] We have added a better justification for the fact that they may serve as an indication for specific types of arguments. We also made a distinction between expressions that can be a direct indication and expressions that can be an indirect indication that the argument is based on a particular type of relationship.

In order to reach a justifiable reconstruction, it would be insufficient to rely on just one of the discussed indicators. The first thing to do is establish whether the text or speech is argumentative. Many of the discussed indicators also occur in non-argumentative language use. An example is the expression 'is characteristic of', which

[79] For examples of previous lists of expressions that are indicative of the different argument schemes see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 98–99) and van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002: 102–104).

has been discussed as an indication for the symptomatic relationship 'in two directions'. Because the indications for symptomatic relationships in two directions do not make an argumentative connection in themselves, the discovery of an expression like 'it is characteristic of' is insufficient proof to decide that there is an symptomatic argumentative connection. The relationship that is indicated using this expression might, for instance, be part of a description, as appears from (123):

(123) [From a review of Pauline Slot's novel *Zuiderkruis*]

This exaggerated consciousness of language use, but also of emotions, gestures and slight changes in behaviour is characteristic of this novel.

(*de Volkskrant*, 22 January 1999)

The expression 'is characteristic of' only points to a symptomatic relationship if it occurs in the major premise of an argument.

Even in case of argumentation, the discussed indicators do not always give a definite answer taken on their own. Some of the discussed expressions may occur in more than one type of argumentation. Whether they are an indicator of type a or type b sometimes depends on their position. A good example of such an expression is 'it is clear that', which was discussed as an indicator of symptomatic argumentation. In order to be an indication for symptomatic argumentation, this expression should at least occur in the standpoint and not in the argument. If this condition is not met, as in (124), we do not have symptomatic argumentation but (in this case pragmatic) argumentation based on a causal relationship.

(124) **'It is clear that** our economy suffers from a lack of confidence by domestic and foreign investors', says Minister of Finance Thanong Bidaya. 'Therefore it must be the first priority of our government to restore that confidence'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 6 August 1997)

Some indicators of a particular relationship function only as such if they occur in a specific constituent part of the argument scheme concerned (standpoint, major premise, minor premise). But this criterion does not always provide a definite answer either. Even if the expression 'it is clear that' occurs in the standpoint, the argument can be causal, as in (125):

(125) **It is clear that** we are getting stuck with the current system of school denominations. […] More and more types are added. You see it now: next year an Evangelical school and the year after that probably an Islamic school.

(*de Volkskrant*, 1 October 1998)

Here the standpoint involves a prediction ('We are getting stuck with the current system'), which, taken on its own, could be an indication for causal argumentation. This prediction is then supported by pointing to the developments that cause the current system to get stuck. An extra indication that this text involves causal, and not symptomatic, argumentation is that neither the standpoint nor the argument

indicates a condition, but a process or event. That is not the case in example (126), where 'it is clear that' is indicative of a symptomatic relationship:

(126) A dubious characteristic of corny language is, according to Guido, 'that the offender, often the family jester type, pulls a face as if he is throwing his witticism off on the spot. But corny language is plagiarism by definition. And treacherous too: before the victim knows what is happening, a laugh has been stolen from him or her'. Offender, victim, plagiarism, steal – *it is clear that* corny language should be included in the Penal Code, as far as Guido is concerned.

(*de Volkskrant* on the Internet)

The writer infers from Guido's language use that the latter is of the opinion that corny language should be included in the Penal Code. The standpoint indicates in this case a condition ('corny language should be included in the Penal Code') and not an event or process. Because of such complications, as many different clues as possible must be included in the analysis in order to come to a well-founded reconstruction.

Not only telling apart causal argumentation and symptomatic argumentation can be a problem, but also the distinction between analogy argumentation and argumentation from example (a subtype of symptomatic argumentation) may cause difficulties. The expression 'just take a look at' can be indicative of both types of argumentation, and therefore, taken on its own, does not tell us whether we have to do with analogy argumentation or with argumentation from example. In order to make a justifiable choice we have to examine the differences between the two types of argumentation in more detail.

Garssen (1997) classes Perelman's 'example' category in two different groups of the pragma-dialectical typology. If the example serves to infer a general rule on the basis of one or more observations, we have come across argumentation based on a symptomatic relationship of the argumentation from example subtype. If the example is not used to defend a broad, generalising statement, but serves to defend a specific case, we have analogy argumentation, according to Garssen:

> In argumentation going from an example to a specific case, a comparison is made between an element from the point of departure and an element from the proposition (1997: 76, our transl.).

An important distinction between argumentation from example and analogy argumentation is found in the nature of the standpoint: is the standpoint a generalised statement or does it concern a specific case? On the basis of this criterion, it is possible to decide in a concrete case whether the argumentation is based on a symptomatic relationship or should be reconstructed as based on a relationship by comparison. We will show this with the help of two examples:

(127) Last year a proposal to dig out the filled part of [the former canal] Rokin was turned down by a hair's breadth. After a long debate, the city council decided on a square with trees. 'The time wasn't ripe for it', says Otten. 'Now it is different. *Just take a look at* Utrecht and Breda'. In these

places town councillors are also toying with the idea to open up the old filled-in canals. In Utrecht, for instance, Catharijnesingel is supposed to be reinstated in its full splendour.

(*de Volkskrant*, 4 August 2000)

(128) What is wrong with a yearly assessment to see whether Dutch school-aged children are sufficiently skilled in language and math? Treffers: 'Nothing in itself. But one has to realise the side-effects. They are tragic. *Just take a look at* England', warns the professor at the internationally renowned Freudenthal Institute for math education. Since the British introduced a national exam, 80 percent of primary schools have changed their methods. 'They only teach the children what they will be asked on the exam. This means they review old subject matter and practice old exams, while every didactician knows that what's important is acquiring a sense of understanding'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 28 February 2000)

In (127), the standpoint is defended that the time has come to open up filled-in canals. It is not clear whether this standpoint specifically concerns the situation in Amsterdam ('In Amsterdam the time is ripe to open up filled-in canals') or that a more general statement is made ('In The Netherlands the time is ripe to open up filled-in canals'). In the first case, the argumentation would be based on a relationship by comparison ('In Amsterdam the time is ripe to open up the filled-in canals, for in Utrecht and Breda they consider it too (and the situation in Utrecht and Breda is comparable to the one in Amsterdam)'). In the second case, we would have argumentation from example ('In The Netherlands the time is ripe to open up the filled-in canals, for that is considered in Utrecht and Breda at this time (and that this is considered in Utrecht and Breda signifies that the time is ripe)').

(128) is an example of argumentation by comparison. The standpoint is 'A yearly assessment of the language and mathematical skills of Dutch school-aged children would have tragic side-effects'. This prediction, which concerns a specific case, is defended by drawing a comparison with the situation in England, where the introduction of a nationwide test has led to didactically irresponsible practices.

CHAPTER 7

INDICATORS OF THE ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURE

7.1 DIALECTICAL PROFILES FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMPLEX ARGUMENTATION

The complexity of an argumentative speech or text depends on the reactions the speaker or writer responds to, or which he anticipates. If the protagonist of a particular standpoint receives or expects criticism about one or more elements of his argumentation, he will have to bring forward more arguments to meet this criticism. Depending on the nature of the criticism and the manner in which the protagonist tries to defend himself against it, the argumentation will display a different structure.

If the antagonist doubts whether he should accept a particular argument, his doubt may relate to the propositional content of the argument or its justificatory or refutatory force. In the first case, he doubts whether the argument is true or acceptable; in the second case, he doubts whether it provides sufficient support for the standpoint. Often the antagonist merely indicates that he considers the argument unacceptable or insufficie nt, without providing any arguments for his position. In that case, his criticising the standpoint comes down to expressing doubt. He can, however, also raise an objection that makes clear why he does not accept the argument as a defence of the standpoint. In that case, he is defending a particular standpoint of his own, namely that the argument in question does not constitute an acceptable defence of the standpoint. With this, the subdispute becomes mixed.

If the protagonist recognises the correctness of the criticism to his argument and thinks this criticism cannot be suppressed by extending his argumentation or by supporting it further, he has no other option than to withdraw his argument. If he thinks that his standpoint can still be defended, in spite of such criticism, he will have to make a new attempt to defend it. Because in that case he will have made more than one defence attempt, we speak of *multiple* argumentation. So, multiple argumentation is created as a result of a combination of a move that acknowledges criticism and one that contests criticism.

When the protagonist does not agree with the criticism and thinks that his standpoint can be maintained without having to withdraw his argument, he will try to overcome, or contest, the antagonist's criticism by extending his argumentation. How he has to extend his argumentation, depends on the type of criticism he responds to.

If the criticism involves that the argument is unacceptable with regard to its propositional content, the protagonist can try to convince the antagonist of the

acceptability of the argument by supporting it. In that case, he brings forward *subordinative* argumentation to defend his argument.[80]

When the antagonist has indicated that he is of the opinion that the argument provides insufficient support for the standpoint, the protagonist can respond in two ways. If the antagonist only indicates that he considers the argument insufficient, without providing an argument, the protagonist could supplement the first argument, in the hope that the combination of arguments satisfies the antagonist. If the antagonist mentions a specific objection by which he tries to demonstrate that the argument is insufficient, the protagonist can attack this objection. Both types of responses lead to coordinative argumentation, because in both cases only the combination of arguments may be considered sufficient to convince the antagonist of the acceptability of the standpoint. In the case of an additional argument, the argumentation as a whole is *cumulatively coordinative*, in the case of refuting an objection it is *complementary coordinative*.

Figure 7.1 is an overview of the different possibilities of criticism for the antagonist and of responses to this criticism for the protagonist.

On the basis of the above outline the following dialectical core profile showing the realisation of the different types of argumentation structures can be drawn (see Figure 7.2).

7.2 INDICATIONS IN THE VERBAL PRESENTATION OF ARGUMENTS

In a lot of cases the verbal presentation of the arguments provides information about the criticism the protagonist anticipates when putting forward his arguments, and, for this reason, also about the structure of his argumentative speech or text. There are a number of expressions that can be used to introduce or connect arguments. These expressions indicate that the protagonist takes into account that one of his arguments could be unacceptable to the antagonist or that he assumes that only a particular combination of arguments will be able to convince the antagonist of his standpoint.

Often, in explicit discussions clues can be gathered from criticism the antagonist passed on previously adduced arguments. By assuming that the arguments brought forward in response to this criticism are aimed at countering the criticism, we can come to a justified analysis of the structure of the pr otagonist's argumentation.

7.2.1 Univocal indications for a subordinative relationship

In (1), Paula tries to defend herself against Anton's criticism of the acceptability of the argument she brought forward in the first move. The argument that there are only scheduled flights to Seville is meant to support the fact that flying to

[80] If the acceptability of the propositional content of an argument is questioned, the discussion is, strictly speaking, moved from the argumentation stage to the opening stage. Because this phenomenon often occurs when the argumentation stage has already started, we prefer to treat it in this chapter.

A	PROTAGONIST RECOGNISES THE PERTINENCE OF THE CRITICISM BUT MAINTAINS HIS STANDPOINT		
	Criticism of A		**Response of P**
	argument is		
	(a)	unacceptable	retracts argument and
	(b)	insufficient	adduces new argument
B	PROTAGONIST DOES NOT RECOGNISE THE PERTINENCE OF THE CRITICISM		
	Criticism of A		**Response of P**
	argument is		
	(a)	unacceptable	supports argument (**–>SA**)
	(b)	insufficient	
		if A just doubts:	1. gives an additional argument (**–>CumCA**)
		Or	
		if A provides a counterargument:	2. refutes counterargument (**–>CompCA**)

A = antagonist
P = protagonist
MA = multiple argumentation
CumCA = cumulatively coordinative argumentation
CompCA = complementary coordinative argumentation
SA = subordinative argumentation

FIGURE 7.1 Model of argumentative responses to criticism in a critical discussion



FIGURE 7.2 Dialectical core profile for the different types of argumentation structure

Seville would be too expensive and is therefore an example of subordinative argumentation:

(1) Paula: I don't think we should go and see him in Seville, because that would be far too expensive.
Anton: What nonsense. You can fly to Spain for almost nothing.
Paula: Not to Seville, because there are only scheduled flights to Seville.

In this example of an explicit discussion it becomes clear that Paula's second argument is subordinative, due to the fact that this argument must be regarded as an attempt to counter the criticism of the acceptability of the propositional content of her first argument. In implicit discussions, the use of particular expressions can show that the protagonist of a standpoint anticipates the situation in which he will have to support one or more of his arguments because its acceptability may be at issue. These are, in the first place, expressions that explicitly indicate the relationship between the arguments, because they express that arguments are provided to support another statement. If the supported statement is an argument in itself, these expressions constitute a univocal indication for subordinative argumentation. Two examples of these expressions are:

– to substantiate
– to support

(2) The American government has gone to court yesterday in order to force the tobacco industry to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to compensate for the costs of public health that are linked to smoking. 'For more than 45 years, tobacco manufacturers have done business without concerning themselves about the truth, the law or the health of the American population', said Attorney General Janet Reno. […] The government *substantiates* the charge with the argument that tobacco manufacturers have known for decades that tobacco is dangerous and addictive, but that they denied this in public. According to the government, this involved a 'deliberate, coordinated campaign of deception and fraud'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 23 September 1999)

(3) The legal adviser argued in favour of more openness with regard to tracing and prosecuting criminals. According to him, investigative journalists and specialised crime reporters like Peter R. de Vries contribute to the 'perfection' of criminal justice. *To support* his claim, Spong pointed to the low percentage of solved crimes and the fact that journalistic productions are allowed to constitute legal evidence.

(*de Volkskrant*, 3 June 2000)

In (2), the American government defends the idea that the tobacco industry should compensate for the expenses of public health, because for years this industry has let its business interest prevail over the truth, the law and the health of the population. That this is actually the case is made plausible (by Janet Reno)

by bringing forward the supporting argument that tobacco manufacturers have known for decades that smoking is dangerous and addictive. In (3), Mr Spong is of the opinion that there should be more openness regarding tracing and prosecuting criminals because investigative journalists and crime reporters can make an important contribution to the execution of criminal law. To support this argument, he argues that the percentage of solved crimes is very low at the moment and that journalistic productions can be legal evidence. So, his subordinative argumentation consists of two coordinative arguments.

7.2.2 Non-Univocal indications for subordinative argumentation

The presence of subordinative argumentation can be found in the use of general indicators of argumentation, such as

– because
– for
– therefore
– since
– after all
– thus
– so
– as

Naturally, these expressions can also point to single argumentation. If particular combinations of these expressions occur in an argumentative speech or text, this is a stronger indication for subordinative argumentation. After all, in that case it is clear that the protagonist is of the opinion that single argumentation will not suffice, but that his argument might be open to question as well, and is therefore in need of additional support. This involves constructions such as:

– Main argument, *because* Subargument and *therefore* Standpoint
– *Since* Subargument, Main argument. *So* Standpoint
– Standpoint, *for* Main argument. *After all* Subargument.

These combinations of indicators occur in (4)–(5):

(4) *Since* pictures, logos and frames often consist of different files, requesting one page – depending on the number of graphic elements on the page – can easily cause five to twenty hits. *So*, as a unit of measure the number of hits is quite meaningless.
(*VNUNET* Nederland Information for advertisers)

(5) Prodi had a good reason to charge a Frenchman with the above-mentioned task. France has a large and sometimes militant agricultural rank and file. *The idea is* that more than anyone else Lamy would be successful in selling the necessary willingness to Paris. *After all*, as a top official of the then

European Committee he used to play a prominent part in acquiring the support of the French for the compromises of the Uruguay Round.
(*Reformatorisch Dagblad,* 29 December 1999)

The expression 'the idea is' functions in (5) as an indicator of argumentation, because the word 'idea' is used in the sense of 'consideration' or 'reason'.

The various indicators of argumentation may be spread over different clauses, but they can also occur in the same clause. In the latter case, the argumentation will generally be subordinative. Examples of such combinations of argumentative indicators are:

– since because
– for because
– because in view of the fact that
– after all because
– namely because
– as because
– as since

In the following examples we find such juxtaposed indicators:

(6) I continue to make individual drawings as well as comics. *For because* Dr Molotow still has a conventional structure, he doesn't allow me to say everything I want to.
(*Veto* 1996)

(7) For those who get a connection that means a financial gain, *for since* the connection is fixed, the Warande students do not have additional variable costs, as they would in case of indirect Internet access through a modem (purchase costs) and the telephone network (call charge).
(*Student apartments on the Internet*)

(8) It's quite challenging to produce quality poems. After all, because of its brevity, a poem's every word holds that much more weight, and must be chosen with great care.
(*www.love-poem.net/www/Poetrywrtingtips.htm*)

When *namely* or *after all* take second place in such a sequence of expressions, the combination of expressions is not indicative of subordinative argumentation. This has to do with the fact that *namely* and *after all*, even though they can be used as an indicator of argumentation, do not always function as such. *Namely* is most commonly used to introduce a more precise description or an explanation of something mentioned before, or to introduce an enumeration. One of the uses of *after all* is to remind the listener of something. According to Elizabeth Closs Traugott's (1997: 3) analysis, *after all* is then used as an 'as we know' connective, by means of which 'appeal is made to obvious, inter-personally recoverable, largely societal norms'.

When *namely* or *after all* is preceded by *because*, it is already clear that a reason will be given from the presence of *because*. For that reason, *namely* and *after all* seem to lose their argument indicating function and are now only used in their other function, that is to indicate that a more precise explanation will be given that is new to the listener or reader, or that the reason given concerns something that is already known to the listener or reader. The most significant difference in meaning between the following sentences is therefore that in (9) the reason of postponing the meeting is considered to be known, while in (10) this reason is presented as new information:

(9) We don't have to book a room, because after all nobody has applied.

(10) We don't have to book a room, because namely nobody has applied.

Because 'after all' and 'namely' are in the following combinations of indicators in second place, these combinations are not indicative of subordinative argumentation:

– for after all
– because after all
– since after all
– because namely

For this reason, the combinations of indicators in the following texts do not point to subordinative argumentation:

(11) Considering the present economic crisis and the unstable political situation, it is of importance that you are well-informed before you decide to go. Avoid the larger cities anyhow (like Medan on Sumatra), *since after all* the unrest turned out to occur exactly in those places in short, but violent bursts.
(*Sumatra, Indonesia – travel information & tips* – Anders Reizen)

(12) *Because namely* the wolf does not contract hip dysplasia, it is assumed that food and, partially, heredity are basically to blame.
(*Hereditary disorders in the Golden Retriever*)

Incidentally, subordinative argumentation does not always need to be used in a combination like 'namely because'. (13) is an example in which it is not the case:

(13) The two amendments concerning the Committee are solely turned down for formal reasons, rapporteurs Laurens Jan Brinkshorst (NL, ELD) and Juan Manuel Fabra Vallés (S, EVP) argue, *namely because* the funds did not occur in the draft of the supplementary budget.
(http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg3/sdp/brief…97/b971020s.htm)

In this case, 'namely' is used in the sense of 'that is' or 'to be more specific' and not as a synonym of 'for'. The combination of 'namely' and 'because' only indicates subordination if the sentence in which these expressions occur is a construction of

the type: '(Standpoint). Namely because Subargument, Main argument' or '(Standpoint). Main argument namely, because Subargument'. In the following example the latter construction is used and functions 'namely because' indeed as an indicator of subordinative argumentation:

(14) The ribbon that we will stretch along the Dutch coast reads, '[…] Go for green energy'. The North Pole is melting *namely because* we use too much electricity.
(World Wide Fund for Nature – Polar Bear Action site)

In (14), the standpoint is defended that we must use green energy or promote the use of it because the North Pole is melting. That this is true is supported by the argument that we use too much electricity.[81]

7.2.3 Univocal indications for multiplicity

In the next example of an explicit discussion, Paula (implicitly) withdraws her first argument when it proves not to be able to withstand Anton's criticism. Paula then tries another tack by advancing a new argument:

(15) Paula: I think you should stop taking these herbal pills. They don't work anyway.
Anton: That's not true; I've already lost a couple of pounds.
Paula: But isn't it dangerous to take something without having any idea of the side-effects?

The argumentation in this example is multiple in the sense that Paula makes more than one attempt to defend her standpoint. In implicit discussions, in which the antagonist cannot respond immediately, the protagonist can play it safe by making more than one alternative attempt to defend the standpoint. From the protagonist's own perspective, one or more of these defences are superfluous, or at least he presents them as such, but, at the same time, he takes into account that the antagonist may view this differently.

There are a number of expressions that indicate the relationship between multiple arguments in a univocal way by making clear that more than one argument is brought forward and that each of these arguments is considered – at least by the protagonist – to provide sufficient support for the standpoint:

there are a number of independent arguments for X
there are a number of decisive arguments (reasons) for X

These explicit indications for multiple argumentation are present in (16)–(18):

[81] Strictly speaking, this interpretation of (14) as subordinative argumentation requires a comma between 'namely' and 'because'. Only then the sentence has the right structure: (Standpoint). Main argument namely, because Subargument. Without the comma, this example could be a case of single argumentation. In that case the sentence has the structure (Standpoint). Namely Main argument (= The North Pole is melting because we use too much energy).

(16) This would lead to denying the requested permission to RDM if it was not true that there are weighty reasons pertaining to business economics that in this case decide in favour of RDM. Three – *independent* – *arguments* play a part in this: a. […] b. […] c. […]
(Year 1995/140. Date of verdict: 29 November 1994 Court of Justice: Cantonal Judge Rotterdam)

(17) The SWOV study did not alter the VVO's preference for a raised junction, however. The fact is that *a number of decisive arguments* in favour of the raised junction were ignored.
The raised junction not only improves the safety of the crossing itself but also of the surrounding area, the 30 km zone. […]
The raised junction not only regulates the priority of cars and bicycles on the main road, but also provides priority for pedestrians on the main road. For this reason it is a lot easier for a disabled person to cross the side-roads. […]
A raided junction regulates more than just priority. It is plausible to assume that the measure also positively influences the number of unregistered accidents […] and the seriousness of the accidents. […] (*Priority junction or raised junction. Which junction gets priority?* Jaap van Minnen, Ton Hummel SWOV, Pieter van Vliet Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer)

(18) [Just now two arguments to support a standpoint were given.] Of course, the first argument is the stronger one, and *it would stand up even if you would not agree with the second argument*.
(freenet.sourceforge.net/lang/nl/index.php?page = philosophy)

7.2.4 Non-Univocal indications for multiple argumentation

In addition to the explicit clues about the structure of the argumentation, there are also expressions that can be a strong indication for multiple argumentation when they are used to introduce arguments.

In the first place, there are expressions that make clear that on its own the argument is sufficient to make the standpoint credible. Usually, the first argument in a multiple argumentation is introduced in this way. If one or more subsequent arguments are brought forward, this is a clue that the argumentation is meant to be multiple. The protagonist is, after all, making clear that he has completed a defence attempt, and nevertheless continues his defence with a new argument. Expressions like the following can be used to indicate the conclusiveness of one of the arguments:[82]

[82] Sometimes it is not the first argument but one of the subsequent arguments that is introduced by such an expression. For example, by using the following structure: X (argument 1), so Z, if only because Y (argument 2).

if only because
X is an argument in itself/on its own

These expressions are used in (19 and (20):

(19) Cuban exiles flooded the little guy with gifts and treated him to a day in Disneyland. The family argues that he belongs in America, *if only* to honour his mother who drowned during the escape. The lawyer of the family also pointed out that the boy has a much better perspective in the United States than in poor Cuba.

(*de Volkskrant*, 6 January 2000)

(20) In spite of this serious subject matter, there is a lot of fun in Underground. And there is swimming and floating, as always with Kusturica. The soundtrack of Goran Bregovic *is an argument in itself* not to miss Underground tonight.

(*NRC Webpages*, 13 January 1999)

In (19), the fact that the mother of the young Cuban refugee drowned during her escape is presented as a sufficient argument to let the boy remain in America. Subsequently, a second argument is adduced: the boy has a much better perspective in the United States than in Cuba. (20) deviates from the norm, because not the first but the last argument of the multiple argumentation is introduced by 'is an argument in itself', which is a clue that this argument is meant to be an independent defence. Preceding this argument, other reasons have been given not to miss *Underground*: the fact that the movie is funny and that it contains swimming and floating.

A second type of clues for multiple argumentation consist of expressions that make clear that the preceding argument should be sufficient, but if this does not turn out to be so, the argument that is introduced by the indicator can independently provide sufficient support for the standpoint. The protagonist makes clear that he anticipates that the development of the discussion will typically lead to the realisation of multiple argumentation: a first defence attempt that is meant to be conclusive fails. The protagonist thinks he can nevertheless maintain his standpoint and makes a new defence attempt. Expressions that can constitute a clue that this is the course of the discussion the protagonist has in mind are, for example:

anyway
anyhow
even if this were not true/not the case, then
even then
whatever the case may be
in any case

According to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), 'anyway' (and 'anyhow') can be used to change the subject or to resume a subject after interruption. In ananalysis based on Ducrot et al.'s (1980) analysis of 'd'ailleurs', the French

equivalent of 'anyway', Snoeck Henkemans gives the following characterisation of 'anyway' when it is being used to introduce a new argument:

> By the use of *anyway* the arguer can indicate that the dialogical situation he is anticipating is precisely the situation which, according to the pragma-dialectical analysis that I have presented here, gives rise to multiple argumentation: the situation in which the arguer decides to undertake a new and separate attempt to defend the standpoint, because he expects that a previous attempt might fail. By using *anyway*, the arguer makes it clear that his first argument should have sufficed to convince his opponent. All the same, he advances a new argument, thus making it clear that he foresees that his first argument might after all not be convincing (1996: 81).

If 'even if this were not true/not the case, then' is used to introduce a following argument, this expression explicitly makes clear that the speaker or writer reckons with the possibility that his opponent regards the first argument unacceptable or that it turns out to be untenable on closer examination. 'Even then' can also be used on its own to introduce a multiple argument, because – according to *Collins* – it can be used 'to say that something is the case in spite of what has just been stated or whatever the circumstances may be'.

The expressions 'whatever the case may be' and 'in any case' can also be used by a speaker or writer to indicate that the acceptability of the first argument is not required for a conclusive defence of his standpoint. In the following passages these expressions are used to indicate multiple argumentation:

(21) Another Israeli journalist […] reacts strongly to Israel and their own media. 'Israel is very self-oriented and there is only little interest here for any suffering unless it is our own. Israeli newspapers seldom report on foreign news, *and even then* these news reports almost always revolve around Israeli or Jewish affairs somewhere else in the world'.
(*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 2 August 2001)

(22) The liberal does not think that the employment of airplanes has 'police state like' traits. 'That has nothing to do with it. When I think about a police state, I see people with guns on their shoulder on every corner of the street. The airplane idea is something else entirely. *Anyway,* along the blue border, that is the side of the North Sea, Orion airplanes of the Navy have patrolled for years'.
(*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 20 March 1999)

(23) Blair also received less complicated guests before. According to a BBC programme broadcasted in North Ireland last week, three of the seven visitors, Adam, Martin McGuiness and Martin Ferris, are members of the IRA Army Council, the highest authority in the army. *And even if this were not true, then* Blair is *still* putting his political prestige on the line by welcoming Sinn Fein.
(*de Volkskrant*, 11 December 1997)

(24) The exporters that collaborated in the investigation criticised the approach of the Committee with regard to the study of damage factors in which 1995 was used as main base year, because both the sold quantities and the prices rose in the whole sector in 1995 due to favourable market circumstances.

> As, however, is explained in the provisional bylaw (consideration 27), for the sake of completeness, and in view of a fair assessment of the damage, the data of 1993 and 1994 were used as well. *Whatever the case may be,* the conclusions of the damage assessment would not have been different if 1993 had been used as the base year. The approach of the provisional bylaw is thereby confirmed.
>
> (*EUR-Lex: Geldende gemeenschapswetgeving* – Document 398R2402)

To support his standpoint that Israel is chiefly interested in itself and not in the other countries, the Israeli journalist in (21) first brings forward that Israeli newspapers hardly offer foreign news reports, and even if that does happen, they almost always concern Israeli or Jewish affairs. In example (22), the speaker argues that the employment of airplanes will not lead to The Netherlands becoming some kind of police state. The first argument to defend this standpoint is that the employment of airplanes is not typical of a police state, unlike having people with guns at every street corner. The second argument, which is introduced by 'anyway', is that airplanes have patrolled the North Sea border for years. In other words, even if airplane patrolling would be typical of a police state, it is still possible to maintain that The Netherlands will not become a police state by the employment of airplanes, because in that case it is one already. In example (23), the standpoint is defended that Blair put himself in a difficult position because of the guests he invited. The first argument in favour of this standpoint is that three of the guests are alleged to be members of the IRA. But even if this were not true, the standpoint is still justified, according to the writer, because Blair puts his political prestige on the line by the mere fact that he is welcoming Sinn Fein. In example (24), the author responds to the criticism of exporters that the damage was assessed incorrectly, because 1995 was used as main base year while this year is not representative for the period the investigation related to, due to favourable market circumstances. In his response, the author first points out that in the investigation not only data from the base year 1995, but also from 1993 and 1994 have been taken into consideration. Next he indicates that it actually does not matter whether or not the data from other years, besides those from 1995, were used ('whatever the case may be'), because the investigation would have yielded the same results if 1993 had been used as the base year.

A third type of expressions that indicate multiple argumentation are those that can be used to introduce an argument and at the same time signal that this argument is, strictly speaking, superfluous. These expressions are a clue that the argumentation is multiple, because the protagonist is making clear that he is prepared to withdraw one of his arguments, since it is, in his view, not really necessary for a conclusive defence.

Sometimes the speaker or writer explicitly indicates that the argument is superfluous ('needless to say'). In other cases the speaker operates in a more subtle way by using expressions like 'not to mention the fact that' and 'leaving aside that', which remind us of the rhetorical *praeteritio* technique. He is then suggesting that he is leaving a particular argument out, but brings it forward all the same.

The following expressions, among others, can be used to present an argument as superfluous:

leaving aside (the fact) that
(quite) apart from (the fact that)
and I won't even mention
not to mention the fact that
needless to say

One of the definitions *Collins Cobuild* (1988) provides for 'apart from' is the following:

Apart from is used to say that you want to ignore a particular subject or line of argument for the moment, so that you can mention another aspect of the situation which is less obvious or which has not yet been considered.

According to *Collins*, 'leaving aside' can be used 'to indicate that you do not want to discuss or take into account a particular subject or aspect of something'. In the following passage these expressions function to indicate multiple argumentation:

(25) Ridiculous claims are often swallowed without question. In his much-praised memoirs, Elie Wiesel remembers that at the age of eighteen, shortly after he was freed from Buchenwald, he read The Critique of Pure Reason – don't laugh! – in Yiddish. *Quite apart from the fact that* Wiesel – according to himself – did not possess any grammatical knowledge of Yiddish, The Critique of Pure Reason has just never been translated into Yiddish. 'The truth I show is the unvarnished truth', Wiesel sighs, 'I can't help it'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 19 July 2000)

(26) The Polish Bride is quite boring, so it must indeed be the message that elicits favourable responses from audience and press. And what then do the makers of The Polish Bride have to tell us? Nothing more than that the loss of the connection to The Earth and The Land causes a lot of grief. The motto is Back to Nature. *Leaving aside that* this does not amount to more than a sentimental nostalgia for an idealised past, it also suffers from lack of originality: every bakery sells organic bread nowadays.

(*Cinemagazine*; review of Traidia's *The Polish Bride*)

(27) The food industry has not been standing still and one supplement after the other is recommended as the ultimate panacea. We cannot see the wood for the trees! [. . .] All these supplements have in common that they prevent the user from changing his or her often wrong dietary pattern, and as long as that is not altered, all these agents are only short-living and phoney successes! *And I won't even mention* standardisation (are composition and quantity constant?) and critical dose (do the active ingredients not exceed the maximum acceptable dose?) of all these supplements.

(*Herbalife, The truth about food and supplements*)

(28) Publication of (parts of) the file before a decision is taken as regards the application of the permit would only be appropriate if that is necessary to adequately hear interested third parties on the basis of article 4:8 of the General Administrative Law Act. Considering the fact that this decision has now been taken, this basis for publication is no longer present.
It is perhaps *needless to say* that there would be objections against disclosing the correspondence you requested if the interest of publication is considered a disproportionate injury to the parties with whom the correspondence was conducted. In view of the above, I refuse your request to inspect the correspondence you indicated.
(www.nma-org.nl/besluiten/1998/besluiten/wob/wob0047-9808.htm)

In (25), the (implicit) standpoint is defended that it is impossible that Wiesel read *The Critique of Pure Reason* in Yiddish shortly after he was freed from Buchenwald. The first argument, i.e. that Wiesel did not possess any grammatical knowledge of Yiddish, is presented as not really necessary ('quite apart from the fact') because the second argument, i.e. that the book in question has never been translated into Yiddish, is conclusive on its own. The author of (26) defends the standpoint that the 'message' of *The Polish Bride* ('Back to Nature') does not amount to much. The first argument is that this message is no more than a sentimental nostalgia to an idealised past. The second argument the author brings forward is that the idea is not very original. In (27), the author defends the implicit standpoint that there is no reason to be overenthusiastic about food supplements. These agents only lead to apparent successes in the short term. A second objection is that little is known about standardisation and the critical dose of such supplements. In (28), a request for the publication of parts of a file is refused on the basis of the fact that publication is unnecessary to adequately hear interested third parties. Perhaps unnecessarily, the author adds another argument: the interest of publication does not outweigh the harm done to the parties with whom the correspondence included in the file was conducted.

A last type of clue that the argumentation is meant to be multiple are expressions that indicate that there is more than one reason to consider the standpoint acceptable. The protagonist makes clear that he is making more than one defence attempt. He can indicate this explicitly by means of expressions like 'but that is not the only reason'. It is also possible that he does not say in so many words that he is going to adduce several arguments, but that he makes this clear by continuing with expressions like 'also because' or 'at least as important' after he has brought forward a first argument. This way he makes clear that a new weighty argument is following:

but that is not the only reason
but there is another reason
also because
at least as important
just as important

(29) Not only in the Bijlmer prison, but also in other prisons regularly private security guards are employed. This is necessary because of the lack of staff

in the penitentiaries. On Friday, Mr. Korthals, Minister of Justice, wrote in a letter to the Lower House that these private guards do not work in places where they are in direct contact with the detainees. He calls the employment of these guards entirely justified, *also because* they receive an additional internal training.

(*de Volkskrant*, 8 June 2001)

(30) In The Netherlands I felt instantly at home, but also very Jewish. Here, being Jewish is inextricably bound up with the holocaust. Friends would sometimes ask me how I could live in Europe after all that has happened. 'Because my family did not live through the war', I would answer. '*But there is another reason*: if Jews are afraid to go and live in Europe, then Hitler has won'.

(*Delta*, 9 April 1998)

(31) Prime Minister Kok will make his first appearance as the PvdA party leader. He will do this five times during the campaign for the municipal elections. Not nearly often enough, some think, and they point to the other three major parties who are less embarrassed to employ their party leader. The argument for a quiet campaign is that Kok, being the Prime Minister, has a different position – is above the parties. *But at least as important* is the fact that a disappointing PvdA result would not rub off on Kok too much.

(*de Volkskrant*, 16 February 1998)

In (29), Minister Korthals indicates that the employment of private security guards is entirely justified, 'also because' these guards receive an additional internal training. Before that, he mentions the argument that these security guards do not work in places where they have direct contact with detainees. The author of (30) defends the standpoint that as a Jew he can live in Europe because his family did not live through the war. In addition, he mentions another reason ('but there is another reason'): according to him, Jews should not shrink from living in Europe, for otherwise Hitler has won. In (31), two arguments are mentioned which the PvdA is supposed to have for a quiet campaign: as Prime Minister Kok has another position than the party leaders of the other major parties, and a disappointing result would not rub off on Kok too much if he does not show himself too often.

That the arguer is advancing more than one independent argument can also become clear by the presence of expressions indicating an enumeration, on the condition, of course, that the different members of the enumeration are arguments.[83] Examples of expressions that are indicative of an enumeration are phrasings such

[83] Bach (1999: 356–358) has drawn up a taxonomy of *utterance modifiers*, expressions that are used to comment on the main part of the utterance. The different types of indicators of multiple argumentation can be rated as one of the classes of this taxonomy. For example, the indicators of enumeration belong to the *positionals* (examples are 'first of all', 'next', 'lastly'), expressions like 'anyway' belong to the *topicals* ('anyway', 'by the way', 'incidentally'), and Bach considers expressions like 'moreover' as *additionals* ('moreover', 'besides', 'furthermore', 'on top of that'). Finally, expressions such as 'at least as important', which can be used to indicate that the argument that follows is as important as the preceding one, come under the category of *emphatics* ('above all', 'most importantly', 'to say the least').

as 'in the first place', 'in the second place' (or 'firstly', 'secondly'). Expressions such as 'another' ('another argument, advantage is …') can also be used 'to refer to an additional person or thing of the same type as one already mentioned or known about; one more; a further', according to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989). In addition, expressions like 'further' and 'furthermore' can have a function in an enumeration. As *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989) explains, 'further' can be used 'to introduce a new point relating to or reinforcing a previous statement'. This dictionary gives the following definition for 'furthermore': 'in addition; besides (used to introduce a fresh consideration in an argument)'. 'Moreover' means, according to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), 'as a further matter; besides'. According to *Collins Cobuild* (1988), this expression is synonymous with 'furthermore'.

Below, the various introductions of an enumeration are listed:

in the first place (because), in the second place (because)
firstly, secondly
to begin with
next
lastly
last but not least
finally
another argument (advantage, benefit, etc.) is
further
furthermore
moreover

In the following texts these expressions are used as indicators of multiple argumentation:

(32) As Flemish government, we wish to give the existing vitality an extra stimulus. Why? *In the first place because* volunteers are active in all policy domains and play an important part there. […] *Furthermore because* the support of voluntary work, which already has been developed in some policy domains, leaves room for improvement, such as the decree concerning the organised voluntary work in the welfare and health sector. *Finally because* the United Nations have proclaimed 2001 'The international year of the volunteer'.
(Policy document *Welfare, health and equal opportunities*. Minister Vogel, January 2000)

(33) You think The Netherlands should play the role of pioneer in the field of biotechnology. Why? 'In the eighties we invested a lot in biotechnology compared to other countries. Though that became less over time, The Netherlands still has a good starting position. Pharming, the 'creator' of the bull Herman, belongs to the top three in the world. *Another advantage* is the knowledge and experience the Dutch farmer has of high-tech agriculture. That makes them very suitable for cultivating and breeding crops and animals in controlled circumstances. […] *Last but not least* we have a

good legislation compared to other countries, with clear procedures that limit the risks of genetically manipulating plants and animals'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 15 April 2000)

(34) The Yugoslavia Tribunal has been called into being to see to it that these crimes against humanity do not remain unpunished. That is *in the first place* important for the sections of the population in Bosnia that have been set at one another's throats. If the perpetrators of such crimes and their bosses are called to account, justice can take the place of revenge. That boosts the peaceful coexistence between Muslims, Croats and Serbians in Bosnia. *At least as important* is that the Tribunal makes clear that the international legal rules prohibiting ethnic cleansing are not a dead letter.

(*de Volkskrant*, 5 April 2000)

(35) Could the report on the revision of the notebooks not have been made public before? 'The media row started when the bishop was away for ten days because of his holidays. He was not able to respond immediately. *Moreover*, the diocese knew that HN Magazine planned to publish three articles about the notebooks. It would not be reasonable to respond immediately after the first article. *Finally*, we *also* wanted to send a letter to all members of the diocese first'.

(Reformatorisch Dagblad, 24 September 1999)

(36) Leaving this room behind us as well, we move all the way to the other side of the house, to the other nursery. In this room resides an urban planner, the only one who is not a HSV member, Arthur Marquard. The neatest room of Hotel de Wereld is a good place to be, *if only because* Katja Schuurman voluptuously peeks from every corner of the room. *Moreover*, this room has the most powerful speakers as far as amplifying the digital sounds of the personal computer is concerned.

(*Student house Hotel de Wereld*, 1997–1998)

In (32), the Flemish government presents three multiple arguments for its standpoint that voluntary work should receive an extra stimulus. These arguments are introduced by indicators of enumeration: ('in the first place', 'furthermore', and 'finally'). In (33), three arguments are brought forward for the idea that The Netherlands should play a pioneers role in the field of biotechnology. In (34), the standpoint is defended that it is important that the Yugoslavia Tribunal sees to it that crimes against humanity do not go unpunished. In the first place because in that way justice can take the place of revenge, which should improve the peaceful coexistence amongst the different population groups in Bosnia. But, according to the author, it is at least as important that the Tribunal makes clear that the international laws that prohibit ethnic cleansing are enforced. The interviewee in (35) is of the opinion that the report on the revision of the notebooks could not have been made public before. The first argument is that the bishop was unable to respond to the media row that arose as a result of publication in HN Magazine, because he was on holiday. The second argument is that it would be unreasonable

to respond after the first article (for the diocese knew there were going to be three articles on the subject of the notebooks). Finally, the argument is brought forward that, before responding to the press reports, the diocese wanted to send letters to all members of the diocese. According to the author of (36), the room of Arthur Maquard is a good place to be, if only because of the pinned up posters of Katja Schuurman. A second argument is that this room has the most powerful speakers to amplify digital sounds from the personal computer.

7.2.5 Univocal indications for a coordinative relationship

In (37), Paula tries to defend herself against Anton's criticism that the fact that a film is playing at the Rialto is no guarantee that it will be good. She does this by advancing a supplementary argument: Theo was also enthusiastic about it. With this cumulatively coordinative argumentation she hopes to convince Anton of her standpoint.

(37) Paula: It must be a good film, because it is playing at the Rialto.
Anton: It's not as if I never saw a bad film at the Rialto.
Paula: Yes, but Theo was also very enthusiastic about it.

In the following dialogue, complementary coordinative argumentation is brought forward. Anton considers Paula's argument that the last bus had left an insufficient reason to stay the night at Eric's. She could also have asked him to come and pick her up. Paula refutes this criticism by arguing that she did not want to wake him up.

(38) Paula: I had no choice but to stay the night at Eric's because the last bus had already left.
Anton: But you could have asked me to come and pick you up.
Paula: But I didn't want to wake you up.

In both (37) and (38) it can be assumed that only the combination of Paula's arguments will be able to convince Anton. The characteristic of coordinative argumentation, which involves that the arguments must be taken together for a conclusive defence, can be indicated in a univocal way by means of some specific expressions. Examples of such expressions are:

(Taken) separately none of the arguments justify the conclusion
(Taken) together the arguments justify the conclusion
X is not an independent argument

These explicit indications for coordinative argumentation occur in the following examples:

(39) Verbeek's point is that the scientific evidence that man is disrupting the climate has become inescapable. He enumerates a few. The temperature

trend is unmistakable: it is a straight line with a clear kink after 1900. Eight years out of the top ten of warmest years since 1860 occurred in the nineties. Snow and ice surfaces on earth have shrunk. The sea level has risen. Clouds and precipitation have increased. All these processes are consistent with the idea that the Earth is warming up. […] '*Taken separately, none of the arguments justify* the certainty the IPCC now radiates. *Taken together, they do*. […] Man is changing the climate'.

(www.trouw.nl/artikel actueel/980322260958.html)

(40) Of course, it is true that the 'social character' of Staphorst differs from other boroughs. […] The character of a borough is, however, *not an independent argument* for the consolidation into a new district, but it can be a factor in the assessment. […] Of course, the test always remains whether or not a borough has sufficient administrative power or, in other words, a fundamental quality. This needs to be partially determined on the basis of objective standards, but, on the other hand, the individual character of the district, the existing cohesion in the borough, and the relation to the region play a part as well. In these respects, it might be observed that the borough of Staphorst, considering its size and administrative tasks, will be able to fulfil its administrative role well for a long period of time.

(*Memorandum after a report on the West Overijssel local government reorganisation,* 26 January 2000)

In (39), Verbeek defends the standpoint that man is changing the climate with a series of arguments that justify this standpoint if they are taken together. In (40), the standpoint is defended that Staphorst does not have to be consolidated into a new district due to a combination of factors: Staphorst distinguishes itself as far as social character goes, and is able to fulfil its role well as far as size and administrative tasks are concerned.

7.2.6 Non-univocal indications for cumulatively coordinative argumentation

Cumulatively coordinative argumentation consists of a number of arguments that, each by themselves, give some support to the standpoint and that should be sufficient, when taken together, to justify the standpoint. The force of the individual reasons may vary. One of the reasons may be the most important in the eyes of the protagonist, but he may think it wise to add one or more arguments nonetheless. It may also be that the argumentation consists of a number of arguments of more or less equal weight, of which the protagonist assumes that, taken separately, they are insufficient to convince the antagonist of his standpoint, while they may be sufficient when taken together.

Examples of expressions that explicitly indicate that a less important argument is added to the arguments that were brought forward before are:

an additional reason is
a secondary reason is

is an added reason
less importantly
of secondary importance

Both 'additional' and 'secondary' are used to make clear that something is added to something else. Moreover, the addition is presented as being less important than the rest, especially in the case of 'secondary', as the definitions in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989) show: 'secondary' can have the following meaning, according to this dictionary: 'coming after, less important than [...] something else that is primary'. 'Additional' means 'added, extra, or supplementary to what is already present or available'. In the following text these expressions are used to introduce a coordinative argument:

(41) A flight must be well-prepared. The luggage, which you have to leave when you check in, may end up lost or may arrive at the destination with a delay. Therefore, it is best to keep all necessary objects for treating and checking your diabetes with you onboard. [...] *An additional reason* to keep your insulin in your hand-luggage is that the temperature in the luggage area of an airplane can become very low, which means the insulin could freeze.
(http://www.diabetes-vdv.be/Diabetes-Info…-1998/verop.htm)

(42) Because of the size of the archives (an inventory showed them to measure 0.5 metres), destruction did not take place. *A secondary reason* for keeping all the existing material is the fact that the financial data have a great supplementary value for historical research into the work of the rationing service.
(http://www.hpveluwe.nl/Inventaris Distributiedienst.html)

(43) A consequence of public committee meetings is that the freedom to ask questions and discuss different subjects is restricted by the presence of the public and the press. […] Besides, open meetings lead to a number of obligations, such as having to advertise the meetings and grant the inspection of documents. In addition to the costs this entails, it also means that the committee meetings cannot be planned for in the current meeting schedule. Although the latter is *an argument of secondary importance* to the purpose, it must be considered in the decision process as well.
(*District Water Board Hunze and Aa-s*)

In (41), two arguments are brought forward why people who suffer from diabetes should put all objects they need for treating and checking their disease in their hand-luggage. The additional reason that is mentioned involves that insulin could freeze in the luggage area of an airplane. The first argument for the decision not to destroy the archives of the food rationing service is the (large?) size of the archives. The secondary reason that is mentioned is that the archives contain financial data that are valuable for historical research into the work of the rationing service. In (43), a number of arguments are mentioned that argue against open committee meetings. The last argument in the list is considered of secondary importance to the purpose, but must, according to the writers of the memorandum, be considered in the decision process anyway.

There are also expressions from which it can be gathered that an argument that is brought forward in addition to previous arguments is, in fact, the most important argument, according to the protagonist:

and all the more since/because
the more so since
especially/particularly (too) because
above all because
more importantly
to top that (off)
even

These expressions have in common that they not only make clear that an argument is added to the one that was brought forward already, but that this addition is of greater importance than the previous one.

'If you top a story, remark, action, etc, you follow it with a better or more impressive one', according to *Collins Cobuild* (1988). About the word 'even' this dictionary says that it can be used 'with comparatives, to emphasise the fact that something is greater in degree than the thing you have just mentioned or are about to mention'.

These indicators of coordinative argumentation are used in the following examples:

(44) The new Bauknecht tumble dryers have an eye-catching design. The main reason for this is the exceptionally large double glass door. The opening is 43 cm wide – measured diagonally – so loading and unloading this dryer is easy. *The more so since* the laundry basket fits exactly under the opening.
(http://www.witgoedland.net/fabrikanten/)

(45) Toddlers play all day long and are extremely curious. So, it is understandable that their curiosity about their little bodies and those of others comes up in their play. *Especially because* children are really getting interested in other children at that age.
(*A little curious: Sexuality in small children*, drs.T. de Vos–van der Hoeven)

(46) At the end of January, the Hong Kong Supreme Court decided that four children from the Chinese mainland – that is to say communist China – are allowed to remain in Hong Kong. On the face of it, this does not seem particularly shocking, but appearances are deceptive. Because on the strength of this verdict all Chinese children with at least one parent in Hong Kong are allowed to come to Hong Kong. *Even* extramarital children are welcome, or children whose Hong Kong father has passed away.
(*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 2 October 2001)

(47) For years some really big investors have made plans for Westerdokseiland. They do not appreciate the monumental buildings, the houseboats, the marvellous flora, the history, and the people who happen to live there.

The development company has started to evict occupants, so they can start demolishing. And this while there are still all kinds of legal proceedings running to protect these fine things. *To top that*, the zoning scheme has not even been approved of yet.

(*Behoud de loods & ander moois westerdokseiland*; squat.net/nl)

(48) Long live the cigarette. […] Smoking is nice, smoking makes me feel completely okay, *and more importantly*, smoking is a really good occupational therapy.

(www.freeler.nl/clubs/)

In (44), the standpoint is defended that the new *Bauknecht* tumble dryers are easy to load and unload. One of the arguments is that the dryer has a 43 cm opening. In combination with the fact that the laundry basket fits exactly under the opening, this makes it easy, according to the author, to put the washing in the machine and to take it out again. According to de Vos–van der Hoeven in (45), it is understandable that toddlers explore their own bodies and those of other children. Toddlers play all day long and are extremely curious. And on top of that, children are getting really interested in other children at this age. The writer of (46) argues that the verdict of the Hong Kong Supreme Court that four children originating from the Chinese mainland are allowed to stay in Hong Kong indeed has far-reaching consequences. On the basis of this verdict, all Chinese children who have at least one parent in Hong Kong are allowed to come to Hong Kong. In order to make clear that this involves a large group, the writer adds that this even applies to extramarital children and to children whose father has died. To defend the standpoint that the investors on Westerdokseiland do not consider the beauty of the area and the people who still live there, the author in (47) brings forward that the development company has started to evict occupants in order to be able to demolish the buildings, even though there are still all kinds of legal procedures running to protect the buildings and the surrounding area. To top that, he adds, the zoning scheme has not been approved of yet. The writer of (48) mentions a number of advantages of smoking.

Besides expressions that mark an added argument as secondary or, on the contrary, more weighty, there are expressions that only make clear that another argument is added to the arguments that have been brought forward. Examples are 'as well as' and 'besides'. According to *Collins*, 'if you refer to a second thing as well as a first thing, you refer to the second thing in addition to the first'. 'Besides' means, according to this dictionary, 'in addition to the object, situation, activity, etc that is mentioned'.

The following expressions can be used to add an argument to an argument that was mentioned before in order to indicate cumulatively coordinative argumentation:

(But) this is only part of the reason
On top of that
(And) also
Besides
In addition to this

Together with
Plus
Moreover
And what is more
As well as

These expressions are used in the following texts:

(49) In our current affluent society physical efforts and exercise are banished more and more from our daily activities. *In addition to this*, our food culture (fast food) gets worse all the time. So, sports are becoming more important every day!

(*Youth plan Flanders Football Fields*)

(50) There is no work for the Albanians in the Presevo valley. That is one of the consequences of the 'discriminating methods the Serbians use to oust the Albanians', says Galib Beciri, the mayor of Trnovac. [...] 'We are not allowed to work or to receive education in our own language. *On top of that*, was, and still is, the maltreatment by the police. We have no rights at all'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 22 December 2000)

(51) Triple P received this award, among other things, for obtaining important certifications such as the Silver Partner Certification and the Advanced Security Partner Certification in a very short period of time. *Moreover*, the high level of knowledge of Triple P of Cisco Systems products carried weight, *as well as* the loyalty Triple P radiates to both Cisco Systems and Triple P – Cisco end users.

(*Cisco Netherlands* – Press)

(52) Marriage is the cornerstone of society. That is how my course in family law started, at the time competently taught by Willy Delva. If Delva was right, Western society must be nearly collapsing. Besides the enormous percentage of failure in marriage practice [...], attempts are made to knock marriage of its pedestal as a moral and legal model.

(*Column Boudewijn Bouckaert, Nova Civitas Texts*)

The writer of (49) defends the standpoint that sports play a more significant part in the current society because we exercise less and less. In addition to this, our food culture is deteriorating, according to the writer. Galib Beciri mentions in (50) some examples to show that the Albanians in the Presevo valley have no rights at all. In (51), a reasonable case is made for the idea that Triple P has deserved the award in question: Triple P has obtained important certifications, has a high level of knowledge, and has shown loyalty towards Cisco Systems as well as the end users. Boudewijn Bouckaert thinks in (52) that Western civilisation is near to collapse, if one chooses to consider marriage the cornerstone of society: the percentage of failure of marriages is enormous and, in addition, one tries to knock marriage from its pedestal as a moral and legal model.

7.2.7 Non-univocal indications for complementary coordinative argumentation

In an implicit discussion, complementary coordinative argumentation is put forward by the protagonist if he anticipates an objection that possibly criticises the supporting force of one of his arguments. In anticipation of this criticism, the protagonist adds another argument by means of which he parries the criticism.

A clue for complementary coordinative argumentation is, for example, the word 'while', when this is used to introduce an argument that follows another argument. 'While' can be used, according to *Collins*, to indicate a contrast: 'You also use while at the beginning of a clause when you mention something in the clause that contrasts with what you mention in the other part of the sentence'.

In cases in which 'while' constitutes a clue for complementary coordinative argumentation there is a contrast between the expectations, assumptions or remarks of a potential critic and the state of affairs as it really is, according to the protagonist. For this reason, 'while' can be a clue that the speaker is trying to refute a possible objection to one of his arguments. For instance, in (53), van Agt defends his standpoint that the conduct of the makers of the NPS documentary is 'infamous' by adducing the argument that he had not been asked to comment on the accusations that were directed at him in the documentary. A critic could object that perhaps at that time the makers of the documentary did not possess the material these accusations resulted from. Van Agt is ahead of this critic by adding to his argument that the makers had the material when they came to interview him.

(53) [Van Agt about the negative way in which he is portrayed in the NPS documentary about the Moluccan train hijack] 'I have not been asked to comment on these accusatory statements. *While* the makers had the material when they came to interview me. […] I consider that infamous once more'.

(*de Volkskrant*, 18 November 2000)

In (54)–(56), the writers defend a particular judgement or a particular qualification. To make a reasonable case that this judgement or qualification is appropriate, the speaker needs to allow for criticism of the type, 'but does the argument that is brought forward justify this qualification?' If the situation or event mentioned in the argument is always the case or very common, then the opinion that something very special (either negative or positive) is the case cannot be justified.

For example, in (54), a soccer player defends the standpoint that the period that lies behind can be regarded as a dull time. His argument is that he played in Ajax 2 for four seasons. Anticipating the critical response 'but isn't that the normal procedure?', he brings forward that normally one only stays in Ajax 2 for two years. The writer of (55) defends the standpoint that all pizza deliverers who were asked to deliver a pizza as part of a test deserve a pat on the back. The argument is that all pizzas arrived at the given address. An objection could be 'but isn't that what you would expect when you want a pizza delivered?' The writer does not think so, because the test address was not so easy to find. Jules

Vereecken in (56) deserves a compliment because he did not keep Bernadette waiting on their wedding day. Here an obvious response could be 'but isn't that to be expected?' The author of the article makes clear that in this case it is not, because Vereecken is a notorious late arrival.

(54) Of course, it was a dull time. I played for four seasons in Ajax 2, *while* normally you don't stay there for more than two years.
(www.ajax.nl/wedstrijden/ptt/98/ajaxcambuur)

(55) In spite of this, we want to give all deliverers a pat on the back, because all pizzas were delivered. *And that while* our test address was *not even* easy to find.
(www.trajectum.hvu.nl/service_pizzatest.html)

(56) Did you know that Vereecken deserves a compliment because he did not keep Bernadette waiting on their wedding day, *while as a rule* he is always late for rehearsals?
(*Het Weldoenertje*: 2nd edition 1998)

In addition to the indicator 'while', (54)–(56) include some other indications for complementary coordinative argumentation: 'normally' and 'as a rule' make clear that the situation in question differs from how things usually are, or how they go in other cases. 'Even' in the expression 'not even' can be used 'to emphasise something surprising or extreme', according to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989). Expressions such as 'whereas' and 'and yet' can also be used by the protagonist to signal a contrast between the expectations or criticisms of a potential opponent and the way things are in reality, according to the protagonist. These expressions are used in the following examples:

(57) I wrote a letter to the administrative council, saying I can't tell you how much I appreciate the stipend. It has allowed me to dedicate so much of my time to SG, *whereas otherwise* I would have worked a campus job to pay the bills.
(www.studentleader.com/sal_r.htm).

(58) Texel is our most beautiful island. Nearby, easy to reach *and yet* so very different.
(www.natuurmaandtexel.nl/)

In example (57), a student defends the standpoint that the stipend has been a great help because it has allowed the student to dedicate a lot of time to student government. A critical opponent might wonder, 'but couldn't you have devoted that time to student government even without the stipend?' The arguer makes clear that this criticism does not hold, since otherwise he or she would have had to take a campus job to pay the bills and that would have interfered with his or her involvement in extracurricular activities. The writer of (58) defends the (implicit) standpoint that 'our most beautiful island' of Texel is well worth a visit, because it is nearby and easy to reach. The reader might object that the island might be very similar to the place where he lives, in other words that going to Texel is far from

adventurous. But the writer has foreseen this criticism: although Texel is nearby, it is still 'so very different'.

When the argumentation supports the standpoint that a particular action is recommended or necessary (as in the case of pragmatic argumentation), the protagonist can use a number of specific expressions to make clear that he anticipates a particular objection to one of his arguments and that he tries to refute that objection. An obvious objection in the case of argumentation that defends the desirability of a particular course of action is, 'but isn't it possible to follow an alternative course of action?' By using expressions like 'X was not an option' or 'X was impossible' when introducing the second (third, etc.) argument, it can be made clear that such alternatives were inappropriate. These clues for complementary argumentation occur in (59) and (60):

(59) 'My consideration to come to Utrecht: I did not want to stay in Twente, where I come from […]. Groningen was *not an option* because everybody from Twente goes to Groningen […]. So, the choice was Utrecht'.
(*U-blad*)

(60) After her first child, Lansink put her job as well as her study on halt. 'I was working four days a week as a coordinator in a day-care centre. I couldn't combine that with housekeeping and collecting my children'. She considered it *impossible* to do her job in part-time. 'If you want to do the job right, you need to be there at least four days a week'.
(www.trouw.nl/artikelverdieping/1000225970084.html)

The student in (59) is defending his choice to study in Utrecht: he did not want to stay in Twente where he came from. Subsequently, he makes it clear that the obvious choice, to go to Groningen, is out of the question as well, because everybody in Twente goes there. The two main arguments ('I did not want to stay in Twente' and 'Groningen was not an option') together constitute complementary coordinative argumentation for the standpoint that Utrecht is the best choice. In (60), Lansink defends the (implicit) standpoint that she was forced to quit her job. She could not combine her job of four days a week with housekeeping and collecting her children, while the alternative, working part-time, was unsuitable, according to her, because you can only do the job of a coordinator well if you work at least four days a week. The arguments 'it was impossible to combine a job of four days a week with my other activities' and 'I could not work part-time' together make up a complementary coordinative argumentation for Lansink's standpoint that she was forced to stop working.

Below the various types of indicators of complementary coordinative argumentation are listed:

while
while normally/otherwise/as a rule
whereas
whereas normally/otherwise/as a rule
not even

and yet
X was not an option/was impossible

7.3 CLUES FOR THE ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURE IN CRITICISM PASSED ON ARGUMENTS

In explicit discussions, the dialectical progress of the discussion can be determined step by step. Starting from the dialectical profile for argumentative responses to criticism presented in section 7.1, it can be determined which structure can best be ascribed to the protagonist's argumentative speech or text. Both expressions by means of which the antagonist introduces his or her criticism and expressions used by the protagonist in response to the criticism can serve as clues for the organisation of the protagonist's arguments. We shall make this clear on the basis of a number of examples.

In (61), the second speaker defends the standpoint that it is a bad idea to send for doctor Emfoist. He considers Emfoist a shady person. To support this (sub) standpoint, the protagonist first brings forward that Emfoist has a devilish scar on his face. The antagonist agrees, but is of the opinion that this has nothing to do with the doctor's abilities. Subsequently, the antagonist tries a different approach ('anyway'): he thinks it is best to send for the doctor, because he will certainly have time as he 'doctors' night and day. This response shows that the protagonist's first argument has not convinced him. The protagonist then adds another argument to his defence of the standpoint ('another thing I don't trust'):

(61) Have you sent for doctor Emfoist yet? He seems to do a good job. The children of the landlord, old Jean, they are almost ready to go to work again'. 'Do you think I'm mad? Have you seen his face? The devil's work if you ask me'.
'Its true that scar is strange. It looks as if it has been cut there. On purpose. But that says nothing about his abilities, does it? […] Anyway, you really should call him. He doctors night and day, so he will have time for you'.
'Exactly! Yet another thing I don't trust. Doesn't the man ever sleep? How can anyone keep that up? We all have to sleep, don't we?'
(www.cultuurnet.nl/persberichten/juni/)

The two arguments for the standpoint that Emfoist cannot be trusted (he has a devilish scar on his face and he never sleeps) together make up *cumulatively coordinative argumentation*. The speaker adds a second sign of untrustworthiness to his first when it turns out that his opponent does not consider this argument convincing enough.

The argumentation in (62) is a case of *complementary coordinative* argumentation. Helen is against the ban on smoking inside because smoking outside is cold and less sociable. To support the fact that smoking outside is less sociable, she puts forward that the students who smoke will have to separate themselves from the other students when they are no longer allowed to smoke indoors. Jessica does

not consider this argument convincing and brings forward a specific objection: 'But now the two of you are also sitting at a separate table, aren't you?' Helen parries this counter-argument by saying that it is still sociable to smoke at a separate table because you can be with the other students whenever you like:

(62) Jessica van Rijswijk and Helen Visser, both first-year students. Jessica (non-smoking): 'It's really over the top, that smoking ban. How are they planning to keep a check on that? You don't think that teachers are going to supervise it?' Helen (smokes a packet of Marlboro light a day): 'Really wrong, that rule. I just want to go on smoking inside. It means I'll have to smoke outside and I don't feel like that at all; it is cold and less sociable. We two will have to smoke outside while the others stay indoors'. Jessica: 'But now the two of you are also sitting at a separate table, aren't you?'

'Yes, but that's different, you can be with the others whenever you like'.

(Haagse Hogeschool, *Nieuws en agenda*, 15 October 1999)

The complete argumentation for the standpoint that smoking outside is less sociable runs as follows: if you have to smoke outside, you and a few others will have to separate yourself from the other students, while if you are allowed to sit inside at a separate table you can be with the others whenever you like. Because this argumentation consists of a combination of an argument and a refutation of a specific objection against that argument, the argumentation is complementary coordinative.

In the following example, a woman defends the standpoint that it is better to break off the relationship with her (married) friend. Her argument is that her friend never shows that he is thinking of her. The friend tries to contest this argument by bringing forward that he does indeed often think of her, and always tells her so. Initially, the woman seems to accept this counter-argument ('Yes, that's true'), but then she makes another defence attempt: she cannot take it anymore that she always has to wait until she sees him again:

(63) 'I still think that I'm expected to make do with very little'. […] 'You never send me a card or give me flowers on my birthday. Or on holidays, for that matter. And that's what I would enjoy the most. To know that you are thinking of me once in a while'.

'Darling, I think of you all the time. How often does one actually think of someone? That is hard to measure. But I do know that I think about you often'.

'I'd really like to see that now and then'.

'You are such an insecure little woman. I always have to prove to you that I love you. Don't I say so every time we meet?'

'Yes, that's true'.

'Exactly!'

'Still, I think it would be better if we stop seeing each other. I can't take it anymore. Always having to wait until the next time …'

(www.schrijven.org/liefde, Eva Verbeek, Harderwijk)

The woman's argumentation is multiple: she makes no attempt to defend her first argument against the attack by the man, but, in spite of this, she does not want to give up her standpoint and brings forward a new defence attempt.

7.4 SOME COMPLICATIONS

In this chapter we have discussed a number of clues that, more or less clearly, indicate the different types of complex argumentation. With the exception of very explicit cases, the indicators never provide certainty about the structure of the argumentation.

A first complication is that some expressions have more than one meaning, one of which seems to point to a coordinative reading of the argument and another to a multiple reading. A good example is *besides*, which, according to *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), is similar in meaning to 'in addition' and 'as well', and therefore seems to be most suitable to indicate a coordinative argument. But the dictionary also says that it can be used to introduce a further consideration 'as an additional or further matter'. In the case of a further matter, a multiple reading of the argument introduced by this indicator seems to be more appropriate.

In the second place, in some cases clues in the introduction of the arguments can be overruled by the clues in the standpoint. If the standpoint makes clear that more arguments are needed for a conclusive defence, as in (64) and (65), the arguments must be analysed as coordinative, in spite of the fact that indicators of multiple argumentation occur in the argumentative text:

(64) Many persons wonder at my devoting so much time and labor to completing a Burdick Genealogy. However, I see many important objects to be gained by this publication for the benefit of the public. *In the first place*, it enables many thousand persons to trace their ancestors back for three centuries, and to many, this is a source of rational satisfaction. *In the second place*, it enables many persons from the older states to receive information respecting relatives who long ago wandered off to the Far West, and had been sought in vain. *In the third place*, it is probable that cases arise hereafter in which this book may prove to be worth a thousand times more than its cost, from the assistance it will render in tracing relationship which may secure the inheritance of estates (www.burdickfamily.org/book.html).

(65) A new strain of potato is *only then* successful, when it meets a number of criteria. *Firstly*, the strain has to have excellent characteristics that make it suitable for the production of French fries or other potato specialities. *At least as important* is whether or not the new strain behaves 'farmer friendly': important is a good yield with a nice coarseness, a sufficient starch content, a fine baking colour and a consistent quality. *Also* the storage properties matter greatly to make a strain succeed in the end. *Only when a strain scores well on all these points*, it has the potency to find a place on the market.

(Korteweg B.V. Swifterbant)

That there are many important objects to be gained for the benefit of the public by the publication of the Burdick Genealogy (64) cannot be made clear by mentioning just one such object. Therefore, despite the indicators of multiple argumentation *In the first place*, *In the second place* and *In the third place*, the argumentation must be analysed as coordinative. The same goes for the argumentation in (65)

for the standpoint that a new potato strain can only be successful if it scores well on a number of points.

In this chapter, we only paid attention to indications for the argumentation structure that occur in the argumentation itself, but as appears from the texts above, there are also clues to be found in the propositional contents of the standpoint, particularly in the quantifying expressions that may occur in it (Snoeck Henkemans 1992: 103–127). For this reason, the nature of the standpoint should always be considered in the analysis of the argumentation structure.

CHAPTER 8

INDICATORS OF THE CONCLUSION OF A DISCUSSION

8.1 ESTABLISHING THE RESULT OF THE DISCUSSION

In the concluding stage of a critical discussion the parties have to establish the result of the discussion. This implies that, together, they need to determine whether the protagonist has conclusively defended his initial standpoint or the antagonist has successfully attacked that standpoint. The purpose of this is to be able to decide who has the right to maintain his initial position at the end of the discussion and who has to retract his initial position.

In this chapter, we shall first consider which moves are needed – viewed dialectically – to establish the result of the discussion and represent these moves in a dialectical core profile. This core profile will then be used to identify the words and expressions that play a part in the realisation of the various types of discussion results.

8.2 DIALECTICAL PROFILE OF HOW THE RESULT OF THE DISCUSSION IS ESTABLISHED

The concluding stage of a discussion that is conducted to resolve a single non-mixed dispute on the merits starts in the ideal model represented in *Speech acts in argumentative discussions* (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984: 99–100) with a move by which the protagonist either maintains his standpoint or withdraws it. Next, it is the antagonist's turn. In the case in which his moves mirror the moves of the protagonist, the antagonist either withdraws his initial doubt about the protagonist's standpoint or maintains his doubt. After they have made these concluding moves, the parties jointly decide to end the discussion and to establish whether the dispute has been resolved (which is only the case if the protagonist's and the antagonist's moves – in contraposition – lead to a consonant result). If the dispute is resolved, they establish in favour of which party it has been resolved. It is also possible that both parties give up their initial positions. In that case, the dispute is not resolved, but it is not really unresolved either: the dispute simply ceases to exist. Finally, there is also the possibility that, at the end of the discussion, both parties decide to start a new discussion, which can relate to the same dispute, but also to a dispute that is a little different, or even very different.[84]

[84] Of course, discussants can also decide to do something completely different (together or separately) – like going on a hiking trip to Trawsfynydd, for example – but such decisions are outside the scope of the concluding stage of a critical discussion.

The moves we described refer to the concluding stage of a discussion that concerns a single non-mixed dispute. In principle, these moves are similar to the moves that must be made in the concluding stage of discussions aimed at resolving a multiple non-mixed dispute, a single mixed dispute, or a (quantitatively or qualitatively) multiple mixed dispute. This is because all these types of disputes can, and must, be analysed as a combination of single non-mixed disputes.[85]

Although the description of the moves in the concluding stage of the ideal model of a critical discussion given in *Speech acts in argumentative discussions* assumes that the protagonist is the first to make a move, one can also imagine that the antagonist could initiate this stage. In the model of a critical discussion, the first move in the concluding stage of an argumentative exchange about a single non-mixed dispute consists of maintaining or withdrawing a position. In principle, this can be either the protagonist's standpoint or the antagonist's doubt. As a rule, this move will not 'come out of the blue'. After all, the move constitutes a concluding 'follow-up' of the discussion conducted in the argumentation stage. We assume that the argumentation stage is 'finished' when either the antagonist does not voice any new criticism after the last (single or coordinative) argument brought forward by the protagonist, or when the protagonist does not bring forward any new arguments after the last criticism of the antagonist. The next move that could then be made by either party that made this last move, and in both cases as a first move in the concluding stage of the discussion, is to conclude that the discussion is decided to that party's advantage, because a response to his last move in the argumentation stage is not forthcoming. In the case of the antagonist, this move would entail that he concludes when new argumentation is not forthcoming that he is allowed to maintain his doubt. In the case of the protagonist, this move would entail that he concludes that he is entitled to maintain his standpoint because there is no criticism forthcoming.

In the 'follow-up' in the concluding stage of the discussion of the ending of the argumentation stage that we outlined above we assumed that one party makes a move in the concluding stage because a move that the other party might have made at that point of the argumentation stage is not forthcoming. In that case, the move that opens the concluding stage always implies that the party initiating the concluding stage *maintains* his initial position. Of course, it is also quite possible that the party who cannot think of a new move in the argumentation stage concludes that he has lost the discussion and initiates the concluding stage himself *by withdrawing his initial position*. The protagonist can do this when a new (subordinative or coordinative) argumentation is expected of him but he does not have one at his disposal. The antagonist can do this when he cannot think of a new critical response to the argument brought forward by the protagonist.

The other party's responses to the moves initiating the concluding stage mentioned above may, of course, vary. It is possible that the responses 'tally' in the sense that the antagonist withdraws his doubt if the protagonist maintains his

[85] Of course, complications may occur in real discussions about more complex differences of opinion if the participants do *not* proceed to the theoretically required dissection of their more complex dispute into simple disputes or, conversely, treat a simple dispute as a complex dispute, which may lead to such non-legitimate moves as the *argumentum ad ignorantiam*.

standpoint or vice versa. As indicated before, however, it is also possible that the responses 'clash' in the sense that the protagonist maintains his standpoint while the antagonist also maintains his doubt. In the latter case, the dispute is not resolved in a reasonable way. In such a case, it must be established in a new discussion, which may be a sub-discussion or – in Krabbe's (2003) terms – a 'meta-dialogue', which of the two parties is responsible for the failure of the resolution process. It extends the scope of this study to concern ourselves with the moves that can be made in this 'meta-dialogue', and with the moves that could follow if both parties withdrew their initial positions, so that the dispute is not resolved but simply ceases to exist.

The moves the discussants can make in the concluding stage of a discussion occasioned by a single non-mixed dispute are represented in Figure 8.1. In Figure 8.1, we assume that the protagonist's initial standpoint was a positive one. 'M' means here 'I maintain', 'W' means 'I withdraw', and 'wins' means 'suggests to consider the dispute resolved in his favour'.

This core profile applies to dialectically sanctioned deliberations with regard to establishing the result of the discussion occasioned by a single non-mixed dispute. Because in a pragma-dialectical analysis all complex disputes are dealt with by breaking the more complex dispute down into basic disputes of the single non-mixed type, establishing the result of a discussion on the occasion of a single mixed dispute, a multiple non-mixed dispute, or a – quantitatively or qualitatively – multiple dispute occurs in the same way. A clear consequence of this analysis is, for instance, that it conveys well that in a mixed dispute it may occur that *both* parties are entitled to maintain their standpoint at the end of the discussion. While classical logic does not allow two opposite statements to be true (or untrue) at the same time, viewed *dialectically*, it is quite possible for two opposite standpoints to be tenable (or untenable) on the basis of the discussion that has been conducted. This becomes visible exactly because the discussion is analytically broken down into two discussions resulting from a non-mixed dispute. Often that outcome of the discussion will only be an intermediate stage in the decision process or the process of knowledge acquisition as part of which the discussion takes place. To give a very common example: if two friends are discussing going on holiday or



FIGURE 8.1 Dialectical core profile for establishing the result of the discussion about a single non-mixed dispute

not, one of them may advance the conclusive argument that there is no money for a holiday of any kind, while the other friend could conclusively defend the opposite standpoint, for instance, by pointing out that it is a psychological necessity for both of them to get away from it all in whatever way. The standpoint of both friends can be tenable in a particular stage of the discussion, even though, in the end, they will still have to decide whether they go on holiday or not.

8.3 THE PROTAGONIST MAINTAINS OR WITHDRAWS HIS STANDPOINT

A first move that can start the concluding stage is that of one of the parties drawing the conclusion that he is allowed to maintain his position. Whether this move is made can become clear from expressions that introduce a conclusion, such as:

– so
– thus
– hence
– therefore
– consequently
– in short

In example (1), Ewald Netten uses the expression 'therefore' to indicate that he thinks he has conclusively defended his standpoint:

(1) Though, in retrospect, I can say that I learned a lot at the ANLS, I found that I sometimes lacked the time to let the subject matter really sink in. That has to do with the fact that it is a one-year training. Because quite a lot of material must be discussed in a short period of time, some subjects are discussed too hastily. I am *therefore* of the opinion that the programme should be extended by six months.
(Ewald Netten, www.anls.nl/ST_01.htm – 48k – 9 July 2005)

It could be true that the people he is addressing are of the same opinion, but, of course, this does not have to be the case.

If the first move originates from an antagonist who thinks that he is allowed to maintain his doubt about the other party's standpoint, it is possible that the protagonist maintains his standpoint, in spite of the antagonist's criticism. The most explicit clue that a protagonist maintains a standpoint, in spite of criticism, in the concluding stage of the discussion is his use of the performative expression 'I maintain that'. According to Fraser (1975: 191, n. 4), a speaker who uses this expression suggests that he previously made the same assertion to the same listener. This implies that a speaker who introduces an assertive with 'I maintain that' asserts something for the second time, which should, in fact, be unnecessary. If we take it that he nevertheless adheres to the *Cooperative Principle*, we have to assume that he is implicating something by his utterance. Since it is beside the point to make the same assertion twice to the same listener, unless the listener did not

accept the asserted proposition the first time, and since it is clear that the speaker still holds the opinion that this needs to happen, we may presume that the speaker who introduces an assertive with 'I maintain that' implicates that the listener did not accept the assertion before, but should, in fact, accept it. On the basis of this implicature, we may assume that a speaker who introduces an assertive with this performative expression is maintaining a standpoint.

Other examples of expressions the protagonist can use to indicate that he is maintaining his standpoint are:

– I stand by my opinion/standpoint/point of view that
– I stick to my opinion/standpoint/point of view that
– I contend that

In (2)–(4), some of these expressions are used to maintain a standpoint, in spite of criticism:

(2) On Friday, Kok also alluded to possible corruption among Antillean customs officers. Rosenda is of the opinion that the Dutch 'should refrain from all kinds of remarks concerning the inadequate checking of Antillean passengers who fly to the Netherlands'. […] Rosenda: '*I maintain that* our customs and police are thorough in keeping an eye on the passengers. If there is a flight from Colombia, our dogs are ready to sniff the travellers and their luggage. They have a good nose, just like our customs officers, by the way. I know that the number of drug runners has diminished, partly due to the deterring effect of that check'.

(*NRC Handelsblad*, 16 January 2002)

(3) *I contend that* the controversy with the Bush government has had a stimulating rather than a demoralising effect on both the military and the non-military European increase of power.

(Prof. dr. Heinrich Vogel, Duitsland Instituut Amsterdam; www.duitslandin stituut.nl/ Onderzoek/ Onderzoeksprojecten/ Prof._dr._Heinrich_Vogel.html)

(4) As far as the involvement of Gates and Microsoft in making the PC useful is concerned, he can't take credit for that either – at least, not in a technical sense. Gates is very good at selling it all, but the technical know-how came from the Xerox PARC group and later from Apple. For that reason, Douglas Engelbart has been included in the list [of computer pioneers]. In short, *I stand by my standpoint* – Gates does not have the technical merits to be added to the list. […] Being good at selling software and raking it in does not make you a pioneer.

(nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overleg:Computer)

The use of 'still' can also indicate that the speaker is maintaining a standpoint, especially if this adverb is used in combination with an indication for a propositional attitude, such as 'I believe that' and 'I think that', in which 'that' refers back to what

was asserted before. For instance, if the speaker argues for his claim that women are better drivers than men, and, provoked by a critical response to his arguments from the listener, says 'I still think that', then he is signalling that he took up a standpoint and is maintaining it.

– I still think that
– I'm still right
– I still stand by/stick to my opinion that
– I still insist/maintain that

(5) There was a tiny piece in *De Telegraaf* that mentioned a new ANWB service. When you type in your postal code, you get a list with cheap filling stations in your neighbourhood. A useful, money-saving tip. But you have to watch out, according to the piece, because for a town like Purmerend you are presented with alternatives you would not even be able to reach without a car. All the kilometres you would have to drive in order to fill up outweighed the difference in price. I think *De Telegraaf* is overlooking something! It is time for further research. [...] *I still insist that De Telegraaf* has made a logical error. Some filling stations are far away, they are right about that. But is that a problem? Apparently, they assume that you want to fill up as close to your home as possible. But we are talking about car owners, aren't we? Guess why they have a car! Yes, right, to drive it, not to leave it in the garage. And in whatever direction you go, you will always come across one of these cheaper filling stations. Even if you live in Purmerend.
(www.examedia.nl/columnx/print.html?nummer = 553)

(6) If the Vatican would just straight out endorse the use of condoms, then probably less people would actually have AIDS. *But I still think that* the Vatican has every right not to do so. Since the Vatican is of the opinion that intercourse between a man and a woman is something special, and that they should be monogamous, and that sex is meant for reproduction and not for pleasure. Condoms do not fit in the way of life a good catholic is supposed to have.
(www.20six.nl/rcstm/archive/2005/04/06/ 1h9blk8evl40.htm *RCSTM*, 6 April 2005)

Of course, the protagonist can also withdraw his standpoint, either in response to the fact that the antagonist maintains his doubt, or because he concludes himself that he has lost the discussion in view of the fact that he does not know what to say against the antagonist's criticism. Expressions used by the protagonist to make clear that he allows the other one to maintain his position and that he simultaneously reconsiders his own position are, for example:

– If that is the case, then
– If that is true, (then) you are right/I agree
– Then that is indeed the case

These expressions make clear that the protagonist is prepared to attach consequences to the fact that something that speaks against his position turns out to be the case.[86] Apparently, a particular point of the antagonist's criticism is also considered decisive by the protagonist. In (7) and (8), some of these expressions are used:

(7) [*Difference of opinion about the question of whether somebody who takes care of a (A's) horse and is allowed to ride it as well can be asked to pay 60 euros per month as a compensation. A thinks this acceptable. B initially disputes this.*]
A: I think 60 euro is quite reasonable, if you consider that the horse costs me about 180 a month anyway.
B: Boy! That's an expensive hobby … *Well, if that's the case, then you should indeed* ask money for it.
(roz.zinngeld.nl/viewtopic.php?t = 415&view = next)

(8) A: It simply goes against the Bible. The Bible even warns against it. Paul is very clear about this. […]
B: *If that is true, then I agree* and we should run a campaign at evangelical congregations where people are moved by the Spirit (the wrong spirit that is).
(forum.eo.nl/mmbob/thread.jsp?forumid = 5774833& postareaid = 5787130&postthreadid = 6092456&page = 4)

8.4 THE ANTAGONIST MAINTAINS OR WITHDRAWS HIS DOUBT

In response to the protagonist maintaining his standpoint, the antagonist may refuse to give in. In that case, we have a 'non-according' response.

Examples of expressions that can be used to maintain doubt about a standpoint are:

– I still disagree with you there
– I still do not agree
– You have not convinced me (yet)

These indicators are used in passages (9)–(11):

(9) The vet phoned me again in the afternoon to ask me how Bambi was […]. He explained once more why she wasn't allowed to run free until the stitches were out, but, being pigheaded, *I still disagree with him there and I stick to my decision* to let Bambi out for a while tonight.
(www.homepages.hetnet.nl /~tschrijfster/sterilisatie.html)

[86] It will be clear that these indicators presuppose that not only critical questions have been levelled against the protagonist's argumentation, but that a sub-discussion has evolved in which counter-arguments have been advanced by the other party.

(10) According to the Board, the outdoor café boat in Voorstraat is permitted, because the people in the neighbourhood support it sufficiently and because it serves the common economic interest. Entrepreneurs and neighbours *did not agree with it and still do not agree with it*.
(www.vvddelft.nl/?credo = 120)

(11) No, Wendi, *you have not convinced me yet*. I think I'll come with some additional criticism.
(www.faq-online.nl/index.php?name = PNphpBB2& file = viewtopic& t = 6692&start = 120–127k)

In (11), the antagonist signals that he is not convinced by Wendi's argumentation. That is why he announces that he will continue to criticise her position and try to make Wendi withdraw her standpoint.

Of course, in his turn, the antagonist can also choose to put aside his doubt. He can explicitly indicate that he does so by using an expression like 'I give up'. But he can also implicitly show that he withdraws his doubt by making clear that he has no further criticism ready or, at least, no criticism that is convincing enough ('I'm no match for these strong arguments'.). Below a few of these expressions are listed:

– I have nothing to say against this/that
– I am no match for these strong arguments
– I give up

In (12), Mr Vogel tries to convince someone that it is sometimes preferable to respond to aggression with another act of aggression. Initially, the antagonist does not see the good of this at all, but eventually he is convinced by Mr Vogel's argumentation. In (13), two expressions are used that indicate that doubt is cast aside.

(12) Mr Vogel gave me two options, while I was talking to him outside:
– Someone would give me a hard blow to the head and I would not do anything in response.
– Someone would give me a hard blow to the head and I would hit him back equally hard. I chose the first option. He asked me why. I did not really know. It just seemed so wrong to hit someone. I also said to him: 'If I hit back, I'm not one jot better that the person who hit me'. His answer set me thinking: 'But you didn't start it. You gave him in return what he gave you. You didn't ask for it. Aggression and bullying must be fought by aggression, or it won't stop, and you know that'. *I had nothing to say against that*.
(www.tegenpesten.nl/index.php?onderwerp = wingchun2)

(13) *I'm no match for such strong arguments, I give up*.
(www.tbforum.nl/thread/49865.html)

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