

- CME 241 Notes: OB Dynamics and Market Making
 - People who submit limit orders provide liquidity
 - People who submit market orders are liquidity takers
 - Market Makers = Dealers = Always willing priors they will buy and sell at.
 - ↳ Always show bid and ask at any point in time
 - ↳ Market makers need to constantly adjust prices and # of shares they are willing to buy and sell.
 - ↳ This is a stochastic control problem
 - Today, consider single market maker trying to buy at bid and sell at ask and take home profit = spread
 - Goal: Maximize Utility of gains
 - ↳ Assume a finite horizon T
 - ↳ If Buy/Sell limit orders too narrow = more frequent but small gains
 - ↳ If Spread is wide, less frequent transactions, but larger gains
 - ↳ Market Maker also needs to manage potentially unfavorable inventory buildup and consequent unfavorable liquidation
 - ↑ Lowering price to balance inventory
 - ↳ You can have negative or positive inventories, and your price changes accordingly
 - ↳ We will consider simplified setup with single bid/ask price
- Finite time steps: $t=0, 1, \dots, T$
- $W_t \in \mathbb{R}$ = Cash
- $I_t \in \mathbb{Z}$ = Inventory

$s_t \in \mathbb{R}^+$ is the order book Mid Price at t

↳ Average of bid and ask price in market

$p_t^{(b)} \in \mathbb{R}^+$: Market Maker bid price (limit order)

$n_t^{(b)} \in \mathbb{Z}^+$: # of shares willing to buy

Submit $p_t^{(b)}, n_t^{(b)}, p_t^{(a)}, n_t^{(a)}$

Assume market maker can add or remove bids/asks costlessly at t

Denote $\delta_t^{(b)} = s_t - p_t^{(b)}$; $\delta_t^{(a)} = p_t^{(a)} - s_t$

$x_t^{(b)} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ denotes bid-share "hit" up to (accumulated) time t

$x_t^{(a)} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ denotes ask-share "lifted" up to time t

∴ "Material" Balance:

$$w_{t+1} = w_t + p_t^{(b)} \underbrace{(x_{t+1}^{(b)} - x_t^{(b)})}_{\text{lifted}} - p_t^{(a)} (x_{t+1}^{(a)} - x_t^{(a)})$$

$$I_t = x_t^{(b)} - x_t^{(a)}$$

$$I_0 = 0$$

Accumulated
Hits

• Goal is to maximize $\mathbb{E} [U(U_T + I_T S_T)]$ for concave $U(\cdot)$

↳ Liquidation at the midprice (idealistic)

↳ Assumes no consumption in time horizon

↳ U_T, I_T, S_T are random variables!

ii Use expectations

- MDP Activity at $0 \leq t \leq T-1$:

observed share := $(s_t, w_t, i_t) \in S_t$

Actions := $(p_t^{(1)}, n_t^{(1)}, p_t^{(2)}, n_t^{(2)})$

↳ See Feb. 12, slide 23 for remainder of formulation

$\pi_t^{(k)}$ is deterministic

↳ Assume $T=1$, but it does not matter because reward is at the end.

- Auctioneta = Stochastic Continuous Time Formulation of previously described MDP

- Observe continuous bids/ offers by Poisson Process

↳ Let $\lambda_t^{(1)}dt, \lambda_t^{(2)}dt$ be mean $dX_t^{(1)}, dX_t^{(2)}$

↳ $\lambda_t^{(1)} = \text{likelihood of bid on submission}$ } Depends on spread
↳ $\lambda_t^{(2)} = \text{likelihood of offer on submission}$ }

↳ Define $f^{(1)}, f^{(2)}$ be decreasing functions of spread γ

- In continuous time, poisson probabilities are essentially Bernoulli

↳ In infinitesimal time, one share or zero shares are transacted

$P(\text{buy or sell} \geq 1 \text{ share}) \approx 0$

↳ Treat $dX_t^{(1)}$ and $dX_t^{(2)}$ as Bernoulli variables over dt

↳ Only focus on $N_t^{(1)}$ and $N_t^{(2)} = 1$, since this is all that can be traded in dt

• Action space reduces to $(\delta_t^{(1)}, \delta_t^{(2)})$
 ↑ Prices, relative to midpoint

→ Assume CARA utility function for $a > 0$

$$\approx U(x) = -e^{-ax} \quad \text{where } a > 0 \text{ is coeff. of risk aversion}$$

• Hamilton - Jacobi - Bellman (HJB) Equation:

Optimal Value Function $V^*(t, s_t, w_t, z_t)$

$$V^*(t, s_t, w_t, z_t) = \max_{\delta_t^{(1)}, \delta_t^{(2)}} \dots \quad (\text{slide 26})$$

↑
Max at $\underline{\underline{t}}$
times t

$$\Rightarrow \max_{\delta_t^{(1)}, \delta_t^{(2)}} \mathbb{E} [V^*] = 0$$

• Change in V^* comprised of 3 components:

- ① Due to movements in time
- ② Due to changes in midprice
- ③ Due to randomness of hits/losses

→ Slide 26 is expansion of ΔV^* due to these factors

→ include $(\delta z_t)^2$ because for stochastic processes

→ Change in V^* due to hitting and hitting affected by 3 possible outcomes

→ Hit \Rightarrow Lower cash and increase inventory by 1

→ Miss \Rightarrow ↑ Cash, inventory down by 1

→ Neither hit nor miss should affect V^*

Slide 27 : Final equation on slide shows changes in value function with hits and misses

↳ Separable max over actions

Slide 28 : Replace λ with $f(\delta)$

Make guess form of V^* based on structure of terminal state

↳ Not based on ability to find guess form

↳ Slide 29 : Job is to solve for θ

↳ Substituting θ into slide 28 PDE

↳ Slide 29

↳ Includes discrete differential of θ due to hit/miss

• Differences in θ due to hit/miss is known as the Indifference Bid and Ask Prices

↳ States optimal value function should not change when buying or selling 1 share

↳ Big concept in economics.

$Q^{(1)}(t, S_t, I_t)$: Indifference bid price : Price to buy 1 share such that optimal VF does not change with guarantee of immediate sale

↳ Substitute $Q^{(1)}$ and $Q^{(0)}$ into equation on slide 29

Slide 32: Set partial derivatives of each max argument equal to zero

↳ Equations 6, 7 are implicit equations for $\delta^{(1)*}$ and $\delta^{(0)*}$ cannot be evaluated analytically

↳ Solving Numerically

Follow instructions on slide 33-34

↳ Assignment is to solve step up to slide 34

- Intrition: Indifference Midprice is an adjustment to s_t (midprice) based on inventory risk

$$\downarrow Q_t^{(m)}$$

↳ Center interval on slide 35 about $Q_t^{(m)}$

$p_t^{(1)*}$ and $p_t^{(2)*}$ move in tandem with $Q_t^{(m)}$

- Slide 36: Make simplifying assumption for $f^{(1)}(s)$ and $f^{(2)}(s)$

↳ Slide 17 apply linear approximation of $e^{\gamma s}$

- Slide 38: Assume θ is an asymptotic expansion and keep only up to quadratic term

↳ Collect terms for I , I^2 and solve separately

- Slide 44: $Q^{(m)}$ carries all influence of inventory I